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KRITIKE is the official open access (OA) journal of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Santo Tomas (UST), Manila, Philippines. It is a Filipino peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary, and international journal of philosophy founded by a group of UST alumni. The journal seeks to publish articles and book reviews by local and international authors across the whole range of philosophical topics, but with special emphasis on the following subject strands:

- Filipino Philosophy
- Oriental Thought and East-West Comparative Philosophy
- Continental European Philosophy
- Anglo-American Philosophy

The journal primarily caters to works by professional philosophers and graduate students of philosophy, but welcomes contributions from other fields (literature, cultural studies, gender studies, political science, sociology, history, anthropology, economics, inter alia) with strong philosophical content.

The word "kritike" is Greek from the verb "krinein," which means to discern. Hence, kritike means the art of discerning or the art of critical analysis. Any form of philosophizing is, in one way or another, a "critique" of something. Being critical, therefore, is an attitude common to all philosophical traditions. Indeed, the meaning of philosophy is critique and to be philosophical is to be critical.

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Sining-Konseptwal, Panitikang Post-Konseptwal: Pilosopiya at Politika ng Postmodernong Sining

Epifanio San Juan, Jr.

Abstract: Controversies regarding conceptual art and post-conceptual practices are central to the understanding of cultural trends in globalization. The case of post-conceptual artist Kenneth Goldsmith illustrates the various ramifications of this development. The essay introduces this aesthetic field into Filipino Studies, exploring local commentaries and examples.

Keywords: Goldsmith, sining-konseptwal, post-konseptwal, postmodernismo

The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.

—Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks

The class struggle, which is always present to a historian influenced by Marx, is a fight for the crude and material things without which no refined and spiritual things could exist …. There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.

—Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History

Malubhang sitwasyon ng kulturang kontemporaryo—sintomas ng masahol na kondisyon ng kabuhayan sa Pilipinas. Bagamat maitatambuli na tayo’y nakarating na sa saray ng mga modernisadong kalinangan sa panahon ng globalisasyon at paghahari ng neoliberalismong kapital, nakalubog pa rin tayo sa puyudal at neokolonisadong kumunoy, Hindi lamang ito totoo sa ekonomiya at politika. Kaagapay rin ang pagkabimbin sa lumang tradisyong ng burgesiyang pananaw, kaakibat ng mapagsunurang gawing minana sa kolonyalismo ng Espanyol. Magkatuwang ang pagkakulong sa lumang pananampalataya—utos/ritwal ng simbahang Katoliko ang nananaig—at indibidwalistikong asta at malig ng pagkilos. Hindi ko tinutukoy ang atrasadong teknolohiya kundi
ang inaaliping mentalidad/saloobin ng mga mamamayan sa neokolonyang sinakop dito sa Timog-Silangang Asiya.

Mapanghamong tanong: maaari kayang malunasan ang di-pantay na pagtsulong kung babaguhin natin ang kamalayan? O lagi ba itong tagasunod lamang sa ekonomiyang pagbabago, ayon sa nakasanayang modelo ng “base/superstructure”? Idinaramay ko rito hindi lamang mga alagad-ng-sining at intelihiensiya kundi lahat ng mamamayang nag-aangkin ng budhi at pintig ng pagkalinga sa kapwa-tao.1


**Krisis ng Sistema, Sigalot sa Kaluluwa**


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inaruga sa disiplinang personal; 4) namumukod ang artistang henyo, kaakuhang taglay ang mahlwaga’t banal na imahinisyon/dunong; 5) ang diskurso sa sining ay nakasalig sa tatlong kategoryang magkalangkap: artista, likhang-sining, awdiyens.

Sa kanluran, ang paglunsad ng kilusang avant-garde laban sa modernismo (binansagang postmodernismo, dekonstruksiyon, poststrukturalismo) ay tumingkad sa taong 1966–1972. Panahon ng “dematerialization of the art object,” hinalinhan ang romantikong aura/fetish ng obra-maestra (mula Michelangelo hanggang Cezanne, Picasso, Pollock) ng idea/information art, sa kalaunan, conceptual art. Naging isang tipo ng art-labor ang pagmumuni o pagninilay na iniilaan sa interogasyon ng problema ng sining.2


**Kongkretong Imbestigasyon sa Milyu**


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Sa pambungad ni Virgilio Almario sa kanyang *Hiyas ng Tulang Tagalog*, inatupag lamang ang kaibahan ng tema o paksang naghihiwalay kina Teo Baylen at Amado Hernandez, walang puna sa tunggalian ng mga puwersang historikal. Makitid at mababaw rin ang makasektaryang pagwari sa tatak modernismo dahil gumamit ng “malayang taludturan ... at kaisipang pribado’t indibidwalista.”

Sa kabilang dako, ayon kay Rene Villanueva, ang dula “ay laging nagtatangkang isaayos ang isang tiyak na karanasan upang mapaghanguan ng manonood o mambabasa ng mga pananaw tungkol sa buhay.”

Lumalayo sa moralistikong tingin ni Villanueva si Gary Devilles sa pinamatnugutan niyang antolohiya, *Pasakalye*. Mapagwawari na ang talinghaga ng paglalakbay, punto at kontrapunto, ay liberalismo pagbubukod sa “muhon ng panitikan” na hindi makatutulak sa simbolo ng transportasyon o hulagway hango sa teknolohiya.

Hindi pa tumatalab ang kuro-kurong radikal ng mga Minimalista’t konseptwalista.


Lahat ng nabanggit na opinyon ay nakasandig pa rin sa lumang tatsulok ng artista, likhang-sining, awdiyens—ang padron ng aprubadong panulat.

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Oryentasyong Pangkasaysayan


Simula pa ng kilusang *Dada*, suryalismo, Constructivism, Cubismo, hanggang *Pop Art*, *Fluxus* (kabilang na si Yoko Ono) at *Minimalism*, unting-unting naaagnas ang pagtitiwala sa isang ordeng matalis ay kahit nambusabos. Sumalisi ang udyok ng aksidente at pagbabakasakali kaakibat ng anarkiya ng walang regulasyon sa kalakal. Sumaksi ang pagtutol sa estetisismo at komoditi-petisismo sina Yves Klein, Robert Rauschenberg,

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**Argumentong Magkatumbalik**


Tunay na masalmuot ang hibla ng pinagbuhatan ng konseptwalismo, pati na ang estratehiyang pagbabago nito. Buhay na nang itanong ni Marcel Duchamp ang kanyang urinal at iba pang “ready-made”

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bilang *art-object* simula 1913, gumana na ang generic modernismong humiwalay sa priblehiyong midya. Wala nang espesyal na kata-diwang estetiko; impormasyon, dokumentasyon, at iba pang determinadong negasyon ng institusyonalisadong sining ang itinataguyod sa sari-saring praktikang dinudukal sa kasalukuyan. Walang partikular na materyales o pamamaraan ang iniririserba para sa paghubog sa likhang-sining.


Gunitain ang proseso ng reduksiyon o demateryalisasyon ng bagay na binansagang “*art-object*”. Tulad nang nabanggit, nailunsad ito sa paglagay sa galerya ng mga bagay na nagsasarili. Pagkatapos, inilapat iyon sa poon o lugar hanggang ito'y mawala. Sa kalaunan, idiniin ang lamang-isip o konsepto sa halip na ituon ang atensiyon sa masasalat na sisidlan na kinaluluklukan ng kahulugan. Hindi pagmasid, hindi pagkapa at paghinuha ng kahulugan mula sa anumang bagay na dinanas. Matindi’t mabalasik ang mga argumento sa diskursong metalingwistikal hinggil sa sining; ang gamit sa wika bilang makahulugang materyal/laman ay bininyagang ideya-sining.

**Sining Bilang Kabatiran/Wari**


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konseptwalistang artista na nakapokus sa ideya/binagap ng dinamikong makinang yumayari ng sining. Lahat ng pagpapasiya tungkol sa kung paano lilikhain ang bagay ay naisakatuparan na sa proseso ng pag-iisip/pagninilay. Hindi na kailangan ang intuwisyon o pangangatwiran dahil nailatag na ang lohikang susundin, ang tinaguriang “OS” (Operating System).

Sa iskemang apriori, wala nang papel na gaganapin ang henyong indibidwal, ang saloobing personal, na dinakila ng mga romantikong pilosopo (Coleridge, Goethe, Schiller, Croce). Pahayag ni LeWitt: “To work with a plan that is pre-set is one way of avoiding subjectivity … The idea itself, even if not made visual, is as much a work of art as any finished product …. Those that show the thought-process of the artist are sometimes more interesting than the finished product.” 13 Napalitan ang kamalayang interyor ng prosesong mala-matematika na gumitaw sa ulirat, may angking lohikang nag-uudyok sa mambabasa o nanonood na lumahok sa pabrikasyon ng danas.

Sa pagkilatis ni Fredric Jameson, ang espasyo/lunan ang importante sa konseptwalistang kadalubhasaan:

> Conceptual art may be described as a Kantian procedure whereby, on the occasion of what first seems to be an encounter with a work of art of some kind, the categories of the mind itself—normally, not conscious, and inaccessible to any direct representation or to any thematizable self-consciousness or reflexivity—are flexed, their structuring presence now felt laterally by the viewer like musculature or nerves of which we normally remain insensible, in the form of those peculiar mental experiences Lyotard terms paralogisms. 14

Pakiwari ko’y mali ang positibistikong akala ni Jameson. Limitado ni Kant ang ideya sa palapag na penomenal, kaya di makaakyat sa kongkretong yuniberhal ng sining. Dapat intindihin na hindi ang anatomiya o biyolohiya ng utak ang nakataya rito kundi ang proseso ng hinuha (inference) na mahuhugot sa nailahad na direksiyon/instruksiyon ng artista.

Pagkawala ng rasyonalistikong subjek/awtor, sumupling ang depersonalisadong sining sa danas at panlasa ng nakararaming tao. Malaya na ang sinumang nais magpahalaga at magpakahulugan sa anumang bagay o panghayari na pwedeng kabitang etiketa, “sining ito.”

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Kahit tagubilin pasalita, o kilos na inirekord sa dokumento, ang naisagawa ay isang kawing lamang sa isang mahabang kadenang metonimiko. Dapat unawain ang sinkroniko’t diyakroniko galaw hitik ng indeks-senyas at sagisag. Kasangkot doon ang komunikasyong oral, ang iniilathalang instruksiyon, ang proseso ng paglabas ng deklarasyon, ang kinahinatnan, ang dokumentasyong fotograpiko, atbp. Sa maikling salita, iba’t ibang anyo o hukus pisikal ang maaaring manipestasyon ng konsepto. Nararapat ikabit dito ang kasaysayan ng sining, hindi estetikang idealistiko ni Kant o Lyotard. Pagnilayin ang matatag na “declaration of intent” ni Weiner na modipikasyon ng simulaing pinahayag ni LeWitt:

1. The artist may construct the piece
2. The piece may be fabricated
3. The piece need not be built
Each being equal and consistent with the intent of the artist, the decision as to condition rests with the receiver upon the occasion of receivership. 15

Simbiyotika ng Teorya at Praktika

Higit na radikal kaysa kina Kosuth at Lewitt ang panukala ni Weiner. Bukod sa pagbaklas sa mito ng paglikhang depende sa awtoridad ng awtor/artistang bukal ng orihinalidad, ang pagkasangkot ng awdiyens, ang demokratikong paglahok ng tumatanggap/nakatanggap ng sining, ay nakabuwa sa tradisyonal na pananaw. Lumalim at tumalas ito sa sumunod na uri ng konseptwalismo sina Daniel Buren, Hans Haacke, Marcel Broodthaers. Pinuntirya nila ang kondisyong ideolohikal ng institusyong pansining (museo, galerya, midyng sosyal), ang mga regulasyon at batas, at ang kanonisadong doktrinang upisyal na nagpapasiya kung anong bagay ang ituturing na sining. Halimbawa, sa Gallery-Visitors-Profile, isininalalat ni Haacke ang sistemang nagtatakda kung ano ang kabulungan ng bagay na inangguriang likhang-sining.16


o kalooban ng ulilang artistang nasukol ng puwersa ng kapaligiran at nabalaho sa bangin ng “art-for-art’s sake,” pwede pa ring bumuo ng estratehiya ng interbensyon.


**Pagbuno sa Palaisipan & Suliranin**

Sa pagbabalik-tanaw sa kasaysayan ng konseptwalismo sa sinining, idiniin ni Craig Dworkin, na impresario ng konseptwalistang panulat, ang pagpanaw ng awtor, ang imbentor ng orihinal na lihing-sining (naibalita ni Roland Barthes at Michel Foucault ang pagkamatay ng awtor). Naipasinaya ng pagburol ng malikhaling awtor ang pagsilang ng “uncreative writing” sa bagong milenyo, sa epoka ng “War on Terrorism” pagkaraan ng pagbulo ng Twin Tower sa New York, USA, noong ika-11 Setyembre 2001.


 Appropriation/pag-angkin, pagkumpiska/pang-aagaw, ang namamayaning estilo at modo ng pagkathwa ngayon sa literaturang nangunguna. Sa milyung umaapaw ng kompyuter, elektronikong teknolohiya, sumagana’t kumalat ang “remix culture” ng hip-hop, global DJ

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Sampling, mash-up, montage, cut-up, atbp. Ginagagad ng manunulat ang “database logic” ng bagong midya,” ayon kay Dworkin, “wherein the focus is no longer on the production of new material but on the recombination of previously produced and stockpiled data. Conceptual poetry, accordingly, often operates as an interface—returning the answer to a particular query; assembling, rearranging, and displaying information; or sorting and selecting from files of accumulated language according to a certain algorithm.” Ayon kay Walter Benjamin, sa reproduksyong mekanikal ng modernong kabihasan, natanggap ang “aura” sa mga pribadong pag-aaring signos ng pribilehiyo/kapangyarihan, at diumanò’y naging demokratiko ang pagtatamasang ng ligayang dulot ng sining.

Kung tutuusin, walang panganib o hamong nakasisindak sa status quo ang konseptwalismong lumaganap at hinangaan. Nasaring nga ni Robert Smithson na naging aliporis ng sistemang kapital ang dating avantgarde: ginawà ni Warhol ang kapitalismo bilang isang alamat/mito pagsuob sa “production for production’s sake.”

“production for production’s sake.”

Yumaman ang mga artistang dating pariah sa Establisimyento. Samantala, ang “uncreative writing” ni Goldsmith ay nagtamo ng mayamang tagumpay, naging bantog at kinilalang sopistikadong biyaya ng pambihirang moda. Pinarangalan sila. Pihikang panlasa?

Hintay, isang araw, inanyayahan si Goldsmith na bumigkas ng isang tula sa isang program sa Brown University, ang “The Body of Michael Brown,” na dagling naging kontrobersial. Hintay muna .... Pinatindi ang reaksyon sa balita na nagbunsod ng umaatikabong tuligsa, pati banta ng pagpatay sa makata. Pakli ni Goldsmith: “There’s been too much pain for many people around this, and I do not want to cause anymore.”


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batikos at tuligsa: “tacky,” “new racist lows,” “white elite institutions pay … another white man holding the corpse of a black child, saying “Look at what I’ve made.” Pinag-initan ang Puting pagsamsam sa kahirapan ng mga Itim, ang paghamak at pagkutya sa kamatayan ng isang inosenteng biktima ng marahas na paghahari ng White Supremacy.

Masusing pag-aralan ang matapang at mahayap na komentaryo ni Anne Waldman:

I was not present, but by all reports what we seem to have is a solipsistic clueless bubble of unsupportable ‘art’ attitude and privilege. What was Kenny Goldsmith thinking? That it’s okay to self-appoint and perform the autopsy report of murdered black teenager Michael Brown and mess with the text, and so “own” it and get paid for his services? No empathy no sorrow for the boy, the body, the family, ignorant of the ramifications, deaf ear to the explosive demonstrations and marches? Reeks of exploitation, of the ‘racial imaginary.’ Black Dada Nihilismus is lurking on the lineaments of the appropriated shadow of so much suffering.

Alingawngaw sa Kaharian ng Arte

Dagling nawala ang pretext ng kontrobersiya. Biglang inurong ni Goldsmith ang tula sa Web, at pinalitan ng isang pagtatanggol (sa Facebook) ng signature estilong pagkopya, pagputol, pagdikit, pag-angkin ng digital text mula sa cyberspace. Ikinatwiran ang ethos ng sampling, reblogging, mimesis, replikasyon, procedure ng pagmanipula, paglilipat at pakikibahagi ng impormasyon, na primaryang imbakan ng konseptwalistang panulat. Maingat nating pagliripin ang paliwanag (hindi apologia) ni Goldsmith sa kanyang pagasa, paghihayat ng pagasaayos ng isang publikong dokumento na pinamagatang “The Body of Michael Brown” — pinagsamantalahang ipuslit ang autopsy report upang makaani ng pansariling “symbolic capital”:

In the tradition of my previous book Seven American Deaths and Disasters, I took a publicly available document from an American tragedy that was witnessed first-hand (in this case by the doctor performing the autopsy) and simply read it. Like Seven American Deaths, I did not editorialize. I simply read it.

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22 Ibid.
without commentary or additional editorializing. Many of you have heard me read from Seven American Deaths. This reading was identical in tone and intention. This, in fact, could have been the eighth American death and disaster. The document I read from is powerful. My reading of it was powerful. How could it be otherwise? Such is my long-standing practice of conceptual writing: like Seven American Deaths, the document speaks for itself in ways that an interpretation cannot. It is a horrific American document, but then again it was a horrific American death.\footnote{Flood, “US poet defends reading of Michael Brown autopsy report as a poem.”}

### Pagtugis sa Katunayan at Kabulaanan

Masinop na imbestigasyon ang kailangan. Kabulaanan ang igiit ni Goldsmith na hindi niya binago ang dokumento. Tandisang litaw na pinili niya, sinipi at niretoke ang ilang detalye ng postmortem examination at ipinasiyang magwakas sa maselang bahagi. Narito ang nakasulat sa report: “Male Genital System: There is foreskin present near the head of the penis. The remaining male genitalia system is unremarkable” (galing sa Office of the Medical Examiner, Dr Gershom; 2014 # 5143). Bakit dito piniling huminto ang akda ni Goldsmith?


*I altered the text for poetic effect. I translated into plain English many obscure medical terms that would have stopped the flow of the text; I narrativized it in ways that made the text*

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less didactic and more literary. I indeed stated at the beginning of my reading that this was a poem called “The Body of Michael Brown”: I never stated, “I am going to read the autopsy report of Michael Brown.” But then again, this is what I did in Seven Deaths and Disasters. I always massage dry texts to transform them into literature, for that is what they are when I read them. That said, I didn’t add or alter a single word or sentiment that did not preexist in the original text, for to do so would be to go against my nearly three decades’ practice of conceptual writing, one that states that a writer need not write any new texts but rather reframe those that already exist in the world to greater effect than any subjective interpretation could lend. Perhaps people feel uncomfortable with my uncreative writing, but for me, this is the writing that is able to tell the truth in the strongest and clearest way possible.

Ecce homo. Behold the man.

Walang pasubali, hindi ito salitang humihingi ng paumanhin. Sa katinayan, isang rasionalisasyon ito sa pagtatanggol sa kanyang tipo ng panulat. Samakatwid, ang “refiguring” o pagmasahe sa dokumento ni Goldsmith ang nakataya rito. Sa malas, talaga bang na-defamiliarize ang Estadong rasista’t pasista, ang layunin ng makata na ipahayag ang katotohanan sa pinakamabang paraan?


Sa anu’t anoman, mahirap maipaghiwalay ang interesasyong pang-estetika sa politikal, etikal at moral na suliraning bumabagabag sa publikong konsiyensiya.

Diskurso ng Pagkilala o Pagwalang-pansin

Tulad ng nabanggit na, batikos si Goldsmith, ang poet laureate ng Museum of Modern Art, ng maraming kolega at manunulat sa website ng Poetry Foundation.27 at iba pang lugar sa Internet at lathalain. Sa marahas na bintang na ang akda ni Goldsmith ay dokumento ng “white supremacy poetics,” kung saan naron ang “white power dissecting colored body,” sulyapan ang website ng “Mongrel Coalition Against Gringpo”: “The murdered body of Mike Brown’s medical report is not our poetry, it’s the building blocks of white supremacy, a miscreant DNA infecting everyone in the world. We refuse to let it be made literary.”28


Mapaparatangan bang nagkasala si Goldsmith sa komodipikasyon ng bangkay ni Brown? Nagkasala ba siya sa pagbebenta ng tekstong ninakaw sa Internet, at pagpuslit ng simbolikong kapital bilang “meme macho”?29 Ano ang kontradiksiyon ng pagkatao ng Anglo-Amerikanong grupo (si Brown ay kinatawan nila) at paglait sa banog (“quantified self” ni Brown). Nananaig pa rin ang aparatong ideolohikal ng Estado sa

27 Conrad, “Kenneth Goldsmith Says He Is an Outlaw.”
pagpapanatili ng rasismo/makismo. Pangalawa, sa harap ng dumaragsang
memes, bulto-bultong dami ng datos digital, labis-labis na “disposable data-
basing,” blogging, identity ciphering, mabilisang programing, paano
maisasaayos ng makata ang kumplikadong penomena upang magkaroon
iyon ng halaga sa buhay natin? Pangatlo, paano malulutas ang hidwaang
nabanggit kung ang paraang konseptwal ay makina-ng-ideyang walang silbi,
hindi utilitaryan, matipid, mahigpit ang paghawak, nais lamang pukawin
ang isip, walang balisa sa pagsasakatuparan ng konsepto? Tatlong
problemang dapat lutasin upang makahulagpos sa bilanggo ng burgesyang
orden.

Sa gitna ng ating pagkalito, iginiit ni Goldsmith: “Arbitrary or chance
decisions would be kept to a minimum, while caprice, taste and other whimsies would
be eliminated from the making of the text.”30 Sa gayon, hindi awtomatikong
collage, pastiche, o transkripsyon ang ginanap na pagbighas ni Goldsmith.
Tunay na iyon ay interbensiyon marahas, wanggis gahasa ng putting lahi sa
bangkay ng aliping kulay-itim, tanda ng barbarikong nekropilya. Sa tatlong
kontradiksiyong nabanggit, anong pinili’t hinulmang paraan ang sinubok ng
awtor sa paglutas ng iniilag na suliranin?

Totoong hindi niyutral o walang pakialam ang manunulat sa paraan
at estilo ng paglalahad. Puna ni Marjorie Perloff, masinop si Goldsmith (tulad
ni Duchamp) pa paghakot at pagpasalansan ng inilipat na tekso sa kanyang
Traffic: “What Goldsmith wants us to see is what the world we live in is actually like.”31
Bilang isang pormang ideolohikal, nakapaloob sa kathang binigkas ni
Goldsmith ang paglalarawan ng lohika ng rasistang lipunan bilang
oposisyon ng kantidad (abstraktong pagkilatis sa bangkay ni Brown gawa ng
Estado) versus makataong pagtransporma ni Goldsmith sa paraan ng
satirikong pagmasahale sa autopsy report. Samakatwid, lumabag siya sa
mungkahi ng kasamang Dworkin na ang konseptwalising bricolage ay
nakapako sa “recontextualizing language in a mode of strict citation.”32

Maselan ang detournement o paghuhugis ng nakumpiskang teksto sa
Internet. Hindi naiba ng “reframing” ang konteksto ng diskurson
kumbensyonal. Nakapokus din sa reduksyon ng liping Aprikano sa sukat
ng genitalia, kaya ipinabulaan ni Goldsmith ang stereotype sa pagwakas ng
kanyang pag-ilit sa medikong ulat na normal lamang ang seks ni Brown—
“unremarkable” genitalia.33 Sa mismong pag-uliit ng rasismong kategorya,
salungat sa kanyang tangka, dinulutan ng positibong bantas ang gawing
rasista: ang tao ay katumbas ng kanyang anatomya/biyolohiya.

31 Perloff, Marjorie, Poetics in a New Key: Interviews and Essays (Manila: De La Salle
University Publishing House, 2013), 160.
32 Craig Dworkin, “The Fate of Echo,” xlvii.
33 Wilkinson, “Something Borrowed.”
Subersiyong Radikal o Kompromisong Liberal?


Sa perspektibang idealistiko/metapisikal, maituturing na repormista ang prinsipyo ni Goldsmith (sampu nina Dworkin at mga kapanalig) sa pagtutol sa orthodoxiya ng romantiko’t mistikal na pagkilala sa awtor. Ang tipo ng mapanghamig na suhbitidad ay batayan ng burgesyakapitalistang orden. Makatwiran din ang tatlong negasyon (ng obhetidad ng likhang-sining, ng midyum biswal, at ng autonomiya ng art-object) na iniulat ni Osborne.35 Nagbunga iyon ng uri ng sining/panitikan na gumagamit o kumakasangkapan sa umiiral na diskurso/teksto sa midya upang mabago ang mga institusyon pang-araw-araw. Kabilang si Goldsmith sa pag-repunksiyon at sirkulasyon ng normatibong doxa tungkol sa identidad at karapatan pantao sa masasagap sa cyberspace.


relasyon ng kapangyarihang nakapaloob sa sistema ng institusyong nangangasiwa’t kumokontrol sa sining/panitikan, sa buong aparato ng kultura/ideolohiya. Naibunyag na ni Charles Harrison ang “utopian fantasy”36 ng rebolusyonaryong programa ng avantgarde kilusan na nagsimula pa kina Andre Breton, Duchamp, Mondrian, Joseph Beuys, Minimalism, Fluxus, hanggang kina Adrian Piper, Barbara Kruger, Sherrie Levine, atbp.


Bukod dito, partikular din na hindi iniuugnay ng konseptwalismong aprubado ang institusyon ng museo, galerya, mass media, at akademyang makapangyarihan sa pagtakda ng paghahati ng lakas-paggawa ayon sa means-ends rasyonalidad ng burgesyan orden. Ito nga ang dahilan ng bangguwardyang pagasisip na siya ring nagtutulak sa konseptwalistang eksperimento.37 Sa kabila dako, maihahalintulad ang transisyonal na katangian ng kalakaran iito sa trahedyang Griyego na, sa loob ng reaksonaryong porma, sinipak nina Aeschylus, Sophocles, at Euripedes na ipasok doon ang pinakarasyonal, demokratiko’t materyalistikong paninindigan ng progresibong uri ng panahong iyon.38 Masinop na pagliripin ang diyalektikang pagsusulit na matutuklasan sa mga nobela nina Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Amado Hernandez, Lazaro Francisco, Efren Abueg, Lualhati Bautista, Jun Cruz Reyes, atbp.39

**Tungo sa Palatuntunan ng Pananagutan**

Siyasatin natin ang ibang semiotika bukod kay Saussure at mga dekonstruktusyonista. Ang malaking pagkukulang ng kritikang institusyonal ay isang bagay na mapupunan kung susundin ang pragmatikong tagubilin ni Charles Peirce hinggil sa kahulugan ng konsepto/ideya:

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a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena that the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept.40

Ipinag-uugnay nito ang teorya at praktika, udyok na pumapatnubay din sa avantgardistang awtor. Nakaugat din ito sa paniwalang ang sining na buod ng mapanlikhang simbuyo’t kakayahan ng tao ay hindi maaunawaan sa pagkahumaling sa intuwisyon, bisyon, organikong porma ng ekspresyon, atbp. Sa halip, dapat idin ang konsepto/ideya ng sinang bilang “polysignificant language dealing with specific types,” at walang silbi ang dakdak tungkol sa porma/anyo/hugis kung walang “eidos or diainoia or idea or concept,” susog ni Galvano della Volpe.41

Sa Pilipinas, buko d sa nasubukan nina Angelo Suárez at kapanalig, pambihirang makakita ng masugit na pagdukal sa konseptwalistang teritoryo. Ipauubaya ko sa iba ang pag-umat sa iba pang pagsubok postkonseptwal. Magkasya na munang banggitin dito ang ilang proyekto ng awtor sa gilid ng pagpasalaysay sa naratibo ng konseptwalismong Kanluran, na baka makatulong sa kilusan laban sa imperyalismo’t oligarkyang kasabwat nito.42


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42 San Juan, *Himagsik*.
43 E. San Juan, Sapagkat Iniibig Kita at Iba pang Bagong Tula (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 2004).
44 E. San Juan, *Kundiman sa Gitna ng Karimlan* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 2014).
“Trahedya/Komedyang Moro-Moro sa Mamasapano.”46 Mula sa panghihimasok sa typograpikal na bihis ng tula (imitasyon ng praktika ng concrete poetry, Mallarme, Weiner), suryalismong eksperimentasyon, at iba pang sinubukang palatuntunan, tumawid tayo sa paghiram/pagkumpiska sa mga salawikain at sampling ng bugtong, pati na modipikasyon ng ilang kanonikal na akda. Sa paraan ng alegorikong montage, sinubok ding ilapat ang minimalistikong metodo ng serye o reduksiyon, parikaling pagpuputol sa kanonisadong teksto, pagkopya ng dokumento ng isang biktima ng tortyur at pagsipi sa midya at diskursong antropologo (tungkol sa alegorikong pahiwatig, konsultahin si Buchloch.47


46 E. San Juan, Wala (Manila: PUP Press, 2016), 47–51.
Ano Ngayon ang Dapat Gawin?


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49 Morawski, Marx and Engels on Literature and Art, 46.
50 Max Raphael, Proudhon, Marx, Picasso (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980); naisakatuparan sa mga dula ni Bertolt Brecht.
kasaysayan. Resulta nga ang sumablay na neoavantgardismo ni Goldsmith at postmodernistang art-komoditi na inilalako sa Sotheby, Amazon.com, Bloomingdale, at Facebook.


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Featured Essay

Pilosopiyang Analitiko: Impluwensya at Kasaysayan

Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr.

Abstract: Analytic philosophy is currently one of the leading philosophical traditions in the world. Its contributions to the flourishing of philosophical studies and development of the discipline of philosophy as a whole are comprehensive and profound. Nonetheless, the lack of a proper understanding of its true nature is still noticeable. For instance, it is sometimes understood as merely referring to a purely intellectual activity where concepts, arguments, and meanings of words are technically and meticulously analyzed without any clear direction. As a result, one fails to see its real beauty and value and to take advantage of its insights and skills. This essay aims to address this lack in two steps. First, it will identify and examine the influences of analytic philosophy inside and outside of the discipline of philosophy in order to show its value. Second, it will trace the history of analytic philosophy in order to clarify its goals and motivations.

Keywords: pilosopiyang analitiko, analitikong pilosopiya, pamimilosopiya sa wikang Filipino, analytic philosophy

Panimula

Ang pilosopiyang analitiko (na tatawagin na lamang nating “PA”), sa pananaw ng mga karamihan sa mga dalubhasa sa kasaysayan nito tulad nina Stephen Schwartz,¹ Hans-Johann Glock,² at Michael Beaney,³ ay ang dominanteng tradisyong pampilosopiko sa mundo sa

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Ang pangunahing layunin ng sanaysay na ito ay ang maka-ambag sa paglinig na maayos na pag-unawa sa PA, o ang mailagay ang pag-unawa sa PA sa tamang perspektibo. Ito ay gagawin sa dalawang hakbang na tatalakayin sa dalawang bahagi ng sanaysay na ito. Sa unang bahagi, ipapakita ang kalalakihan ng impluwensya ng PA sa pamamagitan ng pagtukoy at pagsiyasat sa mga naging impluwensya ng PA sa loob at labas ng disiplina ng pilosopiya. Sa ikalawang bahagi, lilinawin ang mga layunin at motibasyon ng PA sa pamamagitan ng pagbaka sa kasaysayan nito.

I. Lawak at Lalim ng Impluwensya ng PA

Ang impluwensya ng PA sa loob ng disiplina ng pilosopiya ay masisiyasan sa aspetong pangheograpiko at aspetong pangkaisipan. Ang aspetong pangheograpiko ay tumutukoy sa lugar ng kaganapan ng impluwensya ng PA, na kinabibilangan ng mga departamento ng pilosopiya kung saan PA ang pangunahing oryentasyong pampilosopiko, at ng mga samahang pang-akademiko na nagsusulong sa PA. Ang aspetong pangkaisipan, sa kabilang banda, ay tumutukoy sa impluwensya ng PA sa mga usapin sa pilosopiya, na makikita sa mga sangay ng pilosopiya at mga temang pilosopiko kung saan PA ang pangunahing oryentasyong pampilosopiko.

4 Schwartz, A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy, 2.
5 Walang layunin ang sanaysay na ito na ipakita mas mahusay ang PA kay sa mga ibang tradisyong pampilosopiko.
Heograpiya at Impluwensya ng PA

Madaling matutukoy ang impluwensya ng PA sa mga departamento ng pilosopiya sa mga pangunahing pamantasang kung saan yumabong (at patuloy na yumayabong) ang mga kaisipan at metodolohiya ng PA. Pangunahin sa mga kabilang dito ay ang mga nangungunang pamantasang sa mga bansang Inglatera, Amerika, at Australia—lalaki na doon sa mga pamantasang kung saan nagturo ang mga unang nagsulon ng PA at (nagtuturo) ang mga mainluwensyang pilosopong analitiko. Sa kalaunan, ang impluwensya ng PA ay lumagapan din sa mga iba pang bansa at naging pangunahing oryentasyong pampilosopiko ng mga departamento ng pilosopiya ng mga ilang pamantasang sa mga bansang ito. Kabilang dito ang mga ilang bansa sa Europeo tulad ng Alemanya at Pransya—kung saan malakas din ang impluwensya ng pilosopiyang kontinental. Ika nga ni Schwartz: “Interest and participation in analytic philosophy has increased dramatically in Continental Europe and Scandinavia the past few decades.”

