

## Language of the Ineffable: Poetry and Imageless Thought in Heidegger's Later Philosophy<sup>1</sup>

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**Abstract:** This paper aims to shed light on the characteristics of Heidegger's later thinking on language, which we can illuminate by examining his interpretation of Hölderlin's poetry. Poetic language differs from everyday language, such as statements (*Aussagen*). It speaks of imageless thinking. With the help of *a priori* understanding of its beingness (*Seiendheit*), we routinely state a being (*Seiende*) as something. However, the appearing of a being or an appearing being cannot be determined through a statement of "S is p." An appearing being indeed does exist; however, it disappears once the beingness of a being is given. Hölderlin's "*The Rhine*" is a poem that says the appearing of a being. In this regard, the poem is a language of the ineffable, which cannot be said in ordinary language. Therefore, the interpretation of Hölderlin's poetry presented by Heidegger is an elucidation of a language of the ineffable. It is the task of this paper to uncover this fact.

**Keywords:** Heidegger, Hölderlin, "*The Rhine*," the ineffable

In his later philosophy, Heidegger says that language is "the house of Being."<sup>2</sup> This language is, of course, no other than the language of poetry. By examining the poetic language, we can shed light on the characteristics of Heidegger's thinking on poetry. In contrast to this thinking, analytic philosophy or linguistic philosophy as a reflection on language has usually analyzed ordinary language, including statements (*Aussagen*). In this respect,

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<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Letter on 'Humanism,'" in *Pathmarks*, trans. by Frank A. Capuzzi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 254.

Heidegger's thinking on poetry differs from analytic philosophy. We will examine the implications of that different thinking.

Poetic language, of course, exists as a result of poetizing. According to Heidegger, poetizing is the work of a poet who risks the precinct of being and language.<sup>3</sup> Poetry—the poet's language—as we will see later, is a language that says unrepresentable or imageless thoughts. As a language of imageless thought, poetry paradoxically says the ineffable. Hölderlin's "The Rhine" is a poem that says the ineffable, and thus we will examine Heidegger's interpretation of it.<sup>4</sup>

What is essential is that poetizing is the result of a transformation of the human mode of Being. Heidegger's thinking on poetry likewise is closely related to human change, asking about the meaning of language in our lives. A review of his later thoughts on language, therefore, holds importance as a searching out of a philosophy of language which has a sort of ethical meaning. Let us start our discussion by reviewing that Heidegger's thinking on language has undergone changes and then proceed to illuminate the characteristics of poetic language.

### Heidegger's changing thoughts on language

In "My Way to Phenomenology," Heidegger says that he came to the path of exploring Being through questions that arose while reading Brentano's dissertation "On the manifold meaning of being since Aristotle," and especially studying Husserl's *Logical Investigation*.<sup>5</sup> However, the path became longer than he expected and involved many stops, detours, and

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<sup>3</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Why Poets?," in *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 233.

<sup>4</sup> Scholars have interpreted Heidegger's dialogue with Hölderlin in various ways. For example, some interpretations pay attention to the political implication of this dialogue with different focuses: Grossman interprets Heidegger's dialogue with Hölderlin as imparting a holistic character that does not fit Hölderlin's poetic texts (Andreas Grossman, "The Myth of Poetry: On Heidegger's "Hölderlin,"" in *The Comparatist*, 28 (2004), 34; Young interprets this dialogue as Heidegger's fundamental confrontation with Nazism (Julian Young, "Poets and Rivers: Heidegger on Hölderlin's "Der Ister,"" in *Dialogue*, XXXVIII (1999), 411. Plus, some interpretations emphasize the overcoming of language in Western metaphysics and found the human dwelling in the event of language (Jennifer Anna Gossetti-Ferencei, *Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic Language: Toward a New Poesis of Dasein* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 74; Niall Keane, "The Silence of the Origin: Philosophy in Transition and the Essence of Thinking," in *Research in Phenomenology*, 43 (2013), 45. Of course, there are multiple interpretations that differ in point of view; however, this paper, focusing on Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin's poem, "The Rhine," sheds light on how this poem preserves and presents the truth of Being.

