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Paolo A. Bolaños, Dead Corals, 2017. Photograph.
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Polemic

Why Social Movements Need Philosophy
(A Reply to “Feminism without Philosophy: A Polemic” by Jeremiah Joven Joaquin)

Noelle Leslie G. dela Cruz

Abstract: This essay attempts to respond to two main claims presented in the article “Feminism without Philosophy: A Polemic” by Jeremiah Joven Joaquin (Kritike, 10:2, 2016). For Joaquin, (1) feminism, as a socio-political movement, does not need philosophy to explain the nature of gender inequality and that (2) feminism cannot achieve its main goals or concerns through philosophizing. I respond to these by questioning Joaquin’s intended target, i.e., so-called “academic feminism”; countering his implicit assumption of a divide between theory and practice; and citing examples of recent feminist scholarly productions which use theory in the service of political advocacy. I conclude that his views are pernicious and therefore need to be corrected.

Keywords: feminism, feminist movement, academic feminism, theory and practice

I would like to respond to the claims made by Joaquin in his article “Feminism without Philosophy: A Polemic.” As a whole, I find his essay to be generally uninformed, not only about the nature of feminist discourse, but also about recent developments in it. A number of his assumptions are also clearly questionable.

First, I will restate his claims as best as I can, then present my arguments against them. Joaquin identifies two main problems in his paper: (1) “Does feminism, as a socio-political movement, need to have a philosophy concerning the nature of gender inequality?” and (2) “Would feminism achieve its main socio-political concerns by giving philosophical foundations

for them?” He answers “no” to both of these questions, treating the first as the simpler issue while offering a longer justification for his views in regard to the second. He believes that a certain kind of feminism in the academe, inasmuch as it is characterized by “fantastic theorizing,” is ultimately “detrimental” to the main goal of the feminist movement, which is to combat the oppression of women by various social institutions. Too much theorizing supposedly leads to such adverse consequences as the trivialization of gender-related issues, the de-radicalization of the movement itself, and elitism among the ranks of feminists. Thus, feminists ought to stop trying to provide a theoretical explanation for gender oppression. By analogy, he argues, one doesn’t need an aesthetic theory to justify the pragmatic policy of prohibiting the improper disposal of chewing gum waste. Instead of engaging in philosophy, feminists should bring their advocacies to the “proper forums,” namely, the congress or the courts, in which some form of social change can be effected.

It should be noted that Joaquin seems to consider the feminist critique of gender in the history of philosophy as a positive contribution to thought. He believes it is laudable because “it helps in the facilitation of libertarian ideas.” However, what he does take issue with is the transformation of academic feminism into a “rigid doctrine,” i.e., its becoming an ideology, with all the negative baggage that the word is saddled with, e.g., dogmatism and irrationality. He claims that feminism, originally a political movement for social change, had morphed into an ideology due to the development of academic feminism. His recommendation, therefore, is for feminists to abandon the academe and to focus their energies instead in “the public sphere.” Exhorting feminists to “[g]o back to the streets and make their hands dirty,” he claims that this is the only way they could accomplish their political objectives; in the meantime, “philosophical systems need not be built.”

I wish to respond to the above claims by (1) questioning Joaquin’s characterization of his intended target, i.e., the sort of “academic feminism” that theorizes too much; (2) countering his implicit assumption that there is, or should be, a clear dichotomy between theory and practice, between “the academe” (said to be the site of “ideology”) and “the public sphere” (said to be the arena of social policy advocacy); and (3) citing recent feminist scholarly productions, whose existence contravenes the notion that philosophical theories or explanations are detrimental to the political goals of feminism.

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2 Ibid., 287.
3 Ibid., 288.
4 Ibid., 298.
5 Ibid., 293.
6 Ibid., 295.
7 Ibid., 299.
On “Academic Feminism”

In his discussion of “academic feminism,” Joaquin mentions at least three species of examples:

From the fashionable corridors of the academia, we might see a feminist philosopher in her academic gown discussing in highfaluting jargons why the word “womyn” is a better label than “women.” Perhaps, we might also see them (the academic feminists) discussing the ontological status of social constructs such as sex, gender, and gender roles. Or perhaps, we might see the elaborate demonstrations by a well-known French feminist explaining her views on the inadequacy of the bipolarity of the epistemological concatenations that grilled the hybrid array of Otherness in the whole warmth of being.8

Notwithstanding the tongue-in-cheek spirit in which they have apparently been written, I believe that the above examples tend to grossly misrepresent feminism. Consequently, these unfounded opinions cannot support Joaquin’s recommendations about what in fact feminists ought to do.

First, gender-neutral linguistic neologisms have not been predominantly adopted by feminists, and a term such as “womyn” has not gone uncontested in queer studies. In any case, whatever may be said about these neologisms, Joaquin’s parody trivializes the significance of the insight from linguistics that language and thought are interrelated and that therefore, the terminologies or labels we use have the potential to reinforce oppressive attitudes.

Second, theories about sex and gender are integral to feminism, not only in the academic sense but also in the historical sense. The so-called “waves” of the feminist movement, i.e., the paradigm shift from women’s rights (which can be traced back to the Enlightenment era) to women’s liberation (which saw its heyday in the 1960s and ‘70s), is due in large part to the conceptual achievement of philosophical works such as *The Second Sex* by Simone de Beauvoir, first translated from French into English in 1953. Using existential-phenomenological tools, Beauvoir demonstrated that the oppression of women is not rooted in biology (sex), but in social and cultural practices (gender). In the seven decades since its inception, Beauvoir’s insight has been explored, developed, and critiqued, paving the way for allied fields

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such as gay and lesbian studies, men’s studies, and queer studies. Indeed, when it comes to liberation struggles, theory and practice are intricately intertwined. (I shall return to this point in the next section.)

Third, Joaquin’s reference to “a well-known French feminist” obscures the vast differences in style, framework, and method among French feminists, a group that can encompass anyone from Beauvoir to the poststructuralist feminists, or French difference feminists. To count as effective or rationally persuasive, any objection to their ideas should at the very least present a working understanding of their philosophical arguments. Clearly, no such understanding has been demonstrated. Therefore, feminism(s) have been misrepresented in Joaquin’s article.

On the Dichotomy between Theory and Practice

The article also assumes, but does not sufficiently justify, a clear demarcation between theory and practice. This is the bedrock of Joaquin’s call for feminists to leave the academe and to focus their energies in “the public sphere.”⁹ I shall offer a more generous reading of this claim, rather than taking it to imply that educational institutions are not part of the so-called public sphere; such a view would only be true if all students were home-schooled.¹⁰ Instead, I shall take Joaquin’s claim to mean that participation in certain arenas, such as the academe, tends to “de-radicalize” primarily social movements, such as feminism.

His premises in support of this conclusion rest on a certain characterization of “academic feminism,” which I have already shown to be a misrepresentation. Therefore, in the absence of a more substantial argument from Joaquin himself, I shall discuss the key points presented in his source text, from which he borrows the phrase “academic feminism.” I believe that Joaquin misreads this article, which is evincing a stand contrary to his own.

In their article entitled “Academic Feminism and the Process of De-Radicalization: Re-Examining the Issues,”¹¹ Currie and Kazi refer to “academic feminism” as a type of institutionalized intellectualism, one that is separated from feminism as a social movement and is thereby “de-radicalized,” i.e., supporting, rather than challenging, the status quo. They cite Janet Radcliffe Richards, English author The Sceptical Feminist: A Philosophical Enquiry (1980), in which she makes a distinction between

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⁹ Ibid., 297.

¹⁰ I use “public sphere” here in the ordinary sense. However, it should be noted that a classic feminist strategy has been to question the arbitrary separation of spheres, such as private/public and personal/political.

feminism as a rigid doctrine on the one hand, and feminism as a belief about sexual inequality, on the other hand. Currie and Kazi concur with Richards’ critique of (some types of) feminism as a “rigid doctrine,” noting the disunity that arises from theoretical disagreements among schools of feminist thought. Currie and Kazi deplore the rejection by some feminists of Marxist feminism, a move which the authors blame for the overall de-radicalization of the movement. The bulk of their essay criticizes the feminist research methodology offered by Liz Stanley and Sue Wise in *Breaking Out: Feminist Consciousness and Feminist Research* (1983), which identifies the conceptual split between objectivity/subjectivity as the source of gender oppression. Currie and Kazi argue that this is a misidentification, that the conceptual split itself is a product of the material conditions of society, which in turn needs to be challenged in a more systematic way. For this, (Marxist) theory is indispensable. They conclude:

> Whatever the fate of the academy … the struggle for equality must be guided by systematic theory and research. For us as academic feminists, we therefore see our struggle as both within and against the institution. … If we are to challenge the hierarchies that occur in the academia, we require theories that help us conceptualize the processes of separation and domination that occur in that world. We see potential for such a theory grounded in dialectical historical materialism.

By contrast, Joaquin equates Marxism with academic ideology, likening feminism to it. He claims that some people refuse the label “feminist” because of its association with “ideology:”

> It is somewhat depressing to think that feminism as a socio-political movement, which promotes equality of men and women, advocates the rights and liberties of women, and criticizes the oppression caused by the idea of gender hierarchies, would be tainted by a stigma as bad as Marx’s, Stalin’s, or Lenin’s.

Meanwhile, Currie and Kazi point to dialectical materialism as a theory that feminism needs in order to challenge oppressive hierarchies, whether inside or outside the academy. Their adoption of the phrase

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12 Ibid., 79.
13 Ibid., 90.
14 Joaquin, “Feminism without Philosophy,” 297.
“academic ideology,” as used by Richards, does not pertain to Marxism, but to feminism that rejects Marxism. Regardless of the merits of their view, I must question Joaquin’s reading of the original meaning and context of “academic feminism” in Currie and Kazi’s article. The strange theory-practice dichotomy—challenged as early as the ancient times by Aristotle—inheres in Joaquin’s argument, but certainly not in his source text, as we have seen. It cannot be disputed that this is indeed his primary source, given his copious references to the ideas of Currie and Kazi, as well as the works cited by these authors. It should be noted that these writings date from the 1980s, and all of them have been taken out of context by Joaquin.

To be fair, the fraught relationship between theory and practice, or academia and politics, is a perennial subject in feminist writings. Recent work, however, points to a consensus about their inseparability, rather than their mutual exclusivity. For instance, Ahmed considers feminism to be the most efficacious model for social change, precisely because of its theoretical displacement of both the self-identified humanist subject and of the unstable and indeterminate postmodern one. Meanwhile, Boehm characterizes the history of the feminist movement as the history of theoretical conflict between equality and difference, concluding that engaged feminists should be more self-conscious about their own conceptual stances. Jenkins discusses the implications of women’s underrepresentation at elite educational institutions and in high-ranking journals, concluding that feminists would do well to study the inner workings and dynamics of the academe itself as a site of sexism. Finally, Filipino feminist Illo reflects on her own surprised reaction to the equation of the academe with “de-politicisation,” noting “how close the links were between the history of feminism in the academe—particularly in the form of Women’s Studies—and the women’s movement.” It seems that, in the Philippine context, feminist de-radicalization via the academe has never been a remote threat.