Ang impluwensya ng PA ay lumalakas na rin sa Asya tulad ng mga bansang Singapore, Hapon, Hong Kong, at Tsina. Ang isa pang konkretong tanda ng malawak na impluwensya ng PA ay ang pagdami ng mga pang-akademikong samahan o asosasyon na nagsusulong sa pilosopiyang ito. Ang ilan sa mga ito, na tinukoy ni Beaney, ay ang mga sumusunod:

In Europe there are societies for analytic philosophy in Austria (WFAP, founded 2009), Croatia (CSAP, founded 2001), France (SoPhA, founded 1993), Germany (GAP, founded 1990, with around 900 members, claiming to be one of the biggest philosophical societies in Europe), Italy (SIFA, founded 1992, with over 400 members), the Netherlands (and Flemish-speaking Belgium; VAF, founded 2006), Portugal (SPFA, founded 2004), Romania (SRFA, founded 2007), Slovenia (DAF, founded 1991), and Spain (SEFA, founded 1995, with some 100 members) … European Society for

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6 Naririyan, halimbawa, ang Oxford University at Cambridge University sa Inglatera; New York University, Harvard University, at UCLA-Berkeley sa Amerika; at Australian National University sa Australia, bukod sa mga iba pa.
7 Schwartz, A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls, 4.
8 Kasalukuyang malakas, halimbawa, ang PA sa mga departamento ng pilosopiya ng National University of Singapore, Hongkong University, Peking University, at Tokyo University. Dito sa ating bansa, unang isinulong ang PA sa Unibersidad ng Pilipinas sa Diliman. Sa kasalukuyan, ito ay isinulong din, kasabay ng ibang mga tradisyong pampilosopiko, sa Pamantasang De La Salle sa Maynila.
Analytic Philosophy (ESAP, founded 1991)... Analytic philosophy has been strong in the Nordic countries since the early twentieth century ... Poland and Austria, too, boast a proud history of analytic philosophy ....

In Latin America, there are societies in Argentina (SADAF, founded 1972, with over 200 members), Brazil (SBFA, founded 2008, with over 50 members), Chile (SCFA, founded 2007, with some 20 members), and Peru (CESFIA, founded 2006), with Mexico hosting the Asociación Latinoamericana de Filosofía Analítica (ALFAAn, founded 2006, with over 120 members)...

In Japan, analytic philosophy is promoted through such societies as the Association for Philosophy of Science and the Association for the Study of American Philosophy... In China, there is a Center for Analytical Philosophy (founded 2003) in the Institute of Foreign Philosophy at Peking University, as well as a Society for Analytic Philosophy (founded 2005) ....

There are also related societies such as the Institut Wiener Kreis (founded 1991), devoted to the study and further development of the work of the original Vienna Circle, the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society (HEAPS, founded 2003, with over 60 members), and the Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy (SSHAP, founded 2009) ... Bertrand Russell Society (BRS, founded 1974, with some 100 members) and Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (ALWS, founded 1974, with around 120 members), and the newer British Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (BWS, founded 2007, with over 300 members), Internationale Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft (formerly the Deutsche Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft, founded 1994, becoming the ILWG in 2006), Nordic Network for Wittgenstein Research (NNWR, founded 2006, with over 110 members), and North American Wittgenstein Society (NAWS, founded 2000).10

Impluwensya ng PA sa mga Usaping Pilosopiko

Ang impluwensya ng PA ay makikita sa karamihan, kung hindi man sa lahat, ng mga sangay ng pilosopiya at sa maraming tema ng usaping pampilosopiko.11

1. Mga sangay ng pilosopiya kung saan dominante ang PA

Sa mga sangay ng pilosopiya kung saan dominante ang PA, maihahanay ang pilosopiya ng wika, pilosopiya ng isip (o kamalayan), lohika, pilosopiya ng agham, pilosopiya ng batas, pilosopiya ng matematika, at pilosopiya ng kilos.


11 Beaney, “What is Analytic Philosophy?” 7-12.
Kalimitang inuuri ang lohika sa dalawang yugto ng pag-unlad nito: ang lohika ni Aristotle at ang modernong (simbolikong o matematikong) lohika. Ang modernong lohika ay bunga ng mga pag-aaral at pagsusuring ginawa sa lohika, kaunghay ng pilosopiya ng matematika, ng mga pilosopong analitiko na kinabibilangan sina Frege, Russell (at Whitehead), Wittgenstein, Quine, Carnap, at Copi. Bagamat tinuturo pa rin ang lohika ni Aristotle, laluna sa mga seminaryo, dumagsan ang pagtuturo ng modernong lohika dahil ito, bukod sa bahagi ng mga pag-aaral sa matematika (sa set theory), ay ang pundasyon ng mga “wika” ng kompyuter. Kaya, ang nag-aaral ng modernong lohika ngayon ay hindi na lamang mga mag-aaral ng pilosopiya kundi mga mag-aaral din ng matematika at kompyuter—isyang konkretong patunay din sa impluwensya ng PA sa labas ng disiplina ng pilosopiya.

Ang mga pananaliksik sa pilosopiya ng agham at pilosopiya ng matematika ay hindi nakapagtatagakang pinangunguhang ng mga pilosopong analitiko dahil sa malapit na kaunghayan ng PA sa mga disiplina. Sa pilosopiya ng agham, naririyan ang mga analitikong pilosopo tulad ng mga logical positivists (Schlick, Carnap, Reichenbach, Hans Hahn, at iba pa), Hempel, Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos, at Kuhn, bukod sa mga iba pa. Sa pilosopiya ng matematika, naririyan sina Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Turing, Gödel, Putnam, Quine, at marami pang iba. Ang pilosopiya ng mga batas at pilosopiya ng kilos ay analitiko rin ang pangunahing pilosopiyang oryentasyon. Ang mga pangunahing posisyon na nagtutunggali sa mga usapin dito ay mga pananaw ng mga pilosopong analitiko. Sa pilosopiya ng mga batas (philosophy of law), naririyan ang mga pananaw nina Austin, Raz, Dworkin, at Hart, bukod sa mga iba pa.15 At sa pilosopiya ng mga kilos (philosophy of action), naririyan naman ang mga pananaw nina Anscombe, Davidson, Searle, Chisolm, Frankfurt, Dancy, Goldman, at iba pa.16

2. Mga usaping pilosopiko kung saan dominante ang PA

Bagamat hindi PA ang pangkalahatang oryentasyong pampilosopiko sa mga ilang sangay ng pilosopiya, ang mga ito naman ay tumatalakay sa mga tema na PA ang pangunahing pamamaraan ng pamilosopiko. Sa partikular, ang mga pangunahing nagtutunggaling pananaw sa mga tema ito ay isinulong ng mga pilosopikong analitiko. Sa larangan ng metaetika,
Naririyan ang mga pananaw ng emotivism nina Ayer at Stevenson, intuitionism ni Moore, error theory ni Mackie, at prescriptivism ni Hare, bukod sa mga iba.17 Sa larangan ng normatibong etika, naririyan ang mga ilang modernong bersyon ng birtudismo (virtue ethics) na isinulong ng mga pilosopong analitiko tulad nina Anscombe, Foot, at MacIntyre. Naririyan din ang mga modernong pananaw sa tema ng utilitarianismo na isinulong ng mga analitikong pilosopo, tulad ng act utilitarianism ni Smart, rule utilitarianism ni Brandt, ideal utilitarianism ni Moore, at preference utilitarianism nina Hare at Singer. Naririyan din ang mga modernong bersyon ng deontolohiya tulad ng prinsipiyo ng side constraints ni Nozick at contractarianism ni Rawls. At naririyan din ang malakas na impluwensya ng mga pilosopikong analitiko sa iba’t ibang larangan ng praktikong etika (practical/applied ethics): sa etikang pangnegosyo, naririyan ang malakas na impluwensya nina Velasquez, Petit, De George, French, at iba pa; at sa bioetika at etikang pangkapaligiran, naririyan ang malakas na impluwensya ni Singer. Ang larangan ng etikang pangkompuyuter at pangmakina ay dinodimana ng mga pilosopong analitiko18 dahil ito ay natural na ekstensyon ng mga usapin sa posibilidad ng talinong artipisyal (sa pilosopiya ng isip) na dinodimana ng mga pilosopikong analitiko.

Sa larangan ng modernong epistemolohiya, naririyan ang usapin, bukod sa mga iba pa, sa mga kondisyon ng kaalaman na pinsasigla ni Gettier nang sinuri at pinakita niya ang kahinaan ng nakagawang pag-unawa sa kalikasan ng kaalaman bilang napatunayang totoo ng paniniwalan. Sa larangan ng pilosopiyang panlipunan’t pampulitika, naririyan ang usapin tungkol sa katarungang pangdistribusyon (distributive justice) na pinangungunahan ng mga pilosopong analitiko tulad nina Rawls, Feinberg, Nozick, Dworkin, at Sen.19 Sa larangan ng modernong metapisika, naririyan ang mga usapin tungkol sa pansariling identidad (personal identity) na pinangungunahan nina Parfit, Shoemaker, Chisholm, at David Lewis, bukod sa mga iba pa; sa meta-metapisika na pinangungunahan nina Carnap, Chalmers, Armstrong, Sider, at iba pa; at sa mga posible mundo (possible worlds) na pinangungunahan nina Lewis, Carnap, Hintikka, at iba pa.20 Ang pilosopiya ng relihiyon ay may mga tema rin kung saan man sa pilosopong analitiko ang mga nangunguna sa mga pagsusuri. Naririyan, halimbawa, ang mga pagsusuring ginawa nina Wisdom, Mackie, Plantinga, at Philips, sa pag-

Impluwensya ng PA sa labas ng Pilosopiya

Ang impluwensya ng PA ay umaabot din sa labas ng disiplina ng pilosopiya. Ito ay makikita sa mga ilang ibang disiplina kung saan may mahahalagang kontribusyon ang PA o ang mga ilang pilosopong analitiko sa partikular. Makikita, halimbawa, sa disiplina ng lingguistik ang impluwensya ng mga teorya ng kahulugan nina Austin at Searle (ang kanilang speech act theory) at Chomsky (teorya na generative grammar). Makikita sa disiplina ng agham pangkompyuter (computer science) ang mahahalagang gamit ng simbolikong lohika at ang mga pampundasyong kaisipang inilatag ni Turing (ang tinaguriang ama ng agham na ito) para sa direksyon ng pananaliksik sa agham na ito—at ang sangay nito na agham ng talinong pangmakina (artificial intelligence). Sa disiplina ng matematika, nariiran ang mga mahahalagang ambag ng mga pilosopong analitiko: bukod sa mga iba pa, ang simbolikong lohika, ang set theory ni Russell, ang incompleteness theorem ni Gödel, ang Church-Turing thesis nina Church at Turing, ang mga teorya sa probabilidad nina Ramsey, Carnap, Hajek, at iba pa, at ang kontribusyon ni Putnam sa solusyon ng problema tungkol sa Diophantine equations. Sa disiplina ng ekonomiks, nariiran ang teorya ng bounded rationality ni Simon at ang kanyang kontribusyon sa game theory—siya rin (kasama si Newell) ay binigyan ng parangal sa larangan ng artificial intelligence para sa kanilang mga ginawang “logic program.” Ang premyadong ekonomistang si Keynes, na naging mag-aaral na Whitehead gaya ni Russell, ay naimpluwensyahan din ng kanyang mga kasama sa Pamantasang na Cambridge na sina Russell, Ramsey, at Wittgenstei. Nariiran din ang mga kontribusyon ng behaviorism (bunga ng impluwensya ng mga logical positivists sa disiplina ng sikolohiya), evolutionary psychology (na isinulong ni Pinker), at computationalism (na isinulong nina Fodor, Pylyshyn, Smolensky, Simon, at iba pa) sa larangan ng sikolohiya.

Makikita rin ang impluwensya ng PA sa kaisipan ng premyadong pisista at matematiko na si Roger Penrose na pumasok na rin sa mga usapin sa pilosopiya ng isip. Ganun din ang naging impluwensya ng mga kaisipan ni Wittgenstein sa mga miyembro ng Vienna Circle (ang mga tinaguriang logical positivists), na mga daluhbasa sa mga iba’t ibang larangan ng kaalaman.

bago pumasok sa mundo ng pilosopiya: tulad ng pisistang sina Schlick (na naging estudyante ni Max Plank), Reichenbach, at Carnap, ang matematikong sina Hahn at Gödel, at ang sosyolohista at ekonomista na si Neurath (si Albert Einstein ay naiulat na dumalo rin sa mga ilang pagpupulong ng Vienna Circle).

II. Pagbabakas sa Kasaysayan ng PA

Babakasin natin ang kasaysayan ng PA sa dalawang pamamaraan: una, sa aspekto ng mga katangiang karaniwang inuugnay sa PA; ikalawa, sa aspekto ng identidad ng PA bilang isang natatanging tradisyonang pampilosopiya. Sa unang pamamaraan, makikita ang malalim na pagkakaugat ng PA sa kasaysayan ng pilosopiya; sa ikalawa, makikita naman ang mga bagong direksyon na binuksan ng PA para sa disiplina ng pilosopiya. Sa pamamagitan nito, malilinaw ang mga layunin at motibasyon ng PA at ang natatanging identidad nito bilang isang uri ng pilosopiya. Ika nga ni Beaney: "In the end, the only way to answer the question 'What is analytic philosophy?' is to provide a history of the analytic tradition."22

Pag-uugat sa mga Katangian ng PA

Sa mga katangiang karaniwang inuugnay sa PA, anim ang katangian-tangi: (1) may malapit na kaugnayan sa agham at matematika; (2) binibigyang-halaga ang malinaw na paggamit ng mga salita; (3) mahilig magkategorya ng mga konsepto; (4) ma-argumento ang pamamaraan ng pamimilosopiya; at (5) malimit gumamit ng mga eksperimentong pang-isip.

May tatlong dahilan kung bakit sinasabing may malapit na kaugnayan ang PA sa agham. Una, dahil siyentipiko ang pamamaraan ng pagsususing ginagawa sa pilosopiyang ito; at ito, sa partikular, ay tumutukoy sa pamamaraang lohikal na pangangatwiran. Ikalawa, dahil sa isa sa mga pangunahing siinusuri ng PA ay ang mga pundasyon ng mga agham. At ikatlo, dahil ang metapisikang isinusulong nito ay yaong naaayon sa mga natutuklasang kaalaman sa agham. Ang malapit na ugnayan ng PA sa agham ay maugat sa nauna nang ugnayan ng pilosopiya sa agham. Hindi ba ang mga sinaunang pilosopong Griyego, ang mga tinatawag na mga pre-Socratics, ay itinuturing din na mga naunang mga siyentista? Hindi ba ang pilosopiya ay tinatawag kung minsan na reyna ng mga agham (queen of the sciences) bilang pagkilala na ito ang batis o pinagmulan ng iba’t ibang agham? At kaugnay nito, hindi rin ba na ang mga pagsusuri sa kalikasan ay unang tinawag na pilosopiyang pangkalikasan (natural philosophy)—kung kaya nga si

Newton, noong panahon niya, ay tinawag na isang pilosopong pangkalikasan (natural philosopher).

Ang isang dahilan kung bakit sinasabing malapit na ugnayan ang PA sa matematika ay ang mga naunang mga pilosopong nagsulong ng PA ay unang naging abala sa pagsusuporta ng pandasyon ng matematika (Frege, Russell, at Wittgenstein), na nagbigay-daan sa pag-usbong ng simbolikong lohika at pilosopiya ng wika.23 Saan naman natin maiuugat ang ugnayang ito sa kasaysayan ng pilosopiya? Hindi ba ang mga tinaguriang “rationalists” sa modernong pilosopiya, na kinabibilangan sina Descartes, Leibniz, at Spinoza ay mga matematiko rin? Ang mga pilosopong ito, sa katunayan, ay sinubukang gamitin ang mga pamamaraan ng pangangatwiran sa matematika sa pamimilosopiya. Hindi ba ang methodical doubt ni Descartes ay hango sa pangangatwiran sa heometrya? Hindi ba si Leibniz ay isa sa mga itinuturing na ama ng calculus (ang isa pang ama ay si Newton)? At hindi ba ginamit din ni Spinoza ang heometrya sa kanyang pamimilosopiya tungkol sa etika at metapisika (sa katunayan, ang pamagat ng kanyang aklat ay Ethics Geometrically Demonstrated)? Sa panahon ng mga sinaunang Griyego, inilagay ni Plato ang matematika kasunod ng pilosopiya sa kanyang herarkiya ng mga disiplina. At hindi ba ang unang gumamit ng salitang “pilosopo” bilang nagnanahal sa karungungan, na si Pythagoras, ay tinatawag sa kasalukuyang panahon bilang isang matematiko?

Ang isa pang katangiang karaniwang inuugnay sa PA ay ang kahuligan nito sa pagpapalinaw sa mga kahuligan ng mga salita at pagsusuporta ng mga argumento. Saan ba nagsimula ang mga kahuligan ito sa pilosopiya? Ang pagsusuporta ng wika, kung paano nagkakaroon ng mga kahuligan ang mga salita, ay matagal nang ginagawa sa pilosopiya, at hindi unang ginawa sa PA. Matatandaang si Plato ay una nang may mga pagsusuring ginawa sa wika. Ayon nga kay Ryle (sa pagpapaliwanag ni Gaskin): “Plato’s interests in his later dialogues, and in particular in the Parmenides, the Theaetetus, and the Sophist, coincided significantly with those of the founding fathers of modern analytic philosophy.”24 Ang mga pilosopong tulad nina Locke at Mill ay may mahahalaga ring kontribusyon dito. Ang kahuligan ng mga panlahatang salita (general terms) ay mainit na pinagtalunan ng mga ilang pilosopo noong panahong medyebal. At hindi rin mapagkakaila ang mga mahahalagang kaisipan tungkol sa wika mula sa mga pilosopo sa pilosopiyang Kontinental (tulad nina Saussure, Gadamer, at Derrida).

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Karaniwang inuugnay sa PA ang kahiligang gumawa ng mga klasipikasyon, o ng mga kategorisasyon, ng mga konsepto. Ang mga pilosopoong analitiko ba ang nauna sa ganitong pamimilosopiya? Hindi ba si Aristotle ang tinaguriang “the great organizer” sa kasaysayan ng pilosopiya? Ang paniwala ni Aristotle ay ang mundo ay may maayos na disenyo at nais niyang palabasin ito sa pamamagitan ng pagtukoy sa mga klasipikasyon ng mga bagay-bagay. Ang ilan sa mga tanyag na klasipikasyon na kanyang ipinakilala ay ang mga uri ng sanhi, uri ng mga pamahalaan, uri ng literatura, uri ng kaluluwa, uri ng argumento, at ang mga biyoholikal na uri ng mga organismo.

Ang ma-argumentong pamamaraan ng ng pilosopiya naman ay malinaw na ginagamit ng mga argumentong nasa anyo ng eksperimentong pang-isip (ang tinatawag na thought experiment). Ang mga halimbawa ng gitong argumento ay nakataong sa pilosopiya ng isip, tulad ng mga tinatawag na Turing test, Chinese room argument, Mary the neuroscientist, China brain argument, at inverted qualia argument. Sa pilosopiya ng wika, naririyan, halimbawa, ang beetle argument ni Wittgenstein. Ang paggamit ng gitong pamamaraan ng pangangatwiran, subalit, ay hindi natatangi sa PA. Ito ay matagal nang ginagawa sa pilosopiya at ginagawa rin sa mga ibang tradisyong pilosopiko. Sa katunayan, ito ay ginagawa sa agham, lalung-lalo na sa larangan ng pisika (ang isang halimbawa ay ang tinaguriang Schrodinger’s cat sa larangan ng quantum mechanics). Sa kasaysayan ng pilosopiya, ang mga halimbawa ay ang mga sumusunod: ang mga kabalintunaan (paradox) ni Zeno, ang allegory of the cave ni Plato, ang tinatawag na state of nature ng mga social contractarians sa pilosopiyang panlipuna’t pampulitika, at ang original position ni Rawls, at ang mito ni Sisyphus ni Camus.

Makikita natin na ang mga katangian malimit na inuugnay sa PA ay malalim na nakaugat sa mga pananaw at pamamaraan ng pilosopiya na nakakating isinulong o ginamit na ng mga naunang pilosopo. Ang nagbibigay ng kakaibang identidad sa PA ay ang pagkakasama-sama ng mga katangian ito sa isang pamamaraan. Kaunay nito, ating talakayin ang pananaw ni Føllesdal na ipinapalagay na ang PA ay tumutukoy lamang sa ma-argumentong pamamaraan ng pilosopiya kung kaya sinumang
pilosopo ang gumagamit ng ganitong pamamaraan ng pamimilosopiya ay isang pilosopong analitiko. Pahayag ni Føllesdal:

*One can be an analytic philosopher and also a phenomenologist, existentialist, hermeneuticist, Thomist, etc. Whether one is an analytic philosopher depends on what importance one ascribes to argument and justification. There are, for example, phenomenologists who are more analytic, and others who are less. In the same vein, we can classify philosophers from all eras of the subject’s history. Thus, Thomas Aquinas is one of the most analytical Thomists. And Aristotle, Descartes, as well as a large number of other truly great philosophers are analytic philosophers.*

Sa pagsasaalang-alang ng ganitong pananaw, maaari tayong gumawa ng pagkakaiba sa dalawang pakahulugan sa PA: ang **limitadong pakahulugan** at ang **komprehensibong pakahulugan**. Ang limitadong pakahulugan ay ang pakahulugang ipinapalagay ni Føllesdal, kung saan isang katangian lamang ang PA at wala itong natatanging identidad bilang isang tradisyong pamilosopiko. Ang komprehensibong pakahulugan naman, na siyang ating isinusulong, ay ipinapalagay na ang PA ay binubuo ng isang lupon ng mga katangian (kung saan isa lamang ang ma-argumentong pamamaraan ng pamimilosopiya) at may natatanging identidad ito bilang isang tradisyong pamilosopiko. Kung para kay Føllesdal, ang isang Thomist ay maaaring maging isang pilosopong analitiko; para sa atin ang isang Thomist ay maaaring magtaglay ng aspeto ng pagiging isang pilosopong analitiko—ganun din ang isang pilosopong analitiko na maaaring magtaglay ng aspeto ng pagiging Thomist (tulad, halimbawa, nina Anscombe at Kenny, na mga pilosopong analitiko na mga Thomists din). Ngayon, ang kakaibang pataglay ng PA sa mga katangian ito (halimbawa, ang kakaiba sa pagusuri nito sa wika at pagkaka-ugnay nito sa agham at matematika) ay mas makikita sa mga kaganapang nagbigay-daang sa pag-usbong at pagyabong nito, na ating tatalakayin sa susunod.

**Ang PA bilang isang Tradisyong Pamilosopiko**

Ang PA bilang isang tradisyong pamilosopiko ay nagsimula noong patapos na bahagi ng ika-19 na siglo o simula ng bahagi ng ika-20 na siglo at nagpapatuloy sa kasalukuyang panahon. Ang pananalitang “analytic

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Sa mga pangyayaring itinuturing na kritikal sa pag-usbong ng PA, dalawa ang kalimitang itinatangi: una, ang tinatawag na ‘pagbaling sa wika’ (*linguistic turn*); ikalawa, ang tinatawag na ‘rebelyon laban sa Hegelyanismo.’ Bukod sa mga ito, ang isa pang pangayari, ang pag-unlad ng komputer ay kritikal din sa pagyabong ng PA sa larangan ng pilosopiya ng isip—ang dominanteng sangay ng pilosopiya sa tradisyong PA sa kasalukuyan.

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27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.

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Ang Pagbaling sa Wika

Ayon kay Hacker, ang pananalitang “linguistic turn” ay unang ginamit ni Gustav Bergman, na isang miyembro ng logical positivism, sa kanyang pagsusuri sa akda ni Strawson na pinamagatang Individuals noong 1960. Ito ay ginamit din ni Richard Rorty bilang pamagat ng kanyang antolohiya (The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method) ng mga piling sulatin ng mga pilosopong analitiko noong 1967. Ang pagbaling sa wika ay isang kritikal na kaganapan o yugto sa kasaysayan ng PA. Ika nga ni Dummett, isang dalubhasa sa pilosopiya ni Frege: “... analytical philosophy was born when the ‘linguistic turn’ was taken.”29 Ang mga kontemporaryong pilosopong analitiko, subalit, ay may konting pagtatalo sa kung sino talaga ang nanguna sa kaganapan ng pagbaling sa wika. Para kay Dummett, ito ay pinangunahan ni Frege sa kanyang aklat na Die Grundlagen der Arithmetic (Foundations of Arithmetic).30

Para kay Hacker, na isa namang dalubhasa sa pilosopiya ni Wittgenstein, ang pagbaling sa wika ay naging na formal na pinangunahan ni Wittgenstein sa kanyang Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Sabi ni Hacker “‘All philosophy’, Wittgenstein wrote, ‘is a “critique” of language.’ This remark heralds the linguistic turn in twentieth-century philosophy.”31 Ayon kay Hacker, bagamat si Frege nga ang nauna sa pagbaling sa wika, ginawa ito ni Frege sa konteksto lamang ng kanyang pagsisiyasat sa pandasyon ng matematika. Ang pagbaling sa wika ni Wittgenstein ay naganap sa konteksto ng pagbaling sa mga tradisyonal na mga problema sa pilosopiya. Kung ang pagbaling sa wika ni Frege ay kaugnay lamang ng pilosopiya ng matematika, ang pagbaling sa wika ni Wittgenstein ay kaugnay ng pilosopiya sa kabuuan. Mapapansing parehong tama sina Dummett at Hacker, nagkaiba lamang sila sa konteksto ng pansaalam-alang sa naturang kaganapan. Tama si Dummett na si Frege nga talaga ang nauna ngunit sa konteksto lamang ng pilosopiya ng matematika; at tama rin si Hacker na si Wittgenstein ang nauna sa konteksto ng pilosopiya sa pangkalahatan.

Sa kabilang banda, hindi rin maipagkakaila ang mga mahahalagang kontribusyon sa pangyayaring ito sina Russell at Moore, na nauna pa kay Wittgenstein at halos kasabayan ni Frege. Ang “theory of definite descriptions” ni Russell ay, sa katunayan, isa na ring pagbaling sa wika, sa konteksto ng lohika at metapisika. Gayun din ang pamamaraan ng pagsusuri ni Moore sa

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33 Ibid., 14.
mga problemang pilosopiko sa mga larangan naman ng metapisika at etika (ang kanyang tanyag na naturalistic fallacy at views of common sense). Sa mga konsiderasyong ito, mainam na sabihin na ang pagbaling sa wika na nagbigay-daan sa pag-usbong ng PA ay sinimulan, sa iba’t ibang kaparaanan, nina Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, at Moore.

Subalit, ano ba itong kaganapang pagbaling sa wika? Sa paliwanan ni Dummett, “What distinguishes analytical philosophy, in its diverse manifestations, from other schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so attained.” Ayon kay Dummett, ang pagbaling sa wika ay ang paglalim sa pinagmamahalang pagbaling sa wika na nagbibigay-daan sa pag-usbong ng PA. Maaalala na ang mga sinaunang pilosopo ay sinusuri ang mga bagay sa mundo sa pamamagitan ng direktong pagsusuri ng mga katangian ng mga bagay na ito. Pagdating ng modernong panahon ng kasaysayan ng pilosopiya na pinangungunahan ni Descartes, nagkaroon ng ‘pagbaling sa kaisipan,’ kung saan ang pagbaling sa wika ay ginawa sa pamamagitan ng pagsusuri ng mga kaisipan tungkol sa mga bagay na ito. Ang pagbaling sa wika, sa kontekstong ito, ay isang pagbaling mula sa diskurso ng mga kaisipan tungo sa diskurso ng wika sa pagbaling sa kaisipan sa kalikasan ng mundo o ng mga bagay na umiiral dito.

Ang pagbaling sa wika ay nagbunla sa pag-usbong ng pilosopiya ng wika bilang isang natatanging sangay ng pilosopiya. Kaugnay nito, nagalam ang ‘pagbaling sa wika’ sa dalawang direksyon, na humantong sa dalawang tradisyong loob ng pilosopiya ng wika: ang una ay humantong sa tinatawag na ‘pilosopiyang pangwikang-ideyal’ (“ideal language philosophy”); at ang ikalawa ay humantong sa ‘pilosopiyang pangwikang-ordinaryo’ (“ordinary language philosophy”). Nakatuon ang unang direksyon sa ugnayan ng wika at mundo (o ng ugnayan ng mga pananalita sa mga pangyayari sa mundo); samantala nakatuon naman ang ikalawang direksyon sa ugnayan ng mga taong gumagamit ng wika at ng wika (o ng ugnayan ng mga pananalita sa mga intensyon, kaisipan, at kasunduan ng mga tao).

Ang kaganapang pagbaling sa wika sa unang direksyon ay pinangungunahin ni Frege, at unang sinundan at pinalakas nina Russell at Wittgenstein. Ang pagbaling sa wika sa kontekstong ito ay nangyari dahil sa paniniwalang makikita o matatagpuan sa wika ang estruktura ng mundo. Ang punto ay ang lohikal na estruktura ng wika ay sinasalamin ang estruktura ng mundo, kung saan hango ang mga batas na lohika, na siya namang pinaniniwalaang batayan ng matematika. Ating bigyan ng karagdagang paliwanag ito sa mga sumusunod.

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Ang Platonismo ay mga iba’t ibang bersyon. Ang isang bersyon ay ang tinatawag na logisismo, na siyang isinusulong nina Frege, Russell, at Wittgenstein. Ayon sa logisimo, ang mga batas ng matematika ay hango sa mga batas ng lohika, na hango naman sa estruktura ng mundo. Ang mga batas ng lohika ay malalaman sa pagsusuri ng lohikal (kaiba sa gramatikal) na estruktura ng wika; kung kaya para malaman ang mga batas ng lohika, kailangang siyasiatin ang lohikal na estruktura ng wika. Ito, sa pangkalahatan, ang pagbaling sa wika na naganap sa usaping ito.

Ang logisismo ni Frege ay isang reaksyon sa isa pang uri ng Platonismo, ang tinatawag sa sikolohismo. Ayon naman sa sikolohismo, malalaman natin ang estruktura ng mundo sa pamamagitan ng pagisasayat sa estruktura ng ating isip. Ang isang unang tagapagsulong ng sikolohismo ay si Edmund Husserl, ang tinaguriang ama ng penomenolohiya. Subalit nang batikusin ni Frege ang sikolohismo (sa punto na ito ay mauuwi sa pagkasubhektibismo ng matematika), si Husserl di-umano’y nakumbinsi at naging isang kritiko rin, tulad ni Frege, ng sikolohismo. Subalit si Husserl ay hindi bumaling sa wika tulad ni Frege. Si Husserl ay nanatili sa discurso ng kaisipan at kamalayan, ngunit para maiwasan ang subhektibismo bumuo siya ng isang metodolohiya na tinawag niyang penomenolohiya (kung saan hiniiwalay ang mga subhektibong elemento na kamalayan sa mga obhektibong elemento nito).

Ang pagbaling sa wika naman na pinangunahan ni G.E. Moore, na sinundan nina Wittgenstein, Austin, at Searle, ay nangyari sa konteksto mismo ng pilosopiya sa pangkalahatan. Sa kontekstong ito, ang pagbaling sa wika ay isang pagbabago sa pamamaraan ng pagtuklas ng katotohanan. Kung sa unang direksyon ang sinusuri ay ang lohikal na estruktura ng wika at ang ugnayan ng wika sa mundo; sa ikalawang direksyon ang sinusuri ay

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**Ang Rebelyon laban sa Hegelianismo**

Noong ika-19 na siglo, malakas ang naging impluwensya ng Hegelianismo sa mundo ng pilosopiya. Sa katunayan, ang pag-usbong ng mga pangunahing kontemporaryong tradisyong pampilosopiko ay maipapakita bilang mga iba’t ibang reaksyon sa Hegelianismo. Halimbawa, ang dialektikong materialismo ng Marksismo ay isang reaksyon sa Hegelianismong pananaw na ang mga pangyayari sa kasaysayan ay bunga ng mga pangyayari sa kamalayan. Ang subhektibong at pang-indibidwal na katotohanan na isinulong ng eksistensyalismong pilosopiya ni Kierkegaard ay isang reaksyon sa obhektibong at pangkolektibong katotohan ng Hegelianismo. Ang pragmatismo ni William James ay isang reaksyon sa absolutismong metapsika ng Hegelianismo. At ang mga analitikong metapsika nina Russell at Moore ay mga reaksyon sa idealismong metapsika ng Hegelianismo—na isinulong ng kanilang mga guro at kasamahang nagtuturo na sina McTaggart at Bradley.


Parehong ginawa nina Russell at Moore ang kanilang mga pagsusuri sa metapsika sa masusing pagsasaalang-alang sa wika—sa wika ng lohika at agham para kay Russell at sa wika ng karaniwang kaalaman para kay Moore. Sa halip na talakayin nila ng direktong ang mga bagay sa mundo, ang kanilang

Ang Pag-unlad ng Kompyuter

Ang pag-unlad ng teknolohiya ng kompyuter at pag-unlad ng teknolohiya ng kompyuter ay nagbigay ng panibagong direksyon sa PA. Sa partikular, ito ay nagbigay-daan sa pag-unlad ng pagyabong ng larangan ng pilosopiya ng isip. Ang nakamamangha dito ay ang taong nagbigay-daan sa pag-unlad ng teknolohiya ng kompyuter ay si Alan Turing (na isa ring bayani noong Ikalawang Pandaigdigang Digmaan). Ang isa pang nakamamangha ay si Kurt Gödel, at Turing ay paggaling sa pagsasuri ng mga pampundasyong katanungan sa matematika. Subalit kung sina Frege, Russell, at Wittgenstein ay nakatuon sa mga katanungan tungkol sa teknolohiya ng kompyuter at metapisika ng mga numero at batas pang-matematika, si Turing naman, kasama si Kurt Gödel, ay nakatuon sa mga katanungan tungkol sa matematika at katalian sa sistema pang-sistema ng matematika: ang pagiging pagkakamakalain (consistent), kompleto (complete), at natitikyak (decidable) ng sistemang ito.

Si Turing ay tumutok sa katanungan hinggil sa pagkakamakalain ng sistema ng matematika, kung saan naging hamon sa kanya ang sagutin ang kaugnay na tanong ng matematikong si David Hilbert na: mayroon bang epektibong pamamaraan para malaman kung masasagot ang anumang problema matematiko? Sinagot ito ni Turing sa pamamagitan nang inisip niyang makinang nagkakalkula, na naging batay sa kalaunan ng pangkalahatang disensyo (blueprint) ng digital na kompyuter.36 Pagkatapos nito, inusisa ni

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Turing kung maituturing na intelihente ang isang makinang nagkakalkula; at ang kanyang pamamaraan ng pagtugon sa katanungang ito (ang tinaguring Turing test) ay nagbigay-daan sa pagtataguyod ng agham pangkompyuter (computer science at ang sangay nitong agham ng artificial intelligence) at ng pamimilosopiya tungkol dito (sa multi-disciplinaryong larangan ng cognitive science). Tuluyang umunlad at naitaguyod ang pilosopiya ng isip ning gumawa ng mga pagsusuri ang mga sumunod na pilosopong analitiko sa mga palagay ng mga siyentista sa larangang ito, lalung-lalo na tungkol sa di-umano’y kalikasan ng isip ng tao bilang isang sopistikadong kompyuter. Ang usaping ito ay patuloy na lumalaganap sa loob at labas ng akademya (sa larangan ng mga pelikula, pansinin, halimbawa, ang karaniwang tema ng mga kontemporaryong pelikulang sci-fi).