<sup>5</sup> Martin Heidegger, "My Way to Phenomenology," in *On Time and Being*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), 74, 79.

wrong roads along the way.<sup>6</sup> Heidegger's thinking on being likewise changed. In this respect, we should not interpret his so-called turn (*Kehre*) of thought as an absolute disjunction. At the same time, however, we can also see changes in his thought, such as on language. Let us see how Heidegger's thoughts on language changed.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger says that discourse (*Rede*) is the ontological foundation of language.<sup>7</sup> Here, language is "the totality of words,"<sup>8</sup> such as a tool with which we are familiar. In this respect, we cannot regard the language in *Being and Time* as the same language as the house of Being, because the latter is as primordial as the discourse in *Being and Time*. Furthermore, language as the house of Being is even more primordial than discourse because while discourse, with attunement and understanding, constitutes the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, the former is the presentation and preservation of the truth of Being. We will examine the relationship between language as the house of Being and the truth of Being later; we will first focus on the issues regarding discourse and language in *Being and Time*.

It is crucial in *Being and Time* to uncover the ontological structure of discourse through the analytic of Dasein.<sup>9</sup> In this regard, the analytic of Dasein is the key to understanding the ontological structure of discourse and its relationship with language. However, the analytic of Dasein is no longer central to understanding the phenomenon of language in Heidegger's later philosophy. Instead, it is central here that a language that poetizes the truth of Being is one that presents and preserves the truth in poetry. Then what are the characteristics of poetic language? To elucidate this question, we will first examine the features of ordinary language, including statements that, as we already noted, are different from poetic language.

### **The pre-understanding of Being as beingness: the ground of statements**

The ground of a statement made that "S is p" is a pre-understanding of the subject of the statement as well as a pre-understanding of the fact that the subject exists, regardless of whether it is an actual being or just an imaginary being. The pre-understanding of the subject is *a priori* understanding of it as a particular being. In this sense, the pre-understanding

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<sup>6</sup> Heidegger, "My Way to Phenomenology," 79-80.

<sup>7</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 150.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 151.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

is no other than *a priori* understanding of the subject's What-Being (*Wassein*). The pre-understanding that the subject exists is, of course, an understanding that the subject is there in reality or imagination. In this sense, this pre-understanding is an understanding of the That-Being (*Dassein*) of the subject.

Those pre-understandings are pre-ontological understandings, which occur before explicitly raising the question of Being. Implicit pre-ontological understandings of the Being of beings always and already lie in our daily comportment towards beings.<sup>10</sup> Statements about beings, of course, belong to our everyday comportment towards those beings. The pre-ontological *a priori* understanding of the Being of beings occurs before we make statements as well as interpretations about those beings, which are the ground of statements. The problem is that when Being is understood as What-Being and at the same time That-Being, human beings forget Being that is not reduced to What-Being and That-Being or to beingness (*Seiendheit*). As the other name of What-Being and That-Being, beingness is the Being that traditional metaphysics has thought of. Let us examine this issue in more detail.

Heidegger says that "all speaking (*Sprechen*) is speaking about something as something, interpreting it on the basis of something ... hence all speaking possesses, formally, a genus."<sup>11</sup> In this respect, a statement speaking What-Being of beings says of the genus of beings, which is nothing but the categories to which beings belong. So, speaking of the beingness of beings is speaking of "Being, which is phenomenally present in the category."<sup>12</sup> Put differently, speaking of the beingness of beings is speaking of the Being concerning the categories to which beings belong. However, the categories say the most universal thing (*Allgemeinste*) that can be said of beings in saying what the being as a being is.<sup>13</sup>

Conceived by way of thinking from beings and back to beings as their most universal element, beingness results from grasping or comprehending the Being of beings on the guidelines of assertion and judgment.<sup>14</sup> But in this case, Being that is not reduced to beingness cannot be thought of. This issue is deeply related to the problem of metaphysics. This is because, according to Heidegger, metaphysics starts with the fact that Being is summoned into

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<sup>10</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Paris Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 17.

