PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS
IN THE AGE OF HIGH MOBILITY

KRITIKE

An Online Journal of Philosophy

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ABOUT THE COVER

"The Persistence of Motion"

The cover illustrates the persistence of motion in the age of high mobility. It draws inspiration from Salvador Dalí's *The Persistence of Memory* yet in context of technical glitches, apt for today's fast-paced and highly technological world. A glitch signifies an elongation of time, a sudden disruption, a pause, within the programmed sequence of events. What is noticeable in such glitches is the sudden jump after it as a recourse to cover what was lost, yet in actual life one is left to ponder the necessity of such a sudden jump to normality. The glitch, the pause is eventful as it allows philosophical thoughts to persist in an age of high mobility.

KRITIKE: An Online Journal of Philosophy, 14:3 (April 2021, Special Issue)

Photograph by Jinhyoung Lee, 2021
Layout by Kritike Editorial Board

About the Journal

KRITIKE is the official open access (OA) journal of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Santo Tomas (UST), Manila, Philippines. It is a Filipino peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary, and international journal of philosophy founded by a group of UST alumni. The journal seeks to publish articles and book reviews by local and international authors across the whole range of philosophical topics, but with special emphasis on the following subject strands:

- **Filipino Philosophy**
- **Oriental Thought and East-West Comparative Philosophy**
- **Continental European Philosophy**
- **Anglo-American Philosophy**

The journal primarily caters to works by professional philosophers and graduate students of philosophy, but welcomes contributions from other fields (literature, cultural studies, gender studies, political science, sociology, history, anthropology, economics, inter alia) with strong philosophical content.

The word "kritike" is Greek from the verb "krinein," which means to discern. Hence, kritike means the art of discerning or the art of critical analysis. Any form of philosophizing is, in one way or another, a "critique" of something. Being critical, therefore, is an attitude common to all philosophical traditions. Indeed, the meaning of philosophy is critique and to be philosophical is to be critical.

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KRITIKE is a biannual journal published in June and December of each year.

Editorial Board

Introduction | Special Issue

Introduction to the *Kritike* Special Issue: Philosophical Thoughts in the Age of High Mobility[1]

Jinhyoung Lee

Today, we are experiencing an unprecedented surge in mobility technologies and a corresponding increase of movement among humans, objects, data, and cultural constructs. Advanced mobile media such as wireless Internet, IoT, small portable devices, as well as renovated conventional vehicles—for example, high-speed trains and autonomous cars—provide us with seemingly unlimited freedom of movement and reflect the unremitting expansion of the global network. However, global mobility disturbance due to Covid-19 emergency triggers the apparent shrinking and blaming of "mobility" on the one hand, but, significantly, encourages us to identify our being mobilized as our supposed "normal status" to be restored, i.e., what we (should) be, on the other. It is the time when mobile technologies condition us and become part of our social life, when motion and movement are embedded in our epistemological, ethical, and aesthetical practices, and when we thus consider not only our existence but also our nature in light of these mobilities. We can denominate this time as the age of high mobility.

In the introduction to his seminal book, *Being and Motion* (2019), Thomas Nail describes the age of high mobility, noting that,

> … more than at any other time in history, people and things move longer distances, more frequently, and faster than ever before. All that was solid melted into air long ago and is now in full circulation around the world, like dandelion seeds adrift on turbulent winds.[2]

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[2] Tomas Nail, *Being and Motion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 1.

Nail's nod to Karl Marx's well-known passage invokes the notion of mobility's rise of status for thoughts sensitive to today's globalized mobilities, although it may be controversial to insist that "mobility climbs to the rank of the uppermost among the coveted values."[3] The developing and ever-increasing global mobility urges us to consider mobility as an unavoidable postulation for those who seek to grabble with contemporary human life, thought, and culture.

As a pioneer of mobility studies, John Urry, a sociologist, proposed 'a new mobilities paradigm' more than ten years ago in order to theorize the social world as "a wide array of economic, social and political practices, infrastructures and ideologies that all involve, entail or curtail various kinds of movement of people, or ideas, or information or objects."[4] While copious ensuant literature concerning mobilities were published hitherto, humanities scholars and philosophers have not paid enough attention to mobilities themselves, although tangentially or sometimes more meaningfully addressing them, as Peter Merriman and Lynne Pearce have pointed out.[5] This special issue of *Kritike*, "Philosophical Thoughts in the Age of High Mobility," aims to apply philosophical thoughts to the topic of mobility, assuming the latter not only as a social phenomenon to be investigated but also a key concept necessary to navigate the ontology, ethics, aesthetics, politics, as well as everyday life in our high-mobile world.

In the first paper, "The Political Economy of Global Mobility," Alex Taek-Gwang Lee discusses the political economy of global mobility by analyzing the relationship between the nation-states and globalization, the Empire, highlighting the former's new role in globalizing logistics in the building up of global supply chain of commodities. To this end, he focuses mainly on the ambiguous status of tourists as both consumers (global, moveable) and a labor force (situated obligatorily within a specific territory). As both cosmopolitan consumers of the Empire and members of the nation-states, tourists also can be classified as refugees whenever they lose money or the rights of travel assigned by the nation-states. Thus, he concludes, tourists' ambiguity as representing global mobility's real excursion unlocks the political deadlock of the Empire and the nation-states, underscoring the inextricable relationship between global mobility and the political economy of the *Urstaat*. His arguments significantly demonstrate how mobility can function as a lens to ponder critically global capitalism's impasse, particularly by staging tourists as its (im)mobile subjects or performers.

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[3] Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 2.

[4] John Urry, *Mobilities* (Cambridge, Malden: Polity, 2007), 18.

[5] Peter Merriman and Lynne Pearce, "Mobility and the Humanities," *Mobility and the Humanities*, ed. by Peter Merriman and Lynne Pearce (London, New York: Routledge, 2018), 2-4.

Meanwhile, Taehee Kim's article, "How Mobility Technologies Change Our Lived Experiences: A Phenomenological Approach to the Sense of Agency on the Autonomous Vehicle," identifies how the human driver attends to driving without being fully engaged in the act in favor of focusing on the autonomous vehicle itself and explores the ethical issues in autonomous driving. While describing the problem of level three (Conditional Automation) from among the six levels of driving automation as classified by the Society of Automotive Engineers International, wherein drivers are exempt from the duty to attend to driving but demanded to engage in a critical situation, he analyses a sense of agency within the domain of kinesthetics, as proposed by Edmund Husserl who described that state as an indispensable condition of feeling responsibility from a first-person perspective because it entailed recognizing the car as driver's extended body or the driver-car as an assembled social being. His discussions guide us to delve into the ethics and aesthetics of post-humans, i.e., human beings as the mobile hybrids (probably) generalized in the age of high mobility.

Li-Qing Qian's paper, "Mobility in Phenomenological Perspective: On Significances of Movement and Quasi-movement in Human Life," figures out the genealogy of the notion of human mobility spanning human corporeal movement to tool-assisted motion, mainly analyzing its multifaceted meanings from a phenomenological perspective. In this paper, Qian classifies its semantic constitutions diachronically as follows: corporeal motion as bodily movement in space and time signifies interactivity, sociality, and freedom; from a topological view of space and motion in the lifeworld, societal motion is deemed the expected and planned action entailing corporeality; as the societal movement in the age of high mobility, motion by transportation involves a social network based on advanced mobile technology and computationalism; modifications of positional changes as quasi-movements in the age of high-tech refer to recorded or even virtually presented appearances of motion(s) mainly in virtual reality; and, finally, modifications of quasi-motion found in mobilities in cyberspace is understood as the unified combination of daily corporeal motion and incorporeal online social action. By highlighting sedimentation and reactivation of its previous significances in the following, Qian facilitates a consideration of "human mobility" not only as a unified sense-complex of different significances but also as a diachronically open-ended conceptual construct.

In their article, "Dangers and Potentialities of the Highly Mobile World: An Ethical Consideration," Ilman Choe and Myungsim Yang discuss the ethical dangers and potentialities of the highly mobile world, redefining Edmund Husserl's critical concepts of lifeworld, home world, and alien world. Understanding the core of mobility as a change of location nuanced

by the pragmatic meaning brought about by human activity, they characterize the contemporary world as highly mobile in its frequency and speed. Our nomadic lifestyle and frequent meetings with aliens in this world can give rise to ethical dangers by undermining the stability of the home world, the reliable ground for actions, thereby triggering emotional consequences like depression and anxiety. On the other hand, they insist that our attempts to cope with the dangers can present an overture to new ethical potentialities containing social postulation for an understanding of the other, a gradual universalization of the ethical system, and a new ethical category. By recognizing our lifeworld's highly mobile reformation entailing our unexpected frequent encounters with aliens, Choi and Yang urge us to radically redesign today's ethics in terms of mobile coexistence of home world and alien world.

Wan-I Yang's article, "Homeland, Historicity and Ethical of Image from the Mobilities of Image," also approaches a mobility-relevant ethical issue, like Choe and Yang, but focuses on the ethical of image. In this paper, she argues that the nostalgia for the homeland (Eden/Utopia) not only concerns an actual place denoted by the artists and critics but also a place residing the imagination which carries the expectation for the possibly better, highlighting an inseparable entity of the visible image and invisible beauty in the artist's creation of image. In this regard, the ethic of the image is recognized as the relational care configured by the actual and imagined representations flowing at the core; that is, a colorful universe replete with an interplay of images, the mobilities of image, presents, revealing more possibility of life. For this reason, the process of image creation does not emancipate the artists only from the confinement of reality but also provides them experiences on the fluidity of life, a certain dimension of freedom, forming the image of historicity as revitalizing the subject in process dynamically reshaping the subjectivity. Her arguments demonstrate that incorporating a moment of mobility into image theory can rationalize the latter's mobilization toward image ethics.

Speculation on ethics in relation to mobility is followed by Diego D'Angelo's piece, "To Be or Not to Be at Home. Heidegger and Derrida Reading Sophocles," which focuses mainly on Greek tragedies as conveying absolute hospitality based on acknowledging our constitutive foreignness, thus proposing the impossible definition of the human being as "not-being-at-home" (*deinon*) as a tension we have to carry. To this end, he supplements Martin Heidegger's reading of Sophocles' texts by Jacques Derrida's reading. First, the uncanny essence of the human being as "the constant not-being-at-home" is recognized by Heidegger while considering that people change the world s/he lives in, also that, in this ever-changing world, they will never be at ease or peace. At the same time, D'Angelo continues, Derrida's arguments

of hospitality are considered supplements to Heidegger's understanding of human beings as foreigners, pointing out that being foreign presupposes hospitality. Despite hospitality's unsolvable paradox, the tension between the idealistic hospitality and the limited expressions of hospitality we inhabit, D'Angelo ultimately contends that hospitality is something the host must achieve independently by acknowledging the not-being-at-home as the uncanny essence of humanity. His discussion can be considered an attempt to actualize and activate hospitality as an ethic, by assuming an essential indistinguishability between natives and foreigners in the context of human beings on the move as typical in the age of high mobility, thereby rescuing the concept from its idealism and paradoxicality.

Finally, Jinhyoung Lee's article, "Mobility Biopolitics and the Aquarium as a Paradigm of Political Space," politically-philosophically discusses modern mobile space by examining the Korean novel, *The Aquarium of Love* (1939-1940), written and published under Japanese colonialism, in terms of the right to mobility. For him, the colonial government in the Korean Peninsula had fostered a colonial-political mobile space where colonial biopower works via the right to mobility by dichotomically-dividedly organizing society in terms of mobility: citizens with the right to mobility and non-citizens without it. As a paradigm of the space of mobility biopolitics where colonial biopower governs the colonized by assigning them the right to mobility or depriving them of it, also homogenizing them as common fish-like-beings devoid of political rights, he uses the aquarium to argue for the colonial-political space's insubstantiality which originates from categorically excluding political subjects. Consequently, the mobile bare lives, just as fish moving in an aquarium, enables the reader to consider the politics of "more than" the right to mobility by seeking the decolonized-humanized formation of society. By combining mobility studies and biopolitical thoughts, this article provides an alternative paradigm with which to critically examine modern political space as (highly) mobile where people enjoy the right to mobility by trading their political rights for it.

The papers for this special issue have sought to practice thoughts concerning political, ethical, and aesthetical issues considering today's globalized mobility, as well as advanced mobile technologies. Collectively, they reflect that mobility cannot be considered just a social phenomenon; rather it functions as a concept, a lens, and/or *problematique* helping us find new insights on human lives, thoughts, and cultures on the move. We believe mobility philosophy commits to problematizing, critically reflecting, and suggesting solutions concerning our highly mobile planet.

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The Political Economy of Global Mobility

Alex Taek-Gwang Lee

Abstract: In this essay, I will discuss the political economy of global mobility through an analysis of the relationship between nation-states and globalization. Today's aspect of global mobility lies with the logistics of people and goods within and beyond the national governmentality. These logistics flows construct the supply chain locally and globally with infrastructures, people, goods, and information. What must be stressed here is the new role of nation-states in the rise of globalizing logistics. Following the neoliberal model, each nation-state takes on a crucial role in creating markets. In this situation, the dialectics of tourists and the multitude is noteworthy. While the multitude does not belong to the nation-states any longer, tourists as consumers are entrapped to the category of the labor force, i.e., the commodification of labor power. If people want to move from one nation-state to another nation-state, they have to choose whether to be a labor commodity or a consumer. The working class is the moveable population and portable labor force, yet they are legally obliged to stay within a specific territory. It is not labor force but money or a commodity that is permitted to travel around. Although a commodity can be exchanged with money, they are not the same. The monetary circulation brings out the capitalist mobility of production, whereas a commodity completes its final function when it is consumed. In other words, consumption means the withdrawal of a commodity from the circulation. When a commodity is consumed, its function is done, its form finally annihilates, and then money moves from one territory to another in search of different commodities. Global mobility is fueled by the monetary flow, the financial flux in a global scope; nevertheless, its real excursion cannot be withdrawn from the political economy of the *Urstaat*. I contend that this double-binding relationship is the political deadlock of the Empire and the nation-states.

Keywords: tourist, multitude, nation-states, Empire

The Rise of Deadly Logistics

Moving people and goods is the material foundation of global capitalism. The high mobility of developed transportation, such as air travel, has accelerated globalization. Whoever finds the reality of the terrestrial integration should consider the effects of global mobility on each local identity. The primitive accumulations of capitalism would be impossible if there is no geographical difference. It all began with trade but ended up with imperialism and colonialization. Karl Marx was one of the European intellectuals in the 19th century who were preoccupied with this early form of globalization. Observing the first stage of global capitalism, Marx pointed out that "the discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement, and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins are all things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production."[1] Following this early stage of accumulation, the globe turns into a battlefield of the European empires' commercial war.

As Marx described, imperial expansion is nothing more than the creation of the European bourgeoisie *after its own image*. The imperialism did not bring forth a unified world but instead belied colonial subsumption and racialized differentiation. The legacy of the capitalist expansion in the 20th century ended up with two destructive wars and the rise of the nation-states as its aftermath. The postwar nation-states are the political venue of decolonization and, simultaneously, a battleground between socialism and capitalism. However, after the collapse of the socialist bloc in the 1990s, the nation-states come to play a different role from its political origins. The nation-state as the material realization of a nation, i.e., an imagined community, changes to the proponent of globalization. The tension between nationalization and globalization here seems to have lessened but has been left undissolved. From the ruins of the empire, this globalist project replaces colonialism, which has more often been called neoliberalism since the 1980s. Despite many criticisms, the so-called neoliberal champions believe that the global system, the economic replacement of old empire, is a regulated world in which capital and goods move freely according to the principle of supply and demand, producing prosperity for all.

In this sense, today's aspect of global mobility coincides with the logistics of people and goods within and beyond the national governmentality. These flows of the logistics construct the supply chain

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[1] Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1, trans. by Ben Fawkes (London: Penguin, 1990), 915.

locally and globally with infrastructures, people, goods, and further information. In her book on global logistics, Deborah Cowen argues:

> Casually referred to by those in the industry as a "pipeline," logistics space contrasts powerfully with the territoriality of the national state. Today, the supply chain is understood to be both vital and vulnerable and so in urgent need of protection. This networked space surfaces over and over again as the object of supply chain security, rendering its trademark cartography. The corporate supply chain has a history in the military and colonial supply line. It is no accident that the supply chain of contemporary capitalism resonates so clearly with the supply line of the colonial frontier.[2]

What must be stressed here is the new role of the nation-states in the rise of globalizing logistics. In the neoliberal model, each nation-state takes a crucial role in creating markets. The neoliberal government of the state is the dramatic transformation of the state-machine, i.e., the Leviathan, whose body is made up of all the bodies of its citizens. When Thomas Hobbes used this metaphor for describing the unity of commonwealth between the sovereign and people, he presupposed people's authorization of a common representative acting in their names. According to Hobbes, the state is identical with one person as the representative of the sovereign authority, but not the representation of itself. The state must be the incorporation of each single constituent member, for the *unity* of the "representer," not "represented," can make the "person *one.*"[3] This argument tacitly reveals the paradox of the state: the sovereign power as the one person has to exist before the representation of people and brings forth its capacity to act as one. In other words, the one person brought up by the united multitude in a common representative is also created by the sovereign.

Leviathan as an Enterprise

Indeed, it is the sovereign who decides which people can be included and excluded from the representation. The logic of the modern state operates as if the commonwealth squarely corresponds with the representation of all members. Still, the unity of the "representer" is already established before its representative embodiment. In this sense, the body of any democratic polity

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[2] Deborah Cowen, *The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 8–9.

[3] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 104.

always already preserves the exceptional state of sovereignty. Therefore, neoliberal globalization does not abolish the hidden impetus behind a modern state but instead reinforces its capability to unite people as one by the exclusion of those who are not supposed to be included in the unity. This enhancement of the authority leads to the modification of the role of the nation-states in building up the global supply chain of commodities. With this novel role, the Leviathan turns out to be an enterprise to administrate economic policy and markets. There is no retreat of the state but the reassertion of the sovereignty as one person. The local governments of the nation-states universalize competition and create the market-oriented systems of action for individuals and business groups as well as institutions. The new task of regional administration fundamentally reshapes the utopian credo of a nation-state, i.e., the equality of all members within its communal boundary.

A nation-state is the material foundation of a nation. The imagined nation roots in the idea of the commonwealth, in particular, the republican ideal. Based on the republican constitution, the reign of the nation-state mostly aims to protect property but at the same time presupposes the absolute equality among the members of the nation. Two aspects of the nation-state are consolidated in the ideology of national prosperity. In the process of nation-building, the ideology comes along with the sovereign power to discipline the multitude to the abstractive idea of people. Michel Foucault pointed out the primitive violence in the birth of a nation, since the disciplinary power of the sovereignty, unlike Hobbes's presupposition, does not mean the end of wars but brings forth another war: the violent decision as to who is inclusive or exclusive within the border of a nation-state.[4] The war within the state is a civil war, the return of *bellum omnium contra omnes*, the war of all against all. This theoretical model of the permanent struggling with each other explains the homeostasis of a nation-state. The imaginary ideal of a nation, which springs out from the transcendental idea of the universal right, i.e., the absolute equality of the national members, always already overdetermines the presence of people, the reality of the nation-state. According to Foucault,

> The individual as such, in his relationship with others, is the bearer of this permanent possibility of the war of all against all. If there is in fact a war of all against all, it is first of all essentially because men are equal in the objects and ends they set their sights on, because they are

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[4] Michel Foucault, *The Punitive Society: Lectures at the Collège de France 1972–1973*, trans. by Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave, 2015), 24.

> equivalent in the means they possess for obtaining what they seek. They are, as it were, substitutable for each other, and that is precisely why they seek to replace each other and, when something is offered to the desire of one, the other may always substitute himself for the first, wanting to take his place and appropriate what he desires. This substitutability, this convergence of desire characterizes this original competition.[5]

Foucault observes this principle of competition as "quasi-equality," i.e., a rationale for the "dimension of distrust." By this suspicion, each individual in the nation-state knows well that someone else may come to replace them. What must be stressed here is that this dynamic of competition is the most crucial feature founding the function of the sovereign. In my opinion, here, Foucault's insight into the state power reveals how the lack of trust brings forth the war of all against all back into the inside of a nation-state. Without any solution to the civil war, the nation-state would not be sustainable, and then surmounting the mistrust and suspending the competition is the only solution necessary for the due procedure of the nation-building. The political resolution to the problems is to create the glorious one person, i.e., "one of these perpetual combatants" winning over their rivals "by something like an additional power."[6] The power of glory is, of course, the system of signs, the instrumental function of nationalism to bring together those individuals who are on the point of a civil war within a nation-state. For this reason, the eruption of civil wars means the terminal state of the dissolution of the sovereign, the disappearance of the triumphant one.

It seems to me that this Hobbesian fantasy is the foundation of nationalism which aims to maintain the ideological rationale of a nation-state. However, the rise of neoliberal globalization threatens the ground of national integrity. Many arguments concerning this transformation of a nation-state have mainly focused on the neoliberal shift of governmentality from a social welfare system to a market economy. By this move, the role of government in the markets seems necessarily retreated. From the perspective of the political economy, it is undeniable that the global interconnection facilitates more dynamic interactions. The buzzwords in the age of the neoliberal globalization are the stateless corporation, the round-the-clock global financial market, the edged competition under flexible capital and the rule of a single price, and the globally connected information society. However, one

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[5] *Ibid.*, 25–26.

[6] *Ibid.*, 26.

of the essential features of this transformation is the ascendence of global urbanism. The upsurge of the global cities imposes significant alterations on the *raison d'état* of a nation-state.

The Urban "Supermodernity"

There has been a familiar argument revolving around the relationship between globalization and the nation-states, which points out the relative weakening of the nation-states, focusing on the diminishing national economy in the phase of globalization. Jan Nederveen Pieterse argues, "globalization can mean the reinforcement of both supranational and subnational regionalism."[7] The theory of postmodernism seeks to carve out the politics of hybridity in the dialectics of globalization and localization. More interestingly, the cultural entanglements do not mean that the nation-state as such comes to be multicultural but instead is divided by global urbanization. No doubt, the rapid improvement of mobility through technology and connectivity more and more precipitates the emergence of the global cities and universalization of its urbanism. My argument is that the rise of the cosmopolitan megalopolis within the nation-states is the foundation of global mobility. Globalization signifies the disintegration of national and local borders, and the main cities in each nation-state come to function as an intensively interconnected hub of global logistics.

In this way, the global cities no longer belong to the national space but stand detached and isolated from it. The international metropolis simply serves as the totality of "non-places." As Marc Augé points out, "if a place can be defined as relational, historical, and concerned with identity, then a space which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity will be a non-place."[8] In other words, the non-places are the areas without identity such as "the mobile cabins called means of transport (aircraft, trains, and road vehicles), the airports and railway stations, hotel chains, leisure parks, large retail outlets, and, finally, the complex skein of cable and wireless networks."[9] "Supermodernity," which exceeds Baudelaire's conceptualization of modernity, produces the non-places: "transit points and temporary abodes." However, Augé's concept of supermodernity, the condition of the non-places, needs to be clarified further. He seems to assume the divide between modernity and supermodernity. The latter is the excessive modernity which has three features such as

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[7] Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 71.

[8] Marc Augé, *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*, trans. by John Howe (London: Verso, 1995), 77–78.

[9] *Ibid.*, 74.

"overabundance of events, spatial overabundance, the individualization of references."[10]

Yet, the "excessive" factors are not employed only for the explanation of supermodernity. The flourishing of the non-places does not only apply to supermodernity, since modernity always already precipitates the overwhelming flow of moving people and goods. Marx and Engels' description of capitalism lies with the fact that "all that is solid melts into air," the lightness and weightlessness of modernity. In 1848, they already pointed out that the global extension of the bourgeois market gives rise to the modern liquidity; in their words, "the need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe."[11] In this sense, colonialism is the early phase of global capitalism and has still been embodied in modernity's cultural logic. Therefore, I contend that there is no fundamental distinction between modernity and supermodernity, but rather many continuities inherited from the early globalization. What makes a difference between modernity and supermodernity is nonetheless the advancement of transportation and communication technology. In particular, the progress of aviation technology and information technology, e.g., the Internet, have rapidly sped up global mobility. For this reason, the unprecedented growth of international logistics, prompted by new technology, should be regarded as the material foundation of the non-places.

The non-places are, in this sense, nothing more than the fluidity of the urban spatio-temporality and the nodal points of global connectivity. This liquid modality of global urbanism, which removes history and identity from the geographical locations, is the de facto bedrock of supermodernity. In Baudelaire's sense, the anonymous crowd is the protagonist at the modern city, but the non-places of the global megalopolis have no leading character. On the surface, the cultural hybridity comes to exist in the segregated urban space within a nation-state, yet, the deeper layer of the spatial experiences is essentially homogenous, i.e., the single modality of urban consumerism is dominant in such cosmopolitan multiculturalism. Whatever it takes at the local place, everything has to be modified by the global standard's refined demands. Urbanity turns to be the daily norms of life embedded in globalization. The early figure of radical Enlightenment such as "noble savage" becomes replaced with the typical image of the metropolitan elite. The urban cosmopolitanism is a mixed breed but not equally enjoyed by all those living in the nation-state. This inequality stands against the political doctrine of nationalism that promises the members of a nation-state the absolute equality and brings the unification of sovereignty and people into a

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[10] *Ibid.*, 40.

[11] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: International Publishers, 1948), 12.

crisis. Due to this split between people and their representatives, democracy does not work out, and then the political catastrophe of a nation-state ends up with the rise of populism.

What must be stressed here is that the urban-centrism brings forth the new modes of existence. The city dwellers are not only those who populate in urban areas but also the consumers of city commerce. The metropolitan consumerism gains its ultimate form in tourism, the commodification of leisure. As Dean MacCannell argues in his classic analysis of a tourist, the highly commercialized space of global cities is "a *stage set*, a *tourist setting*, or simply, a *set* depending on how purposefully worked up for tourists the display is."[12] This appearance of a tourist, in contrast with an adventurer, is often accused by intellectuals as shallow and superficial in that the tourist experience is not authentic and always mystified, further disguises itself as the revelation of the truth. Daniel Boorstin's description of a tourist as the consumer of a pseudo-adventure is one of such orthodox examples to criticize the fabricated real life of a tourist.[13] According to him, a tourist, whose risks are insurable, does not venture to encounter any native in an unknown place but keep on the mirror-image of themselves wherever they visit. However, the tourist setting is "not merely copies or replicas of real-life situations but copies that are presented as disclosing more about the real thing than the real thing itself discloses."[14] What Boorstin does not recognize in his criticism of a tourist is that tourism, *per se*, is the failed resistance to the metropolitan elitism, which ultimately gains success in confirming it.

Meanwhile, MacCannell accounts the tourist as an ontological condition of a modern man. He claims that tourism is an attempt to overturn alienation, yet a failure to end up with the reaffirmation of their alienation. Due to this alienated state of existence, a tourist is always blamed for their superficial understanding of other people and places, i.e., their ignorance of objectivity in the way things ought to be seen. In MacCannell's sense, global tourism is the expansion of modernity and the alienating obscurity of the distinction between work and leisure. He argues:

> In industrial society, work is broken down into "occupations" and it provides livelihood and status on the individual level. Modern society transforms this same work into a positive and negative aesthetic of

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[12] Dean MacCannell, *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2013), 102.

[13] Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America* (New York: Vintage, 1987), 91.

[14] MacCannell, *The Tourist*, 102.

> production ... The work displays about to be discussed, and the work displays in general, unify economics and aesthetics and they begin to replace industrial concerns for social class and status with the modern concern for "lifestyle." They dramatize the enormous differentiation of the modern work force and, at the same time, reintegrate all classes of workers, from stock brokers to sewer cleaners, in a single system of representations. They obscure the distinction industrial society makes between human and machine labor by displaying the two as inextricably linked in unified design as occurs, for example, in tours of assembly lines.[15]

The point of his argument is that the reality of the work resists the symbolic structure of tourism. The work is what is repressed, i.e., the unconscious layer, in the dramatization and representation of tourism. However spectacular it is, the presence of workforces let the sightseers have the straight experience of society's real side, even though a worker and a tourist are divided. MacCannell's tourist theory elucidates the structure of tourism and the constancy of the tourist as a modern man. Nevertheless, his semiotic analysis of a tourist attracted by sightseeing underestimates global tourism's political economy, which precipitates the spatial separation of the tourist areas from any domestic territory.

Tourists and the Multitude

To push MacCannell's idea further, Hiroki Azuma's philosophy of a tourist deserves attention here. For Azuma, a tourist is a philosophical theme for understanding the dialectical relationship between Empire and nation-states and can be defined as a "postal multitude."[16] He takes the notion of the multitude from Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's discussion of the Empire and Jacques Derrida's concept of the postal. In *Empire*, Negri and Hardt argue that "the creative forces of the multitude that sustain the Empire are also capable of autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political organization of global flows and exchanges."[17] Azuma critically considers this conceptualization of the multitude and attempts to turn its political weaknesses into strengths. For him, the most fundamental problem of the concept resides in the way in which there is no possible political agenda

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[15] *Ibid.*, 62.

[16] Hiroki Azuma, *The Philosophy of the Tourist* 観光客の哲学 (Tokyo: Genron, 2017), 157.

[17] Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, *Empire* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), 15.

in Negri and Hardt's theory of the multitude.[18] According to him, the only rationale of the multitude is the self-organization of global networks. Furthermore, its political motivations and orientations are very ambiguous because they merely suggest that "biopower and communism, cooperation and revolution remain together, in love, simplicity, and also innocence."[19] All those virtues, i.e., love, simplicity, innocence, are ethical rather than political, and Azuma argues that Negri and Hardt's optimistic vision of the multitude as such ironically reveals the political powerlessness of their concept.

On the contrary, Azuma finds out the possibility of a tourist in the political failure of the multitude. For him, the problem of the multitude comes from the fact that they cannot have the grand narratives to unite themselves under the same political doctrine. The rejection of the orthodox political thoughts is their ontological essence, nevertheless, the very absence of the traditional utopianism, or the skepticism of *realpolitik*, is paradoxically the most fragile point of the multitude. Indeed, Azuma's concept of a tourist shares the same condition of global capitalism with Negri and Hardt's concept of the multitude; however, his assumption is that a tourist is nothing less than the reification of "misdelivery" (誤配), the incarnation of the failed communication containing the many performative possibilities. A tourist comes to exist where the multitude fails to gain its unification. The misdelivery, the possibility of the delivery of goods to a wrong party, is a tourist's condition that brings out the unpredictable touristic situation. What they want to see is occasionally informed against what they experience. In this way, their travel always pertains to otherness that they cannot predict and must be supplemented by posteriority. There is no actual alliance, but this repetitive post-configuration of supplements sustains the possibility of the association. This idea is similar to MacCannell's affirmation of tourists as those who participate in others' lives. A tourist's encounter with the others at the places they visit is the modern man's existential condition. Both MacCannell and Azuma regard a tourist as the ontological form of high modernity and the generic mode of existence in global capitalism. In this sense, a tourist could be called the embodiment of cosmopolitanism and the European Enlightenment's global realization.

In my view, however, the multitude is not a mere mirror image of the tourists but rather the primordial substance of those who suffer from global capitalism. The concept is spun off from Spinoza's monism and aims to explain ontological multiplicity. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that tourists are much the same as the multitude, in that the multitude has various modes of existence. Negri and Hardt clearly describe the "postmodern" prototype of

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[18] Azuma, *Philosophy of the Tourist*, 146.
[19] Negri and Hardt, *Empire*, 413.

the multitude as the militant. They argue that "as the figure of the people dissolves, the militant is the one who best expresses the life of the multitude: the agent of biopolitical production and resistance against the Empire."[20] They take the examples of the militant, mainly those communist and liberatory combatants, antifascist intellectuals, the republicans during the Spanish civil war and the resistance movements in the Second World War, and the anticolonial and anti-imperialist guerrilla warriors. Here, Negri and Hardt suggest the concept of the multitude as counter-Hobbesian; the multitude does not belong to the nation-states any longer. This idea corresponds to Marx and Engel's grave-digger dialectics: the capitalist mode of production inevitably produces its destroyers, the proletariat. Negri and Hardt insist that the dialectical movement finally ends up with the ossification of the socialist states. Negri and Hardt intend to criticize the state-form of socialism with the concept of the multitude. The militant is those figures that have already come to exist through the previous resistances within and without the nation-states.

Unlike Negri and Hardt's understanding of the multitude, still, I would say that the multitude discloses the paradox of political economy within Empire; the labor force of global capitalism has to stay within the domestic assembly lines, even though they work for the global companies, and the only way that the local workers can cross the borders of the nation-states is to be a tourist. Any worker, as far as they are regarded as labor force, cannot travel across the national boundaries. Of course, a tourist is not a militant. Azuma's concept of a tourist sheds light on this ontological distinction between two modes of existence. I would like to go beyond his argument. My assumption is that what makes the labor force as a particular tourist is the legal right of travel. A tourist must be identified legitimately as the specific people of any nation-state, while a militant resists the authority's national identification. If you need a lawful permission to visit any country, that means that you are always subsumed to the nation-states. This fact proves that the nation-states are not the outside of Empire but the parts of its assemblages. Nationalism, the absent cause of the nation-states, consists of the partial drives within the Empire, but does not ensure the dissolution of the state-form. In this sense, the ontological modes of the militant, not tourists, are the more salient incarnation of the multitude. Ironically, the militant is neither people nor tourists, yet the third modes of existence between the nation-states and the Empire. They stay in the national territories but are politically dislocated by their global engagement from within. I think that this political disjoint is a critical gap between a tourist and a militant; the

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[20] *Ibid.*, 411.

tourist is never displaced with the nation-states, while the militant struggles to be dismembered with the national body.

The Militant Against *Urstaat*

In this sense, the militant should be understood as those who resist the authority to vouch for their rights of travel and identify themselves with those who have no such documents, i.e., *sans papiers*. As the primordial substance of the militant, the ontological state of the multitude is close to refugees rather than tourists. According to Negri and Hardt, the multitude is "social flesh" that is not a body but "a flesh that is common, living substance":

> The flesh of the multitude is pure potential, an unformed life force, and in this sense an element of social being, aimed constantly at the fullness of life. From this ontological perspective, the flesh of the multitude is an elemental power that continuously expands social being, producing in excess of every traditional political-economic measure of value [...]. From the perspective of political order and control, then, the elemental flesh of the multitude is maddeningly elusive, since it cannot be entirely corralled into the hierarchical organs of a political body.[21]

The flesh of the multitude is the deformation of the Leviathan's body, the expansion of social being against the unification of people and the person one and the excessive production of values against the political economy. These expansions and productions are not quantitative but qualitative, and then the multitude is "an irreducible multiplicity; the singular social differences that constitute the multitude must always be expressed and can never be flattened into sameness, unity, identity, or indifference," not multiple fragments but "singularities that act in common."[22] What is noteworthy here is that the multitude is the counter-concept of the *Urstaat*, the primordial violence of the state-form, which is "the eternal model of everything the State wants to be and desires."[23] It is the State that expresses and constitutes the objective movements of production. People are the

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[21] Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (London: Penguin, 2004), 192.
[22] *Ibid*., 105.
[23] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 237.

captured force of production in the state-form and, in this sense, another side of the multitude. The multitude is nothing less than those who have never been represented by the nation-states, even though living inside it, the void of the *Urstaat*, which repetitively creates the transcendental outside of a specific state-form from within. Unlike MacCannell's structuralist presupposition, in this sense, the modern man's generic condition is not a tourist but a refugee.