Examples of Feminist Philosophical Work in the Service of Social Change

Finally, in this last part of my essay, I would like to cite some recent feminist works that further debunk the specious separation between theory and practice, between intellectualization or conceptualization and political advocacy:

1. Daly examines the vagueness associated with ordinary notions of sex, based on the 2012 International Olympic Committee’s eligibility stipulations for women. Daly argues that, for moral and practical reasons, the vagueness of concepts such as sex is better described through semantic rather than epistemic approaches.20

2. Doan develops a critical-feminist analysis of the phenomenon of complacency in regard to climate change, arguing that existing philosophical accounts of complacency are inadequate in addressing the problem. His analysis enumerates a set of “motivational vices” that need to be recognized.21

3. Shildrick applies feminist Donna Haraway’s cyborg theory to Critical Disability Studies, presenting a non-binary view of the lived experience of people with prostheses.22

4. Weir takes on the issue of agency in relation to the practices of women in the mosque movement in Cairo, Egypt, arguing that these practices point to an alternative conception of freedom as one of belonging or connection.23

5. Walker and Rogers observe that surgery in contemporary health care lacks a strong evidence base. Their paper discusses the disjunct between evidence-based medicinal methods and current surgical practice, using feminist epistemology to suggest solutions.24

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6. Parkins lays down the foundations of a feminist theory of fashion, which does not treat fashion as a theoretical object but as a symptom of the widespread patriarchal disciplining of women’s bodies.25

7. Ferreday analyzes the discourse of rape culture through viewers’ reactions to an episode of the popular HBO television series Game of Thrones, in which the character of Jamie Lannister rapes his sister Cersei. She concludes that fan communities not only reproduce gendered narratives but also allow for the articulation of heretofore silenced trauma experiences.26

In conclusion, concerning Joaquin’s central question, “Would feminism achieve its main socio-political concerns by giving philosophical foundations for them?” the above studies would seem to indicate that the answer is “Yes.” Social struggles do need theory. At the very least, their goals will be more challenging and difficult to achieve without the thoughtful and scholarly work of philosophers. Philosophy—inevitably practiced now in the professionalized institution of the academe, with the attendant conferences, journal publication, and classroom discussions—provides feminists with the conceptual space to present, critique, justify, refine, and extend their political advocacies.

For a non-feminist to insist that feminists do not need philosophy is to adopt a patronizing stance that one knows what is good for a marginalized group. It is to echo the sexist, racist, heterosexist, and classist view that philosophy should be the exclusive domain of the privileged, who have never had to struggle for anything. Lastly, it is to refuse to engage with the Other, inasmuch as rational argumentation—the sort of engagement most popularly associated with philosophers—involves the most charitable interpretation of the opposing position, borne of a careful and thorough reading of it. Unfortunately, none of these philosophical courtesies seem to obtain in Joaquin’s so-called polemic against “academic feminism.” Thus, I offer this response essay as a correction and challenge to such a pernicious view.

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References


An Alternative Dialectical Picture of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Debate: A Reply to Mabaquiao

Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin

Abstract: In “Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” Mabaquiao presents the debate between physicalists and anti-physicalists in light of the plausibility of the phenomenal concept strategy vis-à-vis Chalmers’ master argument. He argues that, as it currently stands, the debate is at an ontological stalemate. This paper argues that this indictment is not fair given an alternative picture of the current dialectical status of the debate. Furthermore, it suggests that, given this picture, we could have reasons to favor the anti-physicalists over the physicalists just by following how the debate has currently been pursued.

Keywords: Chalmers’ master argument, phenomenal concept strategy, epistemic gap argument, philosophical burden of proof, philosophical dialectic

Introduction

In a recent article, Mabaquiao offers an indictment of the current status of the debate between physicalists and anti-physicalists. Focusing on the issue about the plausibility of the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) as a defense of physicalism vis-à-vis Chalmers’ master argument (CMA) against it, he argues that the debate is at a stalemate. This, as Mabaquiao contends, is evidenced by Balog’s idea that “[n]either side can, without begging the question against the opponent, show that the other’s position is untenable.”

This paper suggests that, given an alternative account of the dialectic of the debate so far, this indictment seems to be unfair. Furthermore, it suggests that if we were to follow Mabaquiao’s (cum Balog’s) premise, then we should be led to the idea that, despite the ontological impasse that the debate seems to be currently in, there are good reasons to think that anti-physicalists enjoy the dialectical higher ground contra physicalists.

This paper is divided into two sets of excurses. The first set offers a critical rehearsal of Mabaquiao’s take on the whole PCS debate by providing an alternative picture of the dialectic of the debate. The second provides reasons why, given this alternative picture, Mabaquiao’s indictment is untenable, and the current status of the debate between physicalists and anti-physicalists gives the latter a slight dialectical advantage.

**Excursus 1: The Dialectic of the PCS Debate (The Bigger Debate)**

Mabaquiao maps out the debate about the plausibility of PCS in terms of a bigger debate between physicalism and anti-physicalism. There are various versions of each view, but there are certain common elements which identify theories as either. For example, identity theorists and causal theorists both fall under physicalism; Cartesian dualists and epiphenomenalists, on the other hand, both fall under anti-physicalism.

Physicalism is generally understood as the thesis that, fundamentally, everything is physical, while anti-physicalism is the contradictory of this thesis: viz., that not everything is physical. Another way of cashing out the physicalist view is in terms of either an explanatory thesis or a metaphysical thesis. As an explanatory thesis, it implies that everything can be explained in terms of the physical, or that everything is a priori derivable from the physical. As a metaphysical thesis, it implies that everything supervenes on the physical, or that everything is grounded on the physical. Much in the same way, anti-physicalism is usually cashed out in the same terms: either as an explanatory-cum-epistemic gap thesis that not everything can be explained in terms of the physical, or as a dualist metaphysical thesis that not everything supervenes on the physical.

Given these initial characterizations, we could formulate each of these views in terms of the following generalized theses. The physicalist thesis implies that:

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3 Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 54-56.
4 Mabaquiao adds “idealism” as another sort of contender here (see ibid., 55). But in the interest of the debate about PCS, physicalism and anti-physicalism seem to be the only possible contenders.
(PHY) Everything is either a fundamental physical fact, or else could be explained in terms of some other fundamental physical fact.

While the anti-physicalist thesis implies the negation of PHY, such that:

(A-PHY) It’s not the case that everything is either a fundamental physical fact, or else could be explained in terms of some other fundamental physical fact.

Alternatively, the anti-physicalist thesis could be rendered as the view that:

(A-PHY*) There is at least one thing that is not a fundamental physical fact and which cannot be explained in terms of some other fundamental physical fact.

Cashed out this way, we could easily see that the locus of the debate between the physicalist and the anti-physicalist revolves around the issue of whether there are some non-fundamentally physical things which could be explained in purely physical terms. Of course, the physicalist would claim that yes, there are, since everything is physical or could be explained in physical terms; the anti-physicalist would claim no, there aren’t, since there could at least be one non-physical thing that could not be explained in physical terms.

Given the status of the debate between physicalists and anti-physicalists as characterized in terms of this issue, it is quite clear that the philosophical burden to prove her case lies on both parties. It is generally acknowledged in philosophy that at the onset of a debate, no party should have even the slightest dialectical advantage. And given how we have formulated the issue thus far, this is true of the debate between the physicalists and the anti-physicalists.

Given this characterization of the issue, how would a physicalist and an anti-physicalist argue for their respective claims? Some physicalists have opted for two interrelated arguments to prove their claim. One is the argument from parsimony of causal explanations; the other is the argument

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6 Alternatively, the debate might instead focus on whether there is at least one non-physical thing. But since the first formulation captures the second, we could stick with the first formulation of the debate throughout the paper.
from the consistency with current science. There are different versions of these two arguments. But in a nutshell, we could cast both arguments in one overall argument: viz., as an argument from our best science (ABS). The argument goes like this:

1. Our best science tells us that the world is a causally complete physical world.
2. Therefore, everything is explainable in physical terms.

Of course, ABS is not a foolproof argument for the physicalist thesis; there are possible objections against ABS that are open for an anti-physicalist. For one, an anti-physicalist might argue that granted the premise, the conclusion still does not follow. For even if an anti-physicalist supposes that our present best science might tell us that everything is explainable in physical terms, she might argue that it does not tell us what our future best science might tell us. As such, it is at least an open issue as to whether our future best science would incorporate some anti-physical explanations of certain phenomena. With this dialectical move, and holding all things being equal, we might say that the anti-physicalist’s reply makes the physicalist argument at least questionable. We do not have room to further evaluate the dialectic of this debate in this paper since our primary concern is the debate about PCS as Mabaquiao sees it. But seeing the overall dialectic here is instructive for our purposes later when we evaluate the dialectic of our target debate.

**Excursus 2: The Epistemic Argument and the PCS Reply**

Now where does Mabaquiao see the PCS debate in terms of this bigger debate? He pegs it as a reply of physicalists to various forms of explanatory-cum-epistemic gap arguments given by anti-physicalists. One point of contention between physicalists and anti-physicalists is about the ontological status of consciousness or qualia. Anti-physicalists argue that this is at least one non-physical thing that could not be explained in physical terms. Physicalists, on other hand, deny this. They argue that consciousness is something that could be explained in physical terms.
In terms of how we have characterized the main issue between physicalists and anti-physicalists, one dialectical move that is often attributed to an anti-physicalist is the argument from the failure of physicalism (FOP). The overall argument structure of FOP looks like this:

1. Either physicalism is true or anti-physicalism is true.
2. If physicalism is true, then everything is either a fundamental physical fact, or else explainable in terms of those facts.
3. There are non-fundamentally physical facts which are not explainable in terms of fundamental physical facts.
4. Therefore, physicalism is not true.
5. Therefore, anti-physicalism is true.

FOP might be taken as a prima facie anti-physicalist argument. However, formulated as such, a closer inspection is needed. FOP works on the assumption that the first premise is exhaustive and mutually exclusive. That is, no other possible theory is available, and the two cannot be both false. Only with this supposition will the argument have legs. Furthermore, as Mabaquiao has correctly pointed out, the third premise of FOP needs to be supported by a further argument. Such an argument should imply the anti-physicalist thesis identified as A-PHY* above: viz., that there is indeed at least one non-physical thing that resists explanation in physical terms. Mabaquiao identifies one such argument move as a kind of epistemic gap argument (EGA).

