

Article

Kant's Reflections on the Unity of Consciousness, Time-Consciousness, and the Unconscious

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I

In what follows, I shall address the question concerning the ultimate premise of the Transcendental Analytic in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. I believe the candidates can be reduced to two dominant but opposing principles, one grounded in immanent time-consciousness and the other in the unity of consciousness. In pursuing this goal, I intend to view consciousness through Leibnizian lenses by focusing on its dynamic activity, continuity, unity, and unconscious aspects. Thus, in the first edition Preface of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant declares that the complexities of the Subjective Deduction "have cost me the greatest labour" in formulating the foundation for his entire epistemological edifice, for his transcendental Deduction of the Categories.¹ As he presents it in these early passages, the principle is grounded in the indubitability of (individual) *temporal* consciousness.² Nevertheless, half a dozen years later, in rethinking the critical and substantive starting point of his system, he then announces instead that it is rather the transcendental unity of self-consciousness or apperception upon which he will base his entire epistemic foundation.³ In what follows, I wish to support his initial reflections concerning the epistemological status of the temporal nature of consciousness and conclude with what I consider to be a critical psychological consequence about the irredeemable quality of human loneliness, which I believe follows directly from subjective and immanent time-consciousness.⁴

But allow me first to start with the key Kantian concept of the synthetic *a priori*⁵ and to draw a distinction between its "logical" use versus its epistemological status as it functions in temporal consciousness. For Kant, the

¹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1958), A xvii, A 97-104.

² *Ibid.*, A 99.

³ *Ibid.*, B 131.

⁴ See Ben Mijuskovic, *Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature* (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1979).

⁵ See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 1-2; A 77-79, 105-106, B 2-6; B 102-105; *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. by Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), Preamble, Sections 2-3.

term synthesis implies relation, connection, combination between separate and distinct concepts or entities; between subject and predicate terms in a judgment; or a substance and its accidents. Beyond that, synthesis means unity, binding, togetherness. There are various forms of synthesis in Kant and in a moment, I will discuss some of them.

A priori concepts and judgments are (1) universally true and true in any conceivable universe; (2) they are necessary, indicating that any opposite assertion implies a logical or real contradiction; and, further (c) they are pure or non-sensuous.

There are various forms of synthetic propositions displayed in Kant's writings. Empirical judgments are factual claims, which are contingent and a *posteriori*: "Konigsberg was the capital of Prussia." But the important judgments are those containing concepts that are both synthetic and *a priori*. These may be consciously accessible as *subjective* conditions underlying thought itself, as in the syntheses of apprehension in intuition, reproduction in the imagination, and recognition in a concept;⁶ or they may be *objective* presuppositions, as in the Deduction of the pure concepts of the faculty of the understanding, which result in the continuity of human experience and/or the transcendental unity of apperception.⁷ It is important to notice that the famous cluster of relational syntheses, the categories, are always active, and thus "spontaneous" sources of relation and hence unity.⁸ And in so far as they are active, they necessarily exhibit temporal features. As such, they constitute conditions presupposed as unifying agents in all human experiences, both scientific and ordinary.

By contrast, Kant considers synthetic *a priori* metaphysical judgments that deal with human ideals and aspirations, particularly the three postulates regarding the conceivable or possible existence of a transcendent God, a noumenal will, and a supersensuous immortality as meaningful but without any temporal referents precisely because they point to a noumenal realm, which is "outside" or "beyond" the human representations of time and space.⁹ Although the above form *meaningful* concepts, judgments, and arguments, they are nevertheless cognitively vacuous or empty due to their completely non-sensuous content. They are outside the limits of possible knowledge, in so far as the faculties of sensibility (Transcendental Aesthetic) and understanding (Transcendental Analytic) define such limits. Thus, the judgment, "The soul is immortal," is both synthetic and *a priori* but not knowable because it cannot be encountered in any possible experience. Similarly the purely rational, transcendent principles and proofs, presented in the Paralogisms, Antinomies, and Ideals, in the Dialectic, as well as the ethical formulations discussed in the

⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 97 ff.

⁷ See Ben Mijuskovic, *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant: A Study in the History of an Idea and Argument* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).

⁸ In the idealist tradition, the term "spontaneous" signifies that which is independent of matter and sensation.

⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 3 = B 7; *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. by Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), 122-133.

Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, involve no temporal implications. Thus, for example, although the categorical imperative is a synthetic as well as an *a priori* ethical principle, directing us always to act so that our subjective maxim (the will) can become a universal objective law legislating for all rational beings in any conceivable universe, again, time is not a *constitutive* feature in this principle. The will and the law are related *a priori* and yet there is no reference to phenomenal time in this command or, for that matter, in any of the above concepts, judgments, or arguments for the existence of God, the freedom of the will, or the immortality of the soul

Obviously, although the category of causality intrinsically involves temporal characteristics, a more instructive insight into the temporal aspects of synthetic mental activities is provided by the example of mathematics offered by Kant in both the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783) as well as the second (or B edition) Introduction to the *Critique* (1787). There are, of course, contemporary philosophers who follow Leibniz and Hume in distinguishing *a priori* or analytic propositions, consisting of those in which the predicate term is already contained in the subject concept, from synthetic *a posteriori* or empirical statements, ones in which the predicate term adds a significant and novel element to the proposition—Hume’s “relations of ideas” as opposed to “matters of fact.” Kant, rather controversially however, affirms the genuineness of synthetic judgments *a priori* in mathematics and geometry. Accordingly, in the *Prolegomena* section titled “How Is Pure Mathematics Possible?” he states that “arithmetic achieves its concept of number by the *successive* addition of units in time.”¹⁰ Kant is convinced this is the case because math involves a *further* temporal process since “higher numbers” depend on an additional synthetic activity of progressively counting units in time. (Critics have indicated that the sense of psychological discovery is no proof of logical novelty.) For Kant, the computational factor is based on a mental “construction” and mathematical additives appear to be both synthetic and temporal at once. A non-temporal construction would be a contradiction in terms. Perhaps what Kant has in mind is that if a primitive tribe could only count to the number seven, they would also possess the concept of five; but in advancing to the proposition $7 + 5 = 12$, the twelfth digit would consist in an additional synthetic, temporal progression. In any case, my point is that in this instance Kant is obviously identifying synthetic activities with temporal processes. Kant is simply making explicit this element of time-consciousness in the operations of mental activity. Clearly, the example must have considerable probative value, since he states it in the *Prolegomena* and retains it in the second edition *Critique*.¹¹

Schopenhauer, who agrees with Kant in his identification of synthesis and time, insists “[t]hat *arithmetic* rests on the pure [*a priori*] intuition or perception of *time*” and that this activity is not only synthetic but *a priori* as well.

¹⁰ Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, Section 10.

¹¹ See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 15 ff.

It can be demonstrated...as follows. All counting consists in the repeated setting down of unity; merely to know always how often we have already set down unity do we mark it each time with a different word; these are the numerals. Now repetition is only possible through succession, but succession, thus one thing after another, depends entirely on the intuition or perception of *time*. It is a concept that is intelligible only by means of this; and thus counting is only possible by means of time. This dependence of all counting on *time* is also betrayed by the fact that in all languages multiplication is expressed by “time.”¹²

Later, in the Introduction to the second edition *Critique*, Kant once more reiterates that synthetic propositions *a priori* are possible in mathematics because synthesis occurs when combining acts go “outside” or beyond prior numbers, as for example, when we transcend the immediacy of moments *in time* and “see the number 12 come [i.e. become, progress, develop] into

¹² Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, translated by E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover), II, iv, 34-35. See also: Charles Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant, & Time* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), pages xi-xii. Cf. Jean Piaget, *A Child's Conception of Time* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), pages 54-55. Piaget faults Kant for essentially conceiving time as a form of passive intuition; he is somewhat more sympathetic when Kant views it in “schematic” terms involving the faculty of the imagination (pages 37, 300). In any case, Kant's method is fundamentally “transcendental” and not empirically genetic, as we shall see.