For now, Azuma's question of the multitude still remains. The multitude as the dissolution of people could be regarded as the ontological resistance to the *Urstaat,* although not automatically becoming militant. Their ontological state is not the only condition of "militant-becoming." Azuma's concept of a tourist tries to solve this problem by endorsing small-world and scale-free mathematical models. Small-world networks are typified by local clustering and shortcut ties that reduce the path length between clusters, while scale-free networks take an asymmetrical distribution. Therefore, small-world networks serve as equally contingent connections, but scale-free networks function as unequally skewed distribution. According to Azuma, the nation-states could be called the small-world network, and the Empire could be regarded as the scale-free network.[24] The doctrine of the nation-states is the equality of all national members within their small-worlds, whereas the principle of Empire imposes its unequal dissemination of the scale-free networks on the small-worlds. Based on this presupposition, he argues that a tourist is a "political" existence to recuperate the contingency of "misdelivery" in-between the small-world network and the scale-free network.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that the Empire is not simply the mathematical model but the actualization of global capitalism. Even though the Empire does the work of the scale-free network, the fundamental inequality of the world order is ascribable to capitalism on a global scale. Empire as a scale-free network would enhance the hierarchical disparity, but the politico-economic unevenness among the nation-states is not the consequence of the mathematical law. Darwin's theory of evolution can be adopted to explain that the fittest survive in nature. Yet, its application for the justification of social meritocracy falls into the trap of ruling class ideology. "Social Darwinism" shows the typical fallacy of such pseudoscientific exercises. Above all, it is not self-evident that a tourist is a political subject. The common mode of tourists is a consumer in high capitalism. They have to buy the travel commodities, in other words, and thus become a consumer if they want to encounter the enigmatic others. Travel has the allure of the most popular commodities, and the development of mass transportation has

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[24] Azuma, *Philosophy of the Tourist*, 192.

enhanced the travel industry's competitiveness. During the last decades, air tickets have become the most decomposable commodity with the advent of the low-budget tourist. As a member of the nation-states and at the same time a cosmopolitan consumer of Empire, a tourist has to fulfill the requirements of global capitalism, i.e., money and the rights of travel.

When tourists lose the rights of travel and money, they are forced to become refugees. This moment is when the repressed reality of global capitalism returns. In this sense, tourists are another mode of refugees and vice versa. In fact, the ambiguous status of a tourist is not political in itself; "misdelivery" is not the ontological state only adequate to a tourist but communication in general. As a consumer, tourists want to extend their places to wherever they visit. A tourist's illusion would break down as they encounter the reality of capitalism and are dissociated with their habitual perception of others. What is necessary for this to happen is *méconnaissance*, the misrecognition of the ego, i.e., the very function of a mirror-image. A tourist's ego always looks for their mirror-image in others, but this expectation is occasionally staggered by the real experiences. If a tourist comes across this strangeness by chance, they are no longer who they were. This overdetermined misunderstanding, i.e., each cause is necessary to bring forth an effect in the situation of *méconnaissance*, is the existential condition of a tourist and leads them to the subjectivation of the multitude. In this sense, the militant is not the opposite figure of the tourist but more like their qualitatively transformed subject, the monstrous metamorphosis of a consumer. Therefore, what is crucial in a tourist's political reversion is not the mechanism of "misdelivery" as such but their militant subjectivation.

Conclusion

Marx pointed out that production creates a consumer: "production not only supplies a material for the need, but it also supplies a need for the material."[25] A tourist as a consumer is also entrapped in the category of the labor force, i.e., the commodification of labor power. If anybody wants to move from one nation-state to another nation-state, they have to choose whether to be a labor commodity or a consumer. Mobility is the key feature of capitalism. The working class is the moveable population and portable labor force, yet they are legally obliged to stay within a specific territory. It is not labor force but money and a commodity that are permitted to travel around. Although a commodity can be exchanged with money, they are not the same. Marx argued that "the function of money ... is to remain in

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[25] Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. by Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1993), 92.

circulation as its vehicle, to resume its circular course always anew like a *per-petuum mobile.*"[26] The monetary circulation brings out the capitalist mobility of production, whereas a commodity completes its final function when it is consumed. In other words, consumption means the withdrawal of a commodity from the circulation. When a commodity is consumed, its function is done, its form finally annihilates, and then money moves from one territory to another in search of different commodities. For this reason, the labor force, so far as it is a commodity retracted from its circulation, has no mobility. Global mobility is fueled by monetary flow, the financial flux in a global scope; nevertheless, its real excursion cannot be withdrawn from the political economy of the *Urstaat*. I contend that this double-binding relationship is the political deadlock of the Empire and the nation-states.

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26 Ibid., 202.

Negri, Antonio, and Michael Hardt, *Empire* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000).

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How Mobility Technologies Change Our Lived Experiences: A Phenomenological Approach to the Sense of Agency in the Autonomous Vehicle[1]

Taehee Kim

Abstract: In mobility studies, it is commonly recognized that the development of mobility technologies brings about a vast range of changes in human lived experiences. Taking the autonomous vehicle as an example, this paper investigates the possible changes in human lived experiences resulting from said development. Based on phenomenological and cognitive scientific studies, this paper gives a detailed analysis of how the kinesthesis and sense of agency vary from everyday bodily movement to manual driving to autonomous driving following six levels of driving automation. This paper identifies, through philosophical analyses and interpretation, the problem of how the human driver can attend to driving without being fully engaged in it and suggests the possibility of considering the "driver-car" assemblage, a unified agent that gives relevant secondary attention to and is responsible for the driving situation. In doing so, this paper contributes to the discussions not only on the descriptive features of human lived experience but also on the normative issues around human drivers' responsibility in an autonomous vehicle.

Keywords: mobility, mobility technology, autonomous vehicle, kinesthesis

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
Introduction

T he mobilities lens is considered a useful theoretical tool for analyzing modern societies where mobilities have increased dramatically due to various mobility technologies' developments. From the outset, the "new mobilities paradigm" in social sciences and humanities was meant to examine modern societies using this lens. Following Georg Simmel, who "sets an agenda that connects mobilities and materialities," focus has been put on the "hybrid systems, 'materialities and mobilities,' that combine objects, technologies, and socialities."[2] One of the most dramatic and well-known examples of mobility technology bringing about a vast range of changes in human lived experiences was rail travel in the nineteenth century. More recently, mobility technologies such as GPS navigation have notable effects on the lived experiences of travelers.

Still, "the prevailing phenomenon" is to operate with concepts "usually referring to technologies, not to people" and adopts a "view from above," rather than a "view from on the ground."[3] This phenomenon has given rise to the general ignorance of the lived experiences of "feelings for, of, and within cars," which are "socially and culturally embedded" in embodied sensibilities, practices, and cultures "that form around particular systems of automobility and generate different aesthetic and kinesthetic dispositions toward driving."[4] Therefore, one of my concerns here is to pay particular attention to the mutually influential relationship between the technological conditions for mobilities and human beings who develop and utilize such mobility technologies.

As a humanistic inquiry on mobilities, which is concerned, by nature, with how they are experienced and constituted by and with the meanings and values they represent to hypermobile modern societies and individuals, this paper is supposed to explore "the represented, imagined, and speculated dimensions" of mobilities, for instance, "by employing cultural-political, literary, and philosophical analysis and interpretation."[5] Among those characteristically humanistic approaches, this paper assumes the phenomenological perspective to consider "the most psychologically relevant aspects of the driving situation, namely the experiences of the

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[2] Mimi Sheller and John Urry, "The New Mobilities Paradigm," in *Environment and Planning A,* 38 (2006), 214–215.

[3] Monika Büscher, Paul Coulton, Christos Efstratiou, Hans Gellersen, and Drew Hemment, "Connected, Computed, Collective: Smart Mobilities," in *Mobilities: New Perspectives on Transport and Society*, ed. by Margaret Grieco and John Urry (London: Routledge, 2015), 135.

[4] Mimi Sheller, "Automotive Emotions: Feeling the Car," in *Theory, Culture & Society*, 21 (2004), 222.

[5] Jooyoung Kim, Taehee Kim, Jinhyoung Lee, and Inseop Shin, "Exploring Humanistic Layers of Urban Travel: Representation, Imagination, and Speculation," in *Transfers*, 9 (2019), 99.

driver" that "traditional, quantitative data arguably fail to grasp."[6] The case of the autonomous vehicle, "a topical example of a socially embedded and potentially ubiquitous AI technology,"[7] is taken as the subject of the inquiry since it appears to be of great significance for future mobilities.

Many discussions have been made about autonomous vehicles, mainly regarding their technological developments and their significances in broader social contexts. About the latter, a particular focus has been laid on regulating autonomous vehicles, especially from a legal and ethical perspective, since if the driver's "responsibilities, rights and authority that go with taking control of a vehicle would be denied," "the moral status of the driver" would be removed.[8] In the current discussion, this problem is referred to mainly regarding the responsibility for harms and damages an accident may cause; issues of whom to blame among all the agents' involved in operating the vehicle, for instance, the car manufacturer, the human driver, the self-driving system on the car, or the transport planner. In those discussions, the philosophical, mostly ethical reasoning has mainly concentrated on applying, for instance, the trolley problem to the autonomous vehicle. In this regard, it is barely remembered that these *normative* issues concerning legal and ethical responsibility are inseparably linked to and, thus, supposed to be preceded by *descriptive* issues on the action of *agents* operating autonomous vehicles. This paper refers to one of these issues: the driver's sense of agency, in short, the agent's awareness of initiating, executing, and controlling voluntary action within autonomous vehicles. This, in turn, will play a substantial role in attributing the responsibility relevant to legal and ethical issues.[9]

Driving Agent on an Autonomous Vehicle

An autonomous vehicle, also known as a self-driving car or a driverless car, is a vehicle that drives itself autonomously without a driver; it is able "to operate without human intervention for extended periods of time

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[6] Kjell Ivar Øvergård, "A Video-Based Phenomenological Method for Evaluation of Driving Experience in Staged or Simulated Environments," in *Embodied Minds – Technical Environments: Conceptual Tools for Analysis, Design and Training*, ed. by Thomas Hoff and Cato Alexander Bjørkli (Trondheim: Tapir Academic Press, 2008).

[7] Martin Cunneen, Martin Mullins, and Finbarr Murphy, "Autonomous Vehicles and Embedded Artificial Intelligence: The Challenges of Framing Machine Driving Decisions," in *Applied Artificial Intelligence*, 33 (2019), 707.

[8] Eric Laurier and Tim Dant, "What We Do Whilst Driving: Towards the Driverless Car," in *Mobilities: New Perspectives on Transport and Society*, ed. by Margaret Grieco and John Urry (London: Routledge, 2015), 240.

[9] Patrick Haggard and Manos Tsakiris, "The Experience of Agency: Feelings, Judgments, and Responsibility," in *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 18 (2009).

and to perform a broad range of actions,"[10] equipped with "a complex system that necessarily involves sensors, analytics, actuators and decision making elements, in which the default setting means humans are not directly involved in decision making."[11] Especially with the convergence of information and communication technologies and intelligent transport systems embedded into autonomous vehicles, "an epochal shift" of the automobility system being "reconstituted as a network system rather than as separate 'iron cages,' as a potentially integrated nexus rather than as a parallel series" is imminent.[12] The introduction of autonomous vehicles has further potential to impact developing carsharing systems at the heart of *new mobility concepts* and changing public transportation.[13]

However, the question of who the driving agent of the autonomous vehicle is remains more complicated and significant than it seems at first glance. At the level of "full automation" or "high automation," which will be discussed later, far from "driving" in the sense of freely performed human action, driving in which a human agent is by any means involved is unnecessary. Thus, the problem of the sense of agency during driving as an action freely performed by or by any means relevant to a human agent can be only at issue at the lower levels of driving automation on which this paper intends to focus.

Meanwhile, a human driver responsible for driving is the person using and controlling the vehicle and, through his/her sense of agency, the person being aware of his/her control. The nature and degree of this responsibility for a driving situation vary, depending on the various driving automation levels. Hence, to deal with these descriptive features of agency in the context of autonomous vehicles, the role of a human driver/occupant at each level is to be addressed. In the standard classification system published by the Society of Automotive Engineers International, six levels of driving automation ranging from "no automation" to "full automation" are identified:[14]

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[10] Patrick Lin, "Why Ethics Matters for Autonomous Cars," in *Autonomous Driving: Technical, Legal and Social Aspects*, ed. by Markus Maurer, Chris Gerdes, Barbara Lenz, and Hermann Winner (Cham: Springer Nature, 2016), 69.

[11] Adam Henschke, "Trust and Resilient Autonomous Driving Systems," in *Ethics and Information Technology*, 22 (2020).

[12] John Urry, *Mobilities* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 134.

[13] Barbara Lenz and Eva Fraedrich, "New Mobility Concepts and Autonomous Driving: The Potential for Change," in *Autonomous Driving: Technical, Legal and Social Aspects*, ed. by Markus Maurer, Chris Gerdes, Barbara Lenz, and Hermann Winner (Cham: Springer Nature, 2016), 69.

[14] SAE International, "SAE International Releases Updated Visual Chart for Its 'Levels of Driving Automation' Standard for Self-Driving Vehicles," in *SAE.org*, (11 December 2018), <https://www.sae.org/news/press-room/2018/12/sae-international-releases-updated-visual-

Level 0 (No Automation): The vehicle system performs only auxiliary functions such as emergency notification. The human driver performs all driving tasks such as steering and accelerating/decelerating, taking full responsibility for all aspects of varying driving situations.

Level 1 (Driver Assistance): An advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) can assist the human driver with either steering or accelerating/decelerating, but not both simultaneously. The human driver still handles all steering and accelerating/decelerating while monitoring the surrounding environment, taking full responsibility for all aspects of varying driving situations.

Level 2 (Partial Automation): An ADAS on the vehicle can control both steering and accelerating/decelerating simultaneously under some circumstances. The human driver is allowed to be disengaged from some tasks but must continue to pay full attention to monitoring the driving situation to take control of the vehicle back, if needed immediately. The human driver still takes full responsibility for most safety-critical functions and all monitoring of the environment.

Level 3 (Conditional Automation): An automated driving system (ADS) on the vehicle can itself perform all aspects of the driving task under some circumstances and is responsible for driving control and detecting variables while driving. While, up to Level 2, the system assists in some of the driving tasks, the system performs, from Level 3, entire driving tasks under some circumstances. For instance, the car can change lanes on its own, overtake the vehicle ahead, or avoid obstacles. The human driver must be ready to take control back, if needed, but does not need to continually monitor the driving situation, in contrast to Level 2. The driver's attention is still critical but can disengage from "safety-critical" functions like braking.

Level 4 (High Automation): An ADS on the vehicle can itself perform all driving tasks and monitor the driving situation under certain circumstances, and, contrary to Level 3, should itself respond safely even in a dangerous situation. The human driver need not pay attention to anything. However, in certain conditions, such as bad weather, driver intervention may be required, so a driving control device, such as a steering wheel, is necessary.

Level 5 (Full Automation): An ADS on the vehicle can do all the driving under all circumstances. The human driver turns to a passenger,[15] never involved in driving except deciding the intended destination. This level of autonomous driving requires absolutely no human attention. Compared

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chart-for-its-%E2%80%9Clevels-of-driving-automation%E2%80%9D-standard-for-self-driving-vehicles>.

[15] Tim Dant, "Drivers and Passengers," in *The Routledge Handbook of Mobilities*, ed. by Peter Adey, David Bissell, Kevin Hannam, Peter Merriman, and Mimi Sheller (London: Routledge: 2014), 368.

to Level 4, the ADS at this level has no restrictions on areas where autonomous driving is possible. There is no need for pedals, brakes, or a steering wheel, as the ADS controls all critical tasks, monitoring the environment and identifying unique driving conditions like traffic jams.

At Levels 4 and 5, the vehicle is capable of all of driving tasks such as steering, braking, accelerating, monitoring as well as responding to events, determining when to change lanes, turn, and use signals, either under certain circumstances in the case of Level 4 or under all circumstances when Level 5 is reached. For that reason, although a full-fledged exploration of the driver's experience in an autonomous vehicle may require reviewing all of these levels, these levels, to which most discussions from the ethical and legal perspective are typically devoted, are not relevant to the state of affairs under current discussion: the sense of agency pertinent to the human driver's responsibility. In any case, these driving automation levels are technically challenging to materialize in a short period, and it also remains controversial whether materializing them is desirable at all.

Therefore, Levels 1 to 3 are most relevant for this paper. Among these levels, Level 3 is of particular interest, since, at this level, an awkward demand comes up; being allowed to be "disengaged" from most of the driving situation, the human driver must intermittently be "somehow engaged" in it to respond swiftly to changes and take control back at any time when the ADS requests to do so. However, prior to dealing with how this demand could be met, the sense of agency existent in two other cases will be briefly discussed, that is, in the case of bodily movement and of manual driving (Level 0) to identify how and to what extent human driver's sense of agency changes in the automated driving situation.

Sense of Agency in the Case of Bodily Movements

The concept of *kinesthesis* may hold some clues to elucidate the sense of agency in bodily movements. In this paragraph, this concept is explained not in driving situations but in everyday situations, then applied to driving situations.[16] Kinesthesis is basically "the sixth sense that informs one what the body is doing in space through the sensations of movement registered in his joints, muscles, tendons and so on."[17] This concept is initially defined in this narrow sense as "the sensation of movement, particularly the sense of muscular effort relating to voluntary embodied movements." However, it can be extended beyond this narrow meaning "simply associated with the

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[16] For a more detailed description of kinesthesis, see Taehee Kim, "Significance of Kinaesthesis for Mobility Humanities: A Phenomenological Contribution to the New Mobilities Paradigm," in *Universitas-Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture*, 47 (2020).

[17] Urry, *Mobilities*, 48.

muscular sensations of those who move" toward a broader spectrum, namely, "movement enacted, felt, perceived, expressed, metered, choreographed, appreciated and desired," which presumably has the potential of being "a common thread running through much arts and humanities research on mobility."[18]

This concept, which was initially coined in physiology and used in physiology and psychology, was appropriated by Edmund Husserl, who imbued it with philosophical or phenomenological meaning. In Husserl's schema, it plays a significant role not only in the sensation of one's bodily movement but for the perception of external things. Husserl's discussion of kinesthesis draws on philosophical thought experiments about how visual perception of external three-dimensional objects is possible at all, even though, in a single moment, the object shows only a single aspect, a single adumbration (*Abschattung*) in the Husserlian term, from the singular perspective of the observer. At that moment, for instance, only (a part of) the facade of a house comes into the observer's sight. However, not only this single part but the entire object, including the side and rear, somehow come into the observer's awareness or are "perceived" in a broader sense. How is that possible?

The answer that Husserl proposes draws on the function of kinesthesis for perception. Although you see exclusively (a part of) an object, *if* you turn your eyes a little, *then* another part of the facade that was just on the periphery of your visual field or entirely outside your visual field now comes into the center of the visual field. Not only that, *if* you move around the house, *then* you can see the rear aspect of the house. Concerning this functional relation of if-then, the object's sensations (*aesthesis*) vary in an orderly manner, according to the observer's bodily movements (*kines*). Kinesthesis refers to the implicit knowledge of these functional relations between voluntary movements and an object's sensations, without which the "skillful coping"[19] with things is not at all conceivable.

This notion of kinesthesis is relevant to our discussion to the extent that such an implicit knowledge of these functional relations implies the freedom of action, as Husserl emphasizes: "At the same time, it follows that functions of spontaneity belong to every perception. The processes of the kinesthetic sensations are free here, and this freedom in the consciousness of

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[18] Peter Merriman and Lynne Pearce, "Mobility and the Humanities," in *Mobility and the Humanities,* ed. by Peter Merriman and Lynne Pearce (London: Routledge, 2018).

[19] Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action*, ed. by Mark Wrathall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

their unfolding is an essential part of the constitution of spatiality."[20] This emphasis on the freedom to move that is by definition implied in kinesthesis means this notion plays an essential role in the discussion of agency. Experiencing your bodily movements, not merely as something that is happening to you (sense of ownership), but as something you are voluntarily doing (sense of agency), [21] presupposes the kinesthesis; you have to move voluntarily and know the functional relations between these voluntary movements and the sensations caused by these movements. Given this kinesthesis, you know that you are the "author" of this action in most cases of action, even if you do not need to reflect on that explicitly. Given this kinesthesis, in most cases of action, you know that you are the "author" of this action, even if you do not need to reflect on that explicitly.

No matter how critical such analyses are, identifying the role of kinesthesis in creating the sense of agency is one thing; identifying how the sense of agency is structured is another. This sense of agency is indeed so intricate as to be "the product of several contributory elements: efferent signals, sensory (afferent) feedback, and *intentional* feedback, which is perceptual in nature."[22]

Firstly, a sense of agency or "a phenomenal experience of agency" may be generated by efferent signals, "the signals the brain sends to the muscles to make them move."[23] That is because these signals at the subpersonal or unconscious level are, though in a complex non-linear manner, related to intentions and volitions to move oneself and to immediate anticipations, i.e., protentions in Husserl's terminology, of imminent bodily movements and their corresponding external results at the personal or conscious level.

Secondly, a sense of agency may also be produced by sensory feedback, "visual and proprioceptive/kinesthetic information that tells me that I'm moving,"[24] that corresponds to the proprioception or kinesthesis in the above-mentioned narrow sense transmitted through muscle sensation or joint sensation. Sensory information transmitted from these sensations alone can indeed generate a sense of ownership, the awareness of one's moving body, but not a sense of agency because it can be transmitted even when a specific external force involuntarily moves one's body. Therefore, the sense

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[20] Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Book II*, trans. by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 63.

[21] Tim Bayne, "The Phenomenology of Agency," in *Philosophy Compass*, 3 (2008), 183.

[22] Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 186.

[23] *Ibid*., 182.

[24] *Ibid*., 183.

of agency is possible only when such information counts truly as *feedback* from efferent signals related to the voluntary movements.

Thirdly, a sense of agency may be generated by intentional feedback, "some ... sense that my action is having an effect,"[25] both perceptual and practical. The former is the awareness that one's bodily movements motivate changes in perception, while the latter is the awareness that one's bodily movements motivate changes in things in themselves, such as their displacement or deformation.

The sense of agency issued by voluntary bodily actions involves efferent signals, afferent feedback, and intentional (perceptual and practical) feedback.[26] However, their precise relations discussed among neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and phenomenologists are not pursued further in this paper. Instead, these insights will be used to account for the sense of agency felt in a driving situation.

Sense of Agency in the Case of Manual Driving

The first concern is to what extent the above-mentioned accounts for the sense of agency might be applied to the case of manual driving. The implicit knowledge of the functional relationship between our voluntary bodily movements and sensations enables us to cope with the world skillfully. Therefore, if we are skilled drivers, we experience the cars as extending our body or "dilating our being-in-the-world," as Maurice Merleau-Ponty puts it.

> To get used to a hat, a car, a stick is to be transplanted into them, or conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of our own body. Habit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-the-world or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments.[27]

In the same vein, Don Ihde's phenomenological insights suggest that the car becomes a symbiotic extension of the driver's body.[28] In this "embodiment relation," human beings and technologies such as cars they are

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[25] *Ibid.*, 186.

[26] These three elements of the sense of agency are closely related to the concept of kinesthesis construed by Husserl, consisting of the (self-)consciousness of the perceiver's bodily movements and the consciousness of external objects' perceptual changes. Namely, the former consciousness is caused by efferent signals and sensory feedback, while the latter by intentional feedback.

[27] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge, 1962), 143.

[28] Don Ihde, "The Experience of Technology: Human-Machine Relations," in *Cultural Hermeneutics*, 2 (1974), 272.

riding form an embodied unity which, as a whole, is directed at the world. As we speak with other people through the phone, rather than speak to the phone itself, and as we look through a microscope rather than at it, the car is *between* the human and the external world, being a transparent means of experience.[29]

Experienced drivers have, in most driving cases, tacit know-how as the procedural knowledge, for instance, of the size and shape of their "extended body," namely, the car they are driving, so they can easily pass narrow alleyways and perform parallel parking in a small parking lot, without an enormous explicit and conscious effort. Don Ihde explains this skilled coping of drivers as follows:

> One embodies the car, too, in such activities as parallel parking: when well embodied, one feels rather than sees the distance between car and curb – one's bodily sense is "extended" to the parameters of the driver-car "body."[30]

Merleau-Ponty finds a direct analogy of this skill of experienced drivers to our everyday actions.

> The driver assembles their learnt skill with the functionality of a car to be able to enter a narrow opening and see that I can "get through" without comparing the width of the opening with that of the wings, just as I go through a doorway without checking the width of the doorway against my body.[31]

In this context, the claim might be made that the driver-car has the same kind of implicit body-awareness or body schema (*schéma corporel*)[32] as the one that enables us, in everyday actions, to recognize the affordances that surroundings exercise and to react appropriately to them. This body schema is a crucial element of the driver-car's kinesthesis. Owing to the "extended body schema," if you will, experienced drivers generally possess an

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[29] Don Ihde, *Technics and Praxis: A Philosophy of Technology* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), 8. For a concise summary of three possible relations between human beings and technology suggested by Ihde, see Benjiemen A. Labastin, "A Search for a Model of Critical Engagement with Technology: Feenberg's Instrumentalization Theory or MASIPAG's Struggle against Corporate Control of Agricultural Technologies?," in *KRITIKE: An Online Journal of Philosophy*, 13 (2019), 95.

[30] Don Ihde, *Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 74.

[31] Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 143.

[32] Cf. *Ibid.*, 98.

"extended kinesthesis" or, as Nigel Thrift puts it, an "unnatural kinesthetics of the car ride" "in which the identity of the person and car kinesthetically intertwine,"[33] so that they can act quickly and intuitively.

Thus, we can distinguish the kinesthesis of the driver and the extended kinesthesis of the driver-car. The drivers are aware of their bodily actions with the former kinesthesis, such as turning the steering wheel left or right, as well as the resulting perceptual and practical changes such as the car's turning left or right. Further, the driver-car is, with the latter kinesthesis, *aware* of its turning left or right and the resulting perceptual changes in the landscape surrounding it. In other words, the drivers possess two kinds of kinesthesis: a kinesthesis in a proper sense regarding the functional relations between their bodily actions and the changes in the car's state, as well as an extended or unnatural kinesthesis regarding the functional relations between the "actions" of the driver-car's extended body and the changes in the environment. Creating an analogy between the kinesthesis of everyday bodily actions and the extended kinesthesis of manual driving, the accounts of kinesthesis in manual driving can include the elements mentioned earlier: efferent signals, sensory feedback, and (perceptual and practical) intentional feedback.

Firstly, when drivers move their body for driving, for instance, when they step on the gas pedal or the brake pedal for longitudinal movements of the car or operate the steering wheel for lateral movements of it, efferent signals at the subpersonal level are transmitted from the motor area of the brain to the muscles. These signals are correlated to intentions and volitions to bring about specific actions that can be peculiarly conscious at the personal or phenomenological level. Novice drivers, in particular, are likely to have a higher degree of such conscious intentions and volitions so that they have to continuously give conscious efforts to come up with, for example, how much to turn the wheel along a curved road. By contrast, skilled drivers process this work nearly *automatically* so that the intentions and volitions are barely conscious.[34]

Secondly, these bodily movements then result in the movements of the steering wheel or of the gas/brake pedal, which in turn cause sensory afferent feedback, in other words, proprioceptions transmitted through muscle sensation or joint sensation. For both novice and experienced drivers, this feedback is usually *transparent* unless attention is required, for instance, if some sensory-motor incongruence is felt.

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[33] Nigel Thrift, "Driving in the City," in *Theory, Culture & Society*, 21 (2004), 46–47 (as cited in Sheller, "Automotive Emotions," 228).

[34] This is well shown in the renowned case of the long-distance truck driver proposed by David M. Armstrong. See David M. Armstrong, "The Nature of Mind," in *Arts: The Proceedings of the Sydney University Arts Association*, 3 (1966), 46.

Thirdly, the drivers' bodily movements bring about some intentional feedback that can be classified in two ways: from where and for whom they are transmitted.[35] Concerning the first way of classification, first of all, sensory feedback from (parts of) the vehicle can be called immediate: the visual appearance and haptic smoothness of a rotating steering wheel, the felt resistance of the gas and brake pedal, the sound of the engine, or changes in the sense of balance resulting from a sharp turn. Then, sensory feedback from the environment can be called mediate: the acoustic and haptic changes felt from the transformation of the roadbed or the visual changes in landscape resulting from the driver's movement.

Concerning the second mode of classification, feedback for novice drivers or experienced drivers is different in most cases. For instance, sensory feedback from the steering wheel must be quite apparent to novice drivers, who consistently make an effort to find out how much to turn the steering wheel when going around a sharp curve and flex their arms to turn the wheel that much. By contrast, experienced drivers usually are not that conscious of such feedback, since (parts of) the car feels literally like their (extended) body; it is analogous to the fact that we are, under normal circumstances, not conscious of our hand or mouth when drinking a cup of water with our hand and mouth. Still, experienced drivers are more likely to aware of the minute irregularities and abnormalities of their car or the familiar environment because their attentional resources are not exhausted by relentless efforts to deal with operating the vehicle itself.[36]

Having described the sense of agency based on the kinesthesis in the case of manual driving, that is, at Level 0 of driving automation, we can move, with this knowledge, to the case of autonomous driving.

Sense of Agency in the Case of Autonomous Driving

A sense of responsibility is given by being "vividly aware of being in control of our actions" resulting, "first, from intentional binding which creates a perception of agency, linking an intentional action to its outcome and, second, from the counterfactual reasoning that we could have chosen some other action."[37] Thus, a sense of agency is not a sufficient, but at least a

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[35] It is important to note that intentional feedback is feedback from the vehicle or environment grasped by the driver's intentionality, whereas sensory feedback is the feedback from within the driver's body.

[36] A real expert in driving would be defined, according to Dreyfus's model of skill acquisition, regarding four qualities: situational recollection, holistic recognition, intuitive decision, and absorbed awareness. See Stuart E. Dreyfus and Hubert L. Dreyfus, *A Five-Stage Model of the Mental Activities Involved in Directed Skill Acquisition* (Berkeley: California University Berkeley Operations Research Center, 1980), 15.

[37] Chris D. Frith, "Action, Agency and Responsibility," in *Neuropsychologia*, 55 (2014), 137.

necessary condition for feeling responsibility from a first-person perspective. Given this, and the fact that technological developments have "the potential to turn all drivers into passengers,"[38] it would be strange for mere occupants of autonomous vehicles to have such a feeling.

The higher the level of driving automation is, the less the vehicle occupants engage in driving or, the less they can feel responsible for driving. At the final level of full automation, they need nothing but to have "intentionality of purpose," i.e., "the directing of consciousness to where the mobile subject is to go," without having "intentionality of progress," i.e., "the directing of consciousness to how mobility will be realized." Furthermore, "even the agency of the passenger to select their route may be restricted once intentionality of progress is managed on a collective rather than an individual basis"[39] in an intelligent transport network system. In this case, it would be difficult to define the scope of the individual responsibility, for an individual traffic participant can rarely have responsibility from the ethical point of view, if "you can want an outcome without wanting to produce that outcome" preferring "that the outcome merely materialize."[40]

In this respect, the descriptive issues of how and to what extent drivers or occupants of an autonomous vehicle can have a sense of agency are closely connected to the normative issues of who could and should take responsibility for driving and, especially, for a traffic accident. Whereas the minimal precondition for an agent to take responsibility is that "the agent must have control over the action and know what she is doing,"[41] it is the latter condition of knowledge that refers to the sense of agency we are discussing. Moreover, in that sense, it can be assumed that the sense of agency will gradually decrease as the level of driving automation gets higher from Level 0 to Level 5. Then, provided drivers lose a certain degree of their sense of agency in an autonomous vehicle, how far are they supposed to take responsibility, and how far are they relieved of their responsibility? Even at Levels 1 and 2, while drivers have almost the same basic sense of agency as at Level 0, such functions as a lane-keeping assist system or an automatic braking system can make the driver feel restricted from freely acting and, therefore, limit their sense of agency.[42] The transition from Level 2 to Level 3 is more dubious. At Level 3, ADS on the vehicle alone is responsible for driving performances, and drivers come to be allowed to take their hand off

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[38] Dant, "Drivers and Passengers," 368.

[39] *Ibid.*, 370–371.

[40] Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2011), 62.

[41] Mark Coeckelbergh, "Responsibility and the Moral Phenomenology of Using Self-driving Cars," in *Applied Artificial Intelligence*, 30 (2016), 751.

[42] Bruno Berberian, Jean-Christophe Sarrazin, Patrick Le Blaye, and Patrick Haggard, "Automation Technology and Sense of Control: A Window on Human Agency," in *PLOS One*, 7 (2012).

the steering wheel and be exempted from constant monitoring the driving situation. Still, if the system's requirements are exceeded, drivers are requested by the system to intervene. Until drivers take the control back, however, certain safety risks can arise. Some manufacturers even decided to skip Level 3 altogether to avoid these risks,[43] while others are somewhat optimistic.[44] It seems contradictory to let the driver's attention roam free, yet at the same time to request they pay enough attention to allow them to engage in a critical situation promptly. These issues are crucial because it could be considered excessively demanding for drivers who are not responsible at all for driving tasks to be unfailingly attentive and ready for a specific intervention; their sense of agency will likely have disappeared or at least decreased[45] because, disengaged from the driving tasks, they do not possess any kinesthesis. This problem of the "irony of automation" results in "difficulties in maintaining an appropriate degree of situation and system awareness."[46]

How could drivers, despite their lack of kinesthesis and their corresponding lack of sense of agency, still maintain *situation and system awareness* and the required kind or degree of attention to the driving situation which changes moment by moment? For drivers to maintain situational awareness (SA), their cognitive activities are to be situated "in the context of task-relevant inputs and outputs."[47] In other words, the situation relevant to these driving tasks does not refer to all the environmental factors surrounding the driver-car but the totality of task-relevant factors, among others. For a driver, for example, road conditions or traffic signal systems are elements of the situation in this sense, but road colors, pedestrians who do not try to cross the road, or pedestrian overpass, etc., are generally excluded from this situation. Still, the situation is continuously changing. In most cases, the other cars in front of the vehicle belong to the situation. In contrast, the cars behind the vehicle, except for the car immediately behind the vehicle representing the potential risk of a rear impact, are instantly excluded from the situational awareness because they are not relevant to driving tasks.