<sup>11</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 171.

<sup>12</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, trans. by Andrew Mitchell and François Raffoul (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012), 67.

<sup>13</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche Vol. IV: Nihilism*, trans. by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 41.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

categories and becomes the *a priori*.<sup>15</sup> However, it also means that traditional metaphysics, conversely, did not think of the Being that is not reduced to beingness.

The late Heidegger's task of thinking is to think of Being that is not reduced to beingness. More specifically, this task is to think of the unconcealment or the truth of Being, which is not reduced to Being as beingness. It is the truth of being that traditional metaphysics had not thought of, and the task of thinking in Heidegger's later philosophy has a motive of non-metaphysical thought likewise. His unusual terminology regarding Being, such as *Beyng*, is a way to think of the Being or the truth of Being, which is not reduced to beingness.

### Poetry as a non-metaphysical language

Parallel to the thinking on the truth of Being, Heidegger goes on to think of another language speaking the truth of Being. By extension, he criticizes traditional metaphysics, focusing on the problem of language, saying that human beings, taking language only as a possession, have language within Being that has been stamped metaphysically.<sup>16</sup> This is because when Being is metaphysically imprinted or understood as beingness, human beings use language as a handle for representation of and comportment towards beings.<sup>17</sup>

If so, what is a language other than an instrument to represent beings? Heidegger says, "[it] is language that *has* human beings, insofar as they belong to, pay heed to language, which first opens up the world to them and at the same time thereby their dwelling in the world."<sup>18</sup> Here, we come to the idea that man belongs to language and that language possesses man. A language to which human beings belong is not a tool for representing beings but a language that reveals the world to human beings for the first time. But what does it mean for language to reveal the world to human beings and possess them? Answering this question requires examining the relationship between language as the house of Being and human words. It will be helpful for us to reconsider Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin's poetry to shed light on that relationship.

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<sup>15</sup> "[H]olding fast to being as that which is distinguished from beings indeed compels at the same time an appeal to ideas and to categories. Being becomes the *a priori*. Metaphysics has begun." Martin Heidegger, *The History of Beyng*, trans. by William McNeill and Jeffrey Powell (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2015), 115.

<sup>16</sup> Heidegger, "Why Poets?," in *Off the Beaten Track*, 233.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Phenomenology and Theology," in *Pathmarks*, trans. by Frank A. Capuzzi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 59.

As is well known, Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin's poetry is the core of his later thinking on poetic language. In *Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine,"* Heidegger says that the originary (*ursprünglich*) essence of the Being of human beings is language.<sup>19</sup> This means that human beings exist as the originary essence of Being when speaking in response to language as the originary essence of Being, i.e., the language of the house of Being, or simply, the language of Being. In other words, when a man speaks in response to the language of Being, language possesses him. And in this responsive word, the world is revealed. Poetry is, of course, the first language to unconceal the world. But what is the meaning of unconcealment of the world through poetic language?

Heidegger's thinking on poetry as a non-metaphysical language is helpful for us to understand that meaning. He says that "to think Being itself explicitly requires disregarding Being to the extent that it is only grounded and interpreted in terms of beings and for beings as their ground, as in all metaphysics."<sup>20</sup> Unlike all metaphysics, "it[the fundamental attunement] opens up beings as such in general, and this opening up of the manifestness of beings is indeed so originary that, by virtue of the attunement, we remain inserted into and bound into beings as opened up."<sup>21</sup>

Therefore, the first unconcealment of the world is an encounter of beings as opened up. The thinking which occurs from this encounter is, of course, different from the understanding of the beingness of beings. That new thinking is what is poetized by an attuned poet. We will hereafter shed light on the meaning of poetizing this new thinking with the support of Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin's poetry.

### **Characteristics of poetic language: Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin's poem "The Rhine"**

Language is the primal (*anfänglich*) dimension within which the essence of human beings, corresponding to the claim (*Anspruch*) of Being, can belong to Being.<sup>22</sup> The poet who belongs to Being and responds to the claim of Being is, as is well known, Hölderlin. Poetizing occurs in Hölderlin's

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<sup>19</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine,"* trans. by William McNeill and Julia Ireland (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2014), 62.