The general structure of EGA that Mabaquiao has in mind is the following:

1. There are epistemic gaps (in the sense that there is gap in our description of phenomenal/consciousness facts in terms of a purely physical description of them).
2. If there are epistemic gaps, then there are ontological gaps (between physical facts and phenomenal facts).
3. If there are ontological gaps, then there is at least one thing that is not a fundamental physical fact and which cannot be explained in terms of some other fundamental physical fact.

4. Therefore, there is at least one thing that is not a fundamental physical fact and which cannot be explained in terms of some other fundamental physical fact.

If the premises of this argument are true, then conclusion logically follows. But are the premises true? Or at least, are they motivated? Mabaquiao provides three motivations for the premises of EGA: viz., explanatory gap, knowledge gap, and conceptual gap. This paper would not get into the details of these motivations. But we could have a very broad idea of how they work. Structurally, the argument is motivated as follows:

| EG-Premise | It is possible to have a description of all the physical facts but fail to have a description of some phenomenal/consciousness fact.  
13 |
| IF-EG-THEN-OG-Premise | If it is possible to have a description of all the physical facts but fail to have a description of some phenomenal/consciousness fact, then these consciousness facts are not physical processes or physical facts. |
| IF-OG-THEN-NP-Premise | If these consciousness facts are not physical processes or physical facts, then there is at least one thing that is not a fundamental physical fact and which cannot be explained in terms of some other fundamental physical fact.  
14 |

From these, the conclusion is meant to follow.

Note here that the crucial premises of this argument are the first two. That is, the EG-premise and the IF-EG-THEN-OG-Premise. The third premise comes into play only if we want to make the anti-physicalist thesis explicit. But if we do not wish to make it so, then from the first two premises, we could already have anti-physicalism.

Mabaquiao contends that for friends of PCS:

[T]he epistemic gaps, contrary to the claim of the epistemic arguments, are not brought about by an

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13 That is, given either one of the motivations identified by Mabaquiao.
14 The structural argument here is due to Chalmers. See Chalmers, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap.”
ontological gap but by the peculiar nature of our phenomenal concepts. More specifically, the epistemic gaps are not due to a gap between physical facts and phenomenal facts but to a gap between physical concepts and phenomenal concepts. This gap between physical concepts and phenomenal concepts is precisely brought about by the absence of a priori connections between these two types of facts...15

Mabaquiao follows Chalmers’16 and Stoljar’s17 characterization of PCS. What is interesting here is that since defenders of PCS do not reject the EG-premise, they are, in effect, taking it in as part of their reply. Roughly this means that they acknowledge that there is an epistemic gap between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts, but even if this is so, it does not follow that this gap is grounded on some ontological gap between phenomenal and physical facts. Furthermore, to explain these epistemic gaps, friends of PCS suggest that, as Stoljar puts it, they are only brought about by our temporary non-possession of certain epistemic connections between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts.18

PCS, thus, implies the following. Our first exposure to some new sensation brings about an epistemic gap between our new phenomenal concept of that sensation, and our old stock of physical concepts. But from this epistemic gap, we could not conclude that there is an ontological gap between phenomenal facts and physical facts, since in principle, we could have a set of purely physical concepts that could explain this new phenomenal concept.19 In this way, friends of PCS would have put EGA, especially the IF-EG-THEN-OG-Premise, into question. Thus, they have also secured the physicalist view.

Let us rehearse what we have so far. We have been exploring Mabaquiao’s view of the dialectic of the debate about PCS. This exploration has led us to the bigger debate between physicalist and anti-physicalist. We have seen one argument for physicalism, viz., ABS, and an anti-physicalist counterargument against it. We have also seen one argument for anti-physicalism, viz., FOP. Focusing on the FOP argument, we are led to EGA as the support for the overall anti-physicalist thesis. Now, we have seen the PCS...

18 Ibid.
as a physicalist reply to the IF-EG-THEN-OG-Premise of EGA. And, in a way, we have also seen its motivation.

**Excursus 3: Chalmers’ Master Argument Rejoinder**

Where does Mabaquiao, then, peg Chalmers’ Master Argument (CMA) in all of this? Mabaquiao sees CMA as an anti-physicalist’s rejoinder to the PCS argument. In effect, CMA is a reply to the physicalist’s PCS reply to EGA. It is worth noting that if successful, CMA would not only have secured EGA, but also the anti-physicalist thesis as well.

Recall that friends of PCS put into question the IF-EG-THEN-OG-Premise of EGA. In doing this, they have taken upon themselves two tasks, which if fulfilled, would spell the success of PCS. These two tasks are as follows. First, PCS should explain the epistemic gap. That is, it should explain our epistemic situation whenever we are confronted with a new conscious experience. Second, it should explain phenomenal concepts in terms of physical terms. That is, it should show that the IF-EG-THEN-OG-Premise is false.

Chalmers designed the master argument to show that these two tasks are impossible to fulfill. Mabaquiao quotes Chalmers’ position as follows:

I (Chalmers) think that the (PCS) strategy cannot succeed. On close examination, we can see that no account of phenomenal concepts is both powerful enough to explain our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness and tame enough to be explained in physical terms.

How does CMA work? We would not get into the technical details of the argument, but we could have an idea of its main structure as follows:

1. If it is conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms.
2. If it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal

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20 Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 60.

21 *Ibid.* This is a more spelled out version of the argument. Chalmers presents it as a schematic. See Chalmers, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap,” 168. But we should note that a lot is lost in translation once Ps and Qs come into play. As such, we will make explicit the main thought behind CMA.
3. Therefore, either these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms, or else they cannot explain our epistemic situation. 22

For Mabaquiao, “[I]t is not difficult to see that the entire master argument is based on his zombie hypothesis or the conceivability reasoning concerning this hypothesis ...” 23 As such, he thinks that the primary motivation for CMA has something to do with the conceivability of philosophical zombies—zombies, which are our physical or functional duplicates, but unlike us, lack phenomenology or consciousness.

Furthermore, Mabaquiao thinks that the conceivability of philosophical zombies motivates each of the horns of Chalmers’ dilemma. With regard to the first horn of the dilemma (the first premise), he thinks that this motivation shows “the failure of the PCS as a physicalist defense against the epistemic arguments.” 24 On the other hand, with regard to the second horn (the second premise), he thinks that the same motivation shows the failure of PCS as a defense of the physicalist view which accepts epistemic gaps but not ontological gaps. 25

To this we remark that, yes, CMA as a whole is motivated by a certain conceivability argument (about philosophical zombies), but not as straightforwardly as what Mabaquiao seems to imply. To understand how CMA is so motivated, we must see how Chalmers motivates each horn of the dilemma, and how this informs his overall position quoted above.

Chalmers motivates the first premise (i.e., the first horn) as follows. If one can conceive of a physical or even a functional duplicate (i.e., a philosophical zombie), that is almost similar to us except that, unlike us, it lacks phenomenology or consciousness, then there will be an explanatory gap between physical explanations and their target psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts. This is so since if a philosophical zombie were conceivable; then, since it has no consciousness, it follows that a purely physical explanation could not account for why we have consciousness and

22 Mabaquiao formulates CMA in terms of an explicit constructive dilemma. See Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 61-62. But this is an unnecessary complication. As it stands, CMA is already a valid dilemma argument. That is, it instantiates the valid argument form:
(1) If P, then Q.
(2) If not-P, then R.
(3) Therefore, Q or R.

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
the zombie does not. From this, the first horn of the dilemma follows. Let us call this argument ZOMBIE1.

Structurally, ZOMBIE1 looks like this:

1. If philosophical zombies are conceivable, then there is an explanatory gap between physical explanations and their target psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts.
2. If there is an explanatory gap between physical explanations and their target psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms.
3. Therefore, if philosophical zombies are conceivable, then psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms.

Again, this argument is valid. But notice how the conceivability of philosophical zombies functions in ZOMBIE1. Chalmers uses it in terms of “a connection between conceivability and explanation,” such that: if some physicalist explanation “makes transparent why some high-level truth obtains (e.g., truths about consciousness) given that the low-level truths obtain (e.g., truths about physical facts), and since it is conceivable that low-level truths obtain without high-level truths obtaining, then this sort of transparent (physicalist) explanation will fail.”

Furthermore, given this appreciation of ZOMBIE1, we might now have a good conceptual handle of why Chalmers thinks that no account of phenomenal concepts is tame enough to be explained in physical terms. Given ZOMBIE1, since philosophical zombies are possible, then no physical explanation of psychological facts are possible. A fortiori, no phenomenal concepts could be physically explained as well.

Chalmers motivates the second premise (i.e., the second horn) with what we will label as ZOMBIE2. Structurally, the argument proceeds this way:

1. If it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal

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27 ZOMBIE1 is an instance of this valid argument form:
   (1) If P, then Q.
   (2) If Q, then R.
   (3) Therefore, if P then R.
29 Ibid.
concepts, then philosophical zombies would have the psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts.

2. Philosophical zombies do not share our epistemic situation.

3. If philosophical zombies have the psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts but do not share our epistemic situation, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation.

4. Therefore, if it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation.30

ZOMBIE3 is valid.31 But what is interesting about it is how philosophical zombies are employed in the argument. We might notice that, unlike in ZOMBIE1, the conceivability of philosophical zombies is not the main premise of the argument; rather, it is merely assumed given the connection of conceivability and explanations (as in ZOMBIE1). Chalmers tells us that what is doing the real work in the argument is the second premise.32 So let us focus on that.

The claim that philosophical zombies do not share our epistemic situation needs a bit of clarification. And Chalmers does this as follows.

We can say that two individuals share their epistemic situation when they have corresponding beliefs, all of which have corresponding truth-value and epistemic status. A zombie will share the epistemic situation of a conscious being if the zombie and the conscious being have corresponding beliefs, all of which have corresponding truth-values and epistemic status.33

Two things are noteworthy here. First, the phrase, “epistemic situation” refers to an individual’s beliefs, their truth status (i.e., whether it is

30 Cf. Ibid., 176. As in ZOMBIE1, “references to (philosophical) zombies should be put within the scope of a conceivability operator” (Ibid.). That is, all instances of “philosophical zombies” in the argument should be read as “conceivable philosophical zombies.”

31 ZOMBIE3 is an instance of this valid form:
   (1) If P, then Q.
   (2) R
   (3) If Q and R, then S
   (4) Therefore, if P, then S.

32 Chalmers, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap,” 176. In the original Chalmers argument, our second premise is his fifth.

33 Ibid., 177.
true), and their epistemic status (i.e., whether they are justified, warranted, etc.). In this way, two individuals share their epistemic situation if for some belief (which includes its truth status and epistemic status) that one has, the other has as well. Now, Chalmers asks, do we have good reasons to think that a conscious being and its philosophical zombie duplicate, share the same epistemic situation?\footnote{Chalmers makes further a distinction about what it means to have the same \textit{corresponding belief}, and clarifications about zombies \textit{having} beliefs in the first place. But we will set these issues aside since they would not affect the overall structure of his argument. For details see \textit{ibid.}} He thinks that we do not.