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[43] Russ Mitchell, "When Robots and Humans Take Turns at the Wheel," in *Los Angeles Times* (22 September 2016), <https://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-driverless-levels-tesla-ford-gm-mercedes-volvo-google-20160922-snap-story.html>.

[44] Michael Martines, "Ford Rethinks Level 3 Autonomy," in *Automotive News Europe* (20 January 2019), <https://europe.autonews.com/automakers/ford-rethinks-level-3-autonomy>.

[45] Wen, Yoshihiro Kuroki, and Hajime Asama, "The Sense of Agency in Driving Automation," in *Frontiers in Psychology*, 10 (2019), 9.

[46] Ingo Wolf, "The Interaction Between Humans and Autonomous Agents," in *Autonomous Driving: Technical, Legal and Social Aspects*, ed. by Markus Maurer, Chris Gerdes, Barbara Lenz, and Hermann Winner (Cham: Springer Nature, 2016), 104.

[47] Margaret Wilson, "Six Views of Embodied Cognition," in *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, 9 (2002), 626.

Based on this notion of the situation as the totality of task-relevant factors, three kinds of attention can be distinguished to tackle the problem of Level 3 that, while drivers are exempted from the duty to attend to driving, specific attention is still required to engage in a critical situation. In Aron Gurwitsch's phenomenological analyses on this sense of attention, the scopes to which the attention is directed are distinguished into the "theme," "thematic field," and "margin,"[48] which correspond to the categories of Edmund Husserl's terminology, "primary attention," "the secondary attention relevant to the situation," and "the secondary attention irrelevant to the situation,"[49] respectively.

The second kind of attention, i.e., the relevant secondary attention to the thematic field, can count as required of a driver riding the autonomous vehicle at Level 3. In other words, directing primary attention to some driving-irrelevant tasks, the driver must continuously pay secondary attention to the driving situation as a thematic field. A question that immediately arises is this: How is this possible without any real voluntary action for driving?

To answer this question, some experimental findings concerning so-called "agency distortion" can be used; experimental manipulations to deliberately bring about mismatches between predicted and actual outcomes of bodily actions can result in significant decreases of the sense of agency.[50] In other words, so long as predicted and actual outcomes properly match each other, the sense of agency increases, even though the subjects are not really in control of the outcomes.[51] If that is the case, the question about the possibility of keeping the relevant secondary attention to the driving situation without any real voluntary action moves to other questions. They are questions such as how to make drivers' predicted and actual outcomes properly match with each other even without drivers' real control over the vehicle; how, in the first place, to make the drivers keep predicting, through their relevant secondary attention, the outcomes of their bodily movements or movements of the driver-car.

One suggestion is to provide the drivers with a joint control or a "we-mode" which enables them to control the car together with the system on an autonomous vehicle to preserve the sense of agency. For that purpose, "the

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[48] Aron Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin*, ed. by R. M. Zaner (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 53.

[49] Edmund Husserl, *Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893–1912)*, ed. by Thomas Vongehr and Regula Giuliani, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), 96–100.

[50] Atsushi Sato and Asako Yasuda, "Illusion of Sense of Self-agency: Discrepancy between the Predicted and Actual Sensory Consequences of Actions Modulates the Sense of Self-agency, but Not the Sense of Self-ownership," in *Cognition*, 94 (2005).

[51] Daniel M. Wegner and Thalia Wheatley, "Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will," in *American Psychologist*, 54 (1999).

system should not take over all the control from a driver," but merely "detect the driver's intention and assist in its fulfillment without disturbing the sense of agency."[52] This suggestion aims to restrict the system's role, which seems more or less unrealistic considering current developments of autonomous vehicles.

Another suggestion to solve this problem is to provide the drivers "with different types of information such as a status update and a suggested course of action" to increase situational awareness, namely, "the perception and comprehension of information that allows an individual to project future courses of action needed to respond to a dynamic environment."[53] This suggestion appears, initially at least, to be more promising than the first one. However, it is difficult to tell as to what extent this suggestion is consistent with the autonomous vehicle's promised advantages. For example, driving in general provides the drivers "with a unique opportunity to think about things other than driving."[54] Cars are not only "a prosthesis of the human body" but also "a prosthesis of the human mind," which allows drivers to engage in secondary or driving-irrelevant tasks such as free-floating or deliberative "everyday cognitive journeys" or "mind travels."[55] Autonomous vehicles can extend and enrich such experiences by granting drivers more disengagement from the duties of driving. It is questionable whether providing the driver with more information can avoid conflict with such promises.

Another suggestion is to reinforce user design that serves to keep the driver's sense of agency.[56] The measure to reinforce user design may be a placebo effect employing, for instance, "placebo buttons" or a "truly functionless steering wheel."[57] Albeit this kind of attention-grabbing suggestion is technically feasible, the question remains of how much it is consistent with the promised advantages of the autonomous vehicle.

Heretofore, no satisfactory solution seems possible to keep the driver's sense of agency at Level 3 for safety reasons unless this level is altogether renounced to skip to Level 4 or 5, which is, as aforementioned, what some carmakers are doing. This paper, committed to speculative rather

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[52] Wen, Kuroki, and Asama, "Sense of Agency in Driving Automation," 9.

[53] Luke Petersen, Lionel Robert, X. Jessie Yang, and Dawn M. Tilbury, "Situational Awareness, Driver's Trust in Automated Driving Systems and Secondary Task Performance," in *SAE International Journal of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles*, Forthcoming (2019), 4.

[54] Lynne Pearce, *Drivetime: Literary Excursions in Automotive Consciousness* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press: 2016), ix.

[55] *Ibid.*, 1.

[56] See James W. Moore, "What Is the Sense of Agency and Why Does It Matter?," in *Frontiers in Psychology*, 7 (2016), 6–7.

[57] Tim Hwang, "Back Stage at the Machine Theater - A Look at the Theatrics Guiding User Interaction," in *Medium* (11 April 2015), <https://medium.com/re-form/back-stage-at-the-machine-theater-530f973db8d2>.

than technical discussions, cannot investigate how to materialize the possible technical solutions. However, some further discussion might be useful to cast light upon this urgent problem, drawing on Husserl's insights into how it might be possible for a passenger to keep a kinesthetic sense and a sense of agency, as quoted below.

> If I am seated in the train car, however, then "I move with it," but without kinaesthetic change. In the first place, stationary kinaesthetic states, connected to [the car's] stationary images, motivate stationary Objects. Here I have a stationary kinaesthetic state connected to moving images of the surroundings and to stationary images of the car and of my Body. Yet this does precisely not mean that the surroundings move but, on the contrary, that they are stationary. And it does not mean that I am stationary but that I move (am moved). Should we say that the car, with its states of movement, or with the corresponding phenomenological changes, assumes the function of kinaesthetic sensation?[58]

When passengers are seated and traveling in the train car (*Wagen*), the kinesthetic state regarding their body in a proper sense is no doubt stationary. Still, based on the fact that images of the moving surroundings undergo certain phenomenological changes corresponding to the car's movement, Husserl claims the possibility for the car to assume the function of kinesthesis. Notwithstanding the interrogative sentence at the end of the quotation reveals certain hesitation, Husserl argues elsewhere that "I am appropriated to the vehicle." "Equipment in the most original sense" is "physical objects, with which both the most original and immediate bodily action and the next mediate bodily action affecting the external things gain the new form." This new form, "incorporating a thing which extends the body, can more effectively and purposefully affect the external things." Among the various kinds of equipment (*Zeug*), the vehicle (*Fahr-zeug*) is "unified with the whole body" in contrast to a tool (*Handwerk-zeug*) unified only with a part of my body. Thus, "non-bodily things" such as the vehicle "are not kinesthetic limbs and do not possess own kinesthesis but do in a sense take part in the kinesthesis," so that "now the body itself can be considered equivalent to the non-bodily things."[59]

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[58] Edmund Husserl, *Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907*, trans. by R. Rojcewicz (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 243.

[59] Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929–1935*, ed. by Iso Kern (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1973), 276–277. (My own translation.)

Of course, this statement of Husserl seems to be contrary to his original account of kinesthesis, suggesting that we become mere passengers without any sense of agency once this kinesthesis is entirely removed. At the same time, it seems that even a mere passenger actually preserves some sense of agency. It happens now and then that if a traffic light turns red and the driver does not slow down for whatever reason, the passenger in the front seat urgently intervenes to warn them to stop the car. Paying attention to and participating in the situation somehow, they are continually anticipating both the car's movement and the intentional feedback corresponding to this movement. Then, not actually executing their kinesthesis at all, this passenger could be said to still preserve their agency to some extent based on the past kinesthetic experiences pertinent to these situations.

Indeed, despite Husserl's more or less speculative statement about riding in a train, it is not ultimately settled whether and how the mere passenger of a vehicle without the potential to intervene directly in the movement of the car could still constitute the driver-car hybrid. Some relevant qualitative research or scientific experiments in psychology and cognitive science, for instance, should be conducted for such thought-experiments to be confirmed or dismissed. Notwithstanding the general difficulties involved in this problem, we could understand such "hybrid assemblages" at least at Level 3 as assuming and even facilitating the "kinaesthetic sense" by extending "human capacities into and across the external world."[60]

Concerning whether and how mere occupants of an autonomous vehicle may preserve the attention on the situation, it is worth considering the phenomenological reflection on conventional driving by Lynne Pearce. Even the drivers of a conventional car do not pay full attention to the road but "think—and converse—about non-driving-related matters, as well as perform secondary manual tasks, without necessarily compromising our safety."[61] These phenomena could amount even to daydreaming because the "supervisory attention system" is still ready to "spring into action," if needed.[62] In this context, it is interesting whether this ability is available only for experienced drivers or even for novice drivers or even persons without a driving license in an autonomous vehicle. Putting aside this question, the answer of which may require further empirical research, though, this "ability to pursue 'secondary tasks' while driving"[63] is undoubtedly an illuminating analogy for the driver or occupant in an autonomous vehicle at Level 3.

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[60] Urry, *Mobilities*, 48.

[61] Pearce, *Drivetime,* 162.

[62] *Ibid*., 164.

[63] *Ibid*.

Correspondingly, even as an occupant or a passenger on an autonomous vehicle at Level 3, we can still possess a sort of kinesthesis and sense of agency by being unified with the car, which assumes the kinesthetic function. The car as driver's extended body or the driver-car is "neither a thing nor a person; it is an assembled social being that takes on properties of both and cannot exist without both."[64] Resorting to the "distinctive ontology" that is generated by the "a metaphysical merger, an intertwining of the identities of the driver and a car […] in the form of a person-thing, a humanized car or, alternatively, an automobilized person,"[65] is needed; how the driver's stable attention in this driver-car assemblage is to materialize remains a research subject.

Concluding Remarks

The automobility system as "the predominant global form of 'quasi-private' mobility that subordinates other mobilities of walking, cycling, travelling by rail and so on"[66] is approaching an unprecedented breakthrough; at the core of which autonomous vehicles will be organized into a whole networked system of mobilities. This paper addressed this subject matter in terms of an issue closely related to the legal and ethical debates on the responsibility of autonomous driving, the driver's sense of agency. From a phenomenological point of view, this paper dealt with this issue from the perspective of everyday bodily movement, manual driving, and autonomous driving, focusing on Level 3 of driving automation to analyze the problems that can arise in the transfer of control from system to the human driver. The question was how the human driver, not being fully engaged in driving tasks, can still attend to the driving situation to intervene and take control back, if needed. As a philosophical speculation, this paper, far from being committed to offering any concrete technical suggestions, has suggested an ontological possibility to consider the driver-car assemblage as an agent that pays relevant secondary attention to and is responsible for the driving situation.

An obvious desideratum of this speculation is that, being a phenomenological approach in methodology, it is not a qualitative approach per se. In this respect, it is hoped that this paper's results be tested and

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[64] Tim Dant, "The Driver-Car," in *Theory, Culture & Society*, 21 (2004). Not only for driving in itself, but also "in their interactions, drivers merge with their cars" which means that they "seek intelligibility mainly from the external automobile body." Büscher, Coulton, Efstratiou, Gellersen, and Hemment, "Connected, Computed, Collective: Smart Mobilities," 139.

[65] Jack Katz, *How Emotions Work* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 33 (as cited in Sheller, "Automotive Emotions," 228).

[66] John Urry, "The 'System' of Automobility," in *Theory, Culture & Society*, 21 (2004), 26.

supplemented with concrete qualitative studies targeting the drivers or the users of autonomous vehicles. Furthermore, while taking for granted that the sense of agency is closely linked to the issue of legal and ethical responsibilities of autonomous vehicle's drivers, this paper is not engaged in an in-depth discussion on what this link could be like, primarily through the conscious and enacted freedom as a medium between them. Correspondingly, this paper has not directly addressed these normative debates of freedom and responsibility pertaining to autonomous vehicles' development, such as whether or to what extent it is desirable to develop autonomous vehicles, making redundant human freedom and responsibility. While this paper is primarily directed to the scholars working on agency from the philosophical and psychological perspective, it seems meaningful at the end of this discussion to refer to the overall context of this discussion from the normative perspective.

Technologies have induced fundamental and irrevocable changes in the human condition. In particular, by drastically changing forms, scales, and paces regarding various movements of people, things, and information, and so on, innovations in mobility technologies have altered the power-geometry of cities and spaces. Above all, "mobility artificial intelligence" embodied in autonomous vehicles is being connected to the whole mobility infrastructure to the extent that "trains of driverless cars allow the meeting of wills to be replaced by calculations of logistics."[67] In the long term, this kind of technology will be "invisible in fact as well as in metaphor,"[68] making such intelligent systems "so imbedded, so fitting, so natural, that we use [them] without even thinking about it."[69] Such technologies transform human beings' lived experiences of the world, that is, the relationship between human beings and the world. Even though technologies not only extend human sensations but also reduce them,[70] the discussions on cutting-edge technologies regrettably overlook these aspects of sensory reduction. In this respect, there is a need to properly understand potential problems caused by the (current) inability of intelligent systems such as autonomous vehicles "to annotate and categorize the driving environment in terms of human values and moral understanding."[71]

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[67] Laurier and Dant, "What We Do Whilst Driving," 241.

[68] Mark Weiser, "The Computer for the 21st Century," in *Scientific American*, 265 (1991), 95.

[69] Mark Weiser, "Creating the Invisible Interface," in *Proceedings of the 7th Annual ACM Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology*, ed. by Pedro Szekely (New York: ACM Press: 1994).

[70] Ihde, *Technics and Praxis*, 9.

[71] Cunneen, Mullins, and Murphy, "Autonomous Vehicles and Embedded Artificial Intelligence," 706.

Considered from a historical point of view, these potential problems are well demonstrated; the neologism of "automobile" was meant originally to refer to a new machine "that moves autonomously but simultaneously enables the driver to move autonomously."[72] Nevertheless, due to the "impossibilities of automobility," this ideal of the autonomy of human drivers has been disenchanted; "the more cars are around, the more rules have to be invented" "to allow the regime of automobility to work 'normally,' even though this 'normality' might be contradictory to the image of a completely autonomous movement."[73] Adding the qualification "autonomous" to the "automobile" that was already meant to be autonomous, the same ideological phrase seems to recur; it is questionable whether "autonomous automobiles" enable not only themselves but also human beings to be more autonomous. Granted, "cars would become less like horseless carriages and much more like the carriages of a train, occupied only by passengers,"[74] questions not only from a legal and ethical viewpoint but from a safety standpoint arise. Whether and to what extent is it desirable to remove the drivers' sense of agency and responsibility? Whether and to what extent is it desirable to make autonomous vehicles at Levels 4 or 5, which rarely involve human drivers, come into being? These questions, which are by and large lacking in recent discussions about new mobility technologies, are especially crucial given superficially optimistic or inordinately enthusiastic predictions that "are ideologically driven, especially when coming from actors with deep investments in such future."[75] In this respect, the ideological aspects figuring in imaginations of the autonomous vehicle that "reconfigure and reproduce the historically gendered and raced representations, meanings, and practices of (auto)mobility" also needs to be examined to reimagine the future of (auto)mobility.[76]

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[72] Matthew Paterson, "Carbon," in *The Routledge Handbook of Mobilities*, ed. by Peter Adey, David Bissell, Kevin Hannam, Peter Merriman, and Mimi Sheller (London: Routledge: 2014), 328–329.

[73] Steffen Böhm, Campbell Jones, Chris Land, and Mat Paterson, "Introduction: Impossibilities of Automobility," in *Against Automobility*, ed. by Steffen Böhm, Campbell Jones, Chris Land, and Mat Paterson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 11.

[74] Laurier and Dant, "What We Do Whilst Driving," 223.

[75] Mimi Sheller, *Mobility Justice: The Politics of Movement in an Age of Extremes* (New York: Verso, 2018), 71.

[76] Julia M. Hildebrand and Mimi Sheller, "Media Ecologies of Autonomous Automobility: Gendered and Racial Dimensions of Future Concept Cars," *Transfers*, 8 (2018), 64.

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Mobility in a Phenomenological Perspective: On Significances of Movement and Quasi-movement in Human Life

Li-Qing Qian

Abstract: Motion is the fundamental property of all-natural phenomena. However, when human life is concerned, the significance of motion or movement is beyond mere natural process, its concept beyond physical time and space. The genealogical-phenomenological approach is used to indicate that our conception of motion endures a historical transition; meaning, that the conceptual significances with respect to human movement and mobility have always been updated alongside technological progress. With a phenomenological analysis of the historical transition of concepts regarding motion, space, and other correlated notions concerning human existence, we try to show that the extension of these old concepts has been expanded, and the updated concepts are redefined and comprehended in a united but multifaceted way. To achieve this goal, this paper gives out a genealogical survey on some typical instances in the development of human mobility. Such a unified sense-complex of different significances of movement and mobility in human life will contribute to our understanding of the world in a diversified and pluralistic way.

Keywords: mobility, space, phenomenology, quasi-movement

Introduction: Theme and Methodological Illustrations

Motion is the most fundamental feature of all natural phenomena. Aristotle explicitly claimed that nature is the principle of motion in general, including all kinds of movements and phenomenal

changes.[1] Traditionally, objective motion in general is taken as a basic thesis in natural philosophy, which mainly concerns physical space and time.

However, for objects with consciousness, especially human agents, the significance of motion has to be considered in a more specific way, not only because the human race is a very small species under the concept of object in general, but mainly because phenomena concerning human beings are essentially always beyond mere physical or material interpretations. This essentiality was exposed in detail by John Urry in *Sociology Beyond Societies* (2000). Urry points out in this book that human mobility is essentially socio-ontological, which is not quite opposite to, but definitely surpasses, any possible perspective based on modern physics or other natural, scientific investigations.

Even before it became thematic, mobility has always been one of the most evident features of human action. Yet, just like other fundamental factors of human life, it has been overlooked in theoretic reflections, until a sharp change brings it to the spotlight. As a prominent consequence of industrial revolution, human mobility has greatly developed. The industrial revolution also brought forth a brand-new ideal framework of social communication as well as of society. Two centuries later, the industrial-information revolution introduced a new dimension into human activities, namely, a new configuration in life space created by social networks and mobile technologies. Consequently, with the development of science and technology, the understanding of human movement and mobility has changed time and again, leading to new theoretic reflections.

In philosophy, phenomenological approaches are usually regarded as descriptive methods concerning meanings and essences of things, which are not "hidden" inside but are already manifested explicitly in a certain way. Hence, the point is to appropriately articulate the already-present significance. Concerning the significances of a concept or conceptual system that has been constituted diachronically, a phenomenological analysis must take the historical transition of concepts into account. This does not entail, however, that we have to study such conceptual development by means of historiography; rather, we only focus on the essential features of the genealogy of notion, taking it as an evolution of ideas, with structural changes from simplicity to complexity and with their senses changed from the original into various modified modes.[2] In this process, formerly constituted significances are preserved as foundations for further apprehensions, and new comprehensions may be developed according to different perspectives

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[1] Aristotle, *Physics*, trans. by C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2018), 38, 200b11-14.

[2] See Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, *Volume II*, trans. by J. N. Findley (London: Routledge, 2001), 159-160

and contexts. On the other hand, a newly formed notion can be "fused" with past understanding into one conceptual term that was used before, and people may regard this expanded concept not as internally split or heterogeneous, but still as a unity.

Husserl called this kind of historical preservation and transition of significances as sedimentation and reactivation.[3] Unlike Hegel's concept of sublation, which concerns a presupposed single and absolute ideal entity realized in different forms, sedimentation is about the transition of a definite significance into its latent or dormant status within different stages of constitution. Here the term "constitution" can be simply interpreted as an idealistic "architectonics" of the full sense of a historically generated concept. Indeed, most concepts are generated and developed diachronically, with their meanings shifted more or less in their applications. Generally, there are situations where an original concept is accepted or defined for the first time, and further changes in it, which are based on its originality, are taken as derivatives and modifications. Thus, without the originally emergent case of concept X, be it well-defined or simply a result of convention, no modified case could be properly grasped as an instantiation of X. Conversely, the original or simplest example of X offers us an appropriate point for further cases to be subsumed under X.

The sedimentation of conceptual senses is a result of a formerly constituted unity of significances, and it is the foundation of possibility and validity of our original understanding of a concept. But if some conceptual significance is sedimented within certain constitutions of higher order, it will not function explicitly and may thus be suppressed, neglected, and forgotten by users. Just as the original meaning of the straight line in the Euclidean system is sedimented when the system is axiomatized in the Hilbertian way, the original meaning will only function implicitly or heuristically. In other words, sedimented senses can only be found in a retrospective light that aims at reactivating the origin of validity and comprehensibility of the currently functioning concept. Nevertheless, it is the sedimented that founds the accessibility to the new conceptual framework, and this proves that we can properly make a special type of modification on the sedimented sense to expand a concept. In this perspective, it is valid to continue using the same old term in a new conceptual framework and to regard it as a new starting point for any further modification.

Accordingly, the configuration of a diachronically-expanded conceptual sense-complex seems analogous to what is called "superimposition" in photography. Statically viewed in contemporary

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
[3] Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 71.

understanding, every concept looks like a snapshot of the status of its current notion in use, which has been comprehended differently in the past. Dynamically considered, the historically constituted concept is always a diachronically-superimposed unity. The true meaning of the concept neither lies solely on the top layer of the final compound product, i.e., the latest updated interpretation, nor does it completely belong to the original interpretation. Rather, it manifests itself in the unity of all the layers throughout history. The latest phase of constitution may be only related directly to its closest previous phase as modification, but it may also reduce its predecessors into sedimentation. We need to reactivate the significances of former phases under one perspective in order to grasp the historicity and essentiality of this whole diachronic constitution.

The abovementioned general methodology must be applied concretely to our current issue. Simply, the phenomenological investigation of the significance of human mobility is supposed to start from the most fundamental form of human corporeal movement and then extend to the tool-assisted motion. But modifications and shifts in experiences of mobility never cease here. The way of judging whether we are studying a case of motion depends on how we understand the idea of motion. For example, if we insist that our mobile lives consist in real movements and relevant corporeal (i.e., kinesthetic or proprioceptive) experiences, then we should ignore the current technologies of virtual reality, since action in a simulated environment is always limited and the sense of experiences is only partially fulfilled. However, if we think that motion merely indicates a change of spatiotemporal position pertaining to an object/subject, then a possible modification of human motion could include all kinds of interactive situations in virtual reality, whether visual only or with limited corporeal movement.

Hence, to explore the multifaceted meaning of human mobility, and to interpret phenomenologically its significance to human life as possibly as we can, a step-by-step constitutive analysis might be feasible. Of course, the genealogical-phenomenological approach is not plainly guaranteed by Husserl's or anyone's dogmata; rather, it makes sense only because the meaning and understanding of human mobility are carried out and gradually developed right in a constitutive way just as many other concepts do—from their original modes to modifications. Thus, this study is divided into five main sections according to the following steps:

1. Corporeal motion: Experiences in bodily movements in space and time
2. Societal motion: A topological view of space and motion in the lifeworld

3. Motion by transportation: Societal motion in the age of high mobility
4. Modifications of positional changes: Quasi-movements in the age of high-tech
5. Modifications of quasi-motion: Mobility in cyberspace

The Original Significance of Human Mobility

As humans are social animals, human movement is different from that of ordinary physical objects. Phenomenologically, a basic reason is that there is an unreducible part in the significance of *sociality* in common life, namely, a dimension of *subjective and intersubjective experience*.[4] This can be illustrated in two steps:

1) *The formation of ideas of spatiality in human lifeworld*. As the subjective experiential sense is the bottom layer of social agency, it needs to be discussed at first. However, as mobile agents are mobile objects with agency of cognition, desire, and will, it means that, conversely, we cannot neglect the "objective" constituents within subjective experiences.

For an object, we observe and measure its motion according to its positional changes in outer space. The observation is made possible not only by exact mathematical tools, but first by human capability of following the appearance of movement. In a phenomenological perspective, the objective-spatial significance of an object is originally constituted through sensational data in our *perceptive fields*, e.g., visual fields, tactile fields, etc.[5] These fields are units of perceptive materials given through varied series of movements by relevant sense organs such as eyes, head, and limbs, together with kinesthetic or proprioceptive (oculomotor, cephalomotor, etc.) experiential data during the corporeal motion.

Properly speaking, we cannot really see an object just by staring at it all the time, nor can we touch an object merely through a swift contact on surface. With single stimulation, all we can have is some kind of feeling or the consciousness of "something" at most, while this "something" is by no means a real thing or an object in strict sense. A preliminary idea of a genuine object, which differs from mere perceptive data, originates from identification of varied apparent phenomena, the variety of which is realized in different perceptive fields with motive modifications. That is, the proper notion of a thing essentially starts from being watched multiple times, from different perspectives, with its positional changes observed, etc., and it is our body

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[4] For more specific analysis, see e.g., Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960), 120ff.

[5] See Edmund Husserl, *Thing and Space*, trans. by Richard Rojcewicz (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 68ff.

movement that makes all these situations possible. The significance of this object is thus constituted in such an interactively *mobile system*. Meanwhile, we have also formed the primordial notion of an objective space, which is not understood as a mathematical framework of coordination, but as a unitary place that locates things freely inside. In this way, human mobility and actual motion contribute to the establishment of the idea of an outer space containing objects, and it leads to our most fundamental understanding of the apparent form of nature and our lifeworld.

2) *The fundamental understanding of freedom*. Agential mobility is a fundamental feature of human, which implies the *reality of freedom*. Theoretically, the concept of freedom can be described with regard to human mobility as a special kind of modality of subjective localization, which is different from the modality of objective localization.

For an object, every positional change cannot be properly considered without its being observed, being measured, being located. These descriptions remind us that the concept of objective motion is essentially founded on subjective thought and apprehension, no matter whether the object moves "by itself." On the other hand, however, human motion is not entirely passive, because it is enabled by our desire and willing, to which we may assign terms like "faculty" or "competence." Usually, we understand human activities as a series of acts from one's own will, as a phenomenal change with active properties. Only when an agent is unconscious or under restraint, may we regard his/her motion as totally passive. However, in a state of unconsciousness or restraint, there is no agency in the subject; meaning, the human body is regarded simply as an ordinary physical thing. Thus, due to its intrinsic linkage with will and voluntariness, human mobility entails self-determination and potentiality of choice, which make it distinct from the mobility of a common object.

Moreover, our primordial comprehension of freedom is further constituted in daily life through interaction with other people. To communicate, understand others, or accomplish something together, one must act freely with one's body. The idea of freedom is thus confirmed and reconfirmed through this kind of process. In such a dimension of interactivity, sociality is constituted in its authentic sense, which implies the further possibility of estimating and comparing different degrees of freedom.

Of course, we can say that one is able to estimate one's own capability of reaching some goal in a solipsistic view, yet this estimation bears no intersubjective or social significance, and thus without any cultural-objective value.[6] But when a communal recognition takes place in social life, we can

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[6] It can be argued whether there is any "objective" or interculturally-comparable value, but this is not our focus. For a defense of this standpoint, see Charles Taylor, "The Politics of

practically and diachronically synthesize different phases of life period into one unity, with intersubjective identifications and confirmations on social affairs. Through such synthesis, we obtain a common standard of estimation of varied values, and we now know "objectively" what is better and what is worth doing, for the common good.

Besides historically inherited knowledge, people forge their value system through their own social activities, all of which are realized only in movements with characters of sociality. Here we call this kind of motion as "societal motion." With societal mobility, people get in contact not only with their neighbors, but also with strangers and aliens. To some degree, the recognition of an alien is a typical feature of evolution in one's mindset about sociality. Although sometimes people may not accept an alien lifestyle or ideology, such an understanding is still based on a discovery, and the encounter is made possible only through a certain kind of societal motion. With mobility as a societal and intentional capability, we have expanded our cognitive and ethical scope, no matter if such an expansion brings positive results or not.

The analysis in this section indicates that the comprehension of human movement not only enlarges the referential scope of "motion," but also expanded some correlated concepts like space. Furthermore, with the focus transited from physicality to sociality, our understanding of lifeworld and social existence is inevitably involved. Thus, we find that all proper senses in concepts concerning sociality (like "freedom") are inseparable from those in concepts concerning mobility. On the other hand, this reciprocally offers us an updated version of concepts such as motion and space. We can now understand the newly constituted significance not as merely metaphorical, but as a proper layer of this conceptual unity in expansion. Finally, such an update gives out a new ground that enables a concept to get further expanded due to different foci on varied aspects of this sense complex.

In this perspective, experiences of alien contact not only enable us to compare our own ideological frameworks between past and contemporary understanding of space, but also bring out a possible way of understanding the meaning of exploring the unknown. And this is the next landmark in the process of conceptual expansion of human mobility.

Recognition," in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. by Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 66–73.

Insights from Cartography: A Topological View of Life Space and Societal Mobility

Humans expand their scope of cognition of the world by exploring the unknown terrain, thereby meeting aliens. This spatial information of new places is then recorded and compared with the already known. The product of the unification of spatial records,[7] together with cultural and experiential information obtained by cartographers along the way, are maps and charts.[8] Thus, a map reflects not only the cartographer's comprehension but also an era's general ideology.

Humans depicted landscape representations about 30,000 years ago, and the earliest map discovered was about 8,000 years ago.[9] Maps had been unfamiliar to most civilizations until civilizations dominated vast regions. Thus, the ancient Greeks and Romans made great achievement in terrestrial and celestial cartography as their empires expanded. When Christianity spread throughout the western world, maps were assigned with new significances. This can be seen in the symbolism in medieval cartography, where maps enlarge the principal area of interest and set the perspective based on it. Unlike in realism, the *metric* property is not crucial in symbolism. Thus, medieval continental or world maps are represented as the body of Christ, with his head on the top of the map as the standard orientation.[10] In contrast to this symbolism, large-scale traditional Chinese maps set the orientation with regard to Chinese cosmology, while the earliest Japanese maps might orient west at the top.[11]

Two things need to be noted here. The first one is that human movements in ancient times never brought us merely objective information of a place, because human activities always produce an *integrated comprehension of varied aspects*. When we move to an unfamiliar place, we do not only see landscapes and geological characteristics. As social animals, people are attracted by all kinds of representations of cultural achievements. Our cosmo-mythological and ethnical conceptions, together with fantasies and imaginations, are all constituents of a narrative of an alien place. An ancient map bears such a synthetized narrative, while a modern scientific map does not. However, it is not because human beings have successfully

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[7] See J. B. Harley and David Woodward eds., *The History of Cartography, Volume 1* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 1.

[8] See Matthew H. Edney, *Cartography: The Ideal of Its History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2019), 1–3.

[9] See Harley and Woodward ed., *The History of Cartography, Volume 1*, 57.

[10] See *Ibid.*, 288–292.

[11] See J. B. Harley and David Woodward ed., *The History of Cartography, Volume 2, Book 2* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 247.

escaped from the superstitious or prescientific labyrinth; it is because we do not need maps anymore to tell us about those narratives.

The second point is more crucial. When medieval cartography is compared with Chinese or modern European cartography, differences in metrical consideration can easily be seen. To be precise, it is the medieval map without the exact metric information that highlights a special kind of spatial understanding, i.e., the *topological* conception. The term "topology" here is concerned not with the purely geometric relationship among spatial objects, but with the *teleologically-based spatial relationship among cultural objects in our lifeworld*. We may regard this topological view as *existential* instead of mathematical.

Accordingly, the brief touch on cartography serves here as a historical and typical exemplification of the topological view on life space, and it also indicates that the *thematic conceptualization* of this view should come from our daily experiences. The topological mode of understanding of the world is actually very common in routine life, although one could be unaware of it. Let us consider the ordinary movements in a city or town. If we want to go somewhere familiar, we estimate the time on route, we do not calculate the exact distance. We usually begin with a rough orientation and simply estimate the time with past experiences. If we want to go to a new place around a familiar area, we recall familiar landmarks for basic orientation. Only when the whole place is alien do we use some guidebook or app for the exact location. Normally, streets, corners, shops, and other landmarks are not manifested in our cognition as a strict spatial configuration; instead, they are presented as topological elements, like vertices and lines in graph theory. For ordinary life in a most familiar space, the standard metric is not important, since objects, locations, and orientations are weighted mainly with regard to practical and teleological significances concerned.

Therefore, the topological view concerning human existence is not just a matter of space. Phenomenologically, any comprehension of human mobility must presuppose the possibility of agent movement, that is, human motion as the expected and planned (*entworfen*) action with corporeality. A planned act, however, depends on the formerly constituted understanding of spatial configuration in one's lifeworld, which is not metric but topological.

But why do we humans use such a point of view instead of a metric one? To put it into Heidegger's terminology, here the only thing that matters is Dasein's authentic way of being in the world, which shows characters like de-distancing (*Entfernung*) and directionality (*Ausrichtung*). He writes: "De-distancing is a circumspect approaching, a bringing near as supplying, preparing, having at hand. But particular kinds of the purely cognitive discovery of beings also have the character of bringing near. *An essential*

tendency toward nearness lies in Dasein."[12] Although Heidegger regards nearness not as a physical-spatial notion but a teleological-practical character based on human understanding of the surrounding world, it is an appropriate perspective for us to grasp the essential point: it is our practical purpose and axiological evaluation of varied activities that guide our way to classify different things and set priorities among them, and this situation determines our authentic understanding in their spatial distribution, which is essentially topological. In other words, one originally locates and draws one's psychological map of the lifeworld with topological tools instead of geometric, because the fundamental mode of human existence is teleological and practical.[13]

In this "existential" perspective, according to Heidegger, our topological "datum points/lines" are selected due to the "nearness" of significance which is originated in our existential understanding, and we always start with these easiest or "nearest" handles to comprehend our surrounding life space and to plan for action and motion inside it.

Contemporary cartography might blot out such a point of view with various standards of map design. But again, it is not because the scientification have successfully found out the unique truth of cartography and wiped out the prescientific way; it is just because the teleological and practical function of maps has changed. The authentic significances of human motion in life space are preserved well in our most ordinary activities, through which we understand surrounding environments as meaningful objects indicating orientations for us with varied significances and teleological weights. Nevertheless, this topology is well exposed in the development of modern technologies and relevant conceptual shifts. It was completely imaginable for those who lived centuries ago that they should be living in a different world with brand new understanding of distance if they could have new transportation with tremendous speed. The realization of this dream, on the other hand, relies solely on our actual progress of mobile technology, of which there comes into sight a great shift in human activity with transportation.