<sup>20</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Time and Being," in *On Time and Being*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), 6.

<sup>21</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine,"* 124.

<sup>22</sup> Martin Heidegger, "The Turning," in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. by William Lovitt (New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1977), 41.

hymns in a genuinely primal way, i.e., as another beginning (*Anfang*).<sup>23</sup> In other words, Hölderlin's poetry names the self-showing of the beginning or its present, which comes to presence.<sup>24</sup> Heidegger says that "the greatness of creative activity takes its measure from the extent of its power to follow up the innermost hidden law of the beginning."<sup>25</sup> We can see the characteristics of great poetry that follows the law through Heidegger's interpretation of "The Rhine."

Interpreting the second strophe of "The Rhine," Heidegger deals with the relationships between the origin and the hearing of it. "The hearing of origin ... is ... a hearing that does not yet spring forth, ... and thus remains entirely with itself as an origin: the originary origin (*der ursprüngliche Ursprung*)."<sup>26</sup> It is the originary origin that the poet hears.<sup>27</sup> "It is his hearing ... that first apprehends the fact that an originary Being prevails here. The hearing ... itself grants a hearing to the fettered origin (*der gefesselte Ursprung*) as such. The hearing ... in this way thus *sets* out for the first time what is really happening there: what in the first instance *is*."<sup>28</sup> Then, what *is* in the first place?

Heidegger says that "just as the origin that has merely sprung forth (*der nur entsprungene Ursprung*) is not the origin, neither is the merely fettered origin. Rather, the entire essence of the origin is the fettered origin in its springing forth (*der gefesselte Ursprung in seinem Entspringen*). Yet the springing forth (*Entspringen*) itself first comes to be what it is as the river runs its entire course; it is not limited to the beginning of its course. The entire course of the river itself belongs to the origin. The origin is fully apprehended only as the fettered origin in its springing forth as having sprung forth (*Entsprungen*)."<sup>29</sup> To sum up, the origin is fully apprehended only when it is apprehended as the origin of having sprung forth, the origin of springing forth, and the fettered origin as such.

In addition, at the beginning of the fourth strophe of "The Rhine," Hölderlin says the following:

Enigma is that which has purely sprung forth. Even  
The song may scarcely unveil it.

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<sup>23</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* Bd. 70: *Über den Anfang* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005), 156.

<sup>24</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, trans. by Keith Hoeller (New York: Humanity Books, 2000,) 204.

<sup>25</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 35.

<sup>26</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine,"* 183.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 183-184.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 184.



*Ein Raethsel ist Reimensprunenes. Auch  
Der Gesang kaum darf es enthuelen.*<sup>30</sup>

According to Heidegger, “the innermost essence of what has purely sprung forth is the intrinsically counter-turning doubling of origin (*die in sich widerwendige Doppelung von Ursprung*) as springing forth and having sprung forth.”<sup>31</sup> However, as we have already noted, the origin is the fettered origin as well because the fettered origin is also an origin. Furthermore, in its springing forth, it remains as the ground of having sprung forth or the river which belongs to it. And the poet apprehends not only the origin of having sprung forth but also the origin of springing forth and the fettered origin as such. Poetizing is the result of the poet’s full apprehension of the origin. Then, what does the poet poetize?

Hölderlin’s poem of the river speaks the truth of being or the interplay of unconcealment as the origin of springing forth, and concealment as the fettered origin as such.<sup>32</sup> Of course, Hölderlin’s poem is not the objectification of that interplay. Instead, it is meant to allow the interplay as such to be presented and preserved in the poem. In “The Rhine,” the interplay is presented as the saying of the river that has sprung forth from the origin and belongs to it. “The saying of what has purely sprung forth tears us beyond the origin and back—into the saying of the origin of origin and thereby first face-to-face with the full mystery.”<sup>33</sup> Then, what is the full mystery of the saying of the origin of origin?