Konkluyson

Makikita ang kahalagahan ng PA sa malawak at malalim na impluwensya at ambag nito sa pag-unlad ng mga usapan sa pilosopiya at sa iba pang mga larangan ng karunungan. Sa loob ng disiplina ng pilosopiya, ang impluwensyang ito ay makikita sa dami ng mga departamento ng pilosopiya at samahan na nagsusulong nito, at sa dami ng mga sangay ng pilosopiya at temang pilosopiko kung saan ito ang pangunahing oryentasyong pampilosopiko. Sa labas naman ng disiplina ng pilosopiya, makikita ang impluwensyang ito sa bilang ng mga ibang disiplina kung saan ang mga teorya at kaisipan ng mga pilosopong analitiko ay nagsisilbing mga perspektibo. Makikita naman ang mga layunin at motibasyon ng PA sa kasaysayan nito. Ang mga katangiang bumubuo dito at ang mga pangyayaring nagbibigay-daan sa pag-usbong at pagyabong nito ay malalim na nakaugat sa kasaysayan ng pilosopiya. Ang mga katangian at pangyayaring ito ang siyang nagbibigay ng natatanging identidad sa PA bilang isang tradisyong pampilosopiko. Ang identidad na ito, subalit, ay patuloy na lumalawak sa takbo ng panahon; at ito ay dala ng katangian nitong isaalang-alang ang mga bagong kaalamang natutuklasan, napatutunan, at patuloy na sinaaliksik na iba’t ibang larangan ng kaalaman, lalung-lalo na sa agham at matematika.

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A Humboldtian Critique of the University of the Philippines as the Flagship of Philippine Higher Education (Part II)

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Abstract: For the Philippines to benefit from the ASEAN integration and globalization, in general, it must be able to mould highly educated citizens who can proactively engage themselves with the national, regional and international knowledge economies. The Philippines has nine research universities that presumably lead its approximately 2,500 higher educational institutions in moulding these needed citizens. These nine research universities are the eight autonomous constituent units of the University of the Philippines and De La Salle University. The idea of the modern research university was invented more than 200 years ago in Berlin by the philosopher, linguist, humanist and statesman Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835). Around 1850, American educational leaders started to appropriate Humboldt’s ideas to establish the American research universities. As the University of the Philippines is an American creation and at the same time the flagship institution of Philippine higher education, this paper used the Humboldtian philosophy of education as well as its American rendition in looking at the soundness of this university’s claim to as a research university. To attain this goal, this paper has three substantive sections: 1) a discussion on Humboldt’s philosophy of education, 2) a discussion on the American translation of Humboldt’s philosophy of education, 3) a critique of the foundational principles of the University of the Philippines as a research university.

Keywords: Wilhelm von Humboldt, Humboldtian Research University, American Research University, University of the Philippines, Philippine Higher Education

The University After the Liberation from American Colonization

As already mentioned, this period spanned from 1946, the end of the American colonial rule in the Philippines, to 1972, the year when UP was transformed into a system. The length of this period is 26 years. The key documents that were analyzed under the liberation period of UP are: 1) the 1951 inaugural speech of the University President Vidal Tan; 2) the 1958 inaugural speech of the University President Vicente Sinco; 3) the document Research Organization in the University that was released by the Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs around 1960; 4) The United States Office of Mission to the Philippines’ The Tenth Milestone: A Report of a Decade of U.S. Assistance to Public Education in the Philippines of 1962; 5) Walter Dyde’s A Report on Graduate Education in the Philippines of 1962; 6) the 1962 inaugural speech of the University President Carlos Romulo; 7) Guadalupe Fores-Ganzon’s essay “Research” that is part of the papers and proceedings of the 1966 University of the Philippines Faculty Conference; 8) Alfredo Morales’s essay “Our Goal of Quality Education” that is also part of the said 1966 conference; 9) Victor Valenzuela’s essay “Graduate Education” that is also part of the said 1966 conference; and 10) the 1969 inaugural speech of University President Salvador Lopez.

The 1951 Inaugural Speech of Tan: Dr. Vidal Tan, a mathematician from Cornell University and Chicago University, was president of the university from 1951 to 1956. He mentioned in his inaugural address that the fourth function of a state university is “to serve as our (the country’s) principal contributor to the world’s stock of knowledge.” He stated: “Fortunately, UP, in spite of the meager support it receives from the government, in spite of the heavy faculty teaching load which has been a constant source of embarrassment before visiting professors from famous institutions abroad, has shown notable contributions in such fields as medicine, agriculture, forestry, pharmacy, dentistry, chemistry, archeology, nursing, history and other fields.” Tan’s statement hinted that in the university, there persisted the tension between teaching and research.

The 1958 Inaugural Speech of Sinco: The Lawyer Vicente Sinco was president of the university from 1958 to 1962. He was a former exchange professor to Tokyo Imperial University and Waseda University. He made an almost Humboldtian statement when he said: “A university is distinctively an association of scholars and students engaged in the search for knowledge, in the work of advancing the frontiers of knowledge, in the discovery of new learning, in the exploration of the higher spheres of thought to improve or to replace ideas that have ceased to be valid and true, and, above all, in the creation and cultivation of the spirit of discovery.” But this Humboldtian trace dissipated immediately when Sinco elaborated: “Hand in hand with
research in a university, teaching comes as an inseparable companion, systematic, inspiring, stimulating, and thought-provoking. That kind of teaching is the unmistakable reflection of the teacher’s application to learn and the result of the discipline of research.”

The Document Research Organization in the University: The document Research Organization in the University that was released by the Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs is actually undated. But its internal references suggest that it was published around 1960. The document admitted that for the past 50 years of the existence of the university, it has focused on teaching (i). But the document desired to operationalize the research thrust of Sinco by clarifying first the current configuration of the various research centres within the university (i). The document mentioned an already remarkable number of research centres, yet these remained facilities for faculty members to pursue research and attract external funding.

The 1962 Tenth Milestone Report of the United States Office of Mission to the Philippines: Paul Summers and James Ingersoll headed the United States Office of Mission to the Philippines when this report was made. Section IV of this report zeroed in on the impact of American assistance to Philippine higher education, and almost half of this section talked about UP. The section mentioned six challenges that UP should face, and three of these are directly relevant to the concern of this project: 1) finances, 2) faculty members, and 3) advanced education and research. Concerning finances, the report stated: “It is apparent that the University cannot expand its offerings at the very much more expensive upper division and graduate levels, or support research activities commensurate with the nation’s needs, without a very substantial increase in the financial support by the National Government.”2 Concerning faculty members, the report emphasized: “The problem of developing highly trained faculty members is an extremely difficult one for the Philippines. The University can find very few men and women to appoint, especially to senior staff positions, from the staffs of other institutions in the Philippines. Faculty members with advanced degrees must, for the most part, be trained abroad.”3 Concerning advanced education and research, the report hinted that the United States of America and developed democratic countries of the west are interested that UP transition from being a teaching university into an American-style research university so that it can better serve not only the Philippines but Southeast Asia and

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3 Ibid., 86.
even the Far East. These three challenges suggest that UP in the early part of the 1960s still remained a teaching university.

The 1962 Report on Graduate Education in the Philippines of Dyde: Dyde, a former Vice President for Academics of the University of Colorado, was the adviser on graduate education of the United States Agency for International Development and was assigned to UP when he produced this voluminous report on the university’s graduate education. Dyde’s overall assessment of UP is that it was a “predominantly … teaching institution with a modest program of graduate education” situated in a national context of depressed academic standards and a strong preference for professional-vocational training.

He mentions not less than four reasons why the university was not able to transition to an American-style research university. First is the difficulty in placing sufficient numbers of doctors and high-ranking academics in the university. In 1961, Dyde noted that the ratio among doctors, masters and bachelors in UP was 14.0%-37.8%-46%, while in the 25 American North Central Association universities, the ratio a decade earlier was already 43.0%-37.0%-20.0%. At that time, these doctoral degrees had to be obtained in America or other places abroad, and for Filipino academics, such degrees were simply too expensive. Dyde also noted that the ratio among high ranking and low-ranking academics in UP was 18.6%-81.4%, while in the American North Central Association universities, the average ratio was 48.8%-51.2%.

Second is the salary of and mandatory retirement age of faculty members of UP. Dyde stressed: “the vulnerability to offers of employment from outside the University of those with advanced training in such fields as science, engineering, and business is so great that the importance of improving the salary scale of the University is again underlined.” Professors with the right degrees, and teaching and research experiences were made to retire at age 65. Dyde argued: “a university professor in the Philippines with the highest academic qualifications and with long experience is such a valuable asset not only educationally but purely commercially, considering the cost of his production, that no amount of competent working time should be wasted.”

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4 Ibid., 87
6 Ibid., III-5 & III-3.
7 Ibid., III-5
8 Ibid., III-3.
9 Ibid., III-12.
10 Ibid., IV-4.
The third is the financial considerations. Transitioning into an American-style research university “will require expenditures of an order of magnitude far beyond the unit costs for undergraduate instruction.” 11 Dyde made an estimate that the 1960s budget of UP might be at par with the pre-Second World War budget of the American research universities, but times had already changed and federal, corporate and private funding had been pumped into the American-style research universities.12

Fourth is the long-term effect of the earlier decisions of UP to expand “horizontally into almost every professional curriculum.”13 Such mode of expansion “strained the resources of the university so that vertical expansion into advanced graduate work has been retarded.”14 Despite these four observations, Dyde believes that the time is ripe for UP to put up a research-based graduate education to start its transition into a research university.15

The 1962 Inaugural Speech of Romulo: Writer, soldier and diplomat, Carlos Romulo was president of the university from 1962 to 1968. He studied at Columbia University. In his inaugural speech, he commented on the concept of research during the presidency of Bartlett as merely “research for instruction, not for the sake of knowledge itself or for any other service.” He claimed: “Today, the research function has come to its own alongside with teaching; we have, in addition, dispensed considerable community and extension services, and, as a regional centre, contributed directly to the spread of universal and specialized knowledge in Southeast Asia and beyond.” In his five-year development plan for the university, there are two things that resonated with the model of the American research university: his plan to develop the graduate programs of the university, and his intention that such development would be parallel with his envisioned intensification of research. To what extent was Romulo successful in these two elements of his five-year development plan is something that must be answered by other archival materials. But in as far as the succeeding documents that we are going to examine are concerned, nothing much happened out of these otherwise brilliant and almost Humboldtian plans.

The 1966 “Research” of Fores-Ganzon: As already mentioned, Fores-Ganzon’s essay is part of the papers and proceedings of the 1966 University of the Philippines Faculty Conference. She mentioned three important documents that served as the background to her essay: 1) the 1961 modification of the mandate of UP; 2) a 1962 report of an Ad Hoc Committee on Research Promotion; and 3) the Five-Year Development Plan, 1963-68, that

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11 Ibid., I-7.
12 Ibid., IV-2.
13 Ibid., I-36a.
14 Ibid.
was crafted under the leadership of Romulo. The 1961 modification of the mandate of UP pertains to the addition of the mandate on research on the original 1908 mandate on teaching: “to encourage and undertake research and contribute to the growth of and dissemination of knowledge.”

The 1962 report of the Ad Hoc Committee was intended as an input for the research aspects of the Five-Year Development Plan. The report noted that as of 1962, UP was not prepared to undertake its research mandate. It also noted that there were four basic hindrances for the undertaking of this research mandate: 1) the inadequate annual budgetary allocation for research; 2) the heavy teaching load of the faculty members; 3) the low ratio of research-trained faculty members who were unfortunately also mostly tied to administrative assignments; and 4) the inadequacy of the university’s library, laboratories, equipment and supplies.

The Five Year Development Plan, partly in response to the findings of the Ad Hoc Committee, made the following strategies for research: 1) a budgetary allocation that would allow 10% to 15% of departmental functions to be devoted to research; 2) organization of properly equipped research centres; 3) transformation of existing institutes into research centres that will treat teaching as incidental activity to their primary function of undertaking research; 4) the provision for special assistance to departments with low research productivity; 5) gradual increase of the allocation for research until it will stabilize at 20% of the total annual budget of the university; 6) Prioritization of projects that closely relate to national development plans or programs; and 7) the creation of 100 new academic positions, specifically, teaching staff to relieve research competent staff from teaching.

In 1966, it was too early for Ganzon to make a definitive assessment of the initial effects of the Five-Year Development Plan. Her suggestion that the university should collaborate with other government agencies and even the private sector in addressing “problems of modern-day living” conformed to the idea of a Humboldtian research university. But the way she laboured so much problematizing the impact of an increased research capacity of the faculty members to their current level of teaching capacity betrays the fact that she, the Five-Year Development Plan, and the university as a whole were unaware that it is actually possible to unify teaching and research in a research university.

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 106.
19 Ibid., 110.
20 Ibid., 118
21 Ibid., 112-115.
The 1966 “Our Goal of Quality Education” of Morales: As already mentioned, Morales’ essay is part of the papers and proceedings of the 1966 University of the Philippines Faculty Conference. The already mentioned Five Year Development Plan, 1963-68, again served as a background to this essay. Morales made a pun out of the idea of quality and equality. This pun revolved around justifying the place of teaching amidst the growing emphasis on research. Equality, thus, referred to both equality in terms of teaching and research. Morales offered a counter-polemic, or justification of teaching as a response to the other conference papers made for the sake of research. He asserted that the Five-Year Development Plan ought to keep in mind the major importance that should be given to the objective of having high teaching standards. He maintained that the university should uphold quality education by providing excellent quality instruction and professional training. This statement deviated from the Humboldtian idea of unifying teaching and research.

Morales revealed a disturbing development in the university’s efforts of setting up doctoral programs. The essay mentioned that the university wanted to have its first homegrown doctors of philosophy by 1968, the terminal year of the Five Year Development Program. But it appeared that such first batch of doctors would come from the University Science Teaching Center, a unit that was established by the university with the assistance of the Ford Foundation. The housing of doctoral programs in a unit named as such already suggested that such programs maintained the dichotomy between teaching and research. Another more disturbing feature of the centre was that it was steeped with Jerome Bruner’s pedagogical philosophy called “new educational technology.” Such pedagogical philosophy did not only fall short from the Humboldtian educational philosophy but was more so a pedagogical philosophy what was primarily intended for children’s education. The university’s infatuation with Bruner’s pedagogical philosophy reinforced its dichotomous treatment of teaching and research.

The 1966 “Graduate Education” of Valenzuela: As the title implies, Valenzuela’s speech is loaded with emphasis on improving the quality of graduate education in the university to respond to the growing needs of the industry and the academia. While the emphasis may give one an impression that Valenzuela is following a Humboldtian vision of a research-centric university, his concerns are mostly driven by administrative requirements.

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22 Alfredo Morales, “Our Goal of Quality Education” in Reappraisal and Rededication, 120.
23 Ibid. p.128.
rather than a vision of a research university, for, on the one hand, he highlights the immediate demand of industries such as business administration, agriculture, economics, education, engineering, home economics, hospital administration, public administration, social work, demography and statistics, as a response to the growing needs of the labour industry and government work, while on the other hand, he also chimes in on expanding and improving the graduate programs to respond to a growing specialized need of labour, not only in the labour industry but also specifically in the University itself.

Despite this special emphasis on filling in the ranks of labour, Valenzuela’s envisioned improvements on graduate programs bring about some proposals that could have benefited the research thrust of the University. Unlike the recent emphasis of contemporary universities to promote graduate education for the sake of fulfilling accreditation criteria, Valenzuela’s emphasis on graduate education was aimed at improving and providing specialized skills to respond to the growing demand of the workforce and national concerns. Incidentally, Valenzuela saw the importance of research in developing these skillsets and made several suggestions on how research can improve the graduate program of the University. One of these suggestions was to integrate the admission and graduation requirements, that adds emphasis to the "nature and depth of thesis and dissertation." He also stressed on a closer "tie-up" between faculty research and graduate teaching, to disseminate creative and investigative research work in graduate teaching. Valenzuela emphasized that a faculty member should also transfer his or her knowledge of an existing research work through tutelage and that "the money invested in research grants for faculty members should be made to pay off in terms of education and training of graduate students."

Another interesting development found in Valenzuela’s thoughts on improving the graduate programs of the University is his proposal to create an interconnected graduate program. His proposal was to investigate the possibility of a collaboration with other universities that offer courses and programs that are not available in UP. He suggests a sharing of resources with other universities to supplement weaknesses in areas that are in need of development, while at the same time, extending the expertise to improve the graduate program of other universities. This is perhaps, the most

26 Ibid.,
27 Ibid., 132.
28 Ibid., 133.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 134.
Humboldtian suggestion that Valenzuela has made in this speech. This vision of shared resources pre-dates the competitive nature of universities to simply out-rank other universities with their programs. Not only does this pronouncement provide an avenue for fostering a broad array of research programs, but it is also a move closer to a vision of a unified thrust of research that is much more akin to Humboldt's vision.

The 1969 Inaugural Speech of Lopez: Literary critic and diplomat Salvador Lopez was president of the university from 1969 to 1975. In his inaugural speech, he said: “The university is a single, indivisible community of scholars composed of professors and students jointly engaged in the search for goodness, truth and beauty.”32 This sounds like a Humboldtian statement, which is followed by another even more remarkable statement: “While students improve their scholarship under the guidance of professors, the latter, in turn, heighten the quality of their own scholarship in the very process of teaching, often through intellectual interaction with their students.”33 But Lopez did not elaborate on how these visions can be achieved or how the university could transition from a teaching university into a research university.

Summation: The story of UP during its period of liberation from American colonialism is a story of a teaching university that rose from the devastation of the Second World War. In its 1961 Code, it recognized research as the second function of the university. It took advantage of the rising demand in the country for professionals with graduate degrees and expanded its graduate programs and even started to offer doctoral programs. It also started to problematize, at least at the hypothetical and theoretical level, the negative impact of the research activities of the faculty members on their teaching activities. But instead of unifying teaching and research, at least at the graduate level, the university opted to maintain their dichotomy. Its graduate programs persisted in their being non-research based and became entangled with the non-Humboldtian pedagogical philosophy of Bruner. Towards the end of the liberation period of UP, the anti-American sentiments of the students and citizen unrests steered the university farther away from the chance of embodying the American-style research university. The liberation period of the university was concluded with another devastation, which is the political, cultural, intellectual and spiritual havoc spawned by the declaration of Martial Law.

32 Salvador Lopez, “The University as Social Critic and Agent of Change” in The Role and Mission of the University: Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the University of the Philippines, ed. by Consuelo Fonacier, (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1971) 191.
33 Ibid.
The University as a System

As already mentioned, this period spanned from 1972, the year when UP was transformed into a system, to 2008, the year when the university was officially named a national university and a research university. The length of this period is 36 years. The key documents that were analyzed under this period are: 1) the Presidential Decree 58 of 1972 that amended the University Charter and restructured the university into system; 2) Oscar Evangelista’s essay “Lopez’s Beleaguered Tenure: Barricades on Campus at the Peak of Student Discontent” of 1985; 3) Jose Endriga’s essay “Corpuz and Soriano’s Bifocal Administrations: toward a Realignment of the Academe to National Realities under a Crisis Government” of 1985; 4) Leslie Bauzon’s essay “Angara’s Tough Minded Leadership: the Diamond Jubilee Highlighted by Reform of the University System” of 1985; 5) the 1993 summative speech of the University President Jose Abueva; 6) the 1994 inaugural speech of the University President Emil Javier; 7) the 1998 vision paper of Francisco Nemenzo that led to his appointment as University President; 8) the document Shaping our Institutional Future: a Statement on Faculty Tenure, Rank and Promotion that was released by the Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs in 2004; and 9) the 2005 inaugural speech of the University President Emerlinda Roman.

The 1972 Amendment of the University Charter (Presidential Decree 58): The legislation that amended the University Charter was done two months after the Martial Law was declared. This explains why it was not a product of the Philippine legislative body. This legislation transformed the university into a system and identified its Los Baños campus as the first autonomous unit of such system (Presidential Decree 58, Section 1). The main motive for this dramatic transformation is for the newly established autonomous unit, UP Los Baños, to assist the country’s agrarian reform in terms of agricultural and policy research. The Humboldtian unity of the goals of the university and of the state, at least in as far as UP Los Baños is concerned, is very discernible in this legislation, but not the other Humboldtian unities, particularly those of teachers and students, and of teaching and research.

The 1985 “Lopez’s Beleaguered Tenure” of Evangelista: Evangelista’s essay is part of the book University of the Philippines: The First 75 Years (1908-1983) that was edited by Oscar Alfonso. The essay mentions several changes and developments that enhanced the research capacities of the university’s faculty members during the rest of the presidency of Lopez. In 1972, the teaching load of the faculty members was finally reduced from 15 hours per week to 12 hours per week, which is the current norm in the
In this same year, a policy was made stipulating that only master degree holders with a rank of assistant professors are qualified for tenure. In the same year also, which is just a decade after Dyde presented his report, the university registered a remarkable growth in graduate education: 142 masteral programs and 23 doctoral programs. In 1974, dramatic improvements were noticed in as far as the number of professorial chairs is concerned: an increase from 6 in 1969 to a total of 79 in the said year, aside from the creation of faculty appointments as artists-in-residence, writers-in-residence, and musicians-in-residence.

The 1985 “Corpuz and Soriano’s Bifocal Administrations” of Endriga: Endriga’s essay is also part of the same book edited by Alfonso. This essay tells the story of further changes and developments that enhanced the research and extension capacities of the university’s faculty members, during the presidencies of Onofre Corpuz and Emanuel Soriano, until the university itself came face to face with a crucial problem that Humboldt himself faced prior to the establishment of the University of Berlin. The essay attests that in 1975, the university already had a total number of 144 masteral programs and 29 doctoral programs. This will grow further to 295 and 83, respectively, after just two years. In 1979, two more autonomous units of the university system were established: UP Visayas, and the Health Sciences Center, which later on evolved into UP Manila. Endriga noted the increased internal funding for research as well as the easy availability of funds from external agencies, both local and international. Endriga explained that the proliferation of externally funded research projects gave birth to a category of research projects called “mission-oriented” research, “which by definition meant that it was addressed to the solution of some of the society’s pressing problems.” Endriga also documented the increasing number of consultancy engagements that faculty members accepted from the government, corporations and international organizations. Endriga wrote: “all the

34 Oscar Evangelista, “Lopez’s Beleaguered Tenure: Barricades on Campus at the Peak of Student Discontent” in University of the Philippines: The First 75 Years (1908-1983), ed. by Oscar Alfonso (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1985), 450.
35 Ibid., 491.
36 Ibid., 484.
37 Ibid., 490.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 523-524.
42 Ibid., 524.
43 Ibid., 525.
preceding conjures an image of a university faculty extremely busy with research and extension services and hence forced to relegate teaching into the background.” 44 In other words, without the Humboldtian framework, the dramatic improvements of the university faculty members’ capacities for research and extension had brought the university to an old situation where conflict exists between teaching, and research and extension.

The 1985 “Angara’s Tough-Minded Leadership” of Bauzon: Bauzon’s essay is also part of the same book edited by Alfonso. It was, however, written somewhere during the middle of the term of the University President Edgardo Angara. Thus, it only mentions at least one development pertaining to the university faculty members’ research and extension activities. Bauzon wrote that Angara established the Diamond Jubilee Consultancy Project in 1983 to market and manage the increasing number of consultancy engagements of the university’s faculty members. 45 The management fees scrounged by this project were able to establish funds for the research capacity building and actual research projects of the faculty members. Thus, the time and energy lost by the university for consultancies were compensated by a fund that would further increase the research capacities and activities of the faculty members. The strategy may be novel, but it failed to address the problem that already emerged during the presidencies of Corpuz and Soriano: the conflict between teaching, research and extension.

The 1993 Summative Speech of Abueva: The political scientist Abueva was president of the university from 1987 to 1993. He studied at the University of Michigan. In his summative speech of 1993 he mentioned that the university is the only institution in the country that can be considered a graduate university, for the reason that one in every five of its students is a graduate student, as well as for the reason that the university has “175 master’s programs and over 50 doctoral programs.” 46 Among all the documents examined in this paper, Abueva’s speech is the first one to refer to UP as a research university. 47 But his reasons for doing so are only based on what for him was a high level of “faculty involvement and productivity in scientific and scholarly research and in artistic creativity and production, and. . . investment and expenditures in research.” 48 Nowhere in this document can

44 Ibid., 526.
45 Leslie Bauzon, “Angara’s Tough-Minded Leadership: The Diamond Jubilee Highlighted by Reform of the University System” in University of the Philippines: The First 75 Years (1908-1983) ed. by Oscar Alfonso, (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1985), 569.
46 Jose Abueva, “Summing Up my Years as UP President: Leadership, Innovation and Reform (1987-1993)” Reinventing UP as the National University: Learning for Truth, Leadership and Social Transformation (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 2008), 244.
47 Ibid., 245.
48 Ibid.
we find the Humboldtian unities of teachers and students, and of teaching and research.

**The 1994 Inaugural Speech of Javier:** The agricultural scientist Javier was president of the university from 1993 to 1999. He implies a classic American research university when he said: “We will maintain our undergraduate courses as models of the nation’s educational system and proceed to strengthen our graduate and research programs.” But his elaboration on research never went beyond the Humboldtian unity of the goals of the university and of the state: “we have to push forward the frontiers of science and accelerate the development of our capacity in such new fields as materials science, computer and information science, molecular biology and biotechnology. We must generate and adopt new knowledge not only to satisfy our intellectual hunger but also to achieve a high quality of life for Filipinos.”

**The 1998 Vision Paper of Nemenzo:** The political scientist Nemenzo was president of the university from 1999 to 2005. He studied at the University of Manchester. As his inaugural speech was not published, this paper analyzed the vision paper that he prepared that led to his appointment as University President. He articulated the anxieties of the members of the university due to the fact that the leading universities in the ASEAN region have already left behind the ratings of UP, and that the said university seemed to be unable to actively engage with the global knowledge economy. He said: “our urgent task today is not only to reverse this trend but also to adapt the university to a new global political economy in which knowledge power is the most important factor of production and the brainworkers are the most crucial segment of the workforce.” He envisioned the university to lean towards an American model of a research university: “It is expected to produce leaders in the major professions and academic disciplines. It is also expected to generate new knowledge through research activities of its faculty and graduate students. In recent times, the extension has been added to the university’s essential function.”

**The 2004 Document Shaping our Institutional Future: A Statement on Faculty Tenure, Rank and Promotion:** In 2004, UP as a system already had seven autonomous constituent units. To maintain a system-wide standard in as far as the qualifications and achievements of faculty members, the Office

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49 Emil Javier, “U.P. in the Service of the Nation: Recapturing the Sense of National Purpose.” in *The Investiture of Dr. Emil Q. Javier as Sixteenth President of the University of the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1994), 25.


52 Ibid.
of the Vice President for Academic Affairs deemed it necessary to come up with this document. Among other things, this document describes the job descriptions of the university’s instructors, assistant professors, associate professors and full professors. An overview of these descriptions is the statement: “once appointed to a rank, the faculty member is expected to teach as well as possible, build up a productive record of research or creative work, and engage actively in activities that serve the University and the larger community.” In other words, the document generates a trichotomy teaching, research and extension. Although the document emphasized the Humboldtian unity of the goals of the university and of the state, it does not convey the Humboldtian unities of teaching and research, and teachers and students.

The 2005 Inaugural Speech of Roman: The business and administration professor Roman was president of the university from 2005 to 2011. She studied in UP. Roman echoed the concern of Nemenzo for the university to catch up with the statures of the national universities in Asia, such as “the National University of Singapore, the University of Indonesia, the University of Malaya in Malaysia, Chulalongkorn University in Thailand, Tokyo University, and Seoul National University,” in as far as “spearheading” their respective countries’ “quest for knowledge and keeping abreast of advances in different fields of knowledge worldwide.” Roman asserted that UP is the leading research university in the country. However, when she elaborated what made the university so, she was not able to strongly emphasize the link between graduate education and research: “the number of graduate courses we offer, our upgraded and modernized teaching and research laboratories and other facilities some of which. . . are now of world-class standards, and our research and publications record. . . has undoubtedly made UP the leading research university in the country.”

Summation: The story of UP during the period of its transformation into a system that would eventually be composed of eight autonomous units appears to be a story of a teaching university that has continued to grow and decentralized its administration. It has implemented its current teaching load of 12 units per term to give room for research and extension. It has multiplied its graduate programs. It has experienced, for the first time, the proliferation of external research grants coming from the national government and other

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53 Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs of the University of the Philippines, *Shaping our Institutional Future: A Statement on Faculty Tenure, Rank and Promotion* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 2004), 17-19.
54 Ibid., 17.
56 Ibid., 47.
57 Ibid.
international funding agencies. Consequently, the problematization about balancing the teaching and research functions of the faculty members, which in the preceding period was merely a hypothetical and theoretical musing, became a matter of immediate concern. The actual term “research university,” for the first time, crept into the vocabulary of the university. But the term’s presence in the university’s vocabulary did not guarantee that the university administrators adequately grasped the meaning of such a term. The documents show that during this period, the university continued to fail to unify teaching and research at least at the graduate level. During this period, the university felt that it was left behind by the other leading ASEAN and Asian universities, although it was not able to realize that such surging universities were dyed in the wool research universities. This time, there was no devastation that closed the period of the university’s transition into a system. Instead, the conclusion of this period could be recounted as a time of preparation for the first centenary of the university and of lobbying for its legislated transition into a national research university.

The University’s Transition into a Research University

As already mentioned, this period spanned from 2008, the year when UP was officially named a national university and a research university, to the present times. The key documents that were analyzed under the period when the university finally transitioned into a research university are: 1) the Republic Act 9500 of 2008 that overhauled the University Charter and made it into a national and research university; 2) the 2011 inaugural speech of the University President Alfredo Pascual; 3) the document University of the Philippines Strategic Plan 2011-2017 that was released by the Office of the President of the said university in 2012; 4) the document A University of the Philippines Research Guidebook that was released by the Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs in 2015; 5) the 2016 vision paper of Danilo Concepcion that led to his appointment as University President; and 6) some comparative publication data extracted from Scopus on August 14, 2017.

The 2008 New University Charter (Republic Act 9500): During the centenary of UP, the Philippine Congress crafted the law that would officially transform the university into a national and research university. The said document declares that the university shall: “serve as a research university in various fields of expertise and specialization by conducting basic and applied research and development, and promoting research in various colleges and universities, and contributing to the dissemination and application of knowledge” (Republic Act 9500, Section 3). The same document even emphasizes the Humboldtian idea that the research university should be there to serve the society: “The national university shall harness the expertise
of the members of its community and other individuals to regularly study the state of the nation in relation to its quest for national development in the primary areas of politics and economics, among others, identify key concerns, formulate responsive policies regarding these concerns, and give advice and recommendations to Congress and the President of the Philippines” (Republic Act 9500, Section 7). However, the charter appears to have missed mentioning two fundamental aspects of a research university, which is the unity of teaching and research, and the unity of professors and students in pursuing research.

The 2011 Inaugural Speech of Pascual: By 2010, UP as a system already had its current number of 8 autonomous constituent units, when the Cebu campus of UP Visayas was officially recognized as the eighth autonomous unit. The corporate executive Pascual was president of the university from 2011 to 2017. He studied in UP. Pascual did not elaborate on the research university. About five decades after Dyde coaxed the university to establish research-based graduate education to start its transition into a research university, and after Romulo talked and pushed for his plan to develop the graduate programs of the university in parallel with his envisioned intensification of research, Pascual’s inaugural speech is suddenly back on the same track as he desired UP to become “a university that has a strong research capability, supported by an expanded graduate program, unshackled by sectarian constraints or commercial interests, and geared to addressing societal problems.”

The 2012 Document University of the Philippines Strategic Plan 2011-2017: Aligned with Pascual’s inaugural speech, this document emphasizes that to increase the university’s research and creative output, the university, among other things, must increase the number of its graduate students. The document implies a plan for the university to transition towards the classic American model of a research university.

The 2015 Document A University of the Philippines Research Guidebook: In 2015, the Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs of UP System released a document entitled A UP Research Guidebook. Seven years after the university was legislated to be a research university, it appears that it is still in the process of becoming one. The document admitted: “UP is a teaching and research university, yet it is organized more for teaching than

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58 Alfredo Pascual, “President Pascual’s Turnover Speech,” in UP Newsletter: The University of the Philippines Newspaper, 32:2 (February 2011), 1.
59 Office of the President of the University of the Philippines, University of the Philippines Strategic Plan 2011-2017 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 2012), 6.
for research. It still lacks a vigorous intensive and extensive research culture and focuses more on transferring knowledge rather than creating it.”

The 2016 Vision Paper of Concepcion: The law professor Concepcion is the current president of the university since 2017. He studied in the Queen Mary University of London. As his inaugural speech was too short and did not tackle research, this paper analyzed the vision paper that he prepared that led to his appointment as University President. Concepcion also did not talk about the research university. Instead, he similarly merely problematized how to increase further the research output of the faculty members and how such output could impact the society. He wrote: “our goal is to craft research agenda heavily oriented toward addressing our country’s problems and needs. We want UP researchers to see themselves as an active contributor to nation-building; and we want UP to be able to lend the proper environment that will ensure that their efforts come to fruition, for the nation’s benefit.”

14 August 2017 Comparative Publication Data from Scopus: There are three sets of data that this paper extracted from Scopus to show that nothing much had happened during the legislated transition of UP in 2008, in as far as the university’s research output is concerned. The first set of data is presented in figure 3 and shows the aggregated annual publication output of the university’s eight autonomous constituent units from 2001 to 2015.

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60 Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs of the University of the Philippines, A University of the Philippines Research Guidebook (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 2015), 19.

Figure 3 attempts to show the annual rate of increase of the university’s publication output for us to see if there was a dramatic spike after the university transitioned into a research university in 2008. From 2001 to 2007, the annual rate of increase of the university’s publication output was 11.21%. From 2007 to 2015, the annual rate of increase was 11.56%. A difference of mere 0.35% clearly spells that nothing much has changed in the way the university produced its publications after 2008.

The second set of data is presented in figure 4 and shows the aggregated annual per capita publication output of the university’s eight autonomous constituent units from 2001 to 2016, in relation with the annual per capita publication output of the University of Santo Tomas, Ateneo de Manila University, and De La Salle University. UP and these three private universities constitute what is commonly known as the “Big Four” Philippine higher educational institutions. The numbers of academic staff listed in Quacquarelli Symonds 2016 University Ranking were used as the divisors for the annual Scopus publications of the four universities, specifically: 4,343 for UP, 1,888 for the University of Santo Tomas, 961 for Ateneo de Manila University, and 926 for De La Salle University. This paper merely assumed that such numbers of academic staff remained constant from 2001 to 2016.

Figure 4 attempts to show that in terms of the steepness of the annual per capita publication output, the curve of UP behaved more or less the same
with that of Ateneo de Manila University, which is not a research university, and slightly better than that of the University of Santo Tomas, which is also not a research university. Figure 4 also attempts to show, as a point of comparison, how steep the curve of De La Salle University behaved after it transitioned into a research university in 2011. The four curves attest that nothing much has changed in the way UP produced its publications after 2008.

The third set of data is presented in figure 5 and shows the aggregated annual per capita publication output of the university’s eight autonomous constituent units from 2001 to 2016, in relation with the annual per capita publication output of the twelve other ASEAN universities that made it to the 2016 list of top 100 Asian universities according to Quacquarelli Symonds. UP landed on rank 70, while the other twelve top ASEAN universities are: the National University of Singapore (rank 1), Nanyang Technological University (rank 3), the Universiti Malaya (rank 27), Chulalongkorn University (rank 45), the Universiti Putra Malaysia (rank 49), the Universiti Sains Malaysia (rank 51), the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (rank 55), the Singapore Management University (rank 60), Mahidol University (rank 61), the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (rank 63), the Universitas Indonesia (rank 67), and Ateneo De Manila University (rank 99). The numbers of academic staff listed in Quacquarelli Symonds 2016 University Ranking were used as the divisors for the annual Scopus publications of the thirteen universities.
Figure 5 attempts to show that in terms of the steepness of the annual
per capita publication output, the curve of UP is left well below the curves of
the really strong ASEAN research universities, the Universiti Malaya,
Nanyang Technological University, the National University of Singapore, the
Universiti Putra Malaysia, the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, the Universiti
Kebangsaan Malaysia, and the Universiti Sains Malaysia. Figure 5 also
attempts to show that the curve of UP is also below the curves of most of the
moderately strong ASEAN research universities, Mahidol University, the
Singapore Management University, and Chulalongkorn University. Figure 5
also attempts to show that the curve of UP can only compete with the not so
strong ASEAN research university, the Universitas Indonesia. This paper
already mentioned that Ateneo de Manila University, although part of the
top 100 ASEAN universities, is not a research university. Hence, in as far as
the ASEAN standard of a research university, it appears that UP, and
probably the Universitas Indonesia, have not made the proper transition.

**Summation:** The ongoing story of UP’s period of transition into a
research university appears to be a story of a nominal change that is yet to be
accompanied by more tangible policy, organizational and pedagogical
changes. The new charter of the university was not able to articulate what
becoming a research university meant. It looked like the more than half a
century old initiative of Romulo of using graduate education to boost
university research simply did not take off, because Pascual mentioned the
same strategy as if it is something new in the university. The data culled from
Scopus suggest that there was nothing dramatic happened in 2008 in as far as
the research productivity of the university is concerned. The period is still
ongoing. It has almost been a decade that the university made its nominal
transition. As the mandated model of a higher educational institution in the
country, UP owes the Filipinos that it should do the actual policy,
organizational and pedagogical transition into a research university sooner
than later.

**Conclusion**

The story of the University of the Philippines has had its own
developments, pitfalls, and progress that we can closely follow and develop
by identifying the points in its story that could have led to its own claim as a
research university. From its inception during the American colonial period,
UP had its aspiration to transform itself into a research university in both the
capabilities of its faculty and as well as its graduate program. Despite being
entrenched in the task of providing education beyond its annual budgetary
allocation, UP responded through the criticisms provided by the Monroe
Commission to the extent that in the early 1930s, Alzona achieved tangible
and remarkable results from the strengthening of the university’s faculty research. UP has endured the storms of changes during the American occupation period; it has dealt with the great depression that has led to the decline of funding, as well as the devastation offered by the Second World War.

Rising from these calamities, the University, just like the public sector, used teaching and the civil service to keep the people employed as a response to the great depression. This period in the story of the University is a story of missed opportunities in its struggle to persist in hard times. For one, the University did not respond adequately to the demands of teaching and research. Instead of consolidating it as a unified activity between students and teachers in pursuit of research, the University dichotomized both activities as separate tasks. Instead of learning from the American translation of Humboldt’s research university, the University turned to the non-Humboldtian pedagogical philosophy of Bruner. Adding to this, the Anti-American sentiments of the students and citizen unrests steered the university away from the well-established and proven American-style research university.

Coming from its liberation from the Americans, the University was now engaged in the task of transforming itself as a system. Consisting of eight autonomous units, the University, at this point, is unfolding its story as a growing teaching institution. While it has implemented a 12 unit per semester load to give room for research, the University has become aware of the dichotomized nature of research and teaching when the floodgates for external funding was opened to the University. For the first time, the actual idea of a “research” university came into the consciousness of UP and its administrators as they began to realize its potent role in the global academic scene. Feeling that UP is behind the ASEAN and Asian universities, the University was, by legislation, officially declared as a national research university. Despite changes in its policies and its charter, the documents presented in this paper show that the University was unable to articulate what it meant in its transition to a research university. The data gathered from the period of its declaration of transition in 2008 from Scopus, show that there is no significant or dramatic improvement in its research output.

The importance of the University of the Philippines in its role as a mandated model of higher education means that it should manifest the nominal title of research university into an actual policy, the organizational and pedagogical transition for the other Filipino university to follow. The University of the Philippine’s divergence from the American translation of Humboldt’s educational vision is a clear indication that its transition to the status of National Research University is merely a nominal one. Moreover,
the system offered by Humboldt’s educational system offers a stable, sustainable, progressive, and autonomous unity between stakeholders that advance the interests of the state, students, and professors in the pursuit of infinite knowledge. The evidence presented in this paper shows that the University of the Philippines, despite all the impasses and difficulties from its inception to the present day, has missed the opportunities to transform itself to a truly functional research university.

As a functional research university, the University of the Philippines should no longer have to contend with the issue surrounding its dichotomization of teaching and research, and even contending with the third element, extension work; it should not pose as a separate task that would occupy the time, effort, and resources of the University of the Philippines. The consequence of having these issues at the University of the Philippines is that it serves as a precedent and a model for all the other universities in the Philippines to follow. As an official state model of what a university is, laws, policies, and guidelines in higher education becomes modelled after the University of the Philippine’s system. By going back to these issues and opportunities that the University of the Philippines has missed through over a hundred-year history, we hope that the University would open itself to the possibility of engaging in modelling talks. By engaging the University of the Philippines in this discourse, we can only hope that the University might adopt the Humboldtian model of higher education, be it an American rendition of the system, or a customized one to suit Philippine circumstances. While it is highly unlikely that the University can change its system overnight, opening a discourse about these issues can bring fruitful resolutions to existing educational problems in the Philippines. For example, should the University of the Philippines opt to pursue a specific type of Humboldtian model of research, it can now distribute the resources it has invested in its tripartite task of teaching, research, and extension services. This could mean that local state universities and colleges throughout the Philippines can focus on its role of training professionals, labourers, and technicians, while the University of the Philippines can concentrate on the pursuit of knowledge, which, in the end, is the actual goal of any teacher, student, researcher, and state in any educational institution. Despite this paper’s archival critique of the University of the Philippines, our aim is not to insist on the University of the Philippines for what it is not. Rather, as a model institution for higher education in the Philippines, we reckon that this study can generate further discourse on the viability of Humboldt’s model of education in the Philippines.
APPENDIX A

Annual Publication Output of UP from 2001 to 2015
(Based on Scopus Data as of 14 August 2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>University of the Philippines Diliman</th>
<th>University of the Philippines Manila</th>
<th>University of the Philippines Los Baños</th>
<th>University of the Philippines Visayas</th>
<th>University of the Philippines Baguio</th>
<th>University of the Philippines Mindanao</th>
<th>University of the Philippines Cebu</th>
<th>University of the Philippines Open University</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>215</td>
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<tr>
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<td>53</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>75</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>181</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>222</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
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<td>115</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>164</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>622</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
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<td>171</td>
<td>121</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>645</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
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<td>146</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

Annual Per Capita Publication Output of UP from 2001 to 2016, in Relation with those of the University of Santo Tomas, Ateneo de Manila University, and De La Salle University (Based on Scopus Data as of 14 August 2017, and the Quacquarelli Symonds Asian University Ranking 2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>University of the Philippines</th>
<th>University of Santo Tomas</th>
<th>Ateneo de Manila University</th>
<th>De La Salle University</th>
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<td>Publications</td>
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<td>181</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>4,343</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>4,343</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>232</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>4,343</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>645</td>
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<td>2015</td>
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## APPENDIX C

Annual Per Capita Publication Output of UP from 2001 to 2016, in Relation with those of the Twelve Other ASEAN Universities that Made it to the 2016 List of Top 100 Asian Universities according to Quacquarelli Symonds (Based on Scopus Data as of 14 August 2017).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>ASEAN University</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ASEAN University</th>
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<td></td>
<td>4,080</td>
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<td></td>
<td>260</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
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Usisa, Saliksik, at Tiyaga: The Task of Philosophizing in Ferriols’s Translation of the Apology

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Abstract: This essay is a critical exposition on the translation by Roque Ferriols of Plato’s Apology. By reading this particular rendering alongside the original text as well as various translations in English, we will see certain nuances that inform us of how Ferriols views and expresses the philosophical task that Socrates is exhorting us towards in this work. We will see how details regarding verb choice and sentence construction become instrumental in presenting a specific vision of the philosophical endeavour: that it may involve an interrogation of truth-claims (usisa), but cannot simply be reduced to that, as it perhaps also involves a certain inquiry (saliksik) that goes further; more importantly, however, is how it is also and perhaps primarily a call to properly care and strive (tiyaga) for what truly matters.

Keywords: Ferriols, Apology, philosophy, translation

Preliminary: Questioning Elenchus

As we begin our study of philosophy, our sense of what philosophy itself is all about will most probably be vaguely informed by various ideas coming from a number of different figures within the history of ideas. And then, as we proceed to specialize on one particular figure, it becomes tempting to think of philosophy mainly by following our thinker of choice, and then allowing ourselves only a passing familiarity—if that much—with other thinkers’ ideas. It is from this kind of narrowing of perspective that one might easily but also somewhat simplistically formulate that the idea of philosophy in Descartes is a matter of a search for certitude, or that Hegel’s involves the dialectical unfolding of the spirit, or that Derrida’s is a polemic of deconstruction. From within this kind of summarizing disposition, one might also confidently put forward that
Socrates uses a method of aporetic dialogue, one commonly referred to as “Socratic elenchus.”

And this is not to say that such a claim is simply baseless. After all, one can turn to the so-called “Socratic” or “earlier” dialogues of Plato, and see therein this kind of discussion between Socrates and some interlocutor which does not seem to arrive at any concrete conclusion.¹ And so we find inconclusive discussions about, for instance, piety in the Euthyphro, and courage in the Laches; more specifically, we find in these discussions a display of how Socrates confounds his interlocutors and reveals how an idea previously maintained by a person might not have been thought through well enough. We can also find Plato scholars who will clarify for us how this elenchus is supposed to be understood, and thus cement in our minds the idea that this is how we should understand “Socratic method.”²

In addition, it seems that we can also turn to the Apologia (or the Trial of Socrates), wherein we not only have some demonstration of this practice, but we have Socrates in his own words, elaborating on that which he has been doing through the course of his life. He explicitly uses the term ἔλεγξω—thus, elenchus—and he also speaks of φιλοσοφεῖν, or to philosophize or to do philosophy; and as those Plato scholars are wont to remind us, while the Apologia may or may not be an accurate report of the actual defense trial of the historical Socrates, it most certainly is a portrait in high praise of the thinker, as well as an elegant exhortation to philosophize.³ Or as another commentator puts it, the Apologia is “the literary and philosophical demonstration and justification of a certain kind of life.”⁴

It has become so commonplace for us to think of the Apologia as a defense of the philosophical life that it can keep us from asking the very pertinent question: what exactly do we mean by “philosophy”? What does it mean to philosophize, and what is the philosophical life that we are being encouraged to pursue? Is that question answered by suddenly looking

¹ We will be dealing solely here with Socrates as a character of Plato, and not concern ourselves with the question of the link between this character and the historical Socrates. Readers interested in the debates on this topic are advised to turn to the essays found in: W. J. Prior, ed., Socrates: Critical Assessments – Vol. I: The Socratic Problem and Socratic Ignorance (London: Routledge, 1996).

² Robinson, for instance, defines for us: “‘Elenchus’ in the wider sense means examining a person with regard to a statement he has made, by putting to him questions calling for further statements, in the hope that they will determine the meaning and the truth-value of his first statement.” R. Robinson, “Elenchus,” in Socrates: Critical Assessments – Volume 3: Socratic Method, ed. by W. J. Prior (London: Routledge, 1996), 9.


elsewhere in the history of philosophy, or by scanning the other Platonic dialogues, or maybe even by the expedient of looking to common sense? Or, again, is this answered by simply reiterating that it is a matter of engaging in the Socratic *elenchus*? But then, what does the text of the *Apologia* itself actually say about *elenchus* in the first place?

Let us look at just some of the instances in which a cognate of ἔλεγξω is present in the *Apologia*. Early in the text, we immediately find a sentence wherein Socrates laments that it is so difficult to try to defend himself when none of his accusers are around for him to ἔλεγξαι or “to cross-examine,” as stated in 18d5. Nonetheless, he has no choice but to proceed somehow with his ἔλεγχειν or “cross-examination,” even though there is no one to answer him (in 18d7). Later on, Socrates states that he will set about trying to ἔλεγξων or “challenge” the pronouncement of the oracle concerning his supposed wisdom (in 21c1). A cognate appears again in which Socrates recounts how he obtained the reputation for being wise, because people think that he must be so, since he is able to ἔξελέγξω or “refute” his interlocutors (in 23a5). Later he puts forward a hypothetical scenario describing his meeting a person who claims to care for virtue in the way that he, Socrates, espouses; he says that he will then ἔλεγξω or “challenge” that person to verify that he truly does care (in 29e5). And finally, as Socrates reproaches those jurors who had voted against him and sentenced him to death, he warns them that their getting rid of him will not free them from eventually having to διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου or, “provide an account of [their] life” (in 39c6-7).

So, *elenchus* apparently may refer to, in turn, a cross-examination, or a challenge, or a refutation, or providing an account, depending on the context in which the word is used. It might therefore be wise to remind ourselves that we cannot simply trot out the word *elenchus* and vaunt it as Socrates’ method and conclude that what this means is already singularly and sufficiently clear. What is meant by *elenchus* certainly deserves further scrutiny. But that is not the question we are asking. Our main question—"what is philosophy?", as can be gleaned from the *Apologia*—will not be answered by simply fixating on the term *elenchus* and trying to shed further light on that particular word. It might be good for us to be reminded that “Socrates has no special word for his ‘method,’ nor does he ever refer to what

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5 When summarizing, I will be using my own words; when putting forward a direct English translation of the text, I will be using, within quotation marks, the translation of Rowe (as that is the most recent) unless otherwise specified. All instances of the text being translated into Filipino come from Ferriols. For Rowe’s translation, see: Plato, *The Last Days of Socrates*, trans. by C. Rowe (London, Penguin, 2010). For Ferriols’s translation, see: Roque Ferriols, *Mga Sinaunang Griyego* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1999).

he does as reflecting a method.”? There are many other terms employed by Socrates in describing to us what he does within the philosophical life, and that also deserves closer scrutiny. A more careful reading of the text should lead us beyond fixating on one particular word—*elenchus*—and its cognates, and trying to read into that alone a supposed method or understanding of philosophy. So, the broader question may be asked: how will the different ways by which Socrates himself speaks of what he does enlighten us about doing philosophy?

However, paying close attention to what Socrates says of what he does can be tricky. We need to be conscious of—and cautious of—a hermeneutical conundrum peculiar to someone studying the Platonic Socrates. We are warned that, “[Socrates] is our model of a philosopher. The danger is that even the most scholarly of us will make Socrates her own ideal of philosophy, and so reveal more of herself than of history when she writes of Socrates.”* Now, this difficulty is perennially present for any scholar thinking of—and perhaps idealizing—his or her philosopher, but this is arguably more pronounced in the Plato scholar trying to understand the character of Socrates, and perhaps, most of all, in the translator who strives to make Socrates’ words come alive in a new tongue. It has become axiomatic in hermeneutics to recognize that the translator cannot but place something of himself or herself—the peculiarities of his/her background and personality and mentality—into his/her rendering of the work. Now while this rightly is a word of caution for someone who is just about to translate, we can very well use this idea as a source of insight as we look at a work of translation that has already been done.

In other words, we can augment the question at hand in this essay as not simply being, how does Socrates speak of his philosophical task in the *Apologia*, but instead, going further, what we will explore here is this: how does Roque Ferriols, in his translating the *Apologia* from the original Greek into Filipino, understand the philosophical task of Socrates, as can be gleaned from the translation of the text itself?

We will try to shed light on these related questions by consulting the original text of the *Apologia* as seen in the standard scholarly resource, the Oxford Classical Text, and by looking at Ferriols’s translation as can be found in his *Mga Sinaunang Griyego*; our review of Ferriols’s rendering will be done side by side with six contemporary translations of the dialogue into English

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We will first elaborate on the part of the text in which Socrates recounts how he received both his reputation for wisdom and his mission from the gods (from 21a to 23d); we will then turn to the part of the text in which he speaks specifically of philosophy (from 28b to 29d); and finally, we will pay attention to what exactly is that matter about which Socrates is trying to persuade others (from 29d to 41e). A brief conclusion will summarize and develop our findings.

Part 1: Examining through Examination

At the start of the text, Socrates says that before he defends himself against the formal charges that have been raised against him, he would need to try to overcome a certain prejudice that most likely has long been held by many people, including the jurors; he is referring to the reputation that he, Socrates, has had for a long time of being wise. The text speaks of “a certain Socrates, a wise man,” which is how Fowler translates ὡς ἔστιν τις Σωκράτης σοφός ἄνηγο (in 18b6-7).

It might be of interest to note how Ferriols translates this line as, “… si Sokrates daw ay isang taong nagmamarunong.” While Fowler’s and the other translations in English depend on the implicit irony—of seeming to be a wise man versus truly being wise—which is what will open up the discussion on what comprises wisdom, Ferriols, in his rendering, cuts through the ambiguity. While it can be argued that the negative anticipation in Ferriols’s translation is not yet provided for in the Greek text, it has the advantage of making clear to the reader not only why he would have been found offensive by others and be in his current predicament, but more significantly, by using “nagmamarunong,” he has chosen to anticipate and posit explicitly the problematic failing that he will find, ironically, not in himself, but in those others who then despise him. This early observation, while only tangentially related to the main points we will be developing,

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11 For Grube’s translation, see Plato, “Apology,” trans. by G.M.A. Grube in Plato: Complete Works, ed. by J. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997);
already presents to us a sense of the unique expressiveness of Ferriols’s interpretive choices.

But let us proceed to our main concern. Socrates recounts how this prejudice against him started when he had learned of the pronouncement of the oracle of Delphi stating that, μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι, or that there is “no one wiser” than Socrates (in 21a6-7). He confesses that his immediate response to this claim was one of perplexity, since he does not think of himself as wise in any way, either large or small. However, as a tenet of faith, he must maintain that the divine oracle could not possible be stating a falsehood. This apparent contradiction obliges Socrates to scrutinize the truth-claim put forward by the oracle.

Let us look at the terms that Socrates employs to express these attempts at assessing the oracle’s pronouncement. Socrates says in 21b8 that he started ζήτησιν or “inquiring” into the meaning of the oracle’s claim. In Ferriols, this is rendered as, “paghahanap ng kahulugan.”

Socrates then says in 21c1 that he made it a point to ἔλεγξων or “challenge” the oracle’s claim. In Ferriols, this ἐλέγχον of the oracle’s claim is rendered as “mauusisa.” This will be done more specifically through the expedient of talking to people who are supposed to be wise, which we will turn to shortly.

But focusing first on his reaction to the oracle’s pronouncement, we see him stating in 21e6 that he was so concerned with σκοποῦντι or “searching” for its meaning. This is rendered by Ferriols as “nag-uusisa,” which echoes what he had just seen in 21c1, in his translating of ἔλεγχον.

We return to another form of ζητω in 22a4 when Socrates tells us that he was pursuing this ζητοῦντι or “search” as dictated by the divine. As with the earlier presence of this Greek verb in 21b8, we find Ferriols consistently translating this as “paghahanap.”

Having obtained some indication that perhaps the divinity is right after all, Socrates pursues his inquiry further, this time, not with a view to disproving the oracle’s claim, but of confirming, or at least, testing it with further experience. He says that he proceeds with this ζητοῦντι to ensure that the claim is, in fact, ἁνέλεγκτος (in 22a7-8). This latter term is translated by Rowe as “unrefuted,” or in other words, one might say that Socrates has gone beyond the attempt to falsify and, turning things around, instead is now trying to establish that what the oracle had claimed is true. We find this

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15 A more neutral approach to the line—which could then be taken on either a more positive or more negative sense—can be seen in two of the English translations: in Allen, we have the more neutral statement that Socrates’s thoroughness in pursuing this was out of a desire, “to not leave the oracle untested;” in Tredennick and Tarrant, we have, “to establish the truth of the
sense strongly asserted in the rendering of Ferriols, wherein Socrates is pursuing this search “hangga’t luminaw sa akin na napakatibay at di malalansag ang winika ng diyos.”

He will say once more that all of this has been a matter of ἐξετάσεως or “inquiry” of the meaning of the oracle’s pronouncement (in 22e6). We should note that Ferriols translates this verb to “pag-uusisa,” employing, once again, the term that he had used for elenchōn as we had seen in 21c1 and 21e6.

We have so far found a number of different Greek verbs used by Socrates to refer to the general act of seeking the meaning or assessing the truth claim of the oracle. In several instances of rendering these into Filipino, Ferriols favors the use of the word usisa applied not exclusively to any one Greek verb but to several. We need to consider as we proceed whether usisa thus might be a significant term for Ferriols.

For the moment, let us look at how exactly the examination works. As stated earlier, this assessing of the truth-claim of the oracle’s pronouncement—or inquiring about its meaning—would be done through talking to people who are supposed to be wise. Since the pronouncement was that “No one is wiser than Socrates,” by talking to persons deemed to be wise, that claim would be put to the test and would be proven falsified should he encounter someone who turns out to be wiser than he is.

He says in 21c3 that he first went to one of the very public personages or politicians (tōn politikōn) in town, a man reputed for his wisdom. His διασκοπῶν or “examination” of this man revealed that while he might seem to be wise (and perhaps even imagines himself to be so), the plain fact is that he is not. Ferriols uses the verb “inusisa” to refer to this examination.

He goes about trying to test the meaning of the oracle’s pronouncement further by talking to more people; and after the politicians, he moves on to the poets (tous poiētas), who he surmises must have some kind of wisdom as the basis of their creative works. Rowe translates ἐπ᾽ αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος (in 22b1-2) with the phrase, “I’d catch myself red-handed,” which idiomatically tries to capture the sense of how the act of speaking to the poets about their beautiful writings ought itself to be the very proof of Socrates’s own ignorance. Or as Ferriols puts it, “huling huli ko ang aking sarili.” Would his conversations with the poets prove Socrates less wise than they? He instead discovers that the poets are sadly betrayed by their ignorance of whatever sense might be found in their own writings, which must be, Socrates concludes, the result of some divine inspiration rather than wisdom.

oracle once for all,” leaving ambiguous whether one takes the oracle to be speaking the truth, or one is determining the truth or falsehood of the oracle.
He finally goes to the artisans (tois cheirōtēchnas), with whom he knows he will find many fine things, which he again first surmises must be the fruit of wisdom; but here again, he concludes that these people, too, fall short of wisdom, through the mistake of thinking that they are knowledgeable or wise, even regarding matters about which they actually are not.

He finds that all these types of people collectively share the ultimate foolishness (anathia) of thinking that they know when, in truth, they do not (thus, the aptness of Ferriols use of “nagmamarunong” earlier). This is how he is led to the conclusion that the oracle was speaking rightly after all: Socrates is wisest among men, understanding that his wisdom consisting of his humble recognition of his own ignorance; or to be more precise, Socrates acknowledges that he is of no worth (oudenos axios) with regard to wisdom (pros sophian).

Socrates ends the story by speaking of the present, how all this has led to enmity and to his current predicament, as it seemed to other people—interlocutors and onlookers—that he was showing off his wisdom when he engaged in this εξελέγξω of others (in 23a5). It is of interest to see how the different translators present varying degrees of force in the antagonism present between Socrates and his interlocutors. For instance, in Rowe, the interlocutors suppose themselves to have been refuted, whereas Ferriols more mildly describes what Socrates is doing in terms of “habang ako’y nagtatanong, na inuusisa ko ang dunong ng aking kapuwa.” Our interest in this is how the choice of tone and the choice of verbs inform us of how the translator views what Socrates is doing: either aggressively refuting and proving wrong in most of the English translations, or, so one could read, more mildly questioning and scrutinizing in Ferriols.

Socrates then adds that some young men follow him as he goes about this endeavour, since they delight in listening as other people are εξεταζομένων (in 23c4) or “tested” by Socrates. They then take it upon themselves to engage in their own εξετάζειν (in 23c5) or “examining” of others. In their doing so, those who have been εξεταζόμενοι (in 23c8), that is to say, their “victims,” end up hating Socrates, the figure the young men attempt to emulate. We see in this dense paragraph a form of the same verb thrice used. We also see here Rowe (and similarly Tredennick and Tarrant) employing three different English words, perhaps to avoid potentially

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16 For Rowe and for West, Socrates has refuted the interlocutors; Fowler uses the word, “confute;” in putting forward the same idea; for Tredennick and Tarrant, Socrates has disproven his interlocutor’s claim to wisdom; and similarly in Grube, Socrates ends up proving himself to have the wisdom that his interlocutor did not have. More neutrally (and more an echo of the Ferriols’s translation), we have Allen rendering this line as Socrates being engaged in testing others.
tedious repetition in such a compact sentence. By contrast, our other translators—Allen, Fowler and Grube—more faithfully select and repeat one verb to reflect the repetition in the original. We also find this kind of fidelity to the original in Ferriols, who uses the words “pag-usisa,” “mang-usisa,” and, “mga inusisa” respectively for these three forms of exetazō mentioned above.

As we move forward in the text, we will find this verb reiterated (in 33c3) when Socrates answers the question on why these young men, who he has supposedly corrupted, enjoy being around him: it has to do with how they find amusing the way Socrates trumps those who are “examined” or ἐξεταζομένοις. This is rendered by Ferriols as “nag-usisa sa mga nag-aakalang marunong.”

We need to distinguish how there are actually two examinations at work here: The first examination refers to the testing of the pronouncement of the oracle, as to whether or not it is the case that there is no one wiser than Socrates. This is done by way of the second examination, by engaging people—particularly those with some kind of reputation for wisdom—in conversation, and on that basis, assessing whether or not this person has a greater wisdom compared to Socrates.

Ferriols uses usisa for three different Greek verbs that refer to Socrates’s assessing of the pronouncement of the oracle: ἐλέγξων in 21c1, σκοποῦντι in 21e6, and ἐξετάσεως in 22e6. Ferriols also uses usisa when referring to what Socrates does in the course of the conversations: for διασκοπῶν in 21c3, and ἐξελέγξω in 23a5, and most significantly, for the three forms of exetazō in 23c (ἐξεταζομένων in 23c4; ἔξετάζειν in 23c5; ἐξεταζόμενοι in 23c8) and one more time, for ἐξεταζομένοις in 33c3. We can perhaps stipulate on this basis that Ferriols prefers the use of this verb, usisa to refer specifically to an instance of testing of some kind of truth-claim: whether this be the explicit and specific truth claim that had come from the oracle, or the many truth-claims he encountered, which, while unspecified as to their particulars, the presence of which must certainly be inferred from the conversations that he had with many different interlocutors.

As stated above, Socrates informs us that it has been this practice of his which has led to the enmity of others and the source of that reputation he has; however, he also informs us that he still goes about as he had in the past. Thus, he tells us (in 23b4-6) that: ταύτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἐτι καὶ νῦν περιῄειν καὶ ἑρευνῶ. The two verbs provided are zétō and ereunō. As he goes around, even now, he is, in Fowler’s translation, “seeking and searching.” In Rowe’s translation, the two verbs are collapsed into “search.” Ferriols translates these two verbs as, “hinahanap at sinasaliksik.”

What is the object of this seeking and searching? The sentence next mentions anyone who seems to Socrates to be wise. Conceivably, one would
suppose this to be the direct object of these verbs, that the continued endeavor is a matter of seeking out those with a reputation for wisdom, in order to refute them. We could interpret this — along the lines of Rowe’s rendering — such that the two verbs used here refer to one and the same thing, the finding and assessing, and ultimately, refuting of the truth-claim of another person. And yet, Rowe aside, the other translators choose to provide two distinct English verbs, in a way that more closely echoes the original; this seems to allow us to posit that beyond the finding (ζήτω), there is some form of “inquiry” (Allen) or, “search” (Tredennick and Tarrant) or, “investigation” (Fowler, Grube, West) or, “pananaliksik” (Ferriols) that is taking place. These translators, in their word choice, all acknowledge the difference between the verb used here (ἐρευνῶ) and all the different verbs used earlier to refer to the assessment of truth-claims. So, when we see Ferriols use a new term here—saliksik—in distinction from the earlier usisa, we are alerted to the possibility of exploring further whether this difference is relevant. The assessment of truth-claims, important as it may be, might not be all there is to what Socrates does. In other words, we can ask: is there something more—beyond the assessment of truth-claims—involved in doing philosophy?

Part 2: The Mission of Philosophy

Immediately following Socrates’s story of the double examination, he presents an audacious parallelism between himself and the Homeric heroes of old. He first posits a statement from a hypothetical juror: wouldn’t Socrates wish to rethink everything that he has been doing, since it had landed him in this predicament, in which his life itself is at stake? His reply to his own question is to ask whether a real man cared about life or death, or any possible danger to himself; instead, wouldn’t a real man care only about the question of whether or not he was doing the right thing, doing what needed to be done, no matter what? He explicitly compares himself to Achilles, who gladly faced death as long as he would first be able to avenge his friend, Patroclus. He then shifts from this specific heroic figure to the more general heroic figure of a soldier who steadfastly remains wherever he might be stationed by his superior, even in the face of great danger.

He then speaks of his own task in terms of his having been given an order by his superior, the divine, and he presents this order as follows: φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖ ζῆν καὶ ἑξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους (in 28e5-6).17 The first half of this line (the first four words) would give us “to live...
a life of philosophy,” whereas the second half of this line (the last five words) would give us “examining myself and others.” We have, here, two verbal phrases with the conjunction, kai between them. This allows for a potential ambiguity present in the Greek and potentially echoed in English, wherein the two verbs involved can either be thought of as two distinct tasks (I was running and jumping), or the latter is implied in the former without the two necessarily being identified (I was running and working up a sweat), and finally it could also refer to an identification, with two verbs being employed for the sake of emphasis (I was running and pounding the streets).

This means that there are different possible ways of construing the link between philosophounta and exetazonta. Is the philosophical life identical with this examination of one’s self and others? Or are these two different tasks? Distinct from, and yet reflective of, our question on the verbs usisa and saliksik as we have seen earlier, this statement here begs a new question of what “philosophy” would mean if we are to distinguish it from this examination. Or could we consider the possibility of some kind of examination being implied in philosophy without their being simply identical? That is to say, could philosophy involve some kind of examination, but in such a way that it need not be simply reducible to that?

Let us turn to the various translations.

The translations of Fowler and West maintain the use of the conjunction, translating kai with “and,” such that in doing so, they retain the ambiguity inherent in the presence of kai in the text. The translations of Allen, Grube, Rowe, and Tredennick and Tarrant make use of a comma, and while that similarly allows for the same kind of ambiguity, it can also be argued that the punctuation mark allows for a reading that leans more towards the latter verbal phrase being an extension of the first, clarifying what would be involved in the former, or even making an identification between those two terms. This is arguably how we can read the rendering of Ferriols when he gives us: “…na kailangan kong mabuhay sa pilosopiya, sa pagsasaliksik sa sarili at sa kapuwa...” This pananaliksik clarifies what it means to live in philosophy, either by way of identification, or at least as presenting one aspect of it.

We find pananaliksik as Ferriols’s way of translating the verb: exetazonta. We also find that all of the English translations use a form of “to examine” for exetazonta. We should also recall that we had already seen on a number of occasions that some form of the term exetazonta had been used to refer to the examination of the pronouncement of the oracle and the examination of the wisdom of Socrates’s interlocutors.

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Fowler and West are the only translators who use a form of “examine” for *exetazonta* in both the discussion of the assessment for truth-claims and this line we are analyzing here. Their renderings would give a reader reason to suppose that philosophizing primarily means this assessment of truth-claims. We have seen how Rowe, and Tredennick and Tarrant did not, in the earlier discussion of *exetazonta*, use consistently any one particular word, and so their use of “examine,” here, does not lend itself to one particular interpretation of the verb choice; since they present us with various terms, we are discouraged from taking any of them in any strict technical sense.

By contrast, Allen had earlier consistently used a form of “test,” while for this line he uses “examining.” One could simply read these terms as synonymous, and leave it at that; what we mean by “examining” is nothing more than the testing of truth-claims. However, the difference between verbs could also be read as indicative of a recognition that there could be something more at work in philosophizing, something that could be called “examination” that goes beyond any testing of truth-claims. And this might also be a way we can understand Ferriols’s choice to translate *exetazonta* here, not with *usisa*, as he we have previously seen him do (in 23c and 33c3), but instead with *saliksik*. One can consider these two Filipino verbs as being simply synonymous, or instead, one might take the philosophical task—expressed here as a form of *saliksik*—to extend beyond what one does in *usisa*. This is consistent with the suggestion that was earlier posited, at the end of the previous section of this essay.