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[12] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State of New York University Press, 1996), 98.

[13] One may notice that Heidegger implies that the topological understanding of space is more original, as well as our movements in this regard, but we still take it as a conceptually expanded case. This seeming contradiction is due to two different perspectives: one is existential, another is conceptual. An existentially more fundamental notion does not entail its conceptual fundamentality. Here we are satisfied with merely pointing out the conceptual history in geometry on notions like line, dimension, etc.

Significances and Consequences of Human Motion in the Age of High Mobility

As Urry noted, leisurely walking and pedestrian touring are typical ways of modern life.[14] However, these activities emerged with many correlated factors. One of them resulted from the industrial revolution, which has enhanced greatly the power of transportation. Another important factor may be brought by capitalism, which emancipated man from everyday routines with high productivity and commercial economy. These factors, on one hand, relieved people from exhausting labor of little efficiency and made human movements detached from corporeality, so that people could have leisure to rejoin in movement for themselves. On the other hand, the development of technology, especially of transportation, enabled people to reach much farther than before, not as members with official businesses, but as free individuals. In this perspective, a pedestrian action or a long trip by transportation in the last two centuries indicates that everyday movement is gradually relieved from a usual means of livelihood; the walk may well be an enjoyment or some kind of spiritual training in leisure time. With such a point of view on motion, people update their comprehension of the world and themselves. This section aims at sketching out an interactive and reciprocal relation between our conceptual frameworks and their technological products in respect of societal motion.

1) *The continuous change in social-spatial topology*. We have already interpreted the concept of Heideggerian de-distancing and directionality as topologically shifted characters of human existence with regard to spatial cognition. It entails that the topological structure of spatial understanding can keep on changing with the general framework of human thought.

Long before the proper metric of space and time was used in the civilized community, people had known well of "far" and "near" through corporeal movement. Far destination would cost more time and energy, which can be corporeally and mentally experienced and objectively observed with regard to the change of environment and luminosity. Moreover, the estimation of distance depends solely on our subjective apprehension through time consumed and degree of fatigue in travelling. In light of this, it has been easier for people to find out a sharp change in understanding geographical relationships after the industrial revolution. As Heidegger said, with the emergence of trains, buses, and radio transmission, people may regard a spatially far place as quite near and somewhere close by as very distant. In this view, a distant site will present its "nearness" if there is an easy way to reach it. Heidegger does not take this as merely a difference

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[14] See Urry, *Sociology Beyond Societies*, 52.

between different views; rather, it is a matter of competitive paradigms, i.e., the scientific versus the existential. Modern perspectives may support the former over the latter, but Heidegger argues that the existential understanding of space and distance is original and authentic.[15]

Thus, a topological view on life space is *genetically* prior and fundamental to all kinds of measure and calculation. It explains why and how humans have changed their views and attitudes towards the "same" world, topologically altering it. One can say that there is never one world, but always many different worlds, which are "created" through our understanding and conceptual framework. One crucial alteration in current era is the emergence of a new topological view of society, namely, society as a network.

2) *Societies integrated as a global network*. When the first railway network was designed in 1838 in Germany, most people had no idea of it, and even described it as something strange like a spider or a labyrinth. Later in the second half of the 19th century, railway networks have become part of European and American life, and this formed a new kind of understanding of society's self-recognition as a net.[16] The concept of net has many characteristics,[17] but let us focus on two points.

The first one is *de-centralization*. According to Heidegger, humans live in the world by understanding surrounding objects as referential beings in their activities. The function of such reference constitutes a united structure of the whole world, which finally renders the worldliness as a referential context.[18] In this view, objects that serve as referents of significance function as orientators. When considered on the larger scale, whether in the view of geopolitics or of socioeconomics, people still use such orientators, making the most significant things fundamental locators. It entails, however, that there are one or more "centers" in our existential activities. All these centers must be put into a higher order configuration, and we need to establish a correlation structure among them. This yields a network pattern in modern lifeworld.

It is notable that the network structure never weakens the locational function of our daily referential framework, but it does diminish the importance of traditional centers and the significance of centrality per se. It is mainly because the network is enabled by high mobility and efficiency of production so that the material and informational exchanges can be very frequent and flexible, which have led to rearrangements of all kinds of

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[15] See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 98–102.

[16] See Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt: eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2010), 1011.

[17] See Jonas Larsen, John Urry, and Kay Axhausen eds., *Mobilities, Networks, Geographies* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 11.

[18] See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 86–88.

distribution and accumulation according to varied concrete situations. It is unnecessary to proceed with this topic, which scholars have already studied for centuries. Yet it should be noted that when people have changed the ideology on centralization, there comes a series of consequences in understanding our *position* in the world, including the problem of *home*, of the relation between city and suburb, between the native and the foreign, even between human and nature.

The second characteristic is *interrelation* and *interdependence*. By the end of 19th century, humans have greatly benefited from networks of railway and maritime commerce, while the invention of the telegram and the radio created a new spatial dimension that has incredibly de-distanced human beings. For the first time in history, people realized that the communal life in a globe is not merely imaginable; with highly efficient transportation available, people are now not only connected with others economically, but also mentally and corporeally. Humans used to live in a relatively small areas that are organized in a centralized way, but now one might have many "homes" in different senses. However, a more complicated structure of social life must bring about more complicated understanding and arrangements of our existence. As we are confined to a unique physical space-time, we must plan for everything in a more efficient style.

3) *Life with calculation and exactness*. Critics of modernity have described it as "dimensionally compressed." They have called it "formal rationality" (Max Weber), "one-dimensionality" (Herbert Marcuse), "instrumental reason" (Frankfurt School). All these expressions point to the same character of modernity, i.e., the calculation on everything by means of de-qualification and de-differentiation. A moderate summary of modernity given by Giddens indicates that with the increase of knowledge people will create new risks that have hardly been predicted and are difficult to calculate.[19] There are many reasons of such kind of computationalism,[20] such as the rise of industrial civilization.

The essential difficulty in financial and insurance market leads to an interesting paradox: people appeal more and more to calculation and try to universalize it in daily life. We neither proceed to analyze or resolve the paradox in this computationalism, nor are we interested in judging it from an

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[19] Anthony Giddens and Christopher Pierson, *Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 104.

[20] I borrow this terminology from philosophy of mind to signify the trend of general quantification and process of quantified comparison in modern life. However, the idea of quantifying and comparing different qualities was not a modern invention. It can be traced back at least to a medieval debate on the essence of motion, i.e., the topic of *forma fluens* vs. *fluxus formae*, which are not pursued here.

axiological or ethical point of view. The only thing to be noticed here is its significant relation to human life with high mobility.

On one hand, economical and industrial progress with high mobility has brought us with much more materials than centuries ago, which enabled us to develop varied methodologies of mathematical modelling. This is a theoretical condition for the globally fashioned computationalism. Besides, there are much more places and works accessible to us than before, and we can make decisions in a relatively exact way. No matter for what purpose, decisions with precise calculation are superior to non-quantified estimations on the general scale, which is coherent with the whole system of material exchange.

On the other hand, computationalism has exerted a feedback impact on our daily life. The idea of general quantification has penetrated every detail in modernity. If we use cartography again as an example, it can be seen that modern maps are all based on precise measurements with standard metric and the objects are marked entirely as physical-spatial entities according to a proper scale. A map used to bear varied significances, but now it is simplified as a mere quantified indicator. Even in our trips for leisure, we may still calculate everything with a map, especially time and expense.

Conservative critics usually regard this kind of phenomena as a decline of human understanding, imagination, and creativity. Whether it is true or not, the focus is on a neutral description of transition of human ideas. Some scholars have noticed that developments in computation and calculation are bringing us a new world order.[21] No matter this update of order has a good or bad result, one thing is certain: our life is changed once and for all, and there seems no way back. As one of the most important characteristics of the age of social network, this kind of computationalism is also *existential*, and it has already been internalized as our most intimate pattern of cognition and organized practice in daily life, ruling our societal motion.

The Modified Significance of Physical Motion: Objective Quasi-Movements

We have discussed the significance of human mobility in a step-by-step process of constitutive analysis, trying to show the way in which the societal motion gains its full sense. It is to be noted that in daily life whether we move by our feet or by any mode of transportation, we actually move our bodies in proper sense. Thus, all kinds of societal mobility mentioned in the

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[21] Monika Büscher, John Urry, and Katian Witchger eds., *Mobile Methods* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 14.

previous sections substantially concern the actual motion of human corporeality, which is the original and authentic type of human motion. Now let us proceed to some essentially modified circumstances.

Phenomenologically, when an *original* mode of certain species of intentionality is properly reflected and recognized, we may find some *modified* modes in the same species, which are founded on the original one. For example, in the species of sensible intuition, the original mode of act is perception, and there are modified modes like imagination, recollection, expectation, etc. All these modifications are founded on ordinary perception of physical objects, because they are essentially indirect ways of bringing objects into sensible intuition but with their materials reconstituted and reorganized from originally given data in perception. The concept of motion, in the same light, whether understood *physically* and *societally*, also has its modifications. Yet, the way of modification depends on how we comprehend and interpret the concept.

As is said in the first section, the preliminary significance of movement resides in the constitution of data given in multiple sensual fields of corporeality, and the correlate of sensual experiences is the positional change of the agent regarding its location in the surrounding environment. However, positional change is also constituted in the synthesis of perceptive data as a result of *objectivation*. By and large, motion as a change in spatial status is always constituted from two kinds of *subjective* elements: perceptive fields with data and kinesthetic fields with data. From this point of view, the operation of modification lies in considering the degree of fulfillment of intention regarding these elements.

Let us consider the technology of 3D IMAX. Anyone who has experienced this cinematic achievement has surely been impressed with slogan: "watch a movie, or be part of one?" This "being part of" obviously means some kind of being located within or "projected into" the movie scene. Phenomenologically, we feel like being there because the apperception of data in visual and auditory fields is close to that in the real world. But this approximation is by no means identity, since there is always a gap between reality and the immersive experience. And because of this gap, we are at the same time conscious about not really being part of the movie. To be precise, when watching a 3D IMAX, we may have similar oculomotor experiences as is in real situations, but there is hardly any other bodily kinesthetic experience. Without sufficient corporeal constituents, we will only recognize it as an apparent movement instead of a real one.

Husserl used the concept "quasi-movement" to describe a certain kind of non-objective motion of an object, which can be roughly understood

as the phenomenological version of "apparent movement" in physics.[22] By using "quasi-movement," together with "quasi-location" and "quasi-displacement," Husserl tries to depict an entirely subjective region of pre-objectively synthesized data that are given to our consciousness as mere "presentational contents." However, according to Husserl's methodology, the difference between quasi and proper movement depends solely on the stage of constitutive process. In other words, a proper movement is nothing but a completely constituted quasi-movement with fully objective sense. Conversely, a quasi-movement always lacks some significance or elements of objectivity so that we could not properly apprehend the phenomenon as a real movement of an object. In this perspective, the concept of quasi-movement can be *expanded* with a greater extension; namely, except for real movements of physical objects, all kinds of positional changes in perceptive fields can be regarded as quasi-movements.

Nevertheless, this interpretation seems to imply that we can hardly regard quasi-movement as the modification of real movement, because the real and objective is constituted from the previous stage of apparent change. Consequently, if we want to demonstrate that the experience of quasi-movement in cases like watching a movie is really the modification of real motion, it must be pointed out that a) our current focus is merely on a special class of quasi-movement brought by audiovisual techniques, not quasi-movement in general; and b) this special kind of quasi-movement is not a subjective level prior to objective constitution; rather, it is deliberately designed as a simulation or imitation of real motion in order to bring us lively experiences. That is, audiovisual technologies present us with something *objective*, and we only need to modify our *attitude* towards it, *as if* we were part of the movie, *as if* we were really moving in another world, etc. The attitude of "as if" is usually classified into the intentional act of imagination, but we should notice the *passive* part in this *active* operation, i.e., to realize how much audiovisual technologies have contributed to stimulate our fantasies.

The development of such technologies does not entirely depend on physical science. For all kinds of video shooting, one crucial thing is the position and orientation of cameras, especially in their motion. As a remarkable achievement in the age of high mobility, film, together with its progenies, is based on the study of viewpoint in motion. And this must be further traced back to human sight in the dynamic situation, so the ultimate foundation of cinematic technology is linked with human mobility.

When the ocular viewpoint is replaced with a camera, people can step back and simply watch the motion: they do not have to move by themselves

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[22] See Husserl, *Thing and Space*, 83ff.

or by transportation; they can now leave the real movement aside and just watch it. On the other hand, however, they are not completely cut off from motion. Hence, this type of motion can be seen as preserved in a specially modified way, that is, people participate in this modification not with their whole corporeality, but only with a part of it. Through these cognitions and recognitions, we can enjoy the flow of images on a static screen as the *objective quasi-movement*.

Although 3D IMAX technology is astonishing, it is not so far away from ordinary film, because self-projecting is just an advanced stage of watching, without essential improvement. Hence, we may classify all kinds of traditional audiovisual techniques into one type. Phenomenologically, a more radical invention concerning mobility is virtual reality (VR). Unlike ordinary video, a standard VR scene is 3D-panoramic from the user's viewpoint. It means we must participate with something more than oculomotor and slightly cephalomotor acts; thus, we enjoy it with almost all kinds of corporeal motion.

VR is closer to reality than other types of visual techniques with respect to the significance of quasi-movement; however, it is still distant from real or objective motion. It is not because the corporeal movements in VR lack liveliness, for we can imagine that super machines like those in the movie *Matrix* could offer us a quite vivid world with every kind of corporeal movements available, but still *know* it is virtual. In other words, we are not detached from our reality in VR, and we do not lose the fundamental disposedness (*Befindlichkeit*) of being in the (real) world.[23] What we are experiencing in VR is a *mixed* world situation, with a default belief of still being and acting in the *real world* as a base while perceiving the simulated objects in the *subordinate world* with liveliness.

The mixed or compound experiential feature given out by VR is a result of a synthesis of real movement and objective quasi-movement. As a further step of high mobility, it has inherited all the merits of modern technologies of transportation, and has greatly expanded the scope of accessibility. It even crossed the boundary of reality as the traditional default point of human existence. With the recognition of the significance of quasi-movement, we are gradually updating the understanding of disposedness and other existential features, just as when people moved from an isolated

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[23] See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 126ff. Accordingly, there is an ontological difference between VR and the equipment in *Matrix*. In the movie, which was inspired by the famous thought experiment "brain in a vat," the equipment sets a complete and coherent structure of world experience in a simulated space, and the subject is entirely disposed within this simulation. Protagonists are thus not projected into a *sub* world or a *fake* world, but simply and totally into *another* world. Conversely, *Matrix* does not present us a *virtual* reality; rather, it gives out an alternative *reality*.

area to a modern society. No matter what Heidegger said about humans' homelessness and uprootedness, we can always change our attitude towards the new situations of disposedness, and take the newly modified way as our start point of understanding the world. In other words, it does not mean we have to challenge the classic dogmata of existential phenomenology or to deny the fact of "having forgotten the being as such"; we can just preserve these diagnosis records and leave them aside, then focus on what has been created as the new facticity.

Up to this section, we have seen that the significance of motion/movement endures a diachronic shift with the historical change of our life, and the history of its constitution can be identified as a process of modification, first in its original sense as corporeal movement, then as movement by transportation, finally as a quasi-movement in a recorded or even virtually-presented appearance of motion, which only partly coincides with our experience of real motion. It shows that there is a continuous change of relationship between subject and its surrounding space, or to say, the significance of mobility has been converting step by step from "us coming into the space" to "the space being brought to/in front of us." And the conceptual shift of space will reciprocally affect the meaning of motion.

Modification of Quasi-Movement: Significances of Mobility in Cyberspace

Quasi-movement, whether interpreted as subjective or objective, is eventually about physical changes in space. Correspondingly, there is still another dimension of human mobility, i.e., that of social life. But just as the societal understanding originates from primordial experiences of *physicality*, so is the modification of quasi-movement with regard to *sociality*.

When the relation between agents and space is changed by high technology, which, to some extent, brings the space and its change right in front of us, we can expect a further modification on the significance of space per se in a valid way. One of the purposes of those inventions concerning objective quasi-movement is to blur the *ontological* gap between the real space and the virtual space, which respectively belong to different worlds. Besides, from the intersubjective point of view, with audiovisual techniques available to people, we face the simulated space not as individuals, but as a group or community sharing common experiences. Therefore, a social space can be realized as a "quasi-physical" space, and the time-space compression in modern society also has a direct impact on this kind of situation.[24] In this light,

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[24] David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1989), 284ff.

such a social space will offer us a good viewpoint to take both physical and social features of space and motion into account, in which we may reach to an appropriate modification of these concepts. Let us look at the instance of cyberspace.

Cyberspace was first understood as a virtual realm created by mere links between computers, devices, routers, etc. It is not the Internet itself, but a creation produced by the Internet's infrastructure. We can analogously call it as a "place" or "space," yet the phenomenological sense behind this analogy is nothing but another step of modification of significance and a further conceptual expansion. We have seen from previous sections that the concept of motion, together with that of space, has been gradually shifted and expanded, with the multifaceted sense-complex "fusing" with formerly constituted significances into a more complicated unity.

Just as the idea of motion can be extended to the social realm and can assimilate a contemporary type of quasi-motion into it, the conceptual expansion of space, as a correlated circumstance, may be accepted as well, without contradiction to its original sense. As was said in previous sections, the concept of space, distance, as well as motion, can be comprehended *topologically*. Since the topological understanding has already paved the way for making all kinds of interpretation of things and their connections isomorphic to a graphical model (in which the notion of cyberspace locates), some physical and substantial features of space could thus be neglected or modified. In a word, like the constitutive process from a metric space to its topological or graphical interpretation, we can also enjoy a brand-new view of space in general while keeping the original senses of it in mind.

In cyberspace, we can talk about a *remodification* of objective quasi-movement in a valid way. That is, the quasi-motion, in which the simulated *space* is brought to us, can be further modified in the sense that the *representation of other persons* can be brought to us *together with a special type of space*. And our existence is actually reaching out to each other in this information space, though not with our corporeality transported physically.[25]

However, if cyberspace is taken as a special kind of space, then what about motion and human mobility in it? Obviously, the audiovisual techniques such as VR still provide us with a special kind of motion, though in a simulated way. Yet in cyberspace, there is nothing in movement or in quasi-movement, except for electrons and photons running in wires and servers.

To explain the problem, first we must understand that modification in general is not a mere reconfiguration of semantic structure, as if it could

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[25] Technically, when the metric is defined as a graph-theoretic one, and the exact distance is determined and calculated according to other topological features, the modified pattern of spatial comprehension can be used to describe this abstract dynamic space.

always be traced back to its original form. It is true that we can exert a phenomenological "reverse engineering," according to the process of constitution of the intentional object, but we do it only by analyzing its significance in historical transition, with *some part of its essential structure preserved while altering the rest*. Just as what Husserl saw on the arithmatization of geometry, which emptied the spatial meaning and transformed the geometrical into numerical configurations and algebraic structure,[26] some types of modification may completely change the ontological properties of an object.

As for the transformation or modification of space and motion, it requires us to focus on some invariant features in our flexible understanding of these concepts. On one hand, people have learned that space is essentially a complex of positional relations among objects. A physical space, or a geometric space, or even a space in metaphoric sense, is a particular instantiation in this general class. Furthermore, the notion of *position* is not only *of* the objects, but also *relative to* them with regard to its significance. If the object is understood physically, a position means the location of the object in space-time. And if the object is comprehended socially or culturally, such as a person, we may take that person's position as the social status or social rank in the cultural hierarchy. On the other hand, motion is always a counterpart of space, which entails that we understand motion in the same perspective as we understand space and position. When the space is interpreted essentially as a positional complex, motion will correspondingly and simply refer to the change in such a complex within a segment of time. For example, we usually understand social space in this sense, where the concept of space is understood analogically.

In the case of cyberspace, therefore, the significance of motion can be seen as realized in a *degenerate status* that was transformed from quasi-motion as its previous stage. We *preserve* the essential senses of positions and their relations, though interpreted in a different paradigm, and *remove* all the physical semantics. We understand ourselves as individuals in a special space of sociality, in which all kinds of communications are well preserved and become more efficient. In a net community, we can get close to someone or feel isolated, be active or be passive, follow the hot topics, make a group, or hold a conference. We also apprehend in this way what "nearness," "directionality" and "de-distancing" could mean in cyberspace. All the verbs we use to describe our online routine are taken from reality as analogs, but the possibility of such an analogy is founded on a systematic modification of our understanding of space and mobility. Hence, despite that the original senses of these concepts disappear in cyberspace, they still leave their traces

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[26] See Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences*, 44.

and impacts so that we could continue to shape our understanding of life in cyberspace with the modified and expanded conceptual framework. This could be the basic framework we use to make sense of numerous online "movements" on social media today.

All in all, cyberspace, as a typical instantiation of a modified social space, presents us with a new idea of our orientation in the lifeworld. With new technologies like cyberspace available, we have obtained a *multifaceted comprehension* of mobility, which combines our daily corporeal motion and incorporeal online social action into one unity. Now it is reasonable to state that the concept of mobility must be expanded into a more comprehensive configuration, with plural but unified significances, so that we can apprehend the current lifeworld in a better way.

Conclusion: A Historically Superimposed Image of the Concept of Mobility

Through the progress from video to internet, from traditional media to social media, we know that we are much less confined to physical spaces than ever. We have also discovered the separation between motion and embodiment, because the technical developments after industrial revolution are great enough to shake our traditional beliefs.[27] All these lead to a sharp conversion of our comprehension of mobility.

An important lesson we may learn from history is that the world is becoming more and more complicated, not only in materiality, but firstly in the sense of ideality. Almost all concepts have already been assigned with new meaning, with many not seen as split and different conceptual entities with the same "strings," but rather regarded as *unified* sense-complex with different layers of significances. This layer pattern, though seems geological, is better interpreted with a schema of *superimposition* in the light of phenomenological-constitutive analysis.

Human mobility is an exemplification of this schema. Mobility, together with concepts like space and distance, has been "superimposed" with their updated significances over the past meanings for centuries. We have expanded our scope of comprehension of these notions due to technological and ideological developments, from the existential-topological interpretations to the mathematical-metric ones, and from their primordial modes to varied quasi modes. In this process, we have not only extended our understanding of the concepts of space and motion, but also have changed our lifestyle in reality. Mobility and human life are so intertwined; thus, "how

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[27] It should be noted that there are also technologies of extended embodiment, which, to some extent, do expand our corporeal capability and mobility. However, due to the limitations of this paper, I cannot discuss them in detail here.

mobile lives are conceived of in theories, models and technologies shapes how they are lived and vice versa: plans, rules, theories, models, and technologies become what they are in and through lived mobile practices."[28] Now there is a more complicated and *pluralistic* understanding of "nearness" and other existential notions, concerning their geographical, instrumental, and cyberspatial senses, and we can plan for our lives with calculation on all these factors, comparing their weights in respect to different conditions. In this way, our real life in this age of high mobility, as well as the reality itself, is pluralistically constituted and keeps diversifying.

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[28] Monika Büscher, Paul Coulton, Christos Efstratiou, Hans Gellersen, and Drew Hemment, "Connected, Computed, Collective: Smart Mobilities," in *Mobilities: New Perspectives on Transport and Society*, ed. by Margaret Grieco and John Urry (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011), 140.

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Article | Special Issue

Dangers and Potentialities of the Highly Mobile World: An Ethical Consideration[1]

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Myungsim Yang

Abstract: Although the field of mobility research has always been interdisciplinary, its relation to philosophy has not been particularly close. This essay attempts to give a philosophical contribution to the field: an ethical consideration regarding mobility. Specifically, the dangers and potentialities in the highly mobile world will be identified and clarified through the phenomenological concepts of lifeworld, home world, and alien world. Our home world will be revealed as the sole foundation of values and norms for us. Based on these concepts, the meaning of mobility and highly mobile world will be clarified, and we will understand how high mobility leads to destabilization of the home world thereby posing a threat to our ethical foundation. Finally, three ethical potentialities that emerge from the highly mobile world will be discussed: new ways of understanding, building of a more universal lifeworld, and formation of a new ethical category.

Keywords: mobility, lifeworld, home world, alien world

Introduction

Mobility is neither a physical movement nor a biological one. Rather, it is a sociological movement, and the original locus of mobility is, thus, human society. The mobility paradigm, stimulated by the increase of sociological movement, tries to understand society on the basis of movement rather than anything else. As such, mobility can be approached by various disciplines which are concerned with human society: a human geographer examines how mobility bears on the way in which geographical elements become meaningful to human beings; a sociologist explores how

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mobility is related to various social phenomena; an ethnologist studies the relation of mobility to various cultural groups and communities; a political scientist analyzes how mobility affects the production and distribution of power. Such varying perspectives imply that mobility theories have an interdisciplinary character.

The relation of philosophy to mobility theories is generally not so close, perhaps this is primarily because mobility theories are more concerned with the science of facts, while philosophy is more concerned with the science of essences.[2] At the same time, however, we know how significant the science of essences is for the science of facts. We should confront the problems of the essences when we trace the fundamental meanings of the concepts used by the science of facts, since the former lays and clarifies the foundations for the latter's fundamental concepts. In the case of mobility theories, an ontology of mobility can help theories secure a solid grounding. It is one of the possible contributions of philosophy to mobility theories.[3]

There is another, unexplored field in which philosophy can contribute to mobility theories: ethics. This field has been relatively neglected. The negligence is understandable, given the suspicion surrounding the science of ethics since the 20th century. In the first half of the century, logical positivism tried to banish all logically or scientifically unverifiable propositions. Since the latter half of the century, the field of ethics has been dominated by metaethics, which deals with ethical language rather than ethical virtues, values, and norms.

It is a sheer impossibility, however, to exclude ethics from the humanities, as morality constitutes one of the most specific and universal features of human beings. Specific, because we do not know of any nonhuman beings with a moral system; universal, because we do not know of any human community that has no moral system at all. We can reassure of ethical matters in mobility theories, especially in politics, because modes of power distribution cannot be separated from the question of the rightness of a specific mode. Modes of power distribution have consequence: one mode is desirable or right, and another is undesirable or wrong. Mobility, then, as a human phenomenon should imply morality.

This essay is an attempt to consider the relation between mobility and ethics. The subject of this attempt is not one of individual mobilities, but that

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[2] These terms are borrowed from Husserl. A science of facts (*Tatsachenwissenschaft*) is concerned with the concrete factual phenomena, and a science of essences (*Wesenswissenschaft*) with the abstract, the essential, the universal. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, *First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. by Fred Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), 7–17.

[3] See in particular Thomas Nail, *Being and Motion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

of a more general one: the highly mobile world of our contemporary time. The central question is: "What ethical values can a highly mobile world have?" As Anita Perkins analyzes in her dissertation, the contemporary hypermobile society has produced the loss of the home, contrary to the positive prospects of being mobile.[4] In other words, our highly mobile world produces some ethical issues. Such a situation compels us to undertake the task of thinking about the ethics of mobility.

To carry out the task, the concept of the lifeworld, and especially the distinction between the home world and the alien world as proposed by Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, will be discussed. Before we understand what lifeworld is and how it helps accomplish this essay's task, let us first understand the reason on which the concept of the lifeworld is capitalized in this essay. First, it is suitable specifically for understanding human society because it incorporates the layers of values and norms. Second, the distinction between the home world and the alien world is suitable for reflections on mobility as sociological movements.

Before closing this introduction, some terminological and conceptual remarks must be made. Ethics has multiple meanings. On the one hand, it is about happiness and the values of the good and the bad. On the other hand, it is about moral rules and obligation and prohibition. As it is concerned with behaviors when dealing with human beings, it is also concerned with actions in general. These meanings do not adequately coincide, and as such an ethical matter in one meaning can be morally indifferent in the other. The words themselves—ethics and morality—are not well-defined. This difficult matter will not be discussed in this short essay. The intention is to keep the meaning of ethics vague and use the words *ethical* and *moral* interchangeably. Thus, ethical or moral matters pertains to one of the above-mentioned meanings.

The structure of this essay is as follows. The concept of the lifeworld and the distinction between the home world and the alien world will be clarified in the second section. Subsequently, the concept of mobility and the values implied by it will be discussed in the third section. This will lead us to the exposition of the ethical dangers of mobility. The fourth section will show that the highly mobile world motivates important ethical actions and considerations, thereby carrying out the task of thinking about the general ethics of mobility. Finally, the fifth section, after a brief summary of the discussion, will present the three ethical potentialities that emerge from the highly mobile world: new ways of understanding, building of a more universal lifeworld, and formation of a new ethical category.

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[4] Such a diagnosis makes her question the moral value of being mobile. She asks, "are the new mobilities good for us?" Anita Jean Perkins, "Travel Texts and Moving Cultures: A German-Focused Comparative Analysis in the Context of the Mobilities Turn" (PhD Thesis: University of Otago, New Zealand, 2013), 33, <http://hdl.handle.net/10523/4311>.

Lifeworld, Home World, and Alien World

Lifeworld

The concept of a lifeworld, introduced into the philosophical vocabulary by Husserl in *Crisis*,[5] has become an important resource for thinking about human life. One reason for this is because, as a life*world*, it opposes an atomistic way of thinking. It shows that a person not only deals with individual things, but also deals with the encompassing situation. Another reason is because, as a *life*world, it opposes the positivist way of thinking. It shows that the world in which we live incorporates not only the scientifically verifiable things, but also layers of meanings, values, and norms. As such, it helps us to understand mobility as a sociological movement. For these reasons, the concept of the lifeworld is utilized.

Two guidelines are to be followed here. First, the features of the lifeworld that are relevant to the points of this essay will be discussed. Given the limited space, this essay can by no means fully handle the enormous volume of discussions surrounding the lifeworld. However, three points to keep in mind: 1) the lifeworld is the foundation of human practices; 2) the lifeworld is not a private, but a communal world. 3) the lifeworld, in which a person has originally lived, has a privileged status as their home world, contrary to alien worlds. These points will be discussed later.

The second guideline shall proceed from the simple to the complex. As a concrete world, a lifeworld has complexity; that is, it has various layers on various perspectives: 1) layer of *doxa*, layer of values, and layer of norms;[6] 2) personal layer and communal layer; 3) epistemological layer and practical layer.

Let us begin with cognition on the personal doxic layer. Let us say we see or remember a house over there. What Husserl pays attention to is that such a perception or a remembrance cannot be related exclusively to the house, or to the visible side of the house in question. Cognition of the house requires a certain kind of awareness of the background needed for a house being recognized as a house.[7] For example, in order to recognize something

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[5] See Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1984).

[6] This trifold distinction is borrowed from Husserl. *Doxa* is connected to experience, value to desire, norm to will. In his usage, *doxa* means bare facts stripped of values and norms. Because of a lack of an adequate English word, the term *doxa* is left untranslated.

[7] Consciousness can be used either in the wide sense or in the narrow sense. Consciousness in the narrow sense is contrasted with unconsciousness. Something is consciously in mind of a person when it affects her cognition and action and the fact that it is in her mind is also in her mind. On the contrary, consciousness in the wide sense is being in mind itself, so that

in the visual field as the foreside of a house, we must be aware of the other sides of the house; otherwise, it cannot be a *fore*side. In order to envisage a house, we must also be aware of the surroundings of the house. This can be a forest, a city district, or even an indeterminate empty space, but no matter how indeterminate it may be, it must nonetheless be a certain space. In other words, no matter how much we try to envisage a house in non-space, we can only envisage a house in an empty space. Such surroundings, of which we must be aware even if we are not focused on them, are *horizons* as Husserl calls them.[8]

A horizon is not independent, rather, it also includes its surroundings as its horizons. Also, awareness of a surrounding space implies awareness of further spaces. Aside from spatial horizons, there are also temporal horizons. In order to be aware of a point in time, we must be aware of the preceding point and the following point. When we continue to trace horizons of horizons, we finally get to the ultimate horizon of all the horizons, that is, the *world*.[9]

The world is the totality of things. It is not, however, a disordered accumulation of things. Things are orderly interconnected in the world. An individual thing can appear only upon the background of an orderly interrelation of things. A foreside of a house is what it is only when its sides are systematically interconnected and is systematically interconnected to its surroundings like trees, cars, and human beings. For this reason, when we see but a foreside of a house, we recognize it as something that also has a backside and stands on the certain ground. In short, the world is the totality of orderly interconnected things.

We can now climb up the stairs of concreteness by a step and bring the action into account. We can then see that the horizons for cognition are also horizons for action. Just from our awareness of the backside of a house, when we see the foreside, we can think about moving ourselves to see the backside. We are also aware of the fact that we will see the backside when we move to the back of the house, because we are aware of orderly relations persisting between our actions and our perceptions. The order of the world guides our action. Thus, the world is a *practical* world.

As implied in the term "awareness," we are not always explicitly seeing the world as the background of cognition and action. In most cases, we are implicitly aware of the world, that is, in a way that we do not know that

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it encompasses both unconsciousness and consciousness in the narrow sense. In order to avoid possible confusion, the word awareness is used for consciousness in the wide sense.

[8] See Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology*, 51–55; Edmund Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, trans. by Anthony Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 44–46.

[9] See Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology*, 51–55.

we are aware of it. We do not explicitly think, "That house must definitely have a backside," when we are looking at its foreside. Nevertheless, we can say that we are aware of it because we naturally move to its back in order to see its backside, or we are not surprised when we accidently see its backside. In this way, our cognitions and actions in relation to the world are, in many cases, done implicitly.

We know the orderly connections of the world not *a priori*, but *a posteriori*; that is, because we have learned them by experience and teaching. We are also implicitly aware of them because we have not only learned them but have also embraced them into our habits. When we learn something for the first time, it is strange to us. We cannot take it into account when we do not explicitly keep it in our mind. After we have familiarized ourselves with it through repetition, we can handle it without explicitly thinking about it; it becomes our habit to know how to deal with it. Husserl called such a process *habituation*.[10]

We should now restore the layers of values and norms. A house not only has doxic aspects, but also various aspects of values and norms. Not only is a house big or small, red or blue, but it is also comfortable or uncomfortable, beautiful or ugly. That is to say, it has values. Our actions are governed not only by *doxa*, but also by values. We can be motivated by values; for example, we may leave a house or remodel it because we find it uncomfortable. Further, many actions concerning the house is normatively governed. We should not enter others' houses without permission. Not only the things but also the connections of things have aspects of values and norms. The fact that a table is in a house has not only physical meanings but also cultural meanings: the table is there according to our eating conventions.

Layers of values of norms are also habituated. We do not enter others' houses not because we explicitly think about the prohibition. We simply do not enter them. We are not even aware that we are following a rule. Values and norms are habituated in us and this regulates our cognitions and actions.