If Chalmers is right, then, given that we and our philosophical zombie duplicates share a common belief, our duplicates differ from us either in terms of their truth status or epistemic status. Chalmers illustrates these two \textit{differentiae} as follows. Consider the belief about one’s own consciousness. Let the sentence, “I am conscious” depict this belief. Uttered by a conscious being, like you and me, the sentence is determinately true since you are definitely conscious. On the contrary, when uttered by your zombie duplicate, this sentence is systematically false since zombies, by definition, are not conscious.\footnote{A weaker formulation might suffice here as well. Instead of claiming that a zombie’s report about its self-consciousness is systematically false, we might just claim that it is indeterminately true and indeterminately false. But this weaker formulation implies the same thing: viz., that you and your zombie duplicate have different truth statuses; hence, have different epistemic situations.} Furthermore, since you and your zombie duplicate have different truth statuses, it follows that both of you have different epistemic statuses as well, since your belief is justified, while your zombie duplicate’s is not.\footnote{A similar argument is presented in David C. Chalmers, \textit{The Conscious Mind} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 179.}

Thus, given that the premises of ZOMBIE$_2$ are plausibly true, its conclusion follows: i.e., if it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation. And this is exactly the second horn of CMA. Furthermore, the articulation of ZOMBIE$_2$ provides us with a conceptual handle of Chalmers’ claim that no account of phenomenal concepts is powerful enough to explain our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness. Taken in terms of ZOMBIE$_2$, the claim implies that PCS would not have the resources to explain a conscious being’s epistemic situation since its zombie duplicate does not share our epistemic situation even though both share the same psychological features necessary for phenomenal concepts.

To reiterate, Mabaquiao rightly describes the conceivability of philosophical zombies as the primary motivation for CMA. But this
motivation, as we have seen, is twofold. On the one hand, if philosophical zombies are conceivable, then PCS fails as a physicalist explanation of how phenomenal concepts are derivable from psychological facts. On the other hand, if PCS succeeds as a physicalist explanation, then you and your zombie duplicate would not share an epistemic situation even if both of you share the same psychological features necessary for phenomenal concepts. The former is CMA’s first horn; the latter is its second horn. 37

Excursus 4: Carruthers & Veillet’s Reply to CMA

Let us take stock of what we have so far. The dialectical structure of the PCS debate as we have pictured thus far takes the PCS as a physicalist reply to the anti-physicalist’s EGA. To be successful, PCS should not only explain the phenomenal concepts we employ in terms of physical terms, but also the epistemic (gappy) situation we are in when confronted with some new conscious experience. And as we have seen, CMA shows precisely that any (physicalist) account would fail in both fronts.

Given this, how would a defender of PCS reply to CMA’s dilemma? Dialectically speaking, there are different possible replies. 38 One is to show that at least one of the horns of the dilemma is faulty; and thus, show that the argument is unsound. Another is to show that the whole thing is unmotivated, or rests on a faulty assumption; and thus, show that the argument has no legs. Yet another reply might be to just wave your hands and put your foot down. Mabaquiao does not present the third of these options, and rightly so; rather, he presents Carruthers and Veillet’s reply and Balog’s reply. The first shows that the second horn of the dilemma is faulty; the second shows that the whole argument has no legs. Offhand, we should note that although Mabaquiao’s indictment rests solely on Balog’s reply, it is still instructive to see how the former reply works as a secondary premise for Mabaquiao’s claim.

37 In fairness to Mabaquiao, his discussion of the second horn of the dilemma follows almost the same line of thought that we have seen above. But his discussion is in the context of his presentation of the objection made by Carruthers and Veilett. See Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 63-67. In his dialectic of the debate, he sees the second horn in terms of a reply to CMA. In our context, the second horn (and the motivation of it in terms of ZOMBIE) is seen as part of Chalmers’ overall master argument. This distinction of contexts is important to note here since, dialectically speaking, in Mabaquiao’s picture, ZOMBIE appears as a defensive dialectical move. In contrast, in our picture, it serves as a persuasive dialectical move to further motivate CMA.

38 Chalmers has actually outlined most of them in the “reactions” section of his work. See Chalmers, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap,” 180-189.
Mabaquiao takes Carruthers and Veillet’s reply to CMA as mainly questioning the second horn of the dilemma. Recall that the second horn tells us that if it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation. And the key motivation for this as we have outlined above is ZOMBIE2. Carruthers and Veillet argue, in effect, that the second premise of ZOMBIE2 is false, or at least questionable. That is, they question the premise that philosophical zombies do not share our epistemic situation. But what is their main argument for this? We shall call their argument the argument from twin-earth (ATE).

Mabaquiao outlines ATE as follows:

1. Oscar and Twin Oscar share the same epistemic situation.
2. If Oscar and Twin Oscar share the same epistemic situation, then so should Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers.
3. Thus, Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers share the same epistemic situation.
4. Thus, philosophical zombies do share our epistemic situation.

The first premise of ATE is motivated by the famous twin earth thought experiment for semantic externalism due to Putnam. Semantic externalism is the view that the meaning of linguistic expressions is largely determined by factors external to the speaker. That is, the meaning of the word, like “water,” is not just found in the internal mechanisms of the speaker, but to some environmental factors, like the causal history of the expression. This extends to the question about mental states and mental content. An externalist about mental states or mental content tells us that “in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g., beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way.” The twin earth thought experiment is often cited as a motivation for both versions of externalism. The thought experiment asks us to consider Oscar, an Earth-bound individual, and his twin, Twin Oscar, who lives on twin earth. As Mabaquiao illustrates:

[t]he only difference between normal earth and twin earth is that the chemical composition of water in normal earth is H₂O, while in twin earth it is XYZ. In this case, when Oscar and Twin Oscar utter the same sentence, “water is refreshing,” their respective sentences are both true and justified in similar ways given their respective natural environments. Consequently, in regard to Chalmers, Oscar and Twin Oscar share the same epistemic situation despite the fact that the contents of their beliefs are not the same—Oscar’s refers to a substance consisting of H₂O, while Twin Oscar’s refers to a substance consisting of XYZ.⁴⁴

In effect, this tells us that given Chalmers’ definition of an epistemic situation, we have to say that Oscar and Twin Oscar do share the same epistemic situation—albeit, about different contents and different natural environments. But do we have reasons to grant that Oscar and Twin Oscar indeed share the same epistemic situation? On the one hand, yes, if we are just going for an externalist view of mental states and mental content such that both Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s belief about the refreshing-ness of water is true and justified by different sets of considerations in each of their environments. On the other hand, no, if it turns out that mental states and mental contents are internally justified; i.e., there could be no environmental facts about mental content. Carruthers and Veillet hold that Chalmers is taking an externalist view of mental states and mental content since the latter envisages that the meaning of self-consciousness reports, e.g., “I am conscious” is determined by phenomenal states.⁴⁵ So, we grant the first premise for now.

The second premise of ATE seems to be the crux of the argument.⁴⁶ It tells that if we accept that Oscar and Twin Oscar share the same epistemic situation, then we should also accept that Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers share the same epistemic situation. But what’s the motivation for this conditional? Carruthers and Veillet argue that some conscious being, e.g., Chalmers and his zombie twin, Zombie Chalmers, share the same epistemic situation since, like Oscar and Twin Oscar; each of their self-consciousness report is true and is epistemically justified though by different environmental factors. For Chalmers, it is justified by his having genuine phenomenal states;

⁴⁶ We should note that the following discussion is only implicit in Mabaquiao.
for Zombie Chalmers it is by having *schmenomenal* states (that is, functionally like phenomenal, but not really phenomenal states).47

Mabaquiao quotes a summary of their argument as follows:

> The content of one of Chalmers’ phenomenal concepts will turn out to involve a phenomenal state, whereas the content of his twin’s corresponding phenomenal concept can’t possibly involve such a state. According to Chalmers, it seems plausible that the content of a zombie’s phenomenal concepts would be *schmenomenal* states (these would be states that have the same physical, functional and intentional properties as Chalmers’ states but that aren’t phenomenally conscious). The physicalist would then argue that Chalmers’ and Zombie Chalmers’ corresponding beliefs have the same truth-values and are justified in similar ways, but they are quite importantly about different things. So Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers can share the same epistemic situation after all, just as do Oscar and his twin.48

But is ATE reasonable? Chalmers argues that this proposal either deflates the phenomenal knowledge of conscious beings, or inflates the corresponding knowledge of zombies.49 In effect, given the context about the knowledge of self-consciousness, if Carruthers and Veillet are right that we share the same epistemic situation with our zombie twins, then either our knowledge that we are self-conscious is less than what it actually is, or that the zombie’s knowledge that it is self-conscious is more than what it actually is. Furthermore, since neither of these consequent is true, it follows that we still do not share the same epistemic situation with our zombie twins. As Chalmers puts it, “If a theory predicts that a nonconscious zombie would have the same sort of introspective knowledge that we do, then this is reason to reject the theory.”50

But why think that neither consequent is true? Chalmers could go on either two tracks here. First, by definition, zombies do not have consciousness. So, by definition, any self-consciousness report made by the zombie is systematically false. Thus, zombies do not know that they are conscious. Second, perhaps, our zombies do have a functionally similar *schmonsciousness*, but even so, this is not as rich as our consciousness. Thus,

50 Ibid., 187.

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since our consciousness is phenomenally rich, then it is not less than that of the zombie’s.

Carruthers and Veillet have an objection against this Chalmers line of defense:

If Chalmers’ epistemic situation is partly characterized in terms of the presence of *this state* (a phenomenal state), which we can imagine Zombie Chalmers to lack, then this amounts to saying that it is an important part of Chalmers’ epistemic situation that he has phenomenally conscious mental states, whereas Zombie Chalmers doesn’t. And doesn’t that now beg the question? For this is something that is supposed to be granted on all hands. Defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy, too, allow that we can conceive of someone who is physically, functionally, and intentionally identical to Chalmers (that is, Zombie Chalmers), but who lacks any of the phenomenally conscious mental states that Chalmers enjoys. And we claim to be capable of explaining how such a thing can be conceivable in a way that doesn’t presuppose the existence of anything beyond the physical, the functional, and/or the intentional.51

In effect, Carruthers and Veillet object that Chalmers’ strategy of claiming the richness of our conscious experience (as oppose to our zombie twins) already begs the question against the defender of PCS. Recall that defenders of PCS aim to explain phenomenal concepts in physical terms, but if Chalmers already insists that there is already an in-principle difference between a conscious being’s phenomenology and its zombie twin, then, at the onset, the dialectic is already lopsided.