Edmund Husserl, in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), in section XIII of the Appendix, titled “The Constitution of Spontaneous Unities as Immanent Temporal Objects—Judgment as a Temporal Form and Absolute Time-Constituting Consciousness,” distinguishes between $2 \times 2 = 4$ as *meant*, as an intentional meaningful object, and $2 \times 2 = 4$ as a *process* of judging. “Let us consider: instead of directing my glance of attention toward what is meant as such, I direct it toward the judging, toward the process in which it comes to be given to me that $2 \times 2 = 4$. A process goes on...Therefore, we have a spontaneous act of forming, which begins, goes forward, and ends (page 182)...The judgment here, therefore, is an immanent process of unity in immanent time” (page 184). See Robert Sokolowski, “Immanent Constitution in Husserl's Lectures on Time,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 24:4 (1965): “The first and most fundamental unification comes from the temporal flow” (page 536); again, “One of the reasons why immanent objects must be extended in time is that such extension gives the individuality and unity, which they must have in order to be experienced. An immanent object is individualized, it is made into a determined, distinct unit, only because it fills a certain section of the time flow, because it is constituted in certain temporal phases” (page 538). I will contend that time-consciousness precedes the unity of consciousness and thus functions as the condition for the latter. This insight first appears in germ in Leibniz, attains fruition in Kant, and finds its mature expression in Husserl.

For Husserl's concept of the synthetic *a priori*, see Gaston Berger, *The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pages 25-26; and Emmanuel Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), page 115. According to Husserl, there is even a sensory “material” *a priori*.

being.”¹³ Synthesis not only “takes” time, it *is* time, since consciousness is temporally structured in its most intimate and essential nature.¹⁴

For the analytic tradition, $7 + 5 = 12$ is simply a tautology, while in Kant’s geometric proposition, “The shortest distance (quantity) between two points is a straight line (quality),”¹⁵ it is even more difficult to see how this is a synthetic judgment *a priori*. But I believe the addition example does expose and illuminate Kant’s inner thoughts and so I have recruited it in the interest of clarification as an instance of the synthetic *a priori*. However, the salient issue is not whether Kant is right about mathematics, or geometric constructions, but whether he is correct about the temporal aspects of synthetic acts, which are always relational, discursive, mediate. Certainly, other philosophers have invoked the synthetic *a priori* with considerable effect and success. Plato summons it in the *Meno* when he analogizes the relation between color and shape as identical to the assertion that Virtue is Knowledge of the Good; Hegel enlists it in his dialectical, essentially temporally-structured interplay between Being and Consciousness (all the categories of the *Science of Logic* are synthetic and *a priori*); Husserl introduces it in describing the eidetic difference between thoughts, as given completely when they occur at all, while, by contrast, objects always appear as essentially restricted to incomplete perspectival aspects; and, finally, Sartre maintains that Being and Nothingness, the in-itself and the for-itself, are inseparably related to each other as color and extension, or sound, pitch, and timbre, are to each other (Conclusion to *Being and Nothingness*).

But Kant is captivated by the temporal nature of consciousness, namely that unlike space, whose external parts lie outside one another, the elements of time are essentially continuous with each other, and there can be no time without a fusion, a melding of past, present, and future. This insight, I believe, is grounded in the twin Leibnizian theories of dynamism and continuity, the latter expressed in the principle that neither nature nor consciousness makes “leaps,” that not only is there a seamless continuity in the Great Chain of Being (Lovejoy) but in the “chain” or, more precisely, the stream of consciousness as well. It may be remembered that in Leibniz’ paradigm of self-consciousness, all awareness is essentially temporal by virtue of the fact that the soul is *always active*. Both in the *New Essays on Human Understanding* and *The Monadology*, especially sections 1-21 of the latter, there is an emphasis on the simple, immaterial nature of apperception, its unity, its continuous identity, its (temporal) dynamism, and its unconscious activities. Against the Cartesians and Locke, Leibniz declares, in the *New Essays*, that the

¹³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 15-16.

¹⁴ Aristotle defines time as the measure of physical motion through space; Newton posits time as an independent container, virtually a “substance” or an attribute of God, infinite and eternal; while Leibniz offers two rather different models: (a) one which is implicit in his subjective, immanent, and dynamic description of self-consciousness; and (b) the other grounded in a relational ordering between monadic perceptions or points, as argued in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence; See Robert Paul Wolff, *Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pages 4-8.

¹⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 16.

soul thinks continuously, since “no substance can lack activity” and that in deep sleep and even in death each soul remains aware at some minimal level.¹⁶

Later, in exploring the notion of the unconscious, I will go on to contend that there is an underlying and hidden species of thought, of thinking, that is unconscious—or more precisely non-conscious—and creative, since it is productive of internal time-consciousness. Its foundational acts and generative powers are responsible for *all* our “surface” or conscious states of awareness. And if this is so, it can only occur if the mind is “simple,” unextended, immaterial precisely because no materialist, behaviorist, empiricist, or phenomenalist theory—in principle—can account for the unconscious. In other words, for Kant, consciousness itself rests on acts that are *non-conscious* and in principle irretrievably so. Thus, the difference between the unconscious acts, in the Freudian sense, and the non-conscious, in the Kantian sense, is that the former are in principle retrievable and the latter are not even though they are constituted by the very dynamic forces which allow us to think at all.¹⁷

II

As previously intimated, essentially there are two serious applicants for an indubitable starting-point: (a) the unity of self-consciousness; and (b) consciousness of time. Both have strong features recommending them. The first position is championed by a number of commentators while the second is defended by Schopenhauer, Heidegger, and vigorously advocated by Norman Kemp Smith.¹⁸ In this controversy, I am inclined to side with the latter group

¹⁶ Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, trans. by Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), preface.

¹⁷ Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), pages 179, 273); hereafter cited as NKS. See also: Mijuskovic, Ben “The Unconscious in Plotinus, Cudworth, Leibniz, and Kant,” *Philosophy and Theology*, 20:1 & 2 (2008), 53-83.

¹⁸ Commentators who neglect Kant's first edition emphasis on time-consciousness include H. J. Paton, in *Kant's Metaphysic f Experience* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965): “This transcendental ground is transcendental apperception, and it is not derivative, but ultimate or ‘original’” (I, 396-397); basically, Paton denies that Kant's investigations can be described as “psychological” in character and he dismisses the possibility of any unconscious factors being operative (I, 458); S. Kroner, *Kant* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1960), pages 59, ff.; P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense* (London: Methuen & Co., 1966), pages 91 ff.; A. C. Ewing, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967): “What is the premise of the whole argument of the transcendental deduction? It is, I think, simply that there *occurs awareness of a manifold in time*. I further think that the addition of the words *in time*, is not necessary for the main argument of the transcendental deduction” (page 72); T. D. Weldon, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pages 154-157; R. Scruton, *Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1982), pages 34-35; and Powell, C. Thomas, *Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), *passim*. In general, the analytically-oriented British tradition appears to favor the more “logical” second edition. By contrast, Jonathan Bennett displays some sympathy for Kemp Smith's treatment in *Kant's Analytic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pages 45 ff.; and Fredrick Copleston, in *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday, 1964), VI, ii, 34, briefly mentions time. None of the commentators listed above discuss the unconscious, let alone assign a substantial role to it.

for five reasons. First, I believe it is immune from Hume's sceptical attack on the self (see below). Second, I am convinced that time-consciousness presupposes the unity of consciousness but not the other way around. Third, the Second Paralogism compromises Kant's own positive assertions about the unity of consciousness as expressed in the second edition of the *Critique*.¹⁹ Fourth, time-consciousness essentially implies mental, dynamic acts, whereas a unity of consciousness could be *immediate* and hence non-temporal; but a non-temporal human consciousness is a contradiction in terms. And, fifth, I believe the origin of internal temporality is grounded in unconscious acts and there is sufficient textual support for this view, while the unity of consciousness outlook seems to neglect this important factor. Nevertheless, both premises exhibit persuasive advantages and in fact lead directly to a model of self-consciousness as intrinsically monadic, insular, and hermetic; together they condition an image of lonely man, which I find to be ultimately indubitable.