The world which has all the layers of *doxa*, values, norms, all the layers of cognitions and actions, and the fully concrete world is the lifeworld. It is the lifeworld because our lives take place in it. In our lives, a house is always a place with cleanliness or dirtiness, comfort or discomfort, and not just a plain space comprised of sizes and volumes. We meet a house as a plain space only when we abstract it from life. Furthermore, objective characteristics themselves gain meanings of values and norms in a lifeworld. For example, the size of a house can be related to the convenience or comfort of the house. Therefore, when we are moving from the physical world to the

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[10] See Edmund Husserl, *Die Lebenswelt: Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937)*, ed. by Rochus Sowa (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 401.

lifeworld, it is not that things of values and norms are added to the once-physical world, but that the once-physical things themselves become value-things and norm-things.

As such, lifeworld includes more than tangible things. Many things with values and norms are intangible like conventions, rules, and laws. Since the term "thing" is easily associated with tangibility, the term "meaningful formation" (*Sinngebilde*) must be used in order to indicate lifeworldly entities. The term implies that it is formed as something meaningful by us.[11] Now we can say that *lifeworld is a totality of tangible and intangible meaningful formations which behave as the background for all the cognitions and actions regarding* doxa, *values, and norms*.

A lifeworld functions as the grounds for our actions. It gives us reasons for action through habits, meaning-giving, and stability. First, we act simply according to the habits acquired in the lifeworld. We act so because it is the only possible action that we are accustomed to. Second, a lifeworld is the ultimate ground which our rationality can refer to. We do not always act habitually; we ponder upon the reasons for our actions when needed. In this case, we can confront things critically with values and norms in a lifeworld. However, such reflections must be, on their part, grounded in a lifeworld because values and norms can have concrete meanings in reference to meaningful formations in the lifeworld. For example, the rule "do not enter into others' houses without permission" can have meaning only when we know who counts as other, what counts as house, what counts as permission, and so on, and we should refer to the lifeworld in order to know these things. Third, we can rely on a lifeworld because it has abiding stability. When norms of yesterday, today, and tomorrow differ from each other, we will not be able to guide our actions through norms. Since we believe that our lifeworld will last for quite a while, we can rely on norms in this lifeworld.

Lifeworld as a Communal World

The description of a lifeworld so far has not explicitly taken account of others, only implicitly. This was necessary because meaningful formations in a lifeworld are made by others, received from others, and shared with others. *I* describe a certain physical thing which I am looking at as a house. Yet, the network of meanings to which a house belongs is not made by myself, but has pre-existed; instead, I have learned from others that that house is a building in which human beings live, that certain actions are permitted and

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[11] Literally, *Sinn* means sense or meaning, and *Gebilde* means something constructed, built, or formed. Husserl describes things as something formed because it is "constituted" as it is by our consciousness. This essay will not go deeper into his idealism or constitutionism but simply remark that the idea of constitution does not mean that the mind makes things out of nothing.

others are prohibited in relation to the house. Others are implied in the meaningful formations.

Take note of *others*, not *another*. First, the lifeworldly meaningful formations in general are historically and jointly made by many people. Second, even if a meaningful formation can be produced by one person, for it to be constantly valid, a succession of people is needed. Someone must learn it and transfer it to others. While a physical thing can persist without any intervention of human beings, a value or a norm cannot. Third, a meaningful formation can be effective only when a group of people make it effective, that is, when people in a community talk about such a formation, act in accordance with it, and impose penalties for behavior not in accordance with it. Therefore, a lifeworld is a *communal* world, which presupposes the community of human beings, and relies upon it.

In the opposite direction, a community relies on a shared lifeworld. In order to live together, the same values and the same norms (at least in essential points) are needed. A person who regards a house as a space for all the village people and a person who regards a house as his private sphere cannot get along. Thus, a community can be formed when members share the same idea about the house, as well as the values and norms directing house-related actions. Accordingly, a community and a lifeworld belong to each other. Each family, town, nation, and state have its own lifeworld.

The mutual belonging of a lifeworld and a community implies above all the finiteness of a lifeworld. Finiteness here means a limitedness of the range of effectiveness of lifeworldly meaningful formations. The idea that a house is one's private space is effective only in a community that accepts it as effective. Outside the community, such an idea does not exist or have validity. The second implication of their mutual belonging is the plurality of lifeworlds, as each community has its own lifeworld.

The finiteness and the plurality of lifeworlds does not imply, however, a clear demarcation between lifeworlds. Just as communities can be included in other communities and overlap with one another, and just as there can be in-between regions of communities, lifeworlds can be so as well. The finiteness and the plurality of lifeworlds does not also imply that the different lifeworlds should have completely different pools of meaningful formations. A certain meaningful formation can belong to many lifeworlds as something more universal, like, say, parents, while another meaningful formation belongs to just one lifeworld as something more community specific. And again, a meaningful formation which is shared by many lifeworlds can have different connection of meanings in different lifeworlds. For example, while all the lifeworlds would have the meaningful formation "parents," ideas about how we should treat them, or even whom we should regard as parents, can be diverse.

Home World and Alien World

The discussion on the plurality of the lifeworld was still abstract because the fact that *I* always already live in certain specific lifeworlds has not yet been brought into account. This fact implies that the various lifeworlds are significant to *me* in different ways. There are lifeworlds, into which I have been born or in which I have lived, whose meaningful formations I have learned. Learning and habituation began before I gained self-consciousness and continued after I became self-conscious.

Such lifeworlds are special to me as I take them for granted and act accordingly without being conscious of my actions. As such, my lifeworlds constitute a world that is familiar to me. This familiarity means, first of all, that I can behave skillfully and effortlessly in these lifeworlds, while my actions become clumsy in others. In such unfamiliar lifeworlds, I do not know how to regulate my actions. This familiarity has, on the other hand, emotional effects. In those lifeworlds, I may feel at home, while I become anxious in other lifeworlds. Those lifeworlds, within which we feel familiarity, are called *home worlds* by Husserl. Other lifeworlds, which lie beyond our home world and unsettle us, are called *alien worlds*.[12]

Mobility and Its Ethical Dangers

In the previous section, we have gained conceptual tools of the lifeworld and the home/alien world, with which we can now examine ethically problematic situations brought about by increased mobility. Let us begin by attempting to clarify the notion of mobility, after which we will then discuss the significance of a highly mobile world, and finally conclude by showing its ethical dangers.

Notion of Mobility

The notion of mobility is vague and heterogeneous. On the one hand, mobility refers to the movement of people: travel, commute, immigration, studying abroad, and so on. However, mobility also suggests movements of things like distribution, import, and export. Further, mobility can extend to movements of information through telephone, media, the Internet, and smartphones. All these definitions involve locomotion, but they are not the sole subject of mobility theories. Mobility theories focus also on the corporeal mobility of human beings such as in dance or sports. In order to examine the

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[12] For a fuller exposition on the problematic of home world and alien world, see Anthony J. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1995).

ethical consequences of mobility, we should more or less acquire a clear notion of mobility.

Clarifying the notion of mobility is not about securing a clear-cut definition. Mobility is not a single concept, but a name for a problematic that grows and complicates itself throughout history. In this case, an unambiguous definition cannot be given because new related phenomena can always be discovered, widening the coverage of the notion of mobility. As such, the notion of mobility is inherently equivocal. Dealing with such a notion, it is better to try and find the core of the meaning, which enables the process of historical complexifications.

A good starting point to find the core would be to look at the beginning of the problematic. We had begun to pay attention to the problems of mobility in the latter half of the 20th century, motivated by the fact that the world was moving much more than before. The question is, which movements did we have in mind when we were saying that the world was moving? Of course, it was not the rotation of the Earth or other such natural phenomena. It referred to the global movement of travelers and trade goods.

First, they were locomotion on a global scale, that is, the movements of people and goods across the borders of states and continents.

Second, they were movements with lifeworldly meanings. Not all forms of locomotion—for example, the movement of clouds—are regarded as mobility. The difference between the movement of clouds and that of people and goods does not lie in the fact that the former is a physical movement, because the latter also has a physical aspect. The difference lies in that the latter is more than a physical movement. Travel is not simply a locomotion of people, but also something fun, rewarding, or tiring. Trading is not simply a relocation of things, but also something that increases convenience or pleasure in human society. Movements that are categorized as mobility are, say, movements with lifeworldly meanings.[13]

However, not all the movements with lifeworldly meanings count as mobility. This is because, as already mentioned, lifeworldly meanings are also imposed on physical things in a lifeworld. The movement of clouds also has values — it changes the weather and affects our feelings of delight and melancholy, although it does not count as a mobility Thus, it seems that mobility should be understood as movement produced by human activity. Not only do people and goods move, they are also intentionally moved by us.

Now we can describe the core of mobility as *a change of location with lifeworldly meanings that are brought about by human activity*. Such movements are the ones that saw a massive increase in the latter half of the 20th century

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[13] In the same vein, Cresswell describes mobility as movement with meaning. See Tim Cresswell, *On the Move. Mobility in the Modern Western World* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2–4.

and that motivated sociologists and other scholars to try and understand the world on the basis of mobility. They were the starting point of the mobility paradigm and mobility theories.

The range of the problematic of mobility has since grown from the core meaning. Movement of information is not the movement of physical things, but it can be called mobility because it has lifeworldly meanings, is produced by human activity, and is in a sense also a change of location. Bodily motions are not a change of location, but can be called mobility because they have lifeworldly meanings, are produced by human activity, and are what enables other mobilities. Even further, we must speculate on the ontology of motion if we are to understand what enables all the mobilities on a fundamental level. The core meaning of mobility is not called the core in the sense that it determines the range of mobility theories, but because it gave and gives rise to it.

Lifeworldly Meanings of the Highly Mobile World

Now that we have grasped the core meaning of mobility, we can move on to examine how modes of mobility have transformed in the contemporary world in order to describe their meanings and ethical consequences.

What was invented is the notion of mobility, not the reality of mobility. Mobilities, even long-distance mobilities, have existed from long ago. Our ancestors migrated from Africa to other parts of the world, marched across continents, and sailed across seas. But such ventures were rare events that only a few people willfully or forcibly dared to undertake. Mobilities in the past were also much slower than they are now. Long-distance travel required several months, even years. In both aspects, it is now vastly different: mobilities in the contemporary world are much more frequent and faster—the world is now *highly mobile*.

Mobilization of the world, given impetus by technological and political innovations, has had huge effects on lifeworlds. First, the increase in frequency led to the changes of our valuations concerning sedentarism and nomadism. Although the words sedentary and nomadic are primarily descriptive, they also acquire normative valuations within the lifeworld. In ancient Greece, for example, nomadic life was undesirable, and movement was tolerated only when it was a way back home, that is, a return to a sedentary life.[14] A life with a stable home and family was desirable and valuable, while nomadic life was gazed upon in a suspicious or even contemptuous manner. Such a system of value began to change as more

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[14] Perkins analyzes the Odyssean journey to show such valuations regarding sedentarism and nomadism in ancient Greece. See Perkins, "Travel Texts and Moving Cultures," 34ff.

possibilities of mobility were gradually popularized with faster ships, horse carriages, and so on. With new mobilities vast areas of new experiences were now open—encounters with unknown people and cultures, examination of different lifestyles, consciousness of a wider world not confined to national borders, etc. Such experiences were regarded as contributing to self-education, and thus, positive values were granted to the mobile life.[15] This new system of value continues in the contemporary world, demonstrated by, for example, an increasing public interest in the nomadic lifestyle.[16]

Second, the increase of speed has contracted the world. Now we can cover in a day distances that people in the past needed several months or years to traverse. This shrinks the space in reality—states, continents have never been so close.[17] On the lifeworldly perspective, the contraction of space implies that there are more frequent encounters with alien worlds. In addition, the further we travel, the more we will probably encounter alien worlds that contrast heavily with our home world. In the past, the mobilities of a majority of people were confined in their own provinces or nations. Now it is not difficult to cross borders of states or even continents. There we may meet alien worlds that have almost nothing in common with our home world.

Ethical Dangers of High Mobility

It is time now to demonstrate how a highly mobile world may give rise to ethical dangers. There are ethical dangers because of the fact that the highly mobile world threatens to unsettle the home world. The home world is the taken-for-granted, sole, lasting lifeworld; and thus, we can rely upon it. The highly mobile world can, however, undermine the stability of home world, that is, of the reliable ground for actions.

The stability of the home world is grounded on a sedentary mode of life because a lifeworld becomes one's home world through habituations which are enabled by repetitions over time. In other words, habituations are possible when members of a community share the same meaningful formations, teach and learn them from one another, and think and act according to them over time. For this to happen, the same members should remain in the same world over a long period of time.

The highly mobile world threatens this condition. First, encounters with alien worlds harms the way we take for granted the home world. This

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[15] Here, she analyzes a diversity of values attributed to mobilities in modern German literature. *Ibid.*, 49ff.

[16] For further discussions on sedentarism and nomadism, see Peter Adey, *Mobility, Second Edition* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 69–101.

[17] For a detailed analysis of this phenomenon, see David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity. An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990), 260ff.

mindset of "taking for granted" is more than the fact that *I* consciously take for granted *my* home worlds and the meaningful formations within it. It is not that I have consciously pondered over whether I should take my home world for granted and judged that I should, therefore, it is a prereflective state of mind. For example, when it is taken for granted in my home world that we should go into the house without any shoes on, I do not recognize it as a norm. I simply take off my shoes and go into a house. I realize it as a particular norm for the first time when I encounter a lifeworld in which people enter houses with shoes on, and I can no longer take it for granted. Second, encounters with alien worlds harm the oneness of home world. What this suggests is not the trivial fact that I have only one home world, but that my home world is only one lifeworld that I am aware of, and that I am not even aware of the possibility of other lifeworlds. Through encounters with the alien world, I see the possibility and the reality of other lifeworlds and recognize my home world for the first time as a particular lifeworld among lifeworlds. Now, there is plurality of lifeworlds. In this way, encounters with alien worlds unsettle the home world by damaging its oneness and how we "take it for granted." While it is not particularly difficult to relieve the unsettling effects in a world with low mobility, in a highly mobile world this poses a fairly difficult, if not impossible, task.

First, frequent encounters with alien worlds in the highly mobile world inhibit the habitual operations of home-worldly thinking and action. When our normal habitual thinking and action is performed undisturbed, it reinforces our habits recursively and stables our habitual world. On the contrary, when it is disturbed, for example by unexpected or hostile responses of people from an alien world, it can undermine the respective habitualities. In a world with less mobility, this disturbance is not frequent enough to generally undermine the habitualities; but in a highly mobile world, habitual thinking and action can fail so frequently that a considerable part of habitualities can become unstable.

Second, frequent encounters with alien worlds establishes a need to take alien worlds seriously. In a world with less mobility, we can take alien worlds lightly with few undesirable consequences. In other words, we can regard an alien meaningful formation as an eccentricity, a one-shot event, or a spectacle; that is, it can be regarded as something which does not really belong to our world. Such a temporary measure does not work in a highly mobile world, because encounters with alien meaningful formations already belong to our home world. Therefore, we cannot live an unobstructed life without solving the question of how to deal with alien worlds.

Now we can see why the highly mobile world can destabilize the privileged position of the home world as the ground for cognition and action. In the previous paragraph, it was said that a home world can hold such a

position because 1) we act according to habitualities in our home world, 2) we refer to our home world to make sense of values and norms, 3) our home world has persisted for a long time and is thus reliable. In the highly mobile world 1) our habitual action is frequently disturbed, 2) there are other meaningful formations to which we can refer, 3) frequent exchange with alien worlds can change meaningful formations of our home world, rendering the home world unstable.

The result is that we cannot confidently perform actions personally as well as mutually because our home world, our personal and communal ground for action, is undermined or can be even lost. Destabilization of our home world also carries emotional consequences, like depression and anxiety.[18] This is the ethical danger implied in a highly mobile world. In this way, our highly mobile world presents to us not only economic, cultural, and political challenges, but also ethical challenges.

Ethical Potentialities of the Highly Mobile World

In the previous section, we have seen how an ethically problematic situation is created in the highly mobile world. But we are not completely overwhelmed by such problems in the contemporary, highly mobile world. We try to cope with them, and such attempts also open the gate to new ethical potentialities: 1) new ways of understanding; 2) building of a more universal lifeworld; 3) formation of a new ethical category.

An unstable home world unsettles the ground for action. To solve this problem, it seems that the home world should be restabilized. Yet, it cannot be restored to the old home world, because such a restoration implies the exclusion of alien worlds. This would be undesirable as well as impossible in the new conditions of the highly mobile world. The restabilization that is needed is the establishment of a new, more universal lifeworld encompassing the old home world and the respective alien world. Before describing such a making of a home world, we must discuss the essential premise for it: understanding. Alien worlds should be understood in order to be integrated.

Understanding

There are two kinds of understanding: an intelligent one and an emotional one. An intelligent understanding is the cognition of the reason

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
[18] It is not that the home world collapses necessarily and completely, leaving its members entirely helpless. Such a disintegration is an extreme case, although not impossible. Such destabilizing effects are implied in the nature of the highly mobile world, but they can become actualized to various degrees. Their actualizations can range from a small quarrel with a foreigner aroused by different conceptions of politeness to the absence of social consensus with regards to the right attitude to multicultural families.

and motivational connection of the actions of others.[19] An emotional understanding is the act of empathizing, that is, feeling what others feel. Only the first kind will be dealt with here, because 1) two kinds of understanding can be performed in separation, 2) another word, "empathy," is ready for the second kind, and 3) what is essential in conversation and cooperation is the first kind.

Again, intelligent understanding has three levels. On the first level, we understand others by acknowledging their motivations that we also share. We can understand why a man cries when his daughter dies because we would also be sad if our daughter dies. On the second level, we understand others by figuring out their motivations, which itself we may not have, but which we can accept coherently in our motivational network. When a woman cries when her dog dies, it is possible that we do not understand her crying because we do not have the motivational connection between crying and our dog's death. However, we can try to figure out her motivation by recognizing that we will cry when our family member dies, and that we can accept even an animal as a family member if we live together with it and love it. On the third level, we understand others by somehow figuring out their motivations despite not sharing them and accepting them within our own network of motivations. For example, when a man loves another man or a woman loves another woman, it is possible that we do not understand him or her not only because we do not have that particular motivation of love, but also because we believe that homosexuality is against the nature of human beings. For an understanding to happen in this case, we can utilize *epoché*, in Husserl's sense. *Epoché* is an operation where the validity of meaningful formations is suspended, neither believing nor rejecting the formation, thereby making them ineffective to our cognitions and actions. Through *epoché*, we can suspend our beliefs and try to see the world as the others see it, learn their perspective, and finally understand them.[20]

The understanding on the third level proposes a conundrum, which can lead us to an abandonment of understanding. We can file such actions in the category of the absurd and describe them as being incomprehensible to us, or even inherently incomprehensible, as homophobic people would do in

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[19] In the theory of action in the analytic tradition, an action is explained in terms of rationality, that is, the faculty to give reasons for action. But it can restrict the range of human actions because a large part of our action is performed not by reason, but by feelings, instincts, habitualities, and so on. The term motivation, which is common in the phenomenological tradition, can be a more appropriate tool for explaining a wider range of human actions.

[20] See Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology*, 57–62. Husserl first proposed *epoché* in the context of epistemological reflection but examines later also the possibility and significance of the ethical *epoché*. See also Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24), Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion*, ed. by Rudolf Boehm (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 319.

our example. The abandonment of understanding need not imply hostility because we can also simply tolerate the incomprehensible without understanding. However, such a tolerance presupposes distancing because, firstly, the lack of understanding can make serious conversation and cooperation impossible and, secondly, unavoidable encounters with incomprehensible actions within an intimate relationship may become irritating sooner or later. Living together intimately requires understanding.

Understanding is already an ethical action because it is an effort to treat a person as a person. Motivation is a characteristic feature of person. A thing can only be known, not understood, because there is no motivation in its behavior and thus nothing to be understood. It is possible to ignore and neglect the motivations of a person, but this would mean that we take this person as a thing rather than a person. When we try to understand them, we give justice to their personhood, that is, we begin to act ethically. Understanding on the third level is even more ethical, because on the first and second level we do not grasp the person's singularity, since we see their motivations as reflections of our own motivation. On the third level, however, we try to grasp motivations which lie beyond our network of motivations. In other words, we try to take the other as the other, not as a mirror image of ourselves.

What have been discussed hitherto in the personal sphere can be applied to the intersubjective or social sphere. A motivation has social existence when it is shared and justified by members of a community. Something is socially known when knowledge about it is shared and talked about between members of a community. Accordingly, we can say that motivations of a community are understood by another community when the motivations have social existence in the former and the knowledge about it has a social existence in the latter.

We have seen that the abandonment of understanding is undesirable in an intimate relationship in the personal sphere. The equivalent situation of an intimate relationship in the social sphere is brought about by the highly mobile world. In a world with little mobility, a community can hardly be in a close relationship with another community. In this case, it is not too troublesome to abandon understanding of another community because there is little interaction between them. On the contrary, the highly mobile world implies constant interaction and cooperation between communities, and therefore, demands understanding of other communities. In our example, when a community in which homosexuality is taboo engages in frequent exchanges with another community in which homosexuality is socially accepted, a need for understanding is brought about. This demand for understanding is the first ethical potentiality of the highly mobile world.

Building of a More Universal Lifeworld

As mentioned above, understanding is not the destination. In our original life in the home world, we have only one perspective. We acquire other perspectives by understanding alien worlds. However, we are still left with conflicting perspectives and the question of how to act reasonably is unanswered. In order to answer this question, we need a coherent world.

We strive to banish contradictions from our lifeworld and make it coherent. It is not only an intelligent desire to establish a coherent system of knowledge, but also a practical desire; that is, it is a desire to be able to act reasonably. First, we cannot justify our acts without a coherent lifeworld. In that case, a reason may be right in one perspective, and another reason may be right in another; we cannot argue for a particular perspective because we do not have a common ground to perform a practical estimation of diverse perspectives. We are then left with no choice but to choose one perspective arbitrarily. Second, we cannot establish a coherence of an action over time. Many actions happen in different stretches of time. A certain action can take minutes, hours, or even years. In that case, the unity of an action in time is guaranteed by abiding reasons for it. With the plurality of conflicting perspectives, however, reasons are prone to change, so that the unity of action is spoiled.

Therefore, we need to restore a coherent lifeworld. As mentioned above, such a restoration demands the establishment of a new home world rather than a recovery of the old one or its takeover by alien worlds. The newly established home world will be a synthesis of the old home and alien worlds.

As there are three kinds of understanding, we can identify three ways of synthesis. First, some meaningful formations from an alien world can have analogous counterparts in our home world. In this case, they can be easily assimilated into our home world. Second, it is possible that some alien meaningful formations do not have similar counterparts in our home world while also not conflicting with our other meaningful formations; such formations can be coherently placed within our home world. In both cases, the synthesis of two worlds does not pose particularly difficult problems. Synthesis becomes a real problem when some alien meaningful formations conflict with meaningful formations in our home world—such a situation is always possible, because there is no pre-established harmony between the home world and alien worlds. Finally, conflicts should be resolved. Such a resolution is possible only when we descend to a more fundamental level. We need to, say, step back from the conflicting meaningful formations and to find a common background to them. Here we can utilize *epoché* again: by suspending the superficial effects of meaningful formations, we can bring their background to light.

An important question concerning *epoché* is how universal it should be. Husserl's first attempt at *epoché*, inspired by Descartes' doubt, aimed for a fully universal suspension of meaningful formations. He strived to arrive thereby at ultimate principles, from which he would rebuild the system of meaningful formations. Such an attempt has difficulties. First, in the course of speculation, we must use meaningful formations in the world: we must have knowledge about what the mind is; what thinking, perception, feeling is; about the language we use; and so on. Second, even if it is possible to suspend all the meaningful formations except the principles, they would be too empty or formal to rebuild into a concrete system. Realizing the problems of his earlier attempts, Husserl later developed ways of *epoché* that retain more or less concreteness, a deeper discussion of which is outside the scope of this paper.[21] What is important for us here is that the *epoché* which we need for the synthesis of lifeworlds is also not absolutely universal, because concreteness matters much more in the practical sphere.

We need not, and should not, try to find a universal ground for all possible worlds. We merely need to take the number of steps necessary to arrive at the meaningful formations shared and agreed upon by two lifeworlds. Grounded on those meaningful formations, we can deal with the conflicting elements of both worlds concretely and critically. Such critical considerations can yield various results: discarding certain meaningful formations, compromising between conflicting meaningful formations, or inventing a new network of meaningful formations. In either of these ways, we acquire a revised lifeworld, with modified networks of meaningful formations. In our example, we can suspend different beliefs and opinions about homosexuality, and try to find a common ground in concepts of, for example, the human being, love, and marriage. We can reflect upon and discuss the matter of homosexuality on this shared ground, finding agreeable new meaningful formations. We would introduce these new meaningful formations into our original home worlds, respectively, which could require discarding some conflicting previous meaningful formations. Now we are ready to integrate two worlds. This is how the third way of synthesis can come about.

It is indeed possible that the original home world should lose some meaningful formations (e.g., the belief in the heterosexual nature of human beings) through some process of revision. In extreme cases, the newly synthesized world can appear as a radically different world from the original home world. Nonetheless, it is not a replacement, but a synthesis, because the revision is based on the common ground between the home world and the

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[21] For clarification of the various ways of *epoché*, see Iso Kern, "The Three Ways to the Transcendental Reduction," in *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals*, ed. by Frederick A. Elliston and Peter McCormick (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).

alien world. Also, although some meaningful formations on the surface of the resulting lifeworld can be quite different, the newly synthesized world cannot be radically different from the original home world in the strictest sense, because they share the same *radix* (root).

The revised lifeworld does have a kind of universality, but not an absolute universality in the sense of Kant or Hegel. Not Kantian, because it is not formal. He tried to arrive at universality by abstracting from concreteness and leaping to the most universal laws, which are indeed universal, but empty, due to their formality. The world we get here is a world with all the concrete meaningful formations. Not Hegelian, because the universality of the revised lifeworld is not conceptually predestined and derived. The synthesis here is accomplished through actual actions and interactions, such as critical reflection and assessment, conversation and discussion; the result cannot be foreseen. The revised lifeworld is nonetheless a more universal one, relative to the former ones, in the sense that it provides a coherent and stable ground for members of the original home world and the original alien world alike. Ethical universality can be achieved in this way, that is, gradually and progressively through syntheses of lifeworlds. The opportunity for such a universalization is bestowed through encounters with the alien world. It is the second ethical potentiality implied in the highly mobile world.

A New Ethical Category

Thus, a more universal lifeworld can be gained by understanding and synthesizing. Now we have a novel lifeworld, which will function as the ground for our practices. The resulting lifeworld is, at first, not a proper home world, however. Although its fundamental grounds are left unmodified, and its many meaningful formations are untouched by the revision, it is possible that members no longer feel "at home" because of unfamiliar meaningful formations, e.g., new rules or changed valuations. The becoming-home-world of the revised lifeworld can happen only through collective habitualization, which requires time.

Not only habitualization requires time, but also the understanding and synthesizing that comes before it. First, all the courses of thinking—understanding, *epoché*, critical estimation, and synthesizing—is time-consuming. Understanding a single alien meaningful formation is already not a simple task, because it also requires an understanding of connections in which that meaningful formation is involved. Each phase of mental work required to carry out a synthesis—*epoché*, critical reflection and assessment, figuring out new desirable meaningful formations, etc.—is also time-consuming. Moreover, all the thoughts must be socially digested; that is, a shared conception must be established through mutual exchange and

discussion of relevant thoughts. The result is that we must live through a certain period where we experience a reduced at-homeness.

The problem is compounded when we remember that the success of synthesizing lifeworlds is not guaranteed. As stated above, ethics demands universality *de jure*, but this does not mean an effective universal ethical system is always *de facto* possible. This is because the effectiveness of an ethical system relies on its concreteness. For example, take the universal rule of "thou shall not lie." One and the other can accept it, and so it appears that they have established a universal ground. At the same time, however, the idea of what counts as a lie is different for each other according to their respective lifeworldly network of meaningful formations. Then, in effect, they follow different or maybe conflicting rules. Conversation and discussion between people from different lifeworlds do not guarantee that they will agree on the same concrete ethical system. The possibility of an effective universalization cannot be predicted, and unresolvable conflicts are possible.

In the highly mobile world, therefore, we cannot help but live in a home world destabilized or unsettled by encounters with alien worlds over an undetermined period of time. It would therefore be important for us to learn not only how to restore the home world, but also how to live in an unsettling home world, or, more fruitfully, how to live with a plurality of lifeworlds. Even if we do not have a stable ground for action, we do not want to be caught in a state where we are anxious and unable to act. On the one hand, and as far as possible, we want to act reasonably, based on the grounds which we can consult in the here and now, but on the other hand, we do not want to neglect the alien world altogether. We therefore need other guidelines for action than the ones that could be employed within a stable home world. Virtues like tolerance, negotiation, or compromise would be required—virtues which were largely neglected in universality-oriented ethics. For example, when there is a universal division between right and wrong, negotiation would not be a virtue, but rather an expedient, if not a wrongdoing, because something absolutely right should not be negotiated. But, if the rightness of an action is judged on the basis of the lifeworld, where there is a plurality of lifeworlds, where the unification of lifeworlds is not guaranteed, and when we experience conflicts between lifeworlds—in short, if we live among frequent encounters with alien worlds due to high mobility—negotiation can be a requisite. Such virtues can be called virtues or ethical norms because they regulate or enable actions to interact with other human beings as human beings. They form an ethical category, which is seldom discussed in traditional ethical theories.

This section leaves a closer examination of this new category for future studies will close with some remarks on norms concerning the home world which may belong to this category. It seems that we should change our

way of understanding the home world in a highly mobile world. The conception of the home world as *the* lifeworld and *the* ground for action is based on sedentary conditions of the past, which may have been changed forever. In our time of high mobility, the home world may not be a static, closed, unchanged world. It may be open to frequent encounters with the alien world and may include values and norms concerning interactions with alien worlds. In this way, the highly mobile world calls for a new ethical category, a new conception of the home world. It is another ethical potentiality of the highly mobile world.[22]

Closing Remarks

We have seen the ethical dangers and potentialities of the highly mobile world. The dangers speak of how our home world may be destabilized by frequent encounters with the alien world, so that we may lose our ground for action and fall into anxiety over the inability to act. Potentialities refer to how an understanding of the other is socially demanded, that a gradual universalization of ethical systems is stimulated, and that a new ethical category is called for living in the unsettling home world and frequently encountering the alien world. Anita Perkins's question "are the new mobilities good for us?" cannot be answered with a yes or a no, but with an examination of the dangers and the potentialities implied in a highly mobile world. This essay is one such possible attempt. Other dangers and potentialities may be discovered through further attempts focusing on other aspects of mobility.

This essay closes with a remark on a point that was not taken into account for the sake of keeping the discussion relatively simple. This point is that a home world can already be a place of discomfort and anxiety for some of its members because certain norms in the home world can be repressive to them. The fact that it remains their home world—because it is habituated in them and is the only world they can refer to—makes the situation more difficult as there is no escape for these members. To them, encounters with the alien world can be an experience of liberation, because the home world loses its privilege as the lifeworld, and other ways of life are opened. It can thus stimulate them to seek, or to make a lifeworld in which they can lead a

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[22] In this context, we can see so-called nomadism not only as a distinctive descriptive mode of life, but also as an ethical way of life. For further discussions on nomadism, see Adey, *Mobility*, 81ff.

free, happy life. Here we can see another ethical potentiality of the highly mobile world.

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Article | Special Issue

Homeland, Historicity, and the Ethical of Image from the Mobilities of Image

Wan-I Yang

Abstract: Generally, the study of image is deeply influenced by image ontology. However, if we use image ontology as methodology, we will understand image as a copy of idea and thus be attached to truth. In doing so, we will not be able to carry out image research from the perspective of mobilities and thus ignore the significance and importance of mobilized images. Under this motivation, this paper will gradually clarify the meanings of image of mobilities, the relation between subjectivity and image, and "historical image. In the process of revealing the ethical of image, we should carry out research on affirming the mobilities of image and try to explain the influence and importance of this research on human life.

Keywords: homeland, the ethical of image, image ontology, mobilities of image

Preface

To explore the connotation of image, many would begin with Plato's theory, and immediately perceive image as the imitation of *ousia*. However, if we discuss image from this perspective, it would always be confined to the concept of essence. What is more pitiful is that image would be seen as a subdivision of truth but can never be truth itself. Thus, once artists and critics set out their work, demanding and aspiring for essence and truth, then image, which was dangled in the system of truth, will be marginalized. This theory—whether consciously taken or not, will drive the artists to search for "a never returned utopia," which creates a strong sense of homeland nostalgia (*die Stimmung*) in the image. But what is this homeland? Where does the pity come from? Will the perplexing relation strangled between homeland and the other worlds impact the interpretation of the local land? As for the interpretation of the local "land," besides demarcating it on the world map to make it visible, we should focus more on

analyzing the "core"[1] of the eyes that permeates the condition of how artists and critics see something as such.

This paper further analyzes the distinction between history and historicity from the perspective of mobilities of image. By clarifying the concept of historicity, the paper attempts to reveal the connotation of the ethical of image,[2] differing from the often-discussed ontology of image.

The Lost Homeland

The world is a work of art created by the subject with its own representational ability. However, the image created by representational ability also implies the truth that cannot be revealed by representational ability. As a result, human beings are full of imagination and yearning for the untouchable idea. Therefore, in the creation of the image works, the way of negating the world highlights the truth and beauty as the lost homeland.

The way the world (*le monde*) appears to us as such relates to human beings' *a priori* capability. In other words, the spatial dimensions we perceive of the world associate with the spatial capability we have. This explains why the "world" that human beings created differs from that of other species,

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[1] This article is concerned with the question of whether there exists a possibility that the oeuvres evolving around the themes such as homeland, locality, and nativism can be emancipated from the constraints of their attention to root, and whether the artists merely repeat the preexisting conceptual model and then merely produce the same old mode of (work) production. The further question investigates whether the signification of a work attempts to emancipate itself from the specific preexisting concept—or whether it is a kind of imitation, as Plato contends, which serves as the point of departure of this article.

[2] In the understanding of the "ethical of image," we can say that the way of using the word "the ethical" is more similar to the German word *das Ethische*, which is an adjective used in noun form. The distinction relies on the usage of "ethics," or *die Ethik* in German, particularly employed to highlight the differences between the ethical and "ethics" in the context of metaphysical tradition. Thus, we avoid the translation of "ethics," and use instead "the ethical."