But there is a way that we could remedy Chalmers’ dialectical move without sacrificing its intent. This remedy circumvents the begging the question objection, and, at the same time, highlights the main point of the CMA, and, to some extent, EGA as well. Recall that the main premise of ATE is the second premise: the move from the sameness of Oscar and Twin Oscar’s epistemic situation to the sameness of Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers’ epistemic situation. Grant that Oscar does externally share the same epistemic situation as Twin Oscar. We grant this since the content at stake is not a self-consciousness report; rather it is a report about the “refreshing-ness” of water

(or t-water in Twin Oscar’s case). Now should we grant that this report has the same epistemic features as reports about self-consciousness? *Prima facie,* it seems that we cannot.

Carruthers and Veillet have assumed that Chalmers is an externalist when it comes to Oscar and Twin Oscar. We have granted this. But is Chalmers also an externalist about himself and Zombie Chalmers, especially with regard to reports about self-consciousness, e.g., “I am conscious”? To this we say no. In effect, what is at stake in the second premise of ATE is precisely how wide externalism about mental content could be. To have an externalist view of mental content is one thing, but to have a very *wide* or *broad* externalist view is an entirely different thing. A wide externalist view of mental content tells us that *all* mental states and mental contents are partly determined by external factors.52 Chalmers might contend that externalism does not extend to reports about self-consciousness. Rather, we must accept a sort of narrow conception of mental content when it comes to self-consciousness reports.53 What does this view amount to?

In a nutshell, in this conception, “narrow content is intended to capture a subject’s perspective on the world, the way the world is according to the subject.”54 That is, in the context of self-consciousness reports, it implies the conscious subject’s first-person perspective about his/her own self-consciousness. How does this bear with the Carruthers and Veillet’s ATE?

As we have mentioned, the critical premise in ATE is the conditional second premise that if Oscar and Twin Oscar share the same epistemic situation, then Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers should also share the same epistemic situation. Both the antecedent and consequent are motivated by an externalist view of mental content, but the consequent, unlike the antecedent, has a narrower conception of mental content. Since Zombie Chalmers lacks a first-person perspective, it follows that it has a different epistemic situation from Chalmers who has it.

Alternatively, we could put the main point in terms of EGA. Epistemic gaps arise precisely because there is an ontological gap between the physical and the phenomenal. This ontological gap rests on the gap between phenomenal states, which are uniquely from a first-person perspective, and non-phenomenal states, which are uniquely from the third-


53 This leads to Chalmers’ two-dimensional semantics of which we would no longer touch on. For details of this, see David C. Chalmers, “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics,” in *Two-Dimensional Semantics,* ed. by Manuel García-Carpintero and Josep Macia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

person perspective. As a consequence, we could interpret the anti-physicalist thesis as the thought that one can never have a full explanation of reality without taking in the first-person perspective. This thesis is of course what EGA and CMA both hold.

**Excursus 5: A Question of Philosophical Burdens and Dialectics (Mabaquiao’s Indictment and Balog’s Reply to CMA)**

This result seems to extend to Balog’s reply to CMA and as a consequence to Mabaquiao’s indictment of the debate. But before getting into how this result would affect the Balog-cum-Mabaquiao’s position, it would be prudent to articulate the position first.

Mabaquiao presents Balog’s reply as a kind of undercutting argument against CMA. The thought is that there is a hidden ambiguity in CMA. If this ambiguity is resolved, this would undercut the bite of the dilemma and, thus, show that CMA, as a whole, rests on a simple conceptual mistake. Mabaquiao takes in Balog’s apparatus in terms of two general languages: a purely phenomenal language and a purely physical language. Let us now see how they work in disambiguating the two senses of the premises.

Recall that CMA tells us that:

1. If it is conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms.
2. If it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation.
3. Therefore, either these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms, or else they cannot explain our epistemic situation.

Balog re-conceptualizes the premises in terms of the two languages, and figures that the only way for this argument to work is to cast the first premise in phenomenal terms and the second premise in physical terms. As such CMA would be transformed as:

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55 In this way, it seems that Mabaquiao (as well as Carruthers and Veillet) seems to miss this point when he tells us that “the master argument equivocates between first-person and third-person phenomenal concepts.” Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 63.

1. If it is conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet, \textit{phenomenally}, miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then, \textit{phenomenally}, these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms.

2. If it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet, \textit{physically}, miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then, \textit{physically}, the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation.

3. Therefore, either \textit{phenomenally}, these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms, or else \textit{physically}, they cannot explain our epistemic situation.\footnote{\textit{But what do these languages mean? One way to re-formulate Balog’s point is to consider these languages in terms of the first-person and third-person perspectives, where, as we have pointed out above, the former is phenomenal; the latter is physical (i.e., non-phenomenal). Cast in this way, CMA would look like:}}

But what do these languages mean? One way to re-formulate Balog’s point is to consider these languages in terms of the first-person and third-person perspectives, where, as we have pointed out above, the former is phenomenal; the latter is physical (i.e., non-phenomenal). Cast in this way, CMA would look like:

1. If it is conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet, \textit{from the first-person perspective}, miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms \textit{from the first-person perspective}.

2. If it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet, \textit{from the third-person perspective}, miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation \textit{from the third-person perspective}.

3. Therefore, either these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms \textit{from the first-person perspective}, or else they cannot explain our epistemic situation \textit{from the third-person perspective}.

But what is Balog’s motivation for this move? That is, what is her justification for re-conceptualizing CMA in terms of phenomenal and physical conceptualizations?\footnote{\textit{But what is Balog’s motivation for this move? That is, what is her justification for re-conceptualizing CMA in terms of phenomenal and physical conceptualizations? Her overall motivation seems to be found at the onset of her essay:}} Her overall motivation seems to be found at the onset of her essay:

\begin{itemize}
\item As before, we let the thought of CMA inform the whole formulation here. See footnote 21.
\item Mabaquiao explores another motivation in terms of how Balog’s re-conceptualization defends PCS against CMA. But I think there is more into Balog’s motivation than a mere defense of PCS.
\end{itemize}
... I argue that his Master Argument does not provide any new reasons to reject the PCS, that is, any reasons that go beyond those presented in the original anti-physicalist arguments—which the PCS is designed to rebut. I also argue that, although the PCS shows that the physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up physicalism in the light of the anti-physicalist arguments, the anti-physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up the anti-physicalist argument in the light of the PCS either ...^59

Two things are noteworthy here. We could surmise from the first part of her motivation that Balog thinks that CMA is nothing more than a redressed EGA. This implies that since PCS is already designed to rebut EGA, and since nothing new is offered by CMA as a defense of EGA, then PCS, as it stands, already answers the anti-physicalist’s argument. But the second part of her motivation is telling as well. She holds that both the physicalists and anti-physicalists would not be rationally compelled to shift their view given the other’s (counter-) arguments. This implies that physicalists and anti-physicalists would be on a theoretical impasse.

But do we have reasons to accept the first part of Balog’s claim? In a way, we could answer in the affirmative. CMA is really a re-articulation of the main point of EGA. Both are premised on the idea that if epistemic gaps exist, then there are ontological gaps as well. But even if this is so, an anti-physicalist might still react against the implication that we have drawn. In effect, the anti-physicalist would argue that PCS has yet to resolve the issue at hand. It has not provided a physicalist explanation of the existence of epistemic gaps; it has not provided a compelling account of our epistemic situation. Alternatively, supposing that PCS has given an account for these, we could still say that it has not resolved the issue about the first-person perspective, and whether it is reducible to the third-person perspective. As such, the physicalist position would still be untenable.

To this, Balog replies that this is precisely what the re-conceptualized CMA tells us. But if we were to follow our version of Balog’s re-conceptualization, then Balog’s position would be confusing. Our re-conceptualized first horn of the dilemma illustrates the problem of PCS from the first-person perspective to the effect that there seems to be no physicalist explanation for epistemic gaps from a first-person perspective. Our re-conceptualized second horn, on other hand, illustrates the problem of PCS.

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from the third-person perspective to the effect that we cannot have a third-person account for our first-person epistemic situation. But, as Balog tells us, “this is perfectly compatible with physicalism!”\textsuperscript{60} In effect, what she is telling us is that this is precisely why CMA does not offer any new arguments for anti-physicalism, since this has been EGA’s point all along. That is, that there is a gap between the first-person and third-person perspective. But if this is Balog’s point, then she has already accepted EGA.

Furthermore, given this reply, it seems that it is not feasible to grant Mabaquiao’s point that PCS has at least “save[d] the viability of physicalism from the epistemic arguments.”\textsuperscript{61} In fact, given our articulation of Carruthers and Veillet’s reply, on the one hand, and Balog’s reply, on the other hand, we have to say that the attempt of defenders of PCS to account for the first-person perspective in terms of the third-person perspective is highly suspect.

This leads us now to Balog’s second point, and Mabaquiao’s indictment that the debate between physicalists and anti-physicalists is at a stalemate (or theoretical impasse). We may take this claim as implying something akin to what in the freedom of the will literature has called a “dialectical stalemate.” A dialectical stalemate, as described in that literature,

\begin{quote}
[a]rises when opposing positions within a reasoned debate reach points at which each side’s argument remain reasonable, even compelling, but in which argument runs out; neither can rightly claim decisively to have unseated the legitimacy of the other side’s point of view.\textsuperscript{62}
\end{quote}

But is this the case between the physicalist and the anti-physicalist? Has their debate reached a theoretical dead end? In reply, Balog has this to say:

The anti-physicalist appeals to the anti-physicalist principles, the physicalist appeals to the conceivability of a purely physical world with phenomenality. Both can show that, once granted that one core assumption, their view is consistent and can rebut challenges from the other side. Neither side can, without begging the question against the opponent, show that the other’s position is untenable. Where you end up depends on

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{61} Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 72.
\textsuperscript{62} See Joseph Keim Campbell, Free Will (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), 62. But this seems to run contrary to Balog’s characterization above.
what you take as your starting point. And, as far as I can see, neither side has a privileged start. What this means is that the physicalist can resist the Master Argument. The Master Argument is no more able to refute the PCS than the physicalist is able to refute the anti-physicalist principles. This is a stalemate, as far as this dialectic goes, but a stalemate is enough to make physicalism a viable option.63

To some extent, an anti-realist might agree with all of Balog’s statements except for the last part: that “stalemate is enough to make physicalism a viable option.”64 Yes, it is true to some extent that an anti-physicalist would not shift his/her position given PCS. Yes, it is true that physicalist might not refute anti-physicalist principles. Yes, physicalists might resist CMA. But even if we grant all these, given Balog’s premise that “[n]either side can, without begging the question against the opponent, show that the other’s position is untenable,”65 the burden is still on the physicalist.