In a previous article, titled "The Premise of the Transcendental Analytic," published in the *Philosophical Quarterly*, I discuss Robert Paul Wolff's interpretation of Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception," which he proposes as the indubitable starting point and I now wish to offer some remarks on its interesting contentions.²⁰

But let me first start with Hume's sceptical account of the self, even though it is uncertain whether or not Kant was aware of it, because the important point is not whether Kant was cognizant of Hume's views, in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, but that nevertheless he provides a powerful answer to Hume.²¹

It may be remembered that Hume presents an empirical and phenomenalist paradigm of the "self" as a construction of qualitatively simple impressions and complex ideas with both being classified under the generic title of perceptions, perceptions which are essentially mental in their nature. These perceptions are ultimately caused by the constant motion of (external) material particles in space with the consequence that the "self" dissolves into a bundle of discrete atomistic impressions, each pursuing the next with, in his famous phrase, an "inconceivable rapidity." Thus Hume declares:

We must separate the question concerning the substance of the mind from that concerning the cause of its thought; ...[and] when apply'd to the operations of

¹⁹ See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 352, B 131.

²⁰ Ben Mijuskovic, "The Premise of the Transcendental Analytic," in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 23:91 (1973), 156-161.

²¹ The issue of Kant's possible familiarity with Hume's *Treatise* is taken up by Kemp Smith in his *Commentary*, pages xxv-xxvii. I interpret Hume as a phenomenalist, whose thesis is that the "self" and the "external world" are the result of nominalistic constructions of immediate sense data coupled with an imagined psychological *belief* in the identity of the "self" and "independent" objects.

matter, we may certainly conclude, that motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception.²²

From this follows Hume's analysis of the disintegration of the self and his attack on metaphysicians who attempt to establish personal identity based solely on the soul's immaterial simplicity, unity, and identity. His positive position follows.

But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which *succeed* each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement.²³

But when Hume admits to an awareness of a temporal *succession* of perceptions—which includes both impressions and ideas—he surrenders all that is required for the establishment of personal identity. It is *not* required that

we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity.²⁴

All that is necessary in order to establish the genuine presence of a singular self is that there is *some* self-conscious awareness of a passage of time, of a succession of “perceptions,” and that these transitory thoughts are recognized as mine—I am self-aware of their passage—because otherwise I could not be transitionally aware of their migration.

Now we can profitably turn to Wolff's interpretation and see how he views Kant's answer to Hume while relying on the concept of the unity of consciousness as his guiding principle. According to Wolff, we can gain an insight into the meaning of what is involved in a unified consciousness, and how the various elements are constituted or related to each other within awareness, by recruiting a trick suggested by Franz Brentano [James?]. Let us imagine that we have two pieces of paper on which identical sentences are written. The example Wolff chooses is “The unicorn is a mythical beast.” The first piece of paper is cut into equal pieces and divided among six men, Jones, Brown, etc., with each conscious only of a single word. The second sheet, however, is left intact and given to a seventh man, Smith. It follows that

²² David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), *Of the Immateriality of the Soul*, page 248.

²³ *Ibid.*, 252. Consult, however, Hume's later admission that there *may* be a unity after all, Appendix, 633, ff.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 251.

Now every word of the sentence is contained in the consciousness of some member or other of the group of six. Similarly, every word of the sentence is contained in Smith's consciousness. But the two cases are absolutely different, for while in the former it is true that the separate parts of the sentence are contained in *some* consciousness, they are not contained in the *same* consciousness, and hence there is no *unity of consciousness* of them as there is in the case of Smith...²⁵

Wolff then proceeds to comment on the example from William James:

The fact is that one consciousness of twelve words is not the same as twelve consciousnesses of one word each. Following Kant's terminology, we may characterize the difference by saying that the one consciousness of all twelve words binds them together, or conceives them as a unity.

Accordingly, Wolff concludes that the ultimate and undeniable premise of the first edition *Deduction*, indeed of the argument of the entire *Transcendental Analytic*, in both editions A and B, is the proposition "All the contents of my consciousness are bound up in a unity." Wolff then continues by citing the critical passage as confirmation of his interpretation but notice it is from the *second* edition *Critique*.

The Unity of Consciousness. It must be possible for the "I think" to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.²⁶

Interestingly enough, Kant himself offers a strikingly similar example in the A edition Second Paralogism when he criticizes the errors of metaphysical psychologists, the pure rationalists. Their argument purports to provide knowledge of a noumenal entity and it is therefore rejected by Kant.

²⁵ Wolff then quotes William James, who expresses the same point in the following fashion: "Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence," *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Dover, 1950), I, 160. The underlying and hidden assumption is always the same: Senseless matter cannot think because matter is essentially composed of distinct parts which intrinsically defy unification; material substances, consisting essentially of disparately composed aggregates, can never constitute a true unity but merely a nominalistic one.

²⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 131-132.

At bottom, the real issue for the dogmatists is twofold; the first consideration concerns their negative conviction that “senseless matter cannot think”; and secondly their related positive contention that the soul, as a thinking substance, along with its intellectual predicates or attributes of separate thoughts, must be immaterial, unextended, “simple” in order for thought to be possible as a multiplicity in unity. Again, I must be aware that my thoughts are my thoughts and not yours; and unless they are unified in one and the same consciousness, I could not know this

Kant’s exposition of the metaphysicians follows:

This is the Achilles of all dialectical inferences in the pure doctrine of the soul. It is no mere sophistical play, contrived by a dogmatist in order to impart to his assertions a superficial plausibility, but an inference which appears to withstand even the keenest scrutiny and the most scrupulously exact investigation. It is as follows.

Every *composite* substance is an aggregate of several substances, and the action of a composite, or whatever inheres in it as thus composite, is an aggregate of several actions or accidents, distributed among the plurality of the substances. Now an effect which arises from the concurrence of many acting substances is indeed possible, namely, when this effect is external only (as, for instance, the motion of a body is the combined motion of all of its parts.) But with thoughts, as internal accidents belonging to a thinking being, it is different. For suppose it be the composite that thinks: then every part of it would be a part of the thought, and only all of them taken together would contain the whole thought. But this cannot be consistently maintained. *For representations (for instance, the single words of a verse), distributed among different beings, never make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore impossible that thought should inhere in what is essentially composite.* It is therefore possible only in a *single* substance, which, not being an aggregate of many, is absolutely simple [i.e. immaterial, unextended].

The so-called *nervus probandi* of this argument lies in the proposition, that if a multiplicity of representations are to form a single representation, they must be contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject.²⁷

²⁷ *Ibid.*, A 351-352, italics mine.

The fallacy committed by the Second Paralogism, according to Kant, is that it falsely argues from the merely logical unity of the subject *in representation* to the actual simplicity of the subject *in itself*.

However, if we compare B 131-132 with A 351-352, we can see that if Kant appeals to Wolff's interpretation, then the foundational premise of the Analytic, or more specifically the Deduction of the Categories, is grounded in a rational principle embedded, in turn, in a doctrine which assumes that the soul as a substance, along with its predicates, is immaterial, simple, and hence intrinsically unified. In short, our premise is based on a synthetic *a priori* demonstration arising or following from a noumenal substance and established by an argument from the *Dialectic*, which Kant explicitly disavows. Kant is well aware here that the rationalists are engaged in two contentions: (a) negatively, that "senseless matter cannot think" and (b) positively, that only a simple, immaterial substance can unify diverse elements in one consciousness. Thus, the impossibility of matter being able to think and the soul's simplicity are inextricably connected.²⁸ But merely because it *appears* to be a rationalist argument, it does not mean that it is false. It certainly is the case that separate words are "strung" continuously together in individual consciousness. After all, the example of the diverse men is an empirical one.

Did Kant recognize the compromising nature of these conflicting passages in A versus B and elect to delete the earlier Second Paralogism account because he thought it weakened his position in B 131-132? It is a fact that *both* the first edition Paralogisms *and* the first edition Deduction were completely recast for the second edition. And yet, there is much to recommend the argument from the unity of consciousness.

More recently, a study titled, *The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology*, consisting of some fifteen scholarly articles, committed solely to discussing Kant's Second Paralogism, has been published. In their volume, the editors, Thomas Lennon and Edward Stainton, present Kant's proof in the following syllogistic form:

- P1:** Unification of representations takes place.
P2: Only a simple, unified substance can unify representations.
 Therefore,
C1: The human soul or mind is a simple, unified substance.²⁹

²⁸ As a parenthetical note, Kant also criticizes the simplicity argument not only in failed demonstrations to prove the unity of consciousness but also in inferences designed to establish the immortality of the soul in A 357 and throughout the Paralogism section in the B edition as well; and he insists that a simple soul could nevertheless be completely extinguished by diminution or "elanguescence" (B 414). In brief, the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated by pure reason.

²⁹ In their Introduction, the editors are kind enough to acknowledge my contribution in the following words: "What remains surprising, however, is that so little work has been done before on the Achilles argument. Ben Lazare Mijuskovic's pioneering work was the first in modern times to draw attention to the importance of the argument, but aside from the subsequent work he has done...there is little else in print." Thomas Lennon and Edward Stainton eds., *The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology* (Springer, 2008), 2.

Perhaps two comments are appropriate in this connection: (a) presented in this fashion, the “argument” appears to be a tautology; and (b) the “unification,” to which the editors refer, makes no reference to temporal factors. But without the incorporation of temporal synthetic structures, it is difficult to grasp the dynamics involved in the unification. In any case, it is a rich and complex work providing many important insights into the complexities and strengths of Kant’s thought.

III

Some 90 years ago, Norman Kemp Smith proposed that immanent time-consciousness should serve as the ultimate premise of the Analytic precisely because it is *both* indubitable *and* immune to Hume’s objections. Thus, as Kemp Smith argues, whereas Descartes doubts the reality of the external world and Hume questions the metaphysical reality (actually continuous identity) of the self, clearly Hume—as we have shown above—is forced to admit a “running” re-cognition of a *temporal succession* of impressions as they follow each other within the same “medium” of consciousness. Accordingly, Kemp Smith states that our starting point “must lie beyond the sphere of all possible controversy”:

we are left with only three forms of experience—experience of self, experience of objects, and experience of time. The two former are open to question. They may be illusory, as Hume has argued....Consciousness of time, on the other hand, is a fact whose actuality, however problematic in its conditions, and however mysterious in its intrinsic nature, cannot, even by the most metaphysical of subtleties, be in any manner or degree challenged. It is an unquestioned possession of the human mind. Whether time itself is real we may not be metaphysically certain, but that, whatever be its reality or unreality, we are conscious of it in the form of change, is beyond all manner of doubt.³⁰

Conceivably it is open to Hume to contend that “within” a single, immediate frame of consciousness, “one” could be uniquely aware of a qualitatively simple impression, perhaps in the form of a concentrated absorption in a monochromatic shade of blue.³¹ Could this singular experiment constitute an awareness of time? The answer is certainly not

³⁰ Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* 241, also cf. 242-243. It is this “mysterious” element of time that I claim is grounded in non-conscious activities lying beneath the purview of direct awareness. See Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant, & Time*, 252; cf. 61, ff.

³¹ Cf. Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature*, 6.

without any consciousness of change occurring within awareness. Could it serve as an instance of a unity of consciousness? Possibly, although it would be the consciousness of a clam. Kant, of course, would reject any such possibility, since all human consciousness entails a mutually conditioning relation between changing representations of the self and a contrasting realm of objects. For Kant, a primary epistemological principle is that the phenomenal self is mutually conditioned by the empirical (concept of the) object.³²

In any case, according to Kemp Smith, the Subjective Deduction in the first edition virtually identifies time with the synthetic activities. Hence Kemp Smith's commentary repeatedly emphasizes the "generative processes" in the creation of immanent temporality.³³ It is this spontaneous, creative aspect, this continuous activity that, as we shall see below, is indebted not only to the Leibnizian concept of a *dynamic* consciousness but also to one whose source lies deep in the unconscious. According to Kemp Smith, these thoughts are more properly termed non-conscious rather than unconscious as in the psychoanalytic meaning of the term. If so, then we have a continuous span from the non-conscious, to the unconscious, then the conscious or perceptive, and finally to the rationally self-conscious or apperceptive. The non-conscious possibility is signaled by Kant's following hesitant utterance:

This schematism of our [faculty of the] understanding, in its application to [phenomenal] appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze.³⁴

This leads Kemp Smith to claim that the threefold transcendental syntheses³⁵ not only occur in time but that indeed they are generative of time and I would further argue that they thus constitute the relatively hidden structure necessary for the unity of self-consciousness. But obviously since they can be consciously described, it brings up the question of their own underlying occult activities. In such a case, the "unknown roots" of thought would spontaneously generate, or virtually create, the threefold synthesis of sensuous intuition, productive imagination, and unifying understanding consciously described in A 99 ff. All this would necessarily involve time in a fundamental sense. And, as Kemp Smith comments: "When so viewed, the imagination is virtually regarded as an unknown supersensuous [i.e. noumenal] power."³⁶ The imagination on this account functions as a mediating agency between the

³² By contrast, for Hegel, the self is mutually conditioned by other selves. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), "Lordship and Bondage."

³³ Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, 239-241.

³⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 141 = B 181.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, A 98 ff.

³⁶ Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, 77, 265.

passive nature of the sensory and the spontaneous activity of the understanding. As we recall, Kant is in this section struggling to *hypothetically* “deduce,” to epistemologically justify **how the faculty of thought itself is possible**. Recall that Kant earlier had confessed that the Deduction of the Categories had been the most difficult task in the writing of the *Critique* and that this “deeply grounded” search had cost him the greatest labor of all.³⁷

Further, as Kemp Smith informs us:

The subjective enquiry is mainly interested in the conditions generative of experience, and finds its natural point of departure in the problem by what processes a unified experience is constructed out of a *succession* of distinct happenings.³⁸

In any event, cognition as a unity is a datum of awareness that *follows* rather than precedes time-consciousness. Speculatively we can assert that the infant, in some primordial sense, is aware of the *passage* of time through change, of the *feeling* of time through alterations of pain and pleasure, but because of Freud’s “oceanic feeling,” it has no cognitive awareness of the unity of selfhood; it cannot, at this stage, distinguish “the self” from the other, the mother.