The mystery of the saying is that the poem is more a telling that veils than one that unveils. Heidegger again says, “It[the song] is more a telling that veils than one that unveils, and ... [t]he form of the telling in this poetizing ... must count as one of the greatest creative accomplishments of the poet.”<sup>34</sup> In the same vein, he states that poetic language is “to leave the unsayable unsaid, and to do so in and through its saying.”<sup>35</sup> Hölderlin’s poem

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 217.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 235.

<sup>32</sup> Similarly, interpreting Heidegger’s Hölderlin, Bambach says: “Poetry opens language to the hidden dimension of its self-withholding, a dimension that expresses the very play of truth as ἀ-λήθεια, the struggle/strife of unhiddenness and hiddenness (Charles Bambach, “Who is Heidegger’s Hölderlin?,” in *Research in Phenomenology*, 47 (2017), 48.) Also, Gosetti-Ferencei says likewise: “[I]n the readings of poetic language a tension arises between its role as the revealing of beings in their essence—that is, in relation to origin—the of the revealing-withholding of origin itself (Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, *Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic Language: Toward a New Poesis of Dasein*, 87.)”

<sup>33</sup> Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine,”* 243.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 185.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.



paradoxically leaves the unsayable as the essence of beings, the truth of Being of beings, or the interplay of unconcealment and concealment unsaid in and through its saying. The truth of Being is presented and preserved in poetry, likewise.

### **Elucidation of the phenomenon of the truth of Being, presented and preserved in poetry**

Then what is the interplay of unconcealment and concealment which the poem leaves unsaid in and through its saying? How should we understand it? We can shed light on its concrete meaning in comparison to statements we use daily. As we have already noted, statements state the What-Being of beings based on a *a priori* understanding of beingness. On the contrary, "The Rhine" presents and preserves the unconcealment of beings revealed before a *a priori* understanding of beingness or, put differently, the pure radiance of a being in its truth of Being.

We can understand the meaning of the pure radiance of a being in its truth of Being through Heidegger's interpretation of Cézanne's later works. Heidegger says that "the appearing of what is present in the clearing of presence—in such a way, indeed, that the duality of the two is overcome in the oneness of the pure radiance of his [Cézanne's] painting."<sup>36</sup> The phenomenon of appearing what is present in the clearing of presence means what is present as such appears before its presence is given. In other words, the phenomenon means what is present *is* appearing in the oneness of what is present, i.e., a being, and its presence, i.e., its Being. Cézanne painted the oneness of the two or the pure radiance of a being in its truth of Being.

What is presented in poetry is also the pure radiance of a being in its truth of Being. And if a being does not have a fixed presence, i.e., beingness, but is appearing, or put differently, if a being does not merely persist but is appearing, then what is poetized is the appearing of a being. The appearing or the unconcealment of a being is the origin that is the most concealed from us because we first experience a being mostly in terms of beingness. We ordinarily pre-understand a category related to a being and state it as something with the help of that category. However, the appearing of a being is not reduced to beingness but is concealed when beingness as the categorical is being given to it.

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<sup>36</sup> The translation is cited from Julian Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 153. The original German text is as follows: "das Erscheinen des Anwesenden in der Lichtung des Anwesens - so zwar, dass die Zwiefalt beider verwunden ist in der Einheit des reinen Scheinens seiner beider." Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* Bd. 81: *Gedachtes*, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007), 347-48.

What is crucial is that thinking of the appearing of a being or an appearing being is “essential thinking [that] is image-less (*bildlose*) poetizing.”<sup>37</sup> Thinking of the individual with the help of the image of the general is a representation of *a priori* beingness given to a being. Of course, to represent *a priori* beingness and to perceive an appearing being without an image are different. The latter is to think of (*andenken*) an appearing being as such.