As we have pictured the debate thus far, we have presented EGA as an argument for anti-physicalism. PCS, on the other hand, is the reply to EGA. Furthermore, CMA is a reply to PCS. Now granted that CMA could be resisted, and that there’s a theoretical impasse, does it follow that physicalism is viable? Well, it does not. If we grant Balog’s premise that “neither side can, without begging the question against the opponent, show that the other’s position is untenable,”66 then since PCS begs the question against anti-physicalist, given that we re-characterize EGA in terms of the gap between first-person and third-person perspectives, it follows then that the dialectical burden still resides on the physicalists. S/he needs to still show that PCS does not beg the question against EGA. So, it is not true that a dialectical stalemate would make physicalism a viable option. On the contrary, if there were such a stalemate, it would favor the anti-physicalist who argues for EGA.67

References

64 Ibid., 20.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 This paper grew out from interesting discussions with David Chalmers and Napoleon Mabaquiao about phenomenal concepts. My intellectual debt goes to you both. Thanks also to Robert James Boyles and Mark Anthony Dacela and this journal’s anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.

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Lohikang Makapamilya at Xiào (孝):  
Ang Etika sa Búhay Pamílya ng mga Filipino at Tsino  

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Abstract: The family plays a central role in the life of the Filipino that the interests of the state are sometimes compromised in favor of the interests of the family. This “family logic” of the Filipino culture is comparable to that of the ancient Chinese’s xiào (孝) or filial piety. In one particular Analect, Confucius teaches that righteousness consists in the father concealing the misconduct of the son, and the son concealing the misconduct of the father. This portrays an apparently extreme adherence to filial piety, which goes against the interests of the state. In this paper, I explore how Confucianism explains and justifies this Analect, and whether the same reasoning could be applied to the Philippine setting.

Keywords: Confucianism, filial piety, family logic, concealment case

Kaugnay nitó, mainam na linawing magkaiba ang saklaw ng lohikang makapamilya at ng xiào (孝)—nakatuon sa relasyon ng anak sa kaniyang mga magulang at ninuno, samantala ang dumadaloy ang nauna sa lahat ng mga kamag-anak sa dugo, kasal, at iba pang apinidad. Gayunpaman, hindi sosyolohikal na paghahambing sa estrukturan ng pamilya ng Filipinas at ng sinaunang Tsina ang paksa ng papel na ito, kundi ang etikal na pangangatwiran ng pagkiling sa pamilya, anupaman ang saklaw ng relasyong ito.

Ilalarawan ko sa unang bahagi ang “lohikang makapamilya” (hango kay Lukas Kaelin) na gumagabay sa búhay at pag-aasal ng mga Filipino at karaniwang nagbubunsod ng tensiyon sa kanilang estado. Sa ikalawang bahagi naman, ipapaliwanag ko ang xiào (孝) o “filial piety” ng mga sinaunang Tsino, pati na rin ang batayan nitó. Pagtutuunan ko rin ng pansin ang isang kontrobersiyal na anaelektang malinaw na nagpapakita ng tensiyon sa pamilya at estado, at ibibigay ko ang pangangatwiran ni Confucius at ng kaniyang mga iskolar. Sa ikatlo at hulíng bahagi, ilalantad ko ang pagkakaiba ng dalawang kultura, at ipapakita ko kung bakit hindi basta-basta maaaring ilapat ang pangangatwiran ni Confucius ng xiào (孝) sa sitwasyon ng makapamilyang lohika ng mga Filipino.

I. Ang “Lohikang Makapamilya” sa Búhay ng mga Filipino

Halos baság na ang kasabihang “pamilya ang pangunahing yunit ng lipunan,” ngunit hindi eksaherado ang katotohanan nitó sa búhay ng mga Filipino, dahil ang kaniyang mga mamamayan, at siya ring punsasyon ng mga institusyon, relasyon, pagpapahalaga, at pananaw sa búhay.  

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2 Ibid., 13.
Ang Ugnayang Pampamilya

Nagsisimula ang ugnayang pampamilya sa batayang biyolohikal: ang pagiging magkadugo. Dahil namana ng isang anak ang dugo ng kaniyang ama at ina, nagiging “magka-dugo” ang anak at ang pamilya ng kaniyang mga magulang.³ Mayroon pang finatawag na malapit at malayong kadugo; maituturing na malapit ang mga pamilya ng iyong mga magulang, at malayo naman ang mga kadugo ng mga kadugo.⁴

Nagiging lalong masalimuot ang konsepto ng pamilya sa pamamagitan ng kasal: nagiging magkaugnay ang dalawang pamilyang hindi magkadugo. Bago pa man magkaraan ng anak ang mag-asawa, nagkakaroon na ng mga panibagong ugnayan sa pagitan ng kanilang mga pamilya.⁵ Gayunpaman, mas mababa ang antas ng ganitong ugnayan kaysa ugnayan ng mga magkadugo. Maaari ring magkaraan ng bagong kapamilya sa pamamagitan ng pag-aampon.⁶ Nagkakaroon dito ng pagkakaiba sa biyolohikal na mga magulang (yaong nagpanganak) at ang mga magulang na umampon (yaong nag-aruga at nagpalaki).

Lalo pang lalawak ang saklaw ng pamilya sa pamamagitan ng pagiging ninong o ninang o kumpil. Kahit na hindi magkaugnay sa dugo o sa kasal, may batayang kultural naman ang ganitong uri ng ugnayang pampamilya.⁷ Hindi na kasing-igting ng ugnayang ninong at ninang ang mga magulang sa kapatid ng asawa at kapatid ng ina. ° Gayunpaman, hindi inaasahan ang malalim na pananagutan nila sa isa’t isa.⁸

Samakatwid, malawak ang saklaw ng ugnayang pampamilya sa Filipinas; hindi lamang dugo at kasal ang batayang nitô, kundi pati mga kultural na ugnayan tulad ng pag-aampon at pagiging ninong o ninang. Ngayong nakita natin kung sino ang kinikilalang “kapamilya” ng mga Filipino, suriin naman natin ang epekto nitô sa kanilang pamumuhay.

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³ Ibid., 16. Nabubuo rin ang ugnayang magkadugo ng anak sa kaniyang mga kapatid, tito at tita, lolo at lola, at mga pinsan (kung mayroon).


⁵ Sa kasal, nagkakaroon ng “biyenan” (magulang ng asawa), “manugang” (asa wa ng anak), “bayaw” (kapatid na lalaki ng asawa), “hipag” (kapatid na babae ng asawa), “bilas” (asawa ng kapatid), at “babae” (magulang ng asawa ng anak). Tingnan ang Jocano, Filipino Social Organization, 41.

⁶ Jocano, Filipino Social Organization, 18.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., 45-46.
Ang “Lohikang Makapamilya” sa Lipunan


10 Jocano, Filipino Social Organization, 57-58.
11 Ibid., 63.
12 Kaelin, Strong Family, Weak State, 103.
13 Salin ng may-akda mula sa “family logic.” Mainam ang saling “makapamilya” upang bigyang-diin ang pagkiling ng mga Filipino sa kanilang mga kapamilya.
14 Kaelin, Strong Family, Weak State, 102-103.
15 Jocano, Filipino Social Organization, 155.
“nakakahiya” kapag hindi ka nakikisama o nakakatulong sa kapuwa.\(^{17}\) Nakasalalay ang dangal ng Filipino sa pakikisama sa ibang tao: sa pakikipagkapuwa, pagmamalasákit sa kapuwa, at pagtanaw ng utang-na-loob sa kapuwa.\(^{18}\)

Gayunpaman, ang ganitóng pagkiling sa pamilya ay may katapat na pagpapaliban sa mas impersonal na aspekto ng lipunan. Dahil sa pagpapahalaga sa dangal ng pamilya, hindi natutuunan ng pansin ang mga abstraktong prinsipyo tulad ng katarungan sa lipunan.\(^{19}\) Klasikong halimbawa rito ang pagpapauna ng mga kapamilya sa pila, na karaniwang nangyayari sa ospital, sa panayam sa trabaho, o maging sa mga pagkuha ng mga lisensiya at ID. Dahil sa priyoridad na binibigay sa mga kapamilya, nalalabag ang ideya ng katarungan at pagkakapantay-pantay para sa mga nauna sa pila at naghintay nang mas matagal.

Lalong lumalalim itong problematikong pagkiling kapag estado na ang katunggali ng pamilya. Maging sa larangan ng politika at ekonomiya, inuuna pa rin ang pamilya—matingkad na halimbawa rito ang mga dinastiyang politikal at mga negosyong pampamilya. May kakaiibang kakayahan ang ugnayang pampamilya na makalikha ng partidong politikal, na lalong maaaring lumaki sa mga nauna ang mga naaaring ibang pamilya.\(^{20}\)

Makikita rin natin ang kapangyarihan ng isang pamilya sa estado sa tinatawag na “rent-seeking.” Paliwanag ng ekonomistang si James Buchanan, ang rent ay “isang artipisyal na bentahang pang-ekonomiko na iginagawad ng estado sa pamamagitan ng pagtatakdak ng hanggahan ng pagsasak sa merkado.”\(^{21}\) Isang magandang halimbawa nitó ang mga monopolyo: Kung Meralco lang ang nabigyan ng lisensiya ng pamahalaan upang magbenta ng kuryente, malaki ang kanilang kikitahin dahil wala silang katunggaling iba sa industriya. Sa gayon, nagkakaroon ng kompetisyon sa mga ganitóng rent, na tinatawag na rent-seeking. Sa ganitóng paraan, lumalago ang kapangyarihang pang-ekonomiko ng mga mayamang oligarkiya, samantala nawawalan ng kakayahan ang estado na magbigay ng mga serbisyon panlipunan, dhat nga naililipat sa mga pribadong kompanya (na pagmamay-ari ng mga oligarkiya) ang karapatan sa merkado.\(^{22}\)

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\(^{17}\) Ibid., 73.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 82-83.

\(^{19}\) Kaelin, Strong Family, Weak State, 104.


\(^{21}\) Salin ng may-akda, mula sa orihinal na “rents are created when a state gives an entrepreneur an artificial advantage by restricting ‘freedom of entry’ into the market.” McCoy, “An ‘Anarchy of Families,’” 11.

\(^{22}\) Mas maaunawaan itong rent-seeking kung babalikan ang kasaysayan ng Republika ng Filipinas pagkatapos ng Ikalawang Digmaan P pandaigdig. Dahil naubos ang salapi ng
nawawalan ng kapangyarihan ang estado, lalong umiigting ang relasyon sa loob ng pamilya, dahil kapag hindi nakatatulungan ang estado o ang simbahan, sa pamilya lumalapit ang Filipino.23


Tulad ng nabanggit sa pambungad, hindi nag-iisa ang Filipinas sa pagkakaroon ng makapamilyang lipunan. Sa susunod na bahagi, titingnan naman natin ang pagkilig ng mga sinaunang Tsino sa pamilya, at kung paano nila kinakatwiran ito.

II. Ang Xiào (孝) sa buhay ng mga sinaunang Tsino

Maihahambing ang lohikang makapamilya ng mga Filipino sa xiào (孝) o paggalang sa pamilya ng mga sinaunang Tsino.26 Isa ito sa mga pinakamahahalagang birtud para sa kanila, ayon sa mga pangaral ni Confucius. Itinuturing niyang xiào (孝) ang pinagmumulan ng ren (仁) o kagandahang-loob, na siyang pinakamahalagang birtud ng Confucianismo.27 Titingnan natin sa bahaging ito ang kasaysayan, katwiran, at kahalagahan ng xiào (孝) sa pamumuhay ng mga sinaunang Tsino.28
Kasaysayan at Panimulang Katwiran ng Xiào (孝)

Masasabing nagsimula ang birtud na xiào (孝) sa relihiyosong pagsamba sa mga ninuno. Nakakalap ang arkeologong si Chang Kwang-chih ng katibayan sa ganitong pagsamba sa mga prehistorikong Tsino.29 Sa katunayan, dumadalangin sila sa kanilang Diyos na si Shangdi sa pamamagitan ng pagdarasal sa mga ninuno ng emperador.30 Kalaunan, naisalin ang pagsamba sa mga ninunong yumao sa paggalang at pagmamahal sa mga magulang na nabubuhay pa. Itinuturing pa ngang sukdulang krimen sa panahon ng dinastiyang Chou ang paglabag sa mga utos ng magulang.31


Dahil sa pagpapahalagang ito ng mga sinaunang Tsino sa xiào (孝), hindi nakagugulat na pamilya ang nasa kaibuturan ng kanilang lipunan. Ayon sa The Great Learning, kailangan munang maalagaan ang pamahalaan ng kanilang lipunan. Ang katwiran ng mga pagtuturo, imposibleng maturuan ang iba kung hindi mo kayang turuan ang sarili mong pamilya.34 Samakatwid, ang estado ay itinuturing lâlang na pinalaking

30 Ibid., 186.
31 Ibid., 188.
32 Salin ng may-akda mula sa orihinal na: “[H]uman love towards parents is innate, as in the case of little children, without any need of being acquired through study. This inherent love-and-respect toward parents is the feeling of filial piety. And this is the fountainhead of benevolence. It is the germination or starting point of the gradually expanding virtue, the universal love of mankind.” Hsieh Yu-Wei, “Filial Piety and Chinese Society,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. by Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), 170.
34 The Great Learning, IX.1.
pamilya: ang pinuno ang ama; ang mga mamamayan ang anak. At hangga’t
napapanatili ang kaayusan sa pamilya, magiging maayos din ang estado.

Sa kabila ng kalagahan ng xiào (孝) sa etika ni Confucius, hindi nitó
ibig sabihin na sinasaklaw nitó ang ibang birtud bilang pinakamahalagang
prinsipyo. Kailangang pakatandaan na hakbang lámang ang xiào (孝)
patungo sa ren (仁) na siyang sukdulang layon ng buhay-etikal. Kayà naman
sa mainam na kasabay ng paghubog ng xiào (孝) ay nililinang din ang ibang
mga birtud.\footnote{Hsieh Yu-Wei, “Filial Piety and Chinese Society,” 173-174.}

Gayunpaman, may mga iskolar na tumutuligsa sa labis na
pagpapahalaga ng mga Tsino sa xiào (孝). May mga pagkakataoong
nasasakripisyó ang ibang mga birtud ng pagpapakatao sa taimtim na
pagpapapanatili ng xiào (孝). Maisasakongkreto natin itong tensiyon na ito sa
pagtalakay sa isang kontrobersiyal na analo kta ni Confucius.

**Ang Katwiran ng Analekta 13:18**

Ayon sa Analekta 13:18:

Sinabi ng duke ng Sheh kay Confucius, “Sa bayan
namin, may mga itinuturing kaming matutuwid na tao.
Kapag nagnakaw ng tupa ang ama nila, isinusumbong
nila sa kinauukulan.” Tugon ni Confucius, “Sa bayan
namin, iba ang kinikilalang matuwid. Pinagtatakan ng
mga ama ang kamalian ng kanilang anak, at
pinagtatakan ng anak ang kamalian ng kanilang ama.
Ito ang katuwiran.\footnote{Salin ng may-akda ng Analekta 13:18. Mula sa puntong ito, gagamitan ko ang
“analekta” para tukuyin itong partikular na analo kta na
ang ginamit na sanggunian para sa mga susunod na analo ay Confucius, Analekta, trans. by Edward Slingerland (Indianapolis:
Hacket Publishing Company, Inc., 2003).}

Sa analo kta ito, tila isinusulong ni Confucius na nararapat
pagtakpan ng ama at anak ang kamalian ng isa’t isa. Ipinapakita ng analo
ang maaaring tensiyon na maidulot ng matapat na pagpapapanatili ng xiào (孝).
May mga pagkakataoong magtatalakay ang xiào (孝) at birtud ng, sa
halimbawang ito, katapatan o paggalang sa estado, at ayon kay Confucius,
nananaig ang pagpapalahala sa pamilya.

Hindi naman sa sinasabi ni Confucius na tama ang magnakaw,
ngunit ganoon lang kaigting ang ugnayan ng magkakamag-anak na sa
ganitó nga pagkakataon sa tensiyon, kailangan pa rin unahin ang xiào (孝)}
孝 (孝) .

Ganoon na lang kaeksaherado ang priyoridad sa xiao (孝) na, ayon sa pagsusuri ni Qingping Liu, tinuturo ni Confucius na kailangang unahin ang ugnayang pamamilya kay sa mga mas mataas na prinisipyo ng pagpakakatao.


1. Ming (名) at fen (分)

Kinikilala ng Confucianismo ang pagkakaiba ng posisyon at papel ng mga tao sa lipunan. Tinuturo ni Confucius na magkakaroon ng kaayusan kung bawat tao ay lulugar sa kani-kaniyang posisyon (ming 名, na nangangahulugang “pangalan”) at gagampanan ang kani-kaniyang tungkulin (fen 分, na nangangahulugang “papel”) sa lipunan. May matalik na ugnayan ang ming (名) at fen (分): bawat ming (名) ay may tinutukoy na tiyak na fen (分). Sa gayon, tungkulin ng ama, bilang puno ng pamilya, na magsilbing huwaran sa kaniyang mga anak. Ngunit sa kasong analake, hindi mabuting halimbawa ang pagnanakaw ng ama, kayâ hindi niya nagagampanan ang kaniyang fen (分) bilang ama. Para naman sa isang anak, tungkulin niyang sundin at igalang ang kaniyang ama. Ngunit paano niya bibigyang-dangal ang ama kung pagtatakpan niya ang kaniyang pagnanakaw?

Gayunpaman, nararapat na ikubli ng anak ang kamalian ng ama dahil iyon ang kaniyang fen (分) bilang anak. Ganoon kalaki ang kahalagahang ibinigay ni Confucius sa ugnayang mag-ama (o mag-ina);


38 According to Qingping Liu, “one should place blood ties above ‘higher’ ideals of humanity, even to the point of abandoning these higher ideals if their realization obstructs or endangers the practice of filial piety and brotherly duties.” Tingnan ang Qingping Liu, “Filiality versus Sociality and Individuality: On Confucianism as ‘Consanguinitism’,” in *Philosophy East and West*, 53:2 (April 2003): 236.


kahit na hindi mabuting halimbawa ang ama, kailangan pa ring tupdin ng anak ang kaniyang fen (分).41

Bílang paglalagom, itinuturo ng doktrina ng ming (名) at fen (分) na kailangang kumilos ayon sa papel at tungkulin sa estado upang maging matiwasay ang pamumuhay sa lipunan. Tungkulin ng anak, bilang anak, na igalang ang kaniyang mga magulang, at panatilihin ang mabuti nilang ugnayan. Sa caso ng analakta, kailangan niya pa ring tupdin ang kaniyang fen (分) bilang anak, kahit ang ama niya mismo ay tumataliwas sa kaniyang fen (分) bilang ama.

Nais kong punahin na hindi naisasaalang-alang nitóng doktrina ng ming (名) at fen (分) na maaaring magkaroon ng higit sa isang ming (名) at fen (分), dahil marami táyong ginagampanang papel sa lipunan. Halimbawa, ang anak ay isa ring mamamayan ng estado, at mapapansing may tunggalian sa pagtupad sa kaniyang fen (分) bilang anak at sa kanyang fen (分) bilang mamamayan. Tutunghayan natin ito sa susunod na mga talata.

2. Xiào (孝) at katapatan sa estado

Tulad ng nabanggit, itinuturing ni Confucius na ekstensiyon ng pamilya ang estado. Ibig sabihin, ang paggalang at pagmamahal sa pamilya mula sa xiào (孝) ay nararapat na ibaling din sa lipunan. Ngunit sa caso ng analakta, nagkakaroon ng tunggalian sa katapatan ng anak—hinihingi ng xiào (孝) na huwag niyang hayaang mapahamak ang kaniyang ama dahil sa pagnanakaw nitó, ngunit bilang alagad ng pinuno ng estado, tinatawag din siyang maging tapat sa batas at ilantad ang anumang krimen, tulad ng pagnanakaw ng kaniyang ama.42 Lalong lumalim ang tensiyon kung isasaalang-alang nating ang xiào (孝) ang pundasyon ng katapatan sa estado. Samakatwid, ang katapatan ng anak sa ama ang pinagmumulan ng katapatan niya sa estado, ngunit sa kasong analakta, ang katapatan sa isang panig ay pagtataksil sa isa pa.

Natutugunan ang tunggaliang ito sa pagbibigay-priyoridad sa xiào (孝) sa kasong ito, dahil sa xiào (孝) mismo nakasalalay ang katapatan sa estado. Sapagkat sa ugnayang pamamilya ang huwaran ng magandang ugnayang pampolitika sa estado, maituturing din na may aspektong politikal ang ugnayan ng ama at anak. Nilalayon ng Confucianismo na itaguyod ang kaayusan sa pamilya nang maging maayos din ang estado. Samakatwid, walang argumento sa doktrina ng Confucianismo na tumatangkilik sa tunggalian ng xiào (孝) at katapatan sa estado.43

Sa kabila nitó, hindi natin matatakasan ang tensiyon sa dalawang fen (分) ng anak sa analakta. Maaaring makatulong sa puntong ito ang

41 Ibid., 457.
42 Ibid., 455.
43 Ibid., 464.


III. Ang Etika ng Makapamilyang Lohika at Xiào (孝)

Ngayong napagmasdan na natin ang sitwasyon ng pamilyang Filipino at pilosopiya ng pamilyang Tsino, susubukin nating ilapat ang katwiran ni Confucius sa suliranin ng lohikang makapamilya. Ngunit bago iyon, kailangan munang paghambingin at pagtambisin ang dalawang kultura pagdating sa pamilya.

44 Ibid., 465.
47 Salin ng may-akda mula sa “Confucianism insists that if filial piety is well established in the family, then the family would not produce a member who would act contrary to the interests of the state in the long run, even if he is required to do so in specific cases.” Hsieh Yu-Wei, “Filial Piety and Chinese Society,” 465.
**Makapamilyang Lohika vs. Xiào (孝)**

Una sa lahat, mapapansing magkahawig ang pinagmumulan ng pagkakahalal ng pamilya sa pedestal sa dalawang kultura—kapuwa pamilya ang batayan ng pamumuhay sa lipunan. Ang ugnayang pampamilya ang panimulang karanasan ng mga Filipino sa pakikisalamuha sa ibang tao, kayâ mahalaga para sa kanilang magtatag ng relasyong mala-pamilya man lang para maging panatag sa pakikiugnay. Samantala, itinuturing naman ng mga sinaunang Tsino na unang hakbang ang xiào (孝) para sa napakahalagang birtud ng ren (仁), na lumalayon sa pag-ibig sa sangkatauhan.

Bagaman parehas silang sasang-ayon na ang lipunan ay pamilyang pinalaki lang, may pagkakaiba sa kanilang pangangatwiran. Sa mga Filipino, batayan ang pamilya ng ugnayan at pakikisalamuha; sa mga sinaunang Tsino, batayan ito ng paglilingkod sa kaugalian-loob o ren (仁). Samakatwid, etikal ang motibasyon ng mga Tsino sa xiào (孝), samantalahang hamak na pamumuhay at pakikiugnay ang pinanggagalingan ng lohikang makapamilya ng mga Filipino.

Maaari pa tayong mangahas na sabihing magkasalungat ang ugnayan ng etika at pamilya sa dalawang kultura. Nakita natin kanina na pamilya ang batayan ng etikang Filipino—Ang maituturing na “tamang kilos” o “magandang asal” ay yaong magpapanatili ng mabuting ugnayang pampamilya. Samantala, para sa mga sinaunang Tsino, alinsunod sa Confucianismo, ang kahalagahan ng ugnayang pampamilya ay nakabatay sa etikal—Mahalaga ang xiào (孝) dahil ito ang unang hakbang tungo sa ren (仁), na siyang lalong mahalaga. Sa madaling sabi, ang makapamilyang lohika ng mga Filipino ang batayan ng kanilang etika, samantalahang etika ang batayan ng xiào (孝) ng mga Tsino.

Ngayong tumambad na ang kaibhan ng relasyon ng etika sa ugaing pampamilya sa dalawang kultura, isaalang-alang natin sa mga susunod na talata na may hanggahan ang bisà ng paglapat ng katwirang Tsino sa sitwasyong Filipino.

**Ang Katwiran ng Xiào (孝) para sa Lohikang Makapamilya**

Ang solusyong nakuha natin sa tensiyon ng analekta ay ang pagkakaiba ng aktibong pagkukubli at pasibong pagkukubli ng kamalian ng ama. Mahalagahang panatilihin ang mabuting relasyon ng ama at anak dahil ito ang pundasyon ng kagandahang-loob, ngunit may hanggahan ang priyoridad na naibigay sa xiào (孝) kay sa katapatan sa estado. Sa gayon, pasibong pagkukubli lámang ang katanggap-tanggap.

Sa kasong ng pamilyang Filipino, isusulong din ng makapamilyang lohika na ang pananagutan sa pamilya ang dapat unahin. Muli, may

Lumilitaw rito ang hanggahan ng paglapat ng kwirisan ng xiào (孝) sa sitwasyon ng mga Filipino. Tandaang may batayang etikal ang pagpapahalaga ng mga Tsino sa pamilya, samantala baligtad (pamilya ang batayan ng etika) sa kasong mga Filipino. Layunin ng Confucianismo na linangin ang ren (仁) o kagandahang-loob, na sa pamilya nagsisimula, at kalaua’y nararanasan sa estado. Ngunit sa kasong mga Filipino, pamilya ang nagsisilbing pundasyon ng pagkukubli sa lipunan, na lumilikha ng etika na hindi parating makatwiran.

**Pangwakas**

Samakatwid, maiuwi ang suliranin ng lohikang makapamilya ng mga Filipino sa kawalan ng motibasyong etikal ng ugnayan sa pamilya. Makatwiran ang xiào (孝) ng mga sinaunang Tsino dahil nakabatay ito sa paglaláyong maatim ang birtud ng ren (仁)—May batayang etikal ang ugnayan sa pamilya. Samantala, hindi tumatalab ang ganitong katwiran sa lohikang makapamilya ng mga Filipino sapagkat wala itong pundasyong etikal; sa halip, ang ugnayan sa pamilya na nga ang batayan ng kanilang etika.

Layon ko lámang ipaliwanag ang etikal na katwiran—o tulad ng naipakita ko, kawalan ng katwiran—ng lohikang makapamilya. Ibang pananaliksik na ang pagmumungkahi ng kongkreto hangbang tungo sa pagtutuwid ng ganitong estruktura ng etika sa mga Filipino.48

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48 Nagpapasalamat ako kay Dr. Manny Dy sa kaniyang kurso sa Kasaysayan ng Sinaunang Pilosopiyang Tsino sa pinagmulan ng mga ideyang isinulat ko sa papel na ito, at kay Iman Tagudña sa kaniyang tulungan sa pagwawasto ng estilo ng manuskrito.

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Si Madelene Sta. Maria at ang Sikolohiyang Pilipino: Pakikipanayam sa isa sa mga Kauna-unahang Iskolar na Bumatikos sa Nasabing Intelektuwal na Kilusan

F.P.A. Demeterio, III
Leslie Anne L. Liwanag
Patrick James A. Ruiz

Abstract: The more than forty years of existence of Sikolohiyang Pilipino (SP) has spurred various researches among experts and scholars who followed the ideology of the intellectual movement in different disciplines. However, substantial debates and critiques emerged without any resolution up to the present time. Nevertheless, it is clear with the volume of discussions even after the death of SP’s founder, Virgilio Enriquez, that the intellectual movement continues to capture the interests and inspire researchers not only for the development of SP, but also for the wider range of discourses in the social sciences. With the objective of enriching the discourse of SP, this paper delved into the critical and controversial perspective of the psychology professor Dr. Madelene Sta. Maria.

Keywords: Enriquez, Salazar, Sta. Maria, Filipino Psychology

Introduksyon

naging reaksyon ng itinuturing na ama ng SP na si Dr. Virgilio Enriquez (1942-1994). Sanhi ng nalikhang kontrobersiya ng kanyang disertasyon, hindi na niya ito lubusang nailathala dito sa Pilipinas. Sa kanyang binalak sanang tatlong artikulo mula sa kanyang disertasyon, isa lamang ang kanyang nailathala.


Para sa kanya, isang sistematiko at siyantipikong pagsusuri ng mga Pilipino sa Pilipinong “sikolohikal na konstitusyon, lipunan at kultura” ang SP. Bukod sa pagiging hindi sapat na hindi tugumang konstrak ng mga kanlurang sikolohikal na modelo sa pag-unawa sa diwang Pilipino, naniwala si Enriquez na instrumento ito ng kolonisasyon. Habang nilikha ng mga modelong ito ang dispalining hanging at baluktot na kaalaman ng mga Pilipino tungkol sa kanilang sarili at sa kanilang mundo, itinutulak pababa ng kanlurang sikolohiya ang mga Pilipino sa kumunoy ng kolonyal na dominasyon.

Ipinangako ng SP ang iba’t ibang mapagpalayang gawain. Una, sa pagbaling ng atensyon ng sikolohiya sa Pilipinas papunta sa

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Kinilala ni Enriquez ang ilang paksang maaaring suriin ng mga tagasunod ng SP: ang sikolohiya ng mga laro, kabataan, pagkain, pakikibaka, ang iba’t ibang antas ng pakikitungo sa kapwa, tradisyon na panggagamot, anting-anting, literatura, sining, “at iba pang aspekto ng gawaing popular at pamayanan na nagpapahayag ng natatanging kamalayan o natatanging kahiranan.”\(^3\) Binigyang-diin niyang dapat angkop sa “mga kultural na katangian ng mga Pilipino” ang lokal na metodo ng pananaliksik.\(^4\) Kaya, sa halip na basta na lamang sundin ang mga kanluraning *protocol* sa pananaliksik, iminungkahi niyang gamitin ng mga lokal na mananaliksik ang kasunod na taal na metodo ng pag-aalaman: “pagtanong-tanong..., pakikiramdam..., panunuluyan..., at pakikipamuhay...”\(^5\)


\(^4\) Enriquez, *Colonial to Liberation Psychology*, 27.
\(^5\) Ibid.
fellow of the Psychological Association of the Philippines, at kasapi sa Pambansang Samahan sa Sikolohiyang Pilipino.


Pundasyunal na estratehiya ni Salazar ang pagpapatalsik sa naghariharing presensiyang Euro-Amerikano sa mga diskurso ng mga Pilipino tungkol sa kanilang sarili. Sa presensiyang ito, maaaring nasa anyo ng aktwal na pananaliksik ng isang Euro-Amerikanong iskolar tungkol sa Pilipinas o kaya sa mas laganang proseso ng simpleng paggamit ng mga Pilipinong iskolar ng mga Euro-Amerikanong teorya. Gayundin sa mas banayad na at hindi malay na pagnanais na mapaliwanag na anyo ng presensiyang Euro-Amerikano; habang ang PP naman ni Enriquez ang humula sa pangalawang naanyo na anyo; at ang SP ni Salazar ang humula sa ikatlong anyo na anyo.


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nagdulot ng kahinaan sa kanilang mga diskursong nagreresulta sa pagiging dispalinghado at baluktot sa kanilang nabubuong kaalaman. Kapag tinanggap ng isang Pilipinong iskolar na dapat sa umpisa pa lamang para sa mga Pilipino at sa pagpapatatag ng bansang Pilipinas ang gagawing diskuo, magiging mas madali at mas makabuluhuan para sa kanya ang anomang pag-aaral sa iba’t ibang aspekto ng mundong Pilipino sa kanilang sariling termino. Isinulat ni Lily Mendoza: “Kaya, iginiit niya (Salazar) na kaya ng mga Pilipino dumiskurso at makipagtalastasan nang malaya—sa kanilang sariling termino, sa kanilang sariling wika, gamit ang kanilang sariling hugis ng kaisipan at t paraan ng pakikisalamuha, at higit sa lahat, habang isinaisip unang-unang ang kanilang sariling interes bilang mga Pilipino.”


**Transkrip ng Pakikipanayam**

Matapos planuhin ng research team, mula Mayo hanggang Hunyo 2016, ang daloy ng pakikipanayam at talaan ng mahahalagang tanong, isinagawa nina Ruiz at Liwanag ang dalawang aktuwal na pakikipanayam kay Sta. Maria sa kanyang tanggapan bilang Direktor ng Research Ethics Office ng Pamantasang De La Salle noong Hunyo 30 at Hulyo 20.

**Ruiz:** Kailan po ninyo nabatