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Si Ferriols, ang Katamaran ng Pag-iisip, at ang Alaala ng Meron

Agustin Martin G. Rodriguez

Abstract: This study explores Roque J. Ferriols’s ideas of “pakikitagpo sa Meron” (opening to Being) and “paggising ng alaala ng Meron” (awakening of the memory of Being) and their implications for research and scholarship in philosophy. It argues that the abstraction and systematization that has become the norm of academic philosophical writing is not adequate to the genuine opening to the presencing of Being. Ferriols’s own style of writing and thinking demonstrates a more indigenous form of philosophizing that makes possible what the calls the awakening of the remembrance of Being in the person’s deepest consciousness.

Keywords: Ferriols, Filipino philosophy, scientific knowing, opening to Being.

Ang Inambag ni Ferriols

Hindi mapagkakaila na si Roque J. Ferriols ang isa sa mga pinakamahalagang pilosopo sa kasaysayan ng akademoking pamimilosopiya sa Pilipinas. Dala ito ng sakop ng kanyang impluensiyang sa ilang henerasyon ng mag-aarial at sa pagtataag ng partikular na istilo ng pamimilosopiya sa bansang ito. Malawak at malalim ang kanyang impluensiyang sa ilang henerasyon ng mga namimilosopiya mula noong dekada ‘70. Dahil sa kanyang pagtuturo at mga kasulatan, naturuan niya ang kanyang mga kababahayang mag-isip sa paraang angkop sa kanilang wika at angkop sa kanilang karanasan sa Meron at ng mga nagmemeron.

Kung tutuusin, interesante itong impluensya ni Ferriols dahil batay lang ito sa tatlong libro at ilang sanaysay. Pangunahin sa kanyang

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malaman ng isang mag-aaral ng pilosopiya at para lang niyang ipinapaliwanag ang mga ito sa paraang simple, kundi man simplistiko.

Isang mahalagang halimbawa ang kanyang paliwanag sa Meron gamit ang talinhaga sa mainit na tubig sa kape.

Kung makagagamit ng katatawanan upang subukang itukoy ang nasa kaloo-looban ng pag-uunawa ng tao, maaaring sabinhin, na sa kaloo-looban ng tao may palaging nangyayari na maihahambing sa tubig na kumukulo. Tinutukoy ko iyong talinhagang nagamit na, ukol sa kape at gatas at asukal. Kung umiinom tayo ng ganito, malamang tawagin nating kape at gatas at asukal, at hindi na nating pang-aabalahan pang banggitin ang tubig; sapagkat ang kinagagalawan ng lahat ay hindi na kailangan sabinhin; alam na ng lahat na nandodoon. Pinakukulo na ang tubig bago pa dumating ang bisita; at kapag nakahanda na, hindi na kailangan punahin pa, maliban lamang kung maubusan.


5 Ferriols, Pambungad, 47.
bansang kakaunting librong pilosopikal ang nabebenta, lalong lalo na sa Pilipino, malaking bagay itong ilang paglimbag. Subalit, bagaman ito ang dahilan kung bakit binabasa si Ferriols, hindi ito gagalangin bilang seryosong obra ng mga pangmundong pilosopo. Para sa ma taong may pakialam sa paghusga ng pangmundong komunidad ng pilosopo maaaring mahiya sila dahil may kakulangan si Ferriols sa tinatawag na “sophistication” ng pag-iisip. Lalo itong maiisip kapag mapansin na ang kanyang sinusulat ay tilang pagsalin lamang o paliwanag ng mga batayan o “basic” na konsepto o teksto. Sa madaling salita, ang isa sa mga pinakamahalagang pilosopo sa Pilipinas ay isa lamang tagapagpaliwanag na walang mahalagang pagpapapayamang nagawa para sa pandaidaagdigang pilosopiya.

Subalit, hindi talaga madaling maisalin sa wika ng pandaigdigang pamimilosopiya ang kontribusyon ni Ferriols dahil umiikot ang kanyang pilosopiya sa paglalagay sa alanganin ng batayang gawain ng pandaigdigang pilosopiya sa pamamagitan ng mismong paraan ng pagbigkas at pagpapaliwanag. Makikita natin na may malinaw na pakay si Ferriols sa kanyang moda ng kontra-intelektual na diskuro. Makikita ito sa kanyang pagtatalakay sa mga uring katamaran na humahadlang sa pandaigdigang pilosopiya. Subalit bago ito, talakayan natin ang kanyang pag-uunawa sa pagbigkas sa Meron.

**Pagbigkas sa Meron**

Tulad ng mga Griyego, binibigyan-diin niya yung aspetong konkreto ng pagprepresensiya ng mga nagmemoner at ang pagkadynamikong ng Meron na nagpapapameron sa mga nagmemoner. May katatagan ang mga umiiral bilang itong nagdirito. Ito’y presensiya na sabay may katatagan at dinamismo ng pagdirito. Dinamismo ang anomang nagmemoner bunga ng pagkabukal sa walang hanggang hiwaga. Katatagan din ito dahil nagbubukal ito sa ganap na pagprepresensiya. Ang ano mang nagmemoner o umiiral ay binibigay sa pagmemoner ng Meron: talagang nagdirito ito at nagdadala ng walang hanggang kayamanan.


Para kay Ferriols, mahalaga itong pagmamalay sa Meron dahil pinalilinaw ng pagkamalay na ito na ang lahat ng nagmemoner ay sumasailain sa pagbabalangkas ng Meron. Ang katuturan o kahulugan ng pag-iral ng mga umiiral ay naghuhulog sa Meron. Kaya hindi nakakakita ng pagsapatupad ng pagmemoner ng anomang meron sa isang halos awtomatikong paraan. Walang isip-isip kumbaga. Basta umiiral bilang pagpapatupad sa Meron.

Iba ang tao. Umiiral ang Tao bilang may kalayaan. Samakatwid, tinutupad niya ang kanyang pag-iral nang may pagmamalay at paghapasa. Bagaman nagmemoner o umiiral ang tao sa abot-tanaw ng Meron, kailangan pa rin niyang magmemoner sa isang paraan tapat sa pagmemoner ng tao. Ito ang ibig sabihin ng pagsapakatao. Hindi lang dahil nagprepresensiya ang tao bilang tao na isinasatupad niya ng tapat ang kanyang pagmemoner. Kailangang matutupad ito sa malawig na isatupad ng tao ang kanyang pagkatao ayon sa kanyang kahulugan sa Meron. Samakatwid, dapat may malalim na pagkutob ang tao sa Meron bilang abot-tanaw ng kanyang pag-iral nang sa ganon maging posible ang kanyang pagpapatupad ng sarili ayon sa pagpapapameron ng Meron. Sa ganitong paraan, makikita natin ang halaga ng pagkabukal ng tao sa Meron. Hindi nito tinutukoy ang isang pag-unawa sa Meron bilang isang obheto ng pag-unawa dahil hindi isang bagay na

6 Ibid., 35.
7 Ibid., 32.
8 Ibid., 115.
nagdirito ang Meron. Sa halip, hinihingi sa tao ang isang uring pagkamulat na ang ating pakikitagpo sa mga nagmermeron ay may kinikilusang balangkas na mas malawak.

Tuwing nakikitagpo ang tao sa mga nagmeceron at kapag isinasatupad niya ang kanyang pag-iral sa kanyang pakikipagsapalaran sa mga nagmermeron, dapat siyang mulat na may angkop at nararapat na pagpapatupad ng sarili sa abot-tanaw ng Meron mismo. Sa madaling salita, isinasatupad ang pagmermeron na tao bilang pagpapatupad ng pagbabalangkas ng Meron. Malalaman niya lang kung ano talaga ang binabalangkas ng Meron kung malay siya na narito itong Meron na nagbabalangkas habang nakikipagsapalaran sa mga nagmermerson. Sa ganitong paraan lamang makilala ang tao ng tawag ng Meron. Kaya mahalaga kay Ferriols ang patuloy at masinop na pagsusuri ng tao sa mga nagmermerson ayon sa kanilang tunay na pagmermerson. Mga Katamaran

Para kay Ferriols, tatlo ang katamaran ng pagamit ng isip na hadlang sa pagbigkas ng tao sa Meron. Ang unang hadlang ang katamaran ng taong manatiling gising.\textsuperscript{11} Ito ang katamaran ng tao na manatiling bukas sa pagpapatupad ng pagprepresensiyang meron. Kumbaga, habang sariwa ang bagong karanasan, masipag pa ang taong makipagtagpo. Subalit, unti-unting dumadapo sa kanyang pag-uunawa ang pakiramdam na “alam ko na ito.” Habang nabubuo na ang mga sistema ng pag-uunawa, habang nagkakaroon ng maayos na kaalaman na natutulungan ang taong kumilos sa mundo, at lalo nang namamalayan na may sapat siyang kaalaman para epektibong kumilos sa mundo kasama ng kapwa-meron, nawawalan na siya ng ganang patuloy na manaliksik at makipagsapalaran sa mga nagprepresensiya.\textsuperscript{12} Nananatili na lang siya sa umuubra na kaalaman na naging bunga ng sinauna o batayan karanasan ng pakikitagpo. Katamaran itong hadlang sa pagbubukas sa Meron dahil nagiging kontento ang tao sa
masasabing kaalamang hindi tumutubo. Ito ang kaalamang binibigkas ang aspteo ng nagmemon na maaaring totoo subalit nagiging kasinungalingan dahil tinatanggihan ang kayamanan ng pagprepesensiya ng Meron at mga nagmemon sa pamamagitan ng pagpako ng pagprepesensiya nito sa simplistikong pag-unionawa. Hindi kasing seryosong suliranin ito kung iihambling sa ikalawang katamaran.


Sa kanyang argumento ukol sa posibilidad ng pagpapatupad ng metapsikal na pagmumuni-muni, sinasabi ni Kant na impossible at walang katuturan gawain ang metapsika kung pakay ang bumuo ng analitikong, a priori na kaalamang hindi nababatay sa karanasan at may direkta intuisyon sa Meron. Dala ito ng simpleng katotohanan na walang kakayahan ang katwiran ng taong bigkasin ang Meron at mga nagmemon. Dahil sa paniniwala ni Kant na nauunawaan lamang ng tao ang katalagahan bilang phainomena, o ang pagbibigay kahulugan sa datos ng pandama gamit ang mga kategoriya ng pag-unionawa at forma ng pandama. Ang ano mang makahulugang kabuuang ang mauunawaan ng taon ay isang malikhaing pagbubuo ng katwiran ng datos ng pandama batay sa paggamiit ng mga kategoriya ng pag-unionawa.

Ang karaniwang posibilidad ng karanasan sa kabuuang ay, kung tutuusin, sabay ang unibersal na batas ng kalikasan at ang mga prinsipyong posibilidad ng karanasan na siya ring batas ng kalikasan. Dahil hindi natin alam ang kalikasan kundi bilang ang kabuuang ng lahat ng nagdirito, i.e., ang mga representasyon sa kaisipan ng tao, at kaya hindi natin makukuha ang mga batas ng kanilang pagbubuo mula sa ibang batayan maliban sa mga prinsipyong mga koneksyon mula sa atin, i.e., mula sa mga kondisyon ng

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13 Ibid., 51.
nesesaryong pagbubuo sa iisang kamalayan—pagbubuo na ginagawang posible ang karanasan.\textsuperscript{14}

Samakatwid, para kay Kant, imposibleng bigkasin ang Meron at ang pagprepresensiya ng mga nagmemoner bilang \textit{noumena}. Ang kaalaman ng tao ay sistematikong pagbuo ng makatwirang pag-uunawa sa datos ng pandama ayon sa mga kategoriya ng pag-uunawa atorma ng sensibilidad.

Kung ganon, ang batayan ng mahulugang kaalaman, ang kaalamang angkop sa kakayahan ng taong umunawa, ang pagbuo ng datos ng pandama batay sa sistematikong paggamit ng mga kasangkapang \textit{a priori} ng katwiran. Kung ganon nga, nagiging mahusay ang dahilan kung bakit may katuturan para sa tao ang ikalawang katamaran. Kung walang batayan sa Meron ang kaalaman ng tao, ano ang batayan ng kolektibong kaalaman na maaaring sang-aunan ng tao? Bagaman suhetibo ang kaalaman, para kay Kant hindi ito relatibo.\textsuperscript{15} Universal ang kaalaman ng tao dahil \textit{a priori} ang mga kategoriya ng pag-uunawa. Ito ang batayan ng universal na kaalaman: ang mapagkakasunduang paggamit ng mga \textit{a priori} na kategoriya ng pag-uunawa ay makakamit kung may mga sistematikong paggamit nito na katanggap-tanggap sa lahat. Kaya naman importante sa kanlurang katwiran na nabigyang depensiyon ng epistemolohiya ni Kant na may isang sistematikong paraan ng pag-uunawa sa katalagahan. Ito ang dahilan kung bakit mahigpit ang paggamit ng metodo at sistema ng pagbibigay interpretaison ng mga agham. Ang agham ang universal na kaalamang posible matapos tanggapin ang epistemolohiya ni Kant bilang batayan ng kaalaman. At upang makabuo ng kaalamang katanggap-tanggap sa lahat, mahalagang magkaroon ng sistema na tanggal ng lahat bilang paraan ng pagtuklas sa pinakamaayos at epektibong pagbuo sa datos batay sa istruktura ng pag-uunawa ng tao. Kung ito lang ang ating batayan ng kaalamang universal, dapat lang na hangarin ng tao ang kaalamang bunga ng “isang tunay na uri ng patakaran” na “siya ngang kaisa-isang tunay na uri ng patakaran na magagamit ng tao.”\textsuperscript{16} Kung ganito ang kaalaman ng tao, hindi katamaran kundi hindi maiiwasan o kinakailangang atitud ng tao ukol sa kaalamang makatao.

Subalit, unawain natin kung bakit katamaran nga ito para kay Ferriols. Ang pag-iisip sa paraang kulong sa isang paraan ng pagbigkas sa mga nagprepresensiya ay istilo ng pag-uunawa na nagbibigay ng malinis at eksaktong kaalaman, subalit hadlang sa pagbubukas sa Meron bilang walang

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, 70–71.
\textsuperscript{16} Ferriols, \textit{Pambungad}, 51.
\end{quote}

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hanggang kayamanan na nagpapapresensiya nang may hindi maubos-ubos na kahulugan. Hadlang rin ito sa pagkilala at pagpapatalab sa Meron bilang batayang bukal ng pagprepresensiya ng mga nagprepresensiya. Possible na sa ating pagkakulon sa paniniwala na dapat may isang malinaw at tiyak na sistema ng pagbibigay kahulugan, hindi natin hinahayaang magpresensiya ang Meron sa tao. Ito'y dahil walang hanggang hiwagang nagbibigay sa pagprepresensiya ng mga nagmemeron ang Meron. Ibinibigay ang walang hanggang pagprepresesiyaang ito sa mga nagmemeron kaya kailangan ng tao ng sabay masinop na pagsusuri at bukas na pagpapatalab sa Meron. Tunay na hadlang na bukas na pagpapatalab ang atitud ng kaalaman na naniniwala na iisa lamang ang posibleng sistema ng pagbubuo ng lehitimong kaalaman. Subalit nakasalalay sa panindigan na may isang tanggap na paraan ng paggamit ng mga a priori na kasangkapan ng pag-uunawa ng tao ang pagkalehimo ng anomang kaalaman akademiko o maka-agham. Kaya, laganap ang ganitong “katamaran” at hindi kinikilala bilang lehitimong kaalaman ang anomang hindi bunga ng ganitong sistematikong paggamit ng mga kategoriya batay sa naaitatag na kaalaman. Sa kasaysayan ng magkakating pagsisiskap bumuo ng unibersal at lehitimong kaalaman, may mga rebolusyon ng mga sistema na pag-uunawa. Ito ang tinatawag na pagbabago ng paradigm ni Kuhn. Subalit, ang pagbabago ng paradigm ay pagbabago lamang ng sistema ng pagbibigay interpretasyon para maipaliwanag ang mas masabing ang tinanggap na bagong datos ng katwiran. Kaya, anomang pagbabago ng sistema ng pag-uunawa, ang hangarin ng kaalaman makatoto ang ay ang pagtuklas ng iisang sistema na mapapaliwanag ang lahat ayon sa a priori na kasangkapan ng pag-uunawa ng tao. Sa abot-tanaw ng pagsisiskap bigkasin ang Meron, katamaran ito dahil kapag nakuha na ng tao ang isang sistema na napapaliwanag nga ang lahat, hindi niya nararanasan ang pangangailangan nagpasikapan ang pagbigkas sa nagprepresesiyaang Meron.

Bunga rin ng panindigan nagbubunga ng ikalawang katamaran ang ikatlong katamaran. Ito ang paglalarawan ni Ferriols sa ikatlong katamaran:

May ibang porama naman nitong katamarang ito, na inaakala na hindi nating kayang malaman, kung meron nga ang nakukuha ng anomang patakaran. Sapagkat ang paniniwala nitong panindigan ito ay: na hindi alam, at hindi malalaman ng tao kailaman: ang mismong meron; kaya’t ang kaya lamang niya’y sundan

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18 Ferriols, Pambungad, 52.


Hinubog at hinuhubog ang konsepto sa pagbigkas sa meron. Hindi nga pagbigkas sa meron ang konsepto; ngunit isang uring alaala ng meron, isang tahanang palaging tumutubong alaala ng meron. Kaya’t kung ang konsepto’y gumagalaw na, sa loob ng galaw, ng kalooban na buminigkas sa meron, ang pagpapahiwatig sa pamamagitan ng konsepto ay may malaking kaalaman sa paturo ng daliri. Itinuturo ng iyong daliri ang buwan at araw, mula sa labas.

Kapag binigkas mo ang meron ng isang umiiral na hindi ikaw, nananatili ngang hindi ikaw iyong umiiral, ngunit umiiral na rin sa iyong kaloob-looban. Kapag binigkas ng tao ang isang meron, ang meron ng inuunawa at ang meron ng umuunawa ay pumapasok sa isa’t isa, kaya’t kapag lumpas na ang sandali ng pagbigkas, ang loob ng binigkas ay nag-iwan ng bakas ng kalooban ng umuunawa; at ito ang alaala ng meron.20

Para kay Ferriols, nasa buod ng tao ang pagprepresensiya ng mga nagmemeron dahil Meron din siya. Iisa ang tinutupad na Meron ng anomang nagmemeron. Kaya kapag binigkas ng tao ang pagmemeron ng anomang nagmemeron, may nagigising na kanyang “alaala” ng meron. Ito ang kailangan nating isipin nang mabuti. Ano itong alaala ng Meron?

Malinaw na hindi ito karaniwang akademikong pagpapaliwanag sa kaugnayan ng tao sa Meron o sa paraan ng pag-uunawa ng tao sa katalagahan. Mula ang maipaliwanag na nagmumula sa mga kategorya ng pag-uunawa ng tao ang pag-uunawa sa mga nagmemeron, tilang kahibangan itong pagpapaliwanag sa kaalaman bilang paggising ng alaala ng Meron sa

20 Ferriols, Relihiyon, 57.

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karanasan ng mismong pakikitagpo para magising sa mambabasa at sa nagsusulat ang alaala ng Meron sa buod ng kanyang pagkatao. Kung baga, ginigising niya sa mambabasa ang alaala ng Meron sa maingat na pagsasakonkreto ng karanasan. Ito’y magandang halimbawa kung saan pinag-uusapan niya ang presensiya:


Mahalaga itong halimbawa sa ginagawa ni Ferriols. Sa kanyang pamimilosopiya, ginagawa niyang gisingin ang karanasan ng isang konkretong pakikitagpo sa Meron at sa ganoong paraan magising ang

21 Ibid., 5.
konkreto na talab ng Meron sa kaibuturan ng tao. Kaya masasabi natin ang paraan ni Ferriols ay paraan ng paggising sa presensiya nang muling mabuhay ang alaala ng Meron. Subalit, sa halip na pagpapako ng nagprepesensiyang meron sa takdang kahulugan, isang proseso ng pagpasok sa kadiliman ito. Sa halip na ipako sa liwanag ng katwiran ang Meron, ito’y proseso ng pagpapalalim sa kadiliman hindi upang manatiling walang alam, subalit upang manatili sa isang kalahayan ng pagkakabukas sa meron. At ang nais nitong hantungan ay hindi laging bagong kaalamang sa Meron “kundi bagong kalaliman, bagong kasariwaan, bagong tindi” na ibig sabihin ay patuloy na pagpapalalim at paglagom sa Meron bilang walang hanggang nagprepesensya at nagigising sa kaibuturan ng diwa ng tao.

Tiyak na isa itong hakbang lamang. Hindi ito ang huling salita. Darating din ang sandali ng abstraksyon at pagsisistema ng kaalaman nang sa ganoong marating ng tao ang kaalamang kapakipakinabang sa karaniwang buhay. Subalit ito ang pinakamahalagang hakbang na batayan at patuloy na nagpapayaman sa ating pag-unawa. Ito ang hakbang ng pagpapaloisa ng presensiya ng Meron na patuloy na nagpapayaman sa pakikipagtalab sa Meron.22 Kung may katuturan ang abstraksyon at pagsisistema ng kaalaman, ang halaga nito’y maging batayan at patuloy na pagbigkas ng meron. Tawag dito ni Ferriols ang sandaling marating ang inabstraksyon talab o pagpapalalim sa nagmumula sa mga ‘di maulit na pagkakataon ng mga merong nagprepesensya. Ang bawat pagkakataon ng pagpapalalim sa nagprepesensiyang meron, sa mga panahon ng pakikipagtalaban sa bukod-tanging itong nagprepesensya “nangyayari kung minsan na, sa ating pagbigkas ng meron, ang ating pag-unawa ay para bagang nakasingit sa isang nibel na may tahimik (kaya’t halos hindi napapansin) ngunit maliwanag (kaya’t nagbibigay ng matibay na kaalaman) na nibel ng meron. At doo’y, para bagang naapuhap natin ang katutubong balangkas ng ilang pangyayari ...”25 Ang tinutukoy dito ni Ferriols ay ang mga pagkakataon ng pagkamulat ng tao sa Meron bilang may dinadalang kaalaman at kahulugan. Posible na, dahil sa lalim ng pagkamulat ng tao sa pagpresensya ng mga nagmemeron, may mga pagkakataon na namumulat tayo sa mismong batayang kaalaman ng pagprepesensya ng pagdaramahin. Kaya sina sabi niya na may pagkamulat ang tao sa katutubong balangkas. Ang katutubong balangkas itong naunawaan sa pilosopiya bilang abot-tanaw ng makahulugang pagmemeron ng mga bagay, ang prinsipyong nagbabalangkas ng pagdirito ng mga nagdirito. Sa mga panahon ng malalim na pakikitago sa pagmemeron, posibleng makaroon ng mas malalim na

22 Ferriols, Pambungad, 81.
23 Ibid., 94.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 85.
pag-uunawa sa kabuuan ng kameronan at sa kaugnayan ng mga nagmumeron sa Meron kaya nakakabuo siya ng mga konsepto at sistema ng konsepto na pinahahayag itong batayang balangkas na ito. Ito ang hangarin ng tao, na mabigkas ang batayang balangkas na ginagawang buhay ang patuloy na pagpapresensiya ng Meron. Hindi niya pakay ang makabuo ng malinaw na abstraksyon sa mga nagmumeron na hahadlang sa pagkamulat sa alaala.

Ang Paraan ng Paggising sa Alaala ng Meron Halaw sa Etnomusikolohiya

Dahil sa ganitong pakay ng pagbubukas sa Meron, maitatanong natin kung may implikasyon ito sa akademikong pagsusuri. Posible bang makabuo ng sistema ng paggising sa alaala ng Meron sa paraang disiplinado at bukas? Sinasabi ni Ferriols na ito ang pagtataka na “kalagayan ng taong nakadanas ng isang lakas-loob at disiplinadong pagtatanon.”26 Tila, sa ating kinasanayang paraan ng pagpapatupad ng akademikong pilipoloya, nagaganap ang ganitong disiplinadong pagtatanong sa abot-tanaw ng abstrakson inuuwi ang Meron sa eksaktong sistema ng pag-unawa ng tao sa halip na proseso ng pagpasok sa dilim nang maaninagan ang likas na balangkas ng Meron. Mas madali kasi itong buuin at pagdibatihan ng mga mananaliksik. Kung ang pinagdidibatihan ng mga iskolar ang pagkaeksakto ng paggamit ng konsepto at pagkabuo ng sistema ng mga konsepto, may malinaw na batayan ang pinagkakaisahan. Mas madaling pagdibatihan ang interpretaison sa mga batayang kaisipan ng mga pilosopo at bumuo ng mga bagong sistema ng abstrakson batay sa o kontra sa naitatag na pagsisistema ng pagsusuri, sa halip na subukang gisingin ang alaala ng Meron. Mahirap marating ang nibel ng pag-unawa na talagang tumatalab sa Meron at ginigising sa tao ang alaala ng Meron. Tila masyado itong masalangkot na paglalakbay sa dilim na hindi malinaw na matitiyak kung talaga nga bang nakatapak ang tao sa Meron o hindi. Kaya naman diskurso at debate sa larangan ng sistema ng mga konsepto ang kinaiikutan ng akademikong pamimilosopiya. Dagdag pa rito ang kahirapan bumuo ng mga metodo ng pagbubukas sa Meron na sabay may katiyakan at may malinaw na disiplina at malayang paglalakbay rin sa walang hanggang larangan ng Meron.

Pinapakita sa atin ng mga akademikong nag-aaral ng katutubong musika na posible ang disiplinado at sitemapikong pag-aaal sa mga nagmumeron na hindi kailangang iuwi sa purong abstrakson hiwalay sa nagpapresensiyan Meron. Makikita natin ang isang posibilidad nito sa mga

26 Ibid., 81.
patakaran ng pag-aaral sa katutubong kultura at musika na may pakay na makarating sa pag-uunawa na hindi inuuwi sa simpleng pagsisistema ng abstraksyon ang buhay na pagprepresensiya ng musika’t ritwal. Malinaw ito kay Grace Nono sa kanyang Song of the Babaylan.\(^27\) Sa librong ito, pinapakita ang mundo ng kaiba ng mga babaylan, o tradisyonal na manggagamot at oralista ng katutubong kultura na may kakayahang makipag-uugnay sa mga espirito ng kalikasan at sa mga ninuno. Sila ang mga taong biniyayaan ng kakayahang makipagsapalaran sa mga diwata ng mundo upang matulungan ang taong malutasan ang kanilang mga kapansanan. Iba ang mundo ito sa modernong mundo ng kanluran kaya hindi madaling matulungan ng mga kategoriya ng abstraksyon at pagsisistema ng akademikong pag-iisip. Ang hinihiling pananaliksik sa kaibang mundo ng babaylan ay ang uring pag-iisip na inaangkop ang pagbubukas sa pagka-hindi-masistema ng pagprepresensiya. Kung kumikilos ang disiplina ng pananaliksik sa kanlurang mundo ng pag-iisip, tiyak na hindi angkop sa sistema ng pananaliksik ang nagprepresensiyang realidad. Papaano ba uunawain ang kosmos kung saan totoo ang mga diwata’t taو, kung saan nakikipagsapalaran ang mga ninuno sa mga piling tagapamagat, kung pinagdududahan ang pagkakatwiran ng realidad spiritual na mga teoretikal na sistemang kanluranin? Hinihingi ng kosmos ng babaylan ang isang uring uring ang isang uring pananaliksik na kaya ring pagpapatalab nang maging posible ang pagdirito sa sistema. Dahil dito, makatwiran lamang na ang paraan ng pananaliksik ay maisatupad sa paraang angkop na pagdirito sa pagprepresensiya ng katalagang meron bilang nagprepresensiya. Nararapat na isa itong panggagad na pagdirito sa pagprepresensiya ng mga ninuno ng katalagang meron bilang nagprepresensiya. Naraan na ito at sa pagpapahayag ng mga nagprepresensiya ng purong pagsisistema, hindi tapat na mabibigkas ang nararanasan na nauunawaan ng babaylan. Iba ang mundo ito sa kinagagalawan ng abstraktong pagsisistema at posible na hindi makita ang nagprepresensiya ng mananaliksik kung piliting iuwui ang konkreto ang konkreto ang pagdirito sa sistema. Dahil dito, makatwiran lamang na ang paraan ng pananaliksik ay maisatupad sa paraang angkop na pagdirito sa pagprepresensiya ng katalagang meron bilang nagprepresensiya. Nararapat na isa itong panggagad na pagdirito sa pagprepresensiya ng mga ninuno ng purong pagsisistema, hindi tapat na mabibigkas ang nararanasan na nauunawaan ng babaylan. Iba ang mundo ito sa kinagagalawan ng abstraktong pagsisistema at posible na hindi makita ang nagprepresensiya ng mananaliksik kung piliting iuwui ang konkreto ang pagdirito sa sistema.

\(^27\) Grace Nono, Song of the Babaylan (Quezon City: Institute of Spirituality in Asia, 2013).
batayan ng halaga ng patakaran ng pananaliksik. Sa kanilang paraan ng pananaliksik, sinusubukan ng mananaliksik na pumasok sa konkretong pagprepresensiya ng nagprepresensiya nang may pag-aangkop ng sarili sa paraan ng pagprepresensiya nito. Kumbaga, inuunawaan ng mananaliksik ang katalagahan nang may kakayahang makiramdam sa pagprepresensiya ng pagprepresensiya at pagbabagay ng sarili sa paraan ng pagprepresensiya nito.\(^{28}\)

Ayon kay Nono, may ilang epektibong patakaran at atitud na maaaring gamiting upang maiangkop ang ating katwiran sa pagtanggap sa pagprepresensiya ng mundo ng babaylan. Isa dito ang \textit{pakig-ambit} o ang pakikipagtalaban ng sarili sa kapwa, loob sa loob. Ito'y inuunawaan niya bilang pagbabahagian ng buhay.\(^{29}\) Kung baga, ang mananaliksik ay nagbababad sa buhay ng sinasalisik. Ibinimagihay niya ang sarili sa isang proseso ng pakikibahagi sa buhay na kaiba sa paraan na inaalay niya rin ang kanyang buong sarili sa pagtatalaban. Hindi siya isang mananaliksik lamang subalit ka-sama. Isang pagtatalaban ito ng mga tao sa isa’t isa sa nikel ng pagbabahagian ng sarili sa isa’t isa. Ang pag-uunawa dito ay bunga ng malalim na interes ng nagtatalaban sa isa’t isa sa punto na nais ng bawa’t isang ibahagi ang panahon at atensyon sa isa’t isa. Isa pang paraan ng pananaliksik ang \textit{pangkaanaa} o pagkutub o presensiya, \textit{panuluktuk} o pagkamulat sa katotohanan ng intuisyon, \textit{pamalandong} o kontemplasyon tungo sa direktang pagkamulat sa katotohanan, \textit{pagtugyan} o pagbukas at pagtanggap sa pahayag ng katalagahan at mga espirito, \textit{pagdawat} o pagtanggap ng kalikuran na binibigay ng karanasan,\(^{30}\) at \textit{pag-agas} o pagbububukas ng sarili sa buong yaman ng kosmos bilang nagpapahayag. Ang \textit{panag-abyan} ang paraan ng konkretong pakikitagpo sa abyan o spiritong gabay ng babaylan. Ang mga paraan ng pagkilatis sa pahayag ng mga espirito o diwata sa kalikasan sa tao ay \textit{damgu} o pangingilaltis sa mga pahayag sa panaginip, \textit{timula} o pangingilaltis ng mga palatandaan na nakakatagpo ng tao, \textit{buna-buna} o pangingilaltis sa mga kaisipang dumadapo sa kamalayan na may ipinapahayag, at \textit{pagbati} o pagkilatis sa mga pahayag na dinadaan sa mga damdamin.\(^{31}\) Sa kabuuan, ginagawang mulat at gising ang mananaliksik sa mga alternatibong istilo ng kaalaman na angkop sa mga pahayag ng katalagahan na ipinapahayag o ipinapadaan sa iba’t ibang kakayahan ng tao. Sineseryoso nito, at hindi isinasantabi ang anomang larangan at daluyan ng pakikitagpo, maging mga ligaw na kaisipan, matinding damdamin, kutob, o signos.\(^{32}\) Biniguyan ang mga mananaliksik

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 44.
\(^{29}\) Ibid., 45.
\(^{30}\) Ibid. 46.
\(^{31}\) Ibid.
\(^{32}\) Ibid.
nitong mga paraan ng pananaliksik ng mga paraan ng pagbubukas sa pagprepresensiya ng mga ka-ibang nagprepresensiya na hindi madalas mahuli ng mga kategoriya ng makataong abstraksyon. Hinahayaan ng mananaliksik na magpatalab, o marahil magpatagos sa presensiya. Ito ang paraan ng pakikitagpo sa nagprepresensiyang pumapalag sa karaniwang pag-uunawa ng lohikal at makatwiran. Subalit pinahihintulutan nito na magbukas ang tao sa hindi nila madalas nauunawaan dahil hindi maiuwi sa karaniwang pangangatwiran. Ito ang dahilan kung bakit interesante itong pinapakita ni Nono. Upang tunay na magbukas sa pagprepresensiya ng kaiba, kailangan ng istilo ng pananaliksik na radikal na pagbubukas sa lahat ng posibleng pinagmumulang ng presensiya ng Meron.

Tinalakay ko itong alternatibong mga halaga ng pananaliksik dahil dito natin nakikita kung papaano maaring maging lehlimo ang mga patakaran ng pagbubukas na hindi kulong sa striktong pagsistema ng abstraksyon at ginagawang posible ang konkretong pag-iisip na may sariling patakaran at paraan. Hindi nagawang “isistema” ni Ferriols itong buhay na pakikipagsapalaran sa Meron. Naipakita niya na posible isatupad itong pagbibigkas sa Meron sa pamamagitan ng maingat na pag-iisip na babad sa konkretong pagprepresensiya ng mga nagmemoner. Sa kanyang istilo ng pananaliksik, naipapakita niya na nagsisimula ang paglakbay sa kadiliman ng Meron sa simple at maingat na paglalarawan ng pagprepresensiya ng nagprepresensiya. Ito ang kanyang penomenolohikong metodo—ang maingat na paglalarawan ng pinahihintulutan magprepresensiya ang nagpreprepsensiya sa pagkakakonkreto tungo sa paggising ng alaala ng Meron.

Marahil, gawain ng mga susunod na henerasyon ng mga pilosopo na may mga pilosopo na matuklasan ang paraan para magbukas ng mga tao na maaaring maging lehlimo ang mga patakaran ng pagbubukas na hindi kulong sa striktong pagsistema ng abstraksyon at ginagawang posible ang konkretong pag-iisip na may sariling patakaran at paraan. Hindi nagawang “isistema” ni Ferriols itong buhay na pakikipagsapalaran sa Meron. Naipakita niya na posible isatupad itong pagbibigkas sa Meron sa pamamagitan ng maingat na pag-iisip na babad sa konkretong pagprepresensiya ng mga nagmemoner. Sa kanyang istilo ng pananaliksik, naipapakita niya na nagsisimula ang paglakbay sa kadiliman ng Meron sa simple at maingat na paglalarawan ng pagprepresensiya ng nagprepresensiya. Ito ang kanyang penomenolohikong metodo—ang maingat na paglalarawan ng pinahihintulutan magprepresensiya ang nagpreprepsensiya sa pagkakakonkreto tungo sa paggising ng alaala ng Meron.

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Meron. Hangarin ng pilosopiya ngayon na bumalik sa komportableng pagbubuo ng mga sistema ng konseptong malinaw at tiyak. Kaya mahalagang suriin ang ginagawa ng mga etnomusikologo dahil naging masigasig sila sa pagbubuo ng bagong mga kategoriya ng pagpapatupad ng pananaliksik na nagiging mga gabay na patakaran sa pagbubukas sa radikal na ka-iba. Kailangan ng pilosopiya, lalo na ang pilosopiya sa Pilipinas, na matuklasan ang ganitong ka-radikal at malikhain na paraang pilosopiko tungo sa radikal na pagbubukas sa radikal na hiwaga ng Meron.


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20 ANG KATAMARAN NG PAG-IISIP AT ANG ALAALA NG MERON

Nono, Grace, Song of the Babaylan (Quezon City: Institute of Spirituality in Asia, 2013).
Discourse in Filipino Philosophy

Tao bilang Tagpuan:
Roque Ferriols, San Agustin, 
at ang Puntong Omega

Mark Joseph T. Calano

Abstract: In his book Pilosopiya ng Relihiyon, Roque Ferriols argued that the encounter between God and the human person can be concretely experienced in the attempt of being human. What does he mean by this statement? This paper tries to understand this statement in three parts. The first part analyzes Ferriols's assertion of the role of damdamin, the personal nature of God, and our encounter with others and God. In trying to understand this relational (rather than conceptual) encounter with God, we move to Augustine of Hippo’s discussion of remembering, knowing, and willing (or loving) as the mental faculties that are reflective and analogical of the Trinity in the human person; the second part situates the discourse within a Christian narrative that argues for Christ as the exemplar and fullness of humanity. The third part discusses Ferriols’s treatment of Teilhard de Chardin’s Omega Point, where evolution leads us to further creation instead of destruction; this part connects with the second part in that Ferriols (drawing from de Chardin) speaks of the Omega Point as ‘possibly’ referring to Christ. It further discusses how we are invited into this personal love that unites and creates us in the process of being more human.

Keywords: Augustine, Ferriols, human person, Omega Point
Diyos ang tao ayon sa kaniyang sariling larawan, ayon sa larawan ng Diyos siya nilalang; nilalang niya sila na lalake at babae. At sila’y binasasan ng Diyos, at sa kanila’y sinabi ng Diyos, “Kayo’y magpalaanakin, at magsaklaw, at kalatan, ninyo ang lupa, at inyong supilin; at makaroon kayo ng kapangyarihan sa mga isda sa dagat, at sa mga ibon sa himpapawid, at sa bawa’t hayop na gumagalaw sa ibabaw ng lupa” (Genesis 1:26-28).¹


Kung titingnan ang kahulugan ng banal at mahal, ang dalawang kataga ay kumikilos sa kalooban ng tao patungo sa pagmamahal at pagkakawanggawa sa kapuwa at sa pagpuri at pagsamba sa Diyos. Habang mayaman ang larangan ng mahal (at banal at may paghiwatig ito sa Diyos),

¹ Lahat ng sipi sa Bibliya sa papel na ito ay binago ng kaunlta ng may-akda at mula sa Ang Banal na Kasulatan na Kinalalamnan ng Matanda at Bagong Tipan na Isinalin sa Wikang Tagalog (Manila: Philippine Bible Society, 1982).
³ Ibid., 173-174.
⁴ Ibid., 174.
⁵ Ibid.
nakakagat naman ang ugnayan ng mahal at banal sa ating pagpapakatao. Sa *Pilosopiya ng Relihiyon*, nilinaw ni Ferriols na ang kadalasang tagpuan ng tao at ng mahal-banal ay makikita sa pagsusumikap ng tao na makipagkapuwa tao.6 Ngunit hindi niya ito binigyan ng paliwanag.


**A. Damdamin, Personal, Tao**

Sinimulan ni Ferriols ang kaniyang talakayan ukol sa pakikipagtagpo sa banal sa tungkulin at gampanin ng damdamin; taliwas ito sa nakasanayang kilos ng pilosopiya na nagsisimula sa isip. Habang mahalaga ang papel na ginagampanan ng isip, may kakabang uri ng pagbising na idinudulot ang ating mga damdamin.8 Ayon kay Ferriols, ang mga pagbabago na ito rin ang nagasaangkot sa ating kalooban sa isang malalim na uri ng pakikipagkapuwa tao. Binigyan niya ng diin na ang simula ng bawat pakikipagtagpo sa mahal-banal ay hindi nagaganap sa larangan ng isip, bagkus ay nagsisimula at nagaganap sa larangan ng ating mga damdamin. Sa pakthagat ng kaniyang pagtalakay sa aspeto ng damdamin, iniwasan ni Ferriols ang mga tinatanong ng isipan; ito ay sapagkat hindi

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8 Ferriols, *Pilosopiya ng Relihiyon*, 1.
tinatanong ng damdamin kung meron o kung totoo ba;\(^9\) may kakaibang uri ng pag-alam na dulot ng damdamin.

Tila baga may kilos ang damdamin na hindi katulad ng ginagawa ng isip; humihiwatig ang kilos ng damdamin. Paliwanag ni Ferriols, “Ang damdamin na hindi lamang nagpapamalay sa kalagayan ng katawan kundi may pinagmumulan at may tinutunghulan, kung kaya’t ang tinutunghulan ay nagbibigay-balangkas sa malay-tao … ang ganyang damdamin ay maaaring pagmasdan, masusing tuonan ng pagsusuri.”\(^{10}\) Sa pagsisimula sa damdamin, maaaring sabihin na penomenolohiya ang metodo ni Ferriols. Ngunit ayon sa kaniya, ang metodo ng pagmamasid sa balangkas ng malay-tao ay hindi penomenolohikal, ngunit ito ay maka-penomenolohiko. Mahirap bigkasin ang metodo na ito, ngunit maaari naman itong makuha sa mga susunod na bahagi ng papel.

Kung ang simula ng ating diskurso ay ang isip, maaaring pag-usapan ang Diyos sa isang unibersal na pamamaraan at sa ganyang kalagayan ay masasabi na impersonal ang Diyos. Ngunit sa pagkagat ng ating karanasang banal sa damdamin, tila baga may isang uri ng pagkapersonal ang Diyos. Impersonal o Personal? Habang may mga nagsasabi na ang Diyos ay impersonal (at sa ganyang kalagayan ay higit sa atin at dakila), meron din naman nagsasabi na ang Diyos ay personal (at sa ganyang kalagayan ay binigyang halaga ang tao). Sa ating damdamin, nakarating tayo sa isang personal na kamalayan ng Diyos na parating buo at kumpleto sa karanasan ng pakikipagkapuwa gamit ang ating kalooban. May mas mahabang paliwanag si Ferriols:

Kapag ang nabiyayaan ng pakikipagtagpong personal sa banal ay umaakyat sa mataas na bundok at natatanaw niya ang malawak na kapatagan sa ibaba na umunawan hanggang sa dagat, at ang dagat naman na umunawan hanggang sa langit, habang ang langit naman ay umaakyat at, mula sa itaas, ay sinusubukan siya ... dumarating lahat ito sa kanya bilang salita sa kanya ng banal o kaya katahimikan ng banal. Palagi siyang nakikinig sa salita o katahimikan ng banal. Kapag siya’y nanliliit, ito’y sapagkat nadarama niya ang paglapit sa kanya ng walang-hanggan na pagkalinga at pagbibigay-halaga. Ang bawat pagharap at pagdanas sa banal ay natatablan ng pakikipagkapuwa sa kanya. Araw-araw na pangyayari ang pakikipagsagutan ng kalooban ng tao

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\(^{10}\) Ferriols, *Pilosopiya ng Relihiyon*, 10.

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at ng ubod lalim na kalooban ng banal. Pangyayari na kung minsan kaluwalhatian kung minsan konsumisyon, pero palagi pa ring pangyayari.\footnote{Ibid., 12.}

Sapagkat may personal na aspeto ang banal, hindi ito maaaring sakupin ng konseptong unibersal. Ang karanasan ng personal na pakikipagtagago sa banal ay palaging kakaiiba at magkaiba; ito ang bumubuo sa kuwento ng patuloy na pakikipagtagago sa banal na personal sa sabay tumatawag at tumutugon sa tao.\footnote{Ibid., 13.}


Ang pagpresensiya ay nagaganap sa iba’t ibang kilos ng malay-tao: paggunita, pag-unawa, at paghangad; ngunit ay higit pa sa lahat ng kilos na ito ang bukal ng pagprepresensiya. May tunggalian na nagaganap sa pagbuo at sa laro ng presensiya: lapit-layô. Sa paliwanag ni Ferriols,\footnote{Ibid.}

\footnote{Ibid., 12.}
\footnote{Ibid., 13.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid. Tingnan din ang Jacklyn Cleofas, “Konsepto at Pag-asa ayon kay Ferriols,” in \textit{Perspectives in the Arts and Humanities Asia} (Special Issue: Philosophy and Roque J. Ferriols, SJ), 5:1 (2015), 21-40.}
\footnote{Ferriols, \textit{Pilosopiya ng Relihiyon}, 14.}

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Kung mas tumitindi ang pakikipagpuwa, kung mas naglalapitan, nagtatalaban ang loob, mas natatauhan na ang kapuwa ay may kalaliman na sagrado, may hiwaga na hindi maaring ariin ninoman. Kaya’t may nagaganap na magalang na pag-urong, mapitagang paglayô. Ngunit, kung mas gumagalang, kung mas namimitagan ang tao sa kapuwa ay lalo siyang natatauhan na ubod ng magaling at mahalaga ang hiwaga ng kapuwa, kaya’t lalo siyang naaakit at lalo siyang napapalapit.17

Sa ganitong pag-unawa, bumubuo tayo ng pamayanang mga malay-tao na nakikipagtagpo sa harap ng dinamikong sansinukob. Ngunit nabanggit lamang natin ang kilos ng tao sa kaniyang pakikipagtagpo sa tao. Maari bang sabihin na ganito rin ang kilos ng pakikipagtagpo sa banal?

Tila ang batayan ni Ferriols ay ang kaniyang personal na pag-unawa na kadalasan o madalas pa sa kadalasan “ang banal ay lumalapit sa tao sa loob mismo ng pagsisikap ng taong makipagtagpo sa tao.”18 Sinuportahan niya ito ng obserbasyon mula sa iba pang mga rehiliyon na nagkakaisa sa pagsisikap—“na sa pakikipagpuwa-tao ay tumutubo ang paniniwala sa banal.”19 Ang katapatan na ito sa kapuwa ang siyang nag-uudyok sa atin na buo ang paniniwala sa banal. Ang kapuwa, na maaaring nagdududyo sa ating mga rehiliyon, ay nagbigay-loob sa ating mga tao.20 Sa ganitong pag-unawa, tumatagpuan ang Diyos sa kapuwa at sa tao?

### B. Malay-tao kay Agustin


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17 Ibid., 15.
18 Ibid., 16.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.

Habang naniniwala si Agustin na nakakagat ang ating pagiging imago Dei kay Kristo, ito ay hindi sapat. Sa kaniyang De Trinitate, ating maunawaan ang konteksto ng pagtalakay ni Agustin sa kaniyang pilosopikal na pag-unawa sa misteryo ng Banal na Santatlo. Katulad ng paglagahad ni Ferriols, ginamit ni Agustin ang tao upang mas lalong masumpungunang ang Diyos. 23 Sa unang pitong libro ng De Trinitate, nagbigay si Agustin ng mga Biblikal na batayan sa doktrinang ito. 24 Ngunit matapos ang pitong libro ay tila kulang pa rin ang kaniyang natalakay ukol sa Diyos Ama, Anak, at Espiritu Santo; hindi pa malinaw kung bakit ang Diyos ay may tatlong persona. Kaya sa ikawalong libro, natanto niya na hindi niya


Ngunit sa isang kakaiibang pamamaraan, hindi hinanap ni Agustin ang Diyos sa kaluluwa ng tao; bagkus ay sinayasa niya ang ating malay-tao. Nakita niya ang isang balangkas na bumubuo sa malay-tao bilang paggunita, pag-unawa, at paghangad; ilong kilos ng malay-tao rin ang pinakakagnaman ng ating pagiging tao (at ito ay binubuo ng paggunita, pag-unawa, at paghangad sa Diyos). Iba ang kilos ng paggawa sa kakayahan at kilos ng malay-tao. Kung iintindihin ang paggunita, pag-unawa, at paghangad bilang simpleng kakayahan ng malay-tao, maaaring isipin na naranon lamang ito; ngunit kapag uunawain ang tatlo bilang mga kilos ng malay-tao, matatanto natin na ito ay kinakailangang maisakatuparan at magawa.

Ngunit bakit pinili ni Agustin ang tatlong kilos ng malay-tao (paggunita, pag-unawa, at paghangad) upang kuluytaw sa Ama, Anak, at Espiritu Santo? Sa totoo lang, hindi agarang naisip ni Agustin na bumaling sa mga kilos ng malay-tao upang kuluytawan sa Banal na Santatlo. Ang nais lamang niya ay bigyang liwanag (marahil sa pamamagitan ng analogia) ang eternal na ugnayan ng Anak (ang Salita) at ng Ama sa pamamagitan ng Espiritu Santo. Samakatuwid, nais lamang ni Agustin na makapagbigay ng

Iyan ang ginamit ni Agustin upang tukuyin ang kaniyang kakayahang na bumuo ng konsepto sa kaniyang pag-unawa; ang katangang mabubuo at maisisilang sa proseso ay tinawag niyang ‘salita.’ Kung ‘salita’ ang gamit niya upang pag-usapan ang kaniyang kakayahang na umumana at pagmumuhab sa pagmumuhab ng isip, natanto niya na ‘Salita’ (o sa Griyego ay logos) rin ang gamit sa Ebanghelyo ni San Juan 1:1 upang tukuyin ang Diyos Anak; ganito rin ang kafulangan ng ‘salita’ (o sa Latin ay *verbum*) upang tukuyin ang kaalaman, kuru-kuro, at kahulungan.


Ngunit tila may mali sa *analogia* ni Agustin. Ang nabanggit na kilos ng malay-tao (ang kaniyang pagmumuni-muni sa kaniyang pag-unawa at ang sabay na paghangad rito) ay tila tumutukoy lamang sa banal at hindi sa Ama, Anak, at Espiritu Santo. Ngunit kung babatasin nang maigi si Agustin, maunawaan na ang salita ng Diyos ay maaaring tumutukoy sa kahit na sinong persona (Ama, Anak, o Espiritu Santo) o sa Banal na Santatlo. Ayon

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Upang makahanap ng mas akmang analogya, kinakailangan ni Agustin na baguhin ang katangang pag-unawa at gumamit ng isang kataa ng tumutukoy sa kakayahan ng malay-tao na pag-isipan ang kaniyang sariling isip; tinawag niya itong kilos ng malay-tao na gunita. Upang maintindihan ang pagkaangkop na ito, kinakailangang alalahanan ni ang pag-unawa (gaya ng pag-alam at pagkilala) ay tumutukoy rin sa paggunita; ang mga katangang Latin para sa isip at unawa (mens) at gunita (memoria) ay tila may pagkakaisa. Samakatuwid, nakumpleto ni Agustin ang analogya ng Banal na Santatlo sa pamamagitan ng tatlong kilos ng malay-tao: paggunita, pag-unawa, at paghangad sa kaniyang sariling malay-tao.


Ayon sa pagbawi ni Agustin, na kinakailangang gunitain ang paghigpit, kaunti o iba pang kilos ng *imago Dei* ay hindi lamang isang obhetong kalagayan. Sa ayaw natin o hindi, nakakamit ang mappakatao. At ito ay nakakamit ng mga obhetoong kawangis ng Diyos na maaaring hangarin; bagkus, maaari lamang natin unawaan ang pagiging kawangis sa loob ng mga kilos ng

27 Ibid., III, 6.11.
pagdikit at pagkapit, paghawak at paninindigan, pag-anib at pagsangayon sa Diyos na siya lamang uwian at huwaran.


Ngunit, “nang dumating ang kapanauhan, ay sinugo ng Diyos ang kaniyang Anak, na ipinanganak ng isang babae, na ipinanganak sa ilalim ng kautusan, upang matubos niya ang nangasa ilalim ng kautusan upang matanggap natin ang pagkukupkop sa mga anak” (Galacia 4:4-5). Ang tao ay kinupkop ng Diyos bilang kaniyang mga anak; binago tayo ng biyaya at kaloo ng Diyos sa pamamagitan ni Kristo Hesus—ang Salita ng Diyos na nagkatawang tao. Iginiit ni Agustin na ang obheto ng ating mapapalatayang pananampalataya ay hindi lamang ang Diyos, kung hindi ay ang katawan ng Salitang nagpakatao; ibig sabihin, tinutukoy ni Agustin ang pagsasakatawan ni Hesus bilang dahan ng ating paglaya sa kasalanan. Sa pamamagitan ng kaniyang katawan, na dumanas ng kamatayan at muling-pagkabuhay, pinalaya tayo ni Kristo sa kasalanan. Habang mahirap unawain ang pagpapakumbaba at pagpapakatao ni Kristo, nananatiling mahalaga ito para
kay Agustin sapagkat ang pinakasinaunang kasalanan ay nakakagat sa ating pagkamakasarili, o sa kataga ni Ferriols sa ating “ako-ismo” o “aba-ako!”

Bilang tugon sa ating pagkakasala, pagkabaluktot, at pagkakabasaag, si Kristo ang naging mukha ng kababaang-loob at kaamuhan at sabay ding nagpaanyaya na tanggapin ang ating mga sarili na tao tulad niya.

Ang pagpapanumbalik ng imahe ay nagsimula sa ating pagkakasala kaya kay Kristo (na ating huwaran at kaganapan) sa kaniyang paglinang ng kabutihan; para kay Agustin, ang mga kabutihan na tinutukoy ay halimbawa ng pag-uunawa kung saan ang malay-tao ay matuwid at may sapat na paghiwag sa Diyos lalo na sa kaniyang pagdanas ng mundo. Ang paglinang ng kabutihan ang siyang gumagabay sa isip upang makarating sa karunungan (sapiência) kung saan natin ginugunita, inuunawa, at hinahangad ang Diyos; sa ganitong kalagayan din nararating ang ating personal na kaganapan. Habang ang kaganapang ating tinutukoy ay laging kulang at dapat sa buhay na ito, nararating naman ang kaganapan na ito sa ating pakikiisa sa Diyos na isa sa atin.


Sapagka’t sa kaniya nilalang ang lahat na mga bagay, sa sangkalangitan at sa sangkalupaan, na mga bagay na nakikita at ang mga bagay na di nakikita, maging mga luklukan o mga pagsakop o mga pamunuan o mga kapangyarihan; lahat ng mga bagay ay nilalang sa pamamagitan niya at ukol sa kaniya. (1:16)

Mahalaga ang sinasabi ni Pablo upang itulay ang sinasabi ni Agustin ukol kay Kristo at sa susunod na susabihin ni Ferriols ukol sa puntong Omega.

C. Isahang may Pagkakaiba

Sa kaniyang pagtalakay sa kaisipan ni Teilhard de Chardin, nilinaw ni Ferriols na maraming maaaring pagbasa sa puntong Omega. At ang ikatlo sa mga pagbasa na ito, ay ang posibilidad na ang puntong Omega ay hindi

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28 Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 223-224 at sa Ferriols, Pilosopiya ng Rehiliyon, 63-64.
isang impersonal na puwersa kung hindi ay si Kristo. Sinabi rin niya na mahihiwatigan daw ito ng taong marunong tumingin sa pakikipagtalaban kay Kristo ng mga sumasampalata sa kaniya. Ngunit papaano nakarating si Ferriols sa pagbasa na ito? Papaano at bakit umuuwi sa tao at sa sakripisyo para sa anghang ang tunay na sakripisyo sa banal?


Tila mahalaga ang papel na ginampanan ng persona sa patuloy na sakripisyo na pakikipag-ugnay sa iba pang mga persona sa kanilang katipunan na tinawag na puntong Omega.

Sa Omega tumutungo ang malay-tao. Doon nakikipagtalaban ang isang sentrong malay-tao sa mga

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29 May mahabang sipi si Ferriols sa Pambungad sa Metapisika mula sa Le phenomen humain ni Teilhard de Chardin ukol sa kahalagahan ng wastong pagtingin. Ibid., 211.
30 Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 214.
31 Ibid., 217-219.
32 Ibid., 223.
34 Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 225.
35 Ibid., 225.
ibang sentrong malay-tao, kaya’t doon patindi nang patindi ang pagka-persona ng bawat sentro. Ang Omega’y sentro ng personalisasyon. Kaya’t hindi isa pang sentrong nakikihalubilo sa ibang mga sentro ang Omega. Hindi rin isang lumitaw mula sa puno ng buhay, hindi produkto ng ebolusyon ang Omega. Ang Omega ay super-sentro: katanyagan, sukdulan ng pagka-persona, ng kasarinlan.36

Mahalagang intindihin ang binabanggit ni Ferriols dito kung papaanong ang paglitaw ng malay-tao at ng mga kilos nito ay bahagi ng pagtatalaban ng paghahagilap at paglulusot. Hindi ba ganito ang pagbubuo ng iba’t ibang kabutihan at kagalingan (arête) ayon kay Aristoteles?37 Sapagkat bahagi tayo ng pendaigdigang kilos ng hagilap-lusot, paliwanag ni Ferriols, taglay raw natin sa ating kalooban ang buong paghahakbang ng sanlibutan. Sa ating pagkatao maaaninaw ang kurba ng paglusot ng persona (at malay-tao) sa patuloy at walang-patid na lugar at punto ng tagpuan (Omega); sa puntong Omega, merong kilos ng pagtipon at pag-iingat sa malay-tao.

Taga-tipon at taga-ingat, iyan ang gawain ng Omega na patuloy na nangangalaga sa ating malay-tao. Ibig sabihin, habang lumalapit tayo sa puntong Omega, lalong naisasakatuparan ang ating kamalayan bilang tao (at kapuwa-tao). Nilinaw ni Ferriols na hindi sa harap ng Omega na taglay raw sa ating kalooban ang buong sanlibutan tungo sa kaniyang persona; ngunit ang kilos na ito ay hindi upang tulukan ang bawat nilalang sa kanilang pagmemeeron kung hindi ay upang mas lalong buuin ito. Sa pag-aakit ng Omega ay mayroong pagbabuo ng persona (ng pagkatao) sa harap ng nagsisilapitan, nagsisisulubangan, at nagsisitalaban na mga persona (iba pang kapuwa-tao). Magandang paliwanag ni Ferriols:

Ang puntong Omega ay isang sentrong sukdulan ng kasarinlan: Bukod-tanging sentrong sumisinag mula sa puso

36 Ibid., 226.
38 Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 226.
ng isang katipunan ng mga sentro .... Sa Omega, ang persona ay kumakawala sa bilangguan ng ako-ismo at nagging tunay na ako. Ang tunay na Ako ay mas tumutubo kung mas naglalaho ang Ako-ismo.39


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39 Ibid., 227.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 228.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.

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dito. Sa huli, binanggit ni Ferriols na iisa lamang ang posible at tunay na Omega—si Kristo.45

**Pagtatapos**


Na si Kristo ay manahan sa inyong mga puso sa pamamagitan ng pananampalataya; upang kung kayo’y mag-ugat at magtumibay sa pagibig. Ay lumakas upang matalastas pati ng lahat ng mga banal kung ano ang luwang at ang haba at ang taas at lalim, at makilala ang pag-ibig ni Kristo na di masayod ng kaalaman, upang kayo’y mangapuspos hanggang sa buong kapuspusan ng Diyos (3:17-19).

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46 Ferriols, *Pilosopiya ng Relihyon*, 16.
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Discourse in Filipino Philosophy

Pitong Sulyap sa Pilosopiya ng Wika ni Padre Ferriols

Wilhelm Patrick Joseph S. Strebel

Abstract: The Jesuit priest, Roque J. Ferriols is well known in Ateneo de Manila University as the first philosophy professor to teach philosophy in Filipino. Since 1969 until he retired in 2014, he taught all of his philosophy classes, both in the undergraduate and graduate levels, in Filipino. His example was followed by many Ateneo philosophy faculty. Since around the 1990s the number of philosophy classes taught in English and in Filipino had a 50/50 percentage ratio. This ratio continued on to the present time. As the tradition of teaching philosophy in Filipino nears its 50th anniversary in 2019, Ferriols continues to be appreciated as the trailblazer of the tradition. Even if Ferriols never taught philosophy of language, his teaching pedagogy and his writings reflect important insights relevant to the philosophy of language. This paper seeks to draw these insights from three different texts written years apart from each other but all within Ferriols’s teaching career. The texts are A Memoir of Six Years, an essay written for Philippine Studies in April 1975; Sinauna Bilang Potensikal, the final chapter of his Pambungad sa Metapisika published in 1991; and a few sections of his memoirs, Sulyap sa Aking Pinanggalingan published in 2016. In so doing, this paper seeks to spearhead critical discussions of Ferriols’s philosophy of language stressing on how these insights come from the context of pedagogy and as such how these insights reflect the context, experience, lifeworld and historicity of the learner towards a deeper understanding of the human being qua linguistic being and human being qua human being. Thus, the paper seeks to show that the conscious and deliberate awareness of language and culture often seen in the celebration of Buwan ng Wika distracts us from the reality and nature of language and culture, and obscures the role of language and culture in human life. The main emphasis of this paper is the insight that the reality, nature, and role of language and culture could be found in the actual lived experience of the world as linguistic reality. In other words, we do not experience the world “through the medium” of language and culture. What really happens is that our experience of the world is language and culture. This paper does not pretend to be exhaustive in that it cannot fully follow the logical and
phenomenological implications of the insights it brings to the reader’s attention. Its task is to make thematic these insights and note that these insights are conscious to Ferriols as a philosophy teacher so that these themes and insights could be further mulled over and reflected upon by other writers and scholars seeking to elucidate on the subject matter.

**Keywords:** Filipino Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy in Filipino, Language and Pedagogy

1. Ang Kontekstong Historikal


Nadama rin ang ihip ng hangin ng Filipinization sa Pamantasang Ateneo de Manila, isang pamantasang itinatag ng mga Heswitang Kastila noong 1853. Sa panahon ng mga Amerikano, nalipat sa pamamalakad ng New York Province ng mga Heswita ang pamantasan kung kaya’t hanggang sa katawan ng ikalawang milenyo malimit ang presensya ng mga Heswita Amerikano sa mga bulwagan at silid ng pamantasan. Dito malamang galing ang pananaw ng maraming tao ukol sa Ateneo twang: ang

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pamamaraan ng pagsasalita ng mga Atenista ng wikang Ingles at pati ng wikang Filipino na may puntong New York.


Hindi niya masisisi ang mga Amerikanong administrador at guro ng pamantasang ngunit ang ipinagtaka niya ay ang pananaw ng ilang mga kapwa gurong Filipino. Bagaman sa kasalukuyan ay may polisiyang baylingwal ang pagtanggi mula sa administrasyon, ang Ateneo ay isang pamantasang Filipino, ang Kagawaran ng Pilosopiya lamang ang may balanseng bilang ng mga klase sa Ingles at sa Filipino. May ilang kursong naituturo sa Filipino tulad halimbawa ng teolohiya at agham pampulitika ngunit nakadependente ito sa guro at hindi institusyonalisado tulad nang sa pilosopiya.

Bukod dito, nananatili pa rin ang pagtanggi ng maraming mga estudyante kung sakaling maubusan sila ng klase sa Ingles at mapilitan sila ng mga klase sa Ingles. Bagaman sa kasalukuyan ay may polisiyang baylingwal ang pagtanggi mula sa administrasyon, ang Ateneo ay isang pamantasang Filipino, ang Kagawaran ng Pilosopiya lamang ang may balanseng bilang ng mga klase sa Ingles at sa Filipino. May ilang kursong naituturo sa Filipino tulad halimbawa ng teolohiya at agham pampulitika ngunit nakadependente ito sa guro at hindi institusyonalisado tulad nang sa pilosopiya.

Kung sa bagay, hindi na rin dapat maging kagulat-gulat ito sapagkat nangangailangan pa ng mas malawak na kumalatasan ang pag-uunawa ng mga Pilipino ukol sa kultura at wika. Makikita ito sa pagdaos ng Buwan ng Wika tuwing Agosto. Naglalaan tayo ng isang buwan upang isuot ang mga tradisyunal na baro at kumain ng mga kakanin. Para bagang ang pagiging Pilipino ay nakasalalay sa pag-uunawa natin sa anumang itinatawag nating
Filipiniana. Kung susulyapan nga naman ito muli, katwa rin na mayroon mag-diyos sa Buwan ng Wika. Kung kailangan pang ituro sa mga bata kung paano pahalagahan ang sarili nilang kultura at wika, ibig sabihin lamang nito na walang intrinsikong pagpapahalaga ang mga bata sa sarili nilang kultura at wika. Sa madaling salita, naglalalaan tayo ng isang buwan upang pumabasa ang sarili nating kultura at wika habang may labing-isang buwan tayo upang baliwalain ito.

Sinasuri sa pambungad na ito ang pag-uugali at pananaw sa ilalim ng pagdiwang ng Buwan ng Wika upang ipakita ang pananaw na kailangan natin ng susto ng pagpapahalaga ng sarili at ng daigdig. Hindi natin dinaranas ang daigdig "sa pamamagitan" ng wika at kultura, bagkus ang wika at kultura ang mismong pagdanas natin sa daigdig. Ito ang pangunahing puntong nais ipakita sa pagsulyap sa pilosopiya ng wika ni Ferriols.

2. Ang Mga Tekstong Susulyapan

Ang mga sumusunod ang mga teksito ni Ferriols na hahantong natin ng kanyang pilosopiya ng wika. Magbibigay muna ako ng pagsasakitesto para sa bawat isa.

Isinulat niya ang A Memoir of Six Years noong Abril 1975, anim na taon mula nang simulan niyang magturo ng pilosopiya sa wikang Filipino. Binalik-tanawan niya ang kanyang mga naranasan sa mga taong iyon upang maglabas ng isang apologia, o isang manifesto: alang-alang sa mga hindi naka-unawa kung bakit siya nagtuturo ng pilosopiya sa wikang Filipino. Habang tinutugunan niya ang pitong mga tanong na madalas naibato sa kanya sa nakaraang anim na taon, nakapagbigay-linaw din siya sa kalikasan ng pilosopiya, sa kalikasan ng wika, at sa kalikasan ng tao bilang nilalang na nagsasaalita.


3. Pitong Sulyap sa Pilosopiya ng Wika ni Ferriols

Hindi nagturo ng kursong pilosopiya ng wika si Ferriols ngunit mahihinuha sa kanyang pamamaraan ng pagtuturo ang ilang mga malalalim na pagmumulat at pag-unnawa sa kalikasan ng wika. Nais ngayon ng papel na ito palitawin at bigyan ng balangkas ang naturang pagmumulat upang makapagtukoy ng ilang mga direksyon maaaring tahakin sa patuloy na pagtalakay sa paksang napili. Magbibigay tayo ngayon ng pitong landas.

3.1. Pilosopiyang Filipino

May malaking kaibahan sa pagitan ng Pilosopiyang Filipino at pamimilosopiya sa Filipino. Ang una ay nakatutok sa tatak, kung saan nagiging abala ang tao sa tanong hinggil sa identidad kung kaya’t natatanggali ang kanyang pansin sa mismong akto ng pamimilosopiya. Ang huli naman ay ang pagsusumubok mamilosopiya sa katutubong wika tulad ng maraming pilosopo sa kasaysayan ng sangkatauhan.

pagbabansag dito. At ganon din ang akto ng pamimilosopiya. Ito ay dinaranas at ginagawa. Oras na tanungin ng namimilosopiya kung nagpapakapilipino pa ba siya, nadiskaril sa ibang paksa ang daloy ng kanyang pag-isip.

Kung tutuusin, ang unang puntong ito ay walang kinalaman sa pilosopiya ng wika ngunit mahalagang banggitin upang maisantabi. Sa paglilinaw kung ano ang hindi ginagalawan ng pilosopiya ng wika, harinawa magbigay-linaw ito, sa di-tuwirang paraan, kung ano ang tunay na ginagalawan nito.

3.2 Ang Wika Bilang Di-Makatawag-Pansin-sa-Sarili

Tuwing tinatanong si Ferriols ukol sa kanyang pangangahas na mamilosopiya sa wikang Filipino, palagi niyang idinidiin na ang tunay na pakay ay ang mamilosopiya at hindi ang anumang pulitikal, lingwistiko o kultural na dahilan. Ang hamon ay hindi ang hamon ng pagbigkas ng anumang wika. Bagkus, ang tunay na hamon ay ang hamon ng pilosopiya at ang hamon ng akto ng pamimilosopiya.

Ito ang tugon niya sa mga nagtatanong kung nais ba niyang isulong ang Tagalog bilang wikang pambansa. At siyempre, sangkot sa tanong ang ilang mga pulitikal at kultural na mga agenda na may mulat sa kanyang unang tanong. Nalalaman ay hindi ang hamon ng pagbigkas ng anumang wika, bagkus, ang tunay na hamon nito ay ang hamon ng pilosopiya.


Dagdag pa rito, sinasabi niya hindi niya paboritong wika ang Filipino, ngunit mahusay naman din itong wika. Sa madaling salita, ang tunay na dahilan ng pagbabad sa wikang Filipino ay ang halaga ng pagbabad at mahusay na pagbabad sa danas-daisip ng estudyante at ng lokalidad ng paaralan. Hindi ang wika o ang wikang Filipino ang sentro ng usapan. Nalilihis ang atensyon ng pumupuna kung papansinin niya ang wika imbes na danas ang daigdig ng kahulugan ng pagbabad. Hindi tumatalawag ng pansin sa kanyang
sarili ang wika. Kapiling natin, sapagkat palagi tayang bumibigkas. Nasa sentro ng lahat ng usapan ngunit hindi nagiging sentro ng usapan, maliban lang kung punahin ng pilosopo sa kanyang pagmumuni.

3.3 Ang Wika bilang Paraan ng Pagiging Buháy

Ang wika ay hindi lamang isang kasangkapang ginagamit ng nagsasalita sa kanyang pangangailangang ipahayag ang kanyang sarili upang maunawaan siya ng kapwa tao. Nanganganib ang wika sa ganitong simplistikong pananaw lalo na’t ginagamit sa mga institusyon ng edukasyon ang konsepto ng medium of instruction. Para bagang iniisip ng ganitong kalakaran na ang nilalaman ng isang kursong itinuturo ay maaaring itawid ng guro sa estudyante sa anumang wika sapagkat bilang medium (Latin: gitna o pagitan), ito ang tulay sa pagitan ng guro at estudyante. Ang mahalaga ay ang itinatawid na nilalaman o kaalaman. Ang wika ay instrumento lamang na nagbibigay-daan sa naturang pagtawid. Ganoon lang ba?

Sa halip, natuklasan ni Ferriols na ang wika ay hindi lamang paraan ng pagpapahayag tulad ng kaisipan ng medium. Lagpas pa rito at lalong mahalaga pa, ang wika ay isang paraan ng pagiging buháy. Wika nga niya:

Ang siyang makasalíng sa pinakapuso ng isang wika, kahit sa isang kisap-mata lamang, nalalaman niyang ang wika ay isang di-mahahangganang paraan ng pagiging buháy. May di-mauulit na potensyal ang bawat wika sa pagtingin at pagdama; sarili nitong talino, sarili nitong dating. Kung mas marami kang wikang nadarama, mas buháy ka.2


2 Ferriols, A Memoir, 217. Akin ang salin.
napapansin hangga’t hindi niya nakakataagpo ang ibang mga wika. Sa pagmumulat ko sa mga salita ng aking wika, lalo akong nagiging mulat kung paano ako nabubuhay. Ang bilas ko at ang balae ko ay itinuturing kong may partikular na kaugnayan sa akin. Sa taong nabubuhay sa ibang wika, ituturing lamang sila bilang mga kamag-anak ng sariling asawa at hindi nauugnay nang ganooon sa kanyang sarili.

Mapapansin din sa huling bahagi ng sinipi mula sa itaas na tinukoy ni Ferriols ang paglalarawan ng wika. Karaniwang sinasabi na ang wika ay inaalam, natututunan at umaabot ang tao sa punto kung saan masasabing marunong na siyang magsalita. Ngunit ang sabi ni Ferriols ay “kung mas marami kahit hanggang 100% ang kontrol kong nagtuturong sa ibang wika, ituturing lamang sila bilang mga kamag-anak ng sariling asawa at hindi nauugnay nang ganooon sa kanyang sarili.

Para sa taong nag-aaral ng bagong wika, nakatutulong ang pag-aaral ng gramatika ng wikang pinag-aaralan. Ganito ang hamon ng pagtawid ng pons asinorum para sa nag-aaral ng bagong wika. Maari siyang mag-unawa, maaaring mabagot, mahirap magtutulak, bagamat sa iba’t ibang mga istraktura ng gramatika ng bagong wika ay hindi naiyak sa tiyaga at pagpupursige ng mga gurong ito sa pamamagitan ng pagbasa ng mga pagsasagawa ng bagong wika. Maari siyang mag-unawa, maaaring mabagot, mahirap magtutulak, bagamat sa iba’t ibang mga istraktura ng gramatika ng bagong wika ay hindi naiyak sa tiyaga at pagpupursige ng mga gurong ito sa pamamagitan ng pagbasa ng mga pagsasagawa ng bagong wika.

Bilang paraan ng pagiging buhay, makararating tayo sa bagong pagmumulat kung paano tayo nabubuhay kung susuriin natin ang katagang ‘ka,’ na tanda ng ugnayan. Ani Ferriols:


Ang samu’t saring wikang tinutukoy ni Ferriols ay ang mga wika sa Pilipinas na siya namang may hawig na oryentasyon. Kung sakaling kaliligtaan at lalimun ni isang Pilipino, may paraan ng pagiging buhay na mawawala sa kanya, lalimun niya rin at hihiwalaan; masasayang ang potensyal. At mula sa natuklasan niyang katutubo at ikas na pagkiling sa pakiki-ugnay, binibigkas ni Ferriols ang hamon at tungkulin ng kasalukuyang tao sa harap ng kasalukuyang teknolohiya. Kung tumutungo ang kilos ng teknolohiya sa paghuhubal ay sa ugnayan, ano ang tugon ng wika dito?


4 Roque J. Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika (Quezon City: Office of Research and Publications, Ateneo de Manila University, 1991), 240.
3.4 Ang Wika bilang Potensyal ng mas Matinding Ugnayan

Matagal nang bintang sa pilosopiya ang pagiging hiwalay sa daigdig at realidad na nais nitong unawain. Mula nang unang naitampok sa dula ni Aristophanes ang isang tinatawag na Sokrates na naglalambitin sa kaitaasan at pinaggasasabi na lumalakad daw siya sa himpapawid at namumulastog pa ng kung anu-anong kabulastugan, hanggang sa pananaw sa pilosopo bilang taong naglalaro lamang ng mga salita at nakatira sa itaas ng toreng garing.


Kung may tao sa aklatan, at sinusubukan niyang mamilosopiya sa isang wika na ibang di hamak sa sinasalita ng mga nagsalita ng mga nagsasabing ng dyipni, nagwawalis-tingting sa mga kalsada, nagsisilbi sa mga turo-turo, masasabi kaya na ang taong iyon ay gumagalaw sa katotohanan?


namimilospiya sa wikang iba sa daigdig ng kapwa tao. Patuloy pa nga ni Ferriols:

At kapag ang nagsisikap mamilosopiya ay pumipili sa wikang gagamitin niya, ang kanyang pagpili ay bunga ng kanyang atitud sa salita ng mga pumapaligid sa kanya. At ang kanyang atitud ay maaring katotohanan, maaring kasinungalingan.6

Ang pasyang mamilosopiya sa wika ng mundong ginagalawan ng tao ay tugon sa panawagan tungo sa mas malalim na pakiki-ugnay. Sa ganitong paraan nagigisimang ng tao ang wika bilang potensyal ng ugnayan at punto ng hughpungan ng samu’t saring tao. Ang pasyang mamilosopiya sa wika ng mundong ginagalawan ay isang pag-aamin na nasa isa at pareho kayonbong daigdig. Isang ating tahanan, dangal, at larangan. Tao ako sa harap mo at tao ka sa harap ko. Naghaharap tayo at nagkakaroon tayo bilang magkapatid sa katauhan. Wika ni Ferriols:

Ang huwaran ng ating kalinangan ay tao bilang malalim, sagrado, mapaglikha at nakikipagkapwa sa kapwa-tao at sa Maykapal. Personal na pagbubuklod ng tao sa tao, at personal na pakikisalamuha sa atin ng Maykapal ang buod ng sanlibutan. Nararasanan natin ang meron bilang ugnayan.7

Ikinuwento ni Ferriols kung paano siya tinuruan ni Mulry ng panitikan sa nobisyado. Nararasanan niya, sa tulong ni Mulry, na ang pagbasa ng panitikang banyaga ay paraan upang maging pamilyar ang daigdig ng mga taong iba sa atin at dahil dito, mabigyan tayo ng pagkakataon makena o makiramay sa kanila. Noong minsan na nagbasa sila ng isang tula ukol sa mga kalsada ng London, ganito ang nadama niya:

Ito ay ukol sa buhay ng mga tao sa London. Hindi namin sila kilala. At ang kanilang uri ng pamumuhay ay dayuhan sa amin. Pero kaya naming marararan na talagang may lugar sa London at talagang may mga taong nakatira doon. At kahit na ang tula ay isinulat bago magkagiya alam namin na habang naririnig

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6 Ibid., 236.
7 Ibid., 239.
namin ang tula, ang mga taong iyon ay nagtitiis din sa giyera. At kaagad nakikiramdam kami.8


3.5 Ang Wika at Ang Kayamanan ng Daigdig

Ang magising sa kayamanan ng wika ay magising sa kayamanan ng daigidg. Nabigkas noon ni Ferriols sa klase na ang iba’t ibang wika ng mundo ay maihahambing sa samu’t saring mga tanim. At tulad ng mga tanim, may kanya-kanyang bisa at pakinabang. May mga tanim na gamit na gamit ng tao. Ganito ang punong niyog. Bawa’t bahagi ay kapaki-pakinabang; wala itong tapon. Ang bunga ay may tubig na maiinom at lamang makakain. Ang bunot ng bunga ay magagamit sa pagpapakintab ng sahig. Ang bao ay isinusuot ng sumsasayaw ng manlalatik. Ang mga dahon ay tingting para sa walis at pawid para sa atip. Ang tanggal ay panggatong at naglalaman ng ubod na maaring isahog sa lumpia. May mga tanim naman na nilagay sa kaalaman at sinasayaw ng lupa. May mga tanim na nasa kaalaman, nagtataglay ng lupang alom, nagpapakintab ng sahig. Dito nagmumula ang pananaw ng ilan ukol sa karukhaan ng Filipino kung kaya’t hindi nabibigyan ng parehong pagkakataon ang Filipino na ito’y masanay at mahasa.

Inuulat ni Ferriols na ang isang bagay na ikinagugulat ng mga estudyante ay ang kayamanan ng wika ng Filipino at ang mga hangganang ng wika. Pareho rin lang nagmamahayag ng may hangganan. Sa pagkakataon ng mga kontekstong academiko kung saan hindi makakalat sa komportable ang Ingles bilang wika ng mga naganaplik, guro, estudyante, at maraming iba. Nakarating ang wika na sa ganyang kadagatang dahil sinubukan, hinasa, at sinanay hanapan ng tinig sa halos lahat ng mga larangang ginagalawan ng pamantasahan. Dito nagmumula ang pananaw ng ilan sa harap ng karukhaan ng Filipino kung kaya’t hindi nabibigyan ng parehong pagkakataon ang Filipino na ito’y masanay at mahasa.

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Alam ng sinuman ang tinutukoy ni Ferriols kung may karanasan siya ng pagtigil panandalian upang namnamin ang kayamanan ng daigdig sa kanyang karanasan sa panitikan. Hindi lamang mga salita ang kanyang binabasa. Inihahatid siya ng mga salita upang danasin a ng kayamanan ng daigdig. Heto ang sinabi niya ukol sa pagtuturo sa kanya ni Dela Costa:


Latin man o Ingles ang binabasa, hindi kami nakukulong sa letra ng libro. Nabubuhay ang mga letra at mga kataga at mga verso saaling ng pagpapamulat ni Horacio. Dahil sa kanya ang pumapaligid sa amin na aming mas matinding nagigisnan.10


Ang hamon ngayon sa mga guro, lalo na ng balarila, panitikan, at pilosopiya ay ang gawain ng paggising sa mga estudyante na ang tunay na diwa ng mga tekstong binabasa nila ay lagpas sa mga pinag-aaralan nilang mga balangkas, gramatika, sistema, at teorya. Kung hindi nararanasan ng mga estudyante ang diwa na ito, hindi sila talaga nabubuhay o natututo.

10 Ferriols, Sulyap, 121.
3.6 Ang Sentro ng Wika Bilang Sentro ng Pagkamalikhain

Inamin na natin na bawat wika ay may kakayahan at hangganan. Kung gayon, ang ginagawa ng malikhaing magsalita ay hindi naiiba sa pagpapanday: hinahango niya mula sa kalikasan ang mga materyales ng kanyang sining, kinikilala niya kung anu-ano ang maihahatid sa kanya ng bawat katangian ng mga materyales na ito at gagalawan na niyang lumikha ng bagong bagay mula dito.

Sa mga nag-aakala na ‘taglish’ (o ‘enggalog,’ biro ni Ferriols) ang solusyon sa mga hangganan ng Filipino, nagahain si Ferriols ng bagong perspektiba. Kung ang ibig sabihin ng ‘taglish’ ay ang walang pangingilatis na paghalili ng mga salitang Ingles sapagkat nalimutan ang katagang Filipino o di kaya’y ang pagpilit sa Filipino na sundan ang balangkas at ritmo ng Ingles, halata agad na walang husay o galing sa pagpapanday ang magaganap.


Kung kayat’ may sentro pala ang wika. Dito madarama ang diwa at katutubong galing nito, at may pagkakataon para sa sinumang taong pasukin at damhin ang sentrong ito, kung hahayaan lamang niya ang kanyang sarili na maging tapat sa mga lumang tunog at bigkasin mula ang mga ito at matagpuan ang nalicewaw niyang kalooban bilang bago, sa loob ng daigdig na palaging bago at tumutubo.  

May ibang nangyayari kung may bibigkas ng isang wika mula sa tunay nitong sentro at, mula sa sentrong iyon, lilikha siya ng mga bagong salita sa pamamagitan ng pagnanakaw (ang matatas magsalita, hindi nanghihiram bagkus nagnananakaw) mula sa ibang wika.  

May malikhaing pagnanakaw ng salita na siya namang nagpapalalim ng wika at karasan sa taong marunong bumigkas. Dulot nito, lumalalim ang wika, tumatalas ang kakayahan nitong magsalita ng kahulugan, at lumalalim din ang karasan ng tao sa daigdig. Lumalawak ang mismong daigdig sa harap ng taong bumibigkas.

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11 Ferriols, A Memoir, 222.
3.7 Ang Wika at Ang Danas-Daigdig ng Nagsasarita


Nang walang pasintabi at pagpapaumanhin, pinasya ni Ferriols mamilosopiya sa wika na kanyang nagisnaan: ang wika ng Hilagang Sampalok. Dito niya natuklasan ang kanyang sarili. Dito siya natuto dumanas at tumingin sa daigdig. Dito siya natuto sa kanyaman ng wika at ng daigdig kung kaya’t sinasabi niya sa dulo ng A Memoir of Six Years,

Sa loob ng anim na taon, maaring matutunan na para sa makataong pag-iisip, mas mahusay ang Hilagang Sampalokenyo kaysa sa Griyego ni Platon.13


Tinatamaan ni Ferriols sa puntong ito ang kahalagahan ng pagpapakatotoo. Sa harap ng daigdig, ng lipunan, ng kapwa tao na sumasalubong sa akin sa loob ng abot-tanaw ng sarili kong katutubong wika, ang pinaka-nababagay na tugon sa karanasang ito ay gagalaw at gagalaw pa rin sa loob ng abot-tanaw ng sarili kong katutubong wika. Kung sisikapin kong harapin ito sa wikang iba, di hamak, sa aking katutubong salita,
umaapak na ako palabas ng orihinal kong karanaan at lumalayo na ako sa daigdig na aking iniiralan mismo.

4. Ang Ambag ng Pagsasanay sa mga Klasiko

Kapag tinatanong si Ferriols kung paano siya napunta sa pilosopiya, palagi niyang sinasabi na inutusan siyang pag-aralan ito. At bilang huwarang Heswitang tumatalima sa kanyang mga superior, ginawa niya ito sa abot ng kanyang makakaya. Noong nagkita daw sila muli ni Kerr noong 1957, habang nag-aaral si Ferriols ng doktorado sa pilosopiya sa Pamantasang Fordham sa New York, at nalaman nito na pilosopiya ang ipinaaral sa kanya, nasambit nito na sinasayang ng kanyang superior ang isang classical scholar. Pagkaraan pa ng ilang taon, nasambit naman ni Ferriols na wala ring nasayang sapagkat ang kanyang pananahan sa mundo ng mga klasikong Griyego at Romano ay nakatulong sa kanyang pag-aaral at pagtuturo ng pilosopiya. Hindi matatanggihan ang halaga ng salin niya ng mga teksto ng mga sinaunang Griyego.

Bukod dito, mahihinuha rin bilang paglalagom sa pitong sulyap na ginawa ng papel na ito, na ang mahiwagang nating pilosopiya ng wika kay Ferriols ay nakulayan ng kanyang pagbabad sa mga klasiko. Sapagkat buhay para sa kanya ang mga salitang sinauna (buhay para sa kanya ang mga sinaunang manunulat, makata, o pilosopo), buhay din niyang naitatawid sa kanyang mga aklat at sa kanyang mga klase ang kayamanan ng mundo ng panitikan, at pilosopiya na siyang salamin ng kayamanan ng daigdig at ng kahulugan.

Sa huli, maaari ring ituring na sariwang alternatibo ang paraaang pagmulat ni Ferriols sa wika. Malalim at malawak ang mga pagmumunong-muni nina Wittgenstein, at ng buong analitikong tradisyong pamimilosopiya sa wika. Ngunit ang kanilang sistemático, lohikal, at matematikong pagdulog sa paksa ay madaling maging pormalidad at anyo na lamang. Ang pilosopiya ng wika na nagsisimula sa punto de bista ng panitikan ay nagbibigay ng ibang larawan ng wika; kung paanong buhay na nililikha nito, kasama ang taong nagsusulat, bumibigkas at umuuunawa ang buong mundo ng kahulugang maaari lamang makita kung bukas ang tao sa kalaliman at hiwaga ng daigdig.

Sa mga nakita nating mga puna ni Ferriols ukol sa wika, nagisnan din natinit ang kalikasan ng pilosopiya; na ito ay isang gawain na taong gumagalaw sa daigdig ng kapwa tao at nasisikit ng mas masinsinan ang meron na ginagalawan nila ng kapwa tao. Ang mga bansag at tatak ay hindi sing-halaga at lalong hindi kapalit ng aktwal na karanasang pinagdaanan ng masusing pagsasagawa ng aktong pamimilosopiya.
Sa huli, inaanyayahan ng sulating ito ang iba pang mga nananaliksik na ipagpatuloy ang nasimulang landas ni Ferriols. Sa paninindigan niyang mamilosopiya sa wikang Filipino, nabigyan niya ang sarili niya ng pagkakataong magpakatotoo, aminin ang totoo at isagawa ang totoo. Kung ang pilosopiya nga ay pag-atupag sa katotohanan, ipinakita sa atin ni Ferriols ang daan.

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Discourse in Filipino Philosophy

Ang Pagkukuwento bilang Pagbabalik-loob: Pagdalumat sa Halaga ng “Awit ng Matandang Marinero” ni Samuel T. Coleridge sa Talambuhay ni Fr. Roque Ferriols, S.J.

Preciosa Regina A. De Joya

Abstract: At the beginning of Roque Ferriols’s autobiography, he remembers the night when he and his father read Samuel T. Coleridge’s “Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” and particularly, how his father translated the English verses to Filipino. This essay explores the significance of Coleridge’s long poem to Ferriols’s reflection on the purpose and structure of his own autobiographical writing, showing how storytelling is not only a means of atonement towards personal salvation but a process in which reconciliation and re-connection with the community can be achieved. Furthermore, I relate Ferriols’s account of the translation of Coleridge’s poem to the philosopher’s effort at coming to terms with the controversies of the Filipinization movement in the 1970s.

Keywords: Coleridge, Ferriols, autobiography, Filipinization movement

Pagdagsa ng Alaala


salitang uog, ay hango at ukol sa matatagpuan, may hugis at anyo ng darating, na hindi masasabi at hindi inaasahan sapagkat “matutuklasang hindi hinahanap.”

At ganyan nga ang nangyari: nang tanggihan ni Ferriols na isewalat ang kanyang mga alaala, hindi ko inaasahang biglang maharap sa isang masidhing babala: na hindi nararapat at maaring iuwi ang tao sa disenyo’t plano ng tagapanayam.

Ngunit paano ko naman nasasabi na nag-iwan ng bakas ang aming pakikipagtagpo? Sapagkat habang nilalakbay ko ang mga salaysay na maingat at masinop na nilatag ng may-akda, at tinatanaw ang mga pirasong tanawan ng kanyang nakaraan, mababakasan at mauulinigan pa rin ang pagtanggi noong una ko siyam napanayam. Sapagkat lakin man ng mambabasa ang buong kapatagan ng mga salita, maingat at tusong inilihim ng may-akda ang hindi masasabi ng mga salita, siyam lamang, at na ang tunay sa karunungan ay hindi maipaliwanag sa salita. Kaya ang daing ng matandang manggugulog na, bagaman sinikap niyang turuan ang kanyang anak, na tunay namang pinakinggan ang kanyang mga salita, siya pa rin, sa edad na pitumpung taon, ang nagpapakapagod. Sa mga salita ni Ferriols, ipinaliwanag ng manggugulog kung bakit naging ganito ang kanyang kapalaran. Aniya,


Kuwento ng Matandang Manggugulog

Sapagkat hindi pa nauunawaan ng anak ko, kung papaanong makagalaw ang kamay sa pag-itan ng magaan at magaan at magagalaw

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1 Roque Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Office of Research and Publication, 1997), 35.
2 “Tswang Tsu” ang ginamit na baybay ni Ferriols sa pagsasa-Filipino ng pangalan ng pilosopong Tsino na si Chuang Tsu (baybay ayon sa lumang pagsasatitik sa Romano na Wade-Giles).

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Mula sa kuwentong ito, mababatid na ang tunay na pag-unawa ay matatamo lamang sa pamamagitan ng sariling tiyaga at gawa. Ngunit para kay Tswang Tsu, tila may malubhang pagtanggi na bigyan ng anumang halaga ang salita. Bagaman karaniwang isinasalin bilang “daan,” ang Tao (o Dao),⁵ sa katunayan, para kay Tswang Tsu, and Tao ay isang misteryo na hindi mabibigyang ngalan, humihigit sa anumang umiiral, kung kaya’t hindi maipapahiwatig sa salita, ni sa katahimikan.⁶ At kaya pinagbalaan ng manggugulong ang hari: hindi maiiwasan, dadalhin ng mga matatanda sa kanilang puntoed ang lahat ng kanilang nalalaman.⁷ Kahit ang katahimikan ng taong tunay na marunong ay walang kinalaman sa kakulangan o pagkabaog ng salita; hindi nilalayon o sinasadya, ang kanyang kawalang-imik ay nanggagaling sa kapanatagan, kalagayang hindi nangangailangan pang magwika.

Paano, kung gayon, babasahin ang talambuhay ni Ferriols, at paano mabibigyang halaga ang mga kuwento na kanyang isinalaysay? Totoo kaya ang babala ni Tswang Tsu, na kahit anong gawing pagsisikap ng tagapakinig o mambabasa, walang tunay na dunong na dumadaloy sa mga salita? Hindi kaya ito mismo ang talagang nangyayari: na habang sabik kong binabasa ang mga kuwento ng buhay ni Ferriols noong panahon ng giyera, hindi maiwasang ang mga alaala ng may-akda sa pagiging datos, at ang kanyang mga nasawing kaibigan sa pagiging pulo pangalan lamang?

Sa kanyang pagdadalumat, hindi binibigyang pansin sa teologong si Thomas Merton ang masidhing pagtanggi ni Tswang Tsu sa halaga ng salita. Bagkus, ikinakatuwiran ni Merton na, may nananalaytay sa mga salita na “kuwan,” na inuuugoy ang pag-iisip tungo sa isang landas na hindi napanghahawakan o sinasaklaw ng salita, at habang hindi ito nabibigyang

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⁴ Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 24.
⁵ Ginagamit dito ang Tao na siyang baybay na alinsunod sa paraan Wade-Giles sa pagsasatitik sa Romano.
⁶ Merton, The Way of Chuang Tsu, 152.
⁷ Ibid., 83.
dangal, walang saysay ang mga winika.\textsuperscript{8} Samantala, sa pagtalakay ni Ferriols, may tila ungol ng pagsalungat sa paniniwala ng pilosopong Tsino. Sa simula, inaabiusan ni Ferriols ang kanyang mambabasa na ang kuwento na kanyang isasalaysay ay “medyo galing” kay Tswang Tsu. Bakit medyo lang? Sapagkat mamaya, babaguhin ni Ferriols ang kuwento.

Batay sa maikling salaysay ni Tswang Tsu, nagbigay si Ferriols ng isang palagay sa nagaling kapalaran ng anak. Ang sabi daw ng mga tao, aniya, nagtatag ang anak ng aklatan, sa paniniwala at tigas-ulong pagpupumilit na sabihin ang pinakamahalaga. Kaya’t, ayon kay Ferriols,


Ang pambihirang paglalarawang ito ay upang maipabatid sa mambabasa ang kapangyarihan, sabay kahangalan, na maaring kahahantungan ng

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 82. Sa paliwanag ni Merton, pinahahalaragan ng mundo ang mga libro, sapagkat pinaniniwalaan, na sa pamamagitan nito, napakahalagahan ang Tao. Ngunit iginiit ni Merton, na ni salita, ni kaisipang napapaloob sa mga salita, ang nagbibigay ng tunay na halaga sa mga libro. May iba pang (“something else”) umiiral sa kaisipan na siyang tumutulak tungo sa isang tiyak na direksyon na hindi maibahagi ang mga libro. Upang maunawaan totoo at tapat sa diwa nimong hindi masabi/masasabi, ginagamit minsan ni Ferriols ang “kuwan,” na sinasambit o naririnig sa mga karanwang usapan bilang kapalit ng salita panandaliang nalmumutan o ng ideya na hindi madaling maipaliwanag o mabigyan ngalan.

\textsuperscript{9} Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 24.

Itong bersyon ng kuwento na hinahain ni Ferriols sa atin ay hindi lamang pag-iimbento ng isang mapaglarong isip. Sapagkat ang nakataya dito ay ang panunumbalik ng halaga at dignidad ng salita, na nakita ni Ferriols na madaling ginagawang alanganin ng burarang pagbabasa sa kuwento ng pilosopong Tsino. Kaya, sa kanyang bersyon, dumalaw ang anak sa libingan ng kanyang ama upang ipabatid na, sa kanyang pagsisikap, sa wakas, manggugulong na siya. Ang sabi niya,


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10 Ibid., 25. Akin ang diin.
11 Ibid.
Sa wastong paggamit, may kapangyarihan ang salita na nag-uudyok sa tao na kumilos, inuugoy ang pag-isip patungo sa landas ng paggawa, at kung minsan, sa pagbabalik-loom. Kaya hindi mapagdududahan na sa pagkukuwento ni Ferriols ng kanyang buhay noong digmaan, bagaman mahirap noong una, sinikap niyang sabihin ang masasabi, alang-alang sa lahat na nagtatanong at nais makaalam.

**Awit ng Matandang Marinero**


Hatinggabi na noong natapos kaming makipagsapalaran sa mahiwagang marinero. 12

Ngunit sino ba itong mahiwagang marinero, at ano ang nilalaman ng kanyang kanta?

Ang “Awit ng Matandang Marinero” ay isang mahabang tula na sinulat ni Samuel Taylor Coleridge, isang Ingles na makata, pilosopo, at teologo ng ikalabing-siyam na siglo. Sa simula ng tula, may maririnig na pagdiriwang ng isang kasal. Parating ang mga panauhin, ngunit pininigilan ng matandang marinero ang isa sa kanila. Nais man ng huli na magpatuloy sa pagdiriwang, may kung anong gayuma na pumigil sa kanya, at siya’y napaupong nakinig sa kuwento ng matandang marinero. Isinilaysay ng matandang marinero kung paano niya walang awang pinatay ang isang

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Sa unang tingin, ang pagbanggit sa kuwento ng mabiyakan marinero ay tila isang ligaw na hawig na aalala ng kabataan ng may-akda. Ngunit sa mas mapanuring pagbabasa, maaaring mahinuha na ang kuwento ay hindi lamang halaw na walang isip kundi balangkas na nagbibigay saysay sa buong talambuhay.

Paghahandog

Bilang paghahandog, inialay ni Ferriols ang kanyang talambuhay sa tatlo niyang kaibigan: kay Gusting, na nagturo sa kanya na manghuli ng
tutubi sa damuhan noong araw sa Sampaloc; kay Jonathan, na nagbigay sa kanya ng libro na mapagsusulatan ng kanyang mga kaisipan; at kay Genesis, na “nagbigay loob” sa kanya na simulan ang pagsusulat. Ngunit mahalagang pansinin na sa kanyang panghahandog, hindi nagsimula ang may-akda sa pagbanggit ng kanilang mga pangalan kundi sa isang kuwento ukol sa pagkamatay at pagpapalibing sa kanyang kaibigang si Gusting.


Noong bata ako naiinggit ako sa malay-manok sapagkat hindi nila nadarama ang takot sa kamatayan. Ngunit ngayon ikinalulugod kong manirahan sa abot-tanaw ng aking malay-tao. Sapagkat kaya kong makipagkilala sa sanlibutan at makapagmuni-muni.14

Mula sa maikling sanaysay na ito, mahihinuha ang pag-amin ng may-akda na, sa simula, itinuring niya ang kamatayan bilang sumpa, bilang kasumpasumpa: sapagkat hindi lamang isang malubhang suliranin na kailangan ng tao na mamatay, ang masahol pa’y napakatindi ng kanyang kamalayan, na namamalayan niya sa bawat sandali ang nakasisindak na paglapit ng kamatayan. Mabuti pa ang manok, walang kamuwang-muwang.

Sa tula ni Coleridge, hawig an g naging kapalaran ng matandang marinero. At kaya, sa simula, ang awit niya:

Nag-iisa, nag-iisa, puspusang nag-iisa
Nag-iisa sa malawak na malawak na karagatan!
At ni isang santo ang kailanmang naawa
Sa kaluluwa kong lublob sa kasawian

14 Ferriols, Sulyap, 2.
Napakaraming tao, napakaganda!
At lahat sila’y namatay na nakatihaya
At libu-libong bagay mula sa burak at bulaho
Ang namamalagi, katulad ko.

*Alone, alone, all, all alone
Alone on the wide, wide sea!
And never a saint took pity on
My soul in agony

*The many men, so beautiful!
And they all died did lie:
And a thousand thousand slimy things
Lived on; and so did I.*

Ngunit sa kabila ng lahat ng pagkamatay at pagkabulok, nakita ng matandang marinero ang mga tubig-ahas na, sa kanilang suot na bughaw, makintab na berde, at pelusang itim, lumalangoy sa dagat at nag-iwan ng guhit ng ginintuang apoy. Sa sandali ng kanyang pagkamangha sa kagandahang nasilayan niya, nakalas ang nakagapos na albatross sa kanyang leeg at “nahulog at lumubog na parang tingga sa dagat.”*

Kung para sa matandang marinero, tila napawi ang sumpa nang matunghayan niya ang kagandahan ng kalikasan, gayon din ang pagbabalik-loob na ginanap ni Ferriols. Sa pagtanggap at pagpapalugod sa katalagahan at kondisyon ng pagmamalay-tao, na parating alisto’t mula t sa darating na katapusan, naging posible ang pasasalamat, pagpapalakas-loob, at pagsusulat, ukol sa pagkakabigian, sa mga tutubi sa damuhan ng kanyang kabataan, at sa mga nahuling kislap ng alaala.

**Pagkukuwento, Pangungumpisal**

Noong gabing iyon na binabasa nilang mag-ama ang kuwento ng matandang marinero, naalala ni Ferriols kung paano panandaliang tumitigil ang kanyang ama sa pagsalin kapag may nais siyang ipaliwanag sa tula. Isa

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*16 Ibid., IV:285-290. “And from my neck so free/ The Albatross fell off, and sank/Like lead into the sea.”*
sa mga katangi-tanging binabanggit ng may-akda ay kung paano 
ipinaliwanag ng kanyang ama kung bakit nangungumpisal ang marinero sa 
ermitanyo: “Sabi niya, ‘Kahit na mga Protestante sila, meron silang mga 
ugaling Katoliko’”17

Ngunit kung titingnan ang pag-unlad at hugis ng pag-iisip ni 
Coleridge, bilang tugon sa mga nag-aatigang debate noong panahong iyon, 
masasabing hindi siya karaniwang Protestante. Anak ng isang Anglikanong 
pari, madaling nabighani si Coleridge sa itinuturong Unitarianism ng 
teologong si Joseph Priestley noong nag-aaral pa siya sa Cambridge. Ngunit 
hindi nagtagal, dulot ng impluwensiya ng Platonismo at Idealismong 
Aleman, binatikos ni Coleridge ang mga ideya ni Priestley, kasama ang 
Socinianism at Empiricism ni William Paley, na parehong pinabulaanan ang 
doktrina ng Santisima Trinidad at Pagsisisi.18

Para kay Coleridge, ang pananaw nina Priestley at Paley ay nakaugat 
sa Empiricism ni John Locke, na inuwi ang ideya bilang produkto ng ating 
karanasang pandama, at abstrakso na nililikha at namamalagi sa isip ng tao. 
Dahil dito, hindi tuloy mapahalagahan nina Priestley at Paley ang tradisyong 
Idealismo na hango mula kay Platon, at ang yaman na ibinigay nito sa 
Kristiyanong pananaw ukol sa kalikasan ng Diyos. Para sa kanila, nagbunga 
lamang ito ng katiwalian sa tunay na diwa ng sanaunang Kristiyanismo sa 
pagbuo ng isang pilosopiyang spirituwal. Ang tunay na pananampalataya sa 
iiyang Diyos Ama ay binubuo ng mga empirikal na pagpapatunay, at kasama 
dito ang mga himala na nagbibigay ebidensiya na si Hesus ng Nazareno ang 
Mesiyas ng sangkatauhan. Ngunit wala sa banal na kasulatan ang 
pagpapakilala sa Diyos bilang tatlong persona, kung kaya ang doktrina ng 
pagsasakatawang-tao ng banal na espiritu, pati na ang pagsisisi sa bahagi ng 
pananaw ng kaligtasan bilang pakikibahagi sa buhay ng espiritu (nous o 
logos), ayon kay Priestley, ay mga pagpapalabo dulot ng mga ambisyon ng 
 mga teologo na bigyan ng pilosopiyang pundasyon ang Kristiyanismo.19

Ngunit nanindigan si Coleridge sa pananaw na ang Diyos ng 
Kristiyanismo ay hindi nahihiwalay sa mundo kundi buhay at personal, at 
laganap sa buong daigdig na kanyang nilikha. Nanalig si Coleridge na ang

17 Ferriols, S.J., Sulyap, 6.
18 Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion: Aids to Reflection and the Mirror of 
the Spirit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 50. Ayon kay Hedley, bagaman 
naunang umusbong ang Socinianism bilang produkto ng teolohiya ng Repormasyon noong ika-
16 at 17 na siglo, at ang Unitarianism naman ay hinango mula sa radikal na uri ng Protestantismo 
g ng Socinianism at nabuo lamang noong ika-18 na siglo, kinilala ni Coleridge ang pagkakaisa ng 
dalawa, bilang puwersang tumutuligisa sa doktrina ng Santisimo Trinidad at Pagsisisi.
19 Ibid., 54.
buong realidad ay hindi lamang mauuwi sa pagiging bagay o res, kundi espiritual: bahagi at nakikibahagi sa isang Absoluto na buhay na pagmamalay na nakikipag-ugnay at bukal ng kasaganaan at kaganapan ng kabuuan saklaw ng pag-iral. Sa pagpapatunay nito, nagiging mahalaga ang ideya ng Santisimo Trinidad bilang paraan at proseso ng pagsakatayan ng Diyos Anak bilang mundong may wakas, bilang Logos, naunawaan at tumatalab ang Banal sa kamalayang-tao. Sa pamamagitan ni Kristo, nagiging posible ang pagdurusa at pagsisisi bilang gabay sa paglalakbay at panunumbalik ng bawat nilalang tungo sa kaluluwa ng Diyos.20

Bilang paggunita sa kuwento ng pagkakatapon ni Cain pagkatapos niyang paslangin ang kanyang kapatid na si Abel, ang pagdurusa at pagsisisi ng matandang marinero ay isang mapanglaw na paglalakbay ng pag-isa.21 Kaya bagaman tila unti-unting napawi ang sumpa nang masilayan niyang ganda ng kalikasan, natamo lamang nang lubos ng marinero ang ginhawa nang ikinuwento niya ang lahat ng kanyang ginawa sa ermitanyo. At mula noon, sa mga sandaling nanunumbalik ang kanyang pagdurusa, nag-aapoy ang kanyang puso hangga’t maisalaysay niya muli ang mga kasindak-sindak na pangyayari ng nakaraan.

Dumaraan akong parang gabi sa iba’t ibang lupalop;
Taglay ko ang kakaibang lakas ng pananalita
Sa sandali na mukha niya’y masilayan ko
Batid ko ang taong kailangang pakinggan ‘ko
Sa kanya itinuturo ang aking katha.

I pass, like night, from land to land;
I have strange power of speech;
That moment that his face I see,
I know the man that must hear me;
To him my tale I teach.22

Sa mga salitang ito, mahihinuha na hindi ganap na naglalho ang sumpa. Patuloy na naglakbay ang matandang marinero, at sa tuwing bumabalik ang apoy sa kanyang dibdib, napipilitan siyang paulit-ulit hanapin ang ginhawa

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22 Coleridge, Ancient Mariner, VII: 585-590.
sa pagsasalaysay ng kanyang kuwentong-buhay. Para tuloy na sa bawat pagkukuwento, nauulit ang pangungumpisal na unang naganap sa tulong ng mabuting ermitanyo.

Sa pagdadalumat ng antropolohong si Michael Jackson, ang “Awit ng Matandang Marinero” ay hindi lamang mauuwi sa isang pangungumpisal na naglalayon ng personal na kaligtasan. Ayon sa kanya, masyadong “Eurocentric” o “ego-centered” ang pananaw na nagsasaad na ang pagsasalaysay ng kuwentong-buhay ay naglalayon lamang ng katarsis at personal na pagpapagaan ng loob. Sapagkat kung ginagawa nga ito ng tao upang mapalaya lamang ang sarili mula sa tanikala ng kahihiyan at pagkakasala, hindi pa rin naipapaliwanag kung bakit may puwersang tumutulak na ulit-ulitin ang pagkukuwento na, sa kaso ng matandang marinero, ginagawa sa alang-alang ng sinumang nais makinig at makaalam. Hindi kaya na, bagaman nagsisimula bilang isang kilos ng indibiduwal ang pagkukuwento, ang tunay na layunin nito ay maibaan ang tao mula sa kanyang pag-iisa at pagkakawalay sa komunidad? Sapagkat hindi maitatagpuan kung ano ang nag-uugnay at nagbibigkis sa ating lahat. 23

Saan pakikininig sa kuwentong-buhay ni Ferriols, maari kaya nating ipalagay na ang pahapyaw niyang pagsambit sa awit ng matandang marinero ay higit sa isang ligaw na alaala? Hindi kaya, sa kabila ng maingat niyang pagkakasala at pagpanlong sa awit ng matandang marinero, maunlilihan ang sariling hinaing at pagsusumamo ni Ferriols ng hindi masasabe pagdurusa at hiya, at pagpapangalaga sa dangal ng masidhing pag-iisa na kanyang naramdaman?

Kilusang Pilipinisasyon sa Ateneo (Dekada ’70)

Sa pagbasa ng talambuhay ni Ferriols, hindi maaaring kalimutan ang isa sa mga kontroversyal na pangyayari na nagdulot sa kanya ng matinding pagdurusa. Noong 1969, sinimulan ni Ferriols na magturo ng pilosopiya sa Filipino. Bagaman kinikilala rin si Ferriols, kasama nina Ramon Reyes at Jose Cruz, S.J., na nagpasimuno ng bagong programa sa pilosopiya noong 1966, na ipinalaganap ang penomenolohiya bilang batayan at metodo sa pamilyaropoliya, ang kanyang pagtuturo sa wikang Filipino ay isang makasaysayang hikbang tungo sa pag-uugat ng disiplina sa ating

kabihasnan. Isa sa mga napakahalagang konsepto na binungad ng kanyang pamimilosopiya sa wikang Filipino ay ang ideya ng “Meron,” bilang pagpasakatubo ng ideya ng pag-iral hango sa tradisyon ng Tomismo ni Joseph Maréchal.

Dahil sa kanyang pagpapasimuno ng pagtuturo ng pilosopiya sa wikang Filipino, naging bahagi si Ferriols ng kilusang Pilipinisasyon sa Ateneo, na unang sumiklab noong nilimbag ang isang manifesto na pinamagatang “Down From the Hill” (1968), na isinulat ng limang Atenista, kabilang ang makata at aktibistang si Eman Lacaba at ang makata at mamahayag na si Alfredo Salangga. Ipinahayag ng manifesto ang kanilang reklamo laban sa Kapisanan ni Hesus, at sa simbahan Katoliko, na pinapanatili ang, at nakasandal na, kapangyarihan ng mga elitista, at kaya pati ang oryentasyon ng edukasyon sa Ateneo ay maka-Kanluran, at walang sibilya sa pagpapabuti ng bayan. Imbis na nakakatulong sa mga mahihirap, lalong pinatitindi ang pambubusabos na nangangailangang pawin ng mga rebolusyonaryong pagbabago. Naging bahagi ng panunumbalik sa mga bagay na “Filipino” ang pag-uusisa sa kurikulum ng mga kurso ukol sa kasaysayan ng Pilipinas. Igininit rin ng manifesto na kinakailangang ituro ng mga Filipino mismo ang mga mahahalagang kurso tulad ng ekonomiya, kasaysayan, at agham pampulitika, at hindi dapat ipinagkakatiwala sa mga Amerikanong guro.

Nakiisa si Ferriols sa hinaing ng mga mag-aaral, at ipinaliwanag sa mga kritiko ng “Down From the Hill” na kung hinihingi man nilang baguhin ang oryentasyon ng kurikulum, at na ituro ng mga Pilipinong guro ang mga kritikal na kurso, ito ay dahil, aniya, hindi kaya ng isang lumaki sa banyagang lupain na maging sensitibo sa mga krisis na hinaharap ng ating bayan, o sa angking yaman ng ating kultura. Hindi ito panlalait sa isang taga-labas, kundi katotohanan lamang ukol sa kanyang katayuan bilang dayuhan.25 Sa isang panayam, sinabi ni Ferriols na may ilang Amerikanong Heswitang nagalit at nagbintang sa kanya ng pagsulsol sa mga mag-aaral na labanan sila. Sa pakiwari niya, ito ay nagdulot ng sama nga loob sapagkat inakala nila na politikal ang kanyang ipinaglalaban. Sa kanya, malinaw na hindi politikal, tulad ng “Down From the Hill,” ang pinag-uugatan ng kanyang Pilipinisasyon, kundi teolohikal, isang pagbasiskap na isakatuparan

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Bilang tugon sa tampo ng mga Amerikanong madaling nag-akalang walang pagpapahalaga sa kanilang nagawa, sinikap ni Ferriols noong magulong panahon na iyon na ipaliwanag ang kasalimuotan ng sitwasyon, na hindi maaring iuwi sa simpleng pagtanggi o pagkamuhi sa dayuhan.

Ang atitud ko ay meron akong appreciation sa kanilang ginawa, pero yung kanilang ginagawa ay magiging mas buo…. kagaya ng sinabi ko sa isang meeting namin[ng mga Heswita]. Sabi ko, the Americans have done a great deal for the Philippines, but they have to do something harder. To let the Filipinos become really Filipinos. To do that, the Americans have to give up some of their American ways. The Americans can do it because… kasi may slogan ang mga Amerikano during the war, eh: the difficult we do at once, the impossible takes a little longer. Yun ang isa sa mga slogan ng mga Americans. SEACBEES—isang engineering department ng US Navy ata yon. (Panayam, 2009).

Hali-halili

May mga nagsasabi na nahirapan si Ferriols dahil sa kontrobersyang ito, at may iba pang nagsasabi na dahil dito, nalulong siya sa pag-iinom at nangailangang dumaan ng psychotherapy. Ngunit hindi maikakaila na, habang binabasa ang kanyang talambuhay, isinasalaysay ng may-akda, hindi ang alitan at pagkakaiba kundi, ang pagkakaisa at pagtutulungan ng mga Amerikano’t mga Filipino noong panahon ng digmaan. Isa kaya itong pagbabalik-loob, papapahayag ng may-akda ng pagsisisi sa nangyaring kaguluhan noong dekada ’70? O isa kayang paraan ng pagwawasto ng mga maling akala’t pagtutuwid ng baluktot na pag-uunawa?

Sa buong talambuhay, puspusang pinasasalamatan ng may-akda ang kanyang mga guro, Amerikano’t Filipino, na hali-haliling nagtulong-tulong na gawing posible ang buhay, ang pag-asa at pagtuto, “ang pag-aaral ng Griyego at Latin at pagtanim ng pechay at kamote …”27 sa kabila, at sa gitna, ng kaguluhan. Kasama rin ang mga kwento ng samahan at pakikiramay, sa pakikibahagi sa lungkot at kawalan na dulot ng katangahang pinairal ng digmaan, at mga kaibigang kasama at hindi maiwan sa gitna ng panganib at karahasan. Sa pagkukuwento ni Ferriols sa mga kaganapan noong madilim at magulong panahong iyon, maaulinining ang awit na may patangalan marinero: na tila nagsasabi na sa ating pagdudurusa, mahaba man ang paglalakbay at pag-iisa, natutuklasan rin sa huli ang pagkakaisa at pagbubuklod nating lahat bilang tao—na tulad ng mga Katoliko’t Protestante, masasabi rin na ka-hit Amerikano sila, may mga ugali rin silang Filipino.

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27 Ferriols, Sulyap, 43.
72 ANG PAGKUKUWENTO BILANG PAGBABALIK-LOOB


Recuerdos: Mga Pagbaliktanaw sa Lumahong Programang Pilosopiya ng Far Eastern University

Christian Lemuel C. Afundar, Greg T. Dulay, and Elenita dLR. Garcia

Abstract: Unknown to many Filipino teachers and students in Philosophy, Far Eastern University had its own bachelor’s program in Philosophy. In fact, the Department of Philosophy of the university had some teachers and students who are considered as important Filipino philosophers, such as Benito Reyes, Florentino Timbreza, Antonio Cua, Romualdo Abulad, and Alfredo Co. Using the method of oral history, this paper attempts to reconstruct the story of the program and the Department of Philosophy of Far Eastern University. The researchers interviewed Florentino Timbreza as a former student, Zenaida Santiago-Martinez as a former college administrator, Clarita Villa-Alba as a former Philosophy teacher; and Alfredo Co as another former Philosophy teacher. This paper aims to find out why the bachelor’s program in Philosophy was terminated; if it is appropriate to bring the program back; and if appropriate, how it should be designed to be more stable and sustainable. This paper can also be considered as a contribution to the broader project on the development of the history of Filipino philosophy.

Keywords: Far Eastern University, philosophy program, Filipino philosophy, oral history
ito habang nasa Pambansang Kumperensiya ng Philosophical Association of the Philippines noong Abril 2017. Sa katunayan, mayroon ang Departamento ng Pilosopiya ng nasabing pamantasang na ilang guro at mag-aaral na maaaring ipagmayabang bilang mga mahalagang pilosopong Pilipino, tulad nina Benito Reyes, Florentino Timbreza, Antonio Cua, Romualdo Abulad, at Alfredo Co.

Humugot ng inspirasyon ang pananaliksik na ito sa tatlong institusyonal na pagsusuri na may kaugnayan sa pilosopiyang Pilipino na naisagawa na nina Preciosa Regina de Joya, tungkol sa mga pilosopong Pilipino ng Pamantasang ng Pilipinas, Pamantasang Ateneo de Manila (ADMU), Kolehiyong San Beda, at iba pa;\(^{1}\) F.P.A. Demeterio, tungkol sa mga pilosopong Pilipino ng Pamantasang De La Salle;\(^{2}\) at Emmanuel de Leon,\(^{3}\) tungkol sa mga pilosopong Pilipino ng Pamantasang ng Santo Tomas. Napagtanto ng mga mananaliksik na ang ganitong mga pag-aaral ay may malaking maiambag sa pag-unawa sa kasaysayan at kasalukuyang katayuan ng pilosopiya Pilipino, pati na sa pilosopiya dito sa Pilipinas.

Gamit ang metodo ng \textit{oral history} sinikap ng papel na ito na buuin mula ang kwalidad ng programang Pilosopiya ng FEU. Layunin ng papel na ito na makahulog na ilang aral at kabatiran kung bakit naglaho ang programang Batsilyer sa Pilosopiya ng pamantasang ito; kung nararapat bang buhayin mula ang programa; at kapag nararapat man, kung paano ito ididisenyu para maging mas mataag at sustenable programa. Maaaring ituring din ang papel na ito na isang ambag sa mas malawak na proyekto tungkol sa pagbubuo ng kasaysayan ng pilosopiyang Pilipino. Habang disertasyon at manuskrito ng aklat ang nagawa ng mga pagsusuri nina de Joya, Demeterio, at de Leon, isang malaking artikulo lamang ang nabuo ng kasalukuyang proyekto at itinuturing muna ito ng mga mananaliksik bilang panimulang pag-aaral sa kasaysayan ng pilosopiyang FEU. Unang nakonseptualisa ang proyektong ito sa tulong at suso ng dalubhaha at historyador ng pilosopiyang Pilipino na si Demeterio.

\textbf{Metodolohiya}

Ang modernong \textit{oral history} ay nagsimula sa pagkamulat ng Amerikanong dyurnalista at historyador na si Allan Nevins na madalas ang

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item[1] Preciosa Regina de Joya, “In Search of Filipino Philosophy” (Ph.D. Dissertation, National University of Singapore, 2014).
\end{itemize}}
mga nakasulat na teksto at rekord ay hindi sapat, o hindi mahagilap, para sa ilang historikal na pananaliksik.⁴ Nagsusulat si Nevins noong ng biograpiya ng Amerikanong Pangulong si Grover Cleveland na nabuhay noong uso ng paggamit ng telepono at dumadalang na ang paggamit ng mga nakasulat na memorandum at sirkular. Kinapanayam ni Nevin ang mga nakatrabaho, kaibigan, at kamag-anak ng yumaong pangulo para mabuo niyang ang ginagawang biograpiya. Ngunit may ginawang kakaiba si Nevins, inilagak niya sa isang arkibo ang mga rekord ng kanyang pakikipanayam para mapakinabangan pa ng mga dadating pang mananaliksik at historyador.

Ang oral history ay nakaugat sa pangangailangan ng isang historyador na makakuha ng impormasyon tungkol sa hindi pa masyadong naidokumentong penemonen o pangyayari.⁵ Humahanap ang oral na historyador ng kanyang mga impormante mula sa mga indIbidwal na may direktang kinalaman o karanasan sa paksa na kanyang sinasaliksik. Sistematikong kinapanayam ng historyador ang kanyang mga naahanap o napiling mga impormante. Planado dapat ang pagtatanong ng historyador para maihayag ng kanyang mga impormante ang kanyang kinakailangang mga impormasyon. Kaya tamang paraan ng oral history ang basta hayaan na lamang ang impormantdeng magsalita nang magsalita.⁶ Ang mga pakikipanayam ay dapat nakarekord, gamit ang audio o video na rekorder, at maaaring gawaan ng transkripsiyon.⁷ Ito ang dahilan kung bakit ang modernong oral history ay umusbong lamang maatapos maimbento ang wire recording na maaaring bitbitin sa kinaroroonan ng mga impormante.⁸ Sa puntong ito maari nang magsulat ang historyador ng kanyang ulat o publikasyon.

Ang modernong oral history ay hindi kumpleto kapag wala ang proseso ng paglagak sa isang arkibo ng mga aktuwal na rekord at transkrip na nakalap mula sa proyekto. Ang mga nakalagak na rekord ay bukas dapat para sa mga darating na historyador na may kani-kanilang mga pananaliksik. Ang oral history ay tumutukoy sa sistematikong kinapanayam na mga salaysay mula sa respondents, tumutukoy rin ito sa mga rekord at transkrip, sa mga nakalagak na rekord at transkrip sa arkibo, pati na sa mga pag-aaral ng dadating na mga historiaord na gaganit sa mga nakalagak na rekord at

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⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Yow, Recording Oral History, 2-3.
transkrip, at pati na rin sa mga ulat at publikasyong nabuo kaugnay sa mga gawaing ito.\footnote{Ibid.}


Ang pangalawang lebel ng oral history na sangkot sa proyektong ito ay ang paglagay sa mga transkrip ng mga salaysay ng mga impormante sa papel na ito. Sa kawalan ng angkop na arkibong mapaglagakan ng rekord at transkrip ng mga pakikipanayam, minabuti ng mga mananalikskik na sa binubuo ang artikulo na lamang ilathala ang nasabing mga transkrip. Sa pamamagitan ng isang publikasyon ay magagamit pa rin ang mga transkrip na ito ng sinumang dadating na mananalikskik na may interes sa paksang sinusuri ng proyektong ito. Ang pangatlong lebel ay ang pakikipanayam sa mga nagawang transkrip para matugunan ang mga layunin ng proyekto na unawain ang paglagho ng nasabing programa, na malaman kung nararapat bang buhayin ang programa, at tiyakin na kung nararapat man itong buhayin mulaan, paano naman kaya ito ididisenyo para maging mas mataag at sustenable. Pang-apat ay ang artikulong ito na nabuo ng mga mananalikskik.

**Mga Alaala ng Isang Mag-aaral: Panayam kay Florentino Timbreza**

Ipinanganak si Timbreza sa Tayum, Abra. Siya ay nag-aral at nagtapos sa FEU ng kursong Batsilyer sa Pilosopiya noong 1962. Nagtapos siya ng kanyang Masterado sa Pilosopiya sa Ateneo de Manila University...
(ADMU) noong 1971. Sa University of Santo Tomas (UST) naman siya nag-aral at nagtapos ng kanyang Doktorado sa Pilosopiya noong 1980, kung saan isinulat niya ang kanyang disertasyon tungkol kay Lao Tzu. Ito ang kaunahanang disertasyong pilosopikal dito sa bansa na isinulat at idinepensa sa wika ng Filipino. Iginawad kay Timbreza ang pagiging full professor sa Trinity College, Quezon City kung saan siya ay naging Dean of Student Affairs. Nagturo siya sa De La Salle University (DLSU) noong 1983. Ginawaran siya ng DLSU ng parangal ng pagiging Lucian Athanasius Professorial Chair in Philosophy and Letters. Sa kasalukuyan, siya ang punong patnugot ng Filipino journal na Malay ng DLSU.

Unang nakapanayam ng mga mananaliksik si Timbreza noong ika-17 ng Hulyo 2017 sa DLSU upang magkaroon sila ng preliminaryong impormasyon tungkol sa kanilang pag-aaral. Matapos mapag-aralan ng mga mananaliksik ang transkrip ng unang panayam, nagtala sila ng mga katanungan uungkat ng mas malalim sa karanasan ng kapanayam. Nagsagawa sila ng pangalawang panayam noong ika-15 ng Setyembre 2017 sa parehong lugar. Ang sumusunod ay ang transkrip ng pangalawang panayam.

Christian Lemuel C. Afundar (Kumakapanayam): Ano po ang dominanteng philosophical school na umiiral noon sa FEU?


Greg Dulay (Kumakapanayam): Paano po kayo hinubog ng programang Pilosopiya ng FEU?


Afundar: Pati rin po ba sa pagsusulat ninyo, sila rin ba ang nag-encourage sa inyo?

Dulay: Maliban kay Dr. Jose Espina, sino pa po iyong mga naalala ninyo na naging propesor ninyo?


Afundar: May ambag po ba ang pilosopikal na edukasyon ninyo mula sa FEU sa inyong pagiging isa ngayon sa mga pinakabatikang pilosopong Pilipino?

Timbreza: Maaaring biased ako dito sapagkat ang aking background talaga ay ang aking pag-aaral sa FEU. Oo naman, tulad ng sinabi ko, kung hindi dahil sa pagkakahubog ng aking pag-iisip, lalong-lalo na sa pilosopikal na pag-iisip sa FEU na dulot ng aking magagaling na propesor, palagay ko hindi ko narating ang aking naratnan kung anuman ngayon. Mahalaga ang background mo eh. Mahalaga iyong aking pilosopikal na background sa FEU.

Dulay: Ano po ang inyong masasabi sa paglaho sa programang Pilosopiya ng FEU?


Dulay: Sa tingin ninyo po, malaki ba ang epekto sa isang pamantasan kapag nawala ang Philosophy program nito?
**Timbreza:** Maaaring biased na naman siguro ako dito. Sa palagay ko may epekto, sapagkat tulad ng napag-aralan natin sa pilosopiya, ito talaga ang pundasyon ng paghahanap ng kabuluhan para malutas ang problema sa ating lipunan. Iyon din ang tinutukoy natin sa pilosopiya. Kung mawala talaga, sa palagay ko, maaaring magiging mahina ang epekto ng edukasyon. Sa bagay, meron naman yatang ethics o critical thinking pa rin sa FEU. Bukod pa siyang dito, kailangan pa ang malawakang paghahanap ng kabuluhan, at kinakailangan na ituro din ang iba pang sangay ng pilosopiya para lalo pang lumawak ang pag-iisip ng mga mag-aaral.

**Afundar:** Sa palagay po ninyo ay sapat ba ang graduate educational background ng mga propesor ninyo sa pilosopiya noon?

**Timbreza:** Dahil wala naman akong background talaga rin sa philosophy noon, iyong aking napag-aralan sa kanila ay sapat na para sa akin para mahubog ang aking pag-iisip at pagkakahilig sa pilosopiya. Pero noong ako ay nakapag-aral na sa graduate school, sa iba’t ibang paaralan at eskwalaahan, doon ko natuklasan na hindi pa sapat ang aking educational background. Pero mahalaga rin iyong aking educational background mula sa FEU. Parang stepping stone, wika nga, parang unang hakbang, dahil kung wala ang unang hakbang hindi ako nakatutong sa iba pang pinag-aralan ko sa pilosopiya. Iyon background ko matatag, matibay. Iyon sa palagay ko ang kahalagahan ng aking pagmedyor sa Pilosopiya noon ako ay nasa FEU.

**Dulay:** Sa palagay po ninyo ay sapat ba ang mga ginagawang research ng mga propesor ninyo sa pilosopiya noon?


**Afundar:** Kung sakaling maisipan ng administrasyon ng FEU na buuin muli ang nasabing programa, anong mga gabay at payo ang iyong maibibigay para sa administrasyon?

**Timbreza:** Siguro biased na naman ako kasi Philosophy ang medyor ko. Ang aking masasabi na lamang ... napakahalaga ng pilosopiya sa edukasyon.

Dulay: Kahalintulad po ba ito sa sinabi ninyo dati na ang lahat na hindi ginagamit ay lumiliit?

Timbreza: Mayroon pang karugtong iyon ... kapag paliit paliit na ay hindi mo na talaga magagamit. Kaya sa akin, iyon ang kahalagahan ng pilosopiya sa aking buhay. Kung hindi dahil doon, maaaring hindi ako ang sinoman ako ngayon. Lalong-lalo na iyong pamimilosopiya sa wikang Filipino, mahalaga sa akin iyong pamimilosopiya sa wikang Filipino, mahalaga sa akin iyong pamimilosopiya sa wikang Filipino, mahalaga sa akin iyong pamimilosopiya sa wikang Filipino, mahalaga sa akin iyong pamimilosopiya sa wikang Filipino, mahalaga sa akin iyong pamimilosopiya sa wikang Filipino, mahalaga sa akin iyong pamimilosopiya sa wikang Filipino.

Mga Alaala ng Isang Administrador: Panayam kay Zenaida Santiago-Martinez

Unang nakapanayam ng mga mananaliksik si Santiago-Martinez noong ika-30 ng Hulyo 2017 sa Cainta, Rizal. Matapos mapag-aralan ng mga mananaliksik ang transkrip ng unang panayam na nakatulong sa pagpili ng nararapat na mga katanungan sa pag-aaral na ito, nagsagawa sila ng pangalawang panayam noong ika-10 ng Setyembre 2017 sa Cainta, Rizal. Ang sumusunod ay ang transkrip ng pangalawang panayam.

**Dulay:** Bakit po naging pamilyar kayo sa kasaysayan ng programang Pilosopiya ng FEU?

**Zenaida Santiago-Martinez:** Kasi noon hindi pa ganoon karami ang mga department sa FEU. Well known din ang philosophy dahil parang isa ito sa mga original na programa … philosophy at literature.

**Dulay:** Popular na po ba ang Philosophy Department noong mga panahon na iyon?

**Santiago-Martinez:** Yes. It was well known. Kasi mahusay na departamento iyon. Bakit mahusay? Because of the line up of faculty members and isa ito sa mga flagship course ng FEU. Si Marcial Reyes ay debonair na philosophy. Si Benito Reyes, the front runner. Sina Lydia Almoro at Jose Espina pa. Si Timbreza ay produkto na nila iyon. Pero during his time, makikita mo na ang utak at potensiyal niya. Nakapaka-aktibo niya sa programa nila.

**Dulay:** Nabanggit ninyo po si Benito Reyes bilang front runner ng programa. Maaari po ba ninyo kaming kwentuhan tungkol sa kanya bilang propesor ng pilosopiya?

**Santiago-Martinez:** Naging propesor ko noon si Benito Reyes ng isang semestre lamang. Pero dahil kakaunting noon ang mga department at malilito pa, so parang magkakakilala ang lahat sa loob ng FEU. Tapos, iyong mga anak niya ay naging kakilala ko, pati na ang misis niya. Kasi, si Mrs. Reyes also taught in FEU. Napakabait nitong si Benito Reyes. Kasi kung ano ang kailangan mo, bibigyan ka niya. Ang kanyang office ay parang open to all the students. Kung sino ang gustong magtanong, napaka-accommodating niya at generous.

**Dulay:** Kumusta naman po siya sa loob ng classroom?

**Santiago-Martinez:** Naging propesor ko siya sa isang subject. I think it was Literature. Kasi, he was into literature and philosophy. He was a deep thinker. Pero napaka… taong-tao ba. Napaka-humble. Hindi porke marunong siya ay
alienated na sa kanya ang iba. Hindi siya ganoon. Pati mga anak niya hindi ganoon. Paglabas niya sa classroom, friend mo siya. Pero inside the classroom? It will be about the class that you should talk about. Marami siyang example, marami siyang activity for you to understand the lesson. Marami din siyang naisulat na libro. Marami siyang nai-contribute sa faculty journal. He was a prolific writer.

Dulay: Nabanggit ninyo po kanina si Marcial Reyes bilang debonair ng philosophy. Maaari po ba ninyo kaming kwentuhan tungkol sa kanya bilang propesor ng pilosopiya?

Santiago-Martinez: He was a philosophy professor. Guwapo at Spanish mestizo ito, balbas sarado. Ofelia Reyes ang pangalan nga kanyang asawa. Pero nagkahiwalay sila dahil mas bata si Marcial, guwapo, at kung tama ako may pagka-flirt sa mga babae. Si Ofelia ay nag-aral sa Instituto de Mujeres. Kaklase siya ng mga kapatid ko. Hindi ko naging propesor si Marcial. Pero kilala ko siya because of Ofelia. Si Ofelia ay naging propesor ko. Then, later on, napabalita na naghiwalay sila. That was the time when Marcial left FEU.

Dulay: Nabanggit din po ninyo si Almoro kanina bilang isa sa mga pangunahing propesor ng Pilosopiya sa FEU. Maaari po ba ninyo kaming kwentuhan tungkol sa kanya?


Afundar: Kumusta naman po ang kanyang pagtuturo ng pilosopiya?

Santiago-Martinez: Very exacting, very bookish. Lahat sa kanya may mga rule. Mas naging misteryosa siya as she grew older. Sa Cubao ang bahay niyan eh. May kaya naman sila. Ang anak niya yata ay pito. Lahat ng mga iyon ay nakapagtapos nang libre sa FEU.

Afundar: Napabayaan po ba niya ang kanyang pagtuturo dahil sa dami ng kanyang anak?

Santiago-Martinez: Hindi naman. Malinaw siyang magturo. Kaya nga lang intimidated ang mga student niya kasi iyong mga standard niya napaka-

Dulay: Kahit nag-retire na po siya ay nagturo pa rin sa \textit{graduate school} noon. Naabutan pa kasi namin siya.


Dulay: Nabanggit din po ninyo si Espina kanina bilang isa sa mga pangunahing propesor ng pilosopiya sa FEU. Maaari po ba ninyo kaming kwentuhan tungkol sa kanya?

Dulay: Napag-alaman namin na mayroon palang produkto ang programa na naging batikang propesor ng Chinese philosophy sa Amerika. Si Antonio Cua po ba ay kilala ninyo?

Santiago-Martinez: Hindi ko masyadong nakasalamuha yan dahil nauna sa akin yan sa FEU at hindi naman siya nagturo doon.

Dulay: 1952 daw ito nagtapos ng Batsilyer sa Pilosopiya at Sikolohiya sa FEU. Siguro nga sa Amerika na ito nag-aral para sa mga gradwado niyang degri. Sino-sino pa po ba ang mga pinakabatikang propesor sa pilosopiya ng FEU?


Dulay: Ano po ang inyong masasabi sa paglaho ng programang Pilosopiya ng FEU?

Santiago-Martinez: May mga science program na itinatag, kaya kumaunti ang mga nag-major sa Philosophy. It became a losing proposition for the university. Because if you have very few majors. … You will have to have a full class kasi ang bayad sa mga propersor ay full lagi. So, losing proposition iyon. Hindi puwede na ganoon.

Dulay: Kung sakaling maisipan ng administrasyon ng FEU na buuin muli ang nasabing programa, ano pong mga gabay at payo ang inyong maibibigay para sa administrasyon?

Santiago-Martinez: Ang unang gawin dapat diyan, maski ano mang programa iyan, ay ang marketing. You market by way of publicizing those who were there before. Ito ang mga produkto namin. Ito ang mga nagtuturo sa amin. Gusto nating ma-regain iyong stronghold ng university. Philosophy should always be there.

Dulay: Sa programa ng Philosophy, ano po ba dapat ang kalidad ng isang guro para maging kwalipikadong magturo para sa nasabing programa?

Santiago-Martinez: Sa akin kasi, ang unang titignan mo sa guro ay attitude. Kung willing ba ang guro, kung may passion ba siya. Kasi maski gaano karunong iyan kapag hindi siya committed, wala ring mangyayari. Hindi
iyong nagtatanong lamang tungkol sa salary scale. Kahit na ang FEU ngayon ay very competitive.

Dulay: Sa tingin po ba ninyo, puwede at maganda bang isulong ang muling pagbuo ng programang Pilosopiya sa FEU?


Mga Alaala ng Isang Guro: Panayam kay Clarita Villa-Alba


Dulay: Bakit po naging pamilyar kayo sa kasaysayan ng programang Pilosopiya ng FEU?

Clarita Villa-Alba: Kasi, I belonged to the Philosophy Department from 1973 up to my retirement in 2015.

Dulay: Ano po sa palagay ninyo ang naging dahilan sa paglaha ng programang Pilosopiya ng FEU?

Villa-Alba: Sa palagay ko, ang unang dahilan ay bumaba ang mga enrollee. Puwede ninyong sabihin na bumagsak ang bilang ng mga enrollee sa
Philosophy program dahil sa panahong iyong mga course na inenrolan ng maraming estudyante na gustong makakuha ng mga lucrative job ay iyong Nursing, Medical Technology, na doon naman talaga nag-excel ang FEU, at saka iyong Mass Communications at Psychology. The graduates of Nursing and Medical Technology of FEU and also of Medicine then, usually topped the board examinations. The enrollees in Mass Communications and Psychology were increasing. So, siguro naging unpopular ang Philosophy program.

Afundar: May iba pa ba kayang dahilan bukod dito?

Villa-Alba: Jokingly, the late Dr. Lydia Almoro would say that Dr. Alfredo Co was one of the causes for the disappearance of the Philosophy program because of his strictness and rigor. Lahat naman ng nagtuturo ng philosopy ay mga Philosophy graduate. Alam namin na lang na mahirap ang mga subject at ang programa mismo. Tapos tapaharapan na pa nga mga profesor na sabihin nating talagang hindi lang istrikto kundi talagang nandoon para paiisipin ka nang todo-todo just like them. Kung paano sila mag-isip, gusto nila ganoon din mag-isip ang mga estudyante.

Afundar: Ano po ang inyong masasabi sa paglaho sa programang Pilosopiya ang FEU?


Dulay: Sa palagay ninyo po ba ay nagkaroon ng epekto ang pagkawala ng programa sa paraan ng pag-isip ng mga mag-aaral sa pamantasan?


Afundar: Iyon pong mga estudyanteng nagtatanong sa inyo tungkol sa Philosophy program, ano kaya ang mga major nila?
Villa-Alba: Political Science, usually. At saka yung mga may balak mag-arahal ng law pagkatapos ng bachelor’s degree.

Dulay: Sa tingin po ninyo bakit kaya sila nagkaroon ng interes sa Philosophy program?


Afundar: Kung sakaling maisipan ng administrasyon ng FEU na buuin muli ang nasabing programa, ano pong mga gabay at payo ang inyong maibibigay para sa administrasyon?

Villa-Alba: Naku, they should first conduct feasibility study kung gaano karami kaya ang estudyante na interesado. Kasi, kung kakaunti rin lang naman, I do not think na mabuksan nila ulit iyan, na mabubuo ulit iyan. Kung may possibility man na mabuo, first of all talaga dapat mga Philosophy graduate ang magtuturo.

Dulay: Hindi na po puwedeng maghigpit masyado ang mga propesor?


Dulay: Ano po ang puwede mai-suggest ninyo na magiging thrust ng Philosophy program na ito?

Villa-Alba: Dapat iyong may orientation sila sa lahat ng trend: Oriental, Western, Ancient, Medieval, at iba pa. Dapat alam nila ang mga ito. Siguro, later on, ang isang estudyante naman ay magkaroon siya ng partikular na

Afundar: Ano po kaya ang puwedeng gawing pang engganyo sa mga estudyante para kumuha sila ng Philosophy bilang major, kagaya ng pagkakangganyo ninyo sa pilosopiya noon?

Villa-Alba: Puwede nating sabihin na it is a very good preparation for all graduate courses. Ako, honestly, noong nag-umpisa ako sa kolehiyo, wala akong definite na course na gusto. Ang nangyari lang kasi, si Josephine Acosta—Dr. Josephine Acosta-Pasricha na ngayon—isa ito sa mga propesor ng philosophy sa UST pero pinsan siya ng nanay ko, ay nagsabi sa akin na kung wala pa akong definite na course eh mag-Philosophy na lang daw ako. So nag-enroll ako sa Philosophy. Eh nagustuhan ko naman, kaya tinapos ko na. I suppose na hindi naman ako nagsisisi na iyon ang kinuha ko, kasi nakapagtrabaho naman ako kaagad.

Dulay: Sa personal po ninyong pananaw, malaki ba ang naitulong sa inyo ng philosophy?


Mga Alaala ng Isa Pang Guro: Panayam kay Alfredo Co

Dulay: *During the 2017 National Conference of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines, you mentioned that there was a Philosophy program in FEU. That was the information that inspired us to do this project, as it motivated us to dig deeper into the reasons why it disappeared.*

Alfredo Co: Mabuti naman at nagdulot pala ang aking presentasyon ng mabuting bunga.

Dulay: *We have already interviewed Mrs. Villa-Alba and she believed that you are one of the witnesses of the closure of the Philosophy program.*

Co: *During our time with Clarita [Villa-Alba] there was no Philosophy program in FEU. There was … but not during our time.*

Dulay: *But Mrs. Villa-Alba mentioned that during your time, the chairperson of the Philosophy Department was Dr. Jonas Zita.*

Co: *Yes. But there was no program in Philosophy anymore. The Department of Philosophy was just a servicing department for general education subjects.*

Dulay: *Noong panahon po na nandoon pa kayo sa FEU, ano po ang dominant philosophical school na umiiral?*

Co: *Wala. Kanya-kanya. Since most of the young people that came with me were trained by UST, like Alba, Zita, and Almoro, you could imagine that it was still Scholastic. The Oriental philosophy was not available because there was no course offering for it during that time. That was why if I handled Ethics, I did not teach Christian ethics only, but also Eastern ethical thoughts. That was not enough to make an impact for Eastern philosophy. If I handled Logic, walang lumalabas … Hindi mo nga matatapos ang lesson mo sa Logic, papasukan mo pa iyong mas malawak na Oriental thinking? Of course, Lydia [Almoro] was also using Oriental frameworks in her Ethics class. So that was about it.*
Dulay: Ang pagtuturo po ba ninyo sa FEU ay nagkaroon ng bakas o kontribusyon sa inyong pagiging isa ngayon sa mga pinakabatikang pilosopong Pilipino?

Co: That is not answerable, because I was not there as a regular faculty member handling major Philosophy subjects. Probably, hindi nilinaw ni Clarita na we both belonged to a servicing department.

Afundar: Si Benito Reyes po ay kilalang Orientalista ng FEU. Siya ba ay nakasalamuha ninyo? May naiambag po ba siya sa pagiging Sinolohista ninyo?

Co: Hindi ko siya nakasalamuha. Mas nauna siya sa akin. I did not have the opportunity to meet him. He is much older than I. If Emerita Quito was 30 years older than I, I imagined that Reyes was probably 25 or 28 years older than I. The only way for you to know more about Reyes is to check his biography at Pamantasang ng Lungsod ng Maynila where he served as president. Kaya wala siyang naiambag sa akin. Ang pagkakakilala ko kay Reyes came very much later. Noong nag-research na ako about Filipino philosophy, saka ko lang napuna na meron palang Oriental philosophy noon sa FEU. Formed na ako noon. Ang formation ko sa Chinese philosophy ay mula sa Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Afundar: Ano pa po ang nalalaman ninyo tungkol kay Benito Reyes?

Co: In the early 1950s Benito Reyes and Ricardo Pascual went to study in the United States. Emerita Quito, in 1961, went to study in Switzerland. Benito Reyes was the first man I mentioned. I stated that FEU had an eminent Philosophy teacher, Benito Reyes. Students would listen to his lectures on Indian philosophy. The novelty of Indian philosophy attracted his students and he became the earliest Filipino to have written a book on Eastern philosophy. The book is entitled Moments without Self. That book also made him the first Filipino expert in Indian philosophy. The students enthusiastically followed his lectures in FEU. FEU, however, failed to create a competent group of faculty members who could carry that philosophical tradition in that university. The philosophical climate in FEU died when he left.

Afundar: Bakit po sa tatlong pantas ay si Reyes ang una ninyong binganggit?

Co: Maybe I was referring to him that way because, indeed, he was the center of it all. It was the time when very few people really can come with confidence to lecture about anything with a very big impression, carrying a load of knowledge from abroad.
Afundar: Paano po kaya nabuo ang interes ni Reyes para sa Eastern philosophy?

Co: Actually, he was adopted by an American couple who was into the Theosophical Society. He was brought to the United States and was introduced to theosophical learning. Evidently, theosophical learning will bring you to some sort of Eastern thoughts. Because of that he became very passionate with Eastern philosophy.

Dulay: Mukhang si Antonio Cua na batikan ring Sinolohista ay hindi po ninyo naabutan dahil mas nauna pa itong mag-aral kay Dr. Timbreza sa FEU.

Afundar: Nabalitaan po namin na isa kayo sa mga kilabot noong propesor noon sa FEU at kinatatakutan ng maraming mag-aaral sa pilosopiya. Ano po ang inyong reaksiyon sa reputasyong ito?

Co: Hindi ko alam. Many people translate that if students are afraid of me, they run away from me. But I am treating everybody the same. Whether you are from FEU, DLSU, UST and ADMU, pareho lang turing ko sa kanila. Kahit magkano pa ang pasahod ng institusyon sa akin. Hindi ka puwedeng magyayabang sa akin dahil lang may mataas kang pasahod. Mag-aaral ka sa akin. Iyan ay napakahalaga sa akin, dahil ang turing ko sa kanilang lahat ay pare-pareho. Iyan ay aking dala-dala hanggang ngayon. I think that is a big part of my pedagogical discipline. I'll tell you, many people who are afraid of me still cherish me, they still love me. They are afraid because they know they cannot just walk into my class unprepared, but at the same time they still love me. … They love me because I am strict, and they hate me of course. But they cannot accuse me of something else. Kaya ang pagtukoy nila ay “kilabot” ay figuratibo. Medyo unfair sa akin iyong Nabalitaan na isa kayo sa mga kilabot noong propesor noon sa FEU at kinatatakutan ng maraming mag-aaral sa pilosopiya. Ano po ang inyong reaksiyon sa reputasyong ito?

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Afundar: Bukod po sa inyo, sino sino pa ang mga pinakabatikang dalubguro sa pilosopiya ng FEU?

Afundar: Ano po masasabi nyo sa paglaloh ng programang Pilosopiya sa FEU?

Co: Siguro ang pagkawala ni Benito Reyes, na isa sa mga naunang iskolar na nag-aral sa ibang bansa to broaden their philosophical horizons at bumalik para magturo. … Siya rin ang kauna-unahang Filipino expert in Indian philosophy. Wala na sigurong nakakaungos sa kanya na maaring mamuno sa departemento na may M.A. o Ph.D. … Parang isang katawan ngawalan ng ulo ang programang Pilosopiya sa FEU. Parang sa kanya lang umiikot ang mundo ng Philosophy sa FEU. Ganun talaga ang problema, kaya, I always see that if you wanted a Philosophy program, you cannot create a program that is centered on you. You have to consider the faculty members who will be involved in creating the program, the faculty members who could handle the program. Malaking trabaho iyon. Like him, Pascual of the University of the Philippines was very charismatic, not only in Philosophy but also in Political Science. Kaya lang ang pagkakaiba ng dalawa, scholar si Reyes at nagsulat siya, si Pascual hindi masyado. Thus, Reyes was the first Filipino philosophy scholar who published. Kaya kapag may ganoong tao, parang wala nang susunod na iba. Parang doon na lang umiikot ang mundo ng Philosophy program sa FEU.

Afundar: Sa palagay ninyo, importante ba ang programang Pilosopiya sa isang institusyon?

Co: Dahil ako ang chair ng technical committee ng Philosophy sa Commission on Higher Education (CHED), siyempre ang aking sagot ay oo, napaka-importante nito. Alam ninyo matatanda na kami. Mabuti naman at isinusulat ninyo ang kasaysayan na kagaya nitong inyong ginagawa. May mga taong kasing kinakain sa programang Pilosopiya at pilosopiya sa isang institusyon. Maybe, ganon ako, kahit saan ako pumunta, nag-iwan ako ng bakas na maaring magdulot ng isang kabutuhan. At least, sa research ninyong ito, ikinukuwento ko na meron kayo noong Philosophy program sa FEU.

Afundar: Sa palagay po ninyo ay sapat ba ang mga ginawang research ng mga propesor sa pilosopiya noon sa FEU?

Co: Dahil wala na ngang departemento, kanya-kanya na lamang sulat at lathala. Kung sino na lamang ang gustong umangat. If you want your work to be published, you will do it on your own.
Afundar: Kung sakaling maisipan ng administrasyon ng FEU na buuin muli ang nasabing programa anong gabay at payo ang iyong maibigay para sa administrasyon?

Co: Kailangan ninyo mag-submit ng proposal, and there are two ways. First, look at the program and standards that we have created in CHED and then you should be able to craft the program in such a way that it pushes the mission-vision of the department or university. Ano ba ang gusto ninyong gawin sa departamento o pamantasan? Bakit kailangan pang magkaroon ng isang Philosophy program? Papatunayan ninyo ito. Pagkatapos, dapat maipakita ninyo na mayroon kayong vision ... at diyan makikita kung ano talaga ang binabalak ninyo. Malakas ba ang programa sa, for example, Continental philosophy o sa Analytic philosophy, o sa Oriental philosophy, o sa Comparative philosophy. Dapat lalabas ito.

Afundar: Ano pa po ang dapat naming gawin bilang mga guro ng Pilosopiya sa FEU?

Co: Kailangan ninyo ng certain profile ng faculty members. Kasi ang department chair ay kailangang may qualification. Check the qualification of faculty members based on the standards of CHED. Check the program of Philosophy. Kailangan na tuparin ninyo ito for basic formation. Pero kailangan din ninyo na magdagdag ng bagay na inisip ninyong huhubog sa isang uri ng Pilosopiya na gusto ninyong i-develop para kilalaning tatak FEU. Halimbawa, UST, tatak Iskolastsismo; ADMU, tatak penomenolohiya; at DLSU, eklektisismo ayon sa mungkahi ni Quito. … You are not independent to just open a Philosophy program. The program should conform with the standards designed by CHED. Kailangan ang department chair at tatló hanggang apat pang faculty member ay may Ph.D., habang ang iba ay may M.A. Then, you convince the CHED panel na mayroon kayong magtuturo sa programa. Patunayan ninyo na qualified sila. Masalimuot isipin, pero if you can make it, it will be an achievement.

Paglalagom

ang pagiging praktikal ng pagkuha ng mga nasabing kurso kaysa sa Pilosopiya na ika nga ay “walang maidedeposito sa bangko.” Maaaring ang pag-uso ng panggingibang bansa sa mga nakaraang dekada ay nagtulak sa mga mag-aaral na kumuhang mga estudyanteng madaling makakuha ng gawain sa labas ng bansa. Dahil dito, mahirap nga namang panantilihin ang programang Pilosopiya kung hindi sapat ang mga estudyanteng nagbabayad ng tuition fees kung hindi na makabuo ang departamento noon ng isang klase, habang kailangang suwelduhan ng buo ang mga nagtuturo nito, tulad ng nailahad ni Santiago-Martinez.

Subalit nabanggit din ni Timbreza ang pagkawala ng mga gurong nagtuturo ng Pilosopiya sa FEU dahil sa paglipat nila sa ibang institusyon, pag-alis ng bansa, o pagreretiro. Nabanggit ng mga nakapanayam ang mga pangalan ng mga batikang kaguruan ng Pilosopiya sa FEU noon, tulad nina Benito Reyes, Marcial Reyes, Lydia Almoro, Jose Espina, at Antonio Cua. Malinaw na naipaliwanag din ni Co na ang departamento ng Pilosopiya ay tila “katawan ng nawalan ng ulo” nang nawala ang nagsimula nito, na si Dr. Benito Reyes. Tiniyak ni Co na ang buong programa ng Pilosopiya ay nakaitkom lamang sa katuhan ni Reyes at wala nang nakawasan pa na maaaring mamuno ng departamento. Dahil hindi naibahagi ang kakayahang magpatuloy ng programa sa ibang tao, natural lamang na maglaho ito kasama ng pagkawala ng pasimuno nito.


Si Timbreza naman, sa sadyang nagmamahal ng disiplinang Pilosopiya, lalo na ng pilosopiyang Pilipino, ay naghahayag na ang pilosopiya ay mahalaga sa lahat ng tao dahil ito ang “pundasyon ng paghahanap ng kabuluhan sa buhay.” Ipinalibot ng mga talikuran ang kahalagahan nito at hindi lamang para sa mga Philosophy majors, kung hindi sa lahat ng mag-aaral. Si Co naman ay siyang namumuno sa technical committee ng Pilosopiya sa CHED ay natural na nagdiin sa kahalagahan ng pilosopiya. Dagdag niya rin, sa dahilang tumatanda na ang mga batikang guro sa Pilosopiya ay kailangang maipagpatuloy ng iba ang pagtuturo at pananaliksik at
paglathala sa nasabing disiplina. Ito ay upang makapag-iwan ng bakas sa lahat na tatahak ng landas ng pilosopiya.

Kasama naman sa mga payo at mungkahi ng mga nakapanayam, nang tanunig sila kung paano sisimulan uli ang programa ng Pilosopiya, sakaling mapag-isipan ito ng FEU, ay ang magaling na 
marketing ng programa, at ang pagsasagawa muna ng isang feasibility study upang malaman talaga kung may interes nga sa programa at kung ito ay magiging sustenable. Para kay Santiago-Martinez, kailangang maisapubliko ang kadakilaan ng mga naging guro dito noon, pati na rin ang mga naging dakilang produkto ng programa upang maibalik sa FEU ang lakas ng pilosopiya. Kaya para sa kanya, ang kaguruang magtuturo nito ay dapat may katapatan sa gawain at may malasakit sa disiplina as sa mga mag-aaral nito. 

Idinagdag naman ni Timbreza na kailangang itaguyod ito bilang paraan ng pagbabago, pagbibigay ng kabuluhan sa buhay, at pampamahagi ng katotohanan. Sina Villa-Alba at Co naman ay nagbigay-diin sa pangangailangang desisyonan ng FEU kung ano ang orientasyon ng programa ng Pilosopiya, kung ito ay maabalik nga. Ito ba ay magiging Kontinental, Analitik, Oriental, Komparatibo, atbp. sa orientasyon? Ang payo pa ni Co ay tingnan muna ang pamantayan sa CHED, magkaroon ng mission-vision, itipon ang mga kinakailangan para maipagtagong ng FEU kung bakit magtatayo ito muli ng programang Pilosopiya. Aniya, kailangang mapatunayan muna na may ganitong pangangailangan sa FEU. Masasabi rin, base sa nasabing obserbasyon ni Co ukol sa pagkawala ni Benito Reyes, na kailangang isang komunidad ang magsisikap sa sanib na proyekto upang hindi maging depende sa iisang taong programa. Kailangang may nakapili tao na susunod sa pamunuan.

Ang apat na nakapanayam ng mga mananaliksik para sa pag-aaral ito ay nakapagbigay ng maraming interesanteng impormasyon hindi lamang sa itinigil na programang Pilosopiya sa FEU. Nabalikan din nila sa kanilang mga alaala ang kultura sa nasabing pamantasan ng mga nakalipas na panahon. Nakagagalak marinig sa kampus ang mga guro sa Departamento ng Pilosopiya at mataas din ang mga estudyante ng disiplina. Kaya nakalulungkot malaman na ang pinakamalaking dahilan ng paglaho ng programa ay ang pagliligtas ng enrollment dito. Mabuti na lamang at nagpatulong ang pagtuturo ng pilosopiya sa FEU bilang ilang serviced general education courses, at nananasa pa ng mga mag-aaral ang pagtuturo ng ilang propesor ng pilosopiya tulad ni Dr. Alfredo Co. 

Mahalaga din ang mga naging deskripsyong mga nakapanayam tungkol sa katauhan ng mga namunong kaguruan sa programang Pilosopiya sa FEU. Matinding silang nailarawan—lalo na sa salaysay ni Dr. Zenaida Santiago-Martinez—bilang mahuhusay na guro at mababait na tao, na may
kaniya-kaniyang kakaibang ugali—ang ilan ay istrikto, ang ilan ay hindi, ngunit lahat ay seryoso sa klase at magaling sa pagtuturo. May mga naging pamilya sila na nakilala rin ng mga mag-aaral. Sa madaling salita, naipakita nila ang pagiging regular na tao sa lahat ng nakapagmasid kahit na itinuturing ang pilosopiya na kakaibang disiplina at ito ay siya namang nagaragdag sa paghanga sa kanila bilang mga alagad ng pilosopiya.

Kongklusyon

Sa mga panayam na ginawa, dalawa ang pumaibabaw na dahilan ng paglaho ng Departamento ng Pilosopiya sa FEU. Ang una ay ang pag-iba ng direksyon ng pamantasan, na tila sumunod sa mga nausong kurso tulad ng Nursing, Medicine, at Medical Technology. Mahirap mang tanggapin, malaki ang epekto ng mga salik na pang-pinansyal sa pagsustena ng mga kurso. Kung walang masyadong kumukuha sa Pilosopiya dahil nga sa tila wala itong praktikal na gamit, wala rin itong kita para sa pamantasan. Mahirap makipagsapalaran ang isang institusyon na panatilihin ang kurso na hindi nakaka-ambag sa usaping pampondo. Ang masyadong maliliit na enrolment sa Pilosopiya ay hindi kinayaang panatilihin ang sariling departamento.

Ang pangalawa at kasing-halagang dahilan ay ang paglisan ng mga taong namuno o nagturo sa lumang departamento. Hindi madaling iwasan na iugnay ang tao sa institusyon, lalo na kung napakahusay niya at hindi siya makapagtakda ng kanyang mga kasunod. Nang mag-alisan ang mga gurong nagtaguyod ng Departamento ng Pilosopiya—lumisan man ng bansa o tumigil sa pagtuturo, naging matamlay na rin ang departamento. Kung walang maipagmayabang itong guro, wala rin itong magagamit na “marketing material.”

Ngunit ang pagkawala ng Departamento ng Pilosopiya sa FEU ay maaaring malaking kawalan sa punudsyon ng edukasyon. Ang pilosopiya ay ang naturang puso ng humanidades. Kung wala itong sariling departamento at kung wala itong mga majors, malaki ang magiging puwang sa tinatawag na pangkalahatan o pangkabuoang (general o holistic) edukasyon. Ang pilosopiya ay itinuturing ding isa sa mga pinaka-buong paraan ng pag-iisip at pag-aaral, kung kaya ito ay isang mahusay na paghahanda para sa karagdagang pag-aaral tulad ng Bachelor of Laws. Kaya naman magiging mainam kung maibalik nga sa FEU ang programang Pilosopiya.

Ang pag-aaral na ito ay may kontribusyon rin sa larangan ng pilosopiya sa labas ng FEU. Nakadaragdag ito sa arkibo tungkol sa estado ng pilosopiya sa Pilipinas. Naging talaan din ito ng mga taong nagturo ng at nagsaliksik tungkol sa pilosopiya. Ang mga impormasyong naibahagi dito ay makatutulong bumuo ng larawan ng kultura ng mga pantas pilosopo sa
bansa. Ang mga ito ay makapagbibigay gabay sa mga nakababatang iskolar sa pilosopiya, anuman ang kanilang maging mithiin bilang mag-aalal, guro, o administrador sa akademiya o sa iba pang institusyon. Magagamit din itong datos para sa iba pang pananaliksik tungkol sa (h)istorya ng pilosopiya sa Pilipinas.

Mabuti sanang isipin na gugustuhin ng mga administrador, guro, at mag-aalal ng FEU na buhaying muli ang kanilang programang Pilosopiya. Gaya ng sinabi ng mga kapanayam, kung sakaling maisipan ng FEU na tahakin itong landas na ito, maraming kailangang gawin at ihanda. Mainam din na nariyan ang mga pamantayan sa CHED at pati na rin ang paggabay ng chairperson ng technical committee para sa Pilosopiya na si Co. Kung ito ay matutuloy, maganda ring mapag-aralan ang magiging proseso nito upang maihalintulad sa mga karanasan ng ibang mga pamantasan na nagtayo rin ng programang Pilosopiya.

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Discourse in Filipino Philosophy

Si Demeterio at ang Pilosopiyang Pilipino: Pakikipanayam Tungkol sa Kanyang Ika-25 na Taong Pamimilosopiya

Mary Irene Clare O. Deleña  
Joshua Mariz B. Felicilda  
Leslie Anne L. Liwanag

Abstract: F.P.A. Demeterio III is one of the leading contributors in the field of Filipino philosophy. He is the author of four books and over 60 articles published in local and international journals. His vast contributions in the said area form a certain pattern of discourse in Filipino philosophy. His first philosophical article was published in 1991, therefore he reached his 25th year of philosophizing last 2016. The authors of this paper returned to his writings and publications in order to design this interview according to Demeterio’s classification of Filipino philosophy in 2013. Hence, the research team were able to identify his four major discourses in Filipino philosophy: 1) critical Filipino philosophy, 2) Filipino philosophy as the appropriation of foreign theories, 3) philosophizing using the Filipino language, and 4) exposition of foreign theories. In order to determine the pattern, extent, and depth of his Filipino philosophy in the past 25 years, the authors conducted the interview according to his four salient discourses in Filipino philosophy. This project aims to introduce Demeterio as a significant Filipino philosopher to scholars, students, and those who are interested in the area of Filipino philosophy.

Keywords: Demeterio, critical Filipino philosophy, Filipino philosophy and foreign theories, Filipino philosophy and Filipino language

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Introduksyon

Sa kasalukuyan, isa sa mga marubdok na tagapagtaguyod ng pilosopiyang Pilipino si F.P.A. Demeterio III ng De La Salle University. Siya ay may apat na libro at mahigit 60 na artikulong nailathala sa iba’t ibang lokal at internasyonal na journal. Naglalatag ang mga ito ng partikular na hugis ng pilosopiyang Pilipino. Taong 1991 noong unang naglathala ng pilosopiikal na artikulo si Demeterio. Samakatuwid, humantong na ang kanyang ika-25 taong pamimilosopiya noong nakaraang taon.


¹ Tingnan ang Romualdo Abulad, “Pilosopiyang Pilipino, Uso Pa Ba?” (Plenary Paper presented at the 10th Philosophical Conference, Sancta Maria Mater et Regina Seminarium, Capiz, Philippines, 2010).


kahalagahan ng wikang pambansa sa larangan ng pagtuturo at pananaliksik sa larangan ng pilosopiya at Araling Filipino sa pamamagitan ng pakikipanayam sa nasabing pantas. Sa disertasyon ni Emmanuel De Leon na “Ang Intelektuwal na Pamana ng mga Pangunahing Tomasinson Pilosoper sa Kasaysayan ng Pamimilosopiyang Filipino: Quito, Mercado, Hornedo, Timbreza, Abulad, at Co”\(^{20}\) nito lamang 2017, napakinabangan ang taksonomiya ng pilosopiya Pilipino ni Demeterio sa pag-aaral ng mga pangunahing discurso at kontribusyon ng anim na nangungunang Tomasinson pantas. At sa tesis ni Joshua Felicilda na “Ang mga Politikal na Ideolohiyang Pumapaloob sa mga Nobela ni F. Sionil Jose”\(^{21}\) nito ring 2017, ginamit ang modipikadong ideyolohikal na spektrum ni Demeterio na halaw mula kay Hans Slomp at unang ginamit sa aklat niyang *Ang mga Ideolohiyang Politikal ng Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines*.\(^{22}\)

Layunin ng proyektong itong magagap ang hugis, lawak, at lalim ng pilosopiya Pilipinong itinataguyod ni Demeterio at maipakilala siyang mahalagang pilosopong Pilipino sa mga dalubhasa, mag-aaral, at sinomang may interes sa pilosopiya Pilipino. Maaaring sabihing handong ang proyektong ito ng kanyang mga naging mag-aaral na tinuruan niyang mamilosopiya mula sa pagsusulat, pananaliksik, at kalaunang paglalathala. Pero bago dumako ang papel sa usapin ng pilosopiya at kaisipan ni Demeterio, mahalagang mabilisang tingnan muna ang kanyang intelektwal na talambuhay para lalong maunawaan ang pilosopiya at kaisipan ng naturang pantas.

**Intelektwal na Talambuhay**


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kakayahan pala siyang paghusayan ang mga akademikong gawain at may talento sa larangan ng sining. Hindi natapos ang unang napiling programa dahil nagpasay siya noong 1988 na pasukin ang mundo ng pilosopiya at teolohiya sa University of Santo Tomas.


Sa Departamento ng Filipino ng De La Salle University, natutunan ng Ingleserong Bisayang si Demeterio na magsulat gamit ang wikang Filipino. Doon nabigyang-lunas ang kabalintunaan ng kanyang pagiging Ingleserong dalubhaha sa pilosopiyang Pilipino. Nagbigay-daan ang

**Metodolohiya**

Para makamit ang layunin ng proyektong gagapin ang hugis, lawak, at lalim ng pilosopiyang Pilipinong itinataguyod ni Demeterio, may dalawa ngunit magkakaugnay na substantibong seksyon ang papel. Tinukoy ng unang substantibong seksyon ang apat na diskurso ng pilosopiyang Pilipinong higit na pinagtutuunan ni Demeterio. Naglalaman ng ikalawang substantibong seksyon ng transkrip ng pakikipanayam ng mga mananaliksik kay Demeterio tungkol sa apat na diskurso ng pilosopiyang Pilipinong higit niyang pinagtutuunan ng pansin.

alin ang naging ambag ni Demeterio sa kolaborasyong ito. Ipinapakita naman sa Table 1 ang mga artikulong nailathala niya mula 1991 hanggang 2017.

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Table 1: Listahan ng mga Artikulong Nailathala ni Demeterio mula 1991 hanggang 2017
Isinama ng mga mananaliksik ang lahat ng artikulong nakalista sa Table 1 kung saan kasama ang kanyang mga mag-aaral. Kabisado nila na sa mga kolobarasyong ito kadalasang mas aktibo at substansyal ang ambag ni Demeterio—mula sa konseptuwalisasyon hanggang sa pinal na mga rebisyon ng mga nasabing artikulo. Ipinaakit sa nasabing talahanayan kung paano naging mas kolaboratibo na ang pagsusulat at paglalathala ng pantas simula noong taong 2014. Ito ang naging epekto ng kanyang pagyakap sa ideya ng pilosopiyang edukasyon ni Humboldt.


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26 Ibid., 191.

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Mula sa 16 na diskursong kinalap ni Demeterio, isinantabi ni Liwanag ang pilosopiyang grassroot/folk sa dahilang hindi kabilang sa grassroot ang dalawang babaeng pantas na kanyang sinuri; pati na ang Iskolastisismo/Tomismo (panayam), at ibang banyagang sistema (panayam), sa dahilang mga tekstwal na dokumento ang kanyang sinuri; at pati na ang hindi akademikong kritikal na pilosopiya, sa dahilang mga akademiko ang parehong dalawang babaeng pantas na kanyang sinuri. Kaya, 12 na diskurso ng pilosopiyang Filipino na lamang ang natira para sa sistemang kinumpuni ni Liwanag: 1) lohikal na analisis; 2) penomenolohiya, eksistensyalismo, o hermenyutika; 3) pilosopiyang kritikal; 4) pag-angkop sa mga banyagang teorya; 5) pag-angkop sa pilosopiyang grassroot o folk; 6) pamimilosopiya.

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gamit ang wikang Filipino; 7) pagtalakay sa mga banyagang sistema; 8) rebisyonistang pagsusulat; 9) interpretasyon ng Pilipinong pananaw sa mundo; 10) pagasaliksik sa Pilipinong etika at sistema ng pagpapahalaga; 11) pagsuri sa mga presuposyon at implikasyon ng Pilipinong pananaw sa mundo; at 12) pag-aaral sa mga Pilipinong intelektwal. Ang 12 na diskurso ng pilosopiyang Pilipino ang ginamit ni Liwanag para uri-uriin ang mga obra nina Mananzan at Quito para matukoy ang hugis ng kani-kanilang mga pilosopiya at kaisipan.

Subalit para mabuo naman ang isang mas akmang sistema para sa pag-uri-uri ng tatlong libro at mahigit 60 na artikulo ni Demeterio, minabuti ng papel na dagdagan ng dalawa pang diskurso ang 12 na diskursong pinili ni Liwanag: 1) pagmumuni sa katayuan ng pilosopiyang Pilipino, dahil sadyang marami ang nagawang obra ni Demeterio tungkol sa paksang ito; at 2) ibang hindi pilosopikal na obra, dahil bilang dalubhasa rin sa araling Pilipino, may ilang artikulo si Demeterio na hindi talaga maaaring ituring na pilosopikal.

Matapos uri-uriin ang mga obra ni Demeterio sa nasabing 14 na diskuaro, ang apat na diskursong may pinakamaraming lamang obra ang ituturing na apat na diskursong higit niyang pinagtutuunan-pansin. Ang naturang apat na diskuaro ang maghahayag sa hugis ng pilosopiyang Pilipinong itinataguyod ni Demeterio.

Ang Apat na Diskurso ng Pilosopiyang Pilipinong Higit na Pinagtutuunan ni Demeterio

Ipinakita sa table 2 kung paano inuri-uri sa hindi ekslusibong paraan ng mga mananaliksik ang tatlong libro at mahigit 60 na artikulo ni Demeterio sa 14 na diskursong binanggit na sa metodolohiya ng proyektong ito.

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Table 2: Pag-uri-uri sa mga Artikulo ni Demeterio Gamit ang 12 na Diskurso ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino at Dalawa Pang Karagdagang Diskurso

Biswal na namang ipinakita nga figure 2 ang mahahalagang impormasyong nilalaman ng table 2.

Figure 2: Radar Chart ng Pag-uri-uri sa mga Artikulo ni Demeterio Gamit ang 12 na Diskurso ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino at Dalawa pang Karagdagang Diskurso

Ayon sa table 2 at figure 2, ang mga sumusunod ang apat na diskurso ng pilosopiyang Pilipinong higit na pinagtutuunan-pansin ni Demeterio: 1) pilosopiyang kritikal (44.3%), 2) pag-angkop sa mga banyagang teorya (32.4%), 3) pamimilosopiya gamit ang wikang Pilipino (30.0%), at 4) pagtalakay sa mga banyagang sistema (18.6%). Tinukoy sa “Status of and Directions for ‘Filipino Philosophy’ in Zialcita, Timbreza, Quito, Abulad, Mabaquiao, Gripaldo, and Co” ang kahulugan ng mga nasabing diskurso.
matapos makabuo ng komprehensibong iskema alinsunod sa mga anyo ng pilosopiyang Pilipinong binanggit ng pitong iskolar.


Ang ikalawang diskursong pinagtutuunan ni Demeterio ay pag-aangkop sa mga banyagang teorya. Makatuturan ang diskurso ito dahil nagbubunsod ng intelektwal na dayalogo sa pagitan ng mga pilosopikal na teoryang dayuhan at lokal na kalagayan. Gayunman, ilang Pilipinong iskolar ang nangahas sa ganitong uri ng pilosopikal na discurso. Sina Timbreza, Quito, Abulad, at Gripaldo ang mga pinagbatayang pantas ng diskursong ito.

Ang ikatlong diskursong pinagtutuunan ni Demeterio ay ang pamimilosopiya gamit ang wikang Pilipino. Makatuturan at kapaki-pakinabang ang diskursong ito sapagkat naaayon sa konteksto ng karanasang Pilipino. Sa kabilaan banda, natatali ang ibang iskolar sa politikal na isyu ng paggamit ng pambansang wika at limitado ang paglalathala ng ganitong pamimilosopiya sa ilang tanyag na mga abstracted journal. Sina Timbreza at Mabaquiao ang mga pinagbatayang pantas ng diskursong ito.

Ang ikaapat na diskursong pinagtutuunan ni Demeterio ay ang pagtalakay sa mga banyagang sistema. Mainam itong panimula sa pag-angkop ng mga dayuhang teorya at magandang oportunidad upang suugin ang kontekstwal na pagtalakay ng mga sistemang dayuhan. Bagama’t higit na maraming mga Pilipinong iskolar ang may akses sa mga Ingles na teksto, kakaunti lamang ang may kakayahang makahango ng mga arkibo ng mga partikular na pilosopo. Sina Quito, Abulad, Co, at Gripaldo ang mga pinagbatayang pantas ng diskursong ito.

Batay sa pagsusuri ng proyektong ito, isang pilosopiyang kritikal ang hugis ng pilosopiyang Pilipinong itinataguyod ni Demeterio. Bukas ito sa pag-angkop at pagtalakay ng mga kapaki-pakinabang na banyagang teorya at gumagamit ng wikang Filipino upang maipaabot ang kanyang pamimilosopiya sa mas nakararaming Pilipino.

**Transkrip ng Pakikipanayam**

Matapos matukoy sa naunang seksyon na nakatuon sa pilosopiyang kritikal, pag-angkop sa mga banyagang teorya, pamimilosopiya gamit ang wikang Pilipino, at pagtalakay sa mga banyagang teorya ang mga obra ni
Demeterio, isinagawa ng mga mananaliksik ang pakikipanayam noong ika-13 at 14 ng Oktubre 2017 sa kanyang tanggapan sa De La Salle University. Sa bahaging ito, matutungayan ang transkrip ng mga pakikipanayam na nakabalangkas ayon sa apat na diskurso ng pilosopiyang Pilipinong higit niyang pinagtutuunang-pansin.

**Tungkol sa Pilosopiyang Kritikal**

Leslie Liwanag (Kumakapanayam): Ano po ang masasabi ninyo na kasalukuyang kinikilala kayo ng ilang manunulat bilang pilosopong nagtataguyod ng kritikal na pilosopiyang Pilipino?


Joshua Felicilda (Kumakapanayam): Paano po kayo napunta sa larangan ng kritikal na pamimilosopiya?


Mary Deleña (Kumakapanayam): Bakit po tila walang bahid ng Tomismo at Iskolasismo ang inyong pamimilosopiya gayong produkto kayo ng pilosopiya at teolohiya ng Pamantasang Santo Tomas?
Demeterio: Ang Tomismo at Iskolastisismong naranasan ko sa Pamantasang Santo Tomas ay parang katesismo, walang puwang para sa malaya at malikhain pag-iisip. Mabuti na lamang may ilang Dominikanong at paring propesor ako noong hindi masyadong nagpaalipin sa hegemonya ni Tomas Aquino. Ang mentor ko, halimbawa, tinuruan ako noon paano mag-isip nang malaya, malikhain, at walang takot. Sa halip na kabisaduhin ko si Aristoteles bilang pundasyon ng Tomismo at Iskolastisismo, si Platon ang pinabasa niya sa akin. Inilihis ang aking pag-iisip mula sa pag-iisip ng karamihan nandoon sa aming pamantasang. Isa pa, kung hindi nagsusulat ang karamihan ng mga Pilipinong Tomista, tinuruan ako ng aking mentor na dapat isinusulat at inilalathala ang malaya, malikhain, at walang takot na pag-iisip. Sa pagkaintindi ko, hindi isang institusyonal na patakaran ang katangang “publish or perish,” kundi isang modo ng pamumuhay ng isang pilosopo.

Liwanag: Is there a specific text ni Platon na pinakanaka-strike sa inyo to think outside the box?


Liwanag: Ano pong mga tiyak na aspekto ng kulturang Pilipino ang inyong tinutukan sa inyong mga kritikal na pagsusuri?


Felicilda: Paano po nagiging “Pilipino” ang kritikal na pamamilosopiya gayong hango pa rin ang mga teoretikal na balangkas nito sa kanluran?

Demeterio: Kahit kanluranin ang mga teoryang ginagamit natin, mapiipilitan tayong iangkop at gamitin sila sa konteksto natin. Magiging dialektikal ang ugnayan ng teorya, ng pilosopong Pilipino, ng pilosopikal na problema, at ng konteksto natin. Mula sa dialektikal na prosesong ito, umaasa ako ang Pilipinong diskurso ang malilikha.
Liwanag: Ano po ang inyong masasabi sa ibang pilosopong Pilipinong walang pakialam masyado sa kritikal na pamimilosopiya?


Liwanag: Aling larangan o mga larangan po ng pilosopiyang Pilipino ang sa palagay ninyong mahalagang tutukan ng ibang pilosopong Pilipino?


Deleña: Kadalasang pinupuna ang mga kritikal na pilosopong nakatuon lamang sa paglalathala. Sa paanong paraan po ninyong naipapamalas ang praksis ng kritikal na pamimilosopiya?

mahahalagang martsa at rally. Hindi nga lang ako organizer o speaker doon ngunit mahalaga pa rin ang aking pisikal na paglahok bilang karagdagang warm body.

Liwanag: Produkto rin po kayo ng Unibersidad ng Pilipinas, bakit hindi kayo sumanib sa mga organisasyon doon na mas nakatuon sa praksiyolohiya?


Tungkol sa Pag-angkop ng mga Banyagang Teorya

Liwanag: Paano po ninyo naipamamalas ang pagka-Pilipino ng isang artikulong nakasandig sa dayuhang teorya?

Demeterio: Sa palagay ko, hindi nakatali sa isang nasyonalidad ang teorya. Halimbawa na lamang si Tomas Aquino, gumamit ng mga Griyego, Muslim, at Hudyong teorya kahit na isa siyang sarado-Katolikong pilosopo. Gamitin ang anumang katiwa-tiwalang teorya kung sa palagay nating may silbi ito sa paglutas na pilosopikal na problemang bumabagabag sa atin.

Liwanag: Mayroon po ba tayong dapat ingatan kapag gagamit tayo ng mga dayuhang teorya sa ating sariling pamimilosopiya?


Liwanag: Ano po ang kadalasang estratehiya ninyo sa pag-angkop ng mga dayuhang teorya?
Demeterio: Karaniwang estratehiya ko ngayon ang paggamit ng wikang Filipino habang tinatalakay ang anumang dayuhang teorya. Kapag gamit mo na ang wikang Filipino, mas nagiging malay ka sarili nating konteksto. Isa palang proseso ng paghatak sa sarili nating konteksto ang akala nating simpleng pagsasalin lamang.

Liwanag: Sa proseso ng pag-aangkop, binabago po ba ang teorya mula sa pagiging dayuhan patungo sa pagiging Pilipino?


Liwanag: Ano ang nakikita niyong magandang nagawa ng mga naisulat niyong artikulong may pag-angkop sa mga banyagang teorya?

Demeterio: Magagamit ang mga ito bilang mga modelo para sa aking mga mag-aaral na may balak gumawa ng mga kahalintulad na proyekto. Mapapadali ang kanilang isinusulat na term paper, tesis, o disertasyon dahil sa mga ito.

Liwanag: Ano ang nakikita niyong problematikong bahagi ng mga naisulat niyong artikulong may pag-angkop sa mga banyagang teorya?

Demeterio: Wala akong naranasang problema, liban lamang na marami sa mga banyagang teoryang ito ang hindi talaga madaling intindihin. May ilang daluhbasa rin sa Araling Filipino ang nagasabing hindi tayo dapat sumandal sa mga banyagang teoryang ito. Pero sa pamamagitan ng mga peer-reviewed na publikasyon ko, napatanayan kong posible at nakatutulong ang kritikal na pagsusuri ng mga ito.

Liwanag: Paano po ninyo pinipili ang mga banyagang teoryang inaangkop sa inyong pamimilosopiya?

Demeterio: Habang tuloy-tuloy ako ang nagbabasa, nagsusulat, at nakikipagsapalaran kaharap ang mga problemang pilosopikal at ilang banyagang teorya, lumalawak ako ang kaalaman tungkol sa mga teorya at tumatalas ang pagtatantiya ko kung aling teorya ang pinakatugma sa isang partikular na problemang pilosopikal. Parang pagpipinta o pagluluto ang
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pamimilosopiya. Maraming pagkakataong gagamitin mo ang iyong pakiramdam kung tama ba ang iyong pagtimpla at timing. Mahirap i-articulate ito pero habang tumatagal ang isang pintor at isang kusinero sa kanilang pagpipinta at pagluluto, lumalakaw ang kanilang kaalaman tungkol sa mga materyales at sangkap. Kalaunang makakabisado na nila kung kailan at paano ang mga ito gagamitin.

Tungkol sa Pamimilosopiyang Gamit ang Wikang Filipino

Felicilda: Bakit po ninyo ginamit ang wikang Filipino sa pamimilosopiya?


Felicilda: Wala po bang kabalintunaan ang pagiging isang Sebwano ninyo sa paggamit ng wikang Filipino?

praktikalidad kaysa antas ng pagsasabansa ang pagpapalaganap sa wikang Filipino.”

**Felicilda:** May nabasa po ako sa isang artikulo ninyo tungkol kay Quito. Nabanggit ninyong problematiko pa ang isyu ng paggamit ng wikang Filipino dahil ‘di pa ito nakabatay sa diwa ng mga Pilipinong hindi Tagalog ang kanilang unang wika.

**Demeterio:** Unang-una, isinulat ko ang sanaysay na iyan noong taong 2000 pa. Ang konteksto ng pagkakasabi ko niyan noon ay reaksyon sa isinulat ni Quito na hindi umusbong ang pilosopiyang Pilipino dahil hindi natin ginagamit ang wikang Filipino. Para sa akin, masyadong eksaherado ang punto ni Quito dahil may mga pilosopo tayong kilala sa pamimilosopiyang gamit ang ibang wika tulad ni Tomas Aquino.

**Felicilda:** Nagbago na po ba ang inyong pananaw tungkol dito?


**Liwanag:** Gayong may ibang dalubhasang Pilipinong mas pinipiling magsulat sa wikang Ingles, maituturing po bang pilosopiyang Pilipino ang kanilang mga ginagawa?

**Demeterio:** Para sa akin, hindi dapat gawing batayan ang paggamit ng partikular na wika para masabi nating pilosopiyang Pilipino o hindi ang partikular na pamimilosopiya. Kahalintulad ito sa panitikang Pilipino; wala siguro sa atin ang may karapatan ang magsabing hindi dapat ituring na panitikang Pilipino ang mga nobela nina Jose Rizal, Nick Joaquin at F. Sionil Jose dahil lamang nakasulat ang mga ito sa wikang Espanyol at Ingles. Ang gusto ko lamang sabihin, mas madaling isulat at basahin ang pamimilosopiyang gumagamit ng wikang Filipino. Kapag nakasulat sa
wikang Filipino ang pamimilosopiya ng isang pansa, mas dadami ang mga kapwa nating Pilipinong may kakayahang basahin ang mga ito.

**Felicilda:** Ano po ang mga disbentahe ng pamimilosopiyang gumagamit ng wikang Filipino?

**Demeterio:** Nakikita kong disbentahe ang katotohanang limitado lamang ang bilang ng mga de kalidad na journal na tumatanggap ng mga sanaysay na nakasulat sa wikang Filipino. Kapag dumami ang bilang ng mga piliponong Pilipinong gumamagit ng wikang Filipino, natitiyak kong mapipilitang tanggapan ng ating mga journal ang mga sanaysay nila.

**Felicilda:** Ano-ano po ang mga bentahe ng pamimilosopiyang gumagamit ng wikang Filipino?

**Demeterio:** Mas madali itong isulat. Mas madali itong basahin. Mas maraming kapwa nating Pilipino ang may pagkakataong mabasa ang naisulat natin.

**Felicilda:** Ano po ang inyong mungkahi sa mga pilosopong nag-aalangang magsulat at mamilosopiya sa wikang Filipino?

**Demeterio:** Hangad ko lamang na masubukan nila minsang mag-lecture gamit ang wikang Filipino at damhin nila kung may pagkakaiba ba ang magiging interaksyon ng kanilang mga mag-aaral. Hangad ko lamang na masubukan nila minsang magsulat at mag-publish sa wikang Filipino at damhin nila kung gaano kadulas ang magiging takbo ng kanilang pagsusulat. Mahirap lang itong umpisahan, ngunit nakakatiyak akong magugustuhan nila ang pamimilosopiya gamit ang nasabing wika kapag nasimulan na.

### Tungkol sa Pagtalakay ng mga Banyagang Teorya

**Deleña:** Hindi po ba mababang antas lamang ng pag-iisip ang pamimilosopiya sa larangan ng eksposisyon ng kung ano-anong mga kanluranang teorya?

**Demeterio:** Sinasabi ng karamihang mababang antas ang expository writing at expository philosophizing. Pero sa palagay ko, may halaga ang oras at pagod na inilaan ko sa ganitong uri ng pamimilosopiya. Hinahanda ko ang mga pilosopiyang tinatalakay ko para maangkop ko, ng aking mga mag-aaral, o maging ng aking mga mamabasa. Kaya nakasulat na sa wikang Filipino ang
karamihan sa aking mga bagong ekspositoryong sanaysay. Sa katunayan, may serye ako ng mga ekspositoryong sanaysay kung saan sinasabi ko ang mga posibleng pag-aangkop sa kanila. Kung si Quito, nagsusulat ng mga ekspositoryong sanaysay para labanan ang hegemonya ng Tomismo at Iskolasitismo, nagsusulat naman ako ng mga ekspositoryong sanaysay para may magamit tayong mga teorya sa ating pakikipagsapalaran sa mga problema pilosopikal na bumabagabag sa atin.

Deleña: Ano po ang masasabi ninyo tungkol sa ilang mga pilosopong mas pinili ang mga teorya o balangkas na binubuo para sa panlokal na konteksto?


Deleña: Ano po ang dahilan ng pagtuon ninyo sa postmodernong teorya?

Demeterio: Nababad ako sa mga postmodernistang teorya habang nag-aaral ako ng doktorado sa Universidad ng Pilipinas. Karamihan sa mga napagaralan ko ang may kinalaman sa mga tagapagtaguyod rin ng kritikal na pamimilosopiya. Mga postmodernong pilosopong sina Michel Foucault, Jean-François (Lyotard), at Jean Baudrillard. Nakita ko ang malaking potensiyal na magamit ang kanilang mga teorya para tugunan ang ating sariling mga problema pilosopikal.

Deleña: Nabanggit po sa isa ninyong sanaysay na hindi pa isang postmodernong bansa ang Pilipinas at nasa pre-modernong antas pa lamang ang maraming aspekto nito. Tama po ba kung ipipilit pa rin nating gamitin ang mga postmodernong teorya?

Demeterio: Dahil wala pa tayo sa postmodernong antas at pre-moderno pa ang karamihan sa mga aspekto ng lipunan natin, maraming elemento ang mga teoryang ito na malayo sa reyalidad natin. Noong nag-aral ako ng teoryang kritikal sa University of London noong nakalipas na tag-araw, napansin ko kung gaano ka-high altitude ang kritikal na pamimilosopiya nila. Ground-level philosophizing ang sa tingin kong kailangan natin dito sa Pilipinas. Pero sigurado akong maraming elemento ang mga postmodernong teoryang madali nating maaangkop para sa sarili nating konteksto bilang
isang bansang naghahangad maging moderno. Sa katunayan, inisulat ko na noon kung ano ang mga teorya ng postmodernismong maaaring magbigay sa atin ng mga aral at gabay kung anong uring modernidad ang dapat nating pangarapin.

Deleña: Ano po ang mga bentahe sa paggamit ng mga postmodernong teorya?

Demeterio: Interesado ako sa kritikal na talas ng mga postmodernong teorya. Ang mga ito ang gusto kong maiangkop.

Deleña: Bakit po ninyo isinusulong ang mga kolaboratibong proyekto sa pilosopiya?

Demeterio: Bilang isang research manager ng Pamatasang De La Salle, natuklasan ko ang ideya ng research university ni Wilhelm von Humboldt. 200 years old na ang ideyang ito ng research university ng Unibersidad ng Pilipinas at ang Pamantasang ng De La Salle. Ito ang dahilan kung bakit mahina ang siyensiya, teknolohiya, at pilosopiya sa ating bansa. Kulang ang pananaliksik sa Pilipinas dahil wala tayong ganitong konsepto sa Research University. Nalaman kong nakatungtong sa proseso ng marubdod at walang tigil na kolaborasyon sa pagitan ng mga gurong Pilosopiya — ang research university. Kaya naisip ko, habang hindi pa ganap ang research university, maaari na ako ng mag-asa bilang gurong Pilosopiya sa pamamagitan ng pagkakaroon ng sibilyang research university sa pamamagitan ng mag-asa bilang gurong Pilosopiya. Pinapabilis at pinapayaman ng mga kolaborador ko ang aking pananaliksik, habang sinasanay ko naman sila kung ano (ang) nararapat na buhay ng isang pilosopo—ang patuloy na kahit na sa pamamagitan ng research university.

Deleña: Ano ang pangarap ninyo (para) sa mga susunod na henerasyon ng mga pilosopiya Pilipino?

Kongklusyon

Alinsunod sa malalimang pagsusuri ng proyektong ito, naisakatuparan ng una at ikalawang substantibong seksyon ng papel ang hugis, lalim, at lawak ng pilosopiyang Pilipinong itinataguyod ni Demeterio. Narito ang mga aral at kabatiran magagagap mula sa 1) pagtukoy ng mga pangunahing diskurso ng mga obra ni Demeterio, at 2) pagsasagawa ng aktuwal na pakikipanayam na ibinalangkas mula sa nadiskubreng apat na diskursong higit na pinagtutuunan-pansin ng pantsas.


Ikatlo, mahalagang banggitin ang hermenyutika bilang pinakapundasyon ng mga obra ni Demeterio na ipinakilala na tagagayos at kalatang naging paksa ng kauna-unahang nailathalang artikulo. Nagmula ang hermenyutika sa salitang Griyegong hermeneutik na nangangahulugang “gagawa ng interpretasyon” at hermeneutik na may ibig sabihing “proseso ng
interpretasyon.” May lingguwistikong kaugnayan kay Hermes, isang masigasig na mensahero sa pagitan ng mga diyos sa Bundok Olympus at ng mga tao. Taglay niya ang pagiging bihasa sa wika ng dalawang magkabilang panig upang maipaabo ang saloobin sa parehong mortal at immortal (Demeterio 1 sa “Ang Hermenyutika nina Schleiermacher at Dilthey bilang Batayang Teoretikal sa Araling Pilipino”). Sa paraang ito, maaaring maituring si Demeterio bilang kontemporaryong Hermes upang maipaahid ang mahalagang mensahe sa mga tagapagsulong ng Tagalog, Filipino, at Ingles—na hindi dapat maging balakid ang paggamit ng espesipikong wika upang matantiya kung pilosopiyang Pilipino ba o hindi ang isang pamimilosopiya.


Ikalima, makabuluhang ding itala ang nabanggit ni Demeterio tungkol sa pagkahuna Pilipino ng kanyang kritikal na pamimilosopiya kahit na nakasandig sa Kanluranin ang teoretikal na balangkas. Binigyang-diin ng pantas na masasakihan sa pamamagitan ng dialektikal na ugnayan ng teorya, ng pilosopiyang Pilipino, ng pilosopikal na problema, at ng kontekstong kalaunang pagkakaruhan ng pilosopiyang Pilipino. Mahalaga ang kaisipang ito bilang modelo sa pagsusuri at pagbubuo ng Pilipinong discurso sa ibang larangan tulad ng agham pampolitika, sosyolohiya, antropolohiya, sikolohiya, at marami pang iba. Hindi malayan at maipalit ang teoretikal na balangkas na mula sa kontekstong iba sa atin.

Ikaanim, malaki ang posibilidad na magkasundo sina Demeterio at ang kasalukuyang pilosopiko si Sr. Mananzan sa discurso ng pilosopiyang Pilipino. Gayong hindi masyadong bumabasa si Demeterio sa anyo ng praksis na inisulog ni Mananzan, tulad ng pagiging aktibo sa mga rally at politikal na organisasyon, maituturing pa ring isang uri ng praksiyolohikal na pakikibaka ang itinaguyod ni Demeterio sa usapin
ng pananaliksik sa larangan ng pilosopiyang Pilipino. Pinatunayan sa artikulong “Philosophy, Methodology and Action Research” ang dalawang nagkakaisang proseso ng praksis: isang pagtamo ng kaalaman kung ano ang mainam; at isang pag-alam kung paano ito mapakikinabangan sa mga partikular na sitwasyon.⁲⁷ Sa kaso ng larangan ng pilosopiyang Pilipino, hindi maikakailang mainam at napapanahon ang pag-angkla ni Demeterio sa konsepto ng research university ni Humboldt. Sa pamamagitan ng paglalaan ng panahon sa kolaborasyon, napapayaman ang mga tekstwal na proyekto, maagang nasasanay ang mga nakababata sa pamimilosopiya at paglimbag, at nagdudulot ng insipirasyon sa iba pang guro at mag-aaral na ipagpatuloy ang paglalathala. Mapakikinabangan ito hindi lamang ng napakabatang larangan ng pilosopiyang Pilipino, datapwat maging susunod na henerasyon upang maging mas kritikal at matalinong mga mamamayan.


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Filipino (tunguhang lengguwahe) at mabuksan ang kamalayan sa sariling konteksto ng maraming mambabasang Filipino.

Higit sa lahat, ebidente sa hanay ng mga pananaliksik ni Demeterio ang layuning maisulong ang Araling Filipino alinsunod sa pagpapakahulugan ng kritikong pampanitikan at teoresistang si Priscelina Patajo-Legasto. Ayon sa kanya, hindi na nararapat pang alalahanin kung Pilipino ba o hindi ang nananaliksik na iskolar hinggil sa Pilipinas o kung gumagamit ba siya ng mga katutubong teoretikal na balangkas; maituturing itong Araling Filipino hangga’t pursigidong makapag-ambag ng mga paglalarawan, interpretasyon, at kritisismong magsusulong at magpapataat ng bansa.29 Hindi maitatanggi ang pagkamamayan ni Demeterio bilang Filipino, ngunit hindi rin maitatatang na susi ang bulto ng kanyang mga sanaysay upang makabuo ng mas mapanuring kaalaman, malalimang maunawaan ang lipunang Filipino, at kalaunang makamit ang mas malaya at makataong mundo.

References


29 Tingnan ang Priscelina Patajo-Legasto, “Philippine Studies: Have We Gone Beyond St. Louis?” in Philippine Studies: Have We Gone Beyond St. Louis (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2008), xix.


Patajo-Legasto, Priscelina “Philippine Studies: Have We Gone Beyond St. Louis?” in Philippine Studies: Have We Gone Beyond St. Louis (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2008)
Discourse in Filipino Philosophy

Postmodernism from the Perspectives of Filipino Philosophers: Abulad, Co, Demeterio, and Pavo

Mary Irene Clare O. Deleña and Raymond John D. Vergara

Abstract: Postmodernism may have originated from the west, but the Philippines as an English-speaking neo-colonial state that is thrust into context of globalization could not remain for long unaffected by the impact of this cultural and philosophical movement or trend. This paper analyzed postmodernism as seen by four Filipino philosophy scholars who are known in as far as the field of Filipino philosophy is concerned: Romualdo Abulad, Alfredo Co, Feorillo Demeterio III, and Raymundo Pavo. This paper made thematic, comparative and contrastive readings of the relevant essays of these four Filipino philosophy scholars in accordance to their: 1) definitions of postmodernism, 2) aspects of postmodernism analyzed, 3) discursive positioning, 4) underpinning concerns, and 5) general appraisals of postmodernism. The overall aim of this paper is to provide an initial assessment on how postmodernism has impacted the Philippines and how Filipino philosophy is coming to terms with this predominantly western phenomenon.

Keywords: postmodernism, Philippine context, Filipino philosophy, thematic reading

Introduction

Postmodernism may have originated from the west, but the Philippines as an English-speaking neo-colonial state that was thrust into the context of globalization could not remain for long unaffected by the impact of this cultural and philosophical movement or trend. This paper analyzed postmodernism as seen by four Filipino philosophy scholars: Romualdo Abulad, Alfredo Co, Feorillo Demeterio III, and Raymundo Pavo. There are other Filipino scholars who touched on postmodernism in some of
their publications; but they either touched only very specific postmodern theories, like what Raniel Reyes, Roland Theuas Pada, Darlene Demandante, Tracy Ann Llanera, Daryl Mendoza, and Rhoderick John Abellanosa had done; or talked about postmodernism from a non-philosophical vantage point, like what Erwhin Clarin and Jennie Jocson Antonio Contreras, and Jerry Yapo had done. Abulad, Co, Demeterio, and Pavo, on the other hand, are Filipino philosophy scholars who talked about postmodernism in general and at the same time grappled with this cultural and philosophical phenomenon within the parameters of philosophy.

Methodology

This paper made thematic readings of the pre-identified essays of these four Filipino philosophy scholars, followed by a comparative and contrastive analyses. To make such comparative and contrastive analyses possible, this paper identified the following themes from each of the four writers and philosophers: 1) their definitions of postmodernism, 2) the aspects of postmodernism that they analyzed, 3) their discursive positioning, 4) their underpinning concerns, and 5) their general appraisals of postmodernism. The definitions of postmodernism were extracted from the essays of the said four philosophy scholars after thoroughly reading their selected publications.

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9 See Jerry Yapo, “Pastiche as the Aesthetic of Postmodernism in Jessica Hagedorn’s Dogeaters,” in The UPLB Journal, 6:1 (2009), 27.
The aspects of postmodernism that were analyzed were determined using Georges de Schijver’s conceptualization of postmodernism as composed of foundational and cultural aspects, with Demeterio’s addition of theoretical aspect. Foundational aspects are: 1) attitude towards science and technology, 2) attitude towards the nation-state, 3) organizational management, 4) economic mode, 5) attitude towards progress, and 6) state of industry. Cultural aspects are: 1) the self, 2) attitude towards pleasure and consumption, and 3) art. Theoretical aspect refers to discourse at the level of critique and philosophy. By identifying which aspects of postmodernism were analyzed by the four Filipino philosophy scholars, the readers will be able to grasp how comprehensively these four tackled the said cultural and philosophical phenomena.

Discursive positioning in this paper simply means whether the specific philosophy scholar is philosophizing from a cosmopolitan point of view or from a more defined and specific local or Philippine context. As it is already expected that these four writers and philosophers had been philosophizing from mixed perspectives, this paper determined which point of view is more predominant for each of the four philosophy scholars. Discursive positioning in this paper pertains to the geographic point of view taken by the selected writers and philosophers, and has nothing to do with their epistemic positioning.

The underpinning concerns refer to the goals and intentions of each of these four philosophy scholars in tackling postmodernism in the first place. Lastly, the general appraisal of postmodernism refers to each of the four philosophy scholars’ bottom line attitude towards postmodernism, whether they see it as something positive or negative, or beneficial or harmful and destructive to society and philosophy in general.

The methodology of this paper is visually represented in the following figure:

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11 De Schrijver, “Postmodernity and Theology,” 439.


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To simplify the processes of comparative and contrastive readings, and make them less tedious and more efficient, tables will be used by the paper whenever applicable.

**Significance**

The overall aim of this paper is to provide an initial assessment on how postmodernism has impacted the Philippines by looking into how Filipino philosophy, through its representative scholars, is coming to terms with this predominantly western phenomenon. There are already countless papers that talked about postmodernism; however, there are relatively few papers that were written about it by Filipino scholars; but a thorough check using Google Scholar has established that this is first paper to analyze how Filipino philosophy scholars are making sense of and engaging with this cultural and philosophical phenomenon.

**Romualdo Abulad on Postmodernism**

As suggested in the preceding paragraphs, Aquinas’ position on capital Abulad is a Missionary Brother of the Society of the Divine Word. He retired from De La Salle University as an associate professor of philosophy, transferred to the University of San Carlos, and upon his return to Manila started teaching as a professorial lecturer of philosophy at the University of Santo Tomas, while serving as the dean of the Christ the King Mission.

Abulad’s “What is Postmodernism?” is published in the book Two Filipino Thomasian Philosophers on Postmodernism, which he co-authored with Co. Being an expert in continental philosophy, Abulad explained postmodernism as a philosophical mind frame that emanates from Friedrich Nietzsche’s radical deconstructive thoughts, in contradistinction to the modern philosophical mind frame that emanates from Rene Descartes’ faith on the ego and methodic doubting. It is in this essay that Abulad presented his clearest definition of what postmodernism is. He claimed that postmodernism has a negative component: “the destructive act that makes everything presumptuous, which pulverizes any entity that tends to settle the mind, so that even the mind itself, the ego or consciousness, needs to be presupposed.”14 Yet, he added that postmodernism also has a positive component: “having so cleansed our mental slate, we are then open and free enough to do the more constructive work.”15 The negative and positive aspects of postmodernism open a possibility for a “thoroughly comprehensive consciousness, integral and holistic, global and dialogical, dynamic and evolutionary.”16 The essay is an effort of an expert on modern continental philosophy to grasp postmodernism and assure his modernist and even Scholastic readers that they should not be pessimistic with the impact of postmodernism on the contemporary intellectual landscape.

Abulad’s “Kant and Postmodernism” is also published in the same book. The essay has two sections, one dealing with the philosophy of Kant while the other with postmodernism. The section on Kant explored the core of Critique of Pure Reason. Abulad wrote: “The Copernican Revolution that he (Kant) has effected in philosophy is not the type of revolution that bloats the ego and augments one’s feeling of self-importance. His achievement is a solid cement to what sages of all ages and climes have been trying, oftentimes vainly, to tell us. He who thinks he knows does not know, and he who knows that he does not know knows.”17 The section on postmodernism does not actually talk about postmodernism in general.

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
Instead, it argued how the critical spirit of Kant has influenced the deconstructive and nihilist ways of philosophizing of the postmodern period. Towards the tail end of the essay, Abulad admitted that the deconstructive and nihilist tendencies of postmodernism may not be appealing yet to many Filipinos. But he enticed the Filipino philosophers with the foresight that beyond deconstruction and nihilism is a vast playing field where a stronger Filipino philosophy can be built. He said: “To a Filipino, this could be good news. It means that he is now at liberty to draw up his own architectonic, based on all he knows, while deeply aware of the scope of what he does not know.” Like the preceding essay, “Kant and Postmodernism” is also an effort of an expert in Kantian philosophy to grasp postmodernism and again assure his modernist and even Scholastic readers that postmodern philosophy is not a fatal threat to philosophy.

Abulad’s “Postmodern Critique and the Ethics of Postmodernism” is published in the same book. The intention of this essay is to present “what makes for a critique that fits the postmodern times and how it could radically alter the ethical assumptions we have grown used to.” To achieve such intention, the paper had to grasp first what is meant by postmodern critique and then by postmodern ethics. In talking about postmodern critique, Abulad returned to his imagery of postmodernism as composed of a negative, or critical side, and positive, or constructive side that becomes possible after razing all the unfounded structures of modernism and the classical world. Inspired by the ethical musings of Emmanuel Levinas, Abulad conceptualized postmodern ethics as “a formalistic ethics, an ethics without content, or else with a content which is not predetermined and so not determined from the very core of the individual who is fully conscious of his or her freedom and profound sensibility.” Writing during the times of the Second EDSA Revolution, Abulad could only hope that the Filipino people is actually moving away from the ruins of corrupt Machiavellian politics and towards the construction of new moral and ethical governance. This essay appears to be an assurance to Abulad’s modernist and even Scholastic readers that ethics and morality are still possible in the postmodern era.

Abulad’s “The Future of Ethics: A Postmodern View” is published in the same book. This essay appears to build on the previous essay “Postmodern Critique and the Ethics of Postmodernism,” in the sense that

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18 Ibid., 55.
19 Ibid., 57.
21 Ibid., 79-87.
22 Ibid., 91.
23 Ibid., 90-91.
this current essay attempts to give more descriptions of what postmodern ethics is or should be. Abulad returned again to the negative project of Nietzsche with its underlying positive promise: “What, in fact, he (Nietzsche) has done for morality is cleanse it of the thick cobweb of tradition, the very reason why it has degenerated into a culture of weakness and oppression. There is no doubt that Nietzsche feels the need to destroy, but only so that he can give creation and imagination a new chance.” 24 Abulad’s statement that postmodernism in general started around 1890 had strategically included Nietzsche in the era. 25 On the other hand, Abulad maintains that postmodernism in the Catholic Church started with the Second Vatican Council. In the Philippines, furthermore, he claimed that the first EDSA Revolution signaled the emergence of postmodernism, which reminded us of the timeliness and timelessness of contemplating about ethics and morality, albeit in a different way. 26 To visualize how a postmodern ethical theory may look like, Abulad took as his example Joseph Fletcher’s situation ethics. Abulad argued that giving justice to Fletcher’s criterion of love would require much courage and much circumspection, and very unlike the legalistic and formulaic emphases of traditional ethics. This essay, like the previous essay “Postmodern Critique and the Ethics of Postmodernism,” appears to be an assurance to Abulad’s modernist and even Scholastic readers that ethics and morality are still possible in the postmodern era.

Abulad’s “God and Postmodernity” is published in the same book. The essay laid down the argument that if morality and ethics remained possible in the postmodern era, then religion, theology and the conceptualization of God are also possible. However, considering that there are very few postmodern thinkers who ventured into these latter topics, Abulad did not elaborate much on how these would actually be in the said era. Very broadly he argued that God anyway is somebody that would always exceed human conceptualization, thus the need for a constant review and reconstruction of our theologies. He stated: “the point where we feel we have adequately understood Christ is where we miss him; in our zeal we begin to pontificate about him and lose sight of the fact that the Christ we are forcing others to accept is nothing but our own creation.” 27 This essay is an assurance to Abulad’s modernist and even Scholastic readers that religion,

25 Ibid.,115.
26 Ibid.,115-116.
Alfredo Co on Postmodernism

Co is a professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Santo Tomas. He specializes in Chinese and oriental philosophy. In 2004, he published the essays “Doing Philosophy in the Philippines: Fifty Years ago and Fifty Years from Now,” “Expanding Worldview in a Shrinking Planet: Reading Postmodernism in the Age of Globalization,” and “And Man Created God: Understanding Postmodern Faith.”

Co’s “Doing Philosophy in the Philippines: Fifty Years ago and Fifty Years from Now” is a published in the book Two Filipino Thomasian Philosophers on Postmodernism, which he co-authored with Abulad. This essay presented the history of philosophy and philosophical writing in the Philippines. Emerging from a long tradition of Thomism and Scholasticism,
the Filipino scholars who obtained their highest degrees in philosophy abroad, according to Co, spearheaded the development of more diverse philosophy curricula in various Philippine universities, such as the University of Santo Tomas, University of the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila University, and De La Salle University. Co mentioned that alongside this diversification of philosophical education and writing came the establishment of a number of philosophical organizations: the Philosophical Circle of the Philippines, which he founded; the Philosophical Association of the Philippines, which was founded by Jorge Revilla; the Philosophical Association of the Visayas and Mindanao, which was founded by Quintin Terrenal; and the Philippine Academy of Philosophical Research, which was founded by Emerita Quito. Co, then, problematized what constitutes Filipino philosophy. Consequently, he proffered the answer that Filipino philosophy is the textual output of Filipinos who are actively and consciously engaged in philosophizing. Co banked his hopes that Filipino students and professors of philosophy will more actively engage in philosophizing especially because they are now situated in the more open, interconnected and global age of postmodernism. The essay only tangentially touched on postmodernism as a circumscribing period, an auspicious period, of a segment of Filipino philosophy.

Co’s “Expanding a Worldview in a Shrinking Planet: Reading Postmodernism in the Age of Globalization” is published in the same book Two Filipino Thomasian Philosophers on Postmodernism. The essay started with Co’s recollection on how interested some senior French government officials and professors were with his expertise on Indian and Chinese philosophies and how baffled he was at the same time why the younger French academics were swept away by the writings of Nietzsche. Co said that he only realized why Nietzsche had been so appealing after coming to the Philippines and delivering a lecture on this father of postmodernism. Being an expert in eastern philosophies, Co emphasized how oriental thought seeped into the west and influenced the emergence of postmodernism. The “expanding worldview” mentioned by Co referred to postmodernism’s tolerant blending of eastern and western philosophies and its openness to other systems of thinking; while the “shrinking planet” referred to the present condition of

29 Ibid., 9.
30 Ibid., 13, 17.
31 Ibid., 18.
33 Ibid., 63-64.
interconnectedness brought about by globalization. It is in this essay where Co presented his definition of postmodernism as “an offshoot of the meeting of western and eastern thought ... a way looking at the event from a ‘land’ perspective or a ‘fish-eye’ view;” while globalization is “looking at the same world from an added ‘birds-eye’ view.” But Co made the stern warning that there might be clashes and destructions that would precede the real dialogues and tolerance of postmodernity. The essay is an effort of an expert on oriental philosophies to grasp postmodernism using his own philosophical background.

Co’s “And Man Created God: Understanding Postmodern Faith” is published in the same book. This essay tackled urbanization and technology as the driving forces of the “postmodern future.” Co envisioned that in such future, individuals are able to engage in the exchange of knowledge and information through the use of technology, such as the World Wide Web. Through the World Wide Web, individuals can become equals in their power to represent themselves and contribute in the exchange of knowledge. Furthermore, through the World Wide Web, individuals can create and recreate their representations. In the postmodern age, it is no longer God who creates man. Instead, it is man who creates his/her own image. Taking this position to the extreme, Co argued that in the postmodern age, man can even create his own God, religion, and theology. The essay is an insistence on the possibility of religion and theology in the postmodern age.

Co stated that postmodernism emerged from the meeting of the east and the west, and that it is the ground level counterpart of globalization as being the aerial perspective on the said meeting. The aspect of postmodernism that he analyzed revolved around the theoretical, as he dealt with philosophy, religion and theology; but every now and then touched on the foundational aspect of the said movement, as he dealt with globalization and technological interconnections; and also on the cultural aspect of the same movement, as he dealt with the meeting of cultures and with the Philippine intellectual context. His discursive positioning is both cosmopolitan and local/Philippine, although most of the time this would be cosmopolitan. This means that his geographic positioning most of the time is not that of a Filipino scholar. His underpinning concerns throughout these three essays are to: 1) take advantage of postmodernism as an auspicious time

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34 Ibid., 62-64.
35 Ibid., 65.
36 Ibid., 68-69.
38 Ibid., 180.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 180.
for the development of Filipino philosophy; 2) argue that postmodernism mooted the earlier discourses of nationalistic Filipino philosophy; 3) warn of the impending clashes and destructions that would precede the real dialogues and tolerance of postmodernity; 4) make sense of postmodernism using eastern philosophies; and 5) insist on the possibility of religion and theology. His first and fifth underpinning concerns are premised on the intellectual tolerance of postmodernism. His second underpinning concern is premised on postmodernism emphasis on globalization. His third underpinning concern is premised on his idea that the actual tolerance of postmodernism and its openness to dialogues are preceded with some violent clashes of intellectual and cultural points of view. His fourth underpinning concern is premised on the fact that Co is a respected expert on Chinese and oriental philosophy. Co’s general appraisal of postmodernism is that it is both something good and evil. This means that for him, philosophy, theology, religion and Filipino philosophy should not be overwhelmed with postmodernism for the reason that after his predicted violent clashes is a time for tolerance and dialogues.

**Feorillo Demeterio on Postmodernism**

Demeterio is a former professor of philosophy at San Beda College (now, San Beda University) and currently a professor of Filipino and Philippine Studies at the De La Salle University. He specializes on research in Filipino philosophy and cultural studies. In between 2003 and 2015, Demeterio published the essays “Our Premodernity and their Tokens of Postmodernity: Reflections on the Philippine Condition,” “Understanding the Postmodern Culture and Philosophy,” “Ang Pilosopiya ni Jean-Francois Lyotard bilang Batayang Teoretikal sa Araling Pilipino,” “Iris Marion Young’s Theory of Structural Justice and Collective Responsibility,” and “Ang Pilosopiya ni Jean Baudrillard bilang Batayang Teoretikal sa Araling Pilipino.”

Demeterio’s “Our Premodernity and their Tokens of Postmodernity: Reflections on the Philippine Condition” is published in Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy. Amidst sweeping statements made by a number of Filipino academics that claim postmodernism has already transformed Philippine society, Demeterio investigated how far we can really claim such phenomenon. To be able to do so, he first conceptualized modernism and postmodernism as composed of foundational, cultural, and theoretical aspects.\(^{41}\) Foundational aspects are: 1) attitude towards science

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and technology, 2) attitude towards the nation-state, 3) organizational management, 4) economic mode, 5) attitude towards progress, and 6) state of industry. Cultural aspects are: 1) the self, 2) attitude towards pleasure and consumption, and 3) art. Theoretical aspect refers to theoretical discussion and philosophy. Aspect by aspect, Demeterio determined whether Philippine society is indeed postmodern, modern or even premodern. In terms of foundations, the Philippine society is predominantly premodern. In terms of cultural expression, the Philippine society is also premodern. This essay appears to be an exploration on how Filipino philosophy can appropriate the critical philosophies of postmodernism, specifically on constructing and critiquing a model of modernity that would be more suitable for the Filipinos and free from the dark side of modernity that unfurled in the west.

Demeterio’s “Understanding the Postmodern Culture and Philosophy” is published in The Philosophical Landscape. This is a straightforward introductory essay on postmodernism. Demeterio did this introduction by recalling the historical conditions that brought about the emergence of modernism and postmodernism. He did this also by comparing modernism and postmodernism in culture and art. This essay contains Demeterio’s clearest definition of postmodernism as “the self-conscious cultural movement that reacted against the principles and ideals of the modernist movements in literature, art, architecture, film, philosophy, etc.” Towards the end of the essay, Demeterio presented the thoughts of some of the leading philosophers of postmodernism, namely: Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Jean Baudrillard. This essay appears to be the author’s way of explaining what postmodernism is to his neophyte Filipino readers.

Demeterio’s “Ang Pilosopiya ni Jean-Francois Lyotard bilang Batayang Teoretikal sa Araling Pilipino” is published in Kritike: an Online Journal of Philosophy. This essay, written in Filipino, is Demeterio’s effort in

42 Ibid., 200-203.
43 Ibid., 203-205.
44 Ibid., 205-206.
46 Ibid., 206.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.

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introducing Lyotard’s postmodern thoughts to Filipino readers from the fields of both philosophy and cultural studies. His discussion on Lyotard’s philosophy is contained in four sections: 1) critique of the status of scientific knowledge in the postmodern period, 2) implication of postmodern knowledge on tertiary education, 3) meaning of ethics and justice in the period of the micro-narratives, and 4) meaning of art in the postmodern period. Demeterio concluded the essay by laying down nine points on how Lyotard’s philosophy can be appropriated by Filipino philosophy and Philippine studies. Demeterio viewed Lyotard’s postmodernism as an opportunity to critique colonialism and imperialism, and at the same time multiculturalism, ethnic narratives, gender narratives, and local science and knowledge production. This essay appears to be both an introduction of Lyotard’s philosophy to Filipino readers and a more concrete exploration of the possibility of appropriating Lyotard’s critical thought for the enrichment and development of Filipino philosophy and Philippine studies.

Demeterio’s “Iris Marion Young’s Theory of Structural Justice and Collective Responsibility” is published in Scientia. It is a systematic presentation of the philosophy of the American thinker, feminist and activist, Iris Marion Young. At the time of its publication, Demeterio believed that the essay is the first systematic and comprehensive exposition of Young’s contributions that are otherwise scattered in her various articles and chapters which she herself did not systematize and synthesize prior to her ailment and death. Demeterio’s essay contains four substantive sections dealing with: 1) Young’s theory of structural justice, 2) her theory of collective responsibility, 3) her call for a global theory of justice, and 4) her thoughts on the applicability of her philosophy to the analysis of justice in other countries. The essay may appear as a straightforward introduction to the philosophy of Young, but is also an insistence of Demeterio that ethics and justice can still be meaningfully pursued in the postmodern period. The essay will appear as a forthcoming chapter of Demeterio’s fourth book to be published by the De La Salle University Publishing House. This forthcoming publication deals with how justice is conceptualized by the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines. Hence, the essay can also be read as Demeterio’s invitation to Filipino thinkers to use postmodern theories in analyzing Philippine realities.

“Ang Pilosopiya ni Jean Baudrillard bilang Batayang Teoretikal sa Araling Pilipino” is an essay that Demeterio co-authored with Emmanuel De

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54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
Leon, who, at the time of writing this piece, was his dissertation advisee at the University of Santo Tomas. The essay was published in _Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy_. This essay, written as well in Filipino, is Demeterio and De Leon’s effort in similarly introducing Baudrillard’s postmodern thoughts to Filipino readers from the fields of both philosophy and cultural studies.57

Their discussion on Baudrillard’s philosophy is contained in three sections: 1) his Marxist phase, 2) his anti-Marxist phase, and 3) his postmodern phase.58

Demeterio and De Leon concluded the essay by again laying down five points on how Baudrillard’s philosophy can be appropriated by Filipino philosophy and Philippine studies.59 This essay appears to be both an introduction of Baudrillard’s philosophy to Filipino readers and a more concrete exploration on the possibility of appropriating Baudrillard’s critical thought for the enrichment and development of Filipino philosophy and Philippine studies.

Demeterio wrote that postmodernism is a self-conscious cultural movement that ran counter against the principles of and tenets of modernism in culture, art and philosophy. The aspect of postmodernism that he analyzed revolved around the foundational, as he explored the Filipino attitudes towards science and technology, towards the nation-state, and towards progress, and examined the general Philippine organizational management, economic mode of production, and the state of industry; the cultural, as he analyzed the Filipino self, the Filipino attitude towards pleasure and consumption, and the Filipino art in general; and the theoretical, as he advocated for the appropriation of postmodern philosophical theories for the enrichment of Filipino philosophy. His discursive positioning is predominantly local/Philippine, although at some points this would become cosmopolitan. This means that his geographic positioning most of the time is that of a Filipino scholar. His underpinning concerns throughout these five essays are to: 1) appropriate postmodern theories to critique the Philippine aspiration for modernity; 2) propagate the use of postmodern theories to critique Philippine realities; and 3) insist on the possibility of ethics. His first underpinning concern is premised on his idea that the Philippines is still a premodern state and that its intellectuals are pushing it to become a modern state in a time when postmodern philosophy has already exposed the ailments of modernity. His second underpinning concern is premised on his belief, as a specialist on cultural studies, that postmodern philosophy can be advantageously appropriated and used to study the various aspects of Philippine reality. His third underpinning concern is clearly premised on his


58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.
study and appropriation of Young’s postmodern ethical theories. Demeterio’s general appraisal of postmodernism is that it is something good. This means that for him, philosophy, ethics, cultural studies, and Filipino philosophy should welcome the influx of postmodern philosophical theories as these can be advantageously appropriated by Filipino scholars.

**Raymundo Pavo on Postmodernism**

Pavo is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of the Philippines Mindanao. He is currently the chair of the Department of Social Sciences in the said university. He specialized on Filipino philosophy and on the intersection between philosophy and social sciences. Among the four philosophy scholars studied by this paper, Pavo is the only one who is not a professor and he does not even hold a doctor’s degree yet, but in 2011, he published the essay “Filipino Philosophy and Post-Modernity” that this paper simply could not ignore.

Raymundo Pavo’s “Filipino Philosophy and Post-Modernity” is published in the *International Journal of Arts and Sciences*. In this essay, Pavo underscored the significance of the post-modern tools in pushing for the progress of Filipino Philosophy. Postmodernism, according to Pavo, is “the privileging of the language of particulars” as seen mostly “in the growing appeal of situational perspectives and transitory vantage points” furthermore “since flux and cracks have occupied the forefront of discussions, thinking in the postmodern milieu can be analogous to make-shifts – temporary shelters to live by, nurture and defend.” For Pavo, postmodernism’s inclination to particularities, differences and equivocality opened spaces for particular philosophies like Filipino philosophy. Pavo however does not belittle the significance of the universals. In his critique of Rolando Gripaldo’s methodologies of doing philosophy, Pavo has vividly presented the significance of particulars in establishing the universals. In the citizenship notion of doing philosophy, the nationality of the individual doing the philosophy is considered. In the traditional notion of doing philosophy, the capacity of a person to do his/her own philosophy outside the paradigm of a philosophical system is considered. The person does not limit himself/herself to an absolute philosophical system. Rather, he/she is able to establish his/her own ideas that can contribute to enrichment of Filipino philosophy. In the social science and culture notion of doing philosophy, Pavo showed how Filipino thinkers have utilized culture, ethnicity, literature, language, all

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61 Ibid., 239.
62 Ibid., 250-251.
mini-narratives, in developing Filipino philosophy. Pavo, therefore argued for the enmeshing of social sciences and philosophy. Philosophy cannot simply disregard the particular life-world experiences of the people but on the other hand, philosophy cannot be simply reduced to the particular perspectives of people. The essay is an invitation to Filipino philosophy scholars to take advantage of the postmodern tolerance for ambiguity and hybridity and push for the development of Filipino philosophy.

Pavo expressed that postmodernism privileges the language of particulars, and that such is obvious in the trendiness of situational thinking and transitory point of views. The aspect of postmodernism that he analyzed revolved around the theoretical, as he dwelt only on the realm of philosophy. His discursive positioning is predominantly local/Philippine, although at some points this would become cosmopolitan. This means that his geographic positioning most of the time is that of a Filipino scholar. His underpinning concern throughout this essay is to take advantage of the postmodern tolerance for ambiguity and hybridity and push for the development of Filipino philosophy. Pavo’s general appraisal of postmodernism is that it is something good. This means that for him, Filipino philosophy should not be terrified with the presence of postmodernism in the intellectual and philosophical landscape of our country.

**Comparative and Contrastive Readings**

Abulad and Co tackled postmodernism from the perspective of their mastery of continental and oriental philosophies; Demeterio, from his commitment to the use of critical philosophy as well as from his engagement with cultural studies; while Pavo, from his adherence to logical analysis and to the agenda of blending philosophy and social sciences. The following table compares and contrasts the thoughts of these four Filipino philosophy scholars:

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63 Ibid., 242.
Definition of Postmodernism

Postmodernism has a negative component, “the destructive act that makes everything presumptuous, which pulverizes any entity that tends to settle the mind, so that even the mind itself, the ego or consciousness, needs to be presupposed;” but also has a positive component, “having so cleansed our mental slate, we are then open and free enough to do the more constructive work.”

Aspects of Postmodernism Analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Romualdo Abulad</th>
<th>Alfredo Co</th>
<th>Feorillo Demeterio</th>
<th>Raymundo Pavo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Postmodernism</td>
<td>Postmodernism has a negative component, “the destructive act that makes...</td>
<td>“Postmodernism is an offshoot of the meeting of Western and Eastern thought. It...</td>
<td>“Postmodernism ... refers to a self-conscious cultural movement that reacted against the principles and ideals...</td>
<td>Postmodernism refers to “the privileging of the language of particulars. This...</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discursive Positioning</td>
<td>Theoretical and Cultural</td>
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<td>Underpinning Concerns</td>
<td>Cosmopolitan and Local/ Philippine</td>
<td>Cosmopolitan and Local/ Philippine</td>
<td>Local/ Philippine and Cosmopolitan</td>
<td>Local/ Philippine and Cosmopolitan</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Appraisal of</td>
<td>Insist on the possibility of ethics; insist on the possibility of religion and...</td>
<td>Take advantage of postmodernism as an auspicious time for the development of...</td>
<td>Appropriate postmodern theories to critique the Philippine aspiration for modernity; propagate the use of...</td>
<td>Take advantage of the postmodern tolerance for ambiguity and hybridity and push...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmodernism</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive and Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
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Table 1: Summary of the Similarities and Differences of Abulad, Co, Demeterio, and Pavo’s Thoughts on Postmodernism
The definitions of postmodernism offered by these four Filipino philosophy scholars converged on the theoretical aspect of postmodernism, or postmodernism as a collection of philosophies and philosophical principles. Abulad and Pavo are similar in the sense that their definitions of postmodernism focused only on postmodernism’s theoretical aspect. Co and Demeterio are similar in the sense that their definitions of postmodernism focused both on postmodernism’s cultural and theoretical aspects. Only Co’s definition of postmodernism encompassed the foundational, cultural and theoretical aspects of postmodernism.

Beyond their definitions, the four Filipino philosophy scholars again converged in the theoretical aspect of postmodernism. Pavo focused on the theoretical alone; Abulad focused on the cultural and theoretical aspects of postmodernism; while Co and Demeterio focused on the foundational, cultural and theoretical aspects of postmodernism. Pavo, therefore has the narrowest treatment of postmodernism; while Co and Demeterio have the widest treatment.

Concerning their discursive positioning, Abulad and Co and are similar in the sense that they tackled postmodernism more from a cosmopolitan point of view. This means that their geographic positioning most of the time is that of a global or international philosopher, and not much of a Filipino philosophy scholar. They only take the local/Philippine point of view as an afterthought, or whenever they remember to comment on the significance of their thoughts to the local/Philippine context. Demeterio and Pavo, on the other hand, are similar in the sense that they tackled postmodernism primarily from a local/Philippine point of view. This means that their geographic positioning most of the time is that of a Filipino philosophy scholar, and not much of a global or international philosopher. They are conscious of their being Filipino philosophers and writers who are trying to grapple with the significance of postmodernism to Filipinos and Filipino philosophy.

The following table compares and contrasts the underpinning concerns of the four Filipino philosophy scholars as they grappled with postmodernism:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Underpinning Concerns</th>
<th>Romualdo Abulad</th>
<th>Alfredo Co</th>
<th>Feorillo Demeterio</th>
<th>Raymundo Pavo</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insist on the Possibility of Ethics</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insist on the Possibility of Religion and Theology</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Make Sense of Postmodernism Using Modern Continental and Oriental Philosophies</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Take Advantage of the Postmodern Preference for Deconstruction, Ambiguity and Individuality for the Development of Filipino Philosophy

Argue that Postmodernism Mooted the Earlier Discourses of Nationalistic Filipino Philosophy

Warn of the Impending Clashes and Destructions that would Precede the Real Dialogues and Tolerance of Postmodernism

Appropriate Postmodern Theories to Critique the Philippine Aspiration for Modernity

Appropriate Postmodern Theories to Critique Philippine Realities

Table 2: Summary of the Convergences and Divergences of the Underpinning Concerns of Abulad, Co, Demeterio and Pavo in Grappling with Postmodernism

The most recurrent underpinning concern from these four Filipino philosophy scholars is to take advantage of the postmodern preference for deconstruction, ambiguity and individuality for the development of Filipino philosophy. This underpinning concern is followed by: to insist on the possibility of ethics; to insist on the possibility of religion and theology; and to make sense of postmodernism using modern continental philosophies and oriental philosophies. Co has two uncommon concerns: to argue that postmodernism has mooted the earlier discourses of nationalistic Filipino philosophy; and to warn of the impending clashes and destructions that would precede the real dialogues and tolerance of postmodernism. Demeterio also has two uncommon concerns: to appropriate postmodern theories in critiquing the Philippine aspiration for modernity; and to appropriate postmodern theories in critiquing other Philippine realities.

Concerning their overall appraisal of postmodernism, all of the four Filipino philosophy scholars see the phenomenon positively, as an opportunity for Filipino philosophy to develop into a strong and meaningful discourse. The Filipino thinkers and writers can definitely take advantage of postmodernism. Only Co expressed that postmodernism has an almost Armageddonian negative dimension that we also should be prepared for before we can reap the benefits of its sincere dialogues and tolerant attitude.

At the bottom line, it is noticeable that these four Filipino philosophy scholars are not really postmodern philosophers, but intellectuals who are still committed to some modern and even premodern philosophical projects, such as the building of a stronger Filipino philosophy, the affirmation of ethics, and the affirmation of religion and theology. They presuppose that once the philosophical playing field has been leveled by postmodernism, and
that once Filipino philosophy, ethics, religion and theology have built new and stronger intellectual structures, such structures would be immune from persistent leveling of postmodernism. These Filipino philosophy scholars are not ready to embrace the momentariness and flimsiness of all intellectual structures built on postmodern grounds. If Demeterio wrote in his essay “Our Premodernity and their Tokens of Postmodernity: Reflections on the Philippine Condition” that postmodernism may be present in the Philippines at the theoretical level alone, this paper would like to modify his assertion that such presence could not be able to root deeply considering that the four Filipino philosophy scholars who grappled with postmodernism and who were analyzed in this paper were revealed in the end as thinkers who are not actually committed to postmodernism.

Conclusion

After thematically reading the selected texts of the four Filipino scholars of philosophy who grappled with postmodernism, and after subjecting their thematized thoughts to comparative and contrastive readings, this paper was able to show a number of things. First, their diverse definitions of postmodernism that emphasize the various aspects of this philosophical and cultural movement: Abulad, the critical edge of postmodern philosophy; Co, the openness of postmodernism towards dialogues; Demeterio, postmodernism’s reaction to and critique of modernism; and Pavo, the tolerance of postmodernism towards the language of particulars. Talking only of their definitions, Abulad and Demeterio’s definitions can be clustered together for their emphasis on critique; while Co and Pavo’s definitions can be clustered together for their emphasis on openness and tolerance. Second, these four Filipino philosophy scholars focused more on the theoretical aspect of postmodernism, then on the cultural, and least on the foundational aspect of postmodernism. Third, these four Filipino philosophy scholars took both cosmopolitan and local/Philippine discursive positioning; but Abulad and Co preferred the cosmopolitan discursive positioning, while Demeterio and Pavo preferred the local/Philippine discursive positioning. Fourth, the most recurrent underpinning concerns of these four Filipino philosophy scholars is to take advantage of the postmodern preference for deconstruction, ambiguity and individuality for the development of Filipino philosophy. While their least recurrent underpinning concerns are: to argue that postmodernism mooted the earlier discourses of nationalistic Filipino philosophy; to warn of the impending clashes and destructions that would precede the real dialogues and tolerance of postmodernism; appropriate postmodern theories to critique the Philippine aspiration for modernity; and to appropriate postmodern
theories to critique Philippine realities. Fifth, the four Filipino philosophy scholars generally appraised postmodernism positively.

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References


Do We Need Reasons for the Normativity of Belief?

Marco A. Joven-Romero

Abstract: Here, I defend a constitutive normative account of belief regardless of reasons for belief emergence and based on the believer’s attitude. I first sketch the dichotomy between evidential and nonevidential reasons to believe. Then I relate this dichotomy to doxastic and pragmatic approaches on the nature and the aim of belief. Then I analyze Daniel Whiting’s approach, based on evidentialism, that accommodates pragmatic and epistemic aims of belief and the related further actions and thoughts. I finally defend a doxastic characterization of belief that relies on the attitude of the believer while believing: a person \( x \) believes \( p \) if and only if \( x \) considers \( p \) to be true.

Keywords: evidentialism, doxastic absolutism, pragmatism, wishful thinking

Introduction

Normativist epistemologists usually argue that the doxastic norm of belief relies on the fact that agents take evidence as the only reason to believe.\(^1\) Pragmatists usually argue that nonevidential facts, like the motivational ones, may come into play when developing beliefs.\(^2\) There may be a tension between cognitive and possible conative facts that encourage belief formation. In that way, pragmatists state that there is not any fixed constitutive doxastic rule for beliefs. Beliefs may present good or bad outcomes, but that is an evaluative question in terms of different standards of correctness.

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I defend a constitutive norm of belief based on believers’ attitudes: an agent S that believes p, takes p to be true. The belief p may be true or false, and other evaluative norms of belief can evaluate the belief and the believer in terms of epistemic and nonepistemic standards of correctness.\(^3\) The constitutive norm I consider can accommodate to cases in which the evidence to believe is poor or there seems to be nonevidential reasons to believe. In that way, I defend a constitutive relation between belief and truth even if reasons to believe are based on poor or no evidence. Moreover, I defend, in general, a constitutive link between belief and truth independently of the reasons for belief.

In the first part of this paper, I briefly sketch the epistemic dichotomy between evidential and nonevidential reasons to believe. I show how the evidentialist positions are related to doxastic positions—i.e., how the aim and the norm of truth usually relate to a commitment to evidence—and how the nonevidentialist position relates to non-doxastic positions—i.e., how the aim of ‘the practical’ is sometimes related to nonevidential reasons to belief, like the motivational ones.

Second, I introduce the different approaches to the aim of belief. I sketch the normative and the nonnormative accounts and I develop the norm I am considering.

Third, I analyze the suggesting approach given by Daniel Whiting,\(^4\) who considers a practical aim of belief that relies in the evidence the agents take in order to develop beliefs, i.e., beliefs are based on evidence, beliefs aim at truth, and in that way, beliefs promote further practical actions. In that way, he tries to accommodate practical outcomes and truth.

I finally show the problems these approaches face and I state that the normativity of belief relies in the believers’ taking their beliefs to be true, no matter if beliefs are developed with an evidential or a nonevidential basis. The truth and the falsity of beliefs connotes an evaluative question that is not mandatory to establish a relation between belief and truth. Although beliefs can be correct or incorrect if they turn out to be true or false, respectively, the constitutive normativity of belief relies on the believer’s commitment to truth regardless of the final result.

Here I refer to three different kinds of cases: (1) beliefs based on reliable evidence that aim at truth and in which the truth is practical; (2)

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beliefs based on poor (or no) evidence that are false but practical, at least in the short run; and (3) beliefs based on reliable evidence that aim at truth but are not practical.

It should be noted that I make a difference between the evidential and the nonevidential in terms of epistemic and nonepistemic reasons. I do not want to use the term ‘practical reasons’ in contrast to ‘epistemic reasons,’ as sometimes the epistemic is the practical, and other times the nonepistemic is likely to be more practical. The practical is not at odds with the epistemic nor the nonepistemic.

Evidential Reasons vs. Nonevidential Reasons

(Hugo's pig case) Hugo sees something. It has a pig tail. It has pig ears. It smells like a pig. It snores like a pig. Hugo believes that he sees a pig.

Evidentialism considers that evidence is the reason for belief. The agents create beliefs because they receive evidential inputs. Hugo believes he sees a pig because he has straight evidence to believe so. Nevertheless, some beliefs are developed out of straight evidential inputs:

(Tom’s teacher case) Tom is in class. His teacher tells him and the rest of the pupils that the Earth is not the center of the universe. So, he believes that the Earth is not the center of the universe.

In this case, Tom and the pupils do not have any perceptual evidence to create their beliefs. But, as they trust their teacher, Tom and the pupils finally believe what the teacher says. Although there is no direct perceptual evidence, evidentialist philosophers may establish that Tom and the pupils have enough evidence to develop their beliefs.

Agents deal with different kinds of evidence: the one given by perceptual inputs, the one given by expertise and trustworthiness, the one given by social conditioning, and the one given by previous personal experiences. But even admitting a broader scope of evidence, the evidentialist has to deal with other complex cases, like wishful thinking ones:

(Mark’s love case) Mark is in love with Andrea and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Andrea does not love Mark, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Mark’s friends

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5 See Rinard, “Against the New Evidentialists.”
try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Mark has seen Andrea dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Mark, Andrea is just playing hardball with him. Mark believes Andrea loves him too.

The evidentialist has several options. She can say that Mark’s state is not belief, but just something like ‘stubborn conviction’ or *schmelief*, a state similar to belief but “governed by other aims, such as comfort and pleasantness.” But to consider that Mark’s state is not a belief is a revisionist, nonplausible option: most people agree that Mark’s state is a belief, even being a false one. A more plausible way of dealing with these kinds of cases from an evidentialist approach is to consider that Mark has many available pieces of evidence and that he took the ones that support his belief, e.g., Mark saw Andrea touching her hair when she saw him some days ago. Sometimes, the agent may create his own evidence to justify his belief.

The nonevidentialist philosopher may state that Mark develops his beliefs according to nonevidential reasons, like pragmatic emotional ones: Mark believes that Andrea loves him too because that makes him feel better and motivates him to carry on.

Some evidentialists may admit that there is something pragmatic or motivational that affects belief creation. That explains why Mark chooses weak and poor evidence rather than more reliable evidence, like the testimonies of good friends (trustworthiness evidence) and seeing Andrea meeting another guy (direct perceptual evidence). But what Mark finally chooses to create and maintain his belief is weak evidence. The evidentialist may also show the nonevidentialist other cases:

*(The earning money case)* Suppose that one knows that if one were to believe that David Cameron’s doctor’s uncle has 132,487 hairs on his head one would receive a generous amount of money ... since the fact that one would receive a financial reward were one to have the relevant belief is no evidence that the belief is true, it seems that one cannot take it to justify so believing.8

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6 See David Papineau, “There Are No Norms of Belief,” in *The Aim of Belief*, 64-79.
7 Engel, “In Defense of Normativism About the Aim of Belief,” 52.
8 Whiting, “Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action,” 220.
The agent cannot believe at will. Belief is said to be transparent, automatic, and involuntary.\(^9\) Psychological facts do not allow to create the beliefs we want to have, but they adjust to evidence. However, the nonevidentialist may also reply with other cases:

\textit{(The lottery case)} Jimmy decides to play the lottery. The probability of winning the lottery is 0.01%, but he believes that today he is going to win the lottery. Intuition or something like that tells him that. He believes he is going to win the lottery today.

The nonevidentialist shows that the evidence of winning the lottery is very small, as small as its probability. Nevertheless, Jimmy really takes to be true that he is going to win the lottery. This case is quite similar to Mark’s love case. The evidentialist may reply that, even if the probability is small, it exists. The problem would arise if Jimmy plays the lottery without any opportunity to win, that is, buying a number that is not inside the lottery machine. In that case, there is no evidence.

It should be noted that Jimmy may assume that the probability of winning the lottery is very small. He plays because he just ‘wants to try.’ But this is not our case: Jimmy is convinced that today is his special day for winning the lottery. If Jimmy just wants to try, his commitment to truth is very low and his state is rather a guess\(^{10}\) or the belief that he has a probability of 0.01\% of winning the lottery.

For the purposes of this paper, I do not need to defend an evidentialist or a nonevidentialist position. What I want to show is that belief is normative no matter if we have reliable, weak, or no evidence. In other terms, even if we assume nonevidential motivational reasons to believe, beliefs are normative. Nevertheless, I shall note that a middle point about evidence—considering it in a broad sense, admitting its existence in order to maintain beliefs, and admitting that in its choice influences nonevidential terms like pragmatic or motivational ones—may solve many of the problems and cases introduced in the debate. Perhaps, a deflated notion of evidence and the acceptance of conative features when selecting evidence are the clues. However, I want to show here that belief is normative independently of its reasons. The constitutive normativity relies on the believer involuntarily considering his belief to be true, and not on the correspondence of belief with


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the external reality. Even if we assume pragmatic nonevidential reasons to believe, beliefs are normative in this sense.

## The Aims of Belief

Many philosophers consider that the aim of belief is truth, following Williams’s maxim. Some of them interpret this aim in a normative way: there is a norm of belief that tells that a correct belief is a true belief. These philosophers are usually called doxastic absolutists and they reformulate the norm in ways that accommodate this normative nature of belief and the attitude of the believer. Another interpretation of this aim is the teleological one, in which the cognitive system presents a goal of truth when believing is motivated by biological, psychological, and evolutionary facts, education, and training. Normative and teleological epistemologists accept truth as an aim of belief. But normativists consider a norm of truth while believing and teleologists consider different values apart from truth or deflate truth in terms of moral, personal, or aesthetic underlying values. Teleologists’ commitment to truth is more lenient.

Taking the previous cases, Hugo considers that he sees a pig when he forms the belief that he sees a pig. It is clear that Hugo’s belief aims at truth. Similarly, Tom is automatically considering that he gets the truth when forming the belief that the Earth is not the center of the universe. The difference between Hugo and Tom is that the former takes his direct sensory perception, whereas the latter takes the expertise and authority of his teacher as evidence. Maybe Hugo is mistaken by his senses and what he sees is not a pig but a dog. However, delusions are not problematic for a constitutive normativity based on the believer’s attitude: although delusions are false beliefs, the believer considers them to be true; he simply fails in his performance. Similarly, Tom’s teacher can teach something false, but it is not a problem: Tom considers his belief to be true. Mark also considers his belief that Andrea loves him to be true and Jimmy also considers his belief of

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13 One option is for an agent S and a belief p, S should believe p if and only if p is true.” Interestingly, Whiting proposes a falsationist view of this normativity: “S may believe p if and only if p is true. See Whiting, “Should I Believe the Truth?” A stronger epistemic commitment is adopted by the norm of knowledge proposed by Engel, Williamson, and Gibbons.


15 Papineau, “There Are No Norms of Belief.”
winning the lottery today to be true, but these cases are different: we know that the former is false, while the latter is highly unlikely. Moreover, both Mark and Jimmy have enough evidence of the falsity or the unlikeliness of their beliefs being true, but it does not break the constitutive relationship between belief and truth that I defend.

Traditionally, philosophers have related doxastic positions with evidentialism. Beliefs aim at truth because they are created according to evidence. Hugo believes that he truly sees a pig because he has evidence. Tom considers that his belief about the Earth not being the center of the universe is true because he takes the trustworthiness on his teacher as evidence. Even in the love and lottery cases, doxastic philosophers may assume that Mark and Jimmy consider their beliefs to be true because they take some evidence, no matter if the evidence is false or poor and so their beliefs incorrect. In other words, false beliefs do not pose any problem for the doxastic position of belief: they are just mistakes—in the same way that an expert teacher can be mistaken and teach an incorrect issue, or in the same way that being in a desert may create delusional beliefs on agents. In the earning money case, as the agent has no evidence, he cannot create a belief; whereas, in the case of the lottery, similarly to Mark’s love, Jimmy’s belief aiming at the ‘extremely unlikely truth’ that he is going to win the lottery might be explained in terms of the poor evidence of having a very small probability of winning it—as small as you want but the chance is always there.

Another possible approach to the aim of belief is the pragmatic one: belief aims at pragmatic considerations or belief aims at justification, in pragmatical terms. It is not a common view among epistemologists; sometimes, it is openly criticized but it deserves some explanation in order to use it in the following sections. From that point of view, there is no doxastic absolutism and constitutive norms about belief, and the only internal motivational requirement would be that of fitting the world and getting practical outcomes. Hugo believes he sees a pig to manage the environment and get some profit, i.e., perhaps he is hungry and seeing that pig allows him to hunt it. Similarly, Tom believes what his teacher tells him because it is useful, i.e., such information is likely to be useful to pass the test and thus get

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17 See Owens, “Does Belief Have an Aim?”


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a better job in the future. This approach can explain Mark’s love for Andrea in a more intuitive manner: Mark develops his belief that Andrea also loves him to feel better and keep on; his belief has practical and motivational reasons and consequences. In the lottery case, Jimmy’s belief that he is going to win the lottery is not useful, as he has very little chance of winning. The pragmatist might argue that Jimmy’s belief allows him to feel better during the day. Nevertheless, this pragmatic approach hardly explains the earning money case: the most useful practical outcome is to believe that David Cameron’s uncle has 132,487 hairs in his head, but we cannot believe it at will as we have no evidence for its truth. The pragmatist may offer possible scenarios in which not believing that David Cameron’s uncle has 132,487 hairs in his head is something useful. But there are other cases in which agents believe the truth, and such truth hardly seems to be useful. Opposite to wishful thinking cases like Mark’s love for Andrea and Jimmy’s lottery, there are beliefs in which epistemic analyses are more accurate than pragmatic ones:

(Kate’s hated terrorist son case) Kate is terminally ill. Her son is a terrorist hated by the whole, or almost the whole, country and she believes so because there is enough reliable evidence showing that her son is a terrorist.

In this case, to believe the truth is not practical. For Kate, the most practical thing is to believe that her son is innocent, but she does not as she has evidence to believe he is guilty. It is difficult to envisage situations in which believing the truth is useful for Kate. Or at least, it is a very plausible option to consider that it is more practical for Kate to believe that her son is innocent better than to consider that her son is guilty.

Traditionally, pragmatism is related to nonevidentialism in a broad sense: we may take evidence as the reason for belief if it is practical, but we can also have other practical nonevidential reasons for belief. Hugo’s pig and Tom’s teacher cases are among the former, while Mark’s love and Jimmy’s lottery cases are among the latter. In other words, when the evidence forms useful beliefs, pragmatic accounts coincide with straight epistemic accounts. When nonevidential reasons (like motivational ones) contribute to the formation of beliefs, pragmatism offers a plausible approach for these beliefs (like in wishful thinking). But pragmatism can hardly manage cases where there is no evidence to believe the practical (as in the earning money case) or where beliefs are not practical (as in Kate’s hated terrorist son case).

19 See Rinard, “Against the New Evidentialists.”
Evidentialists may state that in Mark’s love case, Mark takes evidence to form belief, and in that way, his belief aims at truth. The only problem is that he takes poor or weak evidence. In that case, they have to give a chance to the nonevidentialist, by admitting that pragmatic motivational reasons—or broadly put, non-evidential conative reasons—influence the way Mark chooses the evidence.

It can be said that, in the long run, the most practical thing is to get the truth, and so take only reliable evidence and no other nonevidential reasons. So, even if Mark is happier considering that Andrea loves him, in the long run, he will be better if he knows the reality as soon as possible: in that way, truth will hurt Mark less and he can start thinking about other things. However, that is not the way beliefs work: Mark is convinced of the requited love no matter if it is more or less practical in the short run or in the long run. If we assume that the most practical thing in the long run is truth, then there are beliefs that are neither true nor practical. These beliefs can be negatively evaluated, so there can be evaluative norms on beliefs in terms of different standards of correctness. For instance, from an epistemic standard of correctness, a belief is correct if and only if it is true. From a more pragmatic standard of correctness, a belief is correct if and only if it is useful. Mark’s love case is incorrect from an epistemic standard of correctness, and it can be positively evaluated in the short run from a pragmatic standard of correctness and negatively evaluated in the long run from the same pragmatic standard of correctness. But the constitutive norm of belief I am considering does not relate to the outcomes or their correctness, but to the very attitude of the believer while believing: the believer of $p$ takes $p$ to be true. In that way, I establish a constitutive link between belief and truth no matter how the belief is formed, no matter how nonevidential reasons may influence belief formation, and no matter if the belief turns out to be either true or false.

An Evidential Approach to Belief That Aims at Practical Reasoning for Actions

Recently, some philosophers are exploring a new direction: to consider that beliefs aim at truth, truth provides practical reasoning for further action, and as a result, agents take evidence to create those beliefs. Far from assuming the traditional dichotomy between epistemic and practical perspectives, they try to include the former into the latter. Among these

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philosophers, Whiting\textsuperscript{22} has recently offered an accurate approach: he considers that evidence is the only reason to create beliefs because beliefs aim at truth and in that way such beliefs aim at practical reasoning for subsequent actions. When forming beliefs, agents aim at truth, truth constitutes practical reasoning for action, and as a result they choose only evidence that ensures they can get these practical considerations. In Whiting’s words:

A subject takes something to be a reason for believing that \( p \) only if it provides evidence that \( p \), because only evidence that \( p \) indicates that, were she to believe that \( p \), she would satisfy her aim to believe that \( p \) only if that \( p \) is a practical reason.

In effect, I am suggesting that the aim of believing only what is a practical reason generates or incorporates a more familiar aim which is satisfied only if one’s belief is true, that is, only if what one believes is a fact.

... appealing to the independently motivated suggestion that subjects aim to believe only what is a practical reason explains why they aim to believe only the truth — subjects have the former aim because they have the latter aim.\textsuperscript{23}

In the background, we have the idea that truth is practical: “a subject cannot have a particular practical aim which conflicts with and overrides the aim to believe only the truth.”\textsuperscript{24} We can resume Whiting’s position in three main ideas about beliefs:

(i) Beliefs aim at truth.
(ii) Truth constitutes practical reasoning for further actions.
(iii) A commitment to evidentialism.

The result of making a difference between belief and actions, and the result of conjugating both practical considerations for actions and evidentialism for beliefs, are what allow the agents to accommodate some


\textsuperscript{23} Whiting, “Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action,” 225-6.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 227.
kind of pragmatism with doxastic normativism. Nevertheless, some of our examples pose some problems to these principles.

In Hugo’s pig case, it is possible to state that Hugo’s belief that he sees a pig is a practical reason to act—i.e., as I said before, perhaps he is hungry and seeing the pig allows him to hunt it—and its usefulness is motivated by perceptual evidence. Similarly, in Tom’s teacher case, Tom’s belief about the Earth not being the center of the universe is practical in order to pass the test and get a better job in the future, and such belief is based on the evidence given by the authority and expertise of his teacher. In these cases, both (i) and (ii) are accomplished.

In Mark’s love case, we may also state that belief aims at practical reasoning: the false belief is useful in order to feel better and carry on. Nevertheless, as already stated, we can have both evidentialist and nonevidentialist analyses of the case: if we accept the former, then we assume that Mark takes some weak or poor evidence to create and maintain his belief, he considers his belief to be true and as a result his belief provides him with practical reasoning to act. That is feasible for Whiting. If we assume the latter, then Whiting’s approach is not feasible (¬iii). Whiting assumes evidentialism from the beginning, stating that “[I]f evidentialism is the thesis that only evidence provides reason for believing, then subjects are committed to evidentialism.”

In the earning money case, what is practical for the agents is to create false beliefs in order to earn a lot of money. But as agents do not have the proper evidence (¬iii), they cannot do it (¬i). Evidence and practical outcomes are at odds, and no belief is developed. For Whiting, in order to analyze the earning money case, we need first to assume that evidence is mandatory to develop beliefs and that this lack of evidence is not practical, as it does not allow us to develop the practical belief. Whiting argues that the aim of belief is to provide reasons from evidences for acting and reasoning. In cases like the earning money case, agents cannot develop these beliefs because they do not have the evidence.

In the lottery case, what is practical for Jimmy is not to play the lottery. Nevertheless, similar to Mark’s love case, one might say that it is useful for Jimmy to believe he is going to win the lottery to face the day ahead (i, ii). If we accept an evidentialist approach, we might say that there is little evidence—as little as the probability of winning the lottery—but it still exists (iii). If we do not accept it, Whiting’s approach is not possible, as belief aims at the practical because there are evidential reasons for it.

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25 Ibid., 219.
26 See ibid.
In the case of Kate’s hated terrorist son, what is practical for Kate is to believe that her son is innocent, but she does not. It is difficult to envisage situations in which knowing the truth is more useful than knowing the falsity, as Kate is terminally ill and she is likely to be happier believing that her son is innocent. Here, belief aims at truth, but it is difficult to consider that truth to be practical reasoning for action (¬ii), and all this is based on reliable evidence (iii). As I said, some philosophers may argue that in the long run the most practical option is the doxastic one, but in this case, Kate has no ‘long run.’ Whiting takes it difficult to think about beliefs on which agents will not act on or reason in any way from. All beliefs provide practical reasoning for further action or thought. In other words, truths given by beliefs always work as practical reasons for actions or thoughts, even if it is difficult to envisage how a particular belief can provide practical reasoning for action or thought, like in the case of Kate’s hated terrorist son. For these cases, Whiting considers a holism about beliefs: even if a given belief seems to provide no reason to act or think, this belief stands in systematic links with other beliefs. In other words, an apparent useless or bad belief influences many other beliefs. A belief that a subject knows presents no potential practical or theoretical significance for latter action would be the exception, not the rule.

In short, in order to apply Whiting’s ideas to different belief cases, we need to assume: (a) evidence is necessary to form beliefs, (b) beliefs aim at truth based on evidence and not directly at practical issues, and (c) truth always constitutes practical reasoning to act but it is not the only practical reasoning to act. It can be thought that in some cases these conditions are too demanding. We need to assume the existence of evidence to form beliefs in cases in which nonevidentialist approaches seem to be good approaches, e.g., Mark’s love case and Jimmy’s lottery case. Moreover, we need to assume that belief aims at truth, truth being a practical consideration based on evidence in some cases in which it seems more plausible to think that belief aims at true nonpractical considerations based on evidence, e.g., Kate’s hated terrorist son case. In other words, Whiting’s approach implies that (1) evidence is necessary to form beliefs and (2) truth constitutes practical reasoning for subsequent action. It denies nonevidential reasons to form beliefs: it denies possible beliefs based on nonevidential reasons that aim at practical outcomes and that truths may not constitute practical reasoning for further action or thinking.

Whiting in some way realizes these criticisms:

28 See Whiting, “Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action.”
I have accounted for the fact that a subject cannot take practical considerations to justify or favor having a certain belief on the basis of which she will act or decide, since to do so might be to thwart her aim to act only on practical reasons. But suppose that a subject knows that, if she were to believe some utterly trivial proposition which will never figure in her practical reasoning, she would receive a large reward ... Why, then, can’t she take the fact of the reward to justify so believing? ....

If the relevant subject is to take the practical consideration to justify believing the trivial proposition, she must take the belief to be, not only one which she will not act on, but one which she will not reason in any way from. It is not clear what kind of belief would pass this test. 29

Whiting answers to possible critics considering that beliefs formed on nonevidential reasons are beliefs that agents cannot use to act or to reason, so they cannot be practical reasons for action. He argues that the aim of belief is to provide reasons from evidences for further acting and reasoning. In cases like the earning money case, the truth given by the belief is different from the apparent practical reasoning for action based on no evidence: agents cannot develop these beliefs because they do not have the proper evidence. So, truth constitutes practical reasoning for action, but it is not the only practical reasoning actions may have. Agents may act in terms of their desires. And beliefs aim at truth as they are based on evidence. In short, Whiting’s way of accommodating pragmatic and epistemic perspectives relies on making a difference between beliefs as states and actions, on considering truth as practical reasoning for actions, and on a commitment to evidentialism. Let’s recall Mark’s case:

*(Mark’s love case)* Mark is in love with Andrea and he is convinced that it is a requited love. Andrea does not love Mark, and she tells him so. Furthermore, Mark’s friends try to convince him showing opposite evidence and Mark has himself seen Andrea dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for Mark, Andrea is just playing hardball with him. Mark believes Andrea loves him too.

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29 Ibid., 232–3.
According to Whiting’s ideas, Mark needs some evidence to develop his belief that Andrea loves him too. This belief is false, but Mark takes it to be true because of some evidence. This, then, provides a practical reason that guides his action or thought. The evidence is likely to be poor. For instance, maybe Mark saw Andrea touching her hair the last time she saw him. But the evidence exists. On the contrary, a nonevidentialist philosopher would say that Mark does not need any evidence to develop his belief.

Another possible reply is that Mark’s state is not a belief but a desire. He desires that Andrea loves him too, but as he has no evidence, the requited love is a desire and not a belief. There is no requited love, but just a desire to have this. This desire can also constitute practical reasoning to act. Nevertheless, the state of Mark is not only a desire, but also a belief: a false belief, but a belief, and to some extent it is also a useful belief.

I consider that there is a constitutive link between belief and truth that is independent of the evidence the believer may have: believers take their beliefs to be true, regardless of the good, bad, or nonexistent evidence they may have. This option covers the possible cases and alternatives. Only a belief whose believer considers to be false would be a counterexample, but it is not clear which belief would pass this test.

As I see it, reasons for belief sometimes may be epistemic (e.g., Hugo’s and Tom’s cases) and other times may be nonepistemic 30 (e.g., Mark’s and Jimmy’s cases). We can also find cases in which epistemic reasons are not powerful enough to develop beliefs (e.g., Mark’s love and Jimmy’s lottery cases) and also examples in which nonepistemic reasons are not powerful enough to develop beliefs (e.g., the earning money and Kate’s hated terrorist son cases). Whiting relates practical reasons with epistemic reasons, but the practical may be epistemic or nonepistemic depending on the specific case.

In other words, we can have both cognitive and conative reasons for belief: in some beliefs, the cognitive reasons are more powerful than the conative reasons, while in others the conative reasons are more powerful than the cognitive ones. The definition of the “practical” can be both cognitive or conative, but it depends on the specific case.31 Moreover, beliefs may not be practical even if they are based on accurate evidences, such as in the case of Kate’s hated terrorist son.

30 When I speak of nonepistemic reasons, I refer to reasons in which there can be evidential incomes, but they are not the main ones. In other words, the nonepistemic reasons may or may not include evidential reasons, but if there are evidential reasons to believe, they are outweighed by other nonevidential reasons.

31 See Rinard, “Against the New Evidentialists.”
In the next section I defend a constitutive normativity of belief without needing a commitment to evidentialism: believers consider their beliefs to be true.

**Nonreasons for Belief Aiming at Truth**

So far, I have sketched the evidentialist and nonevidentialist accounts. I have briefly related them to the doxastic and pragmatic approaches to the aim of belief. Finally, I have analyzed the account proposed by Daniel Whiting.

This approach is based on two main principles: evidentialism and belief aiming at practical considerations. The author tries to accommodate practical outcomes and reasons, to epistemic outcomes and reasons. Nevertheless, I have showed some possible counterparts:

(i) Evidence is not always practical. Sometimes, the motivational seems to be more practical.

(ii) Some beliefs are not formed on evidence. Or at least, these beliefs are not based on the best reliable available evidence. Other nonevidential considerations come into play.

I defend that belief is normative, but in another way:

(a) Believers consider their beliefs to be true.
(b) Reasons to believe do not matter for (a).

The believer has an involuntary commitment\(^{32}\) to truth: she always considers that her beliefs are true. For that reason, I do not need to assume an evidentialist nor a nonevidentialist position to defend a constitutive relationship between belief and truth. I do not need to care about the necessity or the reliability of the evidence. If we assume that there is no evidence for belief emergence, belief still aims at truth in the sense that, once the believer has her belief—no matter how it is formed—the believer is mirroring her reality—no matter if such reflection is correct or incorrect.

Agents may present ‘different truths.’ So, one agent may believe \(p\) and another agent may believe \(\neg p\): although their beliefs about the same fact are different, both are epistemically committed to truth. Different agents may have ‘different truths,’ and we may defend an external knowledge as the goal of belief, but the relationship between knowledge and truth is beyond the

\(^{32}\) See Gibbons, “Knowledge versus Truth.”

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scope of this paper. Every agent aims at her truth when believing. The goal of these truths may be a trustworthy established knowledge, and in this process, reliable evidence and subjective honesty are likely to be necessary, but I just want to show that when believing—no matter ‘how good or bad’ —the believer presents a commitment to truth. The constitutive normativity of belief relies in the believer involuntarily aiming at truth.

Hugo believes he sees a pig, so he considers that he truly sees a pig. Moreover, we may consider that he has good perceptual evidence for believing so. Perhaps his senses fail, he can be under the effects of hallucinogenic drugs, and what he sees is not a pig. But even under delusions, Hugo considers that what he sees is truly a pig.

Similarly, Tom believes that the Earth is not the center of the universe, so he considers that it is true that the Earth is not the center of the universe. Furthermore, we may consider that his teacher’s testimony is good evidence for such belief. But his professor might be mistaken. Actually, for hundreds of years before, the most intelligent men believed that the Earth was the center of the universe. But it does not matter for our purposes, because Tom is under our constitutive norm: when believing that the Earth is the center of the universe, he considers that it is true that the Earth is the center of the universe.

Mark believes his love for Andrea is requited, so he considers the requited love to be true. We know it is false. The evidence actually shows he is mistaken: his friends know that, and they even try to convince him. Moreover, he himself has seen Andrea dating another guy. But it does not matter: Mark considers true that Andrea loves him too. As I said, in these wishful thinking examples, we may consider weak or poor evidence for believing (e.g., Andrea touched her hair the last time she saw Mark) or we may consider no evidence at all. It does not make any difference for our purposes: Mark believes his love is requited and when doing so, he takes it to be true that his love is requited. His belief aims at truth. His truth and his friends’ truth are different. But the constitutive normativity of belief I defend relies on the agent considering truth that he believes and not on the final result and the external judgment of beliefs—even if getting this knowledge is commonly desirable.

In the earning money case, agents do not believe that David Cameron’s doctor’s uncle has 132,487 hairs on his head, because they simply do not consider that to be true. Evidentialists may also offer a reason: the

33 See the following: Pascal Engel, “Truth and the Aim of Belief,” in Laws and Models in Science, ed. by Donald Gillies (London: King’s College Press, 2004), 77–97; Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits; and Gibbons, “Knowledge versus Truth.”

agents do not have enough evidence, and as a result, they cannot develop the
belief. In terms of the constitutive norm I defend, the agents are epistemically
committed, and as they cannot consider true that David Cameron’s doctor’s
uncle has 132,487 hairs on his head, they cannot believe so.

Jimmy believes he is going to win the lottery. In doing so, he
considers true that he is going to win the lottery, even if he has poor, or no
evidence at all. This case is quite similar to Mark’s love case and it implies an
explicit belief of winning the lottery. Jimmy could also play the lottery ‘just
to try,’ knowing that he has a probability of 0.01% of winning the lottery but
not minding it. This is not our belief: this latter case is just a guess\(^{35}\) or the
belief that he has a probability of 0.01% of winning the lottery.

Kate believes her son is a hated terrorist, and when doing so, she
considers true that her son is a hated terrorist. For our purposes, this case is
very similar to Hugo’s and Tom’s case: Kate just takes reliable evidence and
she forms her belief, even when she would like to believe that her son is
innocent. Here the nonevidential reasons for belief do not come into play but
all this does not make any difference for my position: Kate just believes that
her son is a hated terrorist, so she considers such thing to be true.

So, reasons for belief are independent of the constitutive norm of
belief I propose: once a person has a belief about something, she takes it to be
ture. This is not in tension with the possibility of degrees of believing. So, the
epistemic commitment\(^{36}\) of Hugo while seeing the pig may be stronger than
the epistemic commitment of Tom when listening to his teacher. And the
epistemic commitment of the latter may be stronger than the epistemic
commitment of Kate when thinking about her son, and this may be stronger
than the epistemic commitment of Jimmy playing the lottery. But all these
beliefs, as well as Mark and John’s beliefs, aim at the truth, in the sense that
the believers take their beliefs to be true. And, most important, we do not
need to assume any specific kind of reason for belief in order to defend this
constitutive normative account of belief. Even if we need reasons in order to
evaluate beliefs and to consider knowledge, the constitutive norm of belief
relies in the agent’s considerations during the act of believing regardless of
the reasons and the results.

Conclusions

I have analyzed different ways of relating the nature of belief and its
reasons and I finally defend a doxastic constitutive normativity of belief

\(^{35}\) See Owens, “Does Belief Have an Aim?”

\(^{36}\) See Gibbons, “Knowledge versus Truth.”
independent of its reasons: the believer considers true what she believes. For that, I treat different kinds of belief.

There are beliefs that aim at truth and that are motivated by evidential reasons. These beliefs may be practical. These are the cases of Hugo’s pig and Tom’s teacher.

Other beliefs are motivated by poor or no evidence. Nonepistemic reasons influence their formation. These are wishful thinking cases like Mark’s love and the lottery case. These beliefs are false or likely to be false, as in the lottery case. They are hardly explained by evidentialist approaches. We have seen two of them: a traditional normative one that considers that beliefs aim at truth and are motivated by evidential reasons, and Whiting’s\(^{37}\) approach (also normative) that considers that beliefs are motivated by evidential reasons, beliefs aim at truth, and truth constitutes a practical consideration for further action and thinking. If we give a chance to evidentialism, we need to assume the existence of poor evidence that is outweighed by nonevidential reasons.

A third kind of beliefs is motivated by reliable evidence. These beliefs aim at truth, but they are not practical, as in the case of Kate’s hated terrorist son. These beliefs are hardly explained by approaches that relate belief and practical considerations. Such cases also pose a problem for Whiting’s approach: they are based on evidence and they are not practical. The earning money case is also problematic for the ‘belief aiming at practical considerations’ approach: it is practical to develop a specific belief, but it is not possible without proper evidence.

After this analysis, I defend that all believers aim at truth when believing. It does not matter if their beliefs are caused by epistemic evidential or motivational nonevidential reasons, if they are practical or not. Once the agent believes something, she considers it to be true. The constitutive normativity of belief is set just on the act of \textit{aiming} at truth done by the \textit{believer}. The reasons and the results of beliefs are independent of this constitutive normativity that relates belief and truth: \textit{believers just aim at truth}.

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\(^{37}\) See Whiting, “Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action.”
References


A Case for Machine Ethics in Modeling Human-Level Intelligent Agents

Robert James M. Boyles

Abstract: This paper focuses on the research field of machine ethics and how it relates to a technological singularity—a hypothesized, futuristic event where artificial machines will have greater-than-human-level intelligence. One problem related to the singularity centers on the issue of whether human values and norms would survive such an event. To somehow ensure this, a number of artificial intelligence researchers have opted to focus on the development of artificial moral agents, which refers to machines capable of moral reasoning, judgment, and decision-making. To date, different frameworks on how to arrive at these agents have been put forward. However, there seems to be no hard consensus as to which framework would likely yield a positive result. With the body of work that they have contributed in the study of moral agency, philosophers may contribute to the growing literature on artificial moral agency. While doing so, they could also think about how the said concept could affect other important philosophical concepts.

Keywords: machine ethics, artificial moral agents, technological singularity, philosophy of artificial intelligence

Introduction

Throughout history, technological advancements have led to philosophical inquiry. Developments in artificial intelligence (AI) research, for instance, have prompted philosophers to look into its surrounding foundational issues.¹ This paper examines one of the said issues, specifically focusing on the nature of artificial moral agency and how this relates to a technological singularity, the point in which AI will have greater-than-human-level abilities. Furthermore, this paper also suggests that it is

¹ A number of these philosophical issues are discussed in Matt Carter, Minds and Computers: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, Ltd., 2007), 202-206.
high time for philosophers to get into the picture and discuss the ethical implications of the rise of intelligent machines.

**Ethical Machines and the Singularity**

The idea of artificial moral agents (AMAs) refers to artificial intelligent systems capable of moral reasoning, judgment, and decision-making. It forms part and parcel of what Goertzel\(^2\) defines as artificial general intelligence (AGI).\(^3\) Computer systems with human-like general intelligence are AGIs. Contrasted with “narrow artificial intelligence” or “narrow AI,” which only exhibits intelligence regarding “specific, narrowly constrained problems,” AGIs exhibit a variety of human-like, intelligent behavior. Chess computer programs, for instance, could be classified as narrow AI systems because they are only considered to be intelligent in a single human domain—that is, playing chess. In contrast, an AGI is hypothesized to be intelligent in most, if not all, aspects of human cognition. Since one of the central human cognitive abilities is the capability to reason about moral issues, AGIs should, therefore, include the intellectual activity of moral reasoning (i.e., AGIs should be AMAs as well).

The idea of a singularity, on the other hand, refers to a hypothesized, futuristic event where greater-than-human-level intelligence exists—intelligences that are deemed to be a natural offshoot of modeling AI systems.\(^5\) From this event, it is further hypothesized, that an intelligence explosion would follow.\(^6\) If such an event were to happen, it would put into question a lot of our default notions about reality, truth, and life, including most of our ideas about what is right and wrong.

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\(^3\) Throughout the entire paper, the acronyms AI and AGI are used interchangeably.

\(^4\) Ibid., 1162.

\(^5\) The idea of a greater-than-human-level intelligence being a consequence of developing human-level AIs is further discussed in the subsequent sections. Note that such view may be traced in Irving John Good, “Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine,” in *Advances in Computers*, vol. 6, ed. by Franz L. Alt and Morris Rubinoff (New York: Academic Press, 1966). In addition, the same view is also discussed in David J. Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” in *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 17:9-10 (2010), 7-65.

The term “singularity” has long been used in mathematics and (astro)physics. In mathematics, the singularity refers to “a value that transcends any finite limitation.” For example, the function \( y = \frac{1}{x} \) leads to a singularity since the value of \( y \) increases as \( x \) approaches zero (e.g., \( 1/0.0001 \) is greater than \( 1/0.001 \) as these operations result to 10,000 and 1,000, respectively). Keeping in mind that any number divided by zero yields a mathematically undefined result, the quotient reaches infinity as the value of \( x \) approaches this mark. In physics, the notion of a singularity could be best understood by looking at the aftermath of a star’s death (i.e., when a supernova occurs). Kurzweil explains that a “singularity” is created at the center of a massive star that undergoes a supernova explosion. The remnant of the star collapses to this center, which is said to be a point of apparently zero volume and infinite density. This rupture in the space-time fabric is then called a black hole.

The basic idea of a singularity within the fields of mathematics and physics, therefore, highlights instances wherein our standard models for understanding things just breakdown. This means that our most up-to-date theories cannot account for the phenomenon that needs explaining. For the present study, we consider another type of singularity—that is, the posited (technological) singularity that centers on intelligence. Science fiction literature serves as a storehouse of scientific knowledge, and it is able to project future technologies that are not yet available today. In a way, the same may be said with regard to the

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9 Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 36.
10 The difficulties of studying the very nature of black holes are well documented. For instance, see Brian Greene, *The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999). Here it is highlighted that, in physics, it is widely accepted that Einstein’s theory of general relativity best fits the study of huge and heavy things (e.g., stars, planets, etc.). Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, is used to deal with small and light objects such as atoms, subatomic particles, and so on. The problem with black holes is that, as defined above, it is both heavy and small. So, does one use general relativity because black holes have an infinite density? Or, should quantum mechanics be used instead given that it is a finite point? Furthermore, all the laws (of physics) supposedly break down in such singularities. This idea is also highlighted in Stephen W. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time* (New York: Bantam Books, 1988) and Roger Penrose, “Black Holes,” in *The World Treasury of Physics, Astronomy and Mathematics*, ed. by Timothy Ferris (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1991).
11 This idea is discussed in Walter Moser and Craig Moyes, “Literature—A Storehouse of Knowledge?” in *SubStance*, 22 (1993), 126-140.
development of machines with artificial minds. Carter, for instance, notes that the abstract idea of “mechanical men” or robots may be traced back to the science fiction literature of the early to mid-twentieth century.\textsuperscript{12}

The idea of robots, or inanimate objects coming to life, dates back to the early Greeks, especially in the story of the mythological god Hephaestus, who created sophisticated machines.\textsuperscript{13} The term “robot,” on the other hand, was first used in Čapek’s play, \textit{R.U.R.},\textsuperscript{14} to refer to human-like creatures capable of intelligence. In a sense, before there was a full-blown academic discipline devoted to the study of both robotics and artificial intelligence, science fiction literature toyed with this idea first. The same turn from fiction to reality is envisaged by futurists concerning the idea of an intelligence explosion or a singularity.\textsuperscript{15}

In the discipline of artificial intelligence, the term “singularity” refers to a point in human history that would drastically change life on earth as this would mark the creation of greater-than-human intelligence, followed by an intelligence explosion.\textsuperscript{16} To differentiate this from its counterpart concepts in mathematics and astrophysics, this has been often dubbed as the “technological singularity.”\textsuperscript{17}

Many credit the statistician and computer scientist I.J. Good as one of the pioneers of the idea of a singularity, and the first who thought of the possible implications of an intelligence explosion through the rise of intelligent machines.\textsuperscript{18} The main idea is that, after the creation of the first ultraintelligent machine (i.e., a greater-than-human artificial intelligence system), an intelligent explosion would occur, since the first AI would (mass) produce the next generation of higher intelligent machines. In effect, by iterating this process, the result would be the creation of a whole assembly line of intelligent machines.\textsuperscript{19} In Good’s own words:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{12}] See Carter, \textit{Minds and Computers}, 1.
  \item[\textsuperscript{13}] See Stefanos A. Paipetis, \textit{The Unknown Technology in Homer} (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media BV, 2010), 107-111.
  \item[\textsuperscript{14}] See Karel Čapek, \textit{R.U.R.}, trans. by David Wylie (Adelaide: eBooks@Adelaide, University of Adelaide Library, 2016).
  \item[\textsuperscript{16}] See Kurzweil, \textit{The Singularity is Near}, 24-25.
  \item[\textsuperscript{17}] For the purposes of this work, the term “singularity” would be used to simply refer to this.
  \item[\textsuperscript{19}] As discussed earlier, this is somewhat comparable to the value of \(x\) that becomes larger and larger. See Kurzweil, \textit{The Singularity is Near}, 35-36.
\end{itemize}
Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an “intelligence explosion,” and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. … Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control. It is curious that this point is made so seldom outside of science fiction. It is sometimes worthwhile to take science fiction seriously.20

Good argues that a direct consequence of developing ultraintelligent machines is the creation of more sophisticated AIs. These further creations, however, would not be designed by human beings any longer. For him, it is hard not to think of the scenario that these machines would eventually perform the same creative endeavors of modeling intelligent systems. But, given that this first generation of ultraintelligent machines are more intelligent than humans, it is conceivable that they would also be able to develop more sophisticated AI machines that could further surpass their own intellectual capabilities. In relation to this, also explaining the potential reason why these AI systems might undergo such process of self-improvement, Muehlhauser and Bostrom argue that:

We can predict that advanced AIs will have instrumental goals to preserve themselves, acquire resources, and self-improve, because those goals are useful intermediaries to the achievement of almost any set of final goals. Thus, when we build an AI that is as skilled as we are at the task of designing AI systems, we may thereby initiate a rapid, AI-motivated cascade of self-improvement cycles. Now when the AI improves itself, it improves the intelligence that does the improving, quickly leaving the human level of intelligence far behind.21

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This is why Good states that the first ultraintelligent machine would arguably be the last invention of humankind. It is because all future generations of AI would be made by their fellow machines and so on. One other philosopher who has recently scrutinized the idea of the singularity is David Chalmers. For him, there are pros and cons to be considered.

For Chalmers, the singularity could be considered one of the most significant events in human history. In a post-singularity world, life on earth may drastically change to the point of human incomprehensibility. Consider the impacts (i.e., both the positive and negative ones) that could result from the creation of sophisticated AI systems.

For the positive effects of a singularity, it is very likely that remedies for certain diseases deemed incurable at present (e.g., HIV virus, cancer, etc.) could be discovered eventually as the intelligence level of those on earth continuously grows. Several social problems such as racial discrimination, food scarcity, and poverty, among others, could also be addressed by such intelligent beings, not to mention resolving age-old mathematical, scientific, and even philosophical puzzles, to name a few. Perhaps, it might be the case that these concerns only pervade us today because the current intellectual capabilities of humans are quite limited. The kinds of beings that would exist after the singularity, in contrast, would be of greater-than-human intelligence. Thus, it could be held that these problems could be solved by them. However, even though a singularity could yield positive outcomes, it could also produce negative ones.

There are a number of potential dangers that might result from an intelligence explosion. Among these include the “end to the human race, an arms race of warring machines, [and] the power to destroy the planet.” The annihilation of humanity is not as far-fetched as one may think given that it is possible that AI systems and their next generations could have a different set of values compared to human beings. To hammer more on this point, consider a rough analogy motivated by the question: “Could it really be explained to pigs (i.e., making them fully understand) why it is ethically acceptable to slaughter them?”

It could be said that pig’s meat is staple food for us, humans, and that this is a reasonable way of justifying why we slaughter and eat them. However, it might be difficult, if not impossible, to make pigs really understand this reason. Setting aside the obvious problem of conversing with

23 Compare this with Kurzweil’s view that any problem, insoluble as it may seem at present, has a corresponding solution (i.e., an idea). See Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near, 23-25.
25 See ibid., 24-29.
one another, it could be said that, given their intellectual capacities, they would not be able to fully comprehend such rationale.\textsuperscript{26}

By the same token, it is plausible to suppose that the projected AI systems in the future would have a different value system from us given their higher level of intelligence. To further explain this, consider the different ways of arriving at artificial intelligence, which would, ideally, have to be considerate of human values as well. Chalmers, for instance, identifies two options, which are the human-based approaches and non-human-based ones.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Methods for Modeling Artificial Intelligence}

For Chalmers, there are two ways to develop artificial general intelligence, namely: human-based and non-human-based methods.\textsuperscript{28} Tracks toward the creation of artificial intelligence that employ human-based options extend or upgrade the biological makeup of humans.\textsuperscript{29} This means that such methods aim to duplicate or simulate the biological brains of human beings.\textsuperscript{30} The advantage of this approach is that “[t]he resulting systems are likely to have the same basic values as their human sources.”\textsuperscript{31} The ethical values of the ensuing AI creations that employ the human-based path would remain unchanged (i.e., to what they originally had before their enhancement procedure).

Non-human-based options, on the other hand, build AIs through designing computer programs, learning systems, or any other means that does not enhance the biological constituents of humans. For these methods, Wallach and Allen identify three possible ways,\textsuperscript{32} namely: the top-down or direct programming track, bottom-up or developmental approaches, and the hybrid of these two.

\textsuperscript{26} Here, we could also relate Wittgenstein’s idea that, even if a lion could speak, human beings would not be able to understand it. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations} (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1953), 190.  
\textsuperscript{28} For the purposes of this paper, the human-based and non-human based options will be discussed in light of how they may account for ethical AI systems.  
\textsuperscript{30} This coincides with Vinge’s four tracks towards creating greater-than-human-intelligence. See Vinge, “The Coming of Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era.” Note that Vinge’s intelligence amplification and biological approaches share certain commonalities with Chalmers’ concept of human-based artificial intelligence. This is because both support the idea of creating intelligent systems via harnessing the physiological makeup of human beings.  
\textsuperscript{31} Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” 25.  
\textsuperscript{32} An overview of all these tracks are highlighted in Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen, \textit{Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
Top-down approaches subscribe to the idea that artificial moral agents may be developed via programming moral principles into artifacts so that their actions and behaviors would be regulated by such precepts. Supporters of this track claim that human thinking processes resemble the ones implemented by computational systems. Thus, they argue that intelligent behavior may be instantiated by creating computer programs. Bottom-up options, on the other hand, employ evolutionary, learning, or developmental methodologies. Such approach enables machines to learn ethically-related concepts, for instance, via interacting with other agents in their respective environments. In a way, the manner by which AI systems learn and develop is similar to how children undergo the socialization process—that is, through learning things from scratch. Integrating the design principles of both top-down and bottom-up tracks is what is known as the hybrid option.

The general idea behind the hybrid method is to embed autonomous artifacts with certain moral theories and, at the same time, allow it to further develop such principles, if not learn and acquire new ones, through the process of interacting with other agents. For Wallach and Allen, a feasible way of building AIs via the hybrid method is through the use of a connectionist model. Note that, for connectionists, the human cognitive architecture is just a series of networks that employs parallel distributed processing. Thus, advocates of connectionism emulate human brains via developing artificial neural networks.

The top-down, bottom-up, and hybrid approaches are some of the ways of constructing non-human-based artificial general intelligence. Note that, in contrast to human-based methods, such non-human-based tracks do not upgrade or make use of the biological makeup of humans. Thus, with regard to requiring autonomous agents to be moral agents as well, human-based approaches supposedly have the upper hand. This is because the ethical values of the resulting AIs from human-based methods would remain unchanged, which further implies that there is a higher risk of building advanced AIs via the non-human-based route. This is not to say, however,

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33 How a connectionist model may be considered a hybrid model is discussed in length by Wallach and Allen. See ibid., 121-124.

34 It is believed that artificial neural networks could integrate the design principles of top-down and bottom-up routes. This is because such networks have two separate kinds of connection weights, namely: hardwired and learned connection weights. Supposedly, these weights may be considered to share the same principles with the top-down and bottom-up paths, respectively. For a discussion on connectionism, see Napoleon Mabaquiao, Jr., *Mind, Science and Computation* (Manila: Vibal Publishing House, Inc., 2012), 124-129.

35 Chalmers further argues that human-based approaches are not “extendable,” and, as such, might not lead to a singularity. See Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” 26.
that the human-based path is foolproof. It could be argued that there is no certainty as to what would happen to their set of values once they also upgrade their computational, or thinking, capacities.\textsuperscript{36}

The idea of artificially intelligent machines having a different value system from humans could somehow be drawn from the design methodologies mentioned above. Unfortunately, for us, humans would be the lesser beings as compared to such superior intelligence. If a singularity were to happen, then human values would likely be incommensurable with these AI systems. Thus, the extinction of humankind may be foreseeable if safety measures would not be considered. With the risks involved in creating artificial intelligence, the question is, what now is the job of the philosopher in all of these issues?

**Technical and Foundational Problems**

Research on artificial intelligence has been encountering a number of problems for many years now. Such obstacles could be classified as either technical or foundational ones. Philosophers who wish to contribute in addressing, if not preventing, the potential dangers of a singularity may do so by doing research on the latter.

Delineating one from the other, the technical problems of artificial intelligence may be defined as those that are presently encountered by the field given the current state of technology. However, once certain technological advancements occur, these issues, in theory, would cease to exist. Among these technical problems include issues regarding robustness and generalization, real-time processing, and the sequential nature of programs, among others.\textsuperscript{37}

For example, the issue on robustness and generalization focuses on the problem of noise and fault tolerance. Additionally, it also includes the issue regarding the capability of artifacts to act and react aptly in novel situations. Note that noise is defined as random data fluctuations. So, an artifact is said to be noise-tolerant if it could still process data that contains fluctuations. On the other hand, if an artifact performs adequately in spite of its faulty components, then it is considered to be fault-tolerant.

Analogous to the issue of robustness, autonomous machines often lack the capability of acting and reacting to novel situations that were not originally programmed into them by their designers. This is because they lack generalization capabilities, which eventually results to an artifact halting or

\textsuperscript{36} In relation to this, see the same article of Chalmers, specifically his discussion on Kant’s view regarding values and rationality. See \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{37} Rolf Pfeifer and Christian Scheier, \textit{Understanding Intelligence} (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 63-64.
breaking down. However, the issue of both robustness and generalization may be considered technical ones as they are solvable, in principle, at the advent of technological improvements. In the future, once the current state of technology progresses, these technical problems would foreseeably go away.

As for the foundational issues encountered by artificial intelligence research, these problems are considered philosophical in nature as they question the very foundations, or the foundational assumptions, of the methodologies themselves. Standard examples of these are the symbol-grounding problem and frame problem.

Pfeifer and Scheier explain that the symbol-grounding problem centers on the issue of how the closed system of physical symbols employed by classical artificial intelligent machines relate to the actual world. 38 Note that physical symbols are defined purely in a syntactical manner. They follow the law of representation, which states that situations in the real world may be mapped into internal representations. So, these physical symbols are processed by a central processing system solely based on their syntax. The question is this: “If physical symbols correspond to specific things in the real world, how then could a syntax-based system ground and derive their meanings?” Put in another way, if traditional AI systems process symbols in a purely syntactical manner, then deriving or inferring the meanings of the employed symbols would still not have been accounted for.

On the other hand, the frame problem focuses on the interaction between a modeled system and its corresponding environment. Simply put, this philosophical problem focuses on “how models of a changing environment can be kept in tune with the environment.” 39 Given that artificial intelligent systems developed via the classical artificial intelligence path, for instance, have internal programs of the real world, 40 the frame problem deals with how to properly identify from such world model those data that needs updating after an action takes place. 41 Apparently, the task of keeping programs of changing environments in tune with the real world presents a number of difficulties.

Note that the problems mentioned above are considered philosophical in nature as they question the foundational suppositions of the design strategies towards building AGIs. Another foundational issue that may interest philosophers deals with the problem of making artificially

38 Ibid., 69-71.
39 Ibid., 68.
41 Ibid.
intelligent machines capable of moral reasoning, judgment, and decision-making—that is, the creation of artificial moral agents. As discussed earlier, the extinction of human beings may be a likely consequence if safety measures are not considered in designing AI systems. This is the reason why the research area of machine ethics looks into the possibility of modeling the first batch of AIs as being considerate of human values as well.

**Machine Ethics and the Nature of Moral Agents**

Michael Anderson and Susan Anderson tell us that:

> [M]achine ethics is concerned with giving machines ethical principles or a procedure for discovering a way to resolve the ethical dilemmas they might encounter, enabling them to function in an ethically responsible manner through their own ethical decision making.\(^4\)

What this tells us is simple: machine ethics is concerned about the creation of AMAs—artificial intelligent machines capable of moral reasoning. Note that this field is often contrasted with the closely related discipline of technology ethics. In a nutshell, technology ethics is a branch of applied ethics largely devoted in developing ethics for human beings who use machines or technology.\(^4\)

Distinguishing machine ethics from the philosophy of technology is important, since the latter is more concerned with the ethical standing of human beings who use technological products such as intelligent machines (i.e., it looks at the proper and improper human behavior with regard to the usage of machines). Thus, it considers machines as tools and not as autonomous agents. Machine ethics, in contrast, regards machines as actual or potential moral agents.

For machine ethicists, moral praise and blame could be attributed to the actions of autonomous agents, and it seems that there are good reasons to think that, indeed, sophisticated technologies may be considered as moral agents. Note that moral agents are specific kinds of entities whose behaviors are subject to moral requirements (i.e., under a set of ethical standards, moral praise or blame could be ascribed to its actions).\(^4\)

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In the philosophical tradition, discussions regarding the nature of moral agents are nothing new. Several philosophers have already put forward their own take on the nature of moral agents. For example, Aristotle:

[i]n the course of discussing human virtues and their corresponding vices ... begins with a brief statement of the concept of moral responsibility—that it is sometimes appropriate to respond to an agent with praise or blame on the basis of her actions and/or dispositional traits of character. ... A bit later, he clarifies that only a certain kind of agent qualifies as a moral agent and is thus properly subject to ascriptions of responsibility, namely, one who possess a capacity for decision. For Aristotle, a decision is a particular kind of desire resulting from deliberation, one that expresses the agent's conception of what is good.45

In a way, such notion parallels Aquinas’ idea that “[g]ood ends and means are those befitting the human agent.”46 For Aquinas, as with Aristotle, the said agent should be capable of deliberating and judging what action is good,47 and these actions are called human actions—that is, actions that which one has voluntary control of or those that result from certain free judgements. To account for the nature of such free judgments, Aquinas explains:

The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the

appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel.48

So, for Aquinas, moral agents are those who have mastery over one’s actions, exemplified by their ability to prefer what is good. This same line of thinking seems to be echoed by other philosophers such as Kant. For Kant, “a moral agent is autonomous in that it both gives itself the moral law (it is self-legislating) and can constrain or motivate itself to follow the law (it is self-constraining or self-motivating).”49 In such characterization, note that Kant highlights the notion of a moral agent being autonomous.50 To a certain extent, these characterizations of moral agency, along with the other philosophical theories51 that try to account for its nature, relate to the idea of building artificial moral agents.

Safeguarding Humanity via Artificial Moral Agents

One possible way of preventing the negative outcomes of a singularity would be in terms of how philosophers could further involve themselves in addressing problems related to artificial moral agency. For one, there is the issue regarding the nature of such agents.

In terms of accounting for artificial moral agency, several theories have been proposed by those working under the field of machine ethics. Sullins,52 for instance, defines artificial moral agents as artificial autonomous agents53 that possess moral value. He first explains that:

48 Ibid., Ia 83.3.
50 For Kant’s discussion regarding the nature of moral agents, specifically the concepts of will and autonomy, see Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, ed. and trans. by Allen W. Wood (Yale University Press, 2002), 4:440.
51 Other theories on moral agency are discussed extensively in Theodore C. Denise, Great Traditions in Ethics (California: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008).
53 In defining autonomous agents as systems that act upon their situated environment in pursuit of their own agenda, Sullins cites Stan Franklin and Art Graesser, “Is it an Agent, or just a Program?: A Taxonomy for Autonomous Agents,” in Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (London: Springer-Verlag, 1996). Such characterization implies that agents are presupposed as entities that have causal influence or effect on other agents and their environment. Thus, any piece of technology, a sophisticated robot, for instance, that acts as an agent is considered an autonomous agent.
Ideally, the agent should be a continuous process that monitors its environment, be able to communicate with its user or at least other simple agents, have some sort of machine learning, and be mobile in its environment or able to move to other environments, as well as be flexible in its reactions to stimulus in these environments. It is also a bonus if the artificial agent is affective in its character in order to interact with a realistic personality that will ease communications with human agents.\footnote{Sullins, “Artificial Moral Agency in Technoethics,” 207.}

Note that these specific qualities are not necessary conditions for artificial agency but are conditions that may aid artificial agents in trying to interact with others and the rest of the world.

On top of these qualities, three other conditions would have to obtain in order to ascribe moral agency to artifacts. These are the conditions of autonomy, intentionality, and responsibility. For an artifact to have the capacity to exhibit moral responsibility, it should possess significant autonomy. Thus, an artifact should be capable of performing autonomous actions (i.e., it should be able to implement tasks or goals independent of any other agent). In addition, agents must also possess the capability of acting intentionally. Lastly, it would be possible to ascribe moral agency to artifacts if its behaviors would only make sense by assuming that it has responsibility towards other moral agents. These three conditions supposedly provide a deeper understanding on the nature of AMAs. For Sullins, as long as these things obtain, an artifact could be said to be an artificial moral agent.

In contrast to Sullins, Moor proposed a four-tier categorization of artifacts in terms of appraising their moral status.\footnote{James H. Moor, “The Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of Machine Ethics,” in Machine Ethics, ed. by Michael Anderson and Susan Leigh Anderson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 13-20.} At the bottom-most level are ethical-impact agents. These machines are evaluated based on the moral consequences they produce. Next, machines that have built-in safety features could be considered as implicit ethical agents. To promote ethical behavior, the internal mechanisms of such machines have already been designed to consider potential safety and reliability issues. Explicit ethical agents, on the other hand, are a tier higher than implicit ethical agents. This is because such machines already have some capacity to exhibit moral reasoning. At the top-most level of this hierarchy are full ethical agents. Average adult human beings are an instance of this type of agent. Artificial moral agents, for Moor, are somewhere in-between explicit ethical agents and full ethical ones.
A third alternative is provided by Wallach and Allen. They argue that the path towards the creation of artificial moral agents is through considering the conditions of autonomy and ethical sensitivity. First, they categorize machines as either having operational morality or functional morality. Machines with operational morality are those that are capable of taking into account the morally-relevant aspects of a given situation with the aid of human architects. These architects embed ethical considerations into the said machines. Machines that fall under functional morality, on the other hand, are those that possess the capacity to exhibit some form of moral reasoning and decision-making.

Such categorization forms a spectrum. One finds machines that fall under operational morality on one end of this spectrum and, on the other end, are full moral agents—that is, artifacts that have high autonomy and high ethical sensitivity. Moreover, machines that fall under functional morality are distributed in-between of these two extremes. Wallach and Allen claim that this two-dimensional framework could possibly account for artificial moral agency since the conditions of autonomy and ethical sensitivity serve as benchmarks as to what counts as a full moral agent. Any machine approaching high autonomy and high ethical sensitivity will be counted as a full moral agent, and this could be achieved by incrementally improving these conditions.

At present, there seems to be no hard consensus as to which artificial moral agency framework would likely yield a positive result. For instance, the idea of reducing the three mentioned above into a single, all-encompassing theory has not yet been fully explored. Furthermore, how exactly shall we proceed in actually realizing artificial moral agents is another problem in machine ethics. These issues, among the many others that also need final resolution, should be the business of philosophers. With the body of work that they have contributed in the study of moral agency, philosophers should continue to extend their research in the field of machine ethics.

**Summary and Conclusion**

As discussed above, the singularity is a hypothesized, futuristic event that pertains to the invention of machines that are of greater-than-human-level intelligence. This scenario may be considered a natural consequence of developing AI systems. Once these things are fully realized, an intelligence explosion would follow soon after. Note that such runaway would seemingly put into question humankind’s standard concepts about reality, life, and so on, and this would also include our general ethical notions.

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At present, there is no definitive way on how to make artificially intelligent systems value what humans do. The idea of machines exterminating the entire human race, therefore, is not, strictly speaking, a tall tale. As highlighted by both Vinge and Chalmers, there are plausible threats. To prevent these dangers, those working in artificial intelligence research, including philosophers, should take the problem of creating artificial moral agents more seriously. Philosophers, for instance, should further examine the philosophical tenability of the top-down, bottom-up, and hybrid options, among others, of modeling such agents. For one, as noted earlier, the actual nature of AMAs is still an open question. With their significant contributions in the study of moral agency, philosophers should, therefore, further examine this issue.

Other philosophical concepts such as moral reasoning, moral agency, and others may also be re-examined by philosophers as they closely relate to notion of artificial moral agency. For example, with regard to the notion of moral agency, there are those who argue that humans are not really moral agents. Nadeau, for instance, maintains that robots would be, in fact, the first moral agents to inhabit earth, if ever. If we consider such view, then the question is this: if our conception of moral agency is predicated on the view that human beings are moral agents, then what happens to this notion if it is proven that the latter claim is false? In addition, there are other issues related to AI research that may also be further studied by philosophers. Among these include problems regarding the concept of consciousness and personal identity.

Analyzing the foundational issues surrounding artificial intelligence research is key in safeguarding the future of humanity. Considering the gravity of the potential negative outcomes of a singularity, factor in also the open questions in modeling AMAs, it may be the case that there would not be an overabundance of philosophers working on the issues related to machine ethics—that is, at least for now.

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The Distinction between the ‘Abstract West’ and the ‘Concrete East’ from a Linguistic Perspective

Man-to Tang

Abstract: Ferdinand de Saussure is one of the pioneers who argue for the linguistic distinction between the West and the East. He argues that the western words (yan 言) (especially Indo-European) are mainly phonetic-based, but that the eastern words (especially Chinese) are not. Nevertheless, Edward Slingerland, in “Metaphor and Meaning in Early China,” argues for a better understanding of the role of metaphor in Early Chinese thought (yi 意). Metaphorical conceptual structure is not a unique nature of the Chinese, but it is common among all human beings. On the one hand, Slingerland is correct to argue for the common role of metaphor in both western and eastern thought. On the other hand, this paper aims at arguing that his rejection of the distinction between the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East” is doubtful, as the distinction can be retained linguistically. Saussure and recent neuro-linguistic researchers provide evidences to support the distinction in the sense that the “Abstract West” refers to a phonetic-image (xiang 象) linguistic-determination, and the “Concrete East” refers to a visual-image linguistic-determination.

Keywords: Slingerland, metaphor, the “abstract West” and the “concrete East,” linguistic determination

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for commenting on this paper. He makes two helpful comments. Firstly, he points out that the East is a plurality of traditions. The East might not serve the East well, as this paper focuses on the Chinese rather than the plural Eastern traditions. His observation, however, is correct. The distinction addressed by Edward Slingerland is between the mainstream Western thought and the Chinese thought. This paper aims at arguing against his rejection. Therefore, the “East” follows Slingerland in that it refers to the Chinese. Secondly, he believes that the issue stems from an absolutist interpretation of “Abstract West” and “Concrete East.” To a large extent, I agree with it. On the one hand, this paper aims at arguing against Slingerland’s reconciliation. The distinction between the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East” can be retained in accordance with their linguistic characteristics. On the other hand, it aims at arguing for an absolute interpretation of “Abstract West” and “Concrete East.” The cultural differences, especially the linguistic, cannot be concealed. Besides, I would like to thank Prof. Kwan Tsz-wan for delivering seminars on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and the formation of Chinese characters. His project inspires the main thesis of this paper.

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Introduction

Edward Slingerland, in “Metaphor and Meaning in Early China,” has two claims. The first claim is that the foundational role of metaphor in Early China should not be dismissed. The second claim is that imagistic conceptual structures are fundamental for every human thought, so it cannot express any unique feature of Chinese thought. This paper aims at critically examining Slingerland’s arguments. On the one hand, Slingerland is correct that imagistic conceptual structures are fundamental for every human thought. On the other hand, his rejection of the distinction between the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East” is doubtful. My argument is threefold: firstly, our thoughts are most likely “shaped” by our language; secondly, the linguistic structure and formation in the West and the East are mainly phonetic-based images and visual-based images respectively. To a large extent, phonetic or sound images are more abstract than visual images. The imagistic conceptual structure in the Chinese linguistic structure expresses a unique feature of Chinese thought, namely visual-image linguistic-determination. Therefore, the distinction between the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East” is a comparative metaphorical expression of the two linguistic structures.

This paper consists of three sections. This first section explicates Slingerland’s central claims that the metaphorical nature of Chinese philosophy should not be underestimated or overestimated. The second section explains his three arguments. The first argument is to refute the representational model and to support embodied or enactive models; the second argument is to support how embodied or enactive models avoid the transduction problem and grounding problem through empirical support in contemporary cognitive linguistics and neuroscience; and the third argument is to argue against the misleading distinction between the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East.” The final section critically examines Slingerland’s arguments. I will draw resources from phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty and linguists Jia Yuxin, George Lakoff, and Mark Johnson to develop his argument. We will find that most languages, indeed, are heavily dependent on imagistic metaphorical conceptual structures, which can be justified by embodied or enactive models. Nevertheless, Slingerland has not further explored the essential feature of imagistic conceptual structures in Chinese language. Thus, he fails to understand the distinction between the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East.” To refute his claim, I will draw resources from Saussure and recent neuroscientific research to argue that imagistic schema in Chinese words is mainly dependent upon visual images, whereas imagistic schema in western words (especially Indo-European), is
mainly dependent upon sound/phonetic images Thus, he fails to prove his rejection with soundness.

Edward Slingerland’s Criticism towards the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East” Distinction

Edward Slingerland addresses that there are two problems if we adopt the misleading distinction between the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East,” as we believe Chinese philosophy depends on metaphor, but Western philosophy does not. The first problem is that the Western official philosophical attitude depreciates Chinese philosophy of its metaphorical nature. He argues that,

A deeper problem, however, is involved in the claim that the Chinese were somehow unique, or at least different from the ancient Greeks, in taking their metaphors seriously. To argue in this way is to take the conceit of Western philosophy ... and to underestimate the extent to which, even in the West, meaning and perception are fundamentally shaped by imagistic structures arising from our embodied experience of the world.²

Some Western philosophers like J.P. Reding, who are blind to the metaphorical nature of language and take it to be literal, believe that metaphor is a “reflection of a lack of self-awareness.”³ This is the official philosophical attitude toward metaphor. The official philosophical attitude has to be concrete in the sense that a word should not be ambiguous. By contrast, metaphor provides a double sense of a word. It leads to the ambiguity that the official philosophical attitude aims to avoid.

The second problem is that it leads to the trend, “reverse Orientalism.”⁴ “Reverse Orientalism” is opposite to “classic Orientalism.” The word Orientalism was firstly introduced by R. Schwab and was clearly thematized by E. Said’s work, Orientalism.⁵ The term signifies the European

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³ Slingerland pays attention to Jean-Paul Reding’s work Comparative Essays in Early Greek and Chinese Rational Thinking and makes such a claim. For further details, please refer to Edward Slingerland, “Metaphor and Meaning in Early China,” in Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 10:1 (2011), 6.
⁴ Ibid., 8, 27.
“technology of power” authorizing itself to substitute the silent other, in the name or the image of its universalized self. Precisely, Orientalism refers to a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. The idea of classic Orientalism can be found in Hegel’s work, *The Philosophy of History*, where he argued that Asia is the real theatre of the unfolding drama. Slingerland further interprets that Hegelian Chinese “were a childlike, naturally ‘slavish’ people.” Orientalism is a name denoting the negative view of the Eastern (Chinese). On the contrary, reverse Orientalists believe that the holistic Chinese worldview is a positive corrective to flaws that plague the alienated West. Different from the negative Hegelian view of Chinese culture, more recent interpreters have instead regarded the holistic Chinese world-view as a positive corrective to argue against the alienated West. He argues that,

> The characterization of Chinese thought as uniquely and distinctly metaphorical—the “strong” view that seems so common in our field—is, I believe, part of a large trend that sets up a caricatured China or “the East” as a monolithic, incommensurable Other, fundamentally different from an equally caricatured “West.” China is said to be characterized by a “holistic” conception of the self and the cosmos—in contrast to Western mind-body, appearance-reality, immanent-transcendent dualisms ...

In Slingerland’s view, reverse Orientalism is a pitfall and we have to avoid the overestimation of the role of metaphor in early China. To have a better understanding of the role of metaphor in embodied human experiences, philosophers can have a better judgment and draw a fair distinction between the Chinese and the West. Both positive and negative are biased attitudes, as they do not make a fair judgment to the Chinese and the West, as they cannot portray a correct “picture of metaphor” in their human experiences. Both attitudes share the same view that the Chinese thought is based upon metaphor and imagistic conceptual structure, but the West is not. Therefore, he introduces some arguments to rectify these problematic prejudices.

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9 Ibid., 7-8.
Slingerland’s Arguments

Slingerland introduces three arguments for his claim. The first argument is to refute the representational model and to support embodied or enactive models by drawing a distinction between these models. The representational model leads to two problems, namely “transduction problem” and “grounding problem.” The former asks how perceptual signals could get “translated” into amodal symbols; and the latter asks how arbitrary, abstract symbols could ever come to refer to something in the world. He draws resources from L. Barsalou. On the one hand, no philosopher in the camp of the representational model could give a satisfactory explanation. On the other hand, the models are lacking cognitive or neurological evidence. He thus turns away from the representational models towards some embodied or enactive models. Embodied or enactive models argue that perception is not merely a passive absorption of information but also “a kind of doing.” According to the models, “the symbols manipulated in human thought are understood, not as a picture, but as records of neural activation that arises during perception.” The reason for embodied or enactive models is that the models “enjoy considerable empirical support, and is the basic working model in contemporary cognitive neuroscience.”

The second argument is to support how embodied or enactive models avoid the transduction problem and grounding problem through empirical support in contemporary cognitive linguistics and neuroscience. On the one hand, Slingerland argues that grounding concrete concepts is by means of non-propositional, embodied “image” schemas which “are recurring patterns arising from our sensory-motor interaction with the world.” Traditional cognitive linguistics and neuroscience assume the division between the external world and the internal symbolic representation. It is necessary for them to explain how the internal symbol represents the external world, on the one hand; and how the internal symbol has arisen from the external world, on the other hand. The first is the transduction problem, and the second is the grounding problem.

On the contrary, embodied models drop the standard division between the external world and the internal symbolic representation. Instead of claiming that the internal symbolic representation arises from the external

10 Ibid., 9.
12 Ibid., 583.
14 Ibid.,
world, embodied models state that the world is experienced and determined by mutual interactions between the sensational movement and the environment. In our sensory-motor experience, the bodily speaking subject does not understand perceptual symbols after translating the external perceptual signals to the internal symbolic representation. Rather, the perceptual signals directly present to the bodily speaking subject. For example, when I go inside a classroom and I look around, I immediately grasp some perceptual symbols. When I move my body from the door to the center, I further recognize those perceptual symbols are chairs, a blackboard, and table. In this example, there is no sharp division between the external and the internal as well as the world and the symbolic representation. The image or symbol does not arise from the external world only, but from the interaction between the world and the subject. It explains away how perceptual signals could get “translated” into amodal symbols, as no translation is needed. The embodied models explain away the transduction problem.

On the other hand, he argues that grounding abstract concepts is by means of conceptual metaphor. Conceptual metaphor “involves the recruitment of structure from a concrete domain to a more abstract domain.” Drawing upon works written by Lakoff and Johnson, Slingerland provides some “representative primary metaphors such as AFFECTION IS WARMTH, IMPORTANCE IS BIG, MORE IS UP, etc.” As a result, embodied models explains the origin of abstract symbols by tracing back to our concrete experiences. The abstract symbol, e.g., affection, is nothing other than the concrete experience of warmth. Abstract symbols could always come to refer to something in the world as all primary metaphors develop gradually through experiential correlation and sensorimotor source domain.

Through “image schema” and “conceptual metaphors,” Input (language or other signals) corresponds to conceptual metaphor’s “source” domain, and Input: corresponds to the “target.” Image schema explains transduction problem while conceptual metaphor explains grounding problem. It is what he called simple source-to-target-domain mappings. And it is how “human beings are capable of constructing and processing (mostly) abstract, rational arguments.”

The third argument is to argue against the misleading distinction between the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East.” Slingerland claims that early Chinese philosophical rhetoricians and Enlightenment philosophers of the modern West are “employing the same linguistic tools (metaphor and

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15 Ibid., 12.
18 Ibid., 24.

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metaphoric blends) to manipulate the same basic cognitive processes (image thinking and affective reasoning)."¹⁹ In this argument, one of the premises is that “if the model of human cognition emerging from cognitive science that I have presented above is even remotely correct, then the argumentation should be seen as centrally, if not primarily, focused on winning the battle to metaphorically frame the situation, and thus sway the emotions of one’s conversational partners.”²⁰ In order to fulfill the antecedent, he must establish that the model of human cognition emerging from cognitive science is correct. The soundness of the first and second arguments is the key to establish the statement, a model of human cognition emerging from cognitive science is correct. But are they sound?

**Critical Assessments of Slingerland’s Arguments**

Slingerland’s first argument is sound. It is true that representational models lack empirical support. More importantly, the models do not capture the full picture of our language or speech phenomena. To further explain this point, we can draw from M. Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception.*²¹ He criticizes that,

> the intellectual analysis, here as everywhere, less false than it is abstract. The ‘symbolic function’ or ‘representation function’ certainly underlies our movement, but it is not an ultimate term for the analysis, it in turn rest upon a certain ground. Intellectualism’s error is to make it depend upon itself, to separate it from the materials in which it is realized, and to recognize in us, as originary, a direct presence in the world.²²

Merleau-Ponty’s criticism can further develop Slingerland’s first argument that lacking empirical support, in fact, refers to a major defect. Representational models separate representation from the materials as originary. Representational model believes that language is a visual representation, which functions as a mediator between thought and words. Nevertheless, this model cannot explain the formation of a new word through the association of the old visual representation with the new unity.

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¹⁹ Ibid., 27.
²⁰ Ibid., 24.
²¹ Slingerland mentions the origin of embodied or enactive models can be traced back to the phenomenology Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. But he does not go into detail.
If the need was felt to introduce this new word, it was in order to express that the spatial and temporal unity, the inter-sensorial unity, or the sensorimotor unity of the body is, so to speak, an in principle unity, to express that this unity is not limited to contents actually and fortuitously associated in the course of our experience, that it somehow precedes them and in fact makes their association possible.²³

Representation fails to explain how a new word is formed if language is merely a visual representation between what is thought and what is expressed. Take the word “Millennium Bug” as an example, if we follow the representation model, then the meaning of “Millennium Bug” is always according to what we think and what we express. It is a real case that many people believe “Millennium Bug” is really a kind of bug. However, it is not the case. “Millennium Bug” refers to a class of computer problem related to the formatting and storage of calendar data for dates beginning in the year 2000. “Millennium Bug” is a new word without any visual representation. More importantly, “Millennium Bug” is not limited to, contents actually and fortuitously associated with the course of our experience.

If the representation function is not the originary, then what is the originary? Merleau-Ponty finds that the body (Leib) is the originary. He uses the word “here” and “there” as examples to explain it.

When the word ‘here’ is applied to my body, it does not designate a determinate position in relation to other positions or in relation to external coordinates. It designates the installation of the first coordinates, the anchoring of the active body in an object, and the situation of the body confronted with its tasks.²⁴

When we use the word “here,” it does not designate a determinate position in relation to other positions or in relation to external coordinates. Instead, our body is the orientation of spatial situation, so that we could understand both “here” and “there” as “not here.” Merleau-Ponty further elaborates “every movement has a background, and that the movement and its background are ‘moments of a single whole.’”²⁵ Both perceptual movement and metaphorical reasoning have their background. The background of the

²³ Ibid., 102.
²⁴ Ibid., 102-3.
²⁵ Ibid., 113.
perceptual movement and metaphorical reasoning, “is not a representation associated or linked externally to the movement itself; it is immanent in the movement.” Consequently, the solution of “transduction problem” and “grounding problem” is to reestablish the importance of the body. That’s why Barsalou introduces the importance of bodily subject.

Although Slingerland does not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the second argument is sound in Western words, it is sound in Chinese words. A Chinese Professor of Sociolinguistics and Intercultural Communication at the Harbin Institute of Technology, Jia Yuxin, argues that, “the Chinese character system is a matter of conceptual metaphors and the metaphors emerge from bodily experience.” Unlike Slingerland, Jia draws resources from Chinese thought, *Zhou Yi* (周易). Accordingly, “establishing images or the operation of image schemata is an experience of ‘looking at things and seeking images through analogy’ (*Guan wu qu xiang* 觀物取象) and ‘looking at images and contemplating and grasping meaning’ (*Guan xiang qu yi* 觀象取意).” He then gives several examples in Chinese words, like *Wen* (文). This word is made up of the elements of 亠, which stands for the symbol or image of the sun, moon, and stars in heaven, and 乂, which stands for the mediating points between the eight trigrams in telling good and bad fortunes. According to *Zhou Yi*, the association of the two elements shows that the ancient Chinese observe the sun, moon, and stars in heaven in order to tell fortunes. He addresses that the Chinese word system has two implications: “the whole Chinese character system is grounded in the human bodily or sensorimotor experience, visual experience in particular” and “in characterizing the world via the Chinese characters our ancestors follow the principle of taking analogy from their body that is closest to them and then taking analogy from what is far away.” It demonstrates that embodied or enactive model could provide a better understanding of Chinese words. Similar to Slingerland, Jia justifies the principles of image schemas, homophonic meaning (*Xing jin yi tong, yin jin yi tong* 形近義同, 音近意通). He argues that establishing images or the operation of image schemata is an experience of “looking at things and seeking images through analogy,” and “looking at images and contemplating and grasping meaning.” Johnson points out that an image schema “operates at a level of mental organization that falls between abstract propositional structures... and particular concrete

26 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 33.
images.” Jia then uses Xiang (想) as an example. He indicates a number of complex coherences:

- Xiang as seeing (jian nai wei zhi xiang 見乃謂之象)
- Xiang as image (Xiang zhe, xingxiang ye 象者，形象也)
- Xiang as analogy (Xiang xiang 相象)
- Xiang as phenomenon (Xiang nai xianxiang 象現象)
- Xiang as imagination (Xiangxiang 想象)
- Xiang as thought (Sixiang 思想)

The word Xiang (想) is the combination of the components, 相 (Xiang) and 心 (Xin). Jia interprets it as image in thought or in the mind, which is based on the interaction between human bodily experience and its surroundings. To further understand its part-whole relationship, we can make use of Recognition-by-Components (RBC) model developed by Biederman. He points out that,

Slingerland and Jia called this association synaesthesia. Human bodily and sensorimotor experiences are in human embodied thought and mind. This embodied nature is expressed through Chinese words.

It is correct for Slingerland to argue that the importance of metaphorical conceptual structure should not be neglected as it is never illogical. However, he does not provide any evidence to support the metaphorical conceptual structure in Western words. Therefore, it is doubtful for him to justify that both the Chinese and the West employ the same linguistic tools (metaphor and metaphoric blends) to manipulate the same basic cognitive processes (image thinking and affective reasoning). It seems

that he believes all language structures (the Chinese and the Western) share the same structure. Once we find out the metaphorical conceptual structures with empirical support, then it can be applied to all language systems. Following cognitive linguists, Slingerland claims that “thought is triggered and communicated by language, but not constituted by it.” 35 In his view, thought and language are ready. The metaphorical conceptual structure is merely a mapping process as he called “simple source-to-target-domain mappings.” 36 If the metaphorical conceptual structure is merely a mapping process, then what is a faithful description of it?

Merleau-Ponty points out that “the word, far from being the simple sign of objects and significations, inhabits things and bears significations. For the speaker, then speech does not translate a ready-made thought; rather, speech accomplishes thought.” 37 In fact, Merleau-Ponty draws an important distinction between langue and parole from Saussure.

Saussure states four differences between the two. Firstly, language [langue] is a self-contained whole and a principle of classification. Speaking [parole], however, is only a definite part, though certainly an essential one. Secondly, language, unlike speaking, is something that we can study separately. Thirdly, language is homogeneous, whereas speaking is heterogenous. Fourthly, language is concrete, but speaking is not. 38 Precisely, langue, which is independent of and pre-exists any speaker, refers to the abstract, systematic rules and conventions of a signifying system. Parole, which is a speech act spoken by a speaker, refers to the concrete instances of the use of langue. Thus, langue is the necessary condition for parole. It shows that conceptualization is not merely mapping what ready-made symbols are. The meaningful utterance may influence the abstract, systematic rules and conventions of a signifying system. Therefore, Slingerland is inappropriate to claim that thought is not constituted by language. The better understanding should be formulated like this: thought is triggered, communicated, and constituted by language. In our daily life, thought is somehow determined by langue. It is what I call “linguistic determination.”

Furthermore, Saussure addresses different linguistic determination in the West (especially Indo-European) and the East (especially Chinese). Firstly, the Chinese writing system is ideographic or visual-image based. This system differs from the system commonly known as “phonetic,” in which it tries to reproduce the succession of sounds that make up a word. Phonetic systems are sometimes syllabic, sometimes alphabetic, i.e., based on the

36 Ibid., 14.
37 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 183.
irreducible elements used in speaking. Secondly, he gives an example for further explanation.

To a Chinese, if two words that have the same sound are used in conversation, he may resort to writing in order to express his thought. But in Chinese the mental substitution of the written word for the spoken word does not have the annoying consequences that it has in a phonetic system, for the substitution is absolute; the same graphic symbol can stand for words from different Chinese dialects.

As a result, it is possible to draw a linguistic distinction between the West (especially Indo-European) and the East (especially Chinese) that the former is mainly a phonetic-image system whereas the latter is mainly a visual-image system.

In addition, a recent neuro-linguistic research may shed light towards the distinction between the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East.” In Hoosain’s paper, “Speed of Getting at the Phonology and Meaning of Chinese Words,” he discovers that assessing the meaning of Chinese words is faster than assessing the meaning of English words. On the other hand, assessing phonology of Chinese words is slower than assessing phonology of English words because the core lexical representation of English words is phonological, but that of Chinese words is ideographic. Besides, the phonological access of Chinese words is not always needed for getting the meaning. It seems that the Chinese words emphasize visual association, but the Western words (especially English) emphasize the phonetic association. Therefore, the “Abstract West” refers to a phonetic-image linguistic-determination, while the “Concrete East” refers to a visual-image linguistic-determination. And the distinction is not misled and can be retained. If Slingerland is willing to argue against the misleading distinction between the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East,” it is necessary to provide further evidence and reason.

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40 De Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 26.
42 Ibid., 135.
43 Although it is possible to argue both visual-image and phonetic-image are both imagistic, Slingerland does not offer his argument with this claim. So, it would be unreasonable to add this doubtful claim in this paper.

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Conclusion

Slingerland offers arguments and empirical support to prove that the foundational role of metaphor in Early China should not be dismissed. Scholars like Merleau-Ponty, Lakoff, and Jia directly or indirectly provide evidence for this claim. Therefore, we could conclude this claim is sound. But it is inappropriate for him to argue that imagistic conceptual structures are fundamental for every human thought as he fails to offer sufficient empirical support and sound arguments. As a result, he also fails to justify his rejection of the distinction between the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East.”

I conclude this paper by emphasizing that the distinction I argue for is a linguistic one. Like what Slingerland states, the distinction between the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East” is not about Hegelian classical Orientalism. Unlike what Slingerland states, the distinction is not also about “reverse Orientalism.” Since the distinction is a description of different linguistic structures between the West and the East, there is no value judgment at all. This linguistic distinction is not claiming that the “Abstract West” is merely phonetic-image determined, while the “Concrete East” is merely visual-image determined. The distinction is very minimal that the “Abstract West” and the “Concrete East” can capture some special but not unique features between the western language and the eastern language.

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Beyond Sufficiency: G.A. Cohen’s Community Constraint on Luck Egalitarianism

Benjamin D. King

Abstract: G.A. Cohen conceptualizes socialism as luck egalitarianism constrained by a community principle. The latter mitigates certain inequalities to achieve a shared common life. This article explores the plausibility of the community constraint on inequality in light of two related problems. First, if it is voluntary, it fails as a response to “the abandonment objection” to luck egalitarianism, as it would not guarantee imprudent people sufficient resources to avoid deprivation and to function as equal citizens in a democratic society. Contra Cohenite socialism, this appears unjust. Second, if it is instead enforced, coercive equalization beyond sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism, which is possibly necessary to achieve a shared common life, seems to require unjustified restrictions on liberty. I therefore argue that the constraint is most plausibly specified as requiring enforcement of sufficiency and only voluntary equalization thereafter. I also note, skeptically, why this constraint might be morally preferable to a purely sufficientarian alternative.

Keywords: G.A. Cohen, community, luck egalitarianism, sufficiency

Introduction

In Why Not Socialism? G.A. Cohen attempts to defend the desirability and feasibility of a conception of socialism that is embodied by an egalitarian principle and a community principle. The former Cohen calls “socialist equality of opportunity,” which is more commonly known as “luck egalitarianism” and sometimes as “responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism.” It “seeks to correct for all unchosen disadvantages, disadvantages, that is, for which the agent cannot herself reasonably be held responsible, whether they be disadvantages that reflect social misfortune or disadvantages that reflect...
natural misfortune.”¹ Thus, unlike in contemporary capitalist societies, where distributive shares are influenced by the socio-economic circumstances into which people are born and raised, as well as by differences in people’s natural abilities and their market value, “[w]hen socialist equality of opportunity prevails, differences of outcome reflect nothing but differences of taste and choice,” made against a background of equal options, for which people “may therefore reasonably be held responsible.”²

Socialist equality of opportunity is consistent with two forms of inequality. The first form of inequality occurs when people’s different choices, such as about how many hours to work and how much to consume, result in inequalities of resources, yet the satisfaction of their different preferences “leads to a comparable aggregate enjoyment of life.”³ Cohen deems this form of inequality “unproblematic because it does not constitute an inequality, all things considered.”⁴ The second form of inequality comes in two subtypes, inequalities that occur due to “regrettable choice” and inequalities that occur due to “option luck.” These subtypes are not mutually exclusive and both are problematic as they do involve inequality of aggregate benefit. Regrettable choice inequalities occur when people make genuine choices, for example, to expend less effort and/or care in examining their occupational opportunities, which they retrospectively regret due to the inequality of aggregate benefit they incur.⁵ Option luck inequalities are inequalities of aggregate benefit that result from people’s genuine choices to participate in gambles that they either win or lose, and which losers might not necessarily regret if their chances of winning were reasonable.⁶

But why should we consider these inequalities problematic if people can reasonably be held responsible for their relative advantage or disadvantage? Cohen’s worry is that they potentially undermine community. As he puts it:

Although [regrettable choice and/or option luck] inequalities … are not condemned by justice [because

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⁴ Ibid., 25.
⁵ Ibid., 26-28.
⁶ Ibid., 30-32. Influenced by Ronald Dworkin, luck egalitarians distinguish between “option luck” and “brute luck.” As Dworkin draws the distinction in “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 10:4 (1981), 293: “Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out—whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have declined. Brute luck is a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles.”

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they are responsibility-sensitive], they are nevertheless repugnant to socialists when they obtain on a sufficiently large scale, because they then contradict community: community is put under strain when large inequalities obtain. The sway of socialist equality of opportunity must therefore be tempered by a principle of community.7

This article explores the plausibility of Cohen’s community constraint on luck egalitarianism, and in doing so reveals its demandingness compared to a more commonly embraced sufficiency constraint. I begin by clarifying that it requires resource sharing and avoidance of option luck that constrains the relevant inequalities to the extent that people share in a common life, understood as the lives of the worst off not laboring under many more challenges than those of the best off. This clarificatory task partly involves questioning some interpretations in the literature that associate the constraint with Cohen’s concepts of “justificatory community” and “egalitarian ethos,” which feature in his critique of John Rawls. Following this clarificatory work, I proceed to investigate the plausibility of the constraint in light of two related problems. First, if the constraint is voluntary, it fails as a response to “the abandonment objection” to luck egalitarianism, as it would not guarantee imprudent people sufficient resources to avoid deprivation and to function as equal citizens in a democratic society. Contra Cohenite socialism, this appears unjust. Second, if the constraint is instead enforced, coercive equalization of resources beyond sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism, which is possibly necessary to achieve a shared common life, seems to require unjustified restrictions on liberty. I therefore argue that the community constraint is most plausibly specified as requiring enforcement of sufficiency and only voluntary equalization of resources thereafter. I finish by briefly noting, with some skepticism, two possible reasons why this version of the constraint might be morally preferable to a purely sufficientarian alternative.

The Community Constraint

Cohen describes the community principle in terms of “two modes of communal caring.”8 The second type of caring, which he calls “communal reciprocity,” involves human relationships taking a certain desirable form, where people give not because of what they can get in return, but because others need or want, and where there is an expectation of comparable

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7 Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 34.
8 Ibid., 35.
generosity throughout society.\textsuperscript{9} This resembles the distributive principle of higher communism, where “society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!”\textsuperscript{10} Indeed, the influence of Marx is apparent in the fact that Cohen elsewhere describes the relationship between people under the Marxist principle in almost identical terms to how he describes it under communal reciprocity; the only significant difference is that the latter incorporates a caveat against free riding.\textsuperscript{11}

However, communal reciprocity “is not strictly required for equality,” despite its “supreme importance in the socialist conception.”\textsuperscript{12} In other words, the community principle’s second mode of caring is not a necessary condition of the restriction it places on regrettable choice and/or option luck inequalities. Rather, it is the principle’s first mode of caring that primarily functions as the constraint.\textsuperscript{13} Cohen’s description of it is somewhat underdeveloped. Interpretations are typically drawn from the following passage:

We cannot enjoy full community, you and I, if you make, and keep, say, ten times as much money as I do, because my life will then labor under challenges that you will never face, challenges that you could help me to cope with, but do not, because you keep your money. To illustrate. I am rich, and I live an easy life, whereas you are poor, because of regrettable choices and/or bad option luck, and not, therefore because of any lack of equality of opportunity. You have to ride the crowded bus every day, whereas I pass you by in my comfortable car. One day, however, I must take the bus, because my wife needs the car. I can reasonably complain about that to a fellow car-driver, but not to you. I can’t say to you: “It’s awful that I have to take the bus today.” There is a lack of community between us of just the sort that

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 38-45.
\textsuperscript{11} Cohen on the Marxist principle: “Here the relationship between people is not the instrumental one in which I give because I get, but the wholly non-instrumental one in which I give because you need.” This description is from G.A. Cohen, “Back to Socialist Basics,” in\textit{ On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in Political Philosophy}, ed. by Michael Otsuka (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 219. Cohen on communal reciprocity in\textit{ Why Not Socialism}? 43: “The relationship between us under communal reciprocity is not the market-instrumental one in which I give because I get, but the noninstrumental one in which I give because you need, or want, and in which I expect a comparable generosity from you.”
\textsuperscript{12} Cohen, \textit{Why Not Socialism}? 35.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 35.
naturally obtains between me and the fellow car-driver. And it will show itself in many other ways, for we enjoy widely different powers to care for ourselves, to protect and care for offspring, to avoid danger, and so on.¹⁴

Taking this passage together with what was established at the outset, it appears that Cohen views large inequalities of resources as problematic if they reflect people’s regrettable choices and/or option luck, because considerable differences of economic power then typically amount to large inequalities of aggregate benefit, in the sense that the worst off face many more challenges in life than the best off. This outcome conflicts with community, as Cohen conceives it, because community involves people caring for each other to the extent that they share in a common life, understood as the lives of the worst off not laboring under significantly more challenges than those of the best off.

This interpretation is consistent with a second example provided almost immediately after the above passage. Imagine you are on a camping trip with Cohen and some mutual friends. Imagine further that you have access to a high-grade fishpond, which you won in a lottery that everyone entered, but that you selfishly decide not to share it. As a result, whilst you get fat on exorbitant amounts of fish, the rest of the group has little to eat.¹⁵ This large inequality of resources, which is due to option luck, conflicts with community, because community would involve the group caring for each other by sharing the pond. As Cohen says of the outcome, “even though there is no injustice here, your luck cuts you off from our common life, and the ideal of community condemns that, and therefore also condemns the running of any such lottery.”¹⁶

Contrary to an alternative interpretation, it is also the non-realization of a common life that is fundamental in the bus case. Nicholas Vrousalis thinks it is plausible to assume “that the idea of community at work in the passage above is, or partakes of, justificatory community.”¹⁷ The community principle’s first mode of caring is, he says, “something like justificatory community.”¹⁸ Cohen’s concept of “justificatory community” is developed in his sustained critical engagement with Rawls, definitively presented in Rescuing Justice and Equality. It is realized when policy arguments pass “the

¹⁴ Ibid., 35-36.
¹⁵ Ibid., 37-38.
¹⁶ Ibid., 38.
¹⁸ Vrousalis, “Jazz Bands, Camping Trips and Decommodification,” 156.
interpersonal test,” which “asks whether the argument could serve as a justification of a mooted policy when uttered by any member of society to any other member.”

However, if the interpersonal test were employed in the bus case it would not obviously reveal a lack of justificatory community. Unlike in the case used to criticize the lax interpretation of Rawls’ difference principle for licensing unequalizing incentive payments, where naturally talented individuals struggle to justify to the least-advantaged their intention to work less hard in the face of an income tax rise, the car-driver could justify his relative advantage to the bus-rider on the basis that it is responsibility-sensitive. It thus seems equally plausible to assume that the bus case is not meant to illustrate a lack of justificatory community; Richard Miller denies that Cohen’s evocations of community in *Why Not Socialism?* concern it. Rather, what matters is that, unless the car-driver shares his greater resources with the bus-rider, considerable inequality of resources prevents them from sharing in a common life. The unreasonableness of the car-driver’s complaint if it was uttered to the bus-rider, but not the fellow car-driver, is simply an illustration of the fact that the bus-rider faces significantly more challenges in life, and the corresponding improbability that she would empathize.

What Cohen finds repugnant about the worst off facing many more challenges than the best off, at least in cases where those challenges could be prevented or alleviated to the relevant degree (challenges of severe physical and/or mental impairment, for example, cannot always be prevented or so alleviated), is that it reflects a lack of caring and sharing. It is reasonably clear, given the above illustrations of its non-realization, that the community principle’s first mode of caring involves people sharing resources to the extent that a common life obtains. For example, to invoke the beginning of the passage above, its realization would involve you not keeping all of your money if you earn, say, ten times as much as I do, but you instead sharing your greater resources with me, to the extent that I do not face considerably more challenges in life than you. It would involve rich car-drivers sharing their greater resources not merely to the end that buses cease to be overcrowded, but to the extent that there ceases to be rich car-drivers and poor bus-riders, since transport is only one example of how greatly different

20 For the former case, see ibid., 48-69.
economic power cuts people off from a shared common life. Condemnation of the fishpond lottery on the camping trip suggests it would also involve people avoiding option luck that could lead to the undesired state of affairs.

It is unclear whether the community principle’s first mode of caring is voluntary or enforced. Miriam Ronzoni interprets it as voluntary and suggests that, in addition to resource sharing, it “might entail … that the naturally talented freely choose to put their skills to the service of the community rather than of their own profit only.” This is a reference to Cohen’s concept of an “egalitarian ethos,” which also features in his critique of Rawls. But, as with justificatory community, we should be careful not to blur Cohen’s ideas. The ethos contributes towards distributive justice by informing people’s choices within society’s coercive rules. For example, in Cohen’s “doctor-gardener” illustration, it motivates a naturally talented individual who prefers gardening to doctoring for pay consistent with responsibility-sensitive equality, but doctoring to gardening at a certain rate of unequalizing incentives, to nevertheless refuse unequalizing incentives for doctoring, because if she accepted those incentives she would be acting contrary to her luck egalitarian belief that differences of natural ability fail to justify differences in people’s distributive shares. Yet, as Jonathan Quong argues, contrary to how it is sometimes interpreted, in itself the egalitarian ethos “does not require talented people to choose any particular occupation—it merely forbids talented people (subject to a limited agent-centered prerogative) from accepting unequalizing incentives for taking on socially optimal jobs.” Choosing those jobs whilst forgoing unequalizing incentives further requires the talented to internalize what Cohen variously speaks of as “an obligation to serve others,” or “a desire to contribute to society,” or a “sense of commitment to other people.” It is this productive ethos in combination with her luck egalitarianism that motivates doctor-gardener to make the socially optimal choice.

Is the productive ethos constitutive of the community principle? Possibly, but Cohen’s descriptions of it appear to resemble communal reciprocity more than his illustrations of its first mode of caring. Moreover, the egalitarian-productive ethos is primarily intended as a means to ensure both distributive justice and efficiency without having to restrict freedom of occupational choice. The first mode of caring targets none of those ends. It is instead a means to the realization of a shared common life, from which people

26 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 190.
might nevertheless be cut off in a society whose members internalize the ethos, since a commitment to responsibility-sensitive equality and to performing socially optimal labor does not rule out large regrettable choice and/or option luck inequalities. A world in which doctor-gardener chooses doctoring consistent with a luck egalitarian pay scheme may nevertheless be a world in which she chooses to bet big on a throw of the dice, and, if she loses, perhaps comes to regret that choice.

What is clear is that the central requirement of the community principle “is that people care about, and, where necessary and possible, care for, one another, and, too, care that they care about one another.”27 This leaves open the possibility of democratically enforcing the constraint on inequality. First, note that people might care about one another, in the sense that they are concerned about one another’s welfare, yet, where necessary and possible, not actually do anything to care for one another. Second, if people do care for one another, they might do so only because they are forced to, for example, through social welfare programs funded by general taxation. Third, people might care that they care about one another, and thus vote for forms of enforced caring, such as that just mentioned, or care for one another in an entirely non-coerced way, for example, by voluntarily sharing resources, or some combination of both. Communal reciprocity would also reflect this commitment to others, but, as noted previously, it is not a necessary condition of the constraint. The central requirement of the community principle does not therefore rule out a democratic decision to enforce its first mode of caring. As Pablo Gilabert notes, Cohen himself appears to envisage enforcement when he speaks of the community principle as “forbidding” the relevant inequalities.28

The Abandonment Objection

If the community constraint is voluntary, then the tendency for human beings to act selfishly is a significant practical problem. Unless resources are so abundant that people have no reason to compete for greater distributive shares, only moderate levels of selfishness render it probable that levels of voluntary resource sharing and abstinence from option luck would fall short of establishing a common life. More importantly, if it is voluntary, the constraint does not guarantee security against absolute forms of deprivation that might follow from people’s imprudent decisions, since levels of voluntary caring might also fall short in that regard. A voluntary community constraint thus fails as a response to perhaps the most forceful

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“democratic egalitarian” objection to luck egalitarianism, which is that it denies some citizens the social conditions of their effective freedom by countenancing the “abandonment of negligent victims.”29 For those unfamiliar with this objection, consider the paradigm example of the uninsured reckless driver:30

Imagine a person who, against a background of equal opportunities, makes a genuine choice to drive recklessly without health insurance. This person then goes on to have an accident that leaves her severely injured. If she receives expensive medical treatment she will make a full recovery, but she cannot afford to pay for it due to her lack of insurance, and the consequence of non-treatment would be severe physical and/or mental impairment. A strict luck egalitarian sees no distributive injustice in society not covering the costs, since the driver’s misfortune is a case of bad option luck. Socialist equality of opportunity therefore permits the abandonment of imprudent people to absolute forms of deprivation, whether it is severe physical and/or mental impairment, as in cases such as this, or abject poverty, as in cases where people make genuine choices to gamble their income and wealth and lose to that end.

Abandoning especially imprudent people to deprivation would, of course, at least in a moderately wealthy society, cut them off from a shared common life with the better off. As we have seen, Cohen deems this outcome repugnant if it could be corrected by sharing resources, or if it could have been averted by avoidance of the gamble. Victims of bad option luck would not therefore be abandoned to absolute forms of deprivation in an ideal Cohenite socialist world where the community constraint is voluntarily implemented; although it is important to remember that in this world its implementation is not a requirement of justice, since Cohen understands the constraint as either “defin[ing] the terms within which justice will operate, or [as] … sometimes (justifiably?) contradict[ing] justice.”31

But what if, as is more probable, selfishness thwarts the voluntary implementation of the community principle’s first mode of caring? Cohenite socialists might insist that in this world their preferred socialism is unrealized, and so it cannot be criticized for abandoning negligent victims. However, despite Cohen’s thesis that the principles at the summit of our normative beliefs do not respond to and are therefore not grounded in facts,


the tendency for human beings to act selfishly is a fact that surely counts against a voluntary community constraint. After all, Cohen’s aim is to defend both a desirable and feasible alternative to capitalism, which is why he too considers the problem of selfishness. As he understands it, the problem is not primarily one of human nature but of economic design, because “while we know how to make an economic system work on the basis of the development, and, indeed, the hypertrophy, of selfishness, we do not know how to make it work by developing and exploiting human generosity.” The feasibility of a voluntary community constraint given the probability of selfishness is therefore a valid consideration, and this consideration has implications for its desirability. It is undesirable under the probable conditions because it would not guarantee security against deprivation that is permitted by socialist equality of opportunity. In contrast, an economic design that includes enforcing that security, as the outcome of a democratic decision-making procedure that reflects communal caring, is both feasible and desirable.

An alternative strategy that might be employed by defenders of a voluntary community constraint is to argue that the abandonment objection reveals a problem with socialist equality of opportunity, whilst insisting that the community principle is not meant to solve that problem. On this view, the desirability of Cohenite socialism depends on revising its egalitarian principle rather than its community principle. However, the community principle’s first mode of caring is, at least indirectly, meant to deal with the abandonment objection, for it seeks to mitigate the same inequalities that the objection highlights as unacceptable to leave unmitigated. Unless resources are particularly scarce, mitigating option luck inequalities to the extent that a shared common life obtains will provide the imprudent with enough to avoid deprivation, and if resources are moderately plentiful, it will allocate them significantly more than enough. For example, let us imagine that the situation of the campers who lose the fishpond lottery is so dire that they struggle to satisfy their basic needs of subsistence. If the campers, because they value a shared common life, had instead prohibited the lottery and agreed to common ownership of the pond, or if the lottery winner had instead sought to re-establish a common life after the fact by sharing the pond, an indirect consequence, assuming the fishpond is adequately to plentifully stocked, would be either the prevention of unnecessary suffering or the rescue of imprudent people from it. Hence, the community principle’s first mode of caring is an indirect response to the abandonment objection, although one that is unsatisfactory if it is voluntary.

33 Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 58.
Contrary to Cohenite socialism, abandoning negligent victims to deprivation does not only seem objectionable because it reflects a lack of communal caring, it also seems intuitively unjust. If that intuition is not mistaken, it follows that luck egalitarianism is either an implausible or incomplete theory of distributive justice. In response to the abandonment objection, it is common to reach the latter conclusion and propose supplementing luck egalitarianism with a sufficiency principle that tempers its emphasis on responsibility. On this view, justice does not require holding people responsible for the consequences of their genuine choices if it means denying them a sufficient distributive share, but it does require distributive shares to be responsibility-sensitive above a guaranteed minimum. Paula Casal maintains that this mixed view of justice is not incoherent, as the intermittent role of responsibility in determining just shares can be explained by the fact that forbidding choice-generated inequality would require severe restrictions on liberty, whereas forbidding choice-generated insufficiency tends to require less costly restrictions on liberty.

A particularly forceful justification of a sufficiency constraint, which is open to luck egalitarians to adopt, is to ground it in a liberal democratic interpretation of social contract theory. On this view, citizens are owed what they require to participate fully in a democratic society in return for consenting to the authority of the state, and they act collectively through the state to fulfill each person’s entitlements. In Elizabeth Anderson’s seminal theory of “democratic equality,” this is fleshed out in terms of entitlements to capabilities necessary to avoid oppressive social relationships and for functioning as an equal citizen. Functioning as an equal citizen involves the ability to effectively exercise one’s political rights and to participate in the various activities of civil society, which presupposes effective access to the means of subsistence and human agency. To illustrate, if one does not have sufficient food, clothes, shelter, healthcare, and an adequate education that enables her to make informed choices, she cannot effectively exercise her right to vote or to engage in public deliberation, nor can she participate as an equal in a system of cooperative production, nor might she have effective access to public transport, and thus to certain public spaces, nor might she

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Democratic equality thus “requires that everyone have effective access to enough resources to avoid being oppressed by others and to function as an equal in civil society.”

Nevertheless, Cohenite socialists might insist that distributive justice does not require sufficiency, whilst still viewing the abandonment of imprudent people to deprivation repugnant on the basis that it reflects a lack of caring that cuts people off from a shared common life. Moreover, as the central requirement of the community principle does not rule out democratic enforcement of its first mode of caring, Cohenite socialists might opt for this measure given the undesirability of a voluntary community constraint in a selfish world. The problem, however, is that enforcing the community constraint appears to involve unjustified restrictions on liberty. This becomes evident after further distinguishing how it goes beyond sufficientarianism.

The Liberty Objection

The community constraint on luck egalitarianism varies in degree compared with a sufficiency constraint. Regarding the latter, it is plausible that everyone could have effective access to enough resources to avoid deprivation, oppression and to function as equal citizens in a democratic society that is characterized by large inequalities of resources. Inequalities of resources would be troubling for democratic equality if the consequence were that the ability of people to function as equal citizens were undermined, such as if the inequalities effectively enabled the wealthy to select candidates for public office. When democratic egalitarian concerns are built into a sufficiency constraint it might therefore require minding the gap. But it does not necessarily require it, since, on this view, “[t]he stronger the barriers against commodifying social status, political influence, and the like, the more acceptable are significant income inequalities.” It therefore permits large inequalities of resources if the state successfully prevents their conversion into effectively unequal citizenship.

In contrast, the community constraint does necessarily require minding the gap, as it requires that the worst off do not face significantly more challenges in life than the best off. To emphasize the distinction. On the one hand, supplementing luck egalitarianism with a sufficiency constraint necessarily keeps responsibility-sensitive inequalities of resources within any range except where distributive shares at the bottom end of the scale are insufficient. On the other hand, supplementing luck egalitarianism with the community constraint necessarily keeps certain responsibility-sensitive inequalities of

38 Ibid., 320.
39 Ibid., 326.
resources within a limited range where the top and bottom ends of the scale are narrowed by the goal of establishing a shared common life. For example, imagine that a tenfold income inequality exists between us, not because of any inequality of opportunity, but because of my regrettable choices and/or bad option luck. Your income is $350,000 a year and my income is $35,000 a year. If $35,000 is sufficient for the satisfaction of my basic needs and for me to function as an equal citizen, the requirements of luck egalitarianism supplemented with a democratic egalitarian sufficiency constraint are satisfied. On the contrary, the requirements of Cohenite socialism are not satisfied. Other things equal, I will face significantly more challenges in life than you, due to the considerable difference in our economic power. If the community constraint were enforced your greater resources would instead be shared to the extent that I do not face many more challenges in life than you, or the inequality of resources would have never arisen because of restrictions on option luck, or some combination of both. The community constraint thus requires greater equalization of certain responsibility-sensitive inequalities of resources. It necessarily forbids large regrettable choice and/or option luck inequalities, whereas a sufficiency constraint does not.

Enforcing either constraint, to borrow terms from Andrew Williams, would require “internalizing” and/or “externalizing” of its costs. Internalizing costs would involve restricting people’s liberty to participate in option luck, for example, by enforcing special taxes, compulsory insurance and/or prohibition of reckless activities, to the degree necessary to realize either sufficiency or a shared common life. Externalizing costs would instead involve spreading liability for people’s regrettable choices and/or bad option luck across society by means of general taxation, again, to the degree necessary to realize either constraint.40

Internalizing and externalizing the costs of a sufficiency constraint on luck egalitarianism can be justified on the contractualist grounds explained above. Of the two methods of enforcement, internalizing might be preferable to externalizing, since externalizing the costs of sufficiency would involve, if not injustice, at least unfairness. That is to say, even if justice requires sufficiency, when differences of outcome reflect only people’s genuine choices made against a background of equal opportunities, there is nevertheless an unfairness involved in forcing prudent people to bear the costs of correcting for imprudent people’s insufficiency. That is not to say, however, that externalizing the costs of sufficiency is unjustified. As it might be preferable, all things considered, to collectively fulfill each person’s entitlements by spreading liability for people’s regrettable choices and/or bad

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option luck across society, rather than restrict people’s liberty to participate in option luck, or some combination of both.

In contrast, both internalizing and externalizing the potentially greater costs of the community constraint on luck egalitarianism seems unjustified. Consider again the case above where a tenfold responsibility-sensitive income inequality cuts us off from a shared common life, but where my income is sufficient. Should the state have forbidden this outcome by internalizing the costs of the community constraint? That is to ask, should we have collectively placed restrictions on our liberty to participate in option luck, for example, by enforcing special taxes, compulsory insurance and/or prohibition of reckless activities to the necessary degree? Whereas restrictions on liberty of this sort can be justified if they are necessary, which they are not in this case, to the degree required to guarantee our sufficiency, it is doubtful whether the possibility of one of us having to face many more challenges in life than the other justifies further restrictions. Remember, the difference of outcome reflects only our genuine choices made against a background of equal opportunities. Thus, so long as our choices did not have the potential to generate insufficiency, and did not, therefore, risk the unfairness involved in having to externalize the costs of sufficiency, we have strong claims against others restricting our liberty to make those choices. In cases where large inequalities of resources are responsibility-sensitive, and where internalizing the costs of a shared common life necessitates more severe restrictions on liberty than what is required to secure people’s sufficiency, those greater restrictions appear unjustified.

But what about externalizing the costs for us to share in a common life? Should we instead have acted collectively to forbid the tenfold income inequality that separates us by such means? Suppose that for me not to face significantly more challenges in life than you would require redistributing $100,000 by means of taxation, so that my income increases from $35,000 to $135,000 a year, and your income decreases from $350,000 to $250,000 a year. Similar to the problem with internalizing the community constraint, whereas taxing you can be justified if it is necessary, which it is not in this case, to externalize the costs of my sufficiency, it is doubtful whether the mere fact that I would otherwise have to face many more challenges in life than you justifies further redistributive taxation. Indeed, I appear to have no claim whatsoever to even a small amount of your greater resources, let alone a substantial cut of your income, as I have sufficient resources and it is reasonable to hold me responsible for my relative disadvantage. Thus, in cases where large inequalities of resources are responsibility-sensitive, and where externalizing the costs of a shared common life necessitates redistributive taxation beyond what is required to secure people’s sufficiency,
any further redistributive taxation seems an unjustified restriction on people’s liberty over the use of their resources.

In response to “the liberty objection,” it might be argued that I have misinterpreted the community principle’s first mode of caring. This response targets and denies the distinction I have drawn between its radically egalitarian requirements and the more moderate sufficientarian requirements of democratic egalitarianism. On this view, the first mode of caring should be interpreted as some kind of sufficiency constraint, which does not therefore require the demanding equalization of resources and apparently unjustified restrictions on liberty outlined above.

Gilabert explores a sufficientarian account of the community principle. Contrary to Cohen’s view that the restrictions it places on large inequalities either define the scope of justice or contradict it, he suggests we ought to view them as “more stringent demands of justice … focused on sufficientarian concerns with basic needs and on requirements to protect equal political status and self-respect.”41 I agree that this is a more plausible constraint on luck egalitarianism, but it is a reconstruction of the community principle. On Cohen’s view the community principle is not a requirement of justice, and realization of its first mode of caring would involve more than addressing these sufficientarian concerns. As Gilabert agrees, people committed to the first mode of caring “would feel that their communal bonds are weakened if some of them turn out to face many more challenges in their lives than others due to significant inequalities of income and other material advantages.”42 Thus, unlike a sufficiency constraint, which does not necessarily prohibit this outcome, establishing a shared common life by enforcing the first mode of caring requires that we mind the gap. The interpretation of the community constraint that understands it as necessarily restricting large regrettable choice and/or option luck inequalities is most consistent with Cohen’s view, and supplementing luck egalitarianism by enforcing that constraint appears to require unjustified restrictions on liberty.

Equality, Sufficiency, and Community

One solution to both objections is, of course, to reject Cohenite socialism in favor of some version of sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism. However, an alternative solution is to specify that the community principle’s first mode of caring requires enforcement of sufficiency, but only voluntary equalization of resources thereafter, if it is necessary to establish a shared common life. The community constraint

42 Ibid., 105.
would not then fail to guarantee sufficiency or unjustifiably restrict liberty. Consistent with democratic egalitarianism and Gilabert’s reconstruction, its enforced component should be rebuilt as a requirement of justice, whilst its voluntary component should be understood in terms of acts of caring that go beyond justice, and which reflect the broader requirements of community that Cohen envisions. As Gilabert appreciates, sufficientarian concerns do not exhaust requirements of community, and not all requirements of community are requirements of justice.43

A remaining issue is whether there is any compelling reason to prefer supplementing luck egalitarianism with this version of the community constraint to a purely sufficientarian alternative. This is beyond the scope of the article, but I shall nevertheless finish by noting two possibilities that are perhaps worthy of further reflection.

The first possible reason to prefer it, which is implicit in the bus case, concerns the increased opportunities for empathy provided by a shared common life. Assuming people are more likely to empathize with one another when they encounter similar experiences, and that empathy fosters communal caring that helps people to overcome challenges, it follows that society loses in that respect when its members have very different experiences because of considerable differences in their economic power. If it serves as a means to the creation and reinforcement of a more caring society, perhaps even a society that is characterized by communal reciprocity or the Marxist needs principle, pursuing a shared common life through voluntary resource sharing and/or refraining from option luck might therefore be preferable to settling only for sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism.

The second possible reason invokes “the priority view,” but only as a view about what would be morally good and not as a view about what justice requires. The basic view is that equal improvements in a person’s welfare have greater moral value the worse off a person is in absolute terms, so that we ought to give priority to improving the welfare of the worst off, whilst perhaps allowing that at some stage small gains in welfare for the worst off do not outweigh the moral value of large gains (or avoiding large loses) in welfare for the better off.44 Accordingly, the voluntary pursuit of a shared common life might be preferable to settling only for the enforcement of distributive justice, that is, sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism, if it serves as a means to improve the lifetime welfare of the worst off, and if those gains outweigh the moral value of avoiding the losses in lifetime welfare shouldered by the better off.

43 Ibid., 108.
However, the moral importance of empathy motivated altruism and of improving the lifetime welfare of the worst off is greatly diminished when the worst off enjoy and are guaranteed sufficiency, and when the relative disadvantage they experience above that threshold is responsibility-sensitive. Thus, even if there are reasons to prefer the specified community constraint to a purely sufficientarian alternative, I am somewhat skeptical about the force of the noted possibilities.45

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45 This article draws from and substantially revises a chapter of my PhD thesis, which was completed at the University of Warwick. I am indebted to my supervisors, Matthew Clayton, Andrew Mason and Zofia Stemplowska for their guidance, support and helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also wish to thank my examiners, Adam Swift and Andrew Williams. Lastly, I am grateful to the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council for generously funding my doctorate (award reference 1105321).
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The Ethico-Political Theory of Thomas Aquinas and the Revival of Capital Punishment in the Philippines

Jovito V. Cariño

Abstract: In key passages of *Summa Theologiae*, specifically under the questions on tolerance of heretics (IIaIIae.11.3) and killing of sinners (IIaIIae.64.2), Thomas Aquinas considers the acceptability of death as penalty for a person who endangers either faith or well-being of a community. If one considers the testimony of these texts alone, it would appear as if capital punishment has found a champion in no less than the premier Catholic philosopher himself. There are in fact those who seriously look up to Aquinas as a death penalty advocate. While his insights on capital punishment are crucial, one wonders however whether appeal to the aforementioned texts in question can do justice to the inherent complexity of Thomistic ethico-political theory and to the question itself of capital punishment. How then does one weigh Aquinas’ opinion on the possibility of capital punishment against his sustained and affirmative commitment to the fullness of human life, be it in the context of an individual or a community? This paper intends to address this apparent tension within Thomas Aquinas’ ethico-political theory vis-à-vis the current debate on the re-imposition of capital punishment in the Philippines, a predominantly Catholic country. As important, therefore, as making a Catholic rejoinder in this exchange is the effort to understand better the mind of Aquinas on the said issue. Through such undertaking, one acquires an opportunity to guarantee Catholic presence in the public debate while highlighting at the same time the continuing relevance of Thomistic theory on the pressing ethical and political issues of the day.

Keywords: ethico-political theory, capital punishment, Catholic, Philippines
Introduction

This paper is conceived mainly as a counterpoint to certain perspectives which put Thomas Aquinas on the affirmative side on the question of whether or not capital punishment should be reinstated in the Philippine legal system. This suggestion is apparently informed by certain texts from *Summa Theologiae* where Aquinas justifies the imposition of capital punishment on specific cases like murder and heresy. Proponents of this suggestion likewise maintain that the Catholic faithful ought not to oppose capital punishment on the strength of Aquinas’ favorable remarks. This paper argues that Aquinas’ position on this matter is much more nuanced than what is supposed by the specific extracts from the *Summa*; hence, advocates of capital punishment, Catholics or not, should take Aquinas’ words with maximum care before invoking his authority to argue for an otherwise contentious claim. I will demonstrate that the complexity of Aquinas’ issues from an apparent tension between his *theological opinion* on situations where capital punishment is suggested as a penalty and his *political theory* which contextualizes the enactment of a law like capital punishment is rather disputable. In considering, therefore, a piece of a proposed legislation of which capital punishment is an example, I maintain that political theory should take precedence over a theological claim, owing to the former’s more fundamental relevance on the issue at hand. I will try to develop this argument in five parts. First, I will make an account of the context that purports to justify the revival of capital punishment in the Philippines. To examine the conjunction of this proposal with Aquinas’ mind, I shall turn, in the second part, to his position on capital punishment as articulated in *Summa Theologiae*, in particular, QQ 11 and 64. Consistent with my argument, I will discuss in the third part a perceived tension in Aquinas’ position on the capital punishment by fleshing out two important distinctions, to wit, the distinction between a) capital punishment as a subject of theological opinion; and b) capital punishment as a subject of legislation. In the fifth and concluding part, I will further underscore my claim that a reductive reading of Thomas Aquinas to argue for the re-imposition of capital punishment in the Philippines will not help its cause. Besides the flimsy appeal to authority frowned upon by Aquinas himself, such approach betrays the complexity of Aquinas’ insights as well as the problems inherent in the very idea of capital punishment.

A Culture of Death

As early as the 2016 electoral campaign period, the erstwhile presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte, had been very vocal about his
dogged obsession to curb the problem of criminality in the country and had, in fact, dared the public to get himself killed, should he win but fail to wipe out criminals across the archipelago six months after taking office. Close to a year later, the Philippine National Police reported that crime rate has significantly dropped indeed by 31% under the Duterte administration. This means that 81,064 crime incidents recorded from July to November 2015 substantially dipped to 55,391 within the same period for the year 2016. This is, no doubt, a remarkable feat and one that should give all citizens a good reason to feel relieved. But remarkable as it may seem, there is yet another side to the fight against crime—a side that one needs to take into account if these reported gains must be appreciated for what they are worth. It should be remembered that in the same duration, from July to November 2016, a record of more than 4,000 deaths was reported in the name of the so-called “war on drugs.” This staggering number of killings in such a short period of time readily overshadows the record of reported 3,257 deaths throughout the more than two-decade rule of Marcos. Duterte is wont to consider illegal drugs as the root of all crimes, and hence, the relentless, vociferous campaign to bring its menace to an end regardless of the means employed and the consequences involved. To underscore his resolve, he even made a remark as to how willing he was to exterminate everyone who was hooked on illegal drugs.

2 Mr. Duterte has since backtracked on this pronouncement and has since asked for an extended time to clean the country of criminality. Nestor Corrales “Duterte wants war on crime, drugs extended for 6 more months,” in Inquirer.net (18 September 2016), <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/816443/duterte-asks-for-another-6-months-to-stop-crime-drugs>, 5 October 2017.
6 In his 2017 State of the Nation Address, for example, Duterte once more reiterated his conviction concerning the omni-malevolent role of illegal drugs. As he stressed: “That is why, I have resolved that no matter how long it takes, the fight against illegal drugs will continue because that is the root cause of so much evil and so much suffering that weakens the social fabric and deters foreign investments from pouring in. The fight will be unremitting as it will be unrelenting.” For a transcript of his speech, see: Rodrigo Duterte, State of the Nation Address, 24 July 2017, in Rappler (25 July 2017), <https://www.rappler.com/nation/176566-full-text-president-rodrigo-duterte-sona-2017-philippines>, 6 October 2017.
drugs numbering to almost three million. By issuing pronouncements of this kind, Duterte, his critics charged, makes it appear as though the summary execution of drug personalities is a legitimate state function. The spate, therefore, of killings is seen by them as a direct consequence of Duterte’s explicit encouragement of the so called “extra-judicial killing.” In its “Annual Report on Human Rights Defenders at Risk in 2016,” the human rights watchdog, Front Line Defenders, asserts: “In the Philippines—which already ranks as the most dangerous country in Asia for [human rights defenders]—President Rodrigo Duterte normalized the act of extrajudicial killing in his war on drugs, lowering the political cost of murder and thus raising the risk to defenders whose work threatens powerful interests,” To paraphrase Marx, a spectre haunts the Philippines; and this spectre is, as observers describe it, a creeping “culture of death.”

Rather than acting to curb the increasing number of drug-related killings, the Duterte administration decides instead to introduce a bill seeking to legalize death as a means to penalize drug-related crimes. What makes the whole suggestion scandalous is the very thought of an official endorsement of death as a state policy. There is indeed something thoroughly disquieting when the state becomes the prime agent to legitimatize the extant barbarism still in force in the legal infrastructure of capital punishment. The essential inhumanity characteristic of this extreme penalty is not unknown to the Philippines as attested by its abrogation of capital punishment in 2006 via Republic Act 9346 and its ratification in 2007 of an international anti-death penalty treaty called the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These are the gains that the proposed legislative measure called House Bill 4727 are set to overturn if indeed its proponents will have their way. House Bill 4727 is a legislative measure introduced by Representative Euﬁna A. Amparo and House Majority Leader Lord Allan Velasco that seeks to legalize capital punishment for drug-related crimes.


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vehicle envisioned to restore capital punishment in the Philippine penal system. It specifically targets drug-related crimes but excludes such graver offenses like kidnap-for-ransom, plunder, and rape. As it is, the instrumentalization of death invites serious objection especially when more and more of its victims turn out to be the very citizens who look up to the state for protection and defense. A necessary distinction, therefore, has to be made between legitimizing death as a form of penalty and justifying penalty which may at times require capital punishment. The former reminds us of Michel Foucault’s notion of biopower, a term he used to describe the extent of the modern state’s proclivity to subject to its own political machinations the life processes, including the death of its own citizens, so as to fortify its hegemony as the lone sovereign. The latter however points us to Thomas Aquinas for whom care of the community is the preeminent task of a public person occupying a position of power. At this point, someone may advance an argument and point out that the proposed revival of capital punishment in the Philippines intends nothing but the common good, and, on such ground, should be seen as consistent with Thomistic ethico-political thought. In the ensuing part of this paper, I will try to problematize this claim and put forward a position that will show how the aforementioned argument has no immediate warrant within Aquinas’ ethico-political framework. I maintain that Aquinas’ take on capital punishment is more nuanced than it appears and should, therefore, be read with caution lest his philosophy is misused to

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13 The example cited by Foucault to drive home his point was the Nazi regime. As explained by Foucault: “We have, then, in Nazi society something that is really quite extraordinary: this is a society which has generalized biopower in an absolute sense, but which has also generalized the sovereign right to kill. The two mechanisms—the classic, archaic mechanism that gave the State the right of life and death over its citizens, and the new mechanism organized around discipline and regulation, or in other words, the new mechanisms of biopower, coincide exactly. The Nazi state makes the field of the life it manages, protects, guarantees, and cultivates in biological terms absolutely coextensive with the sovereign right to kill anyone, meaning not only other people but also its own people. There was, in Nazism, a coincidence between a generalized biopower and a dictatorship that was at once absolute and retransmitted throughout the entire social body by this fantastic extension of the right to kill and of exposure to death.” Michel Foucault, “Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the College de France, ed. by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. by David Macey (New York: Picador, 2004), 260.

14 Aquinas wrote: “From this it is clearly shown that the idea of king implies that he be one man who is chief and that he be a shepherd, seeking the common good of the multitude and not his own.” Thomas Aquinas, De Regno ad regem Cyprī [On Kingship: To the King of Cyprus], trans. by Gerald B. Phelan, rev. by I. Th. Eschmann, ed. by Joseph Kenny (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of the Mediaeval Studies, 1949), in St. Thomas’ Works in English, comp. by Joseph Kenny, in Dominican House of Studies: Priory of the Immaculate Conception, <http://dhspriory.org/thomas/DeRegno.htm>, 7 October 2013, 2.13.
compensate for the rational deficit that is at the core of the very notion of the proposed revival of capital punishment in the Philippines.

Aquinas and Capital Punishment

It should be stated, at the outset, that Aquinas’ ethico-political theory is framed within the larger structure of his theological system. Therefore, unlike other theories on ethics and politics, what he has to say on any ethical or political issue like capital punishment is heavily invested in his fundamental creedal commitment. In *Summa Contra Gentiles*, for example, Aquinas invokes “the office of the wise man” whose main concern should be none other than “the highest causes”—his philosophical reference for everything under the umbrella of his primary theological interests.15 This foundational theological slant explains why one would hardly find a stand-alone ethico-political treatise in Aquinas’ oeuvre. Among his works, other than the ethico-political discourses found in *Summa Theologiae* (like the questions on justice, virtues, law, among others), the only materials with considerable explicit ethical and political orientation are *On Kingship* (1267), the commentaries on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (1271-72) and *Politics* (1269-72), and *Disputed Questions on Virtues* (1271-72). This peculiarity notwithstanding, there is no way the said materials can be detached from the theological bent of Aquinas’ intellectual system. The recognition of this basic fact, therefore, is indispensable in appreciating the full import of Thomistic ethico-political theory, particularly his position on the imposition of capital punishment.

The question of whether or not capital punishment should be enforced is addressed by Aquinas three times in *Summa Theologica*: twice in Question 64, specifically in articles 2 and 3, and once in Question 11, specifically in article 3.

Aquinas discusses the issue of murder in Question 64. In the second article of the same topic, he grapples with the problem of the legality of killing sinners. From his conviction that an individual is but a part of the whole, he opines that the life of such individual may be sacrificed if he has become a threat to the welfare of the community. He explains that “… every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in


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order to safeguard the common good, since ‘a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump’ (1 Corinthians 5:6).”  

In the following article of the same question, Aquinas tries to settle the issue of whether such killing should be undertaken by an individual or by a public person. Since the task of promoting common good is incumbent upon the public person, it is then to him alone and not to a private citizen that the determination of such killing belongs.

The third instance where Aquinas confronts the question of capital punishment is found in article 3 of Question 11, that is, on the question of whether or not heretics should be tolerated. Aquinas’ answer is just as stern. Heretics should be deprived of life since their sin, that is, corruption of faith, is a much graver error compared to the infractions of other depraved individuals.

In all three situations, Aquinas registers a positive stance on the question of capital punishment. Moreover, in all three of them, he justifies his position by appealing to the inviolability of common good. To his mind, it is common good alone that could serve as a sufficient ground for the sacrifice of the life of an individual. To the question then whether Aquinas is supportive of capital punishment, one may confidently answer in the affirmative. The situation, however, may turn around if one asks whether Aquinas’ arguments as developed in Summa Theologiae can be used to justify the proposed revival of capital punishment in the Philippines. The distinction between these two questions is as much a matter of content as its theoretical framework. Whereas in the Summa, Aquinas is articulating a theological opinion on idealized situations that would warrant capital punishment, in the Philippines, what is at issue is the lack of substantive arguments that could lend capital punishment sufficient moral and legal gravitas. In other words, Aquinas can afford to extrapolate on the possibility of enforcing capital punishment on account of a tacit proviso that the rational and legal infrastructure for such is already in place. In the Philippine case, capital punishment is a contentious issue because the proposal to revive it tends to contradict the very rational and legal infrastructure which serves as its normative context. When I proceed, then, to the next segment of this paper, I shall offer two important distinctions in support of my claim that Aquinas’ arguments and the Philippine proposal to revive capital punishment cannot be reconciled.

17 Ibid., 2.2.64.3.
18 Ibid., 2.2.11.3.
Important Nuances to Consider: Theology and Legal Theory

As suggested in the preceding paragraphs, Aquinas’ position on capital punishment, though affirmative, cannot be taken at its face value as an outright endorsement of death penalty without further consideration. My task in the segment at hand is to deliberate cautiously on the salient nuances of Thomist ethico-political theories vis-à-vis the question of capital punishment and, in so doing, bolster further my claim that the proposed re-imposition of capital punishment derives a very thin theoretical support from the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. I shall make an account of this argument by clarifying the distinction between a) capital punishment as a subject of theological opinion; and b) capital punishment as a subject of legislation.

a) Capital punishment as a subject of theological opinion. To consider capital punishment as a subject of theological opinion is to acknowledge its theological character in Aquinas’ discourse. This has been established as a matter of fact having identified *Summa Theologiae* as the main locus of Aquinas’ discussion of the said problem. The three instances where this question was properly addressed in the *Summa* had been identified in the preceding paragraphs. What is notable in all three references is Aquinas’ attempt to link capital punishment with his sustained discussion of sin. As it is, sin is a theological concept and Aquinas defines it as “contrary to virtue” and “an inordinate act.”19 In the passages cited above, Aquinas relates sin with common good. He considers the specific inordinate acts of murder and heresy as injurious to common good and the person or persons who do them become major threats to such. Being so, Aquinas recommends that they be put to death so as to keep the good of the community intact. He reasons that an individual is related to the community as part is to the whole. When a part therefore endangers the well-being of the whole, it becomes necessary and justified for his life to be taken out for the greater good of the community. In maintaining this, is Aquinas then making an outright endorsement of capital punishment?

This seems to be the suggestion of *Summa Theologiae* at first glance, and one that warrants serious consideration if its bearing on the revival of capital punishment in the Philippines should be clearly understood.

This is not, of course, the first time that the name of Aquinas is dragged into the issue of capital punishment. Shadia Drury, author of *Terror and Civilization: Christianity, Politics and The Western Psyche* for example, deplored Aquinas’ complicity with the hostility of the Catholic Church against heretics.20 In another work, Drury dished out yet another stinging

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19 Ibid., 2.1.71.4.
remark directed at Aquinas against the contrary claims of an eminent Thomist Jesuit scholar, Josef Pieper. In Aquinas and Modernity: The Lost Promise of Natural Law, Drury asserted that “… Aquinas did not make a single critical remark about the activities of his fellow Domini Canes, even though he was fully cognizant of their conduct. Aquinas’s analogy of heresy with communicable disease ensured that a presumption of guilt was inevitable and that killing a few innocent people was preferable to allowing a single heretic to go free.”21 Judging from these works including an article published online in New Humanist,22 Drury obviously harbored very little affection for Aquinas. Her conclusions, nonetheless, are exactly the standard account that one would gather if Aquinas were judged solely on the testimony of his unsympathetic statements against the heretics who, during the medieval ages, were the sworn enemies of the Catholic Church. As a friar preacher and a professional theologian, his pronouncements on the death warrant for heretics could, at the most, be considered as a polemical stance on the thorny issue of heresy. As they are, they may serve as an insufficient basis for a balanced interpretation of Aquinas’ mind on the matter. It is likewise important to note that heresy was considered a widespread socio-political malaise which threatened ecclesiastical and secular institutions across Jewish, Christian, and Islamic religions alike during the medieval ages. Emperor Frederick II himself, for example, for all his inimical posturing against the Pope in an attempt to combat heresy, enacted stricter anti-heresy imperial laws which included death penalty for incorrigible heretics.23 Moses Maimonides himself advocated death penalty for Jewish heretics in the same way as his Islamic counterparts.24 This is not to say that Aquinas’ position on death penalty should be dismissed merely as an expression of the temperament of his time. The task of this paper after all is not to offer an apologia for Aquinas’ position on capital punishment but to create an alternative way of understanding it. It is important to note that Drury’s caricature of Aquinas as a bloodthirsty inquisitor25 does not at all figure in reputable and more recent literature on medieval heresies and history of

25 Deane in fact pointed out that the notion of a medieval inquisition is pure myth and is merely a product of misrepresentation. See Deane, A History of Medieval Inquisition and Heresy, 88.
inquisition like William Monter’s *Frontiers of Heresy* (2002), Jennifer Kolpacoff Deane’s *A History of Medieval Heresy and Inquisition* (2011), as well as Christine Caldwell Ames’ *Righteous Persecution: Inquisition, Dominicans, and Christianity in the Middle Ages* (2009) and *Medieval Heresies: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam* (2015). Ames, in particular, underscored Aquinas’ distinct prudential handling of the case of heretics. She made it clear that for Aquinas, inquisition was but a method of correction. Only when a heretic refused conversion after two or three attempts could the Church expel him by excommunication and turn him over to the secular tribunal to mete out the penalty of death. It is apparent that during Aquinas’ time, when it comes to heresy, capital punishment was a possibility that cannot be avoided. And because this was so, Aquinas, through writing and teaching, made sure his fellow friar preachers were equipped with requisite philosophical and theological resources to help them reach out to those who had stepped off the grid, so to speak. Thus, his painstaking effort to structure *Summa Theologiae* according to all conceivable questions to which a friar preacher should have a ready answer; his inclusion of his carefully-studied responses to various heretical claims throughout the ages in Book IV of *Summa Contra Gentiles*; his pious updating of the teachings of the Greek Fathers of the Church in *Contra Errores Graecorum*, are all part of his relentless though underrated attempt to win the hearts and minds of the so-called heretics. In the silence and modesty of his texts, Aquinas left no stone unturned to overcome the threat of the penalty of death despite its certain morbid prospect.

b) Capital punishment as a subject of legislation. We turn now to the question of murder, the second violation for which Aquinas, in *Summa Theologiae* is said to have recommended capital punishment. In this case, the penalty is imposed on a sinner or evildoer who has proven to be a grave threat injurious to or against the good of community. There are eight articles under Question 64 and two of these, articles 2 and 3, are linked directly with capital punishment. The Latin verb *occidere* is used in Question 64 to refer both to the violative act in question, i.e., murder, and the recommended penalty of death found in articles 2 and 3. The said term is applied by Aquinas in a rather generic sense and included other modes of killing like self-defense, suicide, and including the killing done by a cleric. The text of Question 64 shows clearly the high regard that Aquinas sets aside for the common good. In article 2, he compares an individual person to a part of the whole and he argues that if a certain individual “be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since ‘a little leaven...
corrupteth the whole lump’ (1 Corinthians 5:6).” 28 Sustaining the same argument, he once again justifies the killing of an evildoer in article 3 as long as it is directed to the good of the community but adds that only public authority, being the custodian of the common good, can lawfully act on taking the life of an erring citizen.29

Some observers detect in Aquinas’ position on articles 2 and 3 a strong utilitarian and consequentialist undertone, and hence, the suggestion that he is an all-out advocate of capital punishment. His emphasis on the benefit of the community once the threat is eliminated is seen by them as an acknowledgement on his part of the advantages that a community stands to gain with the termination of the life of an individual sinner. They think that Aquinas is offering a justification for a person’s death by invoking its positive effect on the community. This is the common error of those who read Question 64 along utilitarian lines. To impute, however, a utilitarian leaning on the part of Aquinas is a case not just of misreading but of grossly missing the crux of his political philosophy. The possibility of Aquinas becoming a utilitarian is as close as Aquinas abandoning his Christian faith. The divide between Thomistic ethico-political theory and utilitarianism is so sharp and wide that the chance of them ever getting remotely near to each other, much less, synchronic, is almost unimaginable. Unfortunately, advocates of capital punishment in the Philippines often mistake the contrary as true. Aquinas, unlike Bentham and the utilitarians, never considers the merit of any action according to its consequences. Ethics, for him, is more than just a question of an outcome that promotes maximum pleasure and minimum pain for the greatest number of people. Utilitarians might hail the use of atomic bombs because it brought World War II to an end, but Aquinas would not. For him, an action becomes ethics-worthy not because of its consequence, but because of the inherent consistency between the object of an action and its telos. To properly appreciate therefore Aquinas’ take on capital punishment and why it should not be misidentified with utilitarianism, one needs to consider once more the main contours of Thomistic ethico-political theory.

Aquinas’ discourse on politics borrows heavily from Aristotle, but rather than merely extend Aristotle’s claims, he chose to amend his core insights and thus came up with a political theory that is patently Aristotelian and at the same time beyond Aristotle himself. It is from Aristotle that Aquinas acquires the thought of ethics and politics as conjunctive domains. As far as the Stagirite is concerned, a political community is as strong or as weak only as the citizenry that comprises it. Hence, in introducing his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes it clear that the study of ethics is

28 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 2.2.64.2.
29 Ibid., 2.2.64.3.
preparatory only for understanding what he terms as the ultimate among sciences: politics. As Aristotle explained in Book 1, Chapter 2 of *Nicomachean Ethics*: “Knowledge of the good would seem to be the concern of the most authoritative science, the highest master science. And this is obviously the science of politics, because it lays down which of the sciences there should be in the cities … its end will include the ends of others and will therefore be the human good.”\(^{30}\) Knowledge of the ethical first principles, good practices, virtues, and norms of excellence are drilled into the individual so they can blend themselves better into the larger sphere of life in the polis. A judicious consideration therefore of Aquinas’ mind on the question of capital punishment requires a preliminary recourse to his notion of law for it is in his proposed theory of law that Aquinas articulates the full political ramifications of the matter. Aquinas reserves his discussion of law in Questions 90 to 108 of the *Summa Theologiae*. Of particular relevance to the issue of capital punishment are Questions 90 and 91. In the former, Aquinas highlights the close link between law and common good, while in the latter, he provides distinction among various notions of law. What is evidently demonstrated in Aquinas’ discussion of law in these key parts is his uncompromising commitment to moral realism. In its ordinary sense, moral realism pertains to the adherence to the objective reality of good. Unlike the modern depiction of good as a derivative either of autonomous duty as in Kant or individual sentiment as in Hume, Aquinas subscribes to a notion of good that precedes the individual’s perception or determination. In the political context, such good is associated with common good. It is important to note that common good, for Aquinas, is utterly distinct from the utilitarian idea of the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Common good goes beyond the quantitative or the statistical and cannot be subjected to a public opinion poll. In *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas emphasizes, more than once, the common good’s rootedness in the rational structure of both the individual and the political body to which he belongs. Hence, to the question, “whether the law is always something directed to the common good?” found in Article 2 of Question 90, Aquinas responds by saying that:

\[\ldots\] the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest \ldots Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last

end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness
... the law must needs regard properly the relationship
to universal happiness.31

In the second article of the ensuing question, Aquinas identifies this
natural human proclivity towards happiness with natural law, specifically
pointing out that “it is from the precepts of the natural law ... that the human
reason needs to proceed ... These particular determinations, devised by
human reason, are called human laws ...” On the determination of common
good itself, Aquinas maintains that such responsibility and privilege belong
either to the whole people or to a public personage32 although, for a more
orderly dispensation, he prefers that such be carried out by a public figure
rather than the populace itself.33 In Article 2 of Question 94, Aquinas
demonstrates the intimate link between natural law and good, saying:

Consequently the first principle of practical reason is
one founded on the notion of good, viz. that ‘good is that
which all things seek after.’ Hence this is the first
precept of law, that ‘good is to be done and pursued,
and evil is to be avoided.’ All other precepts of the
natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the
practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good
(or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as
something to be done or avoided.34

As the preceding excerpt shows, Aquinas refers to “good” not only
as the welfare of an individual alone but also as the welfare of an individual
belonging to a community. In one commentary, John Finnis emphasizes that,
as far as Aquinas is concerned, all discussions pertaining to law are naturally
political, that is, they are derived from a perception that law exists in
“complete communities.”35 “Good,” therefore acquires the character of
common given the fact that it is shared by all in a particular society. Another
element worthy of emphasis is the distinction made by Aquinas concerning
“natural law” and “law of nature.” In Article 2 of Question 95, for example,

31 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1.2.90.2.
32 Ibid., 1.2.90.3.
33 Ibid., 1.2.95.4.
34 Ibid., 1.2.94.2
35 John Finnis, “Public Good: The Specifically Political Common Good in Aquinas,” in
Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Thought of Germain Griez
and American Constitutionalism, <http://www.nlhrac.org/contemporary/new-natural-law-
Aquinas differentiates the two by suggesting how the former serves as basis of the general principles of a particular law, like the law that seeks the punishment of an erring individual; the specifics, however, as to how such punishment should be carried out is something that can defined by the parameters set by the “law of nature.” An advocate of capital punishment therefore would be greatly disappointed if he looks into Aquinas’ notion of natural law and finds nothing that can buttress his claim. In Aquinas’ mind, the possibility of capital punishment is relegated to the “law of nature” which must be discerned by the prudent and the wise with utmost deliberation instead of a rubber stamp legislative body.

In Aquinas’ ethico-political theory, therefore, any form of legislation has an instrumental function in relation to the pursuit of the common good and the political leader has the primary task of ensuring that such is upheld and attained. In De regno ad regem Cypri, Aquinas once more underscores the fact that “… the idea of king implies that he be one man who is chief and that he be a shepherd, seeking the common good of the multitude and not his own.” Common good therefore, in the context of Aquinas’ ethico-political theory, is at the core of the constitution and dispensation of political authority. Quite different from the modern political theories that one can find in the likes of Spinoza, Hobbes, down to Leo Strauss, Aquinas does not consider legislation as aid to the consolidation of greater state power but as tool to the achievement of the common good which by nature and by convention should be recognized as a fundamental priority. An important matter begging for determination, consistent with the exploration of this paper, is the question of whether the proposed revival of capital punishment is aimed at the promotion of common good and not as a scheme to enlarge the hegemony of the state. If it were indeed for the common good, then one would definitely find traces of attempts to approach the problems posed by the proliferation and use of illegal drugs with a maximum degree of reasonable deliberation. As of yet, none of these has come to the surface. What the public sees at the moment is the shameless display of bloodlust, public issuance of death threats, intensification of the politics of hate, and the propaganda that promises a safer environment with the institution of the culture of death. To get rid of what the current president and his men constantly refer to as “narco-politics,” they have relinquished their moral ascendancy for the prospect of what I herewith describe as necro-politics. I am not sure, however, how one may justify the consistency between the common good and death as a state policy. There is always, in the extermination of life, particularly the kind undertaken by the state, that smacks of barbarism.

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36 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1.2.95.2.
37 Thomas Aquinas, De regno ad regem Cypri, 2.13.
Having rehearsed what Aquinas’ mind on law, politics and common good, I do not think that such barbarism would find the least space in the general scheme of his ethico-political theory.

Conclusion

In the preceding paragraphs, I tried to put forward an argument concerning the incompatibility between the proposed re-imposition of capital punishment in the Philippines and the ethico-political theory of Thomas Aquinas. In my discussion, I showed how the invocation of Aquinas’ ethical and political theories to legitimize the institution of the culture of death via the re-imposition of capital punishment in the Philippines indicates a flagrant misreading of his fundamental position concerning ethics and politics, particularly the role of legislation vis-à-vis the common good. The theological context of Aquinas’ opinion on the possibility of capital punishment is likewise highlighted so as to show the nuances of his position and to illustrate how a careless disregard of such nuances could lead to a reductive reading of Aquinas’ core insights. These assertions notwithstanding, I do not, in any way, purport this paper to be the last word on the debate as to whether or not capital punishment should be restored in the Philippine legal system. At the most, what it aims is to register a voice contrary to those who think that there are ethical and political merits in the revival of capital punishment and that they have the theories of Thomas Aquinas on their side. The arguments laid out in this paper show otherwise. It will do both public discourse and our collective moral compass tremendous good if more and different voices on this matter are given a hearing.
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The Incarnation of the Free Spirits in Nietzsche: A Continuum of Triple Dialectic

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Abstract: Most studies on Nietzsche seldom associate him with the dialectic method. We readily think of Socrates, Hegel, and Marx when we hear of dialectic, but very rarely, if at all, of Nietzsche. To date, very few studies on Nietzsche have claimed that one of the German philosopher’s underpinning philosophical methodologies in his literary oeuvre is the dialectic. This paper thus intends to show that Nietzsche has been employing the dialectic throughout his writings, especially in his treatment of the “free spirits” — a recurring subject in his different compositions. To do this, I will first revisit the meaning of dialectic in Socrates, Hegel, and Marx and subsequently argue that in Nietzsche, a type of dialectic akin to Hegel’s permeates his writings. In the next parts of this paper, I will discuss in-depth how for Nietzsche, the incarnation of the free spirits involves not just one, but a continuum of triple dialectic. I will argue that to become a free spirit, one must constantly apply the dialectics of (1) criticality and openness, (2) unlearning and relearning, and (3) overcoming and becoming. These dialectics, in my view, are the necessary conditions for any individual to be truly free. In this paper, I will importantly highlight that these dialectics run through Nietzsche’s works starting from the early up to the final period of his literary productivity.

Keywords: Nietzsche, free spirits, dialectic, overman

I. The Meaning of Dialectic in Socrates, Hegel, and Marx

Most studies on Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900) seldom associate him with the dialectic method. We readily think of Socrates, Hegel, and Marx when we hear of dialectic, but very rarely, if at all, of Nietzsche. To date, very few studies on Nietzsche have claimed that one of the German philosopher’s underpinning philosophical
methodologies in his literary oeuvre is the dialectic. This paper thus intends to show that Nietzsche has been employing the dialectic throughout his writings, especially in his treatment of the “free spirits”—a recurring subject in his different compositions. To do this, I will first revisit the meaning of dialectic in Socrates, Hegel, and Marx and subsequently argue that in Nietzsche, a type of dialectic akin to Hegel’s permeates his writings.

I begin with Socrates (ca. 470 B.C.E.–399 B.C.E.), the first Western philosopher who popularized dialectic. To this day, scholars offer different interpretations on Socrates’s purpose of dialectic. Some interpretations say that Socrates used dialectic to simply refute someone’s errors; others say that he merely used it as a means to show the inconsistency in someone’s set of beliefs. However you interpret the Socratic dialectic, it always results into the same outcome: that is, something which has previously been held as correct is now shown to be incorrect after all. In other words, dialectic for Socrates was more of a special method of dialogue through which one gradually arrives at the knowledge of truth or, in Platonic language, the Forms. But then, because it starts off by rejecting or disproving someone’s truth-claims, Socrates’ use of dialectic is characteristically negative. It proceeds by negating, by showing that someone is on the wrong side. In fact, that was why Socrates was sentenced to death: many hated him and wanted him dead because he had humiliated them during one of his dialectical intercourses with them.

In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), dialectic takes on a different meaning. Instead of seeing dialectic as a pure method of dialogue, Hegel sees dialectic as “the experience of consciousness.” That is to say,
dialectic is that method that brings to light how consciousness works and develops, for example when we form concepts, judgments, and syllogisms.\(^5\) Since for Hegel, our various concepts, judgments, and propositions constitute the categories of consciousness, the primary function of dialectic is to expose the inherent self-contradictory character of these very categories. At the same time, dialectic is also what reconciles these categories by developing another set of categories.\(^6\) However, after these categories are reconciled, their dynamic nature will later on generate a new tension, such that they again have to be reconciled. This continuous process of tension and reconciliation is how dialectic proceeds.\(^7\) There is another important category which Hegel himself gave as an example to illustrate the general sense of his dialectic method. It is the category of Being, whose opposite is Nothing.\(^8\) In Hegel’s view, their opposition can be reconciled by another category: Becoming. “Becoming then,” says Michael Forster, “forms the starting point for a new round of the dialectic.”\(^9\) To put it simply, whatever is (Being) is always opposed by whatever is not (Nothing). And in between the two, there always exists a link that is neither “isness” nor “nothingness,” i.e., Becoming. This is Hegel’s dialectic method in general: a system that can be used to explain not only the development of consciousness but also the relationships of things in the world and the direction of human history. It is similar to that of Socrates in that it culminates at the knowledge of truth or, to use Hegel’s own term, the Absolute Idea.\(^10\) Hegel’s dialectic, then, is teleological since it involves a continuous process of progression towards truth. And like Socrates’s, Hegel’s dialectic also involves some form of negation, where what is claimed to be true is always opposed by a counter-claim and always shown to be just one side of the whole reality.

Karl Heinrich Marx’s (1818-1883) conception of dialectic is heavily influenced by Hegel’s. Marx employed the dialectic in his theory of history as a lens with which to view the incessant economic movements and political changes in the material world. He underscores, for example, the relationship between the capitalists and the proletariat: a contradiction that can only be resolved with the dissolution of the two. And yet even if the two would be dissolved, a new generation of capitalists and proletariat would still arise once more. This is Marx’s dialectical reading of the movement of history.

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\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Ibid.

\(^8\) Ibid., 133. Capitalization by Forster.

\(^9\) Ibid.

\(^10\) Ibid., 132.
Dialectic for Marx is both an instrument to better understand the movement of history and the very dynamic of history’s movement itself.11

II. Recovering the Nietzschean Dialectic

Since Gilles Deleuze published his *Nietzsche and Philosophy* in 1962, subsequent Nietzsche scholars have been “Deleuze’d” into thinking that Nietzsche was never a dialectician both in the Socratic and Hegelian sense. As Deleuze himself puts it, “Nietzsche presents the dialectic as the speculation of the pleb, as the way of thinking of the slave …. [because] [t]he dialectic presents a certain conception of the tragic: linking it to the negative, to opposition and to contradiction.”12 But according to Francesca Cauchi, more and more scholars have expressed their disagreement with Deleuze.13 Cauchi relates that Deleuze arrived at his interpretation of Nietzsche as contra dialectic because all along he was doing “an emphatically anti-Hegelian reading of Nietzsche.”14 And yet, Hegel does not really stand opposed to Nietzsche. Cauchi insists that their philosophies are consonant to one another. Nietzsche, in fact, follows Hegel’s system of dialectic because in Nietzsche, there is a dialectic which is quite similar to Hegel’s.15

Already in *The Birth of Tragedy*,16 Nietzsche shows a penchant for Hegelian dialectic, especially in his overall treatment of the relationship

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13 Francesca Cauchi, “Hegel and Nietzsche on Thought, Freedom, and ‘The Labour of the Negative,'” in *Journal of European Studies*, 46:2 (2016), 110. Cauchi’s references include those scholars who do not agree with Deleuze. Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche may have been influenced by Nietzsche’s own reference to dialectic “as a symptom of decadence” in *Ecce Homo*. And yet in that very same section, Nietzsche not only singles out Socratic dialectic as the object of his criticism, he also boasts about his having “a dialectician’s clarity *par excellence* and… [an ability to] think with cold-blooded lucidity about things.” Thus even if Nietzsche were honest about his negative opinion of dialectic, I believe that it was limited to Socratic dialectic. As for Hegelian dialectic, Nietzsche might have been considering himself as an expert of it in that he personally claims to have that “dialectician’s clarity *par excellence*.” Friedrich Nietzsche, “Why am I so Wise?” in *Ecce Homo: How to Become What you Are*, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. by Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. by Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), § 1. Henceforth, *Ecce Homo* will be referred to as EC.

14 Cauchi, “Hegel and Nietzsche on Thought, Freedom, and ‘The Labour of the Negative,'” 110.

15 Ibid., 111.

16 *The Birth of Tragedy* is Nietzsche’s very first published book (1872). For further reading, see Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, trans. by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Henceforth, *The Birth of Tragedy* will simply be referred to as BT.
between Dionysius and Apollo, the book’s central subjects. Nietzsche takes Dionysius like Hegel’s thesis, Apollo like its antithesis, and the tragic artist like their synthesis. Nietzsche himself confesses that BT “smells offensively Hegelian.” And I would say that his other writings “smell” Hegelian too. As Richardson observes, Nietzsche’s method always involves the reversing of perspectives which “has the dialectical intent of constructing out of the conflict a new and better view.” For this reason, Richardson concludes that the Nietzschean method “is more Hegelian, because it’s more dialectical.” It starts by positing an inherent contradiction not only between two perspectives but also between two notions, “truths,” movements, etc., then continues by seeking their resolution through a “synthesis” of these contradictions. Thus it would not be correct to label Nietzsche as a pure philosopher of contradiction; he is as much a philosopher of dialectic since he never stops at contradictions but rather always looks for some “synthesis” that could bring them together.

Moreover, if we closely examine Thus Spoke Zarathustra, there are two passages in which Nietzsche implies the necessity of dialectic in the continuous process of self-overcoming and becoming. In the first passage, he says: “I am that which must always overcome itself… I must be struggle and becoming and purpose and the contradiction of purposes.” Then in the second, he declares: “Whatever I may create and however I may love it – soon I must oppose it and my love, thus my will wants it.” In many ways, these passages from TSZ echo Nietzsche’s appropriation of Hegel’s dialectic. And such is the Hegelian character of Nietzsche’s thinking that Jacob Golomb even

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17 See Kaufmann, “Nietzsche’s Admiration for Socrates,” 475. See also Footnote 50.

18 Nietzsche, “BT” in EC, § 1.

19 Richardson, Nietzsche’s System, 269. Emphasis by Richardson.


21 Ibid.


23 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ed. by Adrian Del Caro and Robert Pippin, trans. by Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 89. Henceforth, Thus Spoke Zarathustra will be referred to as TSZ.

24 Ibid., 90.


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goes as far as to say that dialectic is the “clue” to Nietzsche’s philosophizing.\textsuperscript{26} There is always something in Nietzsche’s method that “is reminiscent of Hegel’s dialectic.”\textsuperscript{27} Jeffrey Jackson aptly calls this Nietzschean dialectic “negative dialectic” because like Hegel’s, Nietzsche’s involves some form of negation, that is, the loss of cherished perspectives, ideals, concepts, etc.\textsuperscript{28} “But Nietzsche’s dialectic, like that of Hegel, makes negation a positive, dynamic power in nature and history,” affirms Rose Pfeffer.\textsuperscript{29}

Therefore, I contend that in his corpus, Nietzsche employs a dialectic which is akin to Hegel’s. It is not a dialectic which, in Deleuze’s opinion, is a mere “synthesis of forces.”\textsuperscript{30} Nietzsche’s is a teleological dialectic like Hegel’s. It culminates in liberation, in the freedom of the spirits. As Will Dudley notes, Nietzsche, following Hegel, is “engaged in determining the ontology of freedom, or what it is to be free.”\textsuperscript{31} This explains why Nietzschean philosophizing is ultimately aimed towards our becoming free spirits. But this does not mean that once we become free spirits, we have already reached the very end of the road. Becoming free spirits entails a continuous dialectic of self-creation, a dialectic that knows “no final conclusion.”\textsuperscript{32} Nietzsche’s, then, is a teleological dialectic because it has a clear direction towards which it aims to arrive – the freedom of the spirits – and not because it leads to the acquisition of any final essence.\textsuperscript{33} And what makes Nietzsche’s dialectic even more Hegelian, in my view, is the centrality of Becoming as the constant starting point of dialectic.\textsuperscript{34} Nietzsche’s dialectic, unfortunately, has been

\textsuperscript{26} Golomb, “Will to Power: Does It Lead to the ‘Coldest of All Cold Monsters?’” 526.
\textsuperscript{29} Rose Pfeffer, \textit{Nietzsche: Disciple of Dionysius} ( Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 1972), 237.
\textsuperscript{32} Golomb, “Will to Power: Does It Lead to the ‘Coldest of All Cold Monsters?’” 537.
\textsuperscript{33} The teleological character of Nietzsche’s dialectic can never be construed to mean that he is leaning towards essentialism. In Nietzsche, the never-ending dialectic of self-creation leaves no room for anyone to get hold of any unchanging essence.
\textsuperscript{34} See Forster, “Hegel’s Dialectical Method,” in \textit{Cambridge Companion to Hegel}, 133.
mostly forgotten, in large part due to the influence of Deleuze. There is therefore the need to recover it.

In this paper, I intend to show that Nietzsche is consistent in employing not just one, but a continuum of triple dialectic throughout his writings. This is especially evident in his philosophy of the incarnation of the free spirits, a recurring theme in his works. In addition, I argue that to become a free spirit, one must constantly apply the dialectics of (1) criticality and openness, (2) unlearning and relearning, and (3) overcoming and becoming. As an attempt to come up with a comprehensive synthesis of the conditions that would favor the incarnation of the free spirits, I will further show that these dialectics permeate Nietzsche’s works starting from the early period up to the final period of his literary productivity.

III. The Incarnation of the Free Spirits in the Early Period

Nietzsche’s writings have been traditionally categorized into “three distinct periods” consisting of an early (1872-76), middle (1878-85), and late or final (1886-88) periods. This categorization accordingly reflects the development of Nietzsche’s literary concerns: from being relatively philological at the start, to increasingly and ultimately being philosophical. Since the middle period of his writing career, Nietzsche began to repetitively speak about the “free spirit” (Freigeist). In fact, his books during this period—Human All Too Human, Daybreak, and Gay Science—comprised of what he himself called “the free spirit trilogy.”

The “free spirits” refer to Nietzsche’s higher type of human beings. He labeled them “free” precisely because they are those few who are no

35 I admit that Nietzsche never explicitly described the overarching themes of his writings in terms of the following dialectical categories: criticality and openness, unlearning and relearning, and becoming and overcoming. All the same, I will endeavor to show in this paper that these dialectical categories are implied in his oeuvre by citing passages from Nietzsche himself as well as from selected secondary sources.


37 Nietzsche started his career not as a philosopher but as a professor of classical philology at the University of Basle, becoming the youngest, at age 24, to hold such position in 1869. He would eventually be forced to resign in 1879 owing to constant health issues.

38 Pearson, “Friedrich Nietzsche: An Introduction to his Thought, Life, and Work,” 11. Nietzsche did not actually use the word “trilogy,” but at the opening page of Gay Science, he indicated that Human All Too Human, Daybreak, and Gay Science all belong to the same series, “whose common goal it is to erect a new image and ideal of the free spirit” (emphasis by Nietzsche). For details, see Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974). Henceforth, Gay Science will be referred to as GS.

39 Nietzsche would often speak about the free spirits in contrast to the “fettered spirits” whom he classified as lower human beings. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Human All Too Human: A
longer chained by the fetters of history, culture, philosophy, science, morality, and religion.40 The highest—or better yet, the “more perfected version”41—of these free spirits is the “overman” (Übermensch).42 However, Nietzsche reveals that they do not yet exist nor did they exist before.43 For now, they are ghosts devoid of flesh and lacking physicality.44 Despite this, Nietzsche hopes that they may appear in the future even if at present they remain a dream, an aspiration.45 In other words, the incarnation of the free spirits is always an open possibility. And yet, how will it come about? What will bring about the concrete existence of the free spirits in the future?

Although it was only during the middle period of his writing career that Nietzsche fully developed and began to specifically talk about the free spirits, he had already hinted about them in the early period.46 In BT, for example, the free spirits are described as those who are no longer constrained by any form of Socratism47 that has plagued modern culture and society for millennia. Socratism for Nietzsche is “a sign of decline, of exhaustion, of sickness, of the anarchic dissolution of the instincts” because it implies rigidity and dogmatism.48 The various forms of Socratisms include: aesthetic Socratism (what is beautiful or pleasurable is what is reasonable); scientific Socratism (only what is empirically observable is knowable); logical Socratism (only what can be proven as true is valid); and ethical Socratism

Book for Free Spirits, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), passim. Henceforth, Human All Too Human will be referred to as HH.

See ibid., passim. Nietzsche also states that the term “free spirit” refers plainly to “a spirit that has become free, that has taken hold of itself again” (emphasis by Nietzsche). See Nietzsche, “HH,” in EC, § 1.


Walter Kaufmann was the first to translate Übermensch as overman to emphasize that such a human being is someone who is already over himself, that is, he has already overcome himself (his human nature and tendencies). I am adopting this translation in this paper because it is closely connected to our objective of presenting the dialectic of overcoming and becoming as one of the pathways towards his (overman) incarnation. For details on the explanation of overman as the more appropriate translation for Übermensch, see Walter Kaufmann, editor’s note to Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. by Walter A. Kaufmann (London: Penguin Books, 1954), 115-116.

See Nietzsche, Preface to HH, vol. 1, § 2.

See Nietzsche, TSZ, 44.

See ibid.

Henceforth, the three periods of Nietzsche’s writing career will be simply referred to as the early period, the middle period, and the late period.

In BT, Nietzsche criticizes German culture and society for its tendency to be rigid, dogmatic, and autocratic. He calls this tendency on the whole as Socratism, after Socrates whom he blames for pioneering Western aesthetics, logic, science, ethics, etc. See BT, passim.

(what is moral is what is within the accepted norms).\textsuperscript{49} Metaphorically, the free spirits are typified by the artist who embodies the “Dionysiac-Apolline genius.”\textsuperscript{50} Such an artist ideally represents the free spirit: a liberated person who is not chained by Socratism.

After \textit{BT}, Nietzsche composed two other writings where he also hints about the free spirits. In the posthumously published essay “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” Nietzsche alludes to the free spirit as “the man of intuition” who is not conditioned by the clasps of concepts and abstractions.\textsuperscript{51} Meanwhile, in the \textit{Unfashionable Observations}, the free spirits refer to those “unfashionable” individuals (\textit{Unzeitgemassheit}) who have succeeded in untangling themselves from the reins of the “fashionable,” that is, the present cultural trends and norms that dictate how people ought to live and conduct themselves.\textsuperscript{52} So albeit not yet expounded as a concept, discernible traces of the free spirits were already in place in the early period. These spirits may one day appear, Nietzsche hopes; but for someone to become an authentic free spirit, he must firstly be critical, questioning everything that has been established by culture, society, religion, tradition, etc. This is because criticality is an attribute of a genuine free spirit.\textsuperscript{53} Even so, being critical is not enough; it is equally important to be open, willing to embrace new truths and fresh ideas.\textsuperscript{54} Therefore, to become a truly free spirit, a person must constantly employ a dialectic of criticality and openness.

\textsuperscript{49} For aesthetic Socraticism see Nietzsche, \textit{BT}, § 12; for logical Socratism, see \textit{ibid.}, § 13; for scientific Socratism, see \textit{ibid.}, § 19; and for ethical Socratism, see “An Attempt to Self-Criticism,” in \textit{BT}, § 1.

\textsuperscript{50} Nietzsche, \textit{BT}, § 5. Nietzsche observes that the tragic plays of ancient Greeks combine both Apolline (after Apollo, the god of music, poetry, moderation, and harmony) and Dionysiac (after Dionysus, the god of wine, ritual madness, intoxication, wild frenzy, and pleasure) elements. For Nietzsche, the good life is one that closely resembles a pre-Socratic ancient Greek tragedy. It is one that always makes room for a healthy amount of balance between artistic creativity (Apolline) and instinctive impulse (Dionysiac).


\textsuperscript{52} Friedrich Nietzsche, \textit{Unfashionable Observations}, trans. by Richard T. Gray (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 179, 194. For further information, see also Gray, translator’s afterword to Nietzsche, \textit{ibid.}, 395-413. Henceforth, \textit{Unfashionable Observations} will be referred to as \textit{UO}.

\textsuperscript{53} Criticality for Nietzsche is closely linked to truthfulness, to a new way of practicing honesty (\textit{Redlichkeit}) that is a central trait of every free spirit. For details, see Katrina Mitcheson, \textit{Nietzsche, Truth and Transformation} (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 140-150.

\textsuperscript{54} See Nietzsche, \textit{UO}, 144, 249.
A. Between Criticality and Openness: The First Dialectic in the Early Period

When *BT* first came out of publication in 1872, it did not receive a favorable reception. The opus, anyway, was overly critical of German culture and society. But that was really Nietzsche’s intention at the outset: to criticize. Because for him, that’s the only way to go ahead; that is to say, only by being critical of Socratism in all its disguises “might one hope for a rebirth of tragedy”—a rebirth which simultaneously denotes a new encounter with the free spirits. Without being critical, the spirit will remain unfree, confined within the rigid sphere of Socratic rationalism.

For Nietzsche, to be critical does not simply mean to be fault-finding. More than this, Nietzschean criticality is one which necessitates pessimism, skepticism, and nihilism. *TL*, for instance, is a highly critical essay which abounds in pessimistic, skeptic, and nihilistic pronouncements. More like an extension to *BT*, it continues its barrage of tirades against Socratism that had pervaded German culture and society in Nietzsche’s time. And that was so that there will finally be liberation: the freedom of the spirits from the hands of the “daemon called Socrates.”

Nietzsche resumes his usual diatribes in *UO*, but this time it is now against what we might consider the offspring of Socratism: philistinism. The “philistines” were the German cultural elite who Nietzsche derides on

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55 *BT* was originally titled *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music*. In 1886, Nietzsche released the book anew, this time revising its title, making it *The Birth of Tragedy, Or: Hellenism and Pessimism*. He also added a preface with the title “An Attempt at Self-Criticism.”

56 Nietzsche, *BT*, § 17.

57 Nietzsche’s pessimism is heavily influenced by Arthur Schopenhauer (1778-1860) who espoused a generally negative view of life and the world. But unlike Schopenhauer’s, Nietzsche’s “tragic” view of life is not hopeless. It is precisely in tragedy where we can better understand our life and the world. For further reading on Nietzsche’s pessimism, see Roger Hollinrake, *Nietzsche, Wagner, and the Philosophy of Pessimism* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

58 In the late period, Nietzsche would make a more explicit connection between criticality and skepticism, saying that a philosopher, as a free spirit, is better off if he were a critic and a skeptic at the same time. For details, see Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, ed. by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman, trans. by Judith Norman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 106. Henceforth, *Beyond Good and Evil* will be referred to as *BGE*.

59 There are two ways of looking at nihilism in Nietzsche’s context: first, as an approach to, and second, as a problem in, modern culture. With regard to the first, Nietzsche’s criticism of modernity may be classified as a form of nihilism in that for him, nothing (nihil) in it—especially its metaphysical and religious claims—can be held as certain and true. With regard to the second, Nietzsche himself accuses modern culture to be suffering from nihilism. “Nihilism is at our door,” he says in *The Will to Power*. And that’s because “the highest values are losing their value” (emphasis by Nietzsche). For details, see Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, ed. by Oscar Levy and trans. by Anthony M. Ludovici (New York: Gordon Press, 1974), 5, 8.

account of their arrogance, self-conceit, and autocratic tendency. Nietzsche, moreover, makes it clear that he doesn’t want to have anything to do with this “despicable philistinism.” 61 This cultural pathology discourages people from pursuing “wild experimentation” and from following their artistic “creative drive,” in effect preventing the free spirits from coming to life. 62

As we have looked into Nietzsche’s works in the early period, it is evident that criticality is ever necessary if the free spirits were to be given the chance to live. Be that as it may, Nietzsche—in spite of his tendency to be extremely critical—recognizes that criticality cannot be absolute. It still needs to be balanced by a hefty dose of openness. 63 I also believe that if a free spirit were purely critical and closed-minded, he would not be truly free; he would be a prisoner of his own closed-mindedness and intellectual myopia. Instead, Nietzsche encourages openness to go along with criticality. His stubborn insistence on perspectivism strongly supports this claim. Perspectivism64 connotes that I cannot insist my views on another inasmuch as his or her views may have some merits and truth. In the same way, the other cannot insist his or her views on me as well. Truth can always be viewed from different angles—or, to be more precise, from different perspectives. 65 Hence, much as I want to be critical, I should just the same be constantly open. We can thus suppose that for Nietzsche, the free spirits are not solely critical but also open. Though they are pessimists (critical thinkers), they are also a bunch of optimists: people who have hope about the future.

In many ways, Nietzsche exemplifies the free spirits. Towards the end of BT, for example, Nietzsche actually expresses hope that the German spirit will someday free itself from the ropes of Socratism which is currently

61 Nietzsche, UO, 10-11, 44.
62 Ibid., 14.
63 In UO, Nietzsche leaves a number of hints about the value and importance of openness. In one of these, he says that it would make him happy if educated people would also know how “[t]o accept everything objectively, get irate about nothing, love nothing, [and] comprehend everything.” In my interpretation, Nietzsche here is implying that it’s not enough to be educated (critical); it’s also necessary to know how to accept everything, that is to say, to be open. In the later part of UO, Nietzsche likewise speaks of the need for “cultivated people … [to be] ready to receive hints and suggestions, and [welcome] the smallest real truth.” I still interpret this passage to imply that being cultivated (hence, having a critical mind) should be balanced by being open (being ready to receive hints and suggestions). For details, see Nietzsche, UO, 144, 249.
64 At first glance, Nietzsche’s concept of perspectivism sounds no different from relativism. However, the two are different. As one Nietzschean scholar succinctly explains, “Perspectivism … is not equivalent to relativism …. Perspectivism does not result in the relativism that holds that any view is as good as any other; it holds that one’s own views are the best for oneself without implying that they need to be good for anyone else.” For details, see Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), 49, 72.
tying it. He said: “One day it will find itself awake, with all the morning freshness that comes from a vast sleep; then it will slay dragons, [and] destroy the treacherous dwarfs …”66 The free spirits are neither total skeptics. In TL, we get a glimpse of how, though they continue to despise the dictates of reason—the residues of Socratism—the free spirits are ever open to the insinuations of intuition.67 The free spirits cannot be categorized as pure nihilists too. Though Nietzsche proclaimed himself “as the first complete or perfect nihilist,”68 this is more of a hyperbole than fact. The nihilism of the free spirits certainly does not exclude the possibility that there could still be some truths out there. Nihilism for Nietzsche may denote “a pathological loss of trust in the world,”69 but in UO, he unmistakably suggests that no nihilist can totally negate the “experience [of] true satisfactions” brought about by love.70 This goes to show that the free spirits, while maintaining a nihilistic (critical) outlook about the world, remain open to the truth of love, to that “something most marvelous and most sublime.”71

As we have seen, the interplay of criticality and openness dominates Nietzsche’s works in the early period. And the free spirits, even if not yet fully conceptualized at this point, clearly cannot exist sans appropriating the dialectic of criticality and openness. They must, by necessity, be both critical and open. However, the dialectic of criticality and openness alone does not suffice in bringing about the incarnation of the free spirits. There is another tier of dialectic that needs to be taken up: that between unlearning and relearning.

B. Between Unlearning and Relearning: The Second Dialectic in the Early Period

In Nietzsche’s view, the problem with German culture during his time is that Socratism and philistinism have been deeply ingrained in it. Their perennial presence has resulted into the suppression of the free spirits. But once this problem is recognized through the lens of criticality, the next logical step is to unlearn it. Otherwise, the problem remains: Socratism and philistinism persist like an incurable disease that has no more hope of remedy; the existence of the free spirits continues to be an elusive dream. But

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66 Nietzsche, BT, § 24.
67 See Nietzsche, TL, § 2.
69 Andreas Urs Sommer, “Nihilism and Skepticism in Nietzsche,” in A Companion to Nietzsche, 250.
70 Nietzsche, UO, 328.
71 Ibid. For my explication of Nietzsche’s hints on the value and importance of openness in the early period, refer to Footnote 63.
what does this unlearning consist of? How should it be done? In BT, Nietzsche notes that the process of unlearning begins with a culture’s rejection “of those foreign elements which have been forcibly grafted on to it.”72 This is not an easy task; it calls “for a hard fight.”73 It requires a “zealous ambition” similar to that of “all our great artists and poets.”74 As such, those who are faint-hearted cannot accomplish this task. In TL, Nietzsche identifies the receptacle of the aforesaid cultural pathologies: the intellect. For a long time, the intellect has been the slave of Socratism and philistinism. If there should be unlearning, it must mean one thing: the intellect casting off its “mark of servitude,”75 setting aside the authority of reason, and embracing the new supremacy of intuition. Only when the manacles of the slavery of Socratism and philistinism are discarded will it be possible for the free spirits to be incarnated.

Nietzsche gets bolder but more realistic in UO. He asserts that our only hope of successfully carrying out the arduous task of unlearning is “to replace the fundamental principles of our present education system … with a new fundamental principle.”76 This may entail “a possible upheaval in our educational system,”77 Nietzsche admits, but it is so much better than settling as an ignorant slave of Socratism and philistinism by refusing to unlearn. All the same, unlearning for Nietzsche remains one side of the coin. On the other side, there is relearning. Every unlearning has to be accompanied by relearning. The two must go together; they must be engaged in a dialectic. Unlearning cannot be the end of the process that seeks to enflsh the free spirits because if it were so, we would end up with dull and hopeless spirits, forever closed to the possibility of learning new things. Thus, there should always be relearning.

BT is an invitation to relearn from the ancient Greeks how life ought to be lived by drawing essential lessons from how they originally staged tragedy prior to the advent of Socrates and/or Euripides. After all, they were the epitome of the free spirits—in a metaphorical sense at least. TL similarly bids us to relearn the subtle voices of our intuition which are often silenced by the cacophonies of various noises emanating from reason. For it is through continual relearning that one gets on the track of becoming a free spirit. No longer bound by the order of rationalism, the free spirits are those who have relearned how to follow their intuition which has been shelved in favor of reason. In UO, Nietzsche categorically states that “relearning [is]

72 Nietzsche, BT, § 23.
73 Ibid., § 20.
74 Ibid., § 23.
75 Nietzsche, TL, §2.
76 Nietzsche, UO, 232.
77 Ibid., 234.
necessary.” This can be done through education. But it must be the kind of education whose fundamental principles have already been overhauled for it is imperative to “possess that necessary formation.” Nietzsche further reveals that “education is liberation, removal of all weeds, rubble, and vermin that seek to harm the plant’s delicate shoots.” There may be other ways to become a free spirit, he acknowledges, but no other way is better than education.

In the process of giving life the free spirit, unlearning and relearning must continually interact in a dialectical relationship. One cannot stand without the other. This fluid equilibrium between the two is what characterizes the free spirits as they are not tied to a particular extreme. They go about freely, unlearning and relearning as they journey on in life—at least, that’s how the tragic artists were in ancient Greece; and that’s how the free spirits will hopefully be in the unknown future when they will have been finally embodied. But again, completing the incarnation of the free spirits requires yet another tier of dialectic. Aside from the two dialectics we already mentioned—that between criticality and openness, and that between unlearning and relearning—there is still the dialectic of overcoming and becoming.

C. Between Overcoming and Becoming: The Third Dialectic in the Early Period

The notion of overcoming is a theme that Nietzsche often speaks in his writings, even in the early period. In BT, he specifically identifies what must be overcome: all forms of Socratic tendency, the tendency “to murder art” and repress the creativity of artists. TL names a related tendency: that of depending on reason and on our inherited notion of what is moral or non-moral. Likewise, UO presents another common tendency: that of giving more preference to the “fashionable” without much criticality. For Nietzsche, all these tendencies must be overcome. They are what hinder the incarnation of the free spirits. Once the task of overcoming is done, however, the correlative task of becoming must be pursued. But what should one become? From Nietzsche’s point of view, it would be later on—in the middle period, that is—when he would have a much clearer grasp about what the goal of every

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78 Ibid., 226.
79 Ibid., 283.
80 Ibid., 175.
82 Nietzsche, BT, §17.
becoming should be. Needless to say, from our point of view, the answer is obvious: one should become a free spirit – a person who has finally liberated himself from Socratism, philistinism, etc. through an incessant exercise of the triple dialectic of criticality and openness, unlearning and relearning, and overcoming and becoming.

IV. The Incarnation of the Free Spirits in the Middle Period

According to Paolo D'Iorio, it was “in the winter of 1876” in Sorrento when Nietzsche began formulating his “philosophy of the free spirits.” 83 Nietzsche’s early works may have already hinted about them, but since the free spirits did not yet then mature as a concept, Nietzsche could not provide further details and elaborate on them. From the middle to the late period, the free spirits have become a recurring idea, nay ideal. Not unlike in the early period, the free spirits are still essentially those who have liberated themselves from all types of bondage like cultural impositions, religious dogmatisms, and intellectualism of all kinds grounded on traditional metaphysics, epistemology, science, etc. As an ideal, Nietzsche was honest enough to confess that the free spirits have yet to exist. 84 In any case, their incarnation requires the same dynamics: a continuum of triple dialectic which we just expounded earlier.

A. Between Criticality and Openness: The First Dialectic in the Middle Period

In his introduction to HH, Richard Schacht observes that in this book, “nothing is beyond criticism” for Nietzsche; everything must be “subjected to critical scrutiny,” to “a strong suspicion.” 85 But there is nothing surprising in this, especially if we take our cue from the book’s subtitle: A Book for Free Spirits. For Nietzsche, one of the outstanding features of the free spirits is their being critical: they mistrust the data supplied by the intellect; they question the ability of language to capture the essence of reality and to express truths; they doubt the authority of science, religion, and philosophy. Nietzsche relates: “He is called a free spirit who thinks differently from what, on the basis of his origin, environment, his class and profession, or on the basis of the dominant views of the age, would have been expected of him. He is the exception; the fettered spirits are the rule.” 86 The free spirits, therefore, are

84 Nietzsche, Preface to HH, vol. 1, § 2.
85 Richard Schacht, Introduction to Nietzsche, HH, xv.
those who think out of the box. They are free precisely because they are not conditioned by anything around them.

The problem of modern culture, Nietzsche avers, is rooted in its blind attachment to inherited concepts, metaphysical claims from past philosophers, and rigid dogmatism of religious institutions. But these are precisely what’s enslaving it and holding captive the free spirits. Instead, the free spirits are liberated individuals since they have been emancipated from the idiosyncrasies of culture and tradition. They are ever critical of everything that has been institutionalized. However, criticality is not the ultimate attitude for Nietzsche. He values openness just as much. A free spirit does not stop at criticality but goes beyond it by being open to “little unpretentious truths” — that is, those “unimpeachable truths” that have successfully passed the test of rigorous suspicion and intense skepticism.

Let us briefly go over to two other books in this period: Daybreak and GS. In Daybreak, Nietzsche counsels that it is better to always be suspicious and not “to admit a belief merely because it is a custom.” Still, this critical attitude alone is not enough so we will become liberated souls. Openness to new experiences and even to new beliefs and customs is just as important. With regard to GS, this is what completes the free spirit trilogy. It culminates what Paul Franco calls a “tremendous development” of Nietzsche’s thoughts in the middle period, a development capped by his “adoption of scientific skepticism,” marking the maturation of his philosophical position. Assuming a scientist-skeptic persona, Nietzsche in GS attacks religious truths, especially the idea of faith. He wants to convey that a free spirit is one who is not its hostage. He is a critical spirit, the kind of “spirit [that] would take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty.” “Such a spirit,” Nietzsche continues, “would be the free spirit par excellence.” Yet even with its heightened criticality towards established norms and truths, Nietzsche was the first to admit that GS is a book marked by gay or merry openness: to the future, upcoming adventures, new prospects, fresh possibilities and goals. Moreover, as one of the books for free spirits, GS’s characteristic openness indicates that the free spirits are not closed to the idea that there are

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87 Ibid., “Of the First and Last Things,” §3.
88 Ibid. §22.
89 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, ed. by Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 59. Henceforth, Daybreak will be simply referred to as DB.
91 Nietzsche, GS, § 347.
92 Ibid. Emphasis by Nietzsche.
still truths out there that are worth believing in. So, while they remain critical, the free spirits are ever open.

**B. Between Unlearning and Relearning: The Second Dialectic in the Middle Period**

Criticality for Nietzsche always goes along with a corresponding action: unlearning. It is not by chance that his free spirit trilogy all point to the same things that must be unlearned: the so-called “truths” of science, religion, history, philosophy, etc. There’s no need to go into detail into every one of these. Nietzsche is admirably consistent when it comes to the end-goal of most of his works: the abolition of traditions, customs, beliefs, and so forth. All these delay, if not really obstruct, the incarnation of the free spirits.

But just as criticality must be paired with openness, unlearning must also be paired with relearning. The things that have been relegated by science, religion, philosophy, etc. are what must be relearned. This is why there’s a need for an “artistic education of the public,” because our artistic impulses are among those that science, religion, etc. have caused us to lose. Furthermore, Nietzsche calls for a “re-education of the human race.” There must be a lot of things that we need to relearn. Nietzsche himself did not fail to express his own desire to keep on relearning “in order to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful.” But what guarantees re-education? How do we know that one has been successfully re-educated?

Here Nietzsche introduces the concept of “intellectual conscience”—the “conscience behind your ‘conscience.’” It’s not

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94 Although Nietzsche wants everything that has been institutionalized to be eradicated, it should be kept in mind that Nietzsche is not an absolute nihilist. He himself advocates for the establishment of a new ethics, new philosophy, new education, etc., albeit with a caveat that none of these should become absolute. Otherwise, they will have to be eradicated like their predecessors.


98 Nietzsche is a staunch critic of educational institutions. Even so, he recognizes the value of education. For him, since education has been “corrupted” by the influence of tradition, religion, science, etc. then there has to be re-education. He is very much aware, though, that any form of re-education could still turn into a rigid, scientific, religious, or traditional process. When that happens, then a new process of unlearning will be required so that a new process of relearning (re-education) may start. In Nietzsche, nothing ever becomes permanent. This is why I contend that the dialectic of unlearning and relearning is very much implied in Nietzsche’s thinking.


conscience in the Scholastic sense that lets you distinguish right from wrong. Rather, it is conscience in the Nietzschean sense: that is, a critical acuity that lets you sharply tell between what is dictated by the norm and what is not. Thus, if there is any indication that one has been properly “re-educated,” it is when he begins to exercise his intellectual conscience. The free spirits are men of intellectual conscience, but it’s not because they are now disposed to obey the dictates of reason; it’s more because the way they now approach things is no longer based on the standards fixed by traditions and customs but on their independent thinking. In short, having intellectual conscience means thinking big. As Nietzsche sarcastically remarks in TSZ, “Indeed, better to do evil than to think small!”

C. Between Overcoming and Becoming: The Third Dialectic in the Middle Period

Towards the end of the middle period, Nietzsche arrived at a more mature conception of the free spirits. They are not simply those who have managed to unlock themselves from every tradition and institution. They are now the “overman” (Übermensch)—the free spirit in his finest form. One major factor is responsible for this “upgrading,” and that is constant overcoming. The concept of overcoming (Überwindung) is significant in the philosophy of Nietzsche, appearing recurrently in all his writings. It pertains to our having to conquer and transform ourselves in order to become unchained, to become free spirits.

In TSZ, instead of the usual discourse on the free spirits, Nietzsche kept on pointing toward the Übermensch. It could be because he probably thought that if we should become free spirits, we better be the higher type than the ordinary one. Nietzsche himself disclosed that this was the mission of Zarathustra: to teach about overman, or more specifically, about how to become an overman. Right in the opening pages of TSZ, Nietzsche laid down the most basic principle in order to become an overman: overcoming. Zarathustra declared, “Human being is something that must be overcome. What have you done to overcome him?” In the same book, Nietzsche shared that overcoming is a never-ending process, thereby implying that we too should be in a continuous state of becoming. The three metamorphoses of

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101 Nietzsche, TSZ, 68.
102 See Hough, Nietzsche’s Noontide Friend, 88.
103 Mitcheson, Nietzsche, Truth and Transformation, 2.
104 Nietzsche, TSZ, 5.
105 Ibid.
the spirit\textsuperscript{106} represent the number of possibilities that is constantly open before us. Whenever we become a camel, we overcome it by becoming a lion; whenever we become a lion, we overcome it by becoming a child; and whenever we become a child, we overcome it by again becoming a camel, and so forth.

One of the biggest hurdles in becoming an overman is what Nietzsche calls \textit{eternal recurrence}.\textsuperscript{107} It is a notion that Nietzsche introduces in the middle period as a sort of existential challenge to every individual, a challenge to respond to very crucial “what if” questions, like: What if everything—your life, relationships, job, physical looks, abilities, etc.—is actually eternally recurring? What if the way things are happening right now will happen again and again in exactly the same way for all eternity? How will you live your life?\textsuperscript{108} The implications are enormous. The mere thought of it deeply bothered Zarathustra. In fact, he was in coma for seven days, unable to bear the bleak prospect, this “most abysmal thought” of having to eternally live the same life in exactly the same way.\textsuperscript{109} Zarathustra likened the idea of \textit{eternal recurrence} to a crawling monster that gets into his throat and chokes him. But Zarathustra was able to bite its head off and spit it away.\textsuperscript{110} This, for Nietzsche, is how one becomes an overman: you don’t live your life in despair just because things are recurring eternally; rather, you affirm your identity, biting off the head of the crawling monster that gets into your throat and chokes you. Only such an affirmation can allow you to overcome the monotony of ordinary existence. But to do so entails using one’s will power, or in Nietzschean language, the \textit{will to power},\textsuperscript{111} so that you can be in full

\textsuperscript{106} The three metamorphoses of the spirit are the three continuous cycle of becoming that are open to the spirit: that of becoming a camel, a lion, or a child. The camel symbolizes our being burdened by all the things that come down to us from our customs and traditions, that is to say, when we simply accept everything without questioning anything. The lion symbolizes our being a fighter, that is, when we go against all the things that that our customs and traditions impose on us. The child symbolizes our being innocent again, free from any material, worldly, or even other-worldly concerns. For details, see \textit{ibid.}, 16.

\textsuperscript{107} Lee Spinks shares that there are two ways of looking at eternal recurrence: from an existential viewpoint and from a cosmological viewpoint. In this paper, I am adopting the former. See Lee Spinks, \textit{Friedrich Nietzsche} (London: Routledge, 2003), 126.

\textsuperscript{108} Nietzsche first brings up the notion of eternal recurrence in \textit{GS}, in that section where he lets us imagine a demon who suddenly appears to us during one of our loneliest moments, telling us that our life is an infinite repetitive cycle. For details, see Nietzsche, \textit{GS}, 273-274. In \textit{TSZ}, Nietzsche also often brings up the theme of eternal recurrence, especially in Zarathustra’s parable of “The Convalescent.” See Nietzsche, \textit{TSZ}, 173-178.

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Ibid.}, 174.

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid.}, 175.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy} offers a succinct explanation of the notion of the \textit{will to power} as Nietzsche describes it in his writings. The \textit{will to power} is “Nietzsche’s term for the most basic human drive to attain a higher and more perfect state, an insatiable desire to manifest power and a drive to employ and exercise power. For him, life itself is the will to
control of your existence and live your life according to how you will it, not according to how things should be as they eternally recur.\textsuperscript{112}

V. The Incarnation of the Free Spirits in the Late Period

The free spirits still occupy a substantial treatment from Nietzsche in the late period. But in continuation to what he had already begun towards the end of the middle period, he would stick to the concept of overman. \textit{TSZ}, in fact, ends with a note of hope, announcing the imminent advent of the overman. Through the lips of Zarathustra Nietzsche said, “\textit{My children are near, my children.}”\textsuperscript{113} The conditions that would favor the incarnation of the free spirits remain unchanged, in spite of Nietzsche’s maturation as a philosopher in the late period. They are the same triple dialectic, taken as a continuum, of criticality and openness, unlearning, and relearning, and overcoming and becoming.

A. Between Criticality and Openness: The Incarnation of the Free Spirits in the Late Period

Nietzsche opened \textit{BGE} with a harsh criticism against “the prejudices of philosophers,” especially metaphysicians.\textsuperscript{114} He claims that what philosophers christen as “truths” are highly doubtful. An overman should avoid this trap by being very critical, by doubting everything.\textsuperscript{115} Nietzsche would tell us, however, that an overman should not be absolutely critical. It is important to be open that what philosophers consider as mere “appearance” could be the reality, or what they hold as plain “deception” could be the truth.\textsuperscript{116} The overman represents the “new philosophers,” and they are coming.\textsuperscript{117} But their way of doing philosophy is different. In
Nietzsche’s own words, they “philosophize with a hammer”118—that is, with ruthless pounding on established beliefs, teachings, and corpus of knowledge. Still, that doesn’t mean that an overman is closed. He is open,119 ever willing to see the world with new eyes.120

B. Between Unlearning and Relearning: The Second Dialectic in the Late Period

As we have already shown earlier, the dynamics of becoming an overman does not just involve the dialectic of criticality and openness. Another dialectic—which is that between unlearning and relearning—must come into play. Many of the things that prevent us from becoming who we want to be are rooted in our moral system. These are what we need to unlearn. Hence, Nietzsche brings us back to the genealogy—that is, to the very origins—of our moral concepts.121 This will enable us to re-examine and reassess their validity so that, having cleared the dust, we would have a much better look at them. The overman, the free-spirited man, is in many ways a genealogist; he is a fierce critic of established morality. He is an “immoralist” or one of those few “idealists of knowledge in whom alone the intellectual conscience dwells.”122 Thus in GM, Nietzsche argues that we must get rid of the illness called “bad conscience.”123 Precisely, this is done by unlearning everything that we have acquired from it. Bad conscience is teaching us to esteem and practice selflessness, self-denial, and self-sacrifice because these

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118 The subtitle of Twilight of the Idols is, Or How to Philosophize with a Hammer. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols: Or How to Philosophize with a Hammer, in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings. Henceforth, Twilight of the Idols will be referred to as TI.


121 The concept of genealogy, especially as Nietzsche uses the term in GM, should not be confused with archeology. In Nietzsche, genealogy is a method of historical and axiological critique that questions and examines how our values, beliefs, and concepts of truth and morality originated and emerged in history. Archeology, meanwhile, refers to a form of intellectual excavation that digs deep into the history and origins of certain beliefs and concepts as they emerged in the unconscious. This is how Michel Foucault, and in a way, also Paul Ricœur, describe archeology in their works. Genealogy and archeology are not really entirely different because they both deal with origins and history, but they should not be confused with one another. For a concise discussion of the distinction between genealogy and archeology, see Mi Gyung Kim, “Archeology, Genealogy, and Geography of Experimental Philosophy,” in Social Studies of Science, 0:0 (2013), 1-13.

122 Nietzsche, GM, 149.

123 Ibid., 88.
are “beautiful” values. Yet these are all cruelty, Nietzsche would say. This is why we need to unlearn these dregs of “slave morality.” A slave is not a free spirit. He can never be an overman if he remains in that state.

But unlearning is not enough. There should be a revaluation of all values. For Nietzsche, the revaluation of all values is the task of overthrowing all types of morals that originate from “slave morality.” His writings in the late period speak a great deal about the necessity and urgency of this task. Such task is meant for us to relearn what values really are. And so, while all unlearning is done, relearning must at the same time be carried out. The dialectic of unlearning and relearning is essential in order for the overman to transform from being a mere ghost into a concrete flesh. But as always, every incarnation of the free spirits requires the dialectic of overcoming and becoming. Here in the late period, Nietzsche remains hopeful that a time will come in the future when the overman will be a reality.

**C. Between Overcoming and Becoming: The Third Dialectic in the Late Period**

Nietzsche recounts in *GM* that one of the main factors that keep an individual from rising to his freedom and become a free spirit or an overman is the feeling of *ressentiment*. In general, *ressentiment* refers to the feeling of aversion or antipathy towards anything that reflects “master morality” — that is, to the morality that prizes self-control, self-overcoming, self-affirmation, etc. *Ressentiment*, then, is the feeling that emerges as a reaction against master morality. It is a “non-reflecting, bitter emotional state” which “creates a feeling of inferiority or impotence.” This is why *ressentiment* is often associated with slave morality; it is simply the opposite of master morality. Since *ressentiment* gets in the way to liberation, it must be overcome at all cost by exercising the *will to power*, by crashing the tendency to adopt the ideals

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124 Ibid.

125 In his examination of the genealogy of all morals, Nietzsche traces the origin of all “virtues”—especially those that are esteemed in Christianity like humility, meekness, submissiveness, etc.—to the moral system of slaves, specifically the ancient Jews. Nietzsche stresses that Christianity, as an offshoot of Judaism, has a close resemblance to its mother religion.

126 *Ressentiment* is a French word which is equivalent to the word “resentment” in English. Nietzsche’s use of French is perhaps because for him, no German word can better express what this term really means and suggests.


129 See Footnote 111.
of slave morality. As William Remley affirms, “Only by overcoming can a Nietzschean authentic life be achieved.”

But even the overman, the possessor of master morality, the embodiment of the free spirit and authentic existence, is not a finished business. He must constantly use his will to power to continually overcome himself. As Nietzsche warns, “Whenever the will to power falls off in any way, there will also be physiological decline, decadence.” Because overcoming is a ceaseless pursuit, becoming is a perpetual endeavor as well. The two always go together. Inasmuch as I overcome, I also become. But I become an overman not when I am restlessly proving my power and prowess to others, not when I boil with rage and throw fierce criticisms towards everything. Rather, I become an overman when at the end I become a lover, when at the end I have amor fati, that is, love for my fate, love for my life. It is a love that lets the overman embrace with openness his eternally recurring fate and lives his life to the maximum, knowing fully well that he has within himself the power to constantly overcome himself. This is the distinguishing trait of every genuine overman. As Nietzsche himself expressed in EC, “My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati.”

VI. Taking Inspiration from the Free Spirits

Having examined most of Nietzsche’s works from the early up to the late period, we have seen that the free spirits are not only a recurring, but also a central subject in his philosophy. We can even say that Nietzsche’s unique philosophical ideas are closely connected to his concept of the free spirits. If a “Nietzschean utopia” existed in reality, it would most likely be a society of free spirits, a state ruled by a group of, or perhaps just a single, overman. But as I have been arguing throughout this paper, the free spirit or the overman is not a static or fixed reality; he is a continuing process. This implies that Nietzsche’s utopia, if it should become a reality, would also be something that is in the constant process of becoming. Whatever the case, I have shown in this paper that for the free spirits to be incarnated in the future, its conditio sine qua non is a long process that employs a continuum of triple dialectic: the dialectics of criticality and openness, unlearning and relearning, and overcoming and becoming.

130 Remley, “Nietzsche’s Concept of Ressentiment as the Psychological Structure for Sartre’s Theory of Anti-Semitism,” 10.
Nietzsche’s free spirits or overman may not yet be a reality—or they may never be a reality at all—but the dynamics through which they will have been incarnated offers plenty of insights on how we may live our lives as “freer” human beings. We may not readily recognize it, but time and again we actually bow down unwillingly to the mighty dictates of customs and traditions. However, if we take some inspiration from the examples of Nietzsche’s free spirits, we can take comfort at the thought that what’s more important in life is not whether we have followed or disobeyed some rules or norms. What is always important is whether we are happy with the fact that what we have, where we are, and what we have become is not the end-all and be-all of our existence. Finally, in our present capitalist-dominated and technologically-mediated world, many of us have been enslaved by lust for money, materialism, and even by technology itself. In a way, we are not truly free. But if we take inspiration again from Nietzsche’s free spirits, we can always overcome all these obstacles that keep us from rising above our current conditions. After all, we have within us all the power to assert ourselves and affirm our freedom. We have all the potential to become free spirits. The question is not how, but when.

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Our Social Discontents: Revisiting Fromm’s Redemptive Psychoanalytic Critique

Ian Raymond B. Pacquing

Abstract: Modern society is marked with utmost ambivalence. There is the utmost desire to be free, creative, and productive. Yet, our creative and productive desires trap us and now control our own freedom to become. Couple this inconsistency with the rapid sociostructural changes, fragmentation of traditions, and dissolution of communal well-being, what we have is a life of uncertainty. It is a life debased from its very ontological foundation with the transmission of technorationalities of the capitalist industry. In modernity, we could no longer speak of individuality and subjectivity since the very historical thread that serve as its foundation is now wavered towards accumulation and possession of the capital. Moreover, this overleaning towards the capital deadens us unconsciously that we mistake this for reality. The market ideology with all its rationalizations reifies human consciousness to the extent that we consider the technorationalities as the ontological normative structure. As a result, there is a growing dislocation of subjectivity which leads to neurotic social behaviors and inner social contradictions. As a result, we have our own social discontents. It is then the aim of this paper to ponder on the psychosocial effects of the market economy. I argue that there is a need to look at the effects of this economic system that perpetually delineate subjective experiences and plunge humanity into incontrovertible pseudo images. It is at this point that Fromm’s radical psychosocial interpretation of society becomes binding. I argue with Fromm that our social libidinal drives or what he termed as social characterology, which we are all unconscious of, must be thoroughly brought to fore. I claim that this particular characterology result to the obstructions of a normal and healthy society.

Keywords: psychoanalysis, subjectivity, individuality, social characterology
Why does a radical psychology matter in our postmodern times?\(^1\) Freud’s contribution to modernism highlights a revolution inasmuch as our era is characterized by tremendous restlessness, shattering of cultures and beliefs, and the disillusionment of the self.\(^2\) His psychoanalytic method has laid bare a methodology and epistemology which pronounces a metanarrative that has been authoritarian and oppressive.\(^3\) Freud’s philosophy challenges our sociostructural conditions which replicate the metanarrative of modernity.\(^4\) In this sense, Freud’s metapsychology transforms the way we think about ourselves, i.e., he has shown “how little we are in control of our own thought processes.”\(^5\) However, although Freudian psychoanalysis has provided us with so many reprieves from our miseries, it must also be noted that his intellectual genius is only focused on the physiological and biological influence of our instincts. He has thought that every group or class is just composed of individuals who are the only subject of psychic properties.\(^6\) Freud just limits himself with psychic traits which are common to all people regardless of their historical origins.\(^7\) He has engrossed himself with the instinctual drives which he takes as the causes of our miseries.\(^8\) Freud has focused so much on the phylogenetic and

\(^1\) Pekkola describes modernity as ambivalent: it promises progress for humanity through the creation of a new man and a new society, yet it destroys the traditional forms of life and authority. He further says, “The sensations of loss, of the disappearance of foundations and of the dissolution of meanings and points of reference were pivotal for almost all critical analyses of modernity and its crisis.” See Mikka Pekkola, “Prophet of Radicalism: Erich Fromm and the Figurative Constitution of the Crisis of Modernity” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Jyvaskyla, 2010), 10. In this sense, the propagation of ideologies construed from modernity’s ambivalent nature resulted in the experimentation of modern psychology of multiple ways of knowing and understanding human behavior. However, we seldom realize that psychology is incorporated as a medium towards domination and exploitation. Parker explains that psychology becomes a powerful component for the ruling ideology in order to maintain its power and domination. See Ian Parker, Revolution in Psychology: Alienation to Emancipation (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 2. Even Chomsky admits that psychological mechanisms, in controlling those who are in the middle class through investments and benefits, retain the power of capitalist hegemony. See Noam Chomsky, Profit Over the People: Neoliberalism and the Global Order (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999), 53.


\(^3\) See ibid.


ontogenetic causal roles to sexuality,9 thereby lessening the effect of the unconscious forces of history to the individual.10 Freudian psychoanalysis, then, considers man to be a “physiologically driven and motivated homme machine.”11

However, I would like to argue that in the process of our assimilation and socialization with our immediate environment, our instinctual drives are as much a product of our social milieu. Fromm argues that Freud did not consider the individual as an isolated man devoid of any social ties. He quotes Freud:

In the individual’s psychic life, other people ordinarily must be considered as models, objects, helpers, or opponents. Thus, from the beginning, individual psychology is simultaneously social psychology—in this extended but legitimate sense.12

Moreover, Freud has also insisted in his book, Civilization and Its Discontents, that our repressed instinctual drives are caused by the powerful social forces inflicted upon us to the extent that we need to suspend them in order for society to flourish.13 The preservation of life interacts with the gratification of the sexual instincts. The reverse is also true. The satisfaction of the sexual instincts must follow the lead of the instinct on self-preservation. Both of them must interact with the dynamics of the social sphere.14 In other words, there is a fundamental link between what is in our individual psychic drives and the forces emanating from our immediate environment. This is what makes the radical position of Fromm relevant. He asks “what role the instinctual and the unconscious play in the organization and development of society and in individual social facts, and to what extent they change

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11 Durkin, The Radical Humanism, 72.
14 See ibid., 42.
mankind’s psychological structure ... is a sociologically relevant factor.”\textsuperscript{15} He continues, “Just as, for Freud, it is always socialized man who is the object of psychology, so he sees man’s environment and living conditions playing a decisive role in his psychic development and in our theoretical understanding of it.”\textsuperscript{16}

After Freud, psychoanalysis became a very influential tool to expose social contradictions brought about by our interaction with our immediate environment. The interplay between the satisfactions of our instincts within the social structures led Fromm to assert that there is a connection between the material forces of society and the psychic apparatus of men. He asserts, “The active and passive adaptation of the biological apparatus, the instincts, to social reality is the key conception of psychoanalysis.”\textsuperscript{17} How man finds his own satisfaction within the ambit of the social structures and to what extent is his satisfaction become, then, the question of analytic social psychology. He further adds:

\begin{quote}
The thesis that psychology only deals with the individual while sociology only deals with “society” is false. For just as psychology always deals with the socialized individual, so sociology always deals with a group of individuals whose psychic structure and mechanisms must take into account.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Nonetheless, we have to take into account that the effects of our social environment set our thoughts into a reeled construction of “clichés, ideas, rationalizations, and ideologies which fill people’s minds and which form the basis of what they mistake for reality.”\textsuperscript{19} Fromm, then, asserts that what we consciously think is “false,” and that it is a product of wrong ideology and rationalization. Elaborating Freudo-Marxist thinking, he says:

\begin{quote}

16 Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, 144.

17 See ibid., 141.

18 See ibid., 142.

19 Erich Fromm, Beyond the Chain of Illusion (London: Simon and Schuster, 1962), 10. Karl Korsch argued that the lack of the sociopsychological dimension of Marxism led to its collapse after the war in 1918. That is why the Freudian-Marxist theories as imbied by the members of the Frankfurt School were used to base their own findings on the psychosociological aspects of society. See John Rickert, “The Fromm-Marcuse Debate: Revisited,” in Theory and Society, 15:3 (May 1986), 352.
\end{quote}
It should be noted that Marx, like Spinoza and later Freud, believed that most of what men consciously think is “false” consciousness, is ideology and rationalization; that the true mainsprings of man’s actions are unconscious to him. According to Freud, they are rooted in man’s libidinal strivings; according to Marx, they are rooted in the whole organization of man which directs his consciousness in certain directions and blocks him from being aware of certain facts and experiences.20

Fromm, thus, wanted to understand social contradictions by examining the psychological processes operating within the individual.21 His approach is of psychosocial interest, i.e., he wanted to find out why many people behave irrationally in similar ways.22 He now argues,

I tried to show that we cannot understand people by their ideas and ideologies; that we can understand ideas and ideologies only by understanding the people who created them and believed in them. In doing this we have to transcend individual psychology and enter the field of psychoanalytic-social psychology.23

To make this happen, he needs to situate the individual into larger social contexts, i.e., economic, political, social, and cultural aspects.24 Hence, “analytical social psychology seeks to understand the instinctual apparatus of a group, its libidinous and largely unconscious behavior, in terms of its socioeconomic structure.”25 Social Psychoanalysis, then, is entitled and competent to say something about the motives underlying social behavior.26

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20 Erich Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man (London: Continuum, 1961), 19.
25 Fromm, Crisis of Psychoanalysis, 144.
It is here that we come to understand how our conscious life is modified by the prevailing material social forces. In the words of Golding,

... what psychoanalysis reveals about the workings of the unconscious not only helps to clarify the mechanisms by which society enters into the individual but also challenges our most basic assumptions about what it means to be conscious. The relationship between individual and society is complex, tense, and contradictory and psychoanalysis can show us why.

Central to Fromm’s psychosocial theory is the effect of the socioeconomic base of a particular society. Taking the lead from Marx’s famous maxim that our world determines how we think, Fromm develops his concept of the social character. He argues that in the process of acquisition and assimilation with the social sphere, there is a necessity to adapt ourselves for the satisfaction of our instinctual drives. The means of productions, the social stratifications, and social communications are all arranged and activated through those social libidinal impulses so that social energies are swayed towards the survival of society and particularly for our

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29 See Fromm, “Psychoanalysis and Sociology,” 38. See also Fromm, “Man’s Impulse Structure and Its Relation to Culture,” 37.
32 Marcuse and the rest of the Frankfurt School have accused Fromm of revisionism. Marcuse contends that Fromm’s reinterpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis is naïve and does not advance a critique of industrial capitalism. For Marcuse, faithfulness to the original intent of Freud’s instinct and libido theories is a necessity for a critique of modern capitalism. According to Buzby, Marcuse contends that Fromm’s revision of Freudian libido theories, lacks the “explosive, countercultural vision necessary to transform thought and practice.” Further, Fromm’s reinterpretation of Freud looks for the utopian vision which rests on the promises of Enlightenment Humanism. See Buzby, *Subterranean Politics and Freud’s Legacy*, 106–109. However, Fromm responded on this criticism arguing, among others, that in the interaction between the individual and society, the social libidinal drive is activated and formed into what he has termed as social character. Thus, Freud, says Fromm, has wrongly based the instinctual theory on natural factors alone. The social characterology are the traits that are common to the members of a group or class so that the social characterology explains the social behavior or traits inherent in that group or class. See Rickert, “The Fromm-Marcuse Debate Revisited,” 354.
own survival. Unconsciously, we have to act and find gratification in our action in accordance to the required demands for the smooth functioning of society. Social character, then, is a psychic dynamism where the ruling economic and political ideologies are unconsciously disseminated. Our libidinal impulses, for Fromm, express and maintain the socially mandated patterns through which the individual relates to the world around him. As we unconsciously imbibe a particular social characterology, we either regress or progress in our evolution as human beings. Ideologies, rationalization, and clichés form a particular social characterology that either enhances or impedes our growth and productivity. Since our engagements with the social sphere undertake a radical position where the political, economic, and sociocultural dimensions are imperatives, I argue that there is a need to look at the psychosocial dynamics of our society, i.e., our social characterology as a powerful instrument for the maintenance of the socioeconomic mainstream. I contend, therefore, that there is a need to look at how our society, particularly its socioeconomic structures, shakes the social libidinal impulses and thus affects our lives. I think this is where the psychosocial philosophy of Fromm becomes relevant to our contemporary times.

Nevertheless, our contemporary society with a technocapitalist characterology has brought us towards spilling and thrilling. Its rapidity and fast-paced influence has led human consciousness towards a revolutionary change with regard to our epistemic paradigm, i.e., our way of looking at the world as now dependent upon market-based rationality. Human reason

33 See Fromm, The Sane Society, 77-78.
34 See Parker, Revolution in Psychology, 2.
37 See Parker, Revolution in Psychology: Alienation to Emancipation, 7.
38 Funk describes it further. He says, "Fromm proposes to follow Karl Marx in examining social structure as determined by economic factors. If such a determination of social structure is discoverable, it must be asked whether psychic structure is not also shaped by socioeconomic conditions through the family as the psychological agency of society. If so, socioeconomic conditions rather than libidinous energy have the primary shaping influence. In that case, it would not be the structure of drives that determines man’s nature and behavior; instead in the interplay of interacting psychic drives and economic conditions, the latter have primacy.” Rainer Funk, Erich Fromm: The Courage to Be Human (New York: Continuum, 1982), 17.
and affections become apparatuses for the propagation of an irrational ideology which we all mistake for reality. The conscious elements of human adaptation and assimilation have yielded to the instrumentalization of life. Even moral and ethical lives are objectified as a result of human commodification. Honneth remarks that it is the “commercialization” of everyday life where human and individual relationships “interact with a lifeless object without a trace of inner sentiment or any attempt at understanding the other’s point of view.” 40 This is the irrationality of our rationality as human beings. 41 As a result, we dwell on our ego-oriented machinery where we reconstruct our world without any limitation, without any boundaries, as long as the parameters of life suit our innermost narcissistic desires. 42 Life experiences are already determined from this “I-am-me orientation.” Life is no longer bounded by the external moral necessities but rather, an innermost desire to pump up those instinctual libidinal strivings. 43 Everything is measured by the way the individual maps his very own world. There is no relation, no sense of commitment. Everything is centered on the self. The arbiter of our sociopolitical life is the “me” grounded on its very capacity to see itself and the world. Normative discourses make sense if it satiates this “me mentality” that inflates the ego ideal. 44 In other words, as the culture of individualism is greatly emphasized and continuously evolved, the more he is decentered from the community. Safran articulates this when he says “On the one hand, the more individuated person of contemporary culture is freer of the potentially suffocating influence of the community. On the other, he or she is cut off from the sense of meaning and well-being that potentially flows from being integrated with the wider community.” 45 Contemporary man, says Fromm, does not experience himself as the active bearer of his own power and richness. 46

46 See Fromm, The Sane Society, 121.
the fragmentation of our culture, traditions and beliefs, we are left nowhere but to anchor ourselves unto this kind of rationality “I-am-me” orientation where everything is now culturally permitted. Lasch believes that, with no solid foundation to hold on to, our lives lead increasingly to narcissistic mentality. Hence, we are just tossed to and fro in multiplicity, fluidity, and contradictions, resulting to spilling and thrilling in the world of the capital. As Zima says, the “market value as exchange value deprives the individual subject of his singularity by making him comparable to all others.” In other words, the web of traditions and beliefs that we share as a common community have all faded away and what is left is the primacy of the market economy which leads to the emptying of the integral self. Thus, our society experiences a “chronic and undifferentiated emotional hunger.” Take for example the policies of deregulation and competition of neoliberal economy. Since its inception in the ‘70s, we have been forced to negate intersubjective alliances and to focus our energies towards antagonistic individualism where social connectivity is cancelled. Ours is a disintegration of the subjective self where creative, productive, and effective communication of ideational content of the environment is lost. In this sense, people could no longer manage their collective and individual affairs. What we have instead is an alienated existence that does not sense any joy, love, or longing —no continuity of time and life. In other words, there is no self. We plunged into a “state of schizoid inability to experience affect, hence he [man] is anxious, depressed, and desperate.”

48 See Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, 11–12.

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Through a market driven characterology, our passionate strivings are primarily reflections of this particular characterology. It has institutionalized us as socialized a priori. Thus, our “thinking is not an exclusively intellectual process, and that it is bound up with the entire character structure. Doctrines, ideals, or even individual concepts have an ‘emotional matrix’ rooted in the character structure of the individual …” We now unconsciously satisfy our libidinal desires and rooting our life more on a paradigm based on “technorationalities of the culture industry.” Our lives are now truncated into instrumentalities, i.e., how we do things and no longer why we do these things. This pushes us further into a retrograde effect to be economic atoms who dance into the tune of economic management. However, the more we succumb into this lair, the more we fortify the socioeconomic system and thereby shuttering all the more our traditionally stable forms of identity, such as family, community, class, religion, and nationality. Hence, this characterology negates life’s pulsations, tremors, and unpredictable movements which make it alive and meaningful, thereby transforming life

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58 In fact, Wilde captures what Fromm wants to convey as the essential nature of social characterology. The social character results upon the dialectic between the socioeconomic base and the ideological narrative of society. He says “The social character develops as an adaptation to changes in socioeconomic structure, and in turn, it influences the formation of ideas, doctrines, and even individual concepts. Reciprocally, the ideological superstructure then reinforces particular social characters that are functional for the further development of the socioeconomic structure. The social character operates as an internalization of external necessities and Fromm sees it as the harnessing of human energy for the tasks of a given economic and social system.” Lawrence Wilde, *Erich Fromm and the Quest for Solidarity* (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2005), 20.
61 See Pacquing, “Neoliberalism and the Paralysis of Human Rationality,” 158.
itself into storehouse of facts, events, and possessions. As a result, our Weltanschauung, i.e., the historical thread which is supposed to link our past, present, and future posterities are eliminated. We dwell in a world-less universe where individuality and subjectivity are delineated. Thus, what is left for us is the “I-am-me” mentality which isolates us from the locus of our existential domain. Our experience of our “self” as unique individual and as master of our “I” vanishes. What we have instead is inner turmoil that leads us towards contradictory ways of living, i.e., towards fragmented and compartmentalized lives. Undeniably, we have a pseudo-identity—a dead image. We don’t experience our wholeness as a person for we are driven and alienated in ways that we are unconscious of. In this sense we acquire neurotic behaviors which are symptomatic of our own social characterology. That is why Fromm discusses that psychoanalytic therapy must plunge into the “radix” of our social dynamics for he believes that the real cause of neurotic or irrational behaviors is the alienated person who does not experience his wholeness as a person.

These deadening effects of our contemporary times, and principally, the destructive psychological nuances of our market economy, should lead us to understand and ponder those socio-structural policies that serve as the

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66 See Zima, Subjectivity and Identity, 6.
68 See Biancoli, “The Search for Identity in the Being Mode.” In the opinion of Hardt and Negri, our lives have been downgraded into the pit of deterritorializing apparatuses which wobble the center of human relationships. See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Preface to Empire (London: Harvard University Press, 2000), xii–xv.
69 See Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism, 10–11.
70 For Fromm’s discussion of pathology of normalcy, see Fromm, The Sane Society, 12.
71 For Fromm, an alienated person is estranged from himself, out of touch with himself. The individual does not experience himself as the center of his world. He rather creates an artificial world for himself. In the alienated individual, life is denied. Control, creativity, independent thought is all baulked and the inevitable result is a fight or flight on the part of the worker, apathy, destructiveness, and psychic regression. See Fromm, The Sane Society, 124–130.
raison d’état towards governance under the disguise of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{72} We have to be aware of the inconsistencies of these structural policies which cripple and paralyze human growth and development.\textsuperscript{73} We have to unravel the mysteries that lie behind the pathology of normalcy.\textsuperscript{74} Today, where everything is socially constructed and deconstructed,\textsuperscript{75} and with no human base of socialization, we instead have established in us the unholy trinity of uncertainty, unsafety, and insecurity that unconsciously batter our lives into anxiety, meaninglessness, and hopelessness.\textsuperscript{76} What we need is the recontextualization of our lives, i.e., a dynamic orientation that leads towards a development of an authentic, vital sense of self and a construction of personal meaning amidst the perplexity of a postmodern world.\textsuperscript{77} In this sense, social psychology brings back society to health and allows each individual to grow and mature in autonomy and social agency.\textsuperscript{78} This is our social discontents and I believe that we have to revisit and ponder once again a radical humanistic psychology that is found in the philosophy of Erich Fromm.\textsuperscript{79}

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\textsuperscript{73} See Pacquing, “Neoliberalism and the Paralysis of Human Rationality,” 158.
\textsuperscript{74} By pathology of normalcy, Fromm explains that the illusions resulting from our sociopolitical structures are now taken to be the normative paradigm of modern society. The consensual validation does not allow humanity to grow and develop as it should be. As a matter of fact, Fromm asserts that “The fact that millions of people share the same vices does not make these vices virtues, the fact that they share so many errors does not make the errors to be truths, and the fact that millions of people share the same forms of mental pathology does not make these people sane.” See Fromm, \textit{The Sane Society}, 12–16.
\textsuperscript{75} In the book \textit{Identity Crisis}, Dunn argues that with the rapid sociopolitical changes happening within a postmodern society, what we have is a fluid self, characterized by “fragmentation, discontinuity, and dissolution of boundaries between the inner and outer world.” See Robert Dunn, \textit{Identity Crisis: A Social Critique of Postmodernity} (London: Minnesota Press, 1998), 64. Consequently, we are reduced to matter, language, contexts, and constructions which are now the main values and essential reality in a postmodern setting. See Jon Frederickson, “The Problem of Relationality,” in \textit{Relational and Intersubjective Perspectives in Psychoanalysis: A Critique}, ed. by Jon Mills (New York: Jason Aronson, 2005), 72–73; 80–82.
\textsuperscript{77} Safran, \textit{Psychoanalysis and Buddhism}, 6.
\textsuperscript{78} See Buzby, \textit{Subterranean Politics and Freud’s Legacy}, 12.
\textsuperscript{79} Fromm’s radical psychoanalytic theory emphasized that relatedness, transcendence, and belongingness are the key essential features of growth and development. Cf. Durkin, \textit{The Radical Humanism of Erich Fromm}, 70–75.
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Book Review

Pada, Roland Theuas DS., Axel Honneth’s Social Philosophy of Recognition: Freedom, Normativity, and Identity

Jovito V. Cariño

Pada’s book on Axel Honneth’s recognition theory is the latest contribution to the growing number of philosophic literature in the Philippines dedicated to critical theory in general and Axel Honneth in particular. Recent titles like Ranilo Hermida’s Imagining Modern Democracy: A Habermasian Assessment of the Philippine Experiment (2014) and Renante Pilapil’s Recognition: Examining Identity Struggles (2015) are cases in point. Aside from them, one may also consider Agustin Martin Rodriguez’s works such as Governing the Other: Exploring the Discourse of Democracy in a Multiverse of Reason (2009) and May Laro ang Diskurso ng Katarungan (2014) as well as Paolo Bolaños’s On Affirmation and Becoming: A Deleuzian Introduction to Nietzsche’s Ethics and Ontology (2014) as explorations closely aligned with the general problematic of critical theory. Of these materials, Pilapil’s Recognition distinguished itself as the only text to have devoted itself to Honneth’s recognition theory and this it did by examining actual political struggles and identity claims of Muslims in Mindanao. In his review, Paolo Bolaños acknowledged Pilapil’s work as “the first book on recognition theory in the Philippines and it is also the first to use the Moro struggle in Mindanao as a test case for examining the normative validity of recognition theory.”

Pada, an emergent Honneth scholar in the Philippines, counted himself as a worthy conduit of Pilapil when he pursued the same question of recognition albeit via a different narrative style, hermeneutic approach, and overall complexion of discourse. Pilapil, for example, did include a discussion of the actual experiences of identity struggles in Mindanao to give his book the necessary local slant. Pada did not follow the same route but succeeded nonetheless in bringing Honneth’s recognition theory closer to home. This he did by citing


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examples from local scene like the highly controversial Lina Law and by allowing the perspectives of fellow Filipino scholars like Altez, Bolaños, Mercado, and Pilapil himself to speak through his text. Reference to the works of these academics was greatly enriched by Pada’s citation of the eminent Florentino Hornedo whose memory he honored in the book’s dedication page. Pada utilized Hornedo’s reading of Philippine culture and history to underscore his views on Filipinos’ chronically interrupted struggle for recognition vis-à-vis our congenital inability to develop enabling social norms.

A narrative account of the struggles for recognition, be it historical or fictive, is crucial in any discussion of recognition theory. In this regard, Pada must be credited for his ability to supplement his discourse with literary allusions from works such as Ralph Ellison’s *Invisible Man*, Rogelio Sikat’s *Impeng Negro* as well as F. Sionil Jose’s *Ermita*. He also used examples from popular culture like the Philippine television series *Nita Negrita* and Slayer’s cover of the song *Guilty of Being White* to drive home a point. A cross-disciplinary effort like this is useful both for its illustrative and interpretive benefits. Reading Pada’s work, one is inspired to realize that recognition can function both as a theory and as a story. As a theory, it owes its provenance from the philosophic tradition built around the likes of Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Habermas; as a story, it serves as a chronicle of the struggles which mark an individual’s existence in a given society. Honneth’s emphasis on the individual as rehearsed by Pada cannot be overstated. Respect for the individual coincides with the element of difference which in turn animates one’s aspirations for freedom. Freedom in turn is either enriched or negated by its normative context which itself is informed by the actions and interactions of individuals themselves. The operative word for Pada is either “loop” or “looping” whenever he describes the dynamics underlying normativity and freedom. The employment of these words is Pada’s casual way of suggesting the kind of reflexivity that must apply on both individuals and norms within the continuum of social reproduction. The emphasis on social relations is, for Pada, what gives Honneth’s brand of critical theory an edge over the proposals of the likes of Adorno, Foucault, or Habermas. The accent on relations provides the project of social emancipation not only a solid grounding but moreso, a real fighting chance. In Pada’s words: “Personal relations serve a very important role in the everyday practice of recognition. Since personal relations are points of learning and receptivity for individuals, they produce a surplus of normative resources for sustaining identities … While Honneth does not claim a revolutionary form of social movement, he does look at the possibility of social change from within. I think that the emancipatory potential of this perspective, while neither poetic nor romantic, hold a stable and viable potential for initiating changes from within society.
itself.” Pada’s strategy to provide what he terms as “reconstructive normative simulations,” featuring the fictive characters of Elise, Diego and Nolan, is instructive of this point. Each character is intended to dramatize not just a particular sphere of recognition (Elise for personal relations and love; Diego for democracy and rights; Nolan for market economy and esteem) but also specific forms of pathologies which impinge on individuals’ struggle for recognition and fuller participation in the life of the society or Sittlichkeit. Pada, echoing Honneth, says that pathologies are debilitating but they are nonetheless instrumental for the impetus they provide in ensuring that norms are constantly reproduced, and that recognition is relentlessly pursued with the vision of solidarity and freedom in mind.

The good news is that readers who are uninitiated with Honneth or with his recognition theory will find in Pada’s book a helpful tool to get acquainted with the fundamental arguments, hermeneutic structure as well as the basic grammar and vocabulary of Honneth’s ethico-political thought. The bad news is that a book as extensive and as nuanced as Pada’s may not easily lend itself to the uninitiated. This is not to say that a newbie has little to gain from reading the book. I only mean to suggest that Pada’s text is a serious philosophic work which requires focus, deliberation and an expansive interpretive range. In his first foray into international book publication, Pada tried to establish himself as a reputable recognition theory scholar proven no less by his ability to navigate through Honneth’s extensive oeuvre. From The Struggle for Recognition, to Critique of Power, to Freedom’s Right and all other works in between, Pada sought to identify and mend any theoretical gap in Honneth’s discourse while he put together the scaffolds of his own contentions. This is particularly true in Part 4 of the book where he presented a reconstructed critical theory of Honneth against the critique of one of the latter’s leading interlocutors, Nikolas Kompridis. Unlike Honneth, Kompridis has little regard for the role of normative resources when it comes to the formation of the self. He believes that the disposition towards self-understanding is an ontological given available to any individual. By bringing in a contrary voice like Kompridis’, Pada elevated his text beyond the level of exegesis and further enhanced the critical character of his study of Honneth. Recognition is a relatively novel theme in the Philippine intellectual scene. Pada, along with his fellow critical theory scholars, should be acknowledged for espousing this as a way of promoting the more vital causes of freedom and justice.

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3 Pada, Axel Honneth’s Social Philosophy of Recognition, 169-70.
296 AXEL HONNETH’S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF RECOGNITION

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