Heidegger says that “the measure taken by poetry ... imparts itself—as the foreign element (*Fremde*) in which the invisible one preserves his presence—to what is familiar.”<sup>38</sup> It is because an appearing being is foreign to us, unlike a being to which *a priori* beingness is given and thus familiar to us. An appearing being, therefore, is not a thing that can be known as a being is known through a statement that determines it. And even though, as Heidegger says, “what the poet says and undertakes to be is what is truly real,”<sup>39</sup> it is foreign and invisible to human beings who think and state a being in terms of its beingness.

### **Non-representational and imageless thinking: beyond the human condition**

Of course, it is rare for ordinary human beings like us to experience an appearing being as such. However, this experience is a genuine encounter with a being. Unlike metaphysical thought, such an encounter is possible only when a human being lets the self into releasement, which is “the release of oneself from ... representation” and wills “non-willing.”<sup>40</sup> Moreover, the trace of willingness to let oneself into releasement is wholly extinguished in releasement because releasement as a relinquishing of the willingness of representation no longer stems from willingness.<sup>41</sup> In this regard, releasement can be classified neither as activeness nor as passiveness in the ordinary sense. And poetizing is only possible through an encounter with an appearing being, and thus the will to represent beingness completely disappears. Such change is the ground of poetizing.

Thinking of the encounter with an appearing being rather than representing the beingness of beings is no other than thinking beyond representation, i.e., thinking without an image. However, relating to a being

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<sup>37</sup> Heidegger, *The History of Being*, 139.

<sup>38</sup> Martin Heidegger, “... Poetically Man Dwells ...,” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. by Alfred Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Low, 1971), 224.

<sup>39</sup> Heidegger, *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, 62.

<sup>40</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper & Low, 1966), 79.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.

without the representation of beingness or *a priori* understanding of beingness is something like transcending the human condition. In this respect, non-representative thinking of a being beyond the human condition cannot be said in ordinary language such as statements. For this reason, the poetry of non-representative thought is a language of the ineffable which cannot be said in our everyday language.<sup>42</sup> What is revealed in Heidegger's later philosophy is that there is a language of the ineffable that is only possible when a poet transcends the human condition. It is a language that exists as the result of human transformation. If so, what is the meaning of human transformation?

Suppose statements as our daily comportments towards beings are based on *a priori* understanding of beingness; traditional metaphysics that has thought of Being as beingness is not far from us. Instead, the language we use every day is based on metaphysical thinking. In this respect, it is we who comport towards beings in representing the beingness of beings instead of experiencing an appearing being as such. Therefore, overcoming metaphysics is not only a task for philosophers but also for us, who make statements about beings in representing the beingness of beings instead of experiencing an appearing being as such.

Human transformation as the ground of poetizing means we experience an appearing being rather than making a statement about a being on the basis of the representation of its beingness. Such an experience is infrequent but indeed does exist. The poetic language that says this experience informs us that this experience does undoubtedly exist. Hölderlin's poem, which is the language of the ineffable, is evidence of the existence of that experience. Of course, it is impossible to have such an experience unless the mode of Being of human beings is transformed first.

## Conclusion

Hölderlin's poem "The Rhine" is the result of poetizing the appearing of a being or an appearing being. Of course, this appearing disappears as beingness is being given. The poem is more a telling that veils than one that unveils because it is precisely the result of poetizing the experience of appearing that disappears as beingness is being given or the experience of the truth of Being as the interplay of unconcealment and concealment. The poem is the language that says this experience. However,

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<sup>42</sup> Similarly, Kryeziu, examining Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin's later poem, says: "The inexpressible makes itself manifest in poetry, not by being expressed or articulated, but rather by avoiding linguistic formulations. See Saza Kryeziu, "The Unsayable Mystery of the Holy: Hölderlin's Late Poetry," in *ARS & HUMANITAS*, 13, no. 1 (2019), 333.

for such a saying to be possible, human beings must change. Heidegger's later philosophy of language is therefore characterized by the thinking of the language that implies human transformation, which goes beyond representing the beingness of beings and experiences an appearing being as such. I believe that this is the point where Heidegger's philosophy of language is related to human transformation and shows its singularity, which is very different from analytic philosophy or linguistic philosophy.

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