For Kant, as previously stated, apperception indicates a form or structure of temporally successive awarenesses, which are reciprocally constituted by a phenomenal self in constant relational opposition to an empirical realm of objects. (This is why Hegel criticizes Kant’s finite categories as incapable of true development.) These two mutually reverberating elements, as representations, reflect against each other. The self thus *becomes* aware of itself through change. Further, the self can only become self-aware through and within the mediating agency of internal time. For Kant, all consciousness is judgmental and all judgments depend on relations that are forged in and through time (again, the section on the Schematism). Similarly, the relation of substance and accident requires not only an additional mental activity of fusing predicates to a subject but *beyond and in addition to* those acts, the mind must bind and retain the predicates as attached to the “supporting” concept of an object as it changes in and through time. Although the relation of cause and effect is presented as a conditioning or transcendental one, the fact remains that it can only occur under the condition that the *same* mind and its thoughts are able to *move* from one state of awareness to the next. Although Kant may at times, as in the Aesthetic, argue that intuitions are immediate and passive “givens,” certainly concepts are mediate and therefore temporal.

Before returning directly to Kant’s reflections on immanent temporality, let us offer a general comment, which will help us to contextualize the ensuing discussion. First, Kant assumes that self-consciousness or

³⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A xvi-xvii.

³⁸ Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, 240.

apperception always indicates a temporally successive (as opposed to a logically or syllogistically “successive”) awareness of a sequence.

In a critical passage in the first edition Subjective Deduction, just preceding the threefold transcendental syntheses, Kant announces:

Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produced by inner causes, whether they arise *a priori* or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation. This is a general observation which, throughout what follows, must be borne in mind as quite fundamental.³⁹

Once more, William James may serve conveniently as a helpful companion in our search for an encounter with the Self. To be sure, fourteen years later, however, James radically challenged the reality of the self, along with its implicit dualism of mind and matter, in his paper, “Does Consciousness Exist?” (1904). By invoking his doctrine of neutral monism, in which he describes “the mind” as merely the contextual intersection of two independent histories, the autobiography of the person and the continuum of a room, James dramatically, eliminates the self as a substance. Nevertheless, a decade and a half previously, James, who had closely studied Kant’s *Critique*, and especially the first edition Paralogism sections, posited an indubitable stream of thought—of consciousness—in his “study of the mind from within” in *The Principles of Psychology*. According to James, in the earlier writing, he insisted that “Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous.”⁴⁰ Further, quoting with approval Shadworth Hodgson, he announced that “Not to have the succession of different feelings is not to be conscious at all.”⁴¹ Incidentally, in these passages, James also credits the sub-conscious as forming a “secondary personality.”⁴²

Further, the advantage in legitimatizing the immanent temporality of (self-)consciousness is that one is able to incorporate *both* (a) time consciousness *and* (b) the unity of consciousness together since, in order to be aware of time, we must be able to hold together, bind, synthesize the mental activities and meanings of past, present, and future in one and the same “stream of thought.” By contrast, it can be argued that analytic or “innate” propositions may be immediately, directly, intuitively—and therefore non-temporally—apprehended as, for example, in the proposition that $A=A$; or

³⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 98-99.

⁴⁰ William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, two volumes (New York: Dover, 1950), I, 224.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, I, 230.

⁴² *Ibid.*, I, 227.

even in regard to the intuitive *immediacy* of the Cartesian *cogito*. For Descartes, time is essentially unreal, since it depends on God's continual interactive agency in re-creating the universe, along with every individual soul, at each moment of time (Meditation III). Once more, because for Kant, all phenomenal knowledge is relational and synthetic, it follows that it necessarily involves a discursive element, which further intrinsically implies a temporal element or "ingredient." A thought restricted to sheer or absolute immediacy, as we have already noted, would not be a human thought at all.⁴³

Kant's reflections on time take on various forms in different sections of the *Critique*. In the Aesthetic, he presents it as a pure, non-empirical passive form of sensibility, immediately *given* in consciousness rather than actively thought. It serves as a possible matrix for organizing presented sensations or "units," which function as the ideal "material" content of our experiences. In the Analytic, in the Second Analogy, temporal distinctions are presented as critical in drawing a distinction between an objective temporal order and a subjective temporal sequence, as in the example of the house and the moving vessel, since our haphazardly roving perceptions of the house are conceived *as if* they are grounded in and initiated by the subject while, by contrast, our perceptions of the traveling ship are conceived *as if* they are founded independently of the observer in the descending motion of the boat itself as it drifts downstream. And still, in the Third Paralogism, Kant seeks to make sure that an argument in behalf of a *continuous* personal identity, extending all the way into the afterlife, cannot be established on an *a priori* ground and based on an inference concerning the soul's immaterial nature. But even in this last and critical context, Kant is not denying that consciousness of temporal activity occurs in the mind—as in his analogy of the separate steel balls—but only that the *uninterrupted* transmission cannot be demonstrated by pure reason as occurring through the *same identical continuous* self. Thus, although for Kant the rationalist metaphysician is unable to show that active states of cognitive awareness are communicated in an uninterrupted, continuous fashion to succeeding states of the *same* self, as the analogy of the failed transmission of consciousness between separate steel balls indicates; nor whether a real or noumenal transition occurs between elements of the same self; it is nevertheless the case that each steel ball "experiences" *some* sense of internal time.⁴⁴ Consequently, the Third Paralogism states: "That which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at *different times* is in so far a person."⁴⁵ As the italicized phrase indicates, Kant is asserting that at least minimally there must be *some* consciousness of "different times" in each temporally finite steel orb. Hence, Kant is not denying that there is awareness of time in each of the metal spheres but only that it cannot be demonstrated rationally that it extends beyond a brief period of consciousness. In short, pure reason cannot establish that the immateriality or simplicity principle is sufficient to prove either

⁴³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 131-132.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, A 363a.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, A 362.

continuous personal identity or the immortality of the soul. Mental change occurs but cognition is not necessarily attached to a *continuous* self-sufficient to establish either the personal or moral identity required for ethical responsibility or for the immortality of the soul. This permits him to refer to “each and all of my successive determinations” in a positive, as opposed to a metaphysical, way; and it further allows him to invoke a critical admission that “in the whole of time in which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of myself” (A 362). As James expresses it:

How is this possible unless the Thought have a *substantial* identity with a former owner,—not a mere continuity or a resemblance...but a *real unity*?...The ‘Soul’ of Metaphysics and the ‘Transcendental Ego’ of the Kantian Philosophy, are...but attempts to satisfy this urgent demand of common-sense.

It is a patent fact of consciousness that a transmission like this actually occurs. Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each Thought, dies away and is replaced by another. The other, among the things it knows, knows its own predecessor, and finding it ‘warm,’ in the way we have described, greets it by saying: “Thou art *mine*, and part of the same self with me.” Each later Thought, knowing and including thus the Thoughts which went before, is the final receptacle—and appropriating them is the final owner—of all they contain and own. Each Thought is thus born an owner, and dies owned, transmitting whatever it realized as its Self to its own later proprietor. As Kant says, it is as if elastic balls were to have not only motion but knowledge of it, and a first ball were to transmit both its motion and its consciousness to a second, which took both up into *its* consciousness and passed them to a third, until the last ball held all that the other balls had held, and realized it as its own. It is this trick which the nascent thought has of immediately taking up the expiring thought and ‘adopting’ it, which is the foundation of the appropriation of most of the remoter constituents of the self. Who owns the last self owns the self before the last, for what possess the possessor possesses the possessed.⁴⁶

The point of all this, of course, is that it is impossible to speak of (self) consciousness independently of the awareness of internal time. In other words, James’ focus here in the Third Paralogism centers on the issue of temporal

⁴⁶ James, *Principles*, I, 339-340.

continuity whereas in the Second Paralogism his interest lies in the unity of consciousness.

How utterly tortuous and complicated Kant's views on time are can be appreciated by consulting his comments in the Preface to the Second Edition, where he tries to unravel the prior intricacies "concerning the concept [sic] of time" in the Aesthetic and the "false interpretations placed upon the paralogisms charged against rational psychology."⁴⁷

In sum, the advantage of legitimizing the immanent temporality of (self)-consciousness is that the former is able to incorporate, subsume *both* (a) time-consciousness *and* (b) the unity of consciousness, since in order to be aware of time, we must be able to bind and hold together, to synthesize the mental activities and meanings of past, present and future, whereas it can be argued that analytic or identical propositions are, by contrast, immediately, directly apprehended. As suggested above, one could argue that in the statement $A=A$, there is an *immediate* unity of consciousness without a temporal factor being involved even implicitly. But for Kant, of course, there is always at least the relation of knower and known and the reciprocating, reverberating process of observed or experienced change between the two "poles."⁴⁸

At this point, in order to further our discussion, it may be helpful to draw on a distinction made eloquently clear in a passage from Charles Sanders Peirce, who came to philosophy as a student of Kant. In the citation below, Peirce distinguishes two elements of consciousness, sensations and thoughts, those that are directly and immediately *apprehended*—and thus virtually "absolutely" transient—from those that are indirectly, mediately, relationally, discursively synthesized or *comprehended*.

[W]e observe two sorts of elements of consciousness, the distinction between which may best be made clear by means of an illustration. In a piece of music there are the separate notes, and there is the air. A single tone may be prolonged for an hour or a day, and it exists as perfectly in each second of that time as in the whole taken together; so that as long as it is sounding, it might be present to a sense from which everything in the past was completely absent as the future itself. But it is different with the air, the performance of which occupies a certain time, during the portions of which only portions of it are played. It consists in the orderliness in the succession of

⁴⁷ See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B xxxviii, B xxxix, note *a*.

⁴⁸ Although Kant's categorical relations are dyadic, clearly Hegel goes out of his way to stress triadic ones thus highlighting their clearly temporal quality as, for example, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit's* initial stages or "moments" of Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Reason (1807) as well as in the opening triad of the *Science of Logic* (1812-1816), which shows the mind dialectically "moving" through the "bloodless dance" of the categories, as they progress through and within Being, Nothing, and Becoming.

sounds which strike the ear at different times; and to perceive it there must be some [temporal] continuity of consciousness which makes the events of a lapse of time present to us. We certainly only perceive the air by hearing the notes; yet we cannot be said to directly hear it, for we only hear what is present at the instant, and an orderliness of succession cannot exist in an instant. These sorts of objects, what we are *immediately* conscious of and what we are *mediately* conscious of, are found in all consciousness. Some elements (the sensations) are completely present at every instance as long as they last, while others (like thought) are actions having beginning, middle, and end, and consist in a congruence in the succession of sensations which flow through the mind. They cannot be immediately present to us, but must cover some portion of the past or future. Thought is a thread of melody running through the succession of our sensations.⁴⁹

As the metaphor of the melody indicates, the connecting medium that extends the synthetic process is a temporal one. Music is intrinsically temporal—and perhaps that is why Schopenhauer considered it as a passage providing ingress into ultimate reality.

⁴⁹ Charles Sanders Peirce, “How To Make Our Ideas Clear,” in *Essays in the Philosophy of Science*, edited by Vincent Thomas (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957), pages 37-38; brackets mine. Notice the term “flow” in the quotation, a metaphor which will apply to the “indivisible stream of consciousness,” in James, to the pure *duree réelle* of immanent time in Henri Bergson (Mijuskovic, 1977), as well as to the phenomenological approach of Husserl. See Husserl’s early formative explorations regarding the temporal structures of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), pages 23, 30-31. Like Peirce, Husserl employs the example of the notes and the melody in order to provide an insight into the fusion of the diverse elements constituting the immanent flow of consciousness. Internal objects are experienced through “temporal profile manifolds” (Robert Sokolowski, *The Foundation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pages 82-83, 99, 108. Later, in the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl affirms the presence of “active synthesis” and “active genesis” as embedded in temporal noetic acts (Sections 37-39). Thus, the description of the flow of time serves as a common metaphor not only in Peirce and Husserl’s phenomenological orientation but also in the pure duration of Bergson as well. As Professor Sherover indicates, in his second study on Time, “Husserl is following the picture of the Leibnizian monad concerning itself, not with ‘reflections’ of the ‘external’ world constituting the content of consciousness, but with the internal structure by which that content is constituted; by ‘bracketing such content, it then undertakes to examine the ‘reflecting’ structure itself....One way to approach his analysis, then, is to view it as an attempt to explain a puzzle—how an object which is intrinsically dynamic can retain its continuing identity in a consciousness which is inherently temporal and continually in the process of changing.” Charles Sherover, *The Human Experience of Time: The Development of Its Philosophic Meaning* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), page 447.

To be sure, Kant's model of self-consciousness, of course, is radically different from Descartes's noumenally accessible cogito in Meditation II; and much richer than Leibniz's pure monadic apperception in the opening sections of the *Monadology*. Both the Cartesian and Leibnizian paradigms of consciousness are metaphysically noumenal, transcendent for Kant. Nevertheless, Leibniz' emphasis on the dynamic aspects of thinking forms an important transition into Kant's underlying presuppositions as well as his descriptions of synthetic acts.

I now wish to return to my previous claim that the genesis of this temporal factor originates in the non-conscious. In order to fully appreciate this, let us retreat and unravel some pre-Kantian influences. And in doing so we shall return to a point suggested earlier about the role of the unconscious in Kant. According to Leibniz, the cornerstones of his metaphysical assumptions can be summed up in four essential principles: The simple or immaterial nature of the monad; its dynamism; its continuity; and its unity, by which latter he means the monad's constant activity. As I argued in my article on the unconscious in Leibniz and Kant, Leibniz believes that God creates each individual soul *ex nihilo*. Once created, the soul exists continuously. (Only God can annihilate, i.e. return to nothing, a soul once created.) Just as Leibniz is pledged to the ontological "Great Chain of Being" paradigm, wherein God creates as much reality as compossible, from the very lowest to Himself, just so he is likewise committed to the "continuous chain of consciousness" assumption wherein monadic consciousness displays a continuous spectrum from the non-conscious to the self-conscious. All this follows from the fact that once created, the soul has at least some activity, for to exist is to be active and in humans this would include its fetal state as well as its originary cellular existence. Following Leibniz, Kant agrees that at least human consciousness involves entities which are essentially active centers of awareness, exhibiting various degrees of extended cognitions from unconscious *petitio percipi* to perceptions of "outward" objects and then on to full-blown self-conscious or reflexive apperceptions. Thus, Leibniz declares, "I maintain that substances (material or immaterial) cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, that activity is of the essence of substance in general."⁵⁰ This is why Kemp Smith proposes that

⁵⁰ Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings*, edited by Robert Latta (Oxford: Oxford University Press), page 397. "Material" here resolves into immaterial simples, unextended monads. Sections 10 and 11 postulate continuous alterations within the monads. On Leibniz and time, see Sherover, *The Human Experience of Time*, pages 106-107, 111-114. Lancelot Whyte writes that Christian Wolff may have been the first writer to fully analyze and appreciate unconscious factors than any previous thinker on the subject. Whyte also credits him with explicitly stating that "non-conscious activities must be *inferred* from those of which we are conscious." Whyte then goes on to quote Wolff.