The ethical sense used in this paper arises from Emmanuel Levinas. From Gérard Bensussan's understanding of Levinas's ethical signification, we can clearly see the differences remaining in both the ethical and the ethics. Bensussan thus writes: "The discourse ethics, the communicative ethics, the neo-Aristotelianism, the utilitarianism, the contractualism, the communitarianism, the differentialism, the meta-ethical reflection, and the applied ethics—all of the moral practical positions, sectorial or concurrent, have without doubt their effective importance of theoretical and practical point of view of the foundation and of the question of acting. All the ethics have nothing to do with the ethical on which Levinas makes the pivot point about the thinking of subjectivity" Gérard Bensussan, *Ethique et Expérience: Lévinas Politique* (Strasbourg: La Phocide, 2008), 8. Bensussan distinguished the difference between ethics based on moral and rational justification and Levinas's ethic beyond morality. The latter is manifested in the intrusion of the face, or more precisely, in the impact of the face on human beings. In this interpretation, we can see that ethic has a higher priority than rationality and morality, and the implication that "ethic precedes philosophy" is clarified in this priority. What Levinas puts forward, also known as "ethic of ethic" by Derrida, is "the first philosophy" whose subject is the ethical subject.

despite a shared circumstance under the same sun. In the same vein, the creation of human knowledge, culture, and civilization is closely linked to human's unique capability of representation. The concept of representation can be explained from many layers, yet they all bear the same meaning of "reproduction." This definition not only reveals the relation between surface and real, phenomenon and truth, the visible and the invisible, but also shows how the subject represents the world from his/her own worldview (*Weltanschauung*). Such an individual worldview unveils how the (representational) world can be visibly seen, but at the same time, it beclouds the appearing (*das Erscheinen/l'apparaître ou l'apparition*) of other possible world images.

Our discussion on the capability of representation could be further extended to a claim that the world (*le monde*) we see, in one sense, could be regarded as the artwork we created. Such art creation unveils the world in one way, yet it preinstalled a cache for the veiled, which in itself already contains an emotional space yearning for unveiling the cached. The yearning for the cached essence and truth in turn allocates value on the invisible side. Moreover, since representation already indicates an unachievable truth, creators are endowed with an ever-burning passion for the other worlds. In other cases, the feeling of an unapproachable distance will intensify along the pursuit for other worlds and creators will experience an absolute desire that always remains to be satisfied. Based on such rationale, if we try to seek truth from the images that are created by representation capability, we would experience the sense of loss that is more intense than despair (despite the absolute passion we experienced). As a result, we sometimes find that various metamorphoses of nostalgia—the yearning for Eden, the love and mourning for mother (a symbol of the homeland), the impasse of destiny, the futile consumption of passion, the decadence of this life, the ugliness of being, the worship for history—exist in the discourses of image. In different works, the meaning of homeland could be diversely approached through different forms. Yet we should note that in such works, the concept of "homeland" does not merely exist in concrete beings denoted by the creators, but also appears in the form of nostalgia for the concrete beings. Due to the dissatisfaction of being (*être*) and beholding (*voir*), one assumes that there is always a better realm of existence with higher values and happiness.

Using "homeland" to symbolize other places and "the lost homeland" to designate irretrievable beauty hidden behind the images, is actually a way to highlight an inseparable entity—the visible and the invisible—in image creations and discussions. The visible images represented are often intended to describe the invisible (or the cached) beauty. From such a point of view, the nostalgia for the homeland is not simply an actual place denoted by the artists and critics, but indeed the imagination and expectation

for the possibly better. Such general idea of a homeland (Eden/Utopia), which symbolizes the pursuit for essence and truth, is often adopted by artists and critics to endow virtual images with various contents and dreams from their own experience and imaginations. It also enables the observers to evoke their own sense of nostalgia. The images haunted by a sense of eternal loss bring its observers not only to this life or the current location, but also to the imagination of a lost happiness. Subsequently, the imagined happiness aggravates one's dissatisfaction with the reality to a deeper abyss of despair and indifference. In these situations, people may become more apathetic, or they will release the inner dissatisfaction by yelling out "This place cannot be my home." The love and hatred engendered by the comparison between the imaged homeland and reality will eventually separate homeland from reality, opposing the two sides just as truth vs. fiction, beauty vs. ugliness, and goodness vs. evil.

Rule, Transgression, and the Ethical Relation

In daily life, images as illusions are constantly refracting each other, showing the changing world as the signification of a constantly covering worldview. Just as artists put the life, which has originally no meaning, into a specific yardstick, that is, a certain sense of worldview, in order to highlight the life limited by rules as existence, and thus show the meaning of life. Different from Plato's impassable idea as the form of the phenomenal world, in the "transcendence" of norms, people highlight the significance of life and norms as a game, so as to show how the vigor and vitality of life experience and reflect on the ethical relationship between existence and norms, and thus make the meaning of norms beyond the limitations of the moral system.

When one is constrained by experience (*Erlebnis*), one is often engulfed into the situation. The self under such situation is a player in his/her self-represented world.[3] When experience become the experienced (*Erfahrung*),[4] the self, who has represented the world, is able to withdraw himself/herself from the world, and even separate himself/herself from the

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[3] This seems to suggest one is in one's own dream, experiencing the world that one sees, experiencing the sadness, happiness, fear, etc.

[4] What is the difference between *das Erlebnis* and *die Erfahrung*? Franz Rosenzweig in his book *Livret sur l'entendement sain et malsain* once compared the worldview to a bowl. If "person in a flowing river" are compared to "person who experience life," then those who scoop up a ladle of water because they want to know what water is and try to understand it, just like a subject who takes a certain moment of moving life, who tries to isolate the bowl of water from the flow and explore the universal significance of water. This bowl of water, as the object of subject, is like blood flowing out of blood vessels. It is different from the life itself experienced (*erleben*) by human beings and has become the "*Erfahrung*" constructing the subject's cognition. See Franz Rosenzweig, *Livret sur l'entendement sain et malsain* (Paris: Cerf, 1998).

world. At this moment, the reflective and suspicious self, is like an analyst who stands outside of the changes and mobilities of life, employing certain perspectives to reflect the world created by himself/herself and endowing his/her creation with a meaning. Reflection is a way to re-observe the memory of the self: the experienced. This is similar with analyzing our dreams. When we are dreaming, we experience the dream. But once we try to comprehend the image when we are awake, we are already outside of our creations.

To interpret the appearance is a human instinct, like the man who is discontent with only dreaming often questions about the meaning of dreams. The subject, unsatisfied with the mere experience of apparition (*Erscheinung*), always enquires what is the Being (*être*) under the appearing or apparition (*Erscheinen*). Just like psychoanalyst hunting for the repressed desire in one's dream, human beings, out of care, search for the multiple meanings of the world from the represented images. But the attempt to endow the world with a meaning and find an answer from the appearance, paradoxically proves that what one sees is a mere appearance ([*bloße*] *Schein*). Just as the analyst shows that dream is merely an emblem of desire, the interpretation of the image proves that appearing is merely a fabrication. But what is contained in the appearance? Is it the essence sustaining the existence of image?

In fact, not only in dreams, do we often hear people resemble life with images, such as "life is like a dream/drama." Such saying grasps the virtual and ever-changing attributions of the appearance. We, who live in the worldview of our own, display others as our own imagination. The world as such is appearing (*paraître*) itself, and the interactive appearing between me and the other reflect more dimensions of the self. The multi-interwoven infinity of you and me thus dynamically reveals the universe in each instantaneous moment. Even though the universe is a fabrication, the "I" exists in the constant witness of such fabrication. In this sense, it is the fabrication that certifies the "I." Thus, the "I" is also an appearing image. Appearance is like the reflection from which Narcissus saw in the water.

The image of the self is, after all, a partial reflection of the "I" from water. If Narcissus does not insist on this single image/appearing image, then the illusion will only appear as the instantaneous false image.[5] The appearing images are the evanescent illusions, and the illusions reflected with

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[5] From Oscar Muñoz's *Narcisos* (1990), we can see the visage from the image gradually emerges and is formed from the water. But as the water subdues, the visage gradually disappears. The repetitive process highlights the fact that each image of appearing is similar to the self-image reflected on the pond. In the repetition between the happenings and disappearances, we can see how the self-image instantly emerges and disappears. The changes of self-image indicate the mobility of the ability to present. Only when one fixes a certain image can one fall in love with the image of self and objectify oneself into Narcissus that is fixed in a mode of being.

each other appear as the changing universe.[6] As this universe has no essence, it is distinguished from the world chained by the homogenous structure, and henceforth appears as the action of constant relocation of worldview. This constant relocation of image is the same as our ceaseless replacement of the meaning of our existence in the continuous experience of our day-to-day life, linking the illusionary universe with the structural world.

In the works of the contemporary art, we can see the artist uses himself/herself as the material of his/her work, repeating a simple rule, and tries to accentuate the relationship between life and being (such as Tehching Hsieh's work)[7] in this constant repetition. In an idiosyncratic manner, the artist repetitively brings the transforming life into the measurement of rules, sharply exhibiting the relationship between life and rule. If life is in mobility, then existence signifies the status of life structured by rule. When the artist presents (*herausarbeiten*) the paradox between the change of life and the rule of life to display existence, the destruction immanent to the existence of life will appear. As change relies on the essence of life, the work as such highlights the nonsense of life. However, nonsense is not no-sense; it is the attempt to emphasize how the freedom of life becoming is demolished by rules, while revealing the fact that the "life of mankind" needs such a rule to configure its relationship with other beings.[8] Taking Hsieh's works—"Time Clock Piece" (1980–1981) and "Outdoor Piece" (1981–1982)—as an example, when an artist sets a particular time on the clock without falling asleep, it becomes clear that spirit is confined by body; also, it provides a dwelling space for it. When the artist sets the rule that he/she cannot enter buildings with a shelter for a year,[9] the relationship between the building and the

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[6] The image represented by me is an illusion. The world that appears as totality is only a simulacra fragmented by an All. The universe, however, appears as the virtual, bright, and fragmented worldview, and then plays in the illusion, enjoying the infinite universe reflected by the fragmentary illusions.

[7] From 1970s to 1986, Hsieh completed five works of "annual action performance": "Cage" (1978–1979), "Time Clock Piece" (1980–1981), "Outdoor" (1981–1982), "Ropes" (1983–1984), "A Plan Not to Do Art" (1985–1986), and finally, "Thirteen Years of Plan" (1986–1999). In the last announcement, he emphatically notes that "I will make ART this time," and he will not release his further works. For further information, see Adrian Heathfield and Tehching Hsieh, *Out of Now: The Lifeworks of Tehching Hsieh* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008).

[8] Freud reminds us that both life and death drive serve as the two sides of the same coin. The death and life of the cell in the everyday life, the change of life has been confined by a form (if the cell continues to disseminate itself, this will lead the humans to disease or demise). Like the appearing (*paraître*) of each instance, which has been devoured in the constant becoming, the apparition (die *Erscheinung*) emerges in each moment but disappears in each moment too.

[9] In "Outdoor Piece," one is not allowed to enter in the house, but it is negated as the street fight occurs. Then the law of not entering in the house is negated as one is sent into the prison by 15 hours. These accidents seem to explain the reality of existence revealed by the negation of life of the rule as well as its opening. One has to confront the norm, and then experience the relationship between the norm and one's work (or one's existence) through

humankind either as confinement or as protection is thus revealed. The nonsense of life makes life emancipated from the essence as the form that confines itself. And the self defines the rules consciously in order to reflect the relationship between one's life and one's world. From now on, the existing dimension automatically given does not only reshape the work of representation between the self and the world, but also rebuilds the ethical relationship of the world between human and the self.

Life needs some limit (i.e., forms, norms, or structure and so forth) to make existence real, providing some beautiful forms as a representational framework, like Plato who offers the Ideal as the form of phenomenal world. However, as mentioned earlier, the transcendental limit indeed evokes the sense of nostalgia. Then the question appears as such: Can existence itself provide another measurement of life, rather than the transcendental ideal form, that makes the representational world appear as my existence? The search for the logos of the representation existence then becomes the pivotal point of appearing the image of existence. But what measurement is needed to gauge our existence and make it visible? If image is no longer the surface that contains the essence, then the inquiry about image firstly concerns about setting measurement for the existence. The measurement coming from existence does not signify a truth that one cannot transgress. On contrary, it is the transgression beyond the norm that underscores the existence. The transgression beyond the norm does not only exhibit the existence and norm, but also displays the intensity and vitality of life. Thus, in contrast to the traditional unchallengeable truth, the measurement in existence is, for Georges Bataille, meant to be crossed or transgressed.[10] The conflicts arising from the constant experiences of transgression further invite us to consider what measurement and what manner can be made to represent the relationship between the artist and the world. What this inquiry concerns serves as an attempt to reshape the representation of the one's existence and the ethical relationship between the human and the world. The ethical relationship here highlights the experience or the lived-experience in transgression as well as the reflection of the action between existence and norm, which stands in contrast to the constraining simple meaning. Hence, the ethical relationship exhibits the rethinking and the reshaping of meaning

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transgressing the norm. The opening compels the artists not to act in accordance with the norm, but constantly return themselves to the relationship between existence and norm, or the conflicts between life and existence experienced, again and again, by the accidents.

[10] For Bataille's idea of "Transgression," see Georges Bataille, *Oeuvres Complètes X* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), 66.

in the act of transgressing the norm, remaining in contrast to the questions involved in the autonomy and heteronomy of the closed morality.[11]

## The Other Meaning of Homeland from the Self as a Fissure (*Riss*)

The position of "self," the empty subject, makes the virtual self-image flow and thus avoids the formation of identical self. This fissure, which avoids the materialization of life into a being, is the manifestation of existence, but it is not life itself. If this subjective position is regarded as homeland, thus the meaning of homeland will be shown as "circulation." The images that "circulate" in this fissure do not rely on the essence to prove themselves. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to talk about the meaning of image from the image ontology which triggers the thoughts and feelings. On the premise that mobility is the relationship between image and image, the ethical of image should be carried out.

Reshaping the self-image concerns the deconstruction and construction of appearance of the self. The self-image, during its mobilities, appears as the trace of multilayered interlacing appearances.

Between the deconstruction and construction of self-image, the pure form of "self-nature," appearing as the measurement of the self, becomes the core of existential meaning and the eye of structure. The empty hole of "self-nature" grants not only life's nihility and limit, but also the cause that makes us human. The homeland without content, due to its empty void nihilism, becomes the standard of *raison d'être* and marks the relationship of ego and the *alter ego* (the subject and the other). The black hole of the center is the core and the weakness of the structure. The self thus appears as the fissure of structure. Just as norm presupposes transgression, the hero always becomes himself/herself because of his/her weakness and dies on the same cause. The prominence of the phallus inevitably presupposes castration, as well as the relationship between father and the family name presupposes patricide and betrayal. The core of existence is also the fissure (*Riss*) of structure. It gathers together the meaning of life, but it also devours the meanings like the nihilistic root.[12]

The position of the subject that assembles the changes of life into existence becomes the "position" of all phenomena for its emptiness. Francis

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[11] From the mobile relationship of the ethical of image, we are reminded of Nicolas Bourriaud's *Relational Aesthetics*, in which Bourriaud offers the definition of the relational (art). The relational (art) relation does not indicate independent and private space, but the aesthetic creation departing from the theory and practice between the human relations and the social context. See Nicolas Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics* (Dijon: Éditions Presses Du Reéel, 1998).

[12] If we identify the void of care to redemption (that is, the desire to fill in the void of self, which awaits the coming of messiah), this doing cannot still escape the nostalgia mentioned above.

Bacon's *Study for the Head of a Screaming Pope* (1952) serves as an example. The open mouth surrounded by the painting is the fissure towards the inside and outside. The open mouth grants space the ability to change, twist and flow. This hole serves as the center that assembles the representation, as well as the runaway path of the representation. As the measurement of the painting, the two conflicting forces converged in this core, and formed the tensions that saturated the whole painting, casting a dynamic illusion to the static painting. We can name this as the position of the subject, the punctum, the fissure, the crevasse, and so on. Similar to Oscar Muñoz's *Le début et la fin de Narcisse* (2002), there are two displaced face images on the pond. As the two images converge together, the water reflected on the image immediately flow away from the leakage. In this work, firstly, the reflection on water still presents two moving false images, just like Narcissus who, in the beginning, knows that the face reflected on the pond is just his reflection and understands that the reflection changed in the flow is a mere false image. Then Narcissus gradually identifies this false image as true when the reflection continues to exist on the tranquil water. Muñoz slowly overlaps the two images to reveal Narcissus's gradual identification with the false image as time goes by. What he attempts to accentuate is the identification process of the false image in time. When the doubled images symbolizing the fulfillment of identification overlapped on the water, the water leaks the light and erupts through the hole in a spiral manner. Meanwhile, the destruction and fissure of the image come to the fore. When Narcissus recognizes the image and is objectified as daffodil, the crack of the subject instantly appears in the death of the moving image. Muñoz's work reveals that once the mobilities of image are captured by identity, its movability and changeability will ephemerally disappear, and the self will appear in the emptiness as well. Once the dynamic appearance is objectified,[13] the self that traverses the representation will be brought into the nihilism (like the obvious and useless leaking hole, which appears as the crack of the pipe). The nihilism of the self exists for the traversing, which, in such a manner, ensures the dynamism and the possibility of life. This appears like a key knot that welcomes the future, while Being can move as a crack and life can have a hole for breathing.

Self, the virtual position, twisting point, passage, homeland, fissure, and crack, is an open and empty form:[14] nihilism. For existence that appears depending on nihilism, homeland is the exit of life, but not the life itself; it is the existence that appears, but not existence itself. The emptiness waiting to

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[13] Narcissus sees his own reflection on the water, falls in love with the reflection, and then becomes objectified—or dies—as the flower Narcissus. This example indicates that the identity affirmed by the mirror image or the appearing image serves as the key to existence of immobility.

[14] The self-image begins with this opening, and disappears, too, with this.

be filled in is, however, a passage that one can never fill up. It is not an object, but a passage; it does not become existence, but makes representation possible. The core of the passage—like the projector that renders image possible to appear and the eyes that renders vision possible—does not become static in itself but consumes itself to make the image appear. Such saying underscores the ambiguity of homeland, making homeland itself different from the most primary and essential *raison d'être*, and thus becomes the virtual emptiness that makes various possibilities able to appear. Hence, homeland appears as a bridge for access and cultivation. The mobilities of life make it different from the enclosed, grasped, and maintained fixed closed area. The bridge of understanding, which appears on its access to opinions from all directions, exists on its open possibilities for all directions. We can name the relational care configured by the representations flowing in the core the "ethic of image." From this rationale, we could know that image does not necessarily need to prove itself from the perspective of essence. Image can actualize the relationship between images through its intrinsic changes and emancipate the world from the existed structure. Meanwhile, this will create more dynamic modes of existence. Thus, when we observe various works of image, the colorful universe presented by the interplay of images is not merely Plato's contention of a copy on phenomenon. When phenomenon passes through the passage of the artist and reconstructs the relationship of image in the representation of the appearances, the work obviously has shown the artist's care. The ethic of the image hereby appears in the work, and, through this, reveals more possibility of life.

History of the Image or the Image of Historicity

If we call collecting, classifying, summarizing, and studying the image development of creators' worldviews in different times as "the history of images," then the research on the history of images that has already taken place does not seem to be able to highlight the characteristics of mobilities of images. Therefore, in the promotion of "the ethical of image," "image of historicity" is put forward, which emphasizes the mobility and variability of images. In the process of dynamically remolding subjectivity, it challenges the existing concepts, taboos, or history simultaneously, making the image become the driving force to promote the progress of people and the world.

Since the pursuit of "lost homeland" implied in the image ontology will lead to the pursuit of Eden in the creation of image, the mobilities of image[15] are affirmed by "the ethical of image." In the affirmation of the

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[15] Different from the image ontology that image is attached to the essence, the mobility of image means that the image circulates, in an eternal returning way, between the images of subjectivity, giving the possibility of reconstructing the meaning of human and the world.

mobilities of images, images have the historicity of a synchronous development with the creators' life. What is the difference between "historical image" and "image of historicity"? The following passage will try to explain. The humans, armed with the capability of representation, accomplished massive image works through the immanent drive of making imagination visible.

Facing the gigantic image industry, analysts extensively read image works, and induce the development of image from them. Through the categorization of the image works, analysts also categorize the styles of the artists and then encode[16] the reproduced images to conduct the research on the history of images. These research highlight artists' worldview (*Weltanschauung*), and also sum up the themes with constant attention. But for the mobile and virtual image, which does not aim at serving for essence, the past inquiry of image history does not suffice to reveal its characteristics. If we merely approach the "form" of image characteristics as the research rule of image, do we take the risk of categorizing the image within a certain concept, constraining image in a certain worldview that conceptually subjects the image as the historical evidence and that, then, ignores the mobile, dynamic, and open possibilities of image?

The mobilities of eternal return of an image departing from the nihilism underscore the virtuality and the mobilities of image. Different artists with various worldviews provide more possible ways to represent the colorful universe. The image that disappears in each instant configures a virtual world different from reality. Just as Nicolas Bourriaud contends in *Relational Aesthetics*:

> Artistic figure contemporary with the invention of film. The artist takes his camera-subjectivity into the real, defining himself as a cameraman: the museum plays the part of the film, he records. For the first time, with Duchamp, art no longer consists in translating the real with the help of signs, but in presenting this same real as it is (Duchamp, the Lumière brothers...)[17]

The appearance self-framed by the emptiness is a *certain* virtual world constructed by the fragmentary images extracted from the subject's dynamic shots on reality. This world produced through subjectivity includes

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[16] The encoding uses several kinds. The most common one is the encoding by time (period) or space (location).

[17] Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics*, 57.

reality into itself through image, and the image swallowed by the self immediately starts to ruminate the image, which, in the reconstruction of the image, endows the image with different meanings, which initiates the relationship between the self and image.

The process of the image creation henceforth appears as the mobile self, experiencing the relationship between self and reality. This activity does not only make the artist part of the image, but also endows the image the historicity that simultaneously born with the artist's life. The image of historicity does not only revitalize the subject in process, but also dynamically reshapes the subjectivity, challenging the existing notion, taboo, or history in its manner of dynamism and mobilities. Thus, the relationship concerning the ethical of image not only emancipates the artists from the confinement of reality, but also provides experiences on the fluidity of life out of the existence of the self. Moreover, it allows work with a personal touch to differentiate itself (i.e., the dynamic historicity) from the recording-oriented historical image. The image relationship extended from the artist will not only allow the spectators to have historical knowledge and developmental history of image, but also even merge into the world of the artist and experience the dynamic world.

Conclusion

Image is not simply the copy. Once image passes through the passage of subjectivity, it is not the primary reality anymore. Subjectivity as the homeland of image is not the lost elsewhere, but "here" that image constantly passes but never stays. The meaning of homeland or locality thus appears as the bearer of the genesis or mobilities. If image is the endless flowing water, then the subjectivity will be the river (the projector or the video camera). The water on the river instantly creates the powerful surges, just like the instantaneous images, or the world constituted by the traces of the retina or the film of the movie. The world is like the movie. Prior to Heraclitus's motto "no man ever steps in the same river twice," the mode of being exhibited by the temporality of the movie unfurls the irretrievable event or humankind's finite time. Image constantly transgresses the limit of time to make multiple worlds appear through its innovation, and it allows the humankind to experience more possibilities in the finite life. The instant image emancipated from the confinement of the existing structure between humankind and the world, the relationship between one and the self, the others and the world, has been, again, reformed and reshaped. The visibility appeared as the multiplicity and the possibility of being not only can make the invisible and the visible coexist in image, but can also reinforce humankind's capability of

representation to go beyond reality, even manifesting imagination in reality through image.

The image between the existence of representation and the ethical relationship bears the possibility of reshaping the relationship between the other and the world. Image may not be aimed *for* reshaping, but since it is the production of human representation, it attempts to render the immanence of the invisible visible. The image that embodies the visible and invisible, debunks the binary opposition between representation and reality, allowing human beings to exist in the world constituted by reality and imagination. From the development of the Internet virtual world, we can see that today's world is heading towards this direction. Like today's society, many young people, born in this Internet world, are accustomed to dealing with the people in the virtual world more often than those in the actual world. Born and raised in such an environment, they feel more affectively and intimately close with the virtual world, rather than the life world. In this sense, the virtual image has become the focus of their life. So how should we adjust the relationship between the virtual image and the real life? Does the principle of dealing with the real-world people still apply to that with the virtual world? I contend that these are ethical questions that we need urgently to raise.

Image brings human beings a certain dimension of freedom. In the emancipated existence, human beings are able to see many possibilities. How should human beings face themselves, the others, and the world in such a world? This is an urgent question for us to ponder, external to experiencing the ethical relationship reshaped by image. Once the ethical relationship of mobilities becomes an experience, we will find that the change of existential mode of human beings living in the image world between reality and imagination has great impact on the self and existence. Living in the image world, we experience its mobilities. The image ontology, which holds that images are always attached to truth, affirms the truth and denies the value of the study on the mobilities of images. On the contrary, "the ethical of image" affirms the mobilities of images, which constantly liberates people and the world from the established structure, making the relationship between themselves, others, and the world reshaped again and again. Therefore, when researchers take the ever-changing ethical relationship as an empirical reflection, they will find that this dynamic nature challenges the existing concepts, taboos, or history, and has already made the image become the driving force for the advancement of human beings and the world. If we try to interpret the study of image as the reflection of experience, then should we go beyond the givens of experience and embark on the inquiry to the future exhibited by the mobilities of being in the image? If the creation of image endows possibility of new meanings, should we, in the notion of image, offer meaning or warning to the future from the perspective of historicity? These

are the focuses and inquiries that we, situated in the flow of images, will continue to make.

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Article | Special Issue

To Be or Not to Be at Home.
Heidegger and Derrida reading Sophocles

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Abstract: In the 1940s, Martin Heidegger held a series of lectures in which he interprets passages from Sophocles' *Antigone* in order to understand the characterization of the human being as *deinon*, which Heidegger translates as *unheimlich* or "not at home." This essential determination of the human being as a being which is constitutively not-at-home will be discussed in the first part of this paper. In the second part, I will discuss Jacques Derrida's reading of another Sophoclean text, *Oedipus at Colonus*, in order to discuss the question of Oedipus's foreignness. Heidegger's and Derrida's readings of Sophocles do have different approaches and methodologies, but considering the influence of Heidegger on Derrida's thought, it is possible to find deep similarities, connections, and philosophically relevant divergences. This confrontation of the two readings concerning the question of being-at-home and foreignness will show that their approaches complement each other.

Keywords: Heidegger, Derrida, Sophocles, Oedipus

> *Aus der Hand frißt der Herbst mir sein Blatt: wir sind Freunde.*
> *Wir schälen die Zeit aus den Nüssen und lehren sie gehn:*
> *die Zeit kehrt zurück in die Schale.*
> Autumn eats a leaf from my hand: we are friends.
> From the nuts we shell time, and we teach it to walk:
> time returns to the shell.
> Paul Celan, *Corona*

What does it mean for humans to be or to feel "at home"? We can be at home in a certain country, which may but must not be our native country; but we may also feel like strangers in our own

country. Moreover, we may feel "at home" in certain situations rather than in others, when we are surrounded by certain people, or just when we have to carry out a certain task with which we are "familiar."

In the following, I will try to shed some light on this problem by choosing a particular hermeneutical path within philosophical works of the 20th century. The problem of feeling "at home" concerns humans as such, and this is the reason why we can encounter descriptions and examples of this in the earliest traces of written human culture—it is enough to mention the figure of Odysseus and his long-postponed longing for being back home in Ithaca after the Trojan War. The eternal fascination with this question shows itself precisely in the fact that such texts are being read and reinterpreted also today, making apparent that, even some 3,000 years after Odysseus, we are still grappling with the question of what it means to be at home and of why we strive so much for everything "familiar." Indeed, philosophy really seems to address directly this problem already with Socrates, who in the *Apology* claims that he is like a stranger before the tribunal that will condemn him to death. His feeling of being a foreigner is based on the fact that he does not speak the language of the tribunal, i.e., the language of Athenian justice.[1] And one could go on tracing the history of a philosophy of homeness and foreignness up to Augustine of Hippo, an Algerian that moved to Carthage, Rome and Milan to live a life away from home. In the last century Jacques Derrida follows—at least to some extent—his steps and moves from Algeria to Paris. He also writes extensively on the question of being at home, being a stranger, and the rights of strangers in a foreign country.

Quite an opposite tradition sees philosophers not as wandering between different countries, but as sedentary and unwilling to move. Socrates himself is not willing to leave Athens and prefers death to exile. In modern times, Martin Heidegger basically never left Southern Germany and his beloved Black Forest. He spells out his reasons in his short writing "Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?" where he claims that his philosophical work is deeply connected with the region he lives in: "The inner relationship of my own work to the Black Forest and its people comes from a centuries-long and irreplaceable rootedness in the Alemanian-Swabian soil."[2]

But even from this quite different perspective, Martin Heidegger left extensive considerations on what it means for humans to be at home. Some of them seem to point in a direction different than this rootedness in one's own country in order to stress how the human being is essentially a stranger, and I will try to thematize this "other Heidegger" here. This paper will deal with the question of being at home in Heidegger and Derrida as two different

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[1] Plato, *Apology* 17c-d.
[2] Martin Heidegger, "Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?," in *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. by Thomas Sheehan (New York: Routledge 2009), 17.

philosophers that are nonetheless in the same tradition—as is well known, Derrida was heavily influenced by Heidegger's writing. In order to determine more precisely the scope of this paper, I will focus only on a particular part of their writings on being-at-home. Interestingly, both philosophers take as their point of departure in this question a reading of Sophocles and his Theban plays, which include *Oedipus Rex*, *Antigone*, and *Oedipus at Colonus*. However, although Sophocles is a common point of reference for Heidegger and Derrida when discussing what it means to be at home, they depart as to the selection of the work to which they mostly refer: Heidegger focuses on *Antigone*, Derrida on *Oedipus at Colonus*.[3]

In the 1940s Martin Heidegger held a series of lectures at the University of Freiburg in which he interprets passages of Sophocles' *Antigone* in order to understand the characterization of the human being as *deinon.* This concept is translated by Heidegger into German as "*unheimlich*," which can mean "monstrous," but also "not at home." Here, Heidegger tries to discover an essentially ethical determination of the human; indeed, he famously claims in the *Letter on Humanism* that "the tragedies of Sophocles—provided such a comparison is at all permissible—preserve the *ethos* in their sagas more primordially than Aristotle's lectures on 'ethics.'"[4] As is well-known, in his later philosophy Heidegger turns to the Greeks even more intensively than in his earlier writings,[5] and his interpretation of Sophocles is inscribed in his general interest in the "first inception" of thinking in Greek philosophy and literature.

This essential determination of the human being as a being which is constitutively not-at-home will be discussed in the first part of this paper. Heidegger deals with the not-being-at-home of the singular, individual human being, but does not put this in relation with the Other: What about the stranger? That is, what about human beings other than us?

In the second part, I will deal with Derrida's reading of another Sophoclean text, *Oedipus at Colonus*, in order to discuss the question of Oedipus's foreignness when he arrives, accompanied by his daughter Antigone, from Thebes to Colonus. What does it mean to be a foreigner, to be "not at home"? What does asking for asylum and rendering hospitality

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[3] On Derrida and antiquity, see Miriam Leonard ed., *Derrida and Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). On Heidegger and the Greeks, see Drew A. Hyland and John P. Manoussakis eds., *Heidegger and the Greeks: Interpretative Essays* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

[4] Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 2008), 269. See also Norman K. Swazo, "'Preserving the *Ethos*': Heidegger and Sophocles' *Antigone*," in *Symposium*, 10 (2006), 441–471.

[5] For a recent overview of the later Heidegger, see Günter Figal, Diego D'Angelo, Tobias Keiling, Guang Yang eds., *Paths in Heidegger's Later Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020).

imply? Being a foreigner and being not at home, according to Heidegger, are both essential traits of the human being, and Derrida shows this very concept of the foreigner to be affected by a deep dichotomy: he would go on to show that the aim is not to find a solution to the dichotomy, but to inhabit the paradox.

Heidegger's and Derrida's readings of Sophocles do differ from each other in approach and methodology, but—also keeping in mind the influence of Heidegger on Derrida's thought—it is possible to find deep similarities and philosophically relevant divergences. This confrontation of the two readings will be the topic of the third part of the paper. Here, I will show that the impossible definition of the human being as "not-being-at-home" (*deinon*) does not represent a tension to be conceptually solved, but a tension we need to live in and "make our own": by accepting our constitutive foreignness, we can open up a realm where absolute hospitality becomes possible again.

Heidegger's Reading of *Antigone*: The Human Being is Always Not at Home

In the following,[6] I will concentrate on Heidegger's reading of Sophocles' *Antigone* as it takes place in the 1942 summer semester lectures on Friedrich Hölderlin's poem "The Ister." Heidegger already interpreted Sophocles' *Antigone* in his more famous lecture *Introduction to Metaphysics*, where his interpretation of *Antigone* is much less extensive and detailed than in the 1942 lectures, but has received more consideration in subsequent philosophical literature because of its political meaning.[7] For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on the 1942 lectures. Here, Heidegger takes into account especially the second chorus of *Antigone*, where—in the very first verse—human is defined as *deinon*, *unheimlich*, or "uncanny."

The guiding idea of the first section of the present essay is that the determination of the essence of the human being as the "most uncanny of the uncanny" brings with itself a normative dimension, which is a kind of historical normativity: in order to be human, we must be uncanny in the very

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[6] A first version of the argument and analysis presented in this section has already been published in German in Diego D'Angelo "Das Gesetz des Ortes. Ein Versuch über Heidegger und Sophokles," in *Regelfolgen, Regelschaffen, Regeländern. Die Herausforderung für Auto-Nomie und Universalismus durch Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger und Carl Schmitt*, ed. by Manuela Massa, James Thompson, Stefan Knauß, Matthias Kaufmann (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2020).

[7] On this, see Katie Fleming, "Heidegger's Antigone: Ethics and Politics," in *Tragedy and the Idea of Modernity*, ed. by Joshua Billings and Miriam Leonard (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015). A close confrontation between the interpretations of *Antigone* in both lectures will be the topic of a subsequent paper, in which I will claim that Heidegger revised his interpretation in the aftermath of his delusion with the Nazi regime after his Rectorate.

special sense of *unheimlich*, as not being at home in a certain time and place. Being human means, in other words, not being at home.

It is precisely this normative dimension of not-being-at-home that lies at the heart of Heidegger's interest in reading *Antigone*: "If we explicate the choral ode in such a way, then we are thinking always in the direction of illuminating the essence of ... the fundamental law of becoming homely."[8] In speaking of his own interest in reading *Antigone* as related to a fundamental law (*Grundgesetz*), Heidegger is very precise in the choice of his concepts. Indeed, in relation to Hölderlin's *The Ister* (which is the prime object of his analysis in this lecture) he marks a clear distinction between law (*Gesetz*) and rule (*Regel*):

> In the fragment we are dealing with, Hölderlin names the law of being unhomely as the law of becoming homely. The law (*Gesetz*) is that essential trait (*Wesenszug*) into which the history of a historical humankind is placed (*gesetzt*). In the law, therefore, this distinguishing trait must be named. Otherwise, it remains a mere rule in the realm of the indeterminate.[9]

Unlike rules—as this passage seems to suggest—laws have historical traits in which the whole essence of the human being is implied. Rules are transient, but laws (and even more so basic laws, *Grundgesetz*) are concerned with the essence of the human being.