Having asserted what his task is, Socrates then provides a hypothetical scenario; he imagines the possibility of the jury showing him leniency in exchange for his giving up on this task. Speaking on behalf of the jury in this scenario, he posits that condition (in 29c7-8) as follows: ἐφ᾽ ὧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν.18

Once again, we have two verbal phrases—as made apparent in *zétēsei diatribein* and then in *philosophein*—connected by the presence of the two negatory markers: *mēkētē* and *mēde*. The formulation makes for the rhetorical ambiguity (similar to what we have seen earlier in the use of *kai*). To understand this better, we can first consider a similar problem in English, which is the ambiguity inherent in using the *either-or* construct. Consider a

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18 The line in 29c7-8 is rendered by the various translators as follows: Ferriols: “Huwag ka nang mag-aksaya ng panahon sa iyong pananaliksik; huwag ka nang mamilosopiya;” Allen: “… that you no longer pass time in that inquiry of yours, or pursue philosophy;” Fowler: “… that you no longer spend your time in this investigation or in philosophy;” Grube: “… that you spend no more time on this investigation and do not practice philosophy;” Rowe: “… that you stop spending your time on this search of yours, and you stop doing philosophy;” Tredennick and Tarrant: “… that you give up spending time on your quest and stop philosophizing;” West: “… that you no longer spend time in this investigation or philosophize.”
statement taking the form: do neither x nor y; here, x and y may be distinct terms (she neither eats nor sleeps), or one is implicated in the other (she neither exercises nor tries to stay fit), or it might even be possible for them to be identical, with the repetition being for the sake of emphasis (she neither desires nor longs for me). So, similarly, the way we understand the link between \textit{zétései diatribein} with \textit{philosophein} is an open question.

In Grube, Rowe, and Tredennick and Tarrant, we find the use of “and” as the conjunction of choice, which, as stated earlier, serves to retain ambiguity; and as with the earlier line, ambiguity would allow a reader to see the terms of the two verbal phrases as distinct, which would, once again, allow for the further question of what “philosophy” should mean if distinguished from \textit{zétései diatribein}. In Allen, Fowler, and West, we find the use of the connector, “or,” which, again returning to a point made previously, still retains some ambiguity, but also lends itself more to a reading wherein one of the terms serves to clarify the other. The rendering of Ferriols is unique in that instead of using any word as a form of conjunction, he splits the sentence in two with a semi-colon: “Huwag ka nang mag-aksaya ng panahon sa iyong pananaliksik; huwag ka nang mamilosopiya.”

The effect of this in one’s reading of the text is decisive. The latter verbal phrase becomes a clear reiteration of what has gone previously. To spend time (\textit{diatribein}) on this search (\textit{zétései}) is what philosophizing (\textit{philosophein}) is all about. There is, thus, no need to wonder further as to what else philosophizing might be apart from or distinct from this search. In Ferriols’s rendering, \textit{pamimilosopiya} is all about this \textit{pananaliksik}. What would thus matter as we proceed is trying to arrive at a better understanding of what \textit{saliksik} is all about.

Given that hypothetical offer of leniency presented by Socrates to himself, he then immediately responds with an obstinate refusal to abandon the task given to him by the god. As the line states in 29d4-6: οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι ψιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ….19

At first glance, it might seem as if our work here will become even more complicated by the presence not just of two verbs as we have seen so far, but this time, of three verbs— \textit{φιλοσοφῶν}, \textit{παρακελευόμενός}, and

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19 The line in 29c7-8 is rendered by the various translators as follows: Ferriols: “Walang tigil akong mamimilosopiya, magbibigay ng payo sa inyo; matatagpuan ninyo ako sa aking dating anyo.” Allen: “I shall not cease to pursue wisdom or to exhort you, charging any of you …;” Fowler: “I shall never give up philosophy or stop atop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any of you …;” Grube: “I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any of you …;” Rowe: “I shall never stop doing philosophy, exhorting you all the while and declaring myself to whichever of you I meet …;” Tredennick and Tarrant: “I shall never stop practicing philosophy and exhorting you and indicating the truth for everyone that I meet …;” West: “I will certainly not stop philosophizing and I will exhort you and explain this …;”
ἐνδεικνύμενος—once again connected by the conjunction *kai*, with all the
equivocities that such a construct permits, as we had seen earlier. However,
this will not be the case when we look at the rendering of Ferriols: “Walang
tigil akong mamimilosopiya, magbibigay ng payo sa inyo; matatagpuan
ninyo ako sa aking dating anyo.” The text has been streamlined to only bring
in two verbs—*mamimilosopiya* and *magbibigay ng payo*—with the third verb of
what Socrates does passively implied in the statement that follows
“matatagpuan ninyo ako sa dati kong anyo.”

This rendering of Ferriols deserves some comment. First, we can see
how the second verb, *parakeleuomenos* has been translated into English by our
translators using some form of “to exhort.” There is, arguably, something
gentler and less of an imposition on the other in the attitude present in
Ferriols’s translation of “magbibigay ng payo.” This echoes the earlier
difference in attitude between aggressive refutation, and milder questioning
and scrutinizing of another. Second, the disappearance of the third verb in
Ferriols may be justified as the succeeding sentence will clarify what is taking
place. We shall later consider what takes place there, and also how it might
help clarify one or both of the two earlier verbs. Third, with that third verb
gone, in looking at the Ferriols translation, we need to consider only the
relation of the two verbs present: *mamimilosopiya* and *magbibigay ng payo*.

In thinking of this line, we can first see in Tredennick and Tarrant,
and also in West, the use of the conjunction, “and,” again keeping open the
question of what philosophy might mean when distinguished from the latter
terms; Allen, and Fowler use “or,” which may or may not echo the
ambiguities of “and” in ways similar to what had already been discussed;
finally, Grube, Rowe, and Ferriols make use of a comma. Again, the terms so
construed may be interpreted with some ambivalence, but to reiterate the
argument presented earlier, this form lends itself more to the interpretation
that philosophy can be identified with—or at very least, involves—
exhortation (or using Ferriols’s rendering, whatever it is about which he shall
be giving advice).

The content of this advice (or the specific exhortation, if one prefers
the English renderings) is an open question, and we will discuss this at length
in the third section of this essay. For now, let us summarize where we are at
this point: Socrates speaks of an assessment of truth-claims in which he has
been—and apparently still is—involved; he then speaks of philosophy, and
yet he does so within constructs that make it an interpretative question as to
how philosophy should be thought of in relation to some form of examination
or *exetazonta*. Because forms of *exetazonta* were used to refer to the assessment
of truth-claims, there is basis for supposing that philosophy is primarily all
about this refutation of others. But should one prefer it, there is also reason for considering whether philosophy involves more than that, perhaps involving a form of examination that remains distinct from the assessment of truth-claims and the refutation of other people. This seems to have been given form and expression by Ferriols in his choice of two verbs whose uses can be distinguished: usisa, for the assessing of truth-claim, and saliksik, for something more. But even before we could explore what this second term could mean, a complication has arisen: apparently, philosophy involves some kind of exhortation or advice-giving also. Let us examine what this could be about; we might find that this will help clarify what kind of inquiry or search or saliksik is involved in philosophy.

Part 3: Caring as Effort

The last line that we paid attention to shows the philosophical act as involving some form of exhortation which is how all the English translations render parakeleuomenos. We have seen that Ferriols translates this as “pagbibigay ng payo.” A comment on the difference in attitude between the English and the Filipino verb has already been stated. Setting that aside for now, we can consider the question: what would the exhortation or the payo be about? As we shall see, Socrates seems to want his interlocutors to care.

This is how English translators almost always render the various forms of ἐπιμελεῖα that appear in the text. This is the first word that we find in the standard Greek-English lexicon, Liddell and Scott: the listing for epimeleia gives us care, attention, diligence. So, let us be clear: we are not calling into question the use of the word “care” to refer to epimeleia; still the question can be asked, what do we mean by care?

We might speak of a certain mother as caring for her children, and by that we would mean how she attends daily to all their needs. This woman’s brother, the children’s uncle, might also be said to care for them, although that might mean he has some fondness for them such that he gives them gifts on Christmas, the one time in the year he sees them. Or maybe, I could tell you that my friend, Anna cares for the environment, and elaborate on all her work in certain environmental advocacies; but I could also remark that she cares for pizza, by which I simply mean that that is what she loves to eat.

The point here is that the word care could equally refer to something like an internal disposition or affect, on one hand, and maybe something directed externally into action, on the other, with all sorts of possible variations in between. Without having to elaborate on the various

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20 As seems to be Rowe’s reading. See C. Rowe, translator’s footnote in Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, note 49, p. 180.

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possibilities for the word itself, further, we can recognize how care allows for ambiguity in interpretation. This ambiguity, however, is remarkably absent in Ferriols. In his rendering, epimeleia becomes explicitly, and almost unequivocally, a matter of effort, and even struggle. This is made evident in the number of instances that he uses the words sikap and tiyaga. Let us look at this more closely.

Socrates reports that in his conversation with others, he chastises them, his fellow Athenians, asking them whether or not it shamed them that they would excessively ἐπιμελούμενος or, “care” for money (29d9). In Ferriols, this is rendered as “… hindi mo ikinahihiyang magtiyaga upang humigit sa lahat any iyong kayamanan.” And Socrates adds in 29e2-3 that it is further shameful for them to be so preoccupied while “not caring” (οὐκ ἐπιμελῇ) or thinking about being as best as one can (ʰός beltisté estai). In Ferriols, this is rendered as “hindi ka ba nagsisikap, hindi ba mahalaga sa iyo na ikaw ay maging pinakamagaling?”

Socrates then adds that if ever one of his interlocutors should claim that he does ἐπιμελεῖσθαι or, “care,” then he, Socrates, would not simply let the other off, but that Socrates will continue talking with him and testing him (in 29e3-a5). In Ferriols, Socrates describes such a man as “isa sa inyo na nagsasaging nagsisikap siya.”

This active aspect of the exhortation is made even more pronounced and also object-specific when he urges that a person should not ἐπιμελεῖσθαι or, “care” for his body or for money as much as—or more than—he would his own self (τές psuchés), and on this regard rather than any other, try to be at one’s best (aristé estai) in 30a8-b2. In Ferriols, this is rendered as “… huwag pag-aabalahan ang katawan, huwag gawing unang layon ang kuwarta; walang dapat makadaig sa maningas na pagtiyagiyaga alang sa tunay na sarili, nang ito’y maging tunay na magaling.” The insertion of “maningas na pagtiyagitaga” in the line actually does not directly translate any particular Greek term, but stands for the implied epimeleia in the line, and in the reading of Ferriols, what is emphasized is that one should assiduously strive for what one truly cares about. We might note two distinct verbs in the Filipino translation of this line: pag-aabala and pagtiyagitaga. We shall return to this shortly.

Socrates speaks of his own task, in 31b5, as going around like a father or elder brother persuading others to ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, “to care” for virtue (aretés). Ferriols translates this as “nagbibigay loob na pagtiyagaan ninyo ang tunay na kabutihan.”

Further down in 36c5-d2, he reiterates the exhortation, repeating the verb often, that he urges each one to μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι or “not care” about what one might possess, but instead to ἐπιμεληθεὶη or “care” about one being at one’s best (beltistos) and wisest (phronimŏtatos). Ferriols renders
this as “huwag muna niyang pag-abalahan ang pag-aari kundi ang sarili: pagsikapan nyang humantong sa ubod ng kabutihan at katinuhan.” Again, we find the emphasis on effort, as well as the pair of verbs, abala and sikap, echoing the earlier pair of abala and tiyaga.

We will find one more instance of that pairing of distinct verbs, this time, towards the end of the Apologia, in 41c4-7. Here, we see Socrates imploring his listeners to act towards his own sons in the same way that he had acted towards them: to observe if they happen to ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, or, “be caring,” for money or any other thing rather than virtue, and to reproach them for οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται or “not caring” about what they should. For the earlier form of the verb, Ferriols uses “pinag-abalahan,” whereas in the second, he gives us “sapagkat hindi nila pinagtiyatiyagaan ang nararapat.”

The juxtaposition of paired verbs in the three instances mentioned above is telling. In 30a8-b2, it was abala for the body, and tiyaga for the concern for the true self. In 36c5-d2, it was again abala for possessions, and sikap for being the best and wisest one can be; this is echoed once more in 41c4-7, with abala again for money and other trivialities, and tiyaga for that which rightly deserves effort, and this, we can deduce, is virtue. This choice of terms could be taken as indicative of Ferriols’s sense of what philosophizing requires: it is easy enough for one to have a care or concern or simply be preoccupied (abala) with something, which is honestly unimportant, but that which truly matters will require effort and hard work (sikap and tiyaga) if one is to truly care for it. This idea would have to be inferred in the English translations which are unwilling (or perhaps unable?) to make this an explicit point of the text.

We will find, still further, traces of this attitude in the rendering of Ferriols even where it is not a matter of translating some form of epimeleia.

For instance, let us return to the hypothetical scenario posited by Socrates wherein he is conversing with one who claims to care; should he find that this person is only pretending, he will then “rebuke him for making things that are most valuable his lowest priority and giving higher priority to things of lesser worth.” This is how Rowe translates the line in 29e5-30a2: ὀνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἀξία περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος, closely following how one makes (poietai) much worth (ta pleistou axia) about what actually is worth little (peri elachistou), and conversely makes little (ta phaulotera) about what actually is worth more (peri pleionos). Let me reiterate how, in the English, the ambiguity is generally present as to the extent to which one should see the disposition in terms of internal affect or in terms of active effort. By contrast, in Ferriols, we find: “pangangaralan ko siya na ang tiyaga na dapat ibuhos sa mahalaga ay kanyang inaaksaya sa kabuktutan, at katamaran ang kanyang inihaharap sa mahalaga.” It becomes clear in the comparison that the notion of an effort—tiyaga—that one ought to exercise, as opposed to laziness—katamaran—or
lack of effort that one ought to dispel, might not be something explicitly expressed in the original text, but is a unique and meaningful inference incorporated in the Ferriols translation.

A further trace of this emphasis on effort is found in 36c4-d2; we had already seen this text earlier, paying attention to how Socrates exhorts us to not care for anything other than being best in terms of being wisest. But now let us turn to what Socrates says about what he, himself, is doing; in speaking of his own task, Socrates uses the verb: epicheirōn. Translated by Allen as “undertook,” and by West as “attempted,” all the other English translations use some form of the common English verb, “try,” for this. One would therefore understand if Ferriols had used here the term, “subok,” providing the simplest Filipino word for “try,” but instead we find him using again, “tiyaga,” when he says, “Pinagtiyagaan kong hikayatin ang bawat isa ....” There is strong emphasis in the Ferriols translation of the continued effort on the part of Socrates’ own act of exhorting, which is reflected in the effort that he is demanding from his interlocutors.

As one last indicator of this emphasis on effort in the Ferriols translation, we can return to the way Socrates affirms that he will not give up on the task. We had seen earlier his response to the imagined offer of leniency if he would just desist from what he has been doing. His emphatic reply, in 29d4, is to say that he will continue philosophizing. The translations of οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν in English basically assert that Socrates will not stop in philosophizing even with the offer of leniency.21 Again, to mimic this, Ferriols could have simply chosen to translate this in Filipino as “hindi a ko titigil sa pilosopiya,” but what we see, instead, in the Ferriols rendering is “walang tigil akong mamimilosopiya.” This term in Filipino not only covers that decision to not stop when offered leniency, but it also expresses a constancy, a continued and tireless effort that could be inferred, but is not quite explicit, in the English renderings.

To conclude this section, we can note how Socrates gives some indicators of what he believes people should rightly care for, and this may be understood in terms of care for the self. This is thought of as a priority towards being at one’s best in terms of wisdom and virtue, rather than being preoccupied with possessions. However, a significant point about all this which is much more explicit in the Ferriols rendering than any of the English ones is the disposition that philosophy requires, that it is not about having a care in some blasé manner or passionate internal affect, but requires a willingness to commit to sustained effort and striving.

21 See note 19 above.
Conclusion: Striving to Know the Good

We started with the question: how can we understand what philosophy is as has been given to us in a specific philosophical text, the *Apologia*? The question is compounded by a consideration of what a particular translation of the text gives us, such that we can rephrase the previous question in terms of: what does Ferriols’s Socrates tell us about what it means to philosophize as can be found in his *Apolohiya*?

We dismissed the idea that we can simplistically claim that Socratic philosophy is all about “the elenchus,” as it might be tempting to immediately suppose; with that cleared out of the way, we looked more closely at what the text actually offers.

We explored how Socrates recounts this double examination of assessing the oracle’s pronouncement of his supposed wisdom by assessing what other people say; in his doing so, he has garnered many enemies, as his work seems to involve his constant refutation of others. There might be reason to suppose that this, in itself, is what constitutes the philosophical act. When one sees a verb used to refer to this cross-examination (*exetazonta*), and then, later, sees that verb again being mentioned alongside the use of the word “philosophy,” one could take this love of wisdom to be one and the same with the assessment of truth-claims. One might say that the mission consists of nothing more than cross-examination and a demonstration to others of their ignorance. And yet one might see it otherwise and recognize that there could be more to what Socrates does than simply refuting other people’s statements.

While a haphazard use of terms could point us in either interpretive direction, we see Ferriols markedly delineating between two activities—*usisa* and *saliksik*—while his further word choices present an attitude and character to Socrates that is less aggressive and more genial than in some of the other translators. A significant point to raise here is that the assessment of others’ truth-claims should not be isolated from the exhortative aspect of what Socrates has been doing, as he details to us how he has always been urging the people he converses with to care more greatly for some things rather than others. We have tried to see how the rendering of Ferriols of *epimeleia* with the Filipino words *sikap* and *tiyaga* gives us—over and above the somewhat weak *care* often used in the English translations—that sense of constant effort or active pursuit or striving for what truly matters.

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23 “But Socrates does not just seek to call into question his interlocutors’ false beliefs about how one ought to live; he also hopes to make substantive and constructive progress towards developing a correct understanding of how one ought to live.” T. C. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith, *Plato’s Socrates* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 12.
More concretely, what is this striving all about? What is it that truly matters and about which I ought to show sikap and tiyaga? We are told it is about arête or virtue or kabutihan; and we are told, it is about phronimōtatos or being best concerning wisdom or katinuhan. This is all well and good; we know what it is about. Or do we? This is the all-important question; do we know how we ought to live, do we know virtue, or do we only think that we know (nagmamarunong)? Our ignorance is precisely ignorance on how one is to act with kabutihan and katinuhan. But if our ignorance echoes Socrates’s own, this ignorance is not negative but positive; it is a challenge before us. Or as Ferriols himself puts it in his commentary, “Ilong pag-angkin na hindi siya marunong ay hindi galing sa dilim ng walang isip, kundi galing sa liwanag ng pag-unawa.” 24 The realization of ignorance is that first trace of wisdom by which one understands that one needs to search further. This is why inquiry—saliksik—can and must still be done, with untiring effort and striving on our part.

What more can we say of saliksik? In an often quoted line from the Apologia, it is often stated that “the unexamined life is not worth living,” which is Fowler’s way of translating ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ in 38a5-6, and the other English translations more or less echo this rendering. Ferriols gives us “palibhasa’y ang buhay na hindi sinasaliksik ay hindi tao.” But since this is a statement that is expressed negatively, what is the positive corollary?

Often forgotten in the process of turning that quote into a cliché is the line that immediately precedes it; Socrates says in 38a2-5: “ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἄγαθόν ὁ ἀνδρόμορος τοῦτο, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τῶν [sic] λόγων ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃν ὑμεῖς ἔμοι ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἐξετάζοντος.” Rowe translates this as, “It actually is the greatest good for a human being to get into discussion, every day, about goodness and the other subjects you hear me talking and examining myself and others about.” Or as Ferriols puts it, “... na pinakadakilang biyaya sa tao na sa balang araw nakakasilita siya ukol sa tunay na kabutihan at ukol sa mga naririning ninyong pinag-usapan ko, habang sinasaliksik ko ang aking sarili at ang aking kapuwa ....” This allows us to better understand what this philosophical task involves: an inquiry about becoming best and wisest and virtuous that takes place on a daily basis. This inquiry or search is dialogical, not simply a matter of personal introspection or individual reflection, but is conducted through one’s engaging with and speaking to others even as one looks into how we live our lives.

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24 Roque Ferriols, Mga Sinaunang Griyego (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1999), 103.
25 I presume Ferriols, here, means “bawat.”
Now, when we posit that the main point is inquiry, there might be reason for one to suppose that the conversation is instrumental in character; by talking to others, I get to clarify for myself my own thinking about what is good. Another, more generous perspective is to see not only the conversation but the inquiry itself as shared. As one commentator posits, perhaps the goal here is knowledge of the most important things, but this can only be attained through a shared search, involving a readiness to learn from others, and so, philosophy is an invitation to others who may be just as ignorant to join in the search. 26 This seems to echo Ferriols’s own position, when he remarks, “Natauhan [si Sokrates] na itinalaga sa kanya ng diyos ang isang gawain: Tulungan ang kanyang kapuwa tao na magpakatao.” 27 This might be a reason for the general gentleness of Socrates in the translation of Ferriols, as we have noted earlier; while the English translations have Socrates more aggressively refuting and exhorting, in Ferriols, we find him more genially and collegially engaged in questioning and offering advice. The people one engages in dialogue are not competitors, but companions.

There is a shared inquiry, through conversation, on what it means to be virtuous, to be wise, to be truly human. One might even add that, in potential response to an often-stated criticism against philosophy that it is all about conversation, that it is just all “talk,” in this text Ferriols, presents to the reader an image of the inquiry as active, not only in the sense that one is actively inquiring, but also that the inquiry is of what one should actively be doing. As Ferriols puts it, “Sa bawat kalagayan ng buhay, tinatanong [ni Sokrates]: Ano ang gagawin dito ng isang mabuting tao? Ano ang panawagan ng katarungan ngayon? Tinatanong niya ito habang pinagsisikapan niyang gawin ang gagawin ng mabuting tao, isagawa ang katarungan.” 28 This perhaps allows us to understand better why epimeleia is consistently translated in terms of sikap and tiyaga; this is both an inquiry towards and a pursuit of living ethically, of heeding the call of justice, and both these aspects call for much effort.

Philosophy, then, requires—but should not be identified with—the assessment of truth-claims (usisa); certainly, it does not relish the deconstruction of another’s position for its own sake. This starting point serves the need to free the self from the illusion of knowing and to accept ignorance as the condition for sincere searching (saliksik). The object of search is basically ethical, living the best life possible, and this requires having care

27 Roque Ferriols, Mga Sinaunang Griyego (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1999), 104.
28 Ferriols, Mga Sinaunang Griyego, 105.
epimeleia) for what truly matters, and the pursuit and practice of this calls for our striving and our perseverance (tiyaga).

Ferriols says of Sokrates that “gumagawa siya ng kapaligiran upang maging posible sa taong ito na siya’y makakita … upang magpakatayo siya sa wakas.”29 We might extend this statement to Ferriols himself, and say that in true Socratic spirit, he has provided us through his Apolohiya with a window looking into a world of earnest and unjaded philosophical inquiry. Through his nuanced use of Filipino, we are presented with a unique and eloquent expression of the Socratic invitation to acknowledge our ignorance and to pursue an active life of inquiry and of striving to become more fully human.

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Ferriols, Roque, Mga Sinaunang Griyego (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1999).


29 Ibid., 104.
Are Modal Conditions Necessary for Knowledge?

Mark Anthony L. Dacela

Abstract: Modal epistemic conditions have played an important role in post-Gettier theories of knowledge. These conditions purportedly eliminate the pernicious kind of luck present in all Gettier-type cases and offer a rather convincing way of refuting skepticism. This motivates the view that conditions of this sort are necessary for knowledge. I argue against this. I claim that modal conditions, particularly sensitivity and safety, are not necessary for knowledge. I do this by noting that the problem cases for both conditions point to a problem that cannot be fixed even by a revised similarity ranking or ordering of worlds. I offer as groundwork a set theoretical analysis of the profiles of the problem cases for safety and sensitivity. I then demonstrate that these conditions fail whenever necessary links constitutive of the epistemic situation actually obtain but are not modally preserved.

Keywords: Gettier problem, sensitivity, safety, modal epistemic conditions

Introduction

The Gettier problem is exemplified in cases where (1) the subject could have easily believed otherwise and in instances where (2) the proposition that the subject believes could have easily been false. These features motivate the intuition that in these cases some sort of luck is involved: Given (1), the subject, it seems, only accidentally believes a true proposition; and given (2), the proposition that the subject believes seems only coincidentally true. In both instances we have a justified but luckily true belief.

Some epistemologists believe that this intuition is modal in nature: that ‘S accidentally believes p’ is explained by the intuition that there is a
possible world where S believes otherwise, while ‘that \( p \) is accidentally true’ is explained by the intuition that there is a possible world where \( p \) is false. Epistemologists who endorse this view usually drop the justification requirement of knowledge and replace it with a condition that is supposed to guarantee the connection between a person’s justification for believing a proposition and the truth of the proposition he or she believes. It is assumed that such condition guarantees a stronger connection between S’s justification for believing \( p \) and the truth of \( p \). If correct, this would mean that in any instance of knowledge, S would not have easily believed otherwise, and that \( p \) would not have easily been false. Or, in modal terms, that in nearby possible worlds, S would still believe that \( p \) and \( p \) would still be true. What these epistemologists propose is a counterfactual or modal analysis of knowledge that requires counterfactual or modal conditions.

I argue here that modal conditions, particularly sensitivity and safety, are not necessary for knowledge. I do this by examining the profiles of problem cases for sensitivity and safety, noting that these cases actually point to a more serious problem than that of having a vague world-similarity criterion. I ground my argument on an analysis that treats the epistemic situation as a set which members are necessarily linked. I claim that these conditions fail whenever these necessary links that are constitutive of epistemic situations actually obtain but are not modally preserved.

**Modal Epistemic Conditions**

Robert Nozick\(^2\) offers the following as necessary conditions for knowing:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{C1:} & \quad \text{If } p \text{ weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that } p. \\
& \quad \text{(Variation condition)} \\
\text{C2:} & \quad \text{If } p \text{ were true, S would believe it. (Adherence condition)}
\end{align*}
\]

C1 and C2 require *sensitivity* to the truth-value of the proposition. These conditions ask us to consider the status of the belief in situations that would obtain if the proposition is false, and if it remains true. Nozick requires that the belief be made *sensitive* to the truth-value of the proposition, such that if the proposition were false, the subject would not have believed it, and if the proposition remained true in a slightly different situation, the subject would have believed it still.

Sosa, on the other hand, offers the following conditions as an alternative to Nozick’s sensitivity condition:

\[ C3: \text{S would believe that } p \text{ only if it were so that } p. \]

Or alternatively,

\[ C4: \text{S would not believe that } p \text{ without it being the case that } p. \]

C3 requires us to check close possible worlds where the subject believes the proposition and see if in those worlds the proposition that the subject believes is true. Or close possible worlds where the subject does not believe the proposition and see if in those worlds the proposition is false (C4).

Profiles of Sensitivity and Safety Counterexamples

I categorize problem cases for sensitivity and safety into three types:

(1) **A-TYPE:** S has strong justification for believing \( p \) and \( p \) is true.

A-type cases involve a subject who has a strong justification for believing a true proposition, which makes his or her belief *strongly justified*. Justification is strong if the subject’s evidence is almost conclusive. I place under this category the problem cases offered by Vogel and later Sosa, Gellman, and Briggs and Nolan. In A-type cases, the subject’s belief is *internally justified*, insofar as the subject has access to the evidence that supports his or her belief. And as far as there are no (actual) defeaters in the description of the case, A-type beliefs are actually *undefeated*. Thus, in the actual world, the belief is both

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4 The safety condition is strikingly similar to Nozick’s conditions. However, they are not logically equivalent since contraposition is invalid for counterfactuals.

5 For a more extensive discussion of these cases see Mark Anthony Dacela, “Where Sensitivity Don’t Work,” *Suri*, 6:2 (2017), 110-123.

internally justified and undefeated, such that no contrary evidence is given or accessible to the subject. Proponents of these counterexamples count as close worlds those in which the subject holds the same evidence, so the actual belief-characteristics are extended to these worlds. Worlds in which the subject does not believe the proposition are excluded from the set of relevant worlds, while worlds in which the proposition is true and the subject believes it are counted as close. A-type beliefs then turn out to be insensitive, but safe.

(2) B-TYPE: S forms belief $p$ via method $m$, $m$ is conditionally reliable ($m$ is unreliable in a possible circumstance $r$ that almost obtained) and $p$ is true.

B-type cases involve a subject who forms his or her belief using a conditionally reliable method. A method is conditionally reliable if in case there is a possible circumstance where it fails to be reliable. I place under this category problem cases offered by Baumann, Neta and Rohrbaugh, Cosmeña, and Freitag. In these cases, the subject is unaware of the method’s conditional reliability. B-type beliefs are internally justified but are factually defeated. Factual defeaters are true propositions that are unknown to the subject at the time he or she forms his or her belief. The presence of factual defeaters generates two analyses for B-type beliefs: (1) they are either taken as internally justified but almost defeated or (2) internally justified and undefeated. It all depends on how serious one takes the threat of factual defeat. Proponents of these counterexamples count worlds in which the subject holds the same evidence so the belief-characteristics extend to close possible worlds. However, if (1), then the set of close worlds include those in which S’s belief is defeated. If (2), then the set excludes them. If (1), B-type beliefs are insensitive and unsafe; if (2), they are insensitive but safe.

(3) C-TYPE: S forms his or her belief $p$ via method $m$ with unstable reliability (at any time $t$ method $m$ is unreliable), and $p$ is true.

C-type cases involve a subject who forms his or her belief using a method that has unstable reliability. A method’s reliability is unstable if at any time it can be unreliable. I place under this category the problem case offered by

Bogardus. In these cases, the subject is internally justified but factually defeated: he or she is not aware that reliability of his or her belief-forming method is unstable. C-type beliefs are internally justified but factually defeated. Proponents of these counterexamples count as close worlds those worlds in which the subject holds the same evidence, so the belief-characteristics are extended to these worlds. Relevant worlds include worlds in which the subject holds a justified and true belief but is factually defeated, and worlds in which he or she holds a justified false belief. Worlds in which the subject does not believe the proposition are not considered relevant. C-type beliefs are insensitive and unsafe.

**Epistemic Situation and its Constitutive Links: Preliminary Analysis**

**Close Epistemic Worlds and the Ceteris Paribus Set**

One of the problems for sensitivity and safety is the seeming lack of a clear, nonarbitrary similarity criterion or closeness ranking that determines which worlds are similar or close. Counterexamples to safety and sensitivity capitalize on this deficiency and demonstrate very clearly how it questions the warrantedness of these views. The problem in brief is that if the criterion is too strict, say, we consider close worlds only those that are exactly similar to the actual world, then they become trivial conditions. Given such a criterion, the actual world would be the only world included in the set of close worlds. If the criterion is not strict but too narrow, say, we consider close worlds only those in which certain epistemic details similarly obtain while other nonepistemic details vary, then some relevant worlds will not be included in the set of close worlds; also, this set will be limited to worlds that only differ in terms of some epistemically irrelevant facts. If the criterion is too broad, then it fails to properly discriminate between worlds. It seems then that whichever criterion we take these conditions to have, there would be problem cases.

To appreciate the problem, let’s make a distinction between close *epistemic worlds* and close *worlds in general*. Initially, we can take the former as a subset of the latter: a close epistemic world is a close world, but not all close worlds are close epistemic worlds. What are close worlds? These are worlds

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similar to the actual world. All other things being equal, a world where *I am typing on my computer* is close to the actual world where *I am doing the exact same thing*. However, there are many possible worlds in which *I am typing on my computer*:

1. Worlds in which I am drinking coffee while typing on my computer.
2. Worlds in which I am drinking soda while typing on my computer.

Which one is closer? To further limit the members of the set of close possible worlds, we need to identify more details, or facts that actually obtain. Suppose that in the actual world, I am drinking coffee while typing on my computer. If this is the case, then (1) is closer than (2). That is, all the other details being equal, worlds in which I am drinking coffee are closer to the actual world than those in which I am drinking soda. Hence, to determine which worlds are close, you need to identify what facts actually obtain. To limit the ceteris paribus set, or the set of details you take as equal across worlds, you have to qualify your description of the world in a way that identifies more details. If your description of the actual world is too general, then more worlds will be included in the set of close worlds. If you further qualify your description, then the members will be fewer. After enumerating the details that describe the actual world, it is important to identify which details you will include in the ceteris paribus set. You have to consider what things should be equal across worlds. If we exclude in the ceteris paribus set “drinking coffee,” then both (1) and (2) are close worlds. But if we include this detail in the ceteris paribus set, then the set only includes (1). This briefly demonstrates how a similarity criterion can be seen as either arbitrary or trivial.

However, sensitivity and safety theories ask us to track not just any close worlds but close epistemic worlds, or those worlds in which the actual epistemic situation similarly obtains. Identifying these worlds requires that we describe the actual epistemic situation: the actual set of epistemically relevant details. However, the criterion problem also manifests here, for we still need to determine which of these epistemically similar worlds are close.

**Constitutive Epistemic Links**

I find it helpful in this analysis to think of a given epistemic situation as a set of epistemically relevant details. Take these details as the usual things epistemologists identify when they describe epistemic cases: the subject who believes the proposition, his or her belief, the evidence that led him or her to form his or her belief, his or her belief-forming method, the fact (or facts) that
make the proposition true (or false), and the proposition the subject accepts (some cases also include defeaters). I am not claiming that this list is complete, but a typical description of an epistemic case identifies some or all of these details. These details are linked together and constitute an epistemic situation.

‘Evidence’ (e) refers to the things that led to the formation of the belief. Such that, given e, the subject forms belief \( p \):

\[ \text{e} \rightarrow \text{Bsp} \]

While ‘fact’ (f) refers to a particular state of affairs that makes the proposition either true or false:

\[ \text{f} \rightarrow \text{p} \]

But e can also be thought of as a set of particular evidences. Given set \{e\}, the subject forms belief \( p \):

(a) \{e\} → Bsp

Given (a), members of set \{e\} are necessary and sufficient conditions for the subject to form the belief (let ‘→’ stand for implication and {} to the given set):

\[ \{\text{e} \rightarrow \text{Bsp}\} \rightarrow \{\sim\text{e} \rightarrow \sim\text{Bsp}\}. \{\text{e} \rightarrow \text{Bsp}\} \]

Similarly, (f) can be thought of as a set of particular facts. Given set \{f\}, \( p \) is true:

(b) \{f\} → p

Given (b), members of set \{f\} are necessary and sufficient to make the proposition true:

\[ \{\text{f} \rightarrow \text{p}\} \rightarrow \{\sim\text{f} \rightarrow \sim\text{p}\}. \{\text{f} \rightarrow \text{p}\} \]

This brief analysis makes explicit two very important features of an epistemic situation: (1) the subject’s evidence for believing something is necessarily linked to the formation of his or her belief, and (2) facts that actually obtain are necessarily linked to the truth value of a proposition. Treating evidence and facts as sets will help demonstrate what these features imply about epistemic situations and the way we think about close epistemic worlds.
Set Relations of Evidence and Facts

It seems to me that the set of evidence and the set of facts have three possible relations. First, it is possible that all members of the given set of evidence are members of the given set of relevant facts (the term ‘relevant’ indicates that only facts that make the proposition true are included in this set) and vice versa. In this case, set E and set F are equivalent sets (let “=” represent this set relationship, and let the letters inside {} stand for the members of the set and the letters outside {} for the name of the set):

\[ R_1: E \{a, b, c\} = F \{a, b, c\} \]

If \( R_1 \) is the case, then to include in the ceteris paribus set (let * stand for this set) the set of evidence is to include the set of facts. In other words, given \( R_1 \), if all the members of set E are members of set *, then all members of set F are also members of set *:

\[ [(E = F). *\{E\}] \rightarrow *\{F\} \]

Conversely, if all members of set F are members of set *, then, given \( R_1 \), all members of set E are members of set *:

\[ [(E = F). *\{E\}] \rightarrow *\{F\} \]

So, if the given set of evidences imply that the subject believes the proposition and the given set of facts implies that the proposition is true (in other words, if the members of each set are necessary and sufficient conditions for either Bsp or \( p \) to obtain), then, given \( R_1 \), in a possible world in which all the evidences included in set E obtain, and those worlds in which all the facts included in set F obtain, the subject believes the proposition and the proposition is true (Let ‘#’ indicate that the given equation obtains in a possible world where either E or F obtains):

\[ [(E = F). (E \rightarrow \text{Bsp}). (F \rightarrow p)] \rightarrow [#(E.\text{Bsp}.p). #(F.\text{Bsp}.p)] \]

Second, there may also be instances where no member of the given set of evidence is a member of the given set of relevant facts. In this case set E and set F are complement sets (let ‘−’ indicate that these sets are exclusive):

\[ R_2: E \{a,b,c\} \rightarrow F \{d,e,f\} \]
If \( R_2 \) is the case, then if only members of \( E \) are included in the *ceteris paribus* set, then members of \( F \) are excluded from this set (recall: ‘∗’ refers to the *ceteris paribus* set):

\[
[(E - F). * {E}] \to \sim [*{F}]
\]

Conversely, given \( R_2 \), if only members of \( F \) are included in set ∗, then members of \( E \) are excluded:

\[
[(E - F). * {F}] \to \sim [* {E}]
\]

So, if the given set of evidence implies that the subject believes the proposition and the given set of relevant facts implies that the proposition is true, then, given \( R_2 \), in a possible world in which only set \( E \) obtains, the subject believes the proposition and the proposition is false; and in a possible world in which only set \( F \) obtains, the proposition is true but the subject does not believe it:

\[
[(E - F). (E \to \text{Bsp}). (F \to p)] \to [\#(E.\text{Bsp}. \sim p). \#(F.\sim \text{Bsp}. p)]
\]

Lastly, it can also be the case that some members of either set are members of the other set. It may be the case that some members of the set of evidence are members of the set of facts and vice versa. In these cases, these sets are subsets of the other set (let ‘⊂’ represent this relation):

\[
R_3: E \ {a, b,} \subset F \ {a, b, c} \lor F \ {a, b,} \subset E \ {a, b, c}
\]

If set \( E \) is a subset of set \( F \), then only members of set \( E \) are included in the *ceteris paribus* set, some but not all members of set \( F \) will also be included, so set \( F \) is excluded:

\[
[(E \subset F). * {E}] \to \sim [* {F}]
\]

If set \( F \) is a subset of \( E \), include set \( F \) in the *ceteris paribus* set, and some but not all members of set \( E \) are included, so set \( E \) is excluded:

\[
[(F \subset E). * {F}] \to \sim [* {E}]
\]

Thus, if the given set of evidence implies that the subject believes the proposition, and the given set of relevant facts implies that the proposition is true, then, if set \( E \) is a subset of \( F \) (all members of \( E \) are members of \( F \) but \( E \) and \( F \) are not equivalent sets), in a possible world in which only set \( E \) obtains, the subject believes the proposition and the proposition is false, and in a
possible world in which only set F obtains, the proposition is true and the subject believes it:

\[ ([E \subset F]. (E \rightarrow Bsp). (F \rightarrow p)) \rightarrow [\#(E.Bsp. \sim p). \#(F.Bsp.p)] \]

And if set F is a subset of E, (all members of F are members of E but E and F are not equivalent sets), in a possible world in which only members of set F obtains, the proposition is true but the subject does not believe it, and in a possible world in which only set E obtains, the proposition is true and the subject believes it:

\[ ([F \subset E]. (E \rightarrow Bsp). (F \rightarrow p)) \rightarrow [\#(F.\sim Bsp.p). \#(E.Bsp.p)] \]

**Why Modal Conditions Fail?**

Identifying the necessary links and their implications in the way we think about epistemic situations and close epistemic worlds will help us explain why sensitivity and safety fail in the case profiles we identified earlier.

**A-Type Cases**

Recall that in A-type cases, the subject is strongly justified in believing a true proposition. A-type beliefs are insensitive but safe. A-type beliefs are internally justified. There is nothing in the subject’s set of evidence (set E) that makes the proposition that he or she accepts false: there’s nothing in E that is contrary to p. Also in the actual world, the belief is undefeated, since the set of given facts (set F) makes the proposition true.

Proponents of these counterexamples claim that A-type beliefs are insensitive since in close worlds in which p is false, the subject still believes it. Recall that the variation condition of sensitivity requires us to check close not-p worlds and see if in those worlds the subject does not believe the same proposition. What worlds are these? This should at least include worlds in which a similar epistemic situation obtains. The latter pertains to the set that includes the same subject, belief, method, evidence, facts, and proposition. The ceteris paribus set is then limited to worlds in which the subject is in a similar epistemic situation. We cannot include in this set the relevant facts that actually obtain, since we are checking for close worlds in which the proposition is false. If we include the set of relevant facts (set F) in the ceteris paribus set, then the worlds we will identify are worlds in which the proposition is true.
If the set of relevant facts make the proposition true:

\[ F \rightarrow p \]

Then in worlds in which set F obtains, \( p \) is true. So we are looking for worlds in which the subject’s epistemic situation is similar to his or her actual epistemic situation, except, in this possible situation, set F does not obtain. It seems then that sensitivity requires us to look for worlds in which, except for set F, everything else that actually obtains, obtains. If set E is taken to include everything that led to the formation of the belief, the *ceteris paribus* set only includes set E. But if the subject’s set of evidence implies that the subject accepts the proposition \( (E \rightarrow \text{Bsp}) \), then if only members of set E are included in the *ceteris paribus* set, excluding all members of set F, in all these ‘close’ worlds, the subject falsely believes the proposition \( (\text{Bsp. } \sim p) \):

\[
[(E – F). (E \rightarrow \text{Bsp}). (F \rightarrow p). \ast[E] \rightarrow \#(E.Bsp. \sim p)]
\]

As a result, A-type beliefs are insensitive. Note that set E and F are taken here as complement sets.

Sensitivity theorists have two possible moves here: either they claim that A-type beliefs do not qualify as knowledge because they are insensitive, thus accepting the result, or they can show that A-type beliefs are sensitive. Either way, sensitivity will have serious problems. Let’s examine these moves.

First, note that A-type beliefs are *fallible* beliefs. Call a belief “fallible” if and only if the subject’s evidence for accepting or believing a proposition is compatible with the proposition being false. The evidence does not guarantee the truth of the proposition. In cases of this sort, the *set of evidence* is not equivalent to the *set of relevant facts*. If these two are equivalent sets, then it is impossible for the proposition to be false, given the same set of evidence. Thus, sensitivity theorists can take A-type beliefs as having either complementary E and F sets, or E and F subsets. They can either think of them as beliefs that are formed within an epistemic circumstance in which the subject’s evidence is completely different from the relevant facts that make the proposition true, or formed within an epistemic circumstance in which some of the subject’s evidence are included in the set of particular facts that makes the proposition true. So if in the actual world the subject has a fallible belief, then the set relations of E and F are either (recall ‘@’ indicates that the sets obtain in the actual world):

**Complement Sets (R2):** @ E \{a,b,c\} – F \{x,y,z\}; or
**Subsets (R3):** @ E \{a, b\} ⊂ F \{a, b, c\} v F \{a, b, c\} ⊂ E \{a, b\}
If they are complement sets, then if set E but not set F is included in the *ceteris paribus* set, so that in “close worlds” the subject falsely believes the proposition:

\[(E - F). (E \rightarrow Bsp). (F \rightarrow \neg p). * \{E\} \rightarrow \# (E. Bsp. \neg \neg p)\]

So A-type beliefs and all fallible beliefs will always be insensitive.

If they are subsets, you still have to exclude all the members of set F in the *ceteris paribus* set, otherwise \(p\) will obtain instead of \(\neg p\) (remember that sensitivity requires us to check worlds in which \(\neg p\) obtains). But you can include members of F that are members of E (given that all the members of F are necessary and sufficient conditions for \(p\)). In which case, the *ceteris paribus* set is the intersection of set E and F (recall: ‘\(\cap\)’ represent this relation):

\[* \{E \cap F\}*

If this is taken as the *ceteris paribus* set, then in ‘close possible worlds’, the subject does not believe the proposition, and the proposition is false. In those worlds, not all members of set E and F obtain, and given that E is a necessary condition for the subject’s believing the proposition, and F is a necessary condition for the proposition being true:

\[[(E \supset F) (E \rightarrow Bsp). (F \rightarrow p). * \{E \cap F\}] \rightarrow \# [\{E \cap F\}, \neg Bsp. \neg p]\]

So A-type beliefs and all fallible beliefs will always be sensitive.

Thus, if sensitivity theorists want to claim that A-type beliefs are insensitive, then they would have to think of sets E and F as complement sets (R2) in A-type cases. If they claim that A-type beliefs are sensitive, then they would have to think of these sets as subsets (R3) in A-type cases. If in A-type cases E and F are complement sets, then *fallible beliefs are always sensitive*. If in A-type cases E and F are subsets, then *fallible beliefs are always insensitive*.

If fallible beliefs are always insensitive, and only sensitive beliefs qualify as knowledge, then *all justified fallible beliefs*, i.e., beliefs with evidential support but possibly false, do not qualify as knowledge. These include those that are *strongly justified*, or beliefs with strong evidential support. But if these beliefs do not qualify as knowledge, then beliefs in *ordinary propositions* like “I have hands” also do not qualify as knowledge; these beliefs are fallible. This contradicts claim that these propositions are *sensitive*.10

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10 See Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 181.
If fallible beliefs are always sensitive, then Gettiered beliefs, which are justified fallible beliefs, are sensitive beliefs. Sensitivity theorists will then be forced to accept as knowledge the very beliefs they had intended to disqualify as knowledge.

Proponents of safety claim that A-type beliefs are safe since in close worlds in which \( p \) is true, the subject believes the proposition. What worlds are these? Note that, unlike in the case of sensitivity, we are checking worlds in which the subject believes that proposition. So we have to include set \( E \) in the ceteris paribus set. Given that \( E \) implies that the subject believes the proposition:

\[
(E \rightarrow \text{Bsp}) \rightarrow \#(E \rightarrow \text{Bsp})
\]

But what about the set of relevant facts, i.e., set \( F \)? Should \( F \) be included in the ceteris paribus set? It seems that it should be included. If not, then in all ‘close worlds’ the subject falsely believes the proposition. All A-type beliefs are unsafe:

\[
[(E - F). (E \rightarrow \text{Bsp}). (F \rightarrow \text{p}). *\{F\}] \rightarrow [\#(F. \text{Bsp. } \sim \text{p})]
\]

And this is not the result safety theorists have in mind. But even if we suppose that they do accept this result. If all A-type beliefs are unsafe, and safety is a necessary requirement for knowledge, then all justified fallible beliefs do not qualify as knowledge, same problems with sensitivity.

However, you cannot also include both \( E \) and \( F \) in the ceteris paribus set. If you do, then all A-type beliefs will be safe (including Gettiered beliefs). Since in ‘close worlds’, worlds in which \( E \) and \( F \) obtain, the subject truly believes \( p \):

\[
[(E - F). (E \rightarrow \text{Bsp}). (F \rightarrow \text{p}). *\{E \cap F\}] \rightarrow [\#(E. \text{Bsp. p})]
\]

Moreover, if both \( E \) and \( F \) are included in the ceteris paribus set, then the actual world will be the only member of the set of close worlds, unless worlds that only vary in some epistemically irrelevant details are included in this set: worlds in which both \( E \) and \( F \) obtain and some nonepistemic circumstance vary. This move will make safety a trivial condition.

There’s another way: include in the ceteris paribus set only members of set \( E \) that are also members of \( F \). In other words, the intersection of set \( E \) and \( F \) (recall: ‘\( \cap \)’ represents this relation, and ‘*’ indicates that the set obtains in the actual world):

\[
* \{E \cap F\}
\]
Note that if this is done, then it is supposed that the epistemic situation in A-type cases is such that E and F are subsets, for if they are equivalent sets, then the ceteris paribus set will include all members of both sets, and if they are complement sets then ceteris paribus set will be an empty set. But, if the ceteris paribus set only includes the intersection of E and F, then in ‘close worlds’ the subject does not believe false proposition \( p \), given that set E implies the subject’s belief and F implies that the proposition is true:

\[
[(E - F). (E \rightarrow \text{Bsp}). (F \rightarrow \neg p). *([E \cap F]) \rightarrow \#([E \cap F]. \neg \text{Bsp}. \neg p)]
\]

But safety requires us to track worlds in which the subject believes the proposition, and not worlds in which he or she did not. This move, again, trivializes safety.

**B-type and C-type Cases**

Recall that B-type beliefs are either internally justified but almost defeated or internally justified and undefeated, depending on how serious the threat of factual defeat is taken to be (recall: a belief is factually defeated if and only if unknown to the subject, there is a true proposition that defeats his or her belief). Meanwhile, in C-type cases the subject’s belief-forming method has unstable reliability since at any time it can fail to produce a true belief. The factual defeater in B-type and C-type cases is the true proposition, “*my method is conditionally reliable*.” The dilemma comes in two ways: (1) if the subject had known that his or her belief forming method is conditionally reliable then he or she would not have believed the proposition, and (2) if it had been the case that the given circumstance is such that it makes the subject’s belief-forming method unreliable, he or she would have falsely believed the proposition. Note that in both cases, nothing actually defeats the subject’s belief. That his or her method is conditionally reliable, does not take away the fact that it actually works, given the subject’s actual circumstance. The conditional reliability of the subject’s belief forming method does not necessarily make the proposition false. It also does not make the subject’s belief any less justified, since it is unknown to him or her that the method is conditionally reliable.

So how do we determine the worlds close to the actual world in which these cases obtain? Proponents of this counterexample seem to suggest that given the conditional reliability of the subject’s belief-forming method, the ‘closest’ worlds are those in which the method *fails* to produce a true belief. If this is the case, the belief is unsafe. On the other hand, safety theorists can argue that (if the move is to hold that these beliefs are safe) the “close worlds”
are those in which the threat of epistemic defeat is also unrealized, given that that threat is unrealized in the actual world. So, the question really is whether or not the fact that there is an unrealized but potential threat of epistemic defeat in the actual world makes possible worlds in which that threat is realized relevantly close.

To answer this, let us ask first if this unrealized but potential threat is included in the set of the subject’s evidence or the set of relevant facts that make the proposition true. Do we treat it as part of the evidence that led to the formation of the subject’s belief or as a particular fact that makes the proposition false? Safety theorists can claim that such a threat cannot be considered as part of the subject’s evidence for two reasons. First, the subject does not even know that threat exists. Second, the fact that the threat is unrealized does not have anything to do with the formation of the subject’s belief—he would have formed the same belief even if it were realized. On the other hand, the proposition would have been false if the threat were realized. So, that in the given circumstance the threat is unrealized, is a relevant fact that makes the proposition true.

If safety theorists treat this unrealized threat as a member of the set of relevant facts, B-type beliefs will turn out safe, but not without trivializing safety. Note two things. First, like A-type beliefs, these beliefs are justified fallible beliefs. The subject’s evidence is compatible with the proposition being false. Second, also like in A-type cases, sets E and F in B-type and C-type cases are not equivalent sets: case in point, the unrealized threat which is included in set F is excluded in set E. So either they are complement sets or subsets:

Complement Sets (R2): @ E {a,b,c} – F {x,y,z}; or
Subsets (R3): @ E {a, b} ⊂ F {a, b, c} v F{a, b} ⊂ E {a, b,c}

If they are complement sets, then if set E but not set F is included in the ceteris paribus set, in ‘close worlds’ (recall that this is the set of the things we hold equal across worlds) the subject falsely believes the proposition (recall ‘~’ indicates that the given sets are complement sets):

\[(E – F). ( (E→Bsp). (F→p). *[E]) → # (E.Bsp. ~p)\]

Fallible beliefs will always be unsafe. If they are subsets, and the intersection of sets E and F is included, then in ‘close worlds’ the subject does not believe the proposition and the proposition is false, since not all members of both sets obtain in these worlds:

\([(E ⊃ F) (E → Bsp). (F→p). * {E ∩ F}] → #[E ∩ F].~Bsp. ~p]\
**Fallible Beliefs will Always be Unsafe**

Now notice that safety theorists have to include set $E$ in the *ceteris paribus* set, since safety requires us to check for worlds in which the subject believes the proposition, and $E$ implies that the subject believes the proposition:

$$(E \rightarrow \text{Bsp}) \rightarrow \#(E.\text{Bsp})$$

Set $F$ also have to be included, otherwise, given that not-$F$ implies that the proposition is false, in all ‘close worlds’ the subject falsely believes the proposition. So all B-type and C-type beliefs are unsafe:

$$[(E - F). (E \rightarrow \text{Bsp}). (F \rightarrow p). \ast[F]] \rightarrow \#(E.\text{Bsp. } \sim p)$$

However, both $E$ and $F$ cannot be included in the *ceteris paribus* set; otherwise, all fallible beliefs will be safe (including Gettiered beliefs). Since in ‘close worlds’, worlds in which $E$ and $F$ obtain, the subject truly believe $p$:

$$[(E - F).(E \rightarrow \text{Bsp}). (F \rightarrow p). \ast[F.E]] \rightarrow \#(F.E. \text{ Bsp. } p)$$

And again, if both $E$ and $F$ are included in the *ceteris paribus* set, then the actual world will be the only member of the set of close worlds, unless those worlds that only vary in some epistemically irrelevant details are included in this set (recall that these are worlds in which both $E$ and $F$ obtain and some non-epistemic circumstance vary).

Another move is to include in the *ceteris paribus* set the intersection of set $E$ and $F$ (recall: ‘∩’ represents this relation, and ‘#’ indicates that the set obtains in the actual world):

$$\# \{E \cap F\}$$

But, if the *ceteris paribus* set only includes this, then in ‘close worlds’ the subject does not believe false proposition $p$. And, as I already explained in my analysis of A-type cases, this move trivializes safety:

$$[(E - F).(E \rightarrow \text{Bsp}). (F \rightarrow p). \ast[E \cap F]] \rightarrow \#([E \cap F]. \sim \text{Bsp. } \sim p]$$

Similar to my analysis of A-type beliefs, sensitivity theorists cannot claim that B-type and C-type beliefs are sensitive without either accepting that all fallible beliefs are sensitive or that all fallible beliefs are false. They cannot include both $E$ and $F$ in the *ceteris paribus* set, and they cannot limit this set to
all members of set F. Both moves will trivialize sensitivity. If they include E only, in “close worlds,” the subject falsely believes the proposition. So B-type and C-type beliefs and all fallible beliefs will always be insensitive, including our beliefs in ordinary propositions like ‘I have hands’. If they limit the ceteris paribus set to the intersection of both sets, in ‘close worlds’ the subject does not believe the proposition, and the proposition is false. So B-type and C-type beliefs and all fallible beliefs are always sensitive, including Gettiered beliefs.

Not Just a Criterion Problem

The above analysis demonstrates why sensitivity and safety simply do not work in A-type, B-type, and C-type cases, but we can also extend the findings here to all fallible beliefs, or beliefs which evidential features are compatible with the falsity of its propositional object. Sensitivity and safety theorists cannot consistently claim that these beliefs do not qualify as knowledge, since they accept that at least some fallible beliefs do qualify as knowledge, such as our beliefs in ordinary propositions like “I have hands.” But they cannot also consistently claim that they qualify as knowledge without trivializing the modal conditions they necessarily require for knowledge. While this problem implies the lack of a clear and adequate closeness criterion, it also points to a more serious problem, one that is not easily solved by a mere revision of the similarity criterion.

The fundamental problem I am referring to is that these modal conditions fail to recognize certain relational features that constitute epistemic situations. Namely, the constitutive significance of those details or set of evidence that led to the formation of the subject’s belief and the state of affairs, or set of particular facts, that makes a given proposition true. These relational features are constitutive links that determine an epistemic situation.

Modal conditions require us to track possible worlds. To do this, we need to hold as equal across worlds certain details or features of an actual epistemic situation to check if certain links are modally preserved, in a way that seems to forget the constitutive significance of actually established links. And while the link between belief and fact is usually modally preserved, some actually established links are not, like the link between evidence and belief, the link between the set of relevant facts and the truth of a proposition, and the link between evidence and fact.

In a world in which the actual set of evidence is not given, the subject would not have formed the belief that he or she did form in the actual situation he or she is in, and in a world in which not all the relevant facts are given, the proposition would not have been true. However, as demonstrated in our analysis, that these links are not modally preserved does not necessarily mean that they do not exist in the actual situation, or in the
epistemic circumstance that obtains in the actual world. Sensitivity and safety fail when actual links which are not modally preserved is sufficient for knowledge. And for this reason, these modal conditions are not necessary for knowledge.

**Objections and Replies**

Let us now consider some possible objections to my argument.

**Against Constitutive Links**

Objection 1: Epistemic links do not exist.  
Objection 2: Epistemic links do not constitute epistemic situations.

I reply that sensitivity and safety theorists need to assume that these links exist as constitutive elements of the epistemic situation or the modal conditions will not work. Sensitivity and safety theorists require necessarily that the link between belief and truth value of the proposition is modally preserved. But to check if this link is in fact modally preserved, they require us to check close possible worlds in which the proposition is false (sensitivity), or similar worlds in the subject believes the same proposition (safety). But one cannot consider a world “similar” without holding that while some details vary, some details are the same. Which “details” one holds the same and which ones vary will determine relevant epistemic features such as whether or not the subject believes the proposition, and whether or not the proposition is true. The details are linked to these features. If sensitivity and safety theorists do not accept this link, then identifying “close worlds” is going to be arbitrary. Recognizing this link is important in determining which details to hold the same across worlds, and which ones can vary. Sensitivity condition requires us to check if in ‘close worlds’ in which the proposition is false, the subject does not believe it. Which implies that one cannot hold the details that make the proposition true across worlds, one cannot include them in the *ceteris paribus* set. The details that obtain in ‘close worlds’ should vary in a way that makes the proposition false. However, whether or not the subject believes the proposition in these worlds would depend on which other details one holds the same. Otherwise, sensitivity theorists will end up arbitrarily suggesting that in ‘close worlds’ the subject believes or does not believe the proposition.

The correlation between relevant details and epistemic values only shows how relevant these details are. They cannot be treated as trivial details since the epistemic situation varies with them: change the details and there is a
different epistemic situation. Surely a situation in which the subject truly believes \( p \) is different from a situation in which the subject does not believe false proposition \( p \). But what varies here other than the evidence of the subject, the facts that obtain, the subject’s belief, the truth-value of the proposition, and the links in between? These are the things that make epistemic situations unique.

**Against Fallible Beliefs**

Objection 3: The analysis does not extend to all justified fallible beliefs.

Objection 4: Fallible beliefs do not qualify as knowledge.

I reply that sensitivity and safety do not have the mechanism to discriminate between justified fallible beliefs. Sensitivity and safety dislodged the justification condition; they do not qualify beliefs in terms of evidential support. The strength of one’s evidence determines the strength of justification. It is not necessary for sensitivity and safety that justification or the evidence of the subject for believing the proposition is modally preserved (that the subject is justified in believing the proposition in close possible worlds). They only require the modal preservation of the link between belief and facts. So while they can discriminate between lucky and unlucky beliefs (luck here is defined in modal terms: if the link between belief and facts is modally preserved then there is no luck involved in the formation of the belief), they cannot discriminate between unjustified, less justified, and strongly justified fallible beliefs. But even if we suppose that these conditions can discriminate justified beliefs, sensitivity and safety theorists cannot add a justification condition without making their views incoherent, given that some justified beliefs are insensitive and unsafe (for example, A-type, B-type, and C-type beliefs)—unless they accept that sensitivity and safety are not necessary conditions for knowing.

Moreover, even if sensitivity and safety theorists claim that modal conditions fail in A-type, B-type, and C-type cases but not in all cases of justified fallible beliefs, this will still imply that these conditions are not necessary for knowledge, since it cannot account for all knowledge cases. Now if they claim that all fallible beliefs do not qualify as knowledge, then that would defeat their arguments against skepticism, since these arguments assumed that our beliefs in ordinary propositions like “I have hands” are sensitive and safe, and these beliefs are fallible. This move will also make their views incoherent; attempts to solve this problem are motivated by the assumption that some fallible beliefs can generate knowledge, if all fallible beliefs do not
qualify as knowledge, then the Gettier problem is not a problem—but sensitivity and safety are designed to solve this problem. Finally, if all fallible beliefs do not qualify as knowledge then only infallible beliefs do; this will imply that we do not know a lot of things. I also doubt if sensitivity and safety theorists can successfully offer an analysis of infallible beliefs. If they suppose that the set of evidences and facts are equivalent sets (and they have to, because if they are complementary or subsets then the subject’s evidence is nonconclusive, and this makes the belief fallible) in cases that involve infallible beliefs, and if they take as equal all members of both sets, then the epistemic situation that will obtain in close possible worlds is exactly similar to the actual epistemic situation. This will make the modal conditions trivial.

**Against Epistemic Luck**

**Objection 5:** The analysis seems to imply that luck is compatible with knowledge, but lucky beliefs do not qualify as knowledge.

I reply that if my analysis implies anything about luck it is only that some instances of knowledge are compatible with the sort of luck sensitivity and safety theorists have in mind; that is, the nonmodal preservation of the link between belief and fact. It does not imply that luck is always compatible with knowledge.

That sensitivity and safety are not necessary for knowledge implies that in some instances of knowledge the link between belief and fact is not modally preserved. This is not inconsistent with the claim that some instances of knowledge are incompatible with the sort of luck sensitivity and safety theorists exclude in their analysis of knowledge, and the claim that lucky beliefs are insensitive or unsafe. My analysis could imply that it is not necessary to exclude the kind of luck that sensitivity and safety excludes, and not that knowledge is always compatible with luck; since it only shows that having insensitive and unsafe beliefs do not always defeat knowledge.

Our findings could imply that while sensitivity and safety tells us when a belief is lucky in some sort of way, whether or not this sort of luck is present may sometimes have little or nothing to do with actual knowledge cases; that something contrary to what actually happened would have happened in some possible circumstance may not undo the fact that it actually happened; that a subject would have still believed the proposition even if it were false (sensitivity) or that the proposition would have easily been false even if it were that the subject still believes it (safety) may not change the fact that the subject actually believed it and that the proposition is actually true, especially if these things are dependent on actual links that constitute the situation that
actually obtains (and in most cases they are). But all I claim here is that there are instances of knowledge in which (1) the subject actually has a justified true belief, and in which (2) there is an actual link between belief and fact that is not modally preserved. And so, modal conditions are not necessary for knowledge.

References


Translating the Greeks: The Divine Faithlessness of Hölderlin

Soumick De

Abstract: The paper is an attempt to examine the place of Hölderlin in relation to the philosophical, historical, and aesthetic discourse of his time. Examining the concept of tragedy in Hölderlin, we would try to understand how the problem of separation in metaphysics, opened by Kant, expressed itself in history. Moreover, through an exploration of such ideas like that of the proper/non-proper and the aorgic (ancients)/organic (Hesperian/modern) in Hölderlin, the paper would try to argue that instead of a dialectical resolution to the problem of history and art, what Hölderlin sought was the intensification of an arche-separation. In other words, we would try to understand the meaning of an original difference which Hölderlin proposes as the condition for a concept of translation. Yet such translation would speak only of the impossibility of imitating or returning to the Greeks, of constantly being faithless to the Greek reality such that this faithlessness becomes the very basis of the singularity of the modern condition. How to be faithful to this faithlessness so that the Greeks continue to speak without saying anything? The paper would be an attempt to examine this paradox of translation in Hölderlin.

Keywords: Tragedy, aesthetics, translation, arche-separation

I. The General Problem as a Problem of History: The Quest for Epochal Totalization?

The shadow cast by the Greeks onto the horizon of German thinking in the aftermath of the French Revolution is undeniable. It was an epoch of German thinking which is also to say a thinking Germany which wanted to inscribe its name, and thereby, mark the epoch as German. But instead of a

1 This can perhaps be argued as a problem of historical double binding where the desire of German idealism was not only to produce an epoch characterised by its spirit of thinking but self-consciously inscribe that very spirit on to history in order to find its place and recognise itself as German—a double binding which Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe has pointed in his
new epoch born singularly under the sign of modernity, it became a moment in the history of German thought which ironically was caught in a gigantic historical double bind. Johann Joachim Winckelmann’s remark captures this exhaustible desire of a nation which would miss its own birth when he wrote “the only way we can become great and if this is possible, inimitable, is by imitating the Ancients.” ² The shadow cast by the Greeks was fast transforming into the twilight of enlightenment when a dawn was conceived in the form of a theoretical solution. What was sought was nothing less than a dialectical resolution to the crisis whose metaphysical origins lead back to Kant. In other words, working from within the mimetic logic of imitating the Greeks, the “thinking Germany of the 1790s”³ believed to have found a way of overcoming the crisis such that the Moderns would become master of the masters.

Of course, the central philosophical problem was to find some kind of commensurability to the incommensurable gap opened up by Kantian thinking in the very heart of metaphysics. The separation which came in a series of metaphysical oppositions such as subjective/objective, speculative/intuitive, sensible/ideal, necessary/free among others found their way into domains of history and art, giving rise to such binaries like Ancients/Moderns, Nature/Culture, plastic arts/poetic arts, and epic/lyric. It is Schiller who seems to have broken this “indefinitely binary rhythm of identificatory cyclothymia.”⁴ When Schiller announced that “nature in us has disappeared from humanity,”⁵ he not only Rousseau-esquely echoed the ‘sentimental’ desperation of the moderns, the beings of culture—to re-turn to the ‘naïve’ state where being nature, the simple and feeling poet had only to imitate actuality. Schiller wanted not simply to create a schema for this opposition but find a reconciliation, even a speculative one. Thus, he would argue that if reflective understanding stood contrary to naïve perception, then “the sentimental mood is the result of the effort, even under the conditions of

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² For a precise understanding of Winckelmann’s relation to the Greeks which, in a sense summed up the epoch in German thinking, see Johann Joachim Winckelmann, “Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and the Art of Sculpture,” in Johann Joachim Winckelmann on Art, Architecture, and Archaeology, trans. by David Carter (Rochester and New York: Camden House, 2013), 31-55.

³ The crisis of modernity in its relationship to the Greeks was experienced in the works of a number of German thinkers of the time like Johann Gottfried Herder, Karl Philipp Moritz, and later by Schiller and the great wave of German romanticism. See Lacoue-Labarthe, “Hölderlin and the Greeks,” 237.


reflection to restore naïve feeling according to its content. This would occur through the fulfilled ideal in which art again encounters nature." If sentimental is the contrary of naïve (Ancient), then it must carry within itself the condition for its own transgression, ‘a step outside itself,’ cancelling and preserving its opposite from which it arose. In other words, the sentimental sublates the opposition between the Naïve and Sentimental, the Ancients and the Modern.

The post Kantian world7 haunted by the crisis of exile—of Being from appearance, of subject from object, of universal from particular, of man from nature—would not only turn to the tragic propelled by a desire for re-turn. German idealism would theoretically seek to fulfil the promise of the Ancients—what was only an imitation of the actualisation of nature—by orienting its passage through its opposite. The dissociation, the alienation of civilization was only to re-unite with nature but, at an elevated level, an ideal level of humanity. Hölderlin would not remain far from this trajectory of thought (i.e., dialectical thinking) not only because of his relation to German Idealist thinking of the time but also because of his profound engagement with Greek tragedy. But in what way does Hölderlin, the modern poet contribute to this desire for the tragic which informed speculative thinking? In what manner was he positioned in the midst of this tragic turn of German idealism?

In a letter to Schiller from 4 September 1795, Hölderlin writes

I try to prove that what we should insistently demand of any system, the union of subject with object in an absolute I (or whatever you want to call it) is undoubtedly possible in an aesthetic manner, in intellectual intuition, but is possible in a theoretical manner only by way of infinite approximation.8

This spirit of infinitizing, or absolutizing, sought through dialectic, is a tendency which we cannot ignore in Hölderlin. It can be argued, though probably not here, following Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, that this dialectical

6 Ibid., 154-155.
7 The crisis of the post Kantian world was a crisis of transcendence which had many effects within and outside philosophy. In politics for example this crisis would translate into the emergence of the modern state which is separated from any theological justification of a divine foundation. We are however concerned with the metaphysical consequences of this crisis particularly as it transformed speculative thinking in Germany during the late 18th and early 19th century.
triumphalism is closely related to a mimetological tendency which is the very 'model' for modern western historical consciousness. Further that, this imitating heart of historicization is founded upon a cathartic and finally sacrificial logic which needs to be critically analysed as the basis of western culture. But all that gets interrupted, at least in Hölderlin, by the time his efforts at writing a 'modern tragedy' fails and he starts engaging himself with the problem of theatre and his translations of Sophocles. From his writings of this period, roughly starting from 1800-1801, particularly the intensely elliptical notes on his translations and some of the letters addressed to his friend Bohelendornff and to his editor, we come to see an historical and aesthetic imagination which is truly original, and whose place within German Speculative Idealism is inimitably singular. It is during this period that Hölderlin introduces the theme that Greece, at least in itself, does not exist and that it is impossible to imitate it in any manner. This tension interrupting the dialectical resolution of the question of history (Ancients/Moderns) is expressed in categories that Hölderlin creates—proper and non-proper, the native or national and foreign, the aorgic and the organic. That these categories are an echo of the already prevalent dichotomies existing at the time like that of the Ancients/Modern binary or even the more complex Schillerian contradiction of the naïve and the sentimental should not come as a surprise. But what is perhaps singular to Hölderlinean thinking is the imperative which he claims to be the governing principle of any culture or historical epoch so that it can assume what is proper to itself, where it ought to belong and with which it tends to identify. Hölderlin recognises a drive, a pull within history which paradoxically urges that which is proper to first pass through that which is not proper to itself, to exit its own territory such that it can enter itself, enter for the first time, and assume its place in history only on the condition that it has exited. In other words, the place of exit is inscribed in the very heart of a culture’s entry into its own proper place. To pass through this other, this foreign land, not to come back and possess what is one’s own but to re-turn to a dis-possession becoming an alien in one’s own homeland, a nomad who goes nowhere, but brings his nomadism to the very centre of the polis. This could only be possible if, instead of differences, temporal (Ancients) or spatial (Greece), being subsumed under an identity, identities came to be conditioned by an original difference. Instead of merely

9 At the heart of this enigmatic conclusion was Hölderlin’s conviction which was unambiguously philosophical that there remains an incommensurable gap or a caesura between what we know of Greece or even how it manifested itself and what it really was. This is a philosophical problem per excellence directed at representation which is to say the relation between being and appearance. While for Hölderlin there is no just idea about ancient Greece, modern west including Germany which the poet designates with a general term Hesperia also does not exist or better exists only as a possibility.
distinguishing proper from non-proper, native from foreign, such distinction somehow manages to not only separate these categories, (geographical, historical, aesthetic) but separate itself. In other words, difference differentiates itself in order to fold back on to the other, passing through it, such that in order to become what one is, one must first traverse that which one is not. As we would try to show in the final section of this paper, this same paradox finds its most prominent expression in the language of Hölderlin, such that in order to become a work, it must continuously pass through the absence of work, thereby breaking the epic unity of an artist and his work. We shall come to this problem of language in a while. But let us start with an examination of the problem of history in Hölderlin.

For Hölderlin, to say that the Greeks did not exist did not mean that as a culture the Greeks did not produce any meaning innate to itself. On the contrary, what was native to the Greeks was, according to the poet, a certain oriental mystical intensity, a play of the forces, an elemental drive. The element proper to the Greeks was the ‘fire of heaven,’ a ‘sacred pathos’ of being a victim of the divine, a death drive, if you may, which translates in their desire for transgressing the limits of finitude. This is what he imagines as the aorgic nature of the Greeks as against the occidental organic nature of the moderns. But even the moderns for Hölderlin are not a pre-supposed category, a historically given reality, but a fictive reality, a sign of the future, which he calls the Hesperian. In other words, contemporary reality can only come as a sign which is the vessel for another desire, another drive which is that of a yet to come. However, this future is already present in language, as a sign which manifests the perilous reality of such a possibility. We shall return to this point in a while.

But as for the aorgic Greeks, it is this drive to overcome the boundaries of finite existence which also makes them speculative par excellence, because it is quite literally a metaphysical desire which fuels their imagination and constantly urges them to transgress the limits (hubris) of the finite world to unite with the ‘one-all’10. But it is this desire which also pushes them towards that which is foreign to them: the world of art or more precisely the reality of tragic art. Tragedy, as Hölderlin imagines it as the monstrous coupling of God and Man, is the very threshold, the edge of the void standing on which the Greeks could look into the limitless abyss, transgressing mortal limits and yet express such transgression in a purified form. Hence, tragedy

10 We find the idea of one-all in many of Hölderlin’s texts. In the true spirit of Enlightenment, a totalizing impulse dominates Hölderlin’s thinking but in a fashion, which brings him infinitely close yet incomensurably beyond the reach of his contemporaries. For a brilliant exposition of this problem in Hölderlin see Jean-François Courtine, “Of tragic metaphor,” in Philosophy and Tragedy, ed. by Miguel de Beistegui and Simon Sparks (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 57-75.
was also the sobriety of form, the measure of capturing that which was not possibile to capture, but more importantly, something which was foreign to the Greeks to which they had to apply themselves that resulted in forgetting the forgetful gods. Under the sign of tragedy, the Greeks no longer desired the infinite becoming one-whole, but became faithful to their own infidelity, a divine faithlessness which in turn made them so desirable. The sobriety of art, which was foreign to the Greeks, through which they nevertheless had to pass through in order to appropriate that which was proper to them, made the Greeks into an ‘empire of art,’ but at the same time, it transformed the metaphysical desire which was native to the Greeks into something artistic, which itself became desirable. Thus Hölderlin in his letter to Bohlendorff would write “… the Greeks are less master of the sacred pathos, because to them it was inborn, whereas they excel in their talent for presentation, beginning with Homer, because this exceptional man was sufficiently sensitive to conquer the Western Junonian sobriety for his Apollonian empire and thus to veritably appropriate what is foreign.”

There is nothing natural about this naïve art of the Greeks, while at the same time, to be desirable need not mean that the Greeks are an object of desire whose fulfilment lies in the speculative consummation of Greek aesthetics.

We would like to argue that when Hölderlin remarks that the Greeks do not exist what is meant is that they exist as nothing but desire, as nothing but what we want to make of them. However, what is desirable about the Greeks is not their substantial reality, which we do not possess, but their very desire for transgression, their desire of becoming one-whole. What makes the Greeks desirable is desire itself. We desire the Greeks in their desire for the abyss. And tragedy is the site where it plays itself out. This is also the reason why we are not capable of tragedy, because our tragedy is precisely the absence of tragedy. That is to say that modern tragedy is not possible because all we want is tragedy, which is not given to us because we do not have destiny. The theme of this loss of destiny (dysmoron) recurs in many of Hölderlin’s most famous works. In his poem “Bread and Wine” we have the following line “Delphi’s asleep, and where now is great fate to be heard?”

Neither do we have the great oracles of the Greeks nor do we have a fiery volcano to jump into and become one with the one-whole, as did

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Empedocles, the philosopher-hero of Hölderlin’s never completed play “Death of Empedocles.”¹³ The negation of the tragic is the modern reality.

Hölderlin writes “For this is the tragic to us: that packed up in any container, we very quietly move away from the realm of the living, [and] not that—consumed in flames—we expiate the flames which we could not tame.”¹⁴ This unquenchable flame, this insatiable desire for that which is outside, which can only come as a transgression, is not our reality. What we have is the silent search for an address, a nomadic pursuit in desire, to somewhere which is anywhere; an anonymity which must also be clamorous because it strikes out at something, resonating in the other. It is a silence and an anonymity found in madness (as we shall try to show in the last section) which strikes out through language at something; perhaps a new body which can be re-born, immanent to the world, fragile but more original than that which was born before. Hölderlin’s note on Antigone perhaps leads one to think along these lines. He writes

> For us, existing under the more real Zeus who not only stays between this earth and the ferocious world of the dead, but who also forces the eternally anti-human course of nature to another world more decidedly down onto earth, and since this greatly changes the essential and patriotic representations, and since our poetry must be patriotic so that its themes are selected according to our world-view and their representations patriotic, for us, then, the Greek representations change insofar as it is their chief tendency to comprehend themselves, which was their weakness; on the other hand it is the main tendency in the mode of representation of our time to designate something, to possess a skill, since the lack of destiny, the dysmoron, is our deficiency.¹⁵

If Greek art was a desire to express who the Greeks were and thereby be lost to themselves, our artistic imperative is to effectuate something, force something out of art or more precisely perhaps, out of language, a vessel, an address conditioned by our weakness which is the absence of destiny. The categorical turning away of the gods coincides with the divine faithlessness of man such that, man is forced by this arche-separation to turn his view from

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heaven towards the earth and on to himself. A *turning of the self in its own place* such that he can transform himself into something which would give him a singular point of view, no longer determined by the desire for heaven but a longing to strike something, a “formative drive” oriented towards a goal. In a short fragment titled “The Perspective from which We Have to Look at Antiquity” Hölderlin condemns the positive given manner in which we look at the Ancients because it has been appropriated, learnt as something pre-formed. Against or in spite of such appropriation, Hölderlin imagines the current circumstances as fertile with the possibility of orienting ourselves to something more worthwhile than a puerile imitation of antiquity. Hence, he warns that the only mistake one can make now is to let “his formative drive” deviate from the goal which is its ‘address’ in absence of all destiny. He remarks,

&quad; for this is man’s only mistake, that his formative drive goes astray, takes an unworthy altogether mistaken direction, or at least misses its proper place, or if it has found it comes to a halt in the middle of the way with the means which are supposed to lead him to his goal. 18

Clearly, for Hölderlin, this orientation of the desire is purely aesthetic on the one hand, while on the other, the proper place sought is always conditioned by that which is outside the place, which is always an elsewhere. The proper place is equivalent to something like the object of desire which is always out of reach. Tragic desire is a desire which does not ask for an object whose knowledge is available, and which can therefore be fulfilled. It is a desire for something which is completely alien, monstrous and without any available knowledge. A desire which is fuelled by a monstrous lack of its object is the tragic desire which articulates itself in language. Therefore, tragic desire becomes the semantic demand of language which is never fulfilled because it can never refer to anything given. What we witness in Hölderlin is the primordial struggle of a formative desire which seeks a ‘unique rhythm’ through language. In other words, it seeks to perform, in language, the task to address, not simply to communicate, 19 because one has nothing to

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17 In the Thomas Pfau translation, it is translated as “designation”.
18 Hölderlin, “The Perspective from which We Have to Look at Antiquity,” 39-40.
communicate. Language ceases to communicate as it fails to demonstrate anything and becomes the expression of what Jacques Lacan would later call a “monstration”. Because language is, here, caught in this desire for a “monstrous” and completely alien outside; it has no destiny to fulfil, and hence, no destination to reach. And without destination, how can there be communication? So tragic language begins to (de)monstrate itself. And yet something has to be addressed. One has to strike out to something which one encounters even if it is a monstrous nothingness whose knowledge we do not possess but which, nonetheless, stands as threshold, a boundary which helps us to form certain relations with ourselves and others. Its proper place is language, because it is in language that this threshold (dis)articulates itself in its clarity and polysemy. Hence, we need to study the role not only of tragedy but of language itself in the works of Hölderlin a bit more closely. The next section of the paper would be devoted to this purpose of studying the problem of tragedy and language while the last section would take up the question of language and madness in order to examine the problem of history as briefly outlined above.

II. The General Problem as a Problem of Language: Tragedy

In one of his Hamburg essays concerned with the study of the major genres or modes of poetry titled “On the Difference of Poetic Modes,” we find one of the earliest definitions of the tragic poem in Hölderlin. In it, Hölderlin differentiates between the three major modes of poetry: lyric, epic and tragic, further subdividing them into sub-genres according to their basic tone. Hence, each genre or mode or appearance (or “art-character” or “tendency”) would signify the basic or fundamental tone which is its spirit or dwelling. Thus, the fundamental tone (stress) would be divided according to the tonalities it would appear in its art-character which were: the naïve, the idealistic and the heroic. In respect to such division, the definition of the tragic poem offered in the very beginning of the text is as follows: “The tragic, in appearance heroic poem, is idealistic in its signification. It is the metaphor of an intellectual intuition.”20 Following Jean-François Courtine’s lead, we need to understand metaphor here almost literally—metaphora—as transport or translation or transposition, even impropriety or forcing of something un-said through an improper medium.21 But what is being transferred here is not merely a name in the Aristotelian sense of lexis but a tonality or a tone, an order proper to

21 For an excellent exposition of the significance of metaphor in Hölderlin’s thinking of theatre which in a sense challenges the tragic model of German idealism see the Courtine, “Of tragic metaphor.”
itself displacing it into another order which would always be alien to it, improper or foreign to it. It is in this sense of the transport that intellectual intuition becomes a metaphor for the tragic poem. But what is the meaning of intellectual intuition in Hölderlin? From a text dating back to 1795 titled *Judgement and Being* we get a clear idea (almost clear) of the meaning of intellectual intuition in Hölderlin. He writes:

Being—expresses the connection between subject and object. Where subject and object are united altogether and not only in part, that is, united in such a manner that no partition can be performed without violating the essence of what is to be separated, there and nowhere else can being pure and simple be spoken of, as is the case with intellectual intuition.22

If the tragic poem stands as a metaphor for intellectual intuition, then it offers a passage or a “sensible egress” for the originary unity to be expressed, presented or staged. As Courtine remarks, “The tragic poem is what ‘gives rise’ to intellectual intuition, it allows it to take place insofar as it offers it the theatre of a possible ‘propiation,’ even if, paradoxically, this unity—the unity of the ‘primordially united’—only ever presents itself improperly by obscuring or annulling the very ‘sign’ properly destined to manifest it.”23 We hear in this remark of Courtine an echo of Hölderlin’s understanding of the significance of tragedy, where original matter appears only in the weakness or the impropriety of the sign, (remember the formula S=0)24 thus rendering it insignificant. Thus, the Hölderlinean idea of the tragic effect is one-whole. But here, one-whole has to be seen for what it is, which is not the pathos of sacrifice to the whole, but the sensibility of the whole in the parts such that the whole is maintained in the parts but only as separation or individuation. “Intellectual intuition maintains the whole in its parts by restoring the parts to its arche-*unity* which can only be actualised by recognizing the separability

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24 “The significance of tragedies can be understood most easily by way of paradox. Since all potential is divided justly and equally, all original matter appears not in original strength but, in fact, in its weakness, so that quite properly the light of life and the appearance attach to the weakness of every whole. Now in the tragic, the sign in itself is insignificant, without effect, yet original matter is straightforward. Properly speaking, original matter can only appear in its weakness; however, to the extent that the sign is posited as insignificant = 0, original matter, the hidden foundation of any nature, can also present itself. If nature properly presents itself in its weakest talent, then the sign is, nature presenting itself in its most powerful talent, = 0.” Friedrich Hölderlin, “The Significance of Tragedies,” in *Essays and Letters on Theory*, 89.
of each part and the unity of the whole as such which is the supreme separable, or the arche-partition.”

It is also in this light that the line from the significance of tragedy concerning justice and law could be explained. Justice is not the domain of the sovereign Subject, neither is law the actualization of the sovereign Other in the calculable world. Judgement is the operation through which the original unity of intellectual intuition constantly makes itself manifest as the arche-separation, differentiating and individuating itself in the parts such that the unity is recognised in the part only as separation or partition. The part in their difference actualises the potential unity of all but only as separability, differentiation. Intellectual intuition comes here as that original difference or arche-separation which eternally differentiates and individuates. As Hölderlin writes, “Judgement, in the highest and strictest sense, is the original separation of object and subject which are most deeply united in intellectual intuition, that separation through which one object and subject become possible, the arche-separation.”

The possibility of tragedy arises when this principle of individuation has to be expressed such that intellectual intuition becomes tangible. To hear the clamour of Being in its univocity which can only come to us as difference, as partition so that it no longer remains hidden, unknown and silent. How to unfold the world in its totality but only through its folding back, in the double folding back of man and god, their turning away from each other, which is also the sign of their unity? When Hölderlin writes that “the unity present in the intellectual intuition manifests itself as a sensuous one precisely to the extent that it transcends itself, that the separation of its parts occurs which too, separate only because they feel unified” we need to understand this transcendence as a transcendence to nowhere but itself. A transcendence which is a “divine faithlessness” of man and god separating from each other such that one transcends to nothing but an arche-separation which is the condition of possibility of its individuation. By the same logic the whole is a living whole, a sensuous whole which is “determined and rich in content, on account of the liveliness of the parts, of their intensity.” In becoming the whole, the part gains inwardness or intensity while the whole gains “life,”

25 Arche-separation or Urteilung is seen by Hölderlin as the original separation through which subject and object are made possible which are unified in intellectual separation. Therefore arche-separation is pre-supposed by a whole which is its condition of possibility while in itself such separation is the judgement rendered on the ground of all beings. Therefore, Being exists in a state of arche-separation which is to say in a state of alienation as a result of the Judgement rendered onto it. See Courtine, “Of tragic metaphor,” 61-64. See also, Hölderlin, “Judgment and Being,” 37-38.

26 Hölderlin, “Judgment and Being,” 37.


28 Ibid., 85.
the being of the sensible. This is not a dialectical thinking of the part and whole, of man and God, where the whole (God) always comes before the part (man), because it is to the whole that the part has to sacrifice itself, negating and preserving itself in the whole. On the contrary, Hölderlin writes in his remarks on Oedipus “… god and man expressing themselves in the all-forgetting form of infidelity—for divine infidelity is best to retain—so that the course of the world will not show any rupture and the memory of the heavenly ones will not expire.” It is this separation where the gods have fled, where they are no longer with us such that all we can have is the displacement of our being in relation to god, the foreignness or nomadicity of our lives, wandering under the unthinkable, in all forgetfulness and divine faithlessness which is paradoxically also the arrival of the Gods among us but masked, in weakness. But again, this is also the proper way of their appearance. It is this resonance of the idea of deus absconditas, who comes clothed and masked, hidden under the humble garb of a servant, the “original strength” presenting itself in its “weakest talent,” (S=0)

In a fragment, Hölderlin writes:

Always yet marvellously for the love of men
God clothes himself
And hides his face from all knowing.

What we find here is not only the problem of tragedy as a metaphor where god and man encounter each other, such that the divine is revealed but only through the destruction of the sign, which is made insignificant, meaningless so that the truth of the primordial unity can appear in the senselessness of the sign. As we pointed above it is this senselessness of the sign which (de)monstrates the language of tragedy to itself. It is also a mode of thinking which participate in the problem of theatre. A problem of masking and unmasking where one experiences the inner emptiness of all masks and seeks to complete it by filling it with all the difference between the finite and infinite, between man and god. The structure of the metaphor as the vessel for tragedy has to see thus not from the perspective of an approximation of meaning but truly as a transport, a passage for god to appear but as no-one. We hear an echo—an echo before the voice—of Kierkegaard’s knight of faith

who appears as a bourgeois in his Sunday best because he only plays the role of the knight of faith. It is only as play, where the being of the actor resembles the being of no-one that god shows himself but as nothing which is again not to say as negation but the sensuous experience of an originary separation. The language of tragedy as “monstration,” as expressing the desire for an alien god who is absconding, is, for Hölderlin, the problem of theatre per excellence because the failure of meaning is the very success of the truth of tragedy as arché-separation.

But if the metaphor as transport captures the true theatricality of tragic thinking then it also corresponds to the idea of translation. To understand the problem of translation as not merely a literary act but a veritable theatre of the future, a modern theatre which anticipates the failure of modern theatre as theatre of (de)monstration, a place of congregation in the classical sense of the word. A translation-theatre, like Mallarme would later imagine a book theatre (Mallarme who was deeply influenced by Hölderlin) which not only asserts the disappearance of a communal sacred place as the locus of theatre to take place but the imagination of a new inhabitation for theatre which is that of language. To re-imagine Julia Kristeva’s famous title “Modern Theatre Does Not Take (a) Place,” it takes place within language. But this language is not of representation but that of repetition, a language of translation, even a “foreign,” improper, monstrous and alien language.

When Walter Benjamin wrote “The Task of the Translator,” it is evident that he had Hölderlin’s translations in mind which is proved by the last section of the piece which is devoted almost exclusively to Hölderlin’s translations of the Greek tragedies. Irrespective of this relation and the almost impenetrable complexity of Benjamin’s own language, a certain similarity of the idea of translation as explained by Benjamin with an idea of theatre seems to emerge here in context of Hölderlin’s own translation. Benjamin argues that translation is never about the transmission of subject matter because all that one can transmit are facts of communication and never

32 Julia Kristeva’s essay talks of the modern predicament of theatre which has overcome its earlier dialectical logic of theatrical separation and topological distribution. See Julia Kristeva, “Modern Theater Does Not Take (a) Place” trans. by Alice Jardine and Thomas Gora in Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime: The Politics of Theatricality in Contemporary French Thought, ed. by Timothy Murray (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997).
34 After his efforts to write the tragedy “The Death of Empedocles” Hölderlin embarked upon translating the tragedies of Sophocles particularly “Oedipus” and “Antigone.” The translation project was governed by the same tragic fascination with the Greeks which was the source of Hölderlin’s poetic genius. The translations were finally published in 1804 by Friedrich Wilmans.
“truth” of the original work of art. However it is through translation that great works continue to survive in their greatness because a true work would always offer itself up to translation, which is the force or potential of its translatability, the “afterlife” of the work which like a cloud always surrounds the “life” of the text but also gives it to history so that the philosopher can comprehend the natural life of the work though its (after)life in history only through translation. Hence it is through translation that the work gathers its fame. Moreover, it is through translation that the kinship of languages is maintained. What Benjamin means by a kinship of two languages is not the resemblance of words or similar works of literature but something which seems to be clearly inspired by Hölderlin’s idea of uni-totality. Benjamin writes

All suprahistorical kinship between languages consists in this: in every one of them as a whole, one and the same thing is meant. Yet this one thing is achievable not by any single language but only by the totality of their intentions supplementing one another: the pure language.35

The intention (intentio) of translation is thus meant not as a reproduction or representation but as a supplement which needs to be read here as a repetition in the target language not of the original text but the difference which separates the two. Hence to be faithful to the original, in this schema of thought, would be to display a certain infidelity such that what makes appearance in the target language is not the original text, which is impossible but its translatability. While from the point of view of the translated text what appears is the impossibility of translation or its untranslatability. In other words, it is through translation that translatability un-translates or remains eternally unfulfilled. We will not go further into the details of Benjamin’s text. Suffice it to say here that it is this idea of translation, that Benjamin found Hölderlin to be a master of, which becomes evident when we read what Benjamin says of Hölderlin’s translations that they evoke the danger inherent to all translations where “the gates of language thus expanded and modified may slam shut and enclose the translator with silence.”36 Now this idea of the translatability of the work which instead of being fulfilled and exhausted remains incomplete in the act of translation thus producing the inexhaustible possibility of further translation remarkably corresponds to the idea of

36 Ibid., 81.
theatre—here we follow Badiou but only minimally[^37]—where the theatrical text exists as a not-all, which is to say something which does not belong to itself but only finds its completion in the act of enactment. The text has no purpose outside its enactment. Hence it remains as a virtuality, as something *translatable* which can only be completed by its translation into performance. But every performance instead of completing or fulfilling the theatricality of the text enhances it, instead of exhausting its possibility paradoxically increases it opening it up to further possibilities of performance, of more enactments of its theatricality, of more interpretations and translations. This is the mysterious double binding of the *taking place of theatre* which both completes and incompletes the theatrical text. Hence a single text is re-enacted throughout history whose afterlife only contributes to the greatness of its original life. In this sense we would argue that Hölderlin’s translations are not merely theatrical, but it is the *taking place of a modern theatre*, a theatre of translations while at the same time his understanding of the tragic metaphor opens up within philosophy something akin to a theatre of repetitions.

III. The General Problem as a Problem of Language: *Madness*

But one would be still justified in arguing that is it not the German language in which all this takes place? How could this German language be hollowed out of its mastery? How can it be stripped of its aristocracy, the aristocracy of the masters like Goethe and Schiller who were re-turning to the Greek masters in an attempt to find a legitimacy of their own supremacy? If it is true that it is in the Germany of the early nineteenth century that a genuinely historical dimension of the west crystallised itself then what role did the language of Hölderlin play in it? Is it one of aristocracy which borrows

[^37]: Alain Badiou goes on to elaborate on this thesis by constructing four elemental dimensions of the theatre-truth namely its a) evental dimension inscribed in the relation between the theatrical text and its performance, b) its experimental dimension inscribed in its treatment of time, producing an artificial time where the instant encounters eternity, c) its quasi-political dimension which is produced through the universality of the idea by being an art form which is quintessentially public in nature. d) And finally, the amplifying dimension of the theatrical truth which elaborates its relation with history presenting it in a fashion which is neither representational nor absolutely aesthetic devoid of politics. It is the moment where a real historical sequence would meet the artificiality of time making that sequence immortal. We have tried to read the philosophy of Augustine in order to find a movement within that philosophy which we can call theatrical from all this perspective adhering to Badiou’s schematization in spirit and not strictly by letter. See Alain Badiou, *Rhapsody for the theatre* (London and New York: Verso, 2013), 101-103.

its cultural debt from the Greeks? Or is it a language whose sovereignty is challenged by the work of the poet which constantly moves into that which is not a work, which is an absence of work, in other words madness. Is it a language which seeks its condition of possibility from the very loss of language, a single language which can continuously speak of the poem and madness? What is the relation between the two that Hölderlin’s work is a testimony to? Is it the silence of an anonymity which is to say the silence of that which is distant from a work that speaks; is it this distance which is brought into the proximity of language in Hölderlin? The flight of the gods that throws men into the mortal domain of the world, into the domain of history is also the imminence of the Gods. But how can a language speak the silence of anonymity when it has to say something … always something? It is here perhaps that the relation of language and madness is born.

In an essay titled “The Father’s ‘No’” which first appeared in Critique in 1962 as a review of Jean Laplanche’s book Hölderlin and the Question of the Father, Michel Foucault poses this as the general problem of language and history in the modern times. How can a single language speak the language of the poem and the language of madness? Not the sovereign language which can identify what is a poem and what is madness but to understand language topologically, as a space in which one can continuously move from madness to literature and back in infinite speed.

He argues that the transition from the middle ages to renaissance, saw a new modality of the hero figure in the form of the artist whose work and whose life would not only mirror each other, but the work would be taken as an exploit, as the very determining factor of the life of the artist through which the “ephemeral actions” of his life finds its eternal truth, while the life of the artist is seen as the “natural birthplace” of this truth. The truth of the artistic genius, the discovery and recognition of that genius, which Giorgio Vasari’s vite—The lives of Artists (1991)—commemorated, would always be preceded by the existence of that truth, prior to all recognition, before all discoveries. The recognition would merely be a twist in the narrative of the genius life, fraught with a series of vicissitudes. For example, Giotto was a shepherd sketching sheep when Cimabue discovered him on a rock. An apprenticeship follows, where the master becomes the disciple and the disciple is recognised as the true hero of the narrative. The work that he then produces becomes a testimony to this truth of his existence, the truth of his genius. It is this heroic mode of epic perception which became the method of approaching the truth of the artist and his work. However, as Foucault shows this unity was always precarious, threatened by that which was not

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work but which nonetheless was inalienable from the heroic narrative of the artist genius. The “distraught hero” who is consumed by his passion, the “alienated hero,” lost in his work, who becomes alienated not only from the world but tragically from his work, or the “misunderstood hero” who is not recognised in his lifetime. Through such episodes that which is not the work is interwoven into the unity of the artist and his work. However, with the passing of the heroic dimension, madness becomes the very threshold along which the unity of the artist and his work and that which is not works, which is the absence of work came to be determined. But strangely it is this heroic unity of the artist and his work, which gets re-enforced through negatively through the developing discourses of madness. It is madness which identifies the artist to his work as separate from everyone, but it is also madness which situates the artist not just inside his work but outside as well when it “blinds him to the things he sees and makes him deaf to even his own words.” It is this psychology of the artist, even before a discourse of clinical pathology is born, that Foucault identifies as the discursive tendency of understanding the artist and his work. It is done by negating the external relation or unity of the artist and his work and introducing a more subterranean path, a path leading to all that is not reflected in the work, to all that is not external to the unity of the artist and the work but the interior relation between what is work and what is the absence of work. With the loss of divine sovereignty, language becomes the great sovereign which emulates the sovereign prerogative of deciding upon the exception, in this case that which is work and that which is an exception to work.

What is original to Foucault’s analysis is to recognise that in the psychological negation of the unity of the artist and his work there is a more sinister affirmation of the same unity which would enable the artist to be the guarantor of truth which is sought through his work. In other words, the relationship between art and madness, the discourse (psychological) which identifies what is a work and what is not in relation to the successive events of the artists life silently repeats the sovereignty of the artistic subject which the heroic discourse of the genius represented during renaissance. What Hölderlin exposes is a threshold of this relation between madness and art by dissolving this unity and posing the problem of the relation exclusively at the level of language. The repetitions of the lack of the Father figure which comes over and over in Hölderlin’s imagination which informs both his life and work—for example it has been argued by scholars like Jean Laplanche of the presence of Schiller as a replacement of the father figure which is nevertheless abandoned. This proximity with Schiller which is later realised in the

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39 Ibid., 75.
distance which Hölderlin creates between himself and the master can be seen in the tragic light of the unfaithful presence of the gods in their absence. However, in Hölderlin the problem of distance and proximity is always played out in the space of language. Language starts functioning as the mirror which approximates life only to recognise the distance hidden in the proximity. The work becomes a “measure” of what it is not, of the absence of the real. But even this dual relationship of the mirror which can avert madness by the joy of artistic expression, by creating a double in the world of language of the impossible force of the original lack, an emptiness which designates the absence of all work is not enough for Hölderlin. What Hölderlin seeks to expose is the very limit of language in language itself. It is a limit which constitutes a work on the very threshold of its absence. The flight of the immortals pushes existence to its inaccessible limit where nonetheless mortality is touched by the divine. The anguished endurance of the hero, in absence of his exploits characterises the discontinuity between the artist and his work. It is this original distance between the artist and his work which plays out the arche-separation of tragedy in the very enactment of artistic creation. But at the same time, it is this discontinuity which marks the language of Hölderlin with a certain ellipsis which traces the limit of language itself, where it no longer functions through communication of meaningful words. This is not difficult language in terms of the complexity of significance which nonetheless produces meanings which can be deciphered. It is not a codification of language for the sake of hidden knowledge. Nor is it the complex use of images and metaphors which distorts language. In other words, language does not become rhetorical because it seeks to convince. Here language operates as a forcing of that which it is not, the work forces the threshold or the gap which differentiates the work from its absence into the work itself. The work as a unity between the desire of the artistic subject and the object of its satisfaction therefore becomes something akin to what Hölderlin valued so much in tragedy—intellectual intuition. However, it is only a displaced unity because the work expresses this unity only by evoking its absence. It is this arche-separation or the foundational lack which makes the modern work of art, for Hölderlin not merely tragic in its content, but in its form. Modern artistic creativity is tragic creativity because it takes art to the limits of signification such that artistic form exposes itself to its other—life. However, artistic form cannot appropriate life intrinsically. For Hölderlin, form rather than being separated from life as an objective external reality, exposes in its emptiness the negativity of its relation to life. The absence of signification becomes the condition of possibility for the symbolic to exist. The threshold of tragic language carries the trace of this foundational lack or absence.
Thus, it is like the father’s “no” which never forecloses the presence. The father’s absence, as Foucault, following Lacan explains, is never the absence of the real individual who bears the name of father which produces symbolic distortions into images and forms. It is rather the father, as the signifier who instead of naming himself, of nominating himself in the role of the father according to the Law, leaves the place of signification empty. The effect of a lack of nomination, the absence of the limit that the signifier Father is supposed to set up in the psychic field, the loss of its meaning forces the upsurge of the phantasms of psychosis.

Hence, following Foucault we would argue that two moments are to be detected in Hölderlin. The initial tragic moment of the reciprocal withdrawal of the gods to their ether and the hero to his terrestrial world is reflected in the historical consciousness of the poet by the effacement of Greece and the arrival of the Hesperian reality. Interestingly, to be witness to this withdrawal is the tragic poetic gesture per excellence for Hölderlin. We find it echoed best in his “Bread and Wine” when he writes

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But, my friend, we have come too late. Though the gods are living, Over our heads they live, up in a different world. Endlessly there they act and, such is their kind wish to spare us, Little they seem to care whether we live or do not.41
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And a second but simultaneous “zone” is created where language approaching its limit, loses itself by being absolutely unfamiliar to itself. Wandering under the impossible, here language is conditioned by that which comes from elsewhere. Perhaps the most unambiguous example of this threshold of language, when language confronts its own abyss, comes in Hölderlin’s translation of Antigone. Georg Steiner notes about this translation that “The opening word of Antigona is a willed monster: Gemeinsamschwesterliches!”42 It is this “monstrous” translation which brings out a naked literalness of language in Antigone describing the royal sisters together in the beginning of the play which is immediately repeated when Antigone calls out to Ismene’s “head”: “O Ismenes haupt!”43 Steiner notes “such carnal immediacy is appropriate to one who has, just before dawn, confronted, given swift and spontaneous sacrament to, the body of her

41 Hölderlin, “Brod und Wein / Bread and Wine,” 185.
42 (Steiner 1996: 85)
43 (Steiner 1996: 85)
45 Ibid.
But it is not merely the context of the dramatic situation which warrants the use of such physical and primitive language. The primordial words dissolve into the discordance of an impossible language; a barren and ancient language which is not only deprived of rational meaning but hollowed out of any form of signification. And yet it is language which is exposed to its own monstrous other, its alien essence which permanently escapes itself such that all we are left with is language as the measure of an immeasurable gap: a tragic arche-separation is forced into existence as the psychotic phantasm of language. The tragic dissonance of the poem finds a vanishing point within the delirious materiality of the absence of work.

Foucault writes, “the trajectory that outlines the flight of the gods and that traces, in reverse, the return of men to their native land is indistinguishable from this cruel line that leads Hölderlin to the absence of the father, that directs his language to the fundamental gap in the signifier, that transforms his lyricism into delirium, his work into the absence of a work.” It is here that the sovereignty of the artistic subject, which reflects the sovereignty of language collapses giving rise to the “enigma of the similarity“ that the work shares with the absence of work, which the poetic utterances share with the delirious whispers of the mad. In pushing a work towards its own dissolution, Hölderlin succeeded in not only dissolving the heroic unity of the artist and his work, but in creating an order of language which could be common to both the poem and madness. This language is not the sovereign language which identifies itself as the sovereign who can decide on what a work is and what is not. This language always arrives from elsewhere, a there which is always a here, a silence which is always heard while speech dissolves into madness.

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44 Ibid., 85-86.
45 See ibid., 85.
46 Foucault, “The Father’s ‘No’,”84.
THE DIVINE FAITHLESSNESS OF HÖLDERLIN


__________, Werke und Briefe, ed. by Friedrich Beissner (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1969).


The Mimetic Faculty
and the Art of Everyday Life

Milan Kroulik

Abstract: In this paper I attempt to rethink the relationship between art and life by formulating it based on the rereading of the Benjaminian mimetic faculty by the anthropologist Michael Taussig. Taking this position within history as non-teleological change and based on human activity, to uphold a distinction between original and representation metaphysically becomes impossible. This is important in so far as any notion of primacy becomes obsolete, while at the same time one can work with the historical existence, both material and ideational, of initially abstract concepts such as art. Art then is something that in itself does not have a materially specific reality, but forms reality through artworks, institutions, pecuniary allocations or human motivation. Taking art as a world-forming force that is nonetheless historically produced in turn opens up new, pluralist ways of using this historical given for possible futures.

Keywords: Taussig, Marxism, mimesis, aesthetics

The following pages would not have been possible for me to write without the experience of taking and arranging images, be it as photography or as films. Such experience however is only half present: there and not there. Without it, I could not have created this text, and image-making practices helped me generate and organize thoughts, even if I do not specifically treat the topic. Cinema haunts this writing, for cinema, today, is part of the fabric of life.

I.

Where is art said to come from? For some influential figures, an artwork was the copy of a copy of an idea, and thus inferior. The practices and resulting products today regarded as art could be

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subsumed as one coherent group. But there was no art as such. As the Western idealist narration of history tells it, there came a time when this image of the world was inverted. Reality was no longer a mere imitation of eternal ideas; it was thought as the origin. Unfortunately, art is still considered a copy of reality. And it just is, much like the works that are considered to be its manifestations that are mere imitations of something apparently, if inexplicably better. And with all these imitations there was apparently nobody (that is, nobody would have made it into the unified, canonical narrative of History) who would have asked the questions: “How did anybody manage to produce that copy of reality? How did anybody manage to apprehend that one is the copy of the other?” That which is necessary for idealist philosophy and modern/capitalist cosmology to work in the first place, is generally erased. As Marx in his typically biting style puts it: “Even when the sensuous world is reduced to a minimum, to a stick as with Saint Bruno [Bauer], it presupposes the action of producing the stick.”

For there to be a stick, it must first become a stick. To rephrase this in the more contemporary language of deconstruction, praxis—here, material production—is a Derridean “dangerous supplement” to thought, or ideational production. The officially erased activity that makes a thing a thing is a necessary condition and if said thing were to become again, it cannot do without practical activity.

One of the most interesting ways to unearth what has been covered by centuries of burying by bourgeois intellectual praxis, has been formulated by Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno. This line of conceptual work is being elaborated, idiosyncratically, for the post-colonial age(s), by the writings of the anthropologist Michael Taussig. The issue is the following: “If there is a copy (representation) and the original (reality being represented), there must be somebody copying (representing). In what relation then do these three phenomena stand?” This possibility is already inherent in Marx, for it is with his work that the question of production emerges. Nevertheless, there seem to have been few Marxisms and Marxists that have approached Marx’s work as that of an anthropologist, that is, as someone concerned with what different humans do and how humans come to be, from the point of view of the human and not some abstract transcendental. It is not a question of what a human is. Benjamin’s proposition for this problem is the concept of

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the “mimetic faculty,” which is at the crossroads of nature and culture. He writes:

Nature produces similarities. One need only think of mimicry. The highest capacity for producing similarities, however, is man’s. His gift for seeing similarity nothing but a rudiment of the powerful compulsion in former times to become similar and behave mimetically. There is perhaps not a single one of his higher functions in which his mimetic faculty does not play a decisive role.

Every time I reread this short essay, I experience again the shock to the foundations of idealist cosmology that I experienced the first time I read it. Or so I tell myself. Like Benjamin, Michael Taussig thinks that “… the mimetic faculty is the nature that culture uses to create second nature, the faculty to copy, imitate, make models, explore differences, yield into and become Other. The wonder of mimesis lies in the copy drawing on the character and power of the original, to the point whereby the representation may even assume that character and that power.” Copies are as powerful as the original. How is this possible? There is a “two-layered notion of mimesis that is involved—a copying or imitation, and a palpable, sensuous, connection between the very body of the perceiver and the perceived.”

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5 In German, Walter Benjamin uses the word “Vermögen,” which can be translated as “ability,” “capacity,” as well as “faculty.” Here, I follow the standard translation, which apart from being conventionalized, nicely stresses the intimate relationship with the mind or body.

6 This question of the interaction of nature and culture arises in Marx. E.g., “They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation.” Marx and Engels, “Opposition,” in The German Ideology, 37.


8 Throughout the text, I use idealist cosmology as a polemical shorthand for a world where material things are in one way or another seen as depending on their immaterial, ideational counterparts. The former generally standing on the weaker side of this relation. This leads to a certainty about what any thing already is, and makes it hard to perceive how any such thing exceeds the image one already has of it, even if, quite evidently, practical engagement doesn’t necessarily follow ways of thinking. I do not want to claim that this has been the only way within Western thought, otherwise I obviously wouldn’t be writing what I am, nor within Western historical cosmologies, of which I know too little to assert any clear position. Nevertheless, from my experience it is a dominant way of dealing with reality, even with many Marxists.


10 Ibid., 21.
contact, and no contact without imitation. Furthermore, as “a faculty, it is also a history, and just as histories enter into the functioning of the mimetic faculty, so the mimetic faculty enters into those histories.” Benjamin’s formulations, too, are a history. The aim of this work is to think the relationship between art and life from within this history, and what it entails for the production of artworks.

II.

In Aristotle’s *Poetics* one can read the following passages: “… the instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood, one difference between him and other animals being that he is the most imitative of living creatures, and through imitation learns his earliest lessons; and no less universal is the pleasure felt in things imitated. We have evidence of this in the facts of experience” or “tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality.” According to Lacoue-Labarthe, it is about “the recognition of the same and the similar.” But what can also be recognized is that, for Aristotle, the same and the similar are not produced by the same process. Thus, it comes as little surprise that the rest of his work falls back into what appears to me to be arbitrary metaphysical assertions and does not further think about where sentient beings make use of this ‘instinct of nature’ he calls imitation. Neither does most of Western intellectual history. The mimetic faculty is being written out of History and History does not bear on it. Yet, history is not History. It is change. It is productive. It is made, just like artworks. And like the latter, the making of history takes place at the crossroads between culture and nature. So, here we are. Culture uses nature to create second nature. One tries to stand at the crossroads. It is given and made at the same time. Reality as constructed and not-constructed, “as really made-up.” Life imitates art and art imitates life. Life shapes art and art shapes life. And sentient beings are caught within the maelstrom of imitation, with the ground for unambiguous identity disassembled, yet continuously reassembling. Just like in montage, the sense of images changes depending on preceding and following images, subjective (personal) and objective (interpersonal). “Pulling you this way and that, mimesis plays this trick of dancing between the very same and the very different. An impossible but necessary, indeed an

11 Ibid., xiv.
13 Ibid., VI.
everyday affair, mimesis registers both sameness and difference of being like, and of being Other.” Any grounds for a radical separation between art and reality, between nature and culture, between history and being(s) collapse. But where does this leave our dominant idealist cosmology, whose classificatory system makes an essential categorical distinction between art and life? If history (or rather histories) and beings are productive, so must idealism be. So must the concept of art be. How then are we to rethink art on the basis of the mimetic faculty?

III.

It is written in the idealist canons of Western modernity that there are two ways of thinking about art. One is commonly said to be conceived on the grounds formulated by Kant. The other, perhaps less acknowledged, on the grounds formulated by Rousseau. As the stories go, the first is one of “disinterested” reflection from within the world, while the other can be characterized by “interested” effectuation of specific changes on the world. As such, the first appears as conceptualized from within a situation of art appreciation, and the second, from within the situation of art creation. The first wants to overcome the negatively perceived (sensual) effects of art on the sentient being in a situation of encounter with an artwork in favor of (hopefully) purely intellectual perceptive pleasure; the other wants to maximize the (presumably intellectual) effects of an artwork on society. Both forget about the necessary mediation by the material. In a sense, both approaches see double: there is and is not an effect of art on the individual in society—and this effect (negative or positive) is imagined as total, as unified. Each approach wants to minimize the influence of one pole over the other, which is in and of itself hardly problematic. The problem arises when these two poles are treated as radically separate instead of two aspects that are always present. This happens because both the actively mediating materiality and the actively participating subject are erased and forgotten. Paradoxically, the basis for the cognitive creation of total difference is thinking based on primary identity—between objects, their material and cognitive representations, and often those that do the representing.

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16 Ibid., 129.
17 Some writers complicated this simplified reception of Kant, e.g. Halliwell, Aesthetics, 9 ff.
18 How often is it that the basic referent for change is one concrete, historical subject and not either an abstract, totalized society or a transcendental, ahistorical subject?
Negative dialectics is one of the methods out of this idealism: “Crucial to ‘negative dialectics’ was not only the object’s nonidentity with itself, but its nonidentity with the knowing subject, the mind and its logical processes.” Identity-thought conflates all the little differences, the uncertainties, the pluralities that can, at times, be difficult to perceive and transforms continua of transformations into one or two static blocks, depending on the cosmological configuration. But art and life are histories, and thus, change. This is why they are separate, despite the fact that they draw on each other. They are similar and different at the same time. Then, there is the third: the artist. The human is subject-object living in a society with a classificatory model that produces the figure of the artist. The person imitates this figure and the figure imitates the people. The person is considered an artist and considers herself an artist. The creation of a category is one of interaction by societal and individual formation; it is historical. It is history, but it is not history. It is nature, but it is not nature. It changes nature, it becomes nature. Also, the category is productive. It produces the artist. It makes history. The artist, too, makes history. But an artist is not another artist. Neither is she art. Neither the category. They come from each other, they are imitating each other, but they imitate many forms, material and immaterial. They are neither different nor identical; they are both, they are similar. So, what came first: art (category), the artist (producer), or the artwork (material)? Neither, of course. They all make each other.

IV.

Imagine two scenes: one, of artwork production, and the other, of art-sense production. Let us say we have a painter. There she is, in front of the painting to become. Brush in hand, atelier around her, empty canvas in front of her. All things here have become histories. They have been produced by other makers transforming nature into culture, creating objects that are always already both. How does such a technological object come about? It is not found in nature. What must be done is to make all that was learned into

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21 Benjamin is radical precisely because he begins his thought processes with such minutiae and does not try to “put them on the procrustean bed of reason.” Buck-Morss, Origin, 107.

22 “The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated.” Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in Marx and Engels, The German Ideology including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, 569-570 (Thesis III).
an object. A specific combination of transformations of both ideational and material forms. The brush itself then becomes history, for it has the ability to make history, to form reality, to co-produce further imitations. But now, the labor is on our painter and her materials. And the aim is to bring a whitish canvas, that is a canvas already filled with structure and color, to a state where some putative other can say: “Now, this is a painting!” In order to arrive at the categorization of an object as a painting, that is to make sense of a specific material object, one must also work. One must make use of the mimetic faculty to discern similarities and differences. Just try to remember all the effort that went into acquiring the ability to enjoy art, to learn to distinguish between what is art and what is not, to learn to stand still in a museum. Not to mention all the work done by those making it possible for the places within which one views art to come into being and continue being. Neither art-production nor art-consumption is a given, both are productions in constant becoming produced/producing.

What (historically specific) tool-kit can the artist-person draw from? The list, I imagine, could go something like this: art as efficacious category, available materials (always already modified) and technical apparati, bodily techniques and sensual perceptions, cultural imaginary, funds.23 All of these phenomena enable the emergence of the scene proposed above. And indeed, my writing and your reading too.24 And neither the artist, nor her ability to create an artwork is self-identical; each is a variation of what became before.25 Learning which forms can serve to establish similarities and which cannot, that is, learning to use the mimetic faculty, is historical. Artist, like all others, must learn by copying the available tool-kit, based on which works can be produced. Different trades are different histories, and make possible different correspondences. A painter will have different bodily techniques (copied

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23 ‘Art’ is what makes the scene possible in the first place. By materials and technical apparati, I mean things like brushes, types of paint, pigment, etc. By bodily techniques I mean gestures, poses, angles, perceptions, etc. By sensual perceptions, types of brush strokes, angles, etc.

Cultural imaginary, I take to mean that which has been represented, what can be represented—the intertwined histories of art and nature that are present in a society at a given moment. Even in one society there will exist different form-histories and thematic histories that enable and legitimize differing variations. Whatever the currently available wealth of forms, they are accessible through the mimetic faculty—the ability to perceive and produce similarities within difference. Difference and similarity are the products of the same processes.

And with funding I also mean exchange value, that is the allocation (itself possible through abstraction) of money that creates and structures the possibilities of the creation of art.

24 “… the notion that writers and artists were themselves productive workers, more similar to the proletariat than to their capitalist exploitors, was widespread among members of the Berlin circle. Brecht referred to intellectuals as ‘brain-workers’ (Kopfarbeiter) and Benjamin wrote a theoretical article on ‘The Author as Producer.’” Buck-Morss, Origin, 32.

25 See also Buck-Morss, Origin, 44 ff.
from others) than a baker. And while each will have their bodies and minds formed for their profession, either can, in fact, learn (copy) what the other is doing, should they consciously make use of their abilities to see similarities in the production process, and not merely in the resulting artwork, which is caught in a differing web of correspondences. Imitating techniques from other, seemingly unrelated, professions might even lead to radical innovation. Life and art are intertwined not merely because they are both variations on forms, but because they are the fruits of practical activity and themselves engender further practical activity. Seeming chasms between humans appear when people are only aware of similarities between objects and ideational forms of objects. That is, objects are seen from the point of view of ideas. It is granting products of labor (cultural and natural) and thus, History primacy qua objects, while making all efforts not only to hide object-histories, but also object-history-making.

In more ancient times, according to Benjamin, it was a compulsion to behave and become like something else. That is also what European travelers repeatedly encountered: humans that are extremely adept at imitating. But it becomes apparent that who imitated whom in such encounters was not at all clear. Moderns, just as their imagined European forebears, never completely unlearned the conscious use of the mimetic faculty. Mimesis is still basic to other functions. We yield to objects and to beings, at times consciously, at other times not so much. And we do this while participating in artworks as creators and as consumers.

V.

You, reader, might opine that art appreciation is also about feelings, about pleasure, not just about production, about work, about tools, practical or conceptual. And you are right. Life is also about pleasure and other emotions. Yet, even emotions are produced from within certain constellations that are not, cannot be, exclusive to art. Art may produce contexts of intensified emotion or of specialized emotion, but who is to say that life is not intense? Even more, how could art be appreciated—intellectually, formally, emotionally—without everyday experiences? Thus, not only everyday bodily techniques are part of artistic techniques, but emotional experiences, too. Thus, in official Western intellectual history, there have, again and again,
surfaced views that intensified emotions lead to numbing. Or, on the contrary, that intensified emotions will somehow lead to an imitation of what is represented, in seeking to experience the same emotions. Both rest on the metaphysical assumption that representation is, in one way or other, not “real,” which poses the body, our body (which seems to be always both our concrete body and the abstract, universal body) as more directly present than representation. Hence, emotions produced by representation are somehow worse than those produced by reality. The underlying issue is one of how our material, acting bodies, and such bodies of others appear, that is, come to represent themselves, in our consciousness. And how these bodies are mediated by our different senses. But, from our understanding, senses are historical: “Just as the entire mode of existence of human collectives changes over long historical periods, so too does their mode of perception. The way in which human perception is organized—the medium in which it occurs—is conditioned not only by nature but by history.” Material culture is both natural and cultural, and subject to change. It, in turn, produces different sensual (perceptive) existence. Furthermore, different material encounters produce different sensorial-affective effects. And emotions, feelings appear with encounters, as mediated by historical senses. Different material media do not produce separate effects, for they are never “pure” in relation to their specific sense-mediation.

29 Rousseau, in his ‘Letter to d’Alembert’, is a prime example of idealist cosmology. Perhaps, because he sincerely tries to think his position through, many contradictions become glaringly apparent: On the one hand, he holds that art (here theatrical representation) has an effect on people, on the other he claims that cultures (for him: totally separate, totally totalizing in relation to humans and ahistorical, yet historical entities) have their own specific tastes and contingent representations, that do not speak to other cultures. But how can they not speak to others, if they have an effect? See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. d’Alembert on the Theatre, trans. by A. Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960). See also Lacoue-Labarthe, Histoire, 95-100.

30 The depths to which Western cosmology is historically contingent appears when the thought and practice of ‘others’ (both within and without the imagined category of the West) is taken seriously and not just as empirical evidence for European theory. Great work has been done by e.g., Alan Klima, “The Telegraphic Abject – Buddhist Meditation and the Redemption of Mechanical Reproduction,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43:3 (2001), 552-582; 552-554, 558.

31 As Lacoue-Labarthe writes: “Rien n’est présent qui ne soit de quelque manière (re)présenté : en représentation.” Lacoue-Labarthe, Histoire, 135.


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Michael Taussig, in describing his experiences participating in rituals in the Upper Amazon, is instructive: “Furthermore, the senses cross over and translate into each other. You feel redness. You see music. Thus, nonvisual imagery may evoke visual means.” Life and experience, existence, are produced by many influences, none of which are separable. This is not about conflation, but about creating new combinations. A painting viewed on Google produces a different effect than one viewed in a gallery. Viewed from the material ground up, they are different, but equal. One ought to not conflate them, but neither should one discard the other as inferior. After all, what good does it do (except for affirming an ideological hierarchy) since nowadays the majority encounters a painting in a copy first? Experience and emotions are non-identical to themselves; it is the secondary application of a concept that is made to act so as to subsume very real differences.

VI.

But neither are emotions and experience identical among each other. How then are we to relate emotions and mimesis? Emotions overwhelm us, they move us, they take us outside ourselves. They are passions. Idealist cosmology puts the sources of emotions and passions within humans, it is psychological—despite the fact that emotions arise in externally produced situations. How then are we to think emotions or feelings in a non-idealist way? Benjamin is instructive here. He imagines a source of feelings that is not located in the head. As cited by Michael Taussig:

… that we sentiently experience: a window, a cloud, a tree not in our brains but, rather, in the place where we see it, then we are, in looking at our beloved, too, outside ourselves. But in a moment of tension and ravishment. Our feeling, dazzled, flutters like a flock of birds in the woman’s radiance. And as birds seek refuge in the leafy recesses of a tree, feelings escape into the shaded wrinkles, the awkward movements and inconspicuous blemishes of the body we love, where they can lie low in safety. And no passer-by would guess that it is just here,

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34 Taussig, Mimesis, 57.
36 Kramer shows the closeness between passions and possessions: “These would normally be called not passiones, but rather possession, being moved or being filled with emotion.” Kramer, The Red Fez, 60.
in what is defective and censurable, that the fleeting
darts of adoration nestle.37

Feeling and sentience take us outside ourselves. They are two sides of the
same process and do not emerge solely from the dark recesses of souls. Many
non-idealistic, polytheistic cosmologies thus have immaterial entities that exist
alongside material ones, and interact to produce emotions, possessions
even.38 The human being is decentered, the interior and the exterior are not
hierarchized. To be taken outside oneself still implies that there is a self as
history. Mimesis obliterates Self, not self. Each encounter (let us act as if they
were analytically separable) is specific, because with each being-taken-outside-onself, the self changes. And returns similar, but different.39 This
happens regardless of the physical context. Contexts co-produce differently;
they enact differing possibilities for change. And within them, emotions and
sensual experience are separate, but inseparable. And only retrospectively
determinate.

VII.

Returning to the issue of the category “art”, it feels necessary to ask:
“Where then, does art come from?” Art is a product of specific circumstances
and is itself a (co-)producer of further circumstances.40 But art is an abstract
category, a form of classification, and as such, secondary as seen from
materialist practice. It does not exist without humans. What is actually,
physically produced is a thing that exhibits attributes which can be classified
as an artwork, i.e. on which the category of art can be projected. But things
have lives of their own. Things, even commodities, are like us—at the
crossroads of nature and culture. And they are productive.41 They, too, take
us outside ourselves. They make pleasure possible. This is surprising to some,
since humans in capitalist societies dissimulate. We act as if objects were
dead, passive, all the while defining ourselves by things, objectifying and
fetishizing them, but unconsciously. At once above and below objects.
Neither subjects nor objects. It is important “to awaken congealed life in
petrified objects. Thus, Benjamin, in addressing the fetish character of

40 “These phenomena were doubly determined by history, both in the moment of their
conception by the artist out of the material in its historically developed form, and in their
existence after creation, when they acquired a life of their own.” Buck-Morss, *Origin*, 52.
41 “The commodity is both the performer and the performance of the naturalization of
history, no less than the historicization of nature. In other words, the commodity is the staging
objecthood under capitalism, demystifying and reenchanting, out-fetishizing the fetish.”\textsuperscript{42} In a society employing the category of art, an artwork is produced. But it is also produced by the things themselves. One cannot make a painting out of anything, one does it together with things, even if cultural consensus tries to suppress the consciousness of such activity. In societies, where there was or is no concept of art, there are, nonetheless, works that can be classified (by us) as art—artworks. Since things have lives of their own, they sometimes give themselves to humans, and sometimes not. Common classification, however, is based on a logical slip that obfuscates that a (seemingly) eternal quality is retroactively projected onto objects. Common knowledge appears to be unaware of the cognitive process, which is what makes false consciousness of idealism possible.\textsuperscript{43}

Such idealization of art, which is accompanied by a nigh mystical conceptualization of both artists and intelligent people as the ‘genius,’ is then projected onto whatever is deemed fitting. What is and what is not art thus changes and so does the new production of art. The similarities that are possible to be perceived change. And things need not show themselves in all their forms to sensual apprehension. But when they do talk back, they can jumble one’s habitual existence.\textsuperscript{44} The category of art is produced as much by humans, as it is by things. And it acts upon them, it, too, is productive. But it is productive in historically-bound situations. Things, artworks can persist in their existence beyond the confines of the historical situation within which they have come to be. And they can tell things to other beings. Yet, since sense is produced historically, things will not necessarily say the same things to different people. What things say depend on their juxtaposition with other things. After all, production is always accompanied by “unintentional elements”.\textsuperscript{45} It is here, for Walter Benjamin, that truth (as historically contingent) may appear, what he calls “profane illumination.”\textsuperscript{46} This, here, is

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 1.
\textsuperscript{43} Incidentally, this is exactly what the Buddha allegedly taught. In academic Buddhist translations idealism is named eternalism. That operation, which misapprehends the real fact of transitory existence and proceeds to think the world from this misapprehension. The other pole that the Buddhist Middle Way criticizes is the one called nihilism, or in more philosophical Western terminology that of naive, because static, positivism, the one Marx so amusingly pokes fun at. The difference between certain Buddhisms and certain Marxisms lies in their differing soteriological goals—one aims to extinguish existence in the phenomenal world, the other aims to restructure the phenomenal world into an ideal world—communism. Techniques of meditation (e.g., \textit{asubha kammatthana}, i.e., meditation on corpses) also proceed dialectically to make the transitory constructedness of the phenomenal world apparent. Cf. Klima, “The Telegraphic Abject,” 553–554, 561–564.
\textsuperscript{44} E.g., Taussig, \textit{Mimesis}, 226 ff.
\textsuperscript{45} Buck-Morss, \textit{Origin}, 125-126.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
the interaction, in the (conscious) co-production of sense on the intersection of material and ideational processes.

Our times may be such that the “individual finds the abstract form ready made,” but they are (quite apparently, otherwise I would not be writing these words) not times, where there is nothing but encounters between ahistorical subjects and abstract forms. It is precisely because even the idealist, capitalist cultural formation necessarily draws on the mimetic faculty that this cosmological formation is neither ontologically static, nor pure. It may well be that capitalism is most sophisticated in suppressing very real historical changes into a seemingly eternal nature, but that does not make it eternal and unchanging. Indeed, some demonstrate that it changes so fast, that its change is barely perceptible. And so do people. But things live on, and can speak back, unsettle our certainties. What is difficult is to unearth what was thrown away. And while I am not sure about how common “profane illumination” might be, it is important to remember that what humans can do, is modify production processes. And the category of art (much like the category of education), because it produces realms outside the capitalist production process, opens spaces for experimentation.

VIII.

Art is everywhere and nowhere. Anything is and is not an artwork. There is artwork—becoming. Anything can become a source for conscious production of works of art. Things, concepts, humans, faculties are histories. Reality emerges from within interactions of histories. Reality is becoming-real, and it is specific to each one of us. It is montage, the combination of different images, forms that create new meaning by way of similarity and difference. The forms through which we create our realities are shared. They are webs of similarities in which things, concepts, humans and faculties emerge and which in turn produce further similarities and differences. Things that might have, at one time, appeared to certain humans as apparently similar, might begin to appear radically different. While such similarities and differences are apprehended cognitively, they are reproduced in physical actions and more stable physical creations such as things. But production always has its “unintentional” components. What

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47 Ibid., 45.
48 Taussig, following Benjamin, calls this the ‘recently outmoded,’ that is all the commodities, styles, behaviors of yesteryear that seem strange today. Cf. Taussig, Mimesis, 230 ff.
49 Which appears to be easier at the margins of capitalism. Cf. Ibid.
seems given now must not appear so in the future. Mimesis is, thus, becoming-similar not becoming-similar-to. Any perception and creation draw on the mimetic faculty. And that in turn is fickle—that what is needed to create copies is also that which collapses clear distinctions between the original and the copy. For the copy draws on the power of the original. It becomes powerful in its own right. Representation is always creation. And it is the ground that makes possible for “life to produce art” and “art to become life”. The two processes are inseparable. It is a “two-way street operating between nature and history.”

When Aristotle wrote that “objects which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity: such as the forms of the most ignoble animals and of dead bodies,” he used the mimetic faculty to perceive similarities and differences, but it played a trick on him. In distinguishing object and copy, he did not really distinguish it: “Thus the reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness is, that in contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring, and saying perhaps, ‘Ah, that is he.’” Of course, the copy is both, it “is and is not he”. That is the power it draws from the original. But the original itself is viewed through the copy, just like how montage modifies the meaning of the preceding image through the other image. Sentient beings and things are as much reality as representation. And a concrete effect is never ensured. This is perhaps best demonstrated on the example of katharsis. Many viewers present at a dramatic performance might indeed experience katharsis (mediated by mimesis)—others will not. Because, it must first be learned to perceive a dramatic performance in such a way that katharsis can ensure. One must acquire the intellecto-perceptual formation that enables the sensual perception of a drama as a whole; one must become similar to the dramatic performance as a whole, to be able to experience katharsis. This, too, is montage, of a specific idea of a whole, as well as various material circumstances. Aristotle imagines

50 “But not until Benjamin and Adorno articulated the problem within the frame of a Marxist theory of society did they name the source of the ‘unintentional’ elements: the socioeconomic structure mediated all geistige production and hence expressed itself within cultural artifacts – alongside (and often in contradiction to) the subjective intention of their creators.” Buck-Morss, Origin, 79.
51 This is the reason for Plato’s uneasy relationship with representation.
52 Taussig, Mimesis, 250.
53 Aristotle, Poetics, IV.
54 Ibid. Nonetheless, I wonder: do or did ‘men’ really say that? It appears to me that it was Aristotle here who left empirical inquiry for speculation. Who proceeded from the general to the particular and not the other way around? Otherwise he need not have speculated about what men and women say, he could have just asked them.
55 “Especially pertinent was the way Eisenstein came to understand within and as a result of those principles the interdependence of montage with physiognomic aspects of visual worlds.” Taussig, Mimesis, 28.
(dramatic) totality as preexisting physical performance and apprehension, when, in fact, any whole is a project in the making. The conceptual slip between an artwork having an effect and an artwork having a determinate effect is typical of idealist cosmology. However, there are many ways of perceiving (being affected by) a dramatic performance, many sources of pleasure. And it is only when thinking from the particular to the general that such new practices open up. It is a letting go of the acquired ideational form ‘totality.’

IX.

Today, artists and art exist, intertwined as ideational concept and physical reality. A mimesis of ideational and material imitation qua creation. What one can do, is to consciously modify the mimetic process (and thus its externalized results), while accepting its indeterminacy. Taussig calls this “mastery of non-mastery.” As Benjamin “argued that the truth of the novel did not depend on the interpreter’s ability to empathetically identify with the sentiments expressed in the novel or with the author’s intent instead, truth lay within the novel itself. This truth was not immune to history, and perception of it was in fact enhanced by the temporal distance separating the interpreter from his object.” Creating variations of forms (on any level of reality) that then create reality is what reality is. But forms are always already content and society is based on “essentially inarticulable and imageric, nondiscursive knowing of social relationality.” Sensorial (re)production is a becoming of the unconscious ground from which societies emerge. And artistic creations bear on this ground more than ideational, non-material ones. What is at stake are the material histories that have been suppressed by capitalist imagery. But it is not enough to create forms, images that are beyond capitalist convention. Not all contexts enable variations of forms and imagery that might open up real possibilities for a really-made up beyond this idealism. Without awareness that “purity” is impossible, this system will continue being recreated. There is no purely non-capitalist realm at this historical moment, and acting as if there were one, instantaneously means continuing in the very system one wants to overcome. It means that the dance of mimesis that makes such acting possible will continue to be repressed. And nature will appear as Nature, culture as Culture, history as History. And the latter will be imagined to change only through breaks, even as it keeps on changing all the time. Humans will think that there are essential differences between humans themselves, and between humans and non-humans. All

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while continuing to become similar to others—but unconsciously. Humans will be prisoners of the reality they co-create. That is what some in this society profit from. Because of this, the notion of art is important, not because it is better than any other category, but because it creates a space for experimental creation of critical forms. (Critical) forms are not only artworks in the common sense; everyday practice is as much art as theater. But through art, it is easier to find things to which one can become similar that work outside the dominant system—or have been left behind. That way, the elements from which the future as history will be montaged can be modified. And the more forms are created, the more all might change differently than a dominant system expects. This is “mimetic excess.”59 Creating an abundance of forms that make the mimetic faculty apparent—making apparent existence as both objective and subjective at the same time, by heeding the little things, the particularities, that which tends to be ignored, even oppressed by those that think themselves grand, above others. And through that, to make not Art, but artworks and thus history:

As the nature that culture uses to create second nature, mimesis chaotically jostles for elbow room in this force field of necessary contradiction and illusion, providing the glimpse of the opportunity to dismantle that second nature and reconstruct other worlds—so long as we reach a critical level of understanding of the play of primitivism within the mimetic faculty itself. This is why I cite Benjamin’s likening of thinking to the setting of sails in the winds of world history—let us emphasize the worldliness of this history—in which the sails as images (read mimesis) develop into concepts according to how they are set. Here is the space for human agency and shrewdness, the setting of the sail within the buffetting of history.60

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References


60 Ibid., 71 (author’s emphasis).


was tempted to introduce this review by borrowing Marx’s iconic remark—a spectre is haunting the Philippines—in a supposed attempt to give Müller’s book a local slant. After poring over the text, however, I realized that such introduction, had I pushed it, would be quite inaccurate. First, as a spectre, populism is haunting not just the Philippines but the rest of the world; and second, more than mere haunting, populism has in fact encroached into our political culture long before its global surge. One may detect a remote parallelism between contemporary populism and the demagoguery of the Greeks and the Romans, or even the grassroot movement of the American farmers in the 1890s, but none of these historical instances may be proximately comparable, factually nor conceptually, to populism the way it sways politics across nations today. In the tumultuous period of the 1960’s in Europe, two pioneering scholars on populism, Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, tried to use the term to signal the spreading crisis of democracy by announcing, similar to my aborted introduction: “A spectre is haunting the world: populism.”2 It was a warning with an earnest and provocative intent but the erstwhile tentativeness of the term “populism” seemed to have worked against the public attention that both Ionescu and Gellner were hoping to solicit. Until such time, populism was understood in the same sense as its kindred term, popular. It was easy for anyone back then to associate the term with anything related to “populace” or the “public.” Such lack of a specific referent made populism a “politically contested concept.”3 Definitely, the former use of the term had none of the attributes of a typology of politics that is unfolding or has unfolded in countries as varied as the United States, Russia, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Spain, Venezuela, Greece, Spain, North Korea and the Philippines to name a few. What Müller did in this very reader-friendly introductory book on populism was to strip it of its attendant ambiguities and to sharpen the focus on its features which, to date, have brought various countries (like those cited above) into a single

2 Ibid., 7.
3 Ibid., 9.
populist mold. Müller achieved this by citing anecdotes to illustrate the relative “success” of populism in places where it has become hegemonic. Among the examples he related was the common proclivity among populist leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orban, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa and Bolivia’s Evo Morales to maintain a strong and constant media presence either via a radio or TV program as a strategy to maintain what they described as “proximity to the people.”

Such media offensive which, according to Müller, could last for as long as six hours, was normative for populist politics, hence the correlative tag, “media democracy” or “audience democracy.” By staging their own radio and television shows, the aforementioned leaders thought they could foster closer immediacy with their constituents and vice versa. They would rather talk straight to their own people rather than rely on the mainstream media to do the talking for them. Using the same logic, it has been customary for other leaders like Italian parliamentarian Beppe Grillo and the President of the United States, Donald Trump to take to their blogs and tweets respectively when they wish to address the public directly. It is important to note that when Müller employed the term “populism” or “populist”, he did not have in mind politics as a collective praxis undertaken by the principal political agents, that is, the citizens themselves; he was using the term to refer to the maneuverings of strongmen who managed to propel themselves to power by riding on the widespread popular resentment with the inadequacies and unfulfilled promises of liberal, representative democracy. As Müller noted, “populism arises with the introduction of representative democracy; it is its shadow.”

When the dysfunction of such political system sets in, when the electorate feels that those whom they elected no longer represent them, they turn to charismatic individuals who project themselves as anti-establishment and assume the persona of a messiah who promises to come to the people’s succor. These two elements—the populist leader and the imagined united “people”—are two sides of the same coin, mutually feeding on each other. On one hand, the authoritarian posits the symbolic stature of a “people” to legitimize his hold on power; on the other, the public, which imagines itself as one homogenous whole, foments the rise of authoritarian regime as a corrective measure to a decadent establishment. The complicity of populism, both in theory and in fact, with the persistence of identity politics and the emergence of authoritarianism can hardly be overstated. The patent distaste for plurality and dissent is a signature trait of populist politics and populist leaders.

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4 Ibid., 43.
5 Ibid., 20.
6 Ibid., 75-79.
What is Populism? is a slim, straightforward yet very engaging read on populism. In this book, Jan Werner-Müller is neither theorizing on populism nor extrapolating on what it should be but is merely offering an account of this phenomenon as a socio-political fact. By profiling varieties of populist leaders and authoritarian governments across the globe, he is able to draw up a picture of populism recognizable even to those who do not have enough background on political theory or geopolitics. For some reason, Philippine politics does not figure in Müller’s chronicle of examples, but one will surely find allusions to it all over the place. Readers on the lookout for an educated explanation as to why Philippine politics is constantly on the rut will surely find Müller’s book a very useful resource.

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