Let no one imagine that I would join the Cartesians in asserting that nothing can be in the mind of which it is not aware...That is a prejudice, which impedes the understanding of the mind, as we see in the case of the Cartesians.

Discursive activities are conscious processes and are under our control; the synthetic processes are non-conscious; only their finished products appear within the conscious field.⁵¹

Again:

Leibniz, it is true, taught the existence of subconscious perceptions, and so far may have seemed to have anticipated Kant's recognition of non-conscious processes; but as formulated by Leibniz that doctrine has the defect which frequently vitiates its modern [Freudian] counterpart, namely that it represents the subconscious as analogous in nature to the conscious, and as differing from it only in the accidental features of intensity and clearness.⁵²

Differing from Kemp Smith, I believe both Leibniz and Kant posited *non-conscious* activities *below* the *subconscious*, else from where would unconscious and conscious acts derive? They are there as soon as God has elected conception to begin in its cellular form.

Again, there can be no dynamic activity apart from time. Kant would have had access to *The Monadology* and the *New Essays*, which latter consists of an imaginary (eventually interrupted) dialogue between Locke and Leibniz. This work was of great interest to Kant (as were the controversial Clarke-Leibniz correspondences discussing the metaphysical and scientific nature of space and time). In the Preface to the work, Leibniz speculates on a number of critical issues, which would have elicited a resonant response from Kant, topics such as (a) the depiction of the mind as a dynamic, active substance, whose essence is the capacity to live, feel, react, and think continuously; (b) its power to create concepts from its own internal resources, spontaneously and independently of a world of external matter and passive sensations; (c) the controversy between Locke and Bishop Stillingfleet over the possibility of "thinking matter"; and (d) the role of the unconscious.⁵³ In rational human

Insofar as something exists in us than we are conscious of, we must bring it to light by *inferences* from that of which we are conscious, otherwise we should have no ground to do so [italics Wolff's]. *The Unconscious Before Freud* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1978), pages 101-102. Kant, of course, was very familiar with Wolff's work.

⁵¹ Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, 179.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 273; cf. xviii.

⁵³ Professor Andrew Brook maintains that "Kant's models and methods dominated the German-speaking world in the nineteenth century" and further that Freud's theory of the unconscious is thoroughly Kantian: "Kant thought that a large and in many ways the most important part of the operation of the mind is 'unconscious'—not open to introspection," and that "Freud shared Kant's concept in

beings, these four factors are grounded in activities that manifest and develop themselves temporally and thereby underscore the difference between the mind and the external movement of matter in space. Thus, the ability of the mind to create the *meanings* of past, present, and future along with the denial that materialism can account for the mental; and the ascription of a generative power to the unconscious would have directly impressed and influenced Kant.

Obviously, in principle, we are not in a position to inspect the non-conscious or its processes directly but we can nevertheless *infer* certain factors to the extent that we can surmise that both the non-conscious and the conscious share in mental activities. For, if we grant that the (self-)conscious mind is active, as all rationalists and idealists in fact do, then it cannot be maintained that the non-conscious, as well as the retrievably unconscious, if they exist, could possibly be *inactive*. In brief, an active consciousness cannot arise from an inactive non-consciousness any more than thought can arise from senseless matter. And it is clear, from the selections cited above, and his comments regarding the difficulties encountered in the Subjective Deduction, that Kant believes that there is something that lies “beneath,” precedes, and conditions explicit awareness.

For the above reasons, I believe Kant remains committed philosophically to a Leibnizian paradigm of the mind as active and temporally structured.

IV

As previously discussed, there are two quite different roles synthesis plays in Kant. The first is engaged in supporting the temporal structures of human experience as they are expressed in our ordinary and scientific lives. And the second function may be termed metaphysical and it is charged in performing its task among noumenal but meaningful concepts, ideas that are important in ethical, spiritual, and ideal contexts.

In prior publications, I have traced the conceptual history and incidence of a Platonic and Neo-platonic argument as it has surfaced, and continues repeatedly to arise, in the rationalist, idealist, phenomenological, and even analytic traditions in Western thought. The form of the proof is fairly straightforward. It begins with the premise that *both* the soul or mind *and* its essential attribute of thought are immaterial and therefore unextended, devoid of externally related parts, i.e., *simple* (Plato, *Phaedo*, 78B; Plotinus, *The Enneads*, V, 7). In turn, this assumption has generated and entailed no less than seven different conclusions: Accordingly, the simplicity principle has served in

how the mind can tie experience together, and even used Kant’s term ‘synthesis’ as his name for the process.” In addition, the author credits Freud with an “awareness of the Kantian doctrine of the noumenal base of inner sense.” Andrew Brook, “Kant and Freud,” in *Prehistory of Cognitive Science* (Basingbroke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pages 117-118.

demonstrations for: (1) the immortality of the individual soul; (2) the unity of self-consciousness; (3) continuous personal or moral identity; (4) metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical idealism; (5) the freedom of self-consciousness; (6) the “grounding” of conceptual meanings and relations as based independently of empirical sensations and the “association of ideas” principle; and (7) a paradigm of immanent time-consciousness. Because of all this, I think it is fair to say that what I have called the Simplicity Argument has served as the most important premise and argument against metaphysical materialism.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Mijuskovic, Ben, “Descartes’s Bridge to the External World,” *Studi Internazionali di Filosofia*, III:3 (1971), 65-81; reprinted in *Rene Descartes: Critical Assessments*, edited by Georges Moyal (Crom Helm Publishers, 1996), II, 312-328; “Hume and Shaftesbury on the Self,” *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 21:85 (1971) 324-336; “The Premise of the Transcendental Analytic,” *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 23:91 (1973), 155-161; *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of the Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant: A Study in the History of an Argument* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974); “The General Conclusion of the Transcendental Analytic,” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, XII:3 (1974a), 357-364; “Marx and Engels on Materialism and Idealism,” *Journal of Thought*, 9:3 (1974b), 157-168; “Locke and Leibniz on Personal Identity,” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, XIII:2, (1975a), 324-336; “The Simplicity Argument and Absolute Morality,” *Journal of Thought*, 10:2, (1975b), 123-134; “The Simplicity Argument in Wittgenstein and Russell,” *Critica*, VIII:22 (1976a), 85-103; “The Simplicity Argument versus a Materialist Theory of Consciousness,” *Philosophy Today*, 20:4 (1976b), 292-304; “Hume on Space (and Time),” *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, XV:4 (1977a), 387-394; reprinted in *David Hume: Critical Assessments*, edited by Stanley Tweyman (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1994), II, 61-70; “The Simplicity Argument and Time in Schopenhauer and Bergson,” *Schopenhauer Jahrbuch* (1977b), pp. 43-58; “The Simplicity Argument and the Freedom of Consciousness,” *Idealistic Studies*, VIII:1 (1978a), 62-74; “Brentano’s Theory of Consciousness,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XXXVIII:3 (1978b), 315-324; “Loneliness and Time-Consciousness,” *Philosophy Today*, XXII:4 (1978c) 276-286; *Contingent Immaterialism: Meaning, Freedom, Time, and Mind* (Amsterdam: Gruner, 1979); “The Simplicity Argument and the Unconscious: Plotinus, Cudworth, Leibniz, and Kant,” *Philosophy and Theology*, 20:1-2 (2008); “The Argument from Simplicity: A Study in the History of an Idea and Consciousness,” *Philotheos*, (2009), pp. 228-252; the last article is an extension and a reply to Thomas Lennon’s and Edward Stainton’s *The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology* (Springer, 2008), which focuses solely on the “unity of consciousness” argument, Kant’s Second Paralogism in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781); Kant calls it the Achilles, the most powerful of all arguments in the rationalist arsenal concerning the doctrines of the soul; and “Hegel’s Categories of Life, Desire, and Recognition, as Displayed in Infant Consciousness, and Their Relation to Loneliness,” *EIDE: Foundations of Ontology*, forthcoming. See also, Michael Bobo, *The Simplicity Argument in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy: A Study of Roderick Chisholm and Richard Swinburne* (Carson, CA: CSU Dominguez Hills, 2010).

The preceding are all entailed by the following underlying principle and proof: “The essential and complete nature of mind, generally speaking, seems to consist solely in thinking, and, as such, it must be unextended, simple (with no parts), and essentially different from the body and therefore immaterial. This was Descartes’ argument in a nutshell, ultimately drawing a strong ontological conclusion (regarding the distinctness of mind and body) from a starting point constituted by epistemological considerations.

Kant is deeply involved in the preceding issues and although he may try to disown them while wearing his scientific garb, he nevertheless is spiritually robed with them in his most secret stirrings. It is not simply a matter that he has denied knowledge in order to make room for faith but rather that idealist, immaterialist convictions continue to shape his arguments at vital turns precisely because he finds them deeply convincing. Hence, although in the first Paralogism, he criticizes the rationalist's arguments for the immortality of the soul, he remains committed to its conceivable reality in the *Critique of Practical Reason*; although he criticizes the inference for the unity of consciousness in the Second Paralogism, he defends it in the second edition Deduction (B 131-132); although he rejects the third Paralogism argument for continuous personal identity, he advocates for it as a condition of eternal rewards and punishments; although in the Fourth Paralogism he denies the validity of its proof for idealism, he remains a subjective idealist in all his thinking; although he advocates in behalf of a strict physical and psychological determinism in the phenomenal sphere, he insists that freedom of the will is not only possible but necessary for morality. In short, even though Kant is an epistemological conservative, he is intellectually and spiritually dedicated to a set of underlying immaterialist conditions, including a model of the mind which spans a spectrum of activities from the non-conscious to the self-conscious. As both Kemp Smith and H. J. Paton have emphasized, Kant in many respects remains under and within the monadic umbrella of Leibniz. Both thinkers believe the soul is active, dynamic, that it expresses itself in a temporal dimension. For Leibniz, not only does the soul *continuously* think, but just as critically the soul is apperceptive as opposed to merely perceptive. Self-consciousness is "inward bound," whereas consciousness is "outward bound." This reflexive paradigm

As Ben Mijuskovic observes, in this type of argumentation, "the sword that severs the Gordian knot is the principle that what is conceptually distinct is ontologically separable and therefore independent." Mijuskovic, in locating this form of reasoning in its historical context, also notes the presence of the converse of its inference: "If one begins with the notion, explicit or implicit, that thoughts or minds are simple, unextended, indivisible, then it seems to be an inevitable step before thinkers connect the principle of an unextended, immaterial soul with the impossibility of any knowledge of an extended material world and consequently of the relation between them." That is, this time an epistemological conclusion (regarding an epistemic gap between mind and body) is reached from a starting point constituted by an ontological consideration (regarding the distinctness of their nature)." *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*, edited by Joel Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979), page 10.

A word of caution is here advisable. Generally speaking, the simplicity premise identifies the immaterial with the unextended, as in the use which we will go on to discuss in this essay. However, certain thinkers, like Henry More, the English Platonist, and Isaac Newton believe that the immaterial may nevertheless be extended, as in spiritual and visual apparitions; or as in the Newtonian conception of an absolutely empty space and time. In Plato's *Timaeus*, Space, as the nurse or womb of all Becoming, shares with the realm of Forms the essential attribute of immateriality while at the same time, like the physical world, it partakes of the attribute of extension; thus it serves as a *tertium quid* connecting the two.

reverts back to Plato's definition of thinking as the soul's internal dialogue with itself, Aristotle's description of the Unmoved Mover, and Descartes' *cogito*. However, it is Leibniz who defines consciousness as a multiplicity in unity through time. And both Leibniz and Kant presuppose a sphere of thought that is unconscious. In effect, what Kant takes away with one hand in the Paralogisms, he restores with his other hand elsewhere.

In this paper, I have endeavored to show that the epistemological status of temporal consciousness is inextricably intertwined with human consciousness from the very start. But whether one agrees that time-consciousness or the unity of consciousness best represents Kant's ultimate premise, one thing is clear: both principles can only conclude in the absolute solitary, insular, monadic existence of the human soul. Indeed, the Cartesian *cogito*, the Leibnizian windowless monad, and Kant's subjective idealism all go in one direction—the utter loneliness of man.⁵⁵

Finally, elsewhere I have claimed that loneliness, like internal time-consciousness, exhibits synthetic *a priori* meanings (and feelings) consisting of (a) narcissistic entitlement; (b) hostility toward the self and/or others; (c) anxiety of either the Freudian or existential variety; (d) depression; and (e) a sense of failed communication.⁵⁶

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⁵⁵ Elsewhere I have argued in behalf of an existential image of man and I have postulated the fear of loneliness, along with the drive to avoid it, as the most basic universal motivation in all we feel, think, and do. See Mijuskovic, Ben, "Loneliness: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *Psychiatry* 40:2 (1977), 113-132; reprinted in *The Anatomy of Loneliness*, edited by Joseph Hartog (New York: International University Press, 1980), pp.65-94; "Loneliness and a Theory of Consciousness," *Review of Existential Psychiatry and Psychology*, XV:1, (1977), 19-31; "Loneliness and the Reflexivity of Consciousness," *Psychocultural Review*, 1:2 (1977), 202-213; "Loneliness and the Possibility of a 'Private Language,'" *Journal of Thought*, 13:1 (1978), 14-20; "Loneliness and Time-Consciousness," *Philosophy Today*, XXII:4 (1978), 276-286; "Loneliness and Personal Identity," *Psychology*, 16:3 (1979), 11,-20; *Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1979); "Loneliness and Narcissism," *Psychoanalytic Review*, 66:4 (1979-1980), 480-492; "Loneliness and Communication," in *Man and His Conduct* edited by Jorge Gracia (Rio Piedras: University of Puerto Rico Press, 198), pp. 261-269; "Loneliness and Suicide," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, XI:1 (1980), 11-17; reprinted in *Geriatrics and Thanatology*, edited by E. Prichard (New York: Praeger Press, 1984), pp. 148-160; "Loneliness and Human Nature," *Psychological Perspectives*, 12:1 (1981), 69-77; "The Sociology and Psychology of Loneliness," *International Review of Contemporary Sociology* (1984); "Loneliness, Anxiety, Hostility, and Communication," *Child Study Journal* 16:3 (1986),227-240; "Loneliness and Counseling Adolescents," *Adolescence*, XX:84 (1986), 941-950; "Reflexivity and Intentionality," *The Psychotherapy Patient*, 4:3/4 (1988), 39-50; "Loneliness and Adolescent Alcoholism," *Adolescence* XXIII:91 (1988), 503-516;"Loneliness and Intimacy," *The Journal of Couples Therapy*, 1:3/4 (1990), 39-48; reprinted in *Intimate Autonomy: Autonomous Intimacy*, edited by J. Brothers New York: Haworth Press, 1991), pp. 39-48; "Loneliness, Atomistic Societies, and Organic Communities," *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare* XIX:2 (1992), 147-164;; and "Theories of Consciousness, Therapy, and Loneliness," *International Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 13:1 (2005), 1-18.

⁵⁶ See Mijuskovic, "The Phenomenology and Dynamics of Loneliness," *Psychology*, 33:2 (1996), 41-51

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