As is well known, the central verse of *Antigone* for Heidegger's reading is the following: "πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει," which Heidegger translates as, "*Vielfältig das Unheimliche, nichts doch / über den Menschen hinaus unheimlicher waltet*."[10] This verse has been translated into English by William McNeill and Julia Davis as follows: "Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing / beyond the human being prevails more uncannily."[11]

At this point I will not go into the details (and difficulties) in Heidegger's translation, as this has already been done in scholarly literature.[12] My question does not concern the correctness of Heidegger's philology but

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[8] Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* trans. by William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1996), 60; Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister,"* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1984), 73.

[9] *Ibid.*, 133; *Ibid.*, 166.

[10] Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister,"* 64–65.

[11] Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* 52; *Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister,"* 64–65.

[12] Cf. Otto Pöggeler, *Schicksal und Gedichte: Antigone im Spiegel der Deutungen und Gestaltungen seit Hegel und Hölderlin* (München: Fink Verlag, 2004); Vladimir Vukićević, *Sophokles und Heidegger* (Stuttgart/Weimar: Verlag J. B. Metzler, 2003).

tries to understand his philosophy. The crucial point of Heidegger's interpretation of *Antigone* lies in his own understanding of the German word "*unheimlich*." Although "uncanny" is the most frequent (and correct) translation, Heidegger is mostly concerned—as is often the case with his understanding of words and concepts—with the etymology of the word "*unheimlich*." He interprets the "uncanniness" of the uncanny as not-being-at-home. Indeed, the German word "*unheimlich*" is composed by the term "*heim*"—which means "home" (we can think about "*Heimat*" meaning as much as "homeland")—and the negating prefix "*un*": strictly speaking, uncanniness means for us the feeling of not being at ease or not being at home in a certain situation. "*Unheimlich*" is also directly linked to "*heimisch*," which means "native."

The question to be raised at this point concerns what is meant by "home." Is not-being-at home necessarily uncanny? And is home a place, a feeling, a certain situation, or could it consist of being in a certain company, with certain people rather than others? For Heidegger, "home" is nothing of the kind. The concept of home impinges not on feelings or on space, but on time. Both the uncanny (*unheimlich*) and the native (*heimisch*) are not to be understood in the sense of the geographical home, as the everyday use of language would suggest, but they take place "within history."[13] This history, in turn, carries a "necessity" within itself.[14] To put it differently: there is a necessity within history, which determines what being native and/or uncanny mean. This therefore has to do with history and temporality, and not with geography and space.

The human is uncanny. Being uncanny means: not being at home at a particular historical time. But why is this so? In order to elucidate what the necessity in historicity may be, we must take some steps Heidegger does not undertake himself in his interpretations of *Antigone*.

The essence of the human being is associated with the "beasts" in the antistrophe of Sophocles' play: The human being, insofar as he/she is δεινότατον, "ensnares" "the flock of birds that rise into the air" and "pursues the animals of the wilderness and of the ocean's surging waves."[15] Although this is lost in the English translation, in German animals and the waves of the ocean are said to be "*heimisch*," at home. Therefore, the human being, according to the choral song—and this is an analysis that Heidegger does not make himself—is uncanny precisely because he/she hunts the native, the animals. Indeed, the antistrophe goes on saying that the human is "most ingenious" because "he [sic] overpowers with cunning the animal / that roams in the mountains at night, / the wild-maned neck of the steed, / and the

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[13] Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister*," 56; *Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister*," 69–70.

[14] *Ibid.*, 56; *Ibid.*, 69–70.

[15] *Ibid.*, 50; *Ibid.*, 63.

never-tamed bull, fitting them with wood, he forces under the yoke."[16] Clearly, this passage should be read in connection with the well-known distinction that Heidegger makes in his 1929/30 lectures *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. The human builds a world ("*der Mensch ist weltbildend*"),[17] which is why he/she is characterized here as "most ingenious": human beings are not just delivered to their own world, as animals are, but they actively shape the world in which they live. But precisely because the human world can be transformed and is continuously transformed in the course of history, the human being is never really "at home." The world that he/she inhabits will be a different world tomorrow. Therefore, it is the ingeniousness of the human that carries her/his uncanniness as a consequence. On the contrary, animals are "poor in world" (*Weltarm*) because they only know their surrounding world without the capacity to change its structure, but precisely because of this they are "native" in their own world—they are at home because their world is stable and does not change with history.

If understood in this way, it seems now plausible to say that the uncanniness of the human is connected to time rather than to a place: human beings are uncanny in a temporal-historical, not geographical way. The human being is always already uncanny because he/she can change the world he/she lives in and because in this ever-changing world he/she will never be at ease or at peace.

This reading is confirmed by the following lines of the second strophe of the song of the Theban elders: "… He has found his way / into the sounding of the word /and swift understanding of all."[18] Human beings are capable of this: speaking (about the world) and understanding (the world itself), which are presuppositions in order to change it. And the way in which this transformation of the world happens is through the construction of cities: humans have found their way "even into courageous / governance of the towns."[19]

Is the connection between thinking and speaking, on the one hand, and the construction and domination of cities, on the other, coincidental? Not at all, according to Heidegger. Since human beings speak and think, they form a world, and therefore they are uncanny in this ever-changing world, as shown before. But the human being always attempts again to become "native." He/She founds or conquers cities in which he/she can live and over

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[16] *Ibid.*, 59; *Ibid.*, 74.

[17] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, trans. by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).

[18] Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* 60; *Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister,"* 73.

[19] *Ibid.*; *Ibid*.

which he/she can rule; he/she founds (forms, shapes) his/her homeland, for essentially, he/she has none.

But, of course, he/she does not succeed in this attempt to become homely—and precisely therein lies the essence of tragedy. The word δεινόν itself has, according to Heidegger, essentially a twofold character: "We may already gather from this that something counterturning prevails in what the Greeks name δεινόν."[20] This counterturning character of δεινόν is also stressed by the chorus itself, which speaks of this diversity by naming δεινόν in the plural form: πολλὰ τὰ δεινά—"manifold is the uncanny."[21]

This multiplicity and reciprocity belong to the very essence of the human being as the most uncanny. Thus, Heidegger says on the ambiguity of this term: "In that case, Sophocles' word, which speaks of the human being as the most uncanny being, says that human beings are, in a singular sense, not homely, and that their care is to become homely."[22] This is confirmed by a central verse: "*überall hinausfahrend unterwegs erfahrungslos ohne Ausweg kommt er zu Nichts*"; "Everywhere venturing forth underway, yet experienceless without any way out [παντοπόρος and ἄπορος] he comes to nothing."[23]

The human being essentially remains on the move, with no way out. However, this absence of a way out does not motivate humans to search for a way out that leads away from a certain place (since human uncanniness is a temporal, not geographical phenomenon), but rather to a search for a way out of human "placelessness" in general.

The essence of man as δεινότατον is, one could say, a normative reinterpretation of the Aristotelian definition. The Aristotelian definition is purely descriptive, because it says what man is and has, namely, language. The definition that Heidegger gets from Sophocles describes the (verbally understood, not substantial) essence of man by saying how the human being is (*west*, from the verb *wesen*) and has to be (*sein*): to be, for humans, means not being able to leave their placelessness. Humans must remain on their way: they build cities to escape their placelessness, but at some point they must move on. This "must" expresses the normativity implicit in understanding the human being as δεινότατον. Thus, Heidegger writes:

> Yet this is no mere homeless wandering around that
> merely seeks a location in order then to abandon it and
> take its pleasure and satisfaction in a mere traveling
> around. The human being here is not the adventurer

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[20] *Ibid.*, 63; *Ibid.*, 77.
[21] *Ibid.*, 60; *Ibid.*, 73.
[22] *Ibid.*, 71; *Ibid.*, 87.
[23] *Ibid.*, 72; *Ibid.*, 88.

who remains homeless on account of his lack of rootedness. Rather, the sea and the land and the wilderness are those realms that human beings transform with all their skillfulness, use and make their own, so that they may find their own vicinity through such realms. The homely is sought after and striven for in the violent activity of passing through that which is inhabitual with respect to sea and earth, and yet in such passage the homely is precisely not attained.[24]

Now, what has just been said can be combined with the necessity of history and of time which was briefly mentioned earlier. It is precisely because the human being is constantly on the move, and indeed because he/she must be on the move, that he/she experiences his/her own temporality as the temporality of being on the move. This temporality is the basis of history: the history of the founding of places and of migrations to which the human being is forced by her/his nature.

For there is, according to Heidegger in this lecture on Hölderlin, a "law" and a "structural articulation" of "the manner in which the world as a whole is opened up to human beings in general. As a consequence of, and in each case in accordance with this openness, human beings themselves are thus open to the world."[25] This law and structural articulation is the law of history, which is nothing other than the law of placelessness; this in turn is determined by the normatively understood nature of man. The "as yet concealed law of a concealed history"[26] corresponds to the law of placelessness: the place in which humans dwell must be left again and again, and this is so because the human being speaks and thinks.

That being which is most uncanny, i.e., the human being, is thus, according to *Antigone*, ὑψίπολις ἄπολις, which could be paraphrased as follows: humans found cities because they are not at home in any city. As seen before, in his explanation of Hölderlin's hymn "The Ister," Heidegger comes to connect the uncanny explicitly with the concept of place. In this sense, the essence of place is that "at which our becoming homely arrives, yet from which, as a coming to be at home, it also takes its departure."[27] This going in and out of a place is the law of being-not-at-home as the law of human uncanniness:

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[24] *Ibid.*, 73; *Ibid.*, 89.
[25] *Ibid.*, 23; *Ibid.*, 26.
[26] *Ibid.*, 24; *Ibid.*, 28.
[27] *Ibid.*, 35; *Ibid.*, 42.

> This *coming to be* at home in one's own in itself entails that human beings are initially, and for a long time, and sometimes forever, not at home. And this in turn entails that human beings fail to recognize, that they deny, and perhaps even have to deny and flee what belongs to the home. Coming to be at home is thus a passage through the foreign. And if the becoming homely of a particular humankind sustains the historicality of its history, then the law of the encounter (*Auseinandersetzung*) between the foreign and one's own is the fundamental truth of history, a truth from out of which the essence of history must unveil itself.[28]

As it now becomes evident, if lawfulness is conceived in this way, space and time, geography and history collapse and become moments of the same normative structure.

In order to sum up the results of this first section, one can say that, according to Heidegger's reading of *Antigone* and "The Ister," the essence of the human being is not descriptive, stating something that humans have and other living beings do not (such as in Aristotle's definition of the human being as that being which has *logos*), but rather normative. The essence of the human says what humans have to be: uncanny in their constant not-being-at-home. And this is precisely the reason why Antigone is for Heidegger an "authentic" individual.[29] This law is the law of that history which humans create: history is the story of the continuous journey between what is foreign and what is one's own.

But what does it mean to be foreign? Indeed, Heidegger spends a great deal of fascinating analysis on the uncanniness of the human being and on being at home and not being at home. Nevertheless, the word "strange" (*fremd*) does not appear even once in these lectures. It is certainly right to assume that Heidegger's philosophy, for the way in which it conceives of Dasein and of being-with (*Mitsein*), does not need the concept of the foreign.[30] But in a systematic fashion it is possible to ask: what is the relation between the uncanniness of the individual itself and the other individual as a

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[28] *Ibid.*, 49; *Ibid.*, 61.

[29] For a different answer to this question, see Katherine Withy, "Authenticity and Heidegger's *Antigone*," in *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 45 (2014), 239–253.

[30] It would take another paper to deal with the question of why Heidegger does not speak of the "*Fremde*" in these lectures and, more generally, of the difference between Heidegger's conception of being-with (*Mitsein*) and Derrida's thinking of the foreigner. This evolution would become clear only through a comparative reading along with Levinas's work. Cf. Lisa Foran and Rozemund Uljée, *Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida: The Question of Difference* (Berlin: Springer, 2016).

foreigner? In order to address and thematize this question, we thus turn to Derrida.

Derrida's Reading of *Oedipus at Colonus*: Being Foreign

I will now concentrate on Derrida's reading of Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* and show that the question Heidegger left open concerning the philosophical meaning of being foreign impinges on the very essence of the human being.

Derrida develops his interpretation of *Oedipus at Colonus* in a series of lectures in January 1996 in Paris. These lectures have appeared in French with the title *De l'hospitalité* in 1997 and have been translated into English in 2000. The first lecture bears a title that directly thematizes the question that interests us: "Foreigner Question: Coming from Abroad / from the Foreigner."[31]

For Derrida, the question "what does it mean to be foreign?" means asking "the question of the foreigner." But already here Derrida claims a strange point: that the question concerning the foreigner is at the same time "a foreigner's question … coming from the foreigner, from abroad."[32] For Derrida, the question about the essence of the foreign cannot be asked *in abstracto*, but is a question posed by the stranger—for example, in the moment in which he/she arrives in a foreign country seeking asylum, just as Oedipus arrives in Colonus asking King Theseus to receive and accept him.

We become interested in the nature of being foreigner when others enter into our own "home" and ask to be received or when we are the foreigner ourselves. In this concreteness, the question concerning the essence of the foreign becomes the question that the foreigner asks *me*, the question of being received. How do we answer this question? Derrida points out the fact that we usually respond to the question of the foreigner who is asking for reception with another question: we ask the foreigner's name, we want to know his/her identity, his/her history, the family and the country to which he/she belongs (i.e., in which he/she is not a foreigner). But this signalizes that my hospitality is limited: it seems to depend on the willingness of the foreigner to disclose his/her own identity. In Derrida's own words:

> … this foreigner, then, is someone with whom, to receive him, you begin by asking his name; you enjoin him to state and to guarantee his identity, as you would a witness before a court. This is someone to whom you put

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[31] Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, *Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond*, trans. by Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 3.
[32] *Ibid*.

> a question and address a demand, the first demand, the
> minimal demand being: "What is your name?" or then
> "In telling me what your name is, in responding to this
> request, you are responding on your own behalf, you are
> responsible before the law and before your hosts, you
> are a subject in law."[33]

At this point, Derrida asks if it is possible to envision an "absolute hospitality," what he also calls "just hospitality,"[34] a hospitality that does not ask for something in exchange:

> The law of hospitality, the express law that governs the
> general concept of hospitality, appears as a paradoxical
> law, pervertible or perverting. It seems to dictate that
> absolute hospitality should break with the law of
> hospitality as right or duty, with the "pact" of
> hospitality. To put it in different terms, absolute
> hospitality requires that I open up my home and that I
> give not only to the foreigner (provided with a family
> name, with the social status of being a foreigner, etc.),
> but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and
> that I *give place* to them, that I let them come, that I let
> them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them,
> without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into
> a pact) or even their names.[35]

It may seem loving and caring to ask for the identity of foreigners—and perhaps it is indeed all right. But Derrida points out the fact that, even if in a minimal way, this act of asking the foreigners to identify themselves is an act of violence and imposition of power on someone that cannot really say "no": in such cases we would feel like we have a reason to deny hospitality. We justify the necessity to ask for the name of the stranger because we feel like we cannot render hospitality to someone who is not even ready to reveal their identity.

Therefore, if for Heidegger the essence of the human being has to be formulated as the law of being-foreign, Derrida notes that being foreign presupposes hospitality, and that in turn this law of hospitality is paradoxical, because it implies a pure hospitality besides every positive right, besides every law, even beyond the possibility of asking for something in

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[33] *Ibid.*, 27.
[34] *Ibid.*, 25.
[35] *Ibid*.

return—not even the foreigner's name and history. "The law of absolute hospitality commands a break with hospitality by right, with law or justice as rights."[36] This is the paradoxical nature of hospitality: being a law besides actual law.

In order to describe this situation better, Derrida turns to the arrival of Oedipus at Colonus as described at the start of Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*. It is the last surviving tragedy of the great Greek poet, probably composed when he was 90 years old and presented in the theater only after his death. In this tragedy, Oedipus himself is an old man, and this, along with a number of reasons into which we cannot go at this point, has brought interpreters to find autobiographical elements in the protagonist.[37]

Antigone accompanies the blind and old Oedipus to Colonus, where he wishes to find hospitality and shelter to live his remaining days—which are not many, since at the end of the tragedy he dies and is buried in Colonus, as predicted by the oracle. In the mythology of Thebes, therefore, this story happens before that facts narrated in *Antigone*, in which Oedipus is already dead and Antigone has left Colonus in order to return to Thebes, where she faces Kreon and his denial to bury the corpse of Polynikes.

Derrida turns his interest to the start of this tragedy precisely because here Oedipus, a stranger, addresses strangers (the people of Colonus) in order to know where he is. He is, according to Derrida's interpretation, "the outlaw"[38] because of his family history.[39] I think it is necessary to recall the passage wherein Antigone, on behalf of Oedipus, asks the stranger from Colonus to tell her where they are; this scene incarnates precisely the question concerning the essence of the foreigner as the question *of* the foreigner in the sense Derrida spells out:

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[36] *Ibid*.

[37] See for example Karl Reinhardt, *Sophocles* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1979).

[38] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, *Of Hospitality*, 35.

[39] In the chapter "Possible Returns: Deconstruction and the Placing of Greek Philosophy" from his book *Place, Commonality and Judgment*, Andrew Benjamin stresses that the "*anomos*" (the outlaw) is at the same time "*adike*" (without justice) and points out that the difference between one's own and the foreigner has to be understood not as diversity but as discontinuity. Andrew Benjamin, *Place, Commonality and Judgment: Continental Philosophy and the Ancient Greeks* (London: Continuum, 2010), 130. Merging my interpretation and Benjamin's in a single enterprise would require substantial work, but it seems to me that the starting points are common. See in particular the following passage: "There is therefore an implicit threat in Derrida's analysis of Oedipus and law. While there is a sense in which he wants to hold to the real possibility that the 'unconditioned' can be effective, the necessity that there be an outside—and it should be remembered that the outside in question is not one that pertains to the particularity of *nomoi*, but to the presence of *nomos* as a transcendental condition and thus to the already present modes of relationality defined by *being-in-common* and *being-in-place*—cannot preclude the reciprocal necessity of the inscription of a founding act of violence as that which allows for law (where the latter will always be marked by forms of plurality and contestation)." *Ibid*.,134.

> ANTIGONE: Shall I go now and ask what place it is?
> OEDIPUS: Yes, child, as long as it is habitable.
> ANTIGONE: It is even inhabited. But I think there is no need. I can see a man right here close to us .... So say what you think is a good idea, for here he is.
> OEDIPUS: Stranger, hearing from this girl who sees for both of us that you have luckily turned up as a messenger to tell us what we are unclear about ....
> STRANGER: Before you ask me anything else, get up from that seat. You are on land that is not meant for walking on.
> OEDIPUS: What land is it? Is it dedicated to one of the gods, then?
> STRANGER: It must not be sat on or dwelt on. It belongs to the goddesses of fear, the daughters of Earth and Darkness.[40]

Oedipus himself is addressed by the people of Colonus as a "wanderer" and as someone who is "not a native." They ask him his name, they ask where he comes from and of which family he is, and he tries to avoid answering in order to guard his "terrible secret."[41]

> CHORUS: It is dreadful, stranger, to reawaken a bad thing long laid to rest. All the same I am longing to know ….
> OEDIPUS: What is this?
> CHORUS: ... about that awful pain, irresistibly appearing, that you became embroiled in.
> OEDIPUS: In the name of your hospitality *(xenias)*, don't ruthlessly open up what I suffered.
> CHORUS: There is a widespread and constant rumor, and I ask, stranger *(xein')*, to hear it truly told ....
> OEDIPUS: I suffered the worst things, strangers, I endured them even willingly, let the gods be witness.[42]

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[40] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, *Of Hospitality*, 37.

[41] *Ibid*., 39.

[42] *Ibid*., 41.

At this point in the tragedy, we see that Oedipus is asked by the Chorus of old, native inhabitants of Colonus to reveal his name and his secret history. The arrival of Theseus, king of Colonus, is represented as the encounter between two strangers: both stranger to each other, but also both strangers in Colonus, since Theseus himself arrived there from a foreign land many years before Oedipus.

Now Derrida points out that the question that accompanies us—what does it mean to be foreigner?—is a question that presupposes a dichotomy between the foreign and one's own, a dichotomy that is problematic:

> Nowadays, a reflection on hospitality presupposes, among other things, the possibility of a rigorous delimitation of thresholds or frontiers: between the familial and the non-familial, between the foreign and the non-foreign, the citizen and the non-citizen, but first of all between the private and the public, private and public law, etc.[43]

But precisely this is not possible, since it is not at all clear on the basis of what other concepts we should draw such thresholds and frontiers. This is shown in an exemplary way by the figure of Theseus, king of Colonus (and therefore its most excellent citizen) but at the same time a foreigner himself. How can we draw a line, a frontier, between home and foreign?

In the end, the question of frontiers is precisely the question of the foreigner we are asking, and in doing so we find ourselves necessarily caught within a logical circle from which there is no escape: in order to define the foreign, we need to define frontiers, which can only happen on the basis of a distinction between foreign and own's one, and so on *ad infinitum*. The same dialectical tension pervades hospitality itself:

> No hospitality, in the classic sense, without sovereignty of oneself over one's home, but since there is also no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only be exercised by filtering, choosing, and thus by excluding and doing violence. Injustice, a certain injustice, and even a certain perjury, begins right away, from the very threshold of the right to hospitality.[44]

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[43] *Ibid.*, 47, 49.

[44] *Ibid.*, 55.

Now, Oedipus arrives in Colonus with the explicit desire to respect the sovereignty of Theseus over the city. He and his daughters (Antigone and Ismene) repeatedly state in the play that they will do as the inhabitants of Colonus will say. But at the same time, Oedipus arrives in Colonus with a precise idea: he wants to follow the oracle that predicted that Oedipus will die in Colonus, and that his death would bring salvation to the city. Oedipus also has very clear ideas concerning the way in which he wants to be buried, most notably that there should be no tombstone marking the place of his burial. Is Theseus bound to accept Oedipus's requests by the laws of hospitality? Or should Oedipus accept to be buried according to the funeral laws of Colonus? In other words and more generally, one could ask: what are the norms, the rights and duties, for hosts and guests?

Precisely here Derrida shows (as is typical of his philosophical style) that the very concept of hospitality implies an unsolvable paradox:

> … there would be an antinomy, an insoluble antinomy, a non-dialectizable antinomy between, on the one hand, *The* law of unlimited hospitality (to give the new arrival all of one's home and oneself, to give him or her one's own, our own, without asking a name, or compensation, or the fulfillment of even the smallest condition), and on the other hand, the laws (in the plural), those rights and duties that are always conditioned and conditional.[45]

These plural laws are the concrete laws that define hospitality in a certain country. The ideal of perfect hospitality would require the host to accept the guest and the foreigner without any boundaries, without asking for the name, but just according to the foreigner's desires—such as of being buried on foreign ground without a tombstone.

Derrida shows some examples of this kind of unlimited hospitality in an interpretation of the Biblical narratives of Lot, who is willing to protect his guests up to the point of giving up his virgin daughters for them. Interestingly, the example of Lot is needed in order to show that Derrida's philosophy of hospitality is no naive theory of unlimited hospitality. He rather wants to state the tension that is implied in the concept itself. Lot is the example of someone who "puts the laws of hospitality above all, in particular the ethical obligations that link him to his relatives and family, first of all his daughters."[46] And in Lot's way of handling this situation, the sexual

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[45] *Ibid.*, 77.
[46] *Ibid.*, 151.

difference plays a crucial role;[47] but, Derrida asks, the concept of hospitality we have inherited could be a direct heir of the horrible deeds of Lot: "Are we the heirs to this tradition of hospitality? Up to what point? Where should we place the invariant, if it is one, across this logic and these narratives? They *testify* without end in our memory."[48] These are the very last words of Derrida's book.[49]

This tension between an ideal hospitality that can be gruesome in its unboundedness and the limited laws of hospitality is therefore not something we should discard, but something we should inhabit: "Between an unconditional law or an absolute desire for hospitality on the one hand and, on the other, a law, a politics, a conditional ethics, there is distinction, radical heterogeneity, but also indissociability."[50] Inhabiting means in this case also to take seriously what some texts of the tradition (*Oedipus at Colonus*, the Bible) *testify* in regard to hospitality. If Lot is a symbol of an unbounded hospitality, Theseus, for Derrida, is a symbol of a middle way that can be ethically correct: Theseus asks Oedipus about his name and his history, but is ready to give something in exchange, that is, to accept Oedipus and his funeral wishes without conditions, and he even accepts the burden of being the only one that knows the secret of Oedipus's burial place. Theseus is therefore, in Derrida's reading, the one who inhabits the tension in the right way—maybe because he is himself a foreigner in Colonus and knows what it means to be a foreigner. Derrida writes:

> We will always be threatened by this dilemma between, on the one hand, unconditional hospitality that dispenses with law, duty, or even politics, and, on the other, hospitality circumscribed by law and duty. One of them can always corrupt the other, and this capacity for perversion remains irreducible. It *must* remain so. It is true that this abstention ("come, enter, stop at my place, I don't ask your name, nor even to be responsible, nor where you come from or where you are going") seems more worthy of the absolute hospitality that offers the

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[47] The fact that Derrida speaks himself of the role of the sexual difference in the contest of his interpretation of Lot does not contradict Rachel Bowlby's correct observation that Derrida seems to forget the role of Ismene and Antigone as female figures in his reading of *Oedipus at Colonus.* See Rachel Bowlby, "Derrida's Dying Oedipus," in *Derrida and Antiquity*, ed. by Miriam Leonard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 187–206.

[48] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, *Of Hospitality*, 153.

[49] For a more comprehensive account of Derrida's interpretation of the figure of Lot, see Judith Still, *Derrida and Hospitality: Theory and Practice* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 51–92.

[50] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, *Of Hospitality*, 147.

> gift without reservations; and some might also recognize
> there a possibility of language. Keeping silent is already
> a modality of possible speaking.[51]

There is much more to be said about these passages. However, the scope of this article is limited. I would like to conclude here and point out the way in which I think Derrida's interpretation of hospitality in *Oedipus at Colonus* can be read as complementing Heidegger's reading of *Antigone*—and what philosophical consequences can be drawn from this.

Conclusion

What Heidegger spells out as the law of the human being, that is, the necessity of not-being-at-home, is shown by Derrida to be impossible, or at least to imply some kind of violence to the foreigner. Is it possible to solve this tension? Here, I will show that the impossible definition of the human being as "not-being-at-home" does not represent a tension to be conceptually solved, but a tension we need to live in and "make our own": by accepting our constitutive foreignness we can open up a realm where absolute hospitality becomes possible again.

The impossibility of the law of hospitality as individuated by Derrida resides in the impossible necessity to render hospitality without asking questions, without even asking for the name of the foreigner, allowing him/her to keep his/her own secrets. But another way, which Derrida interestingly does not thematize himself, is possible. Instead of asking questions, we can simply let the foreigner speak for himself/herself. Without forcing our sovereignty upon them, it is possible to wait for them to find the right moment and the right time to disclose their secrets and to reveal their names.[52] By opening up a space in which a dialogue is possible, but without forcing the foreigner to a dialogue through questions, we can show openness for a loving and caring relationship to the foreigner by adapting ourselves, but transforming our way of life in such a way that hospitality does not require, as for Oedipus, that he accepts the law of the country which is to render him hospitality, but rather where hospitality does not require anything from the foreigner; it just requires something from the host: to wait and let the foreigner speak if and when he/she wishes to. Caring for the foreigner thus becomes an irreducible aspect of the way in which we should

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[51] *Ibid*., 135.

[52] A similar idea, although from a theological perspective, has been developed in a close reading of Derrida and Levinas by Andrew Shepherd. See Andrew Shepherd, *The Gift of the Other: Levinas, Derrida, and a Theology of Hospitality* (Princeton: Pickwick Publications, 2014).

build the world we inhabit and embrace the essence of the human being as a being constitutively not-at-home.

Our reading of Heidegger's concept of being-at-home by way of a comparison and development through Derrida's question of the foreigner has thus shown consequences that go beyond a mere confrontation between two authors in the history of philosophy; it has shown that, if thought through, hospitality is not a request coming from the foreigner and directed to the host, but something that the host must achieve by himself/herself: accepting the not-being-at-home that belongs to the human being as such.

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Mobility Biopolitics and the Aquarium as a Paradigm of Political Space[1]

Jinhyoung Lee

Abstract: This paper examines Namcheon Kim's novel *The Aquarium of Love* and, using Japanese colonialism as an example, identifies the aquarium as a paradigm of political space in terms of the right to mobility. It pays special attention to mobility biopolitics which a colonial biopower imposes upon the colonized lives by managing their mobilities, redefining the threshold in life. In the novel, Kim describes colonial Korea as a mobile society composed of citizens with the right to mobility and non-citizens without it, and as a colonial-political space in which a colonial biopower excludes (probably) threatening mobilities from society for the maintenance of the colonial regime. In the colonial-political mobile space, non-citizens, including the poor and the threats, are identified as lives devoid of value. At the same time, by utilizing an aquarium as a paradigm of political space, Kim characterizes citizens in the colonial society as fish in an aquarium, who (un)consciously practice "sheer political thoughtlessness," restricting their movements within "animal reaction and fulfillment of functions." Thus, as the colonized, citizens and non-citizens are homogenized equally as the bare life deprived of political rights, that is, the sacred life. Thus, the aquarium discloses the colonial space's insubstantiality originating from the categorical exclusion of political subjects, which then encourages the politics of "more than" to seek the decolonized-humanized formation of society.

Keywords: Aquarium paradigm, Japanese colonialism, mobility biopolitics, Namcheon Kim, politics of "more than"


The Right to Mobility and Japanese Colonialism

This paper examines Namcheon Kim's novel *The Aquarium of Love* (1939–1940) and identifies the aquarium as a paradigm of political space in relation to the right to mobility, using Japanese colonialism (1910–1945) in the Korean Peninsula as its example. It pays special attention to mobility biopolitics which a colonial biopower imposes upon the colonized lives by managing their mobilities. In the novel, a colonial biopower molds the colonized differently: its citizens with the right to mobility and its non-citizens without it. However, neither the citizens nor the non-citizens have political rights in colonial society. Like fish in an aquarium, they are homogenized as the bare life devoid of value, that is, the sacred life. Thus, the aquarium paradigm discloses the colonial-political space's insubstantiality, which originates from its categorical exclusion of political subjects.

The right to mobility has been regarded as an expansion of human rights. Act 13 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) stipulates free movement within and beyond the borders of each State as a human right. Thus, the right to mobility is considered a fundamental right that ensures access to housing, employment, education, and culture,[2] and philosophically integrates the ideas of personal mobility and freedom.[3] However, as John Urry critically pointed out, focusing on the right to move as simply "the freedom from" can result in the fetishization of movement through unconditioned affirmation and pursuit of mobility and its development by identifying it with the progress of human rights.[4]

More noteworthy, Tim Cresswell argued that, by the logic of "othering," the right to mobility shaped citizens and others simultaneously, by focusing on the creation of American citizenship.[5] For example, Chinese migrant workers working on railroad construction sites in the United States are excluded from American citizenship; they were treated as aliens, and denied the freedom of movement, thereby strengthening a boundary between citizens and non-citizens. By extending Cresswell's *problematique* in her book, *Mobility Justice* (2018), Mimi Sheller placed the understanding of the freedom of movement outside the liberal narrative of "presumed rights-bearing individuals," demanding the consideration of the profound inequality and

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[2] See Jean-Pierre Orfeuil, "The 'Right to Mobility', Now and in the Future," in *Mobile/Immobile: Quels Choix, Quels Droits pour 2030 1*, ed. by Christophe Gay, Sylvie Landrieve, and Stéphanie Vincent-Geslin (La Tour d'Aigues: Éditions de l'Aube, 2011), 49.

[3] See Jean Viard, "Mobility, the Culture of Modern Times," in *Mobile/Immobile: Quels Choix, Quels Droits pour 2030 2*, ed. by Christophe Gay, Sylvie Landrieve, and Stéphanie Vincent-Geslin (La Tour d'Aigues: Éditions de l'Aube, 2011), 56.

[4] John Urry, *Mobilities* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 207.

[5] Tim Cresswell, "The Right to Mobility: The Production of Mobility in the Courtroom," in *Antipode*, 38 (September 2006), 751–752.

exploitation of others therein, "the fundamental basis of the freedom of movement in the domination of the bodies of others, whether female, animal, or slave."[6] Hence, the right to mobility cannot be viewed simply in terms of human rights. Instead, it should be reconceptualized as a paradoxical construct, composed of the freedom of movement and its denial, which molds citizens and non-citizens at the same time.

The right to mobility demonstrates an aspect of biopolitics, to use Giorgio Agamben's terminology, that inscribes natural lives in the juridico-political order of the nation-state by managing their mobility and categorizing them as citizens or non-citizens. For Agamben, modern biopolitics does not recognize as the nation-state's basis "man as a free and conscious political subject," but "man's bare life, the simple birth that as such is."[7] At the same time, it constantly redefines "the threshold in life" that separates "what is inside" from "what is outside,"[8] that is, a citizen from a sacred life, *homo sacer*, as "life devoid of value."[9] In short, while setting bare life as the premise for a nation-state, modern biopolitics molds citizens, assigns the freedom of movement inside the nation-state, and identifies non-citizens, such as refugees and prisoners who are not allowed freedom of movement, as "devoid of value." Accordingly, the right to mobility attests to the actualization of biopolitics via mobility, that is, a mechanism of mobility biopolitics: biopower is exercised by managing citizens' movements while sorting the valueless (im)mobilities of non-citizens, the sacred lives—i.e., for Sheller, female, animal, or slave.

Recalling Takashi Fujitani's arguments, Japanese colonialism transformed its discrimination against Koreans from the exclusive "vulgar racism" to the inclusive "polite racism" in order to mobilize them to fight in the Sino-Japanese War (1937) and the Pacific War (1941). Thus, colonial policies toward Koreans were crafted to make them into "a major subpopulation" by improving their health and sanitary conditions and raising their birthrate. More precisely, colonial biopower was used to constitute living beings' aggregate as a subpopulation by separating "who must live" from "who must die," "those who will foster the life and welfare of the population" from "those considered threats" and thus must be killed or expelled.[10] For example, while incarcerating a thousand political offenders by enforcing the thought control policy,[11] the colonial government announced

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[6] Mimi Sheller, *Mobility Justice* (London: Verso, 2018), 49–50.

[7] Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 127–128.

[8] *Ibid.*, 131.

[9] *Ibid.*, 139.

[10] Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 38–40.

[11] In the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the colonial government launched the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement Campaign (1938–1940) to mobilize the support of the

the enforcement of the "naisen-ittai" (內鮮一體; Japan and Korea as one body) in 1936, aimed at the Japanization of Korea, which could thus be (mis)construed as the abolition of the domination by Korean intellectuals.[12] For the colonial regime's maintenance, Japanese colonialism, on the one hand, organized citizens mobile as its subpopulation and the valuable life, and, on the other hand, identified non-citizens immobile as the valueless or threats, redefining the threshold in life.

The citizen can underpin the existent political regime by circulating freely inside society, where biopower "can only be carried out through and by reliance on the freedom of each," as Michel Foucault said.[13] In colonial Korea, the word "citizen" was often used to signify people engaged in everyday economic activities by enjoying the freedom of movement at the expense of political rights.[14] By asserting the right to circulate freely inside the society, citizens could be separated from non-citizens, whose mobilities were not allowed in colonial society due to their valuelessness or probable minaciousness.[15] However, it is notable that, as colonized beings, neither the citizens nor the non-citizens have political rights; in other words, their authority of life-and-death was surrendered to the colonial biopower. That is,

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colonized for the war, while enforcing the Public Peace Maintenance Law in 1925, imprisoning even moderate nationalists who were denounced as thought criminals. Jeongmok Son, *A Study on the Urban Society under the Japanese Occupation* (Seoul: Iljisa, 1996), 148–172.

[12] Minami Jiro (南次郎), appointed as the Japanese governor-general of Korea in 1936, implemented the "naisen-ittai," setting it as the most urgent national polity. Its purpose was to establish the Koreans' and the Japanese' spiritual identity through the former's sharing of the Loyal Japanese Subject spirit. Specifically, to this end, the Japanese Government-General of Korea enacted the Army Special Volunteer System (1938), the Third Chosen Educational Ordinance (1938), the Japonification of Korean Names (1940), among others. However, it also adhered to the juridical division and inequality between both by disciplining them according to the different legal systems, respectively, denying their juridical unification. Nevertheless, by assuming their substantial equality and unification, Korean intellectuals sometimes demanded their equal obligations and political rights to the colonial authority. Seungil Lee, *Legislative Policy of the Japanese Government-General of Korea* (Seoul: Yuksabipyeongsa, 2008), 11; Myunggoo Kim, "The Acceptance and Its Logic of 'Naeseon Ilchae' Theory/Propaganda in Joseon during the Period of the Sino-Japanese War," in *The Journal for the Studies of Korean History*, 33 (November 2008), 381–388.

[13] In *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault elaborates "a physics of power" which "can only be carried out through and by reliance on the freedom of each," that is, "freedom of circulation," including "the possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things." Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, ed. by Michel Senllart, trans. by Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2007), 48–49.

[14] In colonial Korea, the notion of the citizen was involved mainly in private freedom and right. Thus, the political movements and activities were unfolded mostly in the names of nation and class. Myoungkyu Park, *Nation, People, and Citizen* (Seoul: Sowha, 2009), 219–231.

[15] For instance, the colonial government organized the mobile police, who had worked mainly in the train and ship, to supervise Korean activists' movements. Shin Jang, "Travel Forbidden in Joseon under Japanese Occupation: A Study on the Transit Police," in *Journal of Humanities*, 25 (August 2017), 115–143.

in colonial Korea, whether citizens or non-citizens, both were the colonized. Thus, mobility biopolitics in the colony ultimately recognizes both equally as the bare life, as a basis of the colonial regime; ergo, the *homo sacer*, deprived of political rights.[16] In this regard, Ann Laura Stoler defines the "colony" as "*a principle of managed mobilities*, mobilizing and immobilizing populations according to a set of changing rules and hierarchies that orders social kinds."[17]

Drawing from these theoretical reflections, this paper explores Kim's novel, *The Aquarium of Love*, which was serialized from August 1, 1939 to March 3, 1940 in the Korean daily newspaper *Chosunilbo*. Narrating Kwangho Kim and Kyunghee Lee's love story from their first encounter at the railroad construction site, their movements within and beyond a border, and their eventual marriage, this novel depicts the reality of Korean colonial society.[18] Significantly, it portrays colonial Korea as the mobile society, in which citizens can enjoy the freedom of movements but non-citizens cannot; also, the colonial-political space, in which the colonial biopower expels threatening mobilities from society for the colonial regime's maintenance.

Kim's novel allows us to discern the mechanism of mobility biopolitics through which Japanese colonialism exercises its biopower, managing the colonized lives' mobilities, thereby not only making citizens mobile and non-citizens (probably) immobile, but also homogenizing both as fish, the sacred lives devoid of value. Using the aquarium as a paradigm of political space, Kim characterizes citizens moving in the society as fish swimming in an aquarium, who are empowered with the freedom of movement at the expense of political rights, (un)consciously practicing "sheer political thoughtlessness," thus restricting their movements within "animal reaction and fulfillment of functions." The aquarium paradigm highlights the homogeneity of citizens and non-citizens as the colonized, the bare life deprived of political rights. Thus, it discloses the colonial space's insubstantiality, which originates from the categorical exclusion of political

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[16] Gyanendra Pandey denominated citizens deprived of the political right as "subaltern citizens" who are "materially more comfortable citizens" but "not allowed to be part of the polis." Gyanendra Pandey, "Introduction: The Subaltern as Subaltern Citizen," in *Subaltern Citizens and Their Histories*, ed. by Gyanendra Pandey (New York: Routledge, 2010), 4. Despite the usefulness of this theory in identifying colonial Koreans who demanded their political rights, this paper will use the definition of "citizen" to maintain Agamben's conceptual classification of citizen and non-citizen.

[17] Ann Laura Stoler, *Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 117. (Original emphasis.)

[18] Hyerim Choi has pointed out the coincidence of the time in the novel and the real-time in Kim's work, focusing on the contemporaneity of events in the novel and news in the daily newspaper the work had been serialized. Hyerim Choi, "A Study on the Meaning of Everyday Life Represented in *Sarang-Eui Sujokwan* (*The Aquarium of Love*) Written by Nam-Cheon, Kim," *Journal of Korean Literary History*, 25 (2004), 253.

subjects from inside, thereby encouraging us to ponder the politics of "more than" that seeks the decolonized-humanized formation of society.

The next section presents Korean society in the 1940s as a mobile society, which cultivates citizens mobile, the valuable lives, and non-citizens immobile, the sacred lives. Moreover, this paper focuses on a colonial-political space where mobility biopolitics governs colonial society by expelling threatening mobilities from society, characterizing them as the political. Afterward, it proposes the aquarium as a paradigm of political space. This paradigm critically views the barrenness and insubstantiality of the colonial-political space as a consequence of its categorical exclusion of political subjects, in which not humans but fish, animal-like beings, solely can survive. Concludingly, this paper ponders an alternative to colonial mobility biopolitics, that is, the politics of "more than."

The Mobile Society, Citizens, and Non-Citizens

While serializing *The Aquarium of Love*, Namcheon Kim executed his theoretical investigation of the novel as a genre by publishing a series of essays, "Research Notes on Balzac" from October 1939 to May 1940.[19] For Kim, Balzac was a realist who captured the spirit of 19th-century Paris by describing mostly bourgeois characters who mainly seek money in capitalist society.[20] Central to his work was "a milieu," a social environment considered a cultivator of the bourgeois.[21] Based on this understanding, Kim argued that Korean writers should describe "the historical epitome of human society" by portraying the social environment of colonial Korea.[22]

Kim's novel can be read as an attempt to seize on "the historical epitome of human society," focusing on the romance between Kwangho Kim and Kyunghee Lee.[23] In an interview with *Chosunilbo*, he admitted that he had written the novel to reflect contemporary Korean society through the

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[19] The series of "Research Notes on Balzac" published in *Inmunpyungnon* [Humanistic Criticism] consists of four pieces: "Le Pere Goriot, Father's Love, and the Like," *Inmunpyungnon* 1 (October 1939); "Problems of Character and Monomania," in *Inmunpyungnon* 3 (December 1939); "Essay on the Literature of Observation," in *Inmunpyungnon* 7 (April 1940); and "The Experienced and the Observed," in *Inmunpyungnon* 8 (May 1940).

[20] Namcheon Kim, "Problems of Character and Monomania," in *Namcheon Kim's Collected Works*, ed. by Ho-Ung Jung and Jeong-Soo Son (Seoul: Pagijong Press, 2000), 550.

[21] *Ibid*., 552.

[22] Namcheon Kim, "Essay on the Literature of Observation," in *Namcheon Kim's Collected Works*, ed. by Ho-Ung Jung and Jeong-Soo Son (Seoul: Pagijong Press, 2000), 597–599.

[23] After its serialization in the Korean daily newspaper, the work was published in book form in November 1940 and its second edition in December 1940, which, considering its intention of describing contemporary society, would demonstrate not only its popularity but also its verisimilitude.

struggles of ordinary young people.²⁴ To this end, he presented their relationship not as a private emotion or individual behavior but rather as representation of the thoughts and customs of the social groups to which they belong. Thus, *The Aquarium of Love* first centers on its characters' love affairs.

What is striking in *The Aquarium of Love* are the relationships among the characters, who most of all seek love as well as money. The male protagonist, Kwangho Kim, is a talented civil engineer. He wants to win the love of Kyunghee Lee, the female protagonist, a university graduate and the daughter of the head of the giant conglomerate in colonial Korea, Daeheung Konzern. While exerting herself to establish a public nursery, Kyunghee Lee also desires to marry him. While her father, Shinkook Lee, aspires to develop his conglomerate, his right-hand man, Hyundo Song, plays a deep game to marry Kyunghee, ultimately occupying Shinkook's company while enjoying immoral intimacy with Kyunghee's new mother. While a friend of Kyunghee, Hyunsoon Kang, a tailor, dreams but fails to win Kwangho's love, Ilsung Shin, Hyunsoon's distant relative, repeatedly courts her at once prowling around, cheating others out of their money. It is through these love affairs, through the relations of those zealously moving to satisfy their desires, that the novel depicts contemporary Korean society.

It is more notable that their relations are formed by depending on and utilizing modern mobility systems. When the novel begins, Kwangho and Kyunghee meet at a railroad construction site in the mountains. They spend a long time traveling through Seoul. At the climax of the novel, she takes a high-speed train, Nozomi [のぞみ], to journey to Manchuria in China.²⁵ In addition, the novel repeatedly specifies central figures' travels and means of transportation. For example, Shinkook's daily travels by private luxury cars, Hyundo's business trip abroad by plane, Ilsung's wanders by taxi for deceiving others, and Hyunsoon's routines by tram. In short, Kim's novel represents Korean society around 1940 as a mobile society, where modern mobilities empower people to travel to indulge their desires. In this respect, the mobile society assures the right to mobility.

In Kim's novel, characters' movements allow them to form social relations and fall in love. In other words, they have the right to mobility, which is equated with citizenship, the right to reside inside the mobile

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²⁴ "*The Aquarium of Love* that displays contemporary characters," in *Chosunilbo* (July 31, 1939).

²⁵ In this regard, the close association between love and mobility also can be considered. For example, in "'Walking Out': The Mobilities of Love," Lynne Pearce discussed "the significance of mobility in the production, or facilitation, of relationships." Lynne Pearce, "'Walking Out': The Mobilities of Love," in *Mobilities*, 13 (2018), 2.

society.[26] At the same time, the right to mobility creates others who cannot travel freely, whose existences thus become known only mediately. These include construction workers, sex workers, and stay-at-home mothers—that is, the poor. Their inability to travel demonstrates their otherness, prevents them from being part of a mobile society, and relegates them to the status of non-citizens.

The presence of non-citizens is inferred through the conversations among citizens on the move. At the railroad construction site where Kwangho works, Kyunghee hears something about the construction workers. She comes to perceive the presence of prostitutes by chance while on a date with Kwangho. Also, she talks about young mothers while on a walk with him. As immobile beings, the poor exist as the unrepresented in the novel. Despite working in workplaces, existing in a restricted area, or caring for their babies, they are considered non-citizens, immobile and invisible, that is, "what is outside." Unlike citizens with the right to mobility, they are others without it; thus, they are unworthy to visualize materially in the mobile society.

In this regard, striking is the public nursery, which Kyunghee establishes to satisfy her vanity.[27] In terms of the narrative development, this charitable work constitutively and significantly parallels her courtship and marriage. She says that the public nursery will be constructed in villages so that poor people will be able to work.[28] Her charitable work is not intended to improve their social status or living conditions but rather to tie them to their workplaces. Also, Kwangho exploits construction workers in the construction site and he is not interested in enhancing their lives. Just like her, he also identifies the poor only as labor forces in a mobile society, thus letting them remain as immobile non-citizens. This immobility makes them not only the unrepresented, but also the valueless lives, that is, the dehumanized, bare lives. In other words, they are the sacred life, *homo sacer*, which may be killed and yet not sacrificed, as Agamben puts it.[29] They may be exploited and exhausted in workplaces, not yet considered significant and meaningful.

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[26] In the novel, Ilsung Shin described "the right of citizen" as access to mobilities enabling citizens to move freely and easily. Namcheon Kim, *The Aquarium of Love* (Keijo: Inmunsa, 1940), 110.

[27] In colonial Korea, charitable works were usually discussed as activities for satisfying vanity. Jinsook Park, "The Aspects and Meanings of Textualization in the Novels in the Late Period of Japanese Rule over Korea," in *Gaesin Language and Literature Research*, 32 (2010), 123–125. By setting Kyunghee's public nursery as an impetuous choice as an equivalent to a study abroad, Kim also characterizes it as an act to satisfy her vanity.

[28] When Kwangho asked Kyunghee about her charitable work, "Why will the poor leave their children to the public nursery?" she answered, "To go to work!" Kim, *Aquarium of Love*, 169.

[29] Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 8.

Thus, a mobile society that assures the right to mobility cultivates citizens mobile and non-citizens immobile, simultaneously. In other words, citizens' movements confirm and (re)produce non-citizens, that is, the sacred lives by practicing the right to mobility, thus materializing the threshold in life. Thus, contemporary Korean society is described as the mobile space, maintained by the dichotomy of life, privileging citizens moving therein, (re)producing non-citizens as the sacred life.

Mobility Biopolitics of the Colonial-Political Space

In Kim's novel, contemporary Korean society is not exhausted by describing the mobile society, dichotomously composed of mobile citizens and immobile non-citizens. Instead, it portrays the mobile society as the colonial-political space in which colonial biopower governs the colonized lives by managing their mobilities. Thus, mobility biopolitics performs.

It is notable that Kim's mobile society is underpinned by modern mobility systems, which Japanese colonialism established. Before its occupation of Korea (1910–1945), Japanese colonialism briskly participated in the construction of modern mobility infrastructures, including railroads, new roads, and sea routes, within and beyond the Korean peninsula to invade Korea, China, and Russia. After the occupation, it allocated 20% of the total budget of the Japanese Government-General of Korea—the Japanese colonial government organization inaugurated in 1910—in the 1910s to constructing an expansive mobility system. Under the "12 Years Plan of Korean Railroad" (1927–1938), the mobility system extended to every corner of the country.[30] In Kim's novel, the completion of the mobility systems is suggested in the first scene when railroad construction has progressed deep into the mountains.

As a constructor of the mobile society, Japanese colonialism first is depicted symbolically, as follows:

> The sound of the tram, "boo-," turning curvedly in front of the Japanese Government-General of Korea, is heard and, in the Samchung Park directly opposite to it, early morning walkers' shouts are audible, it is the time when the eastern sky is colored with red sunbeams and the movements of the citizens, reawakening from their sleep, make noises at the Jongno crossroads.[31]

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[30] Jinhyoung Lee, "Colonial Mobility and the Biopolitics of the Colonial Non-Place," in *Kritika Kultura*, 36 (2021), 217–220.

[31] Kim, *Aquarium of Love*, 146.

In the excerpt, the morning in Seoul, the capital of colonial Korea, begins with the sound of the tram and shouts of people taking early walks, the Japanese Government-General of Korea being their geographical center. Thus, in this mobile society, Japanese colonialism exercises its dominance and reinforces the colonial order by organizing mobilities.

Japanese colonialism is also incorporated into the narrative, organizing the movements of the protagonists. For example, at the start of their courtship, the two protagonists pass by the headquarters of the Japanese Government-General of Korea while on their way home. It happens again when they quarrel and make up; and at the climax, in which Kyunghee returns to Seoul from the countryside to tell her father that she is getting married. Having these crucial scenes take place at the headquarters of the Japanese Government-General of Korea shows colonial power not only constitutes but also manages citizens' everyday mobile lives.

Japanese colonialism exercises its dominance in colonial Korea by erecting modern mobility systems and organizing everyday mobilities, thus empowering citizens to move in search of their desires. In this respect, their freedom of movements perpetuate the colonial regime by confirming and (re)producing the dichotomic structure of the mobile space. In other words, citizens' practice of their right to mobility renders them as subjects in the colonial society. Hence, Japanese colonialism can be considered governing its colony by fostering a social environment ensuring the right to mobility of colonial subjects. In Foucault's words, the right to mobility materializes "the insertion of freedom within governmentality."[32]

At the same time, to maintain its colony, colonial power removes from society "those considered threats," who probably or possibly disturb or undermine the colonial regime, redefining the threshold in life, that is, separating "what is inside" from "what is outside." Given citizens' right to mobility as supporting the colonial regime, their unconstrained movements for gratifying their desires are allowed as "what is inside"; on the contrary, politically dubious movements possibly jeopardizing the colonial regime's security are categorized as "what is outside." Therefore, in a colonial-political society, movements because of love, money, and vanity are regarded as freedom of movement. However, political movements must be stopped, the participants killed or expelled from society. Thus, categorically excluding alleged threats from society is colonial biopower's most urgent task.

The death of Kwanjun Kim, Kwangho's older brother, and the expulsion from school of Kwangshin Kim, his younger brother, are examples of categorical exclusion. Kwanjun, about 30 years old, died of acute tuberculosis early in the novel. His last words were, "I am pleased and

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[32] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 353.

pleasant that my body becomes unlivable as timely as my usefulness enabling me to live longer gets lost…."[33] His refusal to enter the hospital for treatment allows his death to be interpreted as partially intentional, and as a sign of resistance. As Kwanjun had previously participated in anticolonial or socialist movements, Kwangho commented, "It could not be imagined that, as expected, my older brother threw away his attachment to life. Rather, what threw away is the belief, which can nourish such attachment."[34] In short, regardless of the cause, Kwanjun's death is seen by his brothers as evidence of the uselessness of his political beliefs in the colonial society. As a result, with his secluded life in the barmaid's home as a metaphor of uselessness, his death can be interpreted as the biological expulsion of a valueless life from society; more precisely, the biopolitical exclusion of politically threatening mobility.

The next case is Kwangshin's expulsion from secondary school for alleged misbehavior. He had been cited by an agent of the Guidance League, which supervised Korean students' extramural mobilities.[35] His teacher reports that Kwangshin had been spied walking in a public park together with a barmaid, Yangja Park, who is also his elder brother's girlfriend. After asserting that "What matters is his ideology. It is his spirit,"[36] his teacher says, "Then, had his uncle been caught by a rebellious ideology once?"[37] and explains that he will be expelled for his rebellious idea not just for his misbehavior. As the teacher accuses him of having made threatening gestures in school, like his late brother's resistance, he sees Kwangshin's deviant mobility as the embodiment of seditious ideology, influenced by his older brother—as Kwangshin utters, "the ones who can understand my elder brother are exclusively the barmaid and me."[38] Like Kwangjun's death as the biopolitical exclusion from society, Kwangshin's life, closely linked to his elder brother's death, is regarded as "what is outside." In short, his expulsion can be understood as the biopolitical exclusion of political mobility as a threat.

These examples demonstrate the way that colonial biopower dominates its colony by separating valuable mobilities from valueless mobilities, thereby politically threatening mobilities. In other words, it governs the colonized lives by separating citizens from non-citizens,

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[33] Kim, *Aquarium of Love*, 66.
[34] *Ibid.*, 70.
[35] The Japanese Government-General of Korea wanted to control Korean students by creating the Guidance League in 1933 because students had participated in anti-colonial movements. Hye-Young Hwang, "Gyeong Seong Guidance League's Establishment and Management during the 1930s–1940s," in *Yeoksa Yeongu*, 22 (June 2012), 204–205.
[36] Kim, *Aquarium of Love*, 232.
[37] *Ibid*.
[38] Kim, *Aquarium of Love*, 56.

redefining the threshold in life and considering political mobilities as threats. Thus, it produces threats as non-citizens. Naturally, colonial biopower will kill or expel the latter from society by categorizing them as non-citizens which should be outside. Due to the Kwanjun's and Kwangshin's valuelessness, their death and expulsion, respectively, do not engender grief or anger even from their families or friends. Instead, they are merely portrayed coldly or philosophically from the viewpoint of their brother, Kwangho. That is, their life and death have no value in colonial society. The threshold in life is established firstly between citizens and others, the poor, and then between citizens and non-citizens, those considered threats. In colonial society, they are the sacred life devoid of value.

Japanese colonialism exercises its power by constructing, organizing, and managing mobilities and by expelling non-citizens. While enhancing citizens' lives by assigning them the right to mobility, it produces and excludes the poor and threats from society, categorizing them as non-citizens, as the sacred lives devoid value. That is, Japanese colonialism governs its colony by redefining "the threshold in life," recategorizing citizens as "who must live" and "who must die." In this respect, the right to mobility and the expulsion of threats from society converges in the mobility biopolitics, which, via the right to mobility, (re)creates citizens as "who must live" and "who must die." Thus, the mobile society is the colonial-political space in which citizens' right to mobility is the embodiment of mobility biopolitics.

The Aquarium as a Paradigm of Political Space

Notably, Kim uses the metaphor of the aquarium for society and swimming fish for traveling citizens. The chapters of the novel are "A Sweet Fish is in the Mountain," "The World Carp Lives," "A Deep-Sea Fish," "A Tropical Fish," "A Couple of Fish Find Romance," "A Chief Whale's Realism," "Ornamental Fish's Romanticism," "A Freshwater Fish's Eyesight," "Cutlassfish," "Happy New Year of Fish," "Mudfish and Dragon Fruit," "Wandering Goldfish," and "Spring Is in the Aquarium." In Korean society, citizens, like fish, travel to satisfy their desires and form social relationships.[39] Thus, the aquarium as a metaphor connotes the mobile nature of the colonial society. Simultaneously, given the mobile society as the colonial-political space, the aquarium can be considered a paradigm of political space, from which the colonial space is viewed critically as forcing the colonized, both citizens and non-citizens, to be fish-like-beings.

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[39] In 1940, colonial Seoul had a population of 935,464 and 154,687 Japanese residents. Despite the high percentage of Japanese (16.54%), Kim rarely makes them his central characters. *The Aquarium of Love* also does not have Japanese characters because it is a novel about Koreans.

As shown in the previous section, colonial biopower includes seemingly apolitical mobilities seeking indulging desires and, on the contrary, excludes political mobilities. Thus, practicing apolitical mobility is an essential prerequisite for citizens moving in society, which leads to their (un)conscious ignorance of their politicization. However, their indifference in politics would not allow them to survive only as mobile citizens but also as bare lives deprived of political rights. In other words, they are mobile bare lives, who, like swimming fish, can travel in search of desires but, like fish in an aquarium, should surrender their authority of life-and-death to the biopower in the colonial-political space. In the aquarium as the colonial-political mobile space, citizens are paradoxical colonial subjects who self-consciously move apolitically but thereby reinforce the colonial regime as their stronghold.

For instance, in criticizing Kyunghee's plan to open a public nursery, Kwangho confesses philosophy of life:

> Be that as it may, it is a matter of fact even that I don't have any ideology or ism. I didn't think so regarding your work from a standpoint I have. I sometimes recall my older brother passed away. Of course, I didn't sympathize with his thought or ism and even now don't want to be in his position; however, his influence seems to remain in my thinking. My callous attitude toward charitable work or similar businesses is like a legacy received from him, although I don't know what exactly what the legacy means. However, I am not a malicious nihilist you might imagine concerning me. First, I can be devoted to my duty. I have never been profoundly sceptical of my work, but I am not sure of the reason. For what do I lay the railway? To what are my knowledge and technique used? I have asked these questions. Yet, I quickly managed to shake such thinking off. For I thought as follows: While inventing electricity, Edison probably did not consider that it would be used for homicide; even if he knew such usage, he must not suspend his work of invention.[40]

Drawing on Hannah Arendt's notion of "sheer thoughtlessness," to describe Adolf Eichmann, who "never realized what he was doing,"[41] this

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[40] Kim, *Aquarium of Love*, 251-252.
[41] Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 287. (Original emphasis.)

passage stresses the necessity of "sheer thoughtlessness" as an essential prerequisite for making a living, conducting the railroad construction and most of all satisfying his desire for love. By acknowledging the legacy from his dead older brother, Kwangjun, the "callous attitude toward charitable work," while ruling out Kwangjun's political thought, Kwangho justifies his philosophy of life that, like Edison, does not extend beyond the call of duty. Notably, he probably is conscious that his work is utilized for political and military purposes, when he says that "One who dominates oils today is the one who will dominate the world tomorrow"[42] and that "the railway is material to transport coals. On the contrary, an engineer doesn't ask to which end oils are employed."[43] Given historical conditions of wartime between the Sino-Japanese War (1937) and the Pacific War (1940), the public works, conducted according to Japanese imperialistic planning, must be utilized for its political-military purpose. When thought control policy was severely implemented,[44] shaking political thinking off would be a necessary qualification for a citizen.

In this regard, the narrator remarkably overemphasizes the protagonists' involvement in Japanese national businesses, such as establishing the public nursery and developing artificial petroleum; that is, they are incorporated into the narrative disproportionately and artificially. At the climax, the tension concerning the protagonists' love affair is heightened when three letters from the hero to the heroine was excessively lengthy with nine pages, focusing not on the ease of their tension but the successful development of artificial petroleum in Manchuria,[45] of which Kwangho's work of the railroad construction is part. Thus, after receiving the letters, Kyunghee throws them into the wastebasket. Also, at the concluding scene, where they talk about their marriage, the hero suddenly demands her to devote her whole finance to organizing social work, including public nursery business as its qualification, which she accepts. Given that the colonial government endorsed public nurseries from the mid-1920 and especially

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[42] Kim, *Aquarium of Love*, 484.

[43] *Ibid*., 485.

[44] Around 1940, the colonial government implemented policies to commandeer the colonized and natural resources for military purposes. In 1940, it implemented the Japonification of Korean names, suspended the Korean newspapers, *Dong-A Daily News* and *Chosunilbo*, and forcedly transformed Koreans into loyal Japanese subjects.

[45] By enforcing the "7 Years Plan of Artificial Petroleum" in 1937, Japanese imperialism began securing petroleum to compensate for the oil shortage and to prepare for war. Yunmi Kim, "Wartime Munitions Securement and Korean Labor Mobilization," in *The Historical Association for Soong-Sil*, 25 (2010), 207–210.

around 1940,[46] the concluding scene proves their (un)conscious commitment to the national business.

Considering colonial subjects' ignorance of the colonial-political nature or usage of their businesses, artificially overemphasizing their involvement in the national businesses can be read as disclosing their paradoxical way of being: the entirely political nature of their seeming apolitical movements seeking desires, attained by their "sheer political thoughtlessness." In order to survive in colonial Korea, or not to be expelled from it, they should be those who never realized what they were doing. In other words, their paradoxicality can be deemed the effect of the colonial-political constitution of the mobile space adjuring the colonized to be depoliticized by depriving them of political rights.

Therefore, Arendt's insight that "men insofar as they are more than animal reaction and fulfillment of functions are entirely superfluous to totalitarian regimes"[47] can be applied to the colonial-political space. Depending on her insight, citizens' paradoxical being can be considered originating from the restriction of their movements within "animal reaction and fulfillment of functions" in the colonial society, which prevents them from being political subjects and which instead permits them to enjoy the freedom of movement solely as animals. Hence, despite their possible separation from non-citizens, they are not ultimately heterogeneous with the poor or threats by (un)consciously scorning their politicization and at once consenting to their animal nature. Although mobility biopolitics separates citizens from non-citizens, "what is inside" from "what is outside," their absence of political rights allows them to be categorized equally as the colonized. Thus, as the colonized, both citizens and non-citizens can be identified as living beings deprived of political rights, *homo sacer*; that is, the sacred animals who have surrendered their authority of life-and-death to colonial biopower.

Agamben's description of the camps as a paradigm of political space "at the point at which politics becomes biopolitics and *homo sacer* is virtually confused with the citizen"[48] helps specify an aspect of the political space under the Japanese colonial rule; where the colonial biopower manages the colonized populations' lives by including or excluding them to or from society, ultimately manufacturing them homogeneously as *homo sacer*. Meanwhile, Kim's novel describes not just the biopolitical but also the colonial and mobile space, where colonial biopower governs the colonized

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[46] Yunjin Lee, "The Viewpoint of Women through Child-Care Policy during Japan's Occupation of Korea," in *Journal of Asian Women's Studies*, 42 (2003), 303–307.

[47] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 457.

[48] Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 171. (Original emphasis.)

lives via the right to mobility by assigning or retrieving the freedom of movement to or from them. Thus, when it comes to the colonial-mobile society, the aquarium seems more relevant than the camp to describe the political space in which mobility biopolitics performs, a space in which the colonized, as citizens, commit to the colonial regime by possibly enjoying the freedom of movement, at once finding non-citizens. Simultaneously, as fish and *homo sacer*, citizens approve their lives' bareness, that is, their dehumanization due to their absence of political rights by (un)consciously ignoring their politicization. From the aquarium paradigm, the colonial-political space cultivates (im)mobile *homo sacer*.

Notably, the colonized movements are necessarily restricted as mere "animal reaction and fulfillment of functions." This restriction prevents the colonized from traveling as political subjects not only as a recognition of their movement as a political threat but as a consequence of unwavering adherence to the colonial relation of dominance/subordination. In this respect, colonial biopower can mold the colonized at best as "subpopulations" that are mobilizable and sacrificeable, not political subjects invested with political rights. In this regard, for instance, the enforcement of the 1937 policy of "Japan and Korea as one body," the "naisen-ittai" (內鮮一體), elicited the expectation of the abolition of the colonial relation of dominance/subordination from the Korean intellectuals. However, its motive was only to mobilize the colonized to the imperialistic warfare or businesses, denominating them as loyal Japanese subjects, not to eliminate the discrimination between the Japanese and the Korean by vesting the latter with the same political rights as the former.[49]

From the aquarium as a paradigm of political space, Kim's novel shows the colonial-political space's barrenness in which citizens trade their political rights for the right to mobility. Considering that citizens (un)consciously restrict their movements within "animal reaction and fulfillment of functions," the right to mobility in the colonial-political space would be deemed merely the rationalization of the deprivation of political rights, the dehumanized and animalized constitution and management of the colonial society. More significantly, the colonial-political space's barrenness demonstrates its insubstantiality, which ultimately originates from categorically excluding political subjects. Given its barrenness that prevent the colonized from moving as human subjects with political rights, the colonial-political space must be suffered from the shortage of its sincere subjects, probably, ensuring the colonial regime's continuity. However, the

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[49] Seungil Lee, *Legislative Policy of the Japanese Government-General of Korea* (Seoul: Yuksabipyeongsa, 2008), 307–315.

colonial regime's maintenance itself seems to be absurd due to its dehumanizing nature as a result of its mobility biopolitics.

The society's barrenness and insubstantiality might be recovered most of all by human movements seeking "more than animal reaction and fulfillment of functions," more precisely, their movements for *more than* the right to mobility, which entails the abolition of the colonial regime, that is, the decolonized-humanized formation of society. Thus, their mobile practice would be framed in the politics of "more than."

Contesting Maps and the Politics of "More Than"

By examining Namcheon Kim's novel, *The Aquarium of Love*, in terms of the right to mobility, this paper identified the aquarium as a paradigm of colonial-political space. In this novel, Kim portrayed Korean society around 1940 as not only the mobile but also the colonial-political space in which Japanese colonialism asserts its power via the right to mobility, thereby molding the colonized as mobile citizens (colonial subjects) and as immobile non-citizens (the sacred lives, including the poor and threats). However, the novel uses the metaphor of fish, which (un)consciously practice "sheer political thoughtlessness" in order to not be expelled from society or to survive therein and whose movements are restricted within "animal reaction and fulfillment of functions" for the colonized deprived of political rights. Thus, the aquarium paradigm critically views mobility biopolitics, adopted by Japanese colonialism, as reducing the colonized to fish and, thus, disclosing the colonial space's barrenness and insubstantiality that originates from its categorical exclusion of political subjects.

Three maps appear in Kim's novel. In the late 1930s, Ilsung Shin, a swindler, utilized the map of Seoul to defraud people out of their money, using urban development information. The map shows the Japanese Government-General of Korea's plan to expand Seoul to Incheon for military purposes.[50] Kwangho's map of Manchuria, drawn by using an aerial survey, was a blueprint for the railroad construction. Despite his supposed apolitical use of the map, it would assist in Japanese imperialism's territorial expansion in Manchuria. Kwangjun had a map of the world that helped him to think about its present and future, used mainly to explore international political relations just before World War II.

These maps display the diversity of cartography by visualizing Seoul, Manchuria, and the world. Whereas the maps of Seoul and Manchuria

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[50] In the late 1930s, the Japanese Government-General of Korea hurried to enforce the policy of expanding Seoul to the nearby cities officially in order to facilitate commandeering populations and artifacts to the warfare, broadening its coverage of mobility. Bokkyu Yum, *The Origin of Seoul, the Birth of Keijo* (Seoul: Idea, 2016), 335–367.

present the cities "inside" or "within" Japanese imperialism, a map of the world materializes the globe "outside" or "beyond" them. Thus, while the former involves restricting the colonized populations' movements within "animal reaction and fulfillment of functions," the latter encourages them to travel to seek "more than" their current status, albeit probably following their expulsion from society, as shown by Kwangjun's death. In this respect, the cartographical diversity would denote the possibility of designing an alternative to the current colonialist or imperialist map, one that seeks what is "more than."

In this light, in the epilogue, Hyunsoon Kang, the younger sister of Kwanjun's girlfriend, after failing to date Kwangho and determining not to participate in Kyunghee's public nursery, then decides to travel to Manchuria, looking forward to a new life. On the other hand, Kwangshin, removed from school, decides to move down to the country to study outside Seoul. Their movements first may be interpreted as the colonial biopower's abandonment of them. However, from Hyunsoon's and Kwanjun's self-conscious decision to leave colonial Korea, their movements can also be considered flights from the aquarium. Considering her movement to Manchuria to escape Kwangho, Kyunghee, and Korean society, it seems that Hyunsoon will not depend on Kwangho's map. Similarly, Kwangshin's journey will not be guided by the existing maps. Thus, their mobilities can be rendered as physically designing an alternative space to the colonial constitution of space.

Hyunsoon and Kwangshin take advantage of their mobility to leave the barren and insubstantial colony. However, their cartography is not likely to materialize as long as the colonial regime remains in power. Considering their destinations, their mobilities are likely to end in failure or death. Thus, the aquarium paradigm allows us to ponder upon the political space in which (im)mobile humans precariously lean toward either animal or death, that space that drive humans to seek for a being that is "more than" animals, risking their lives.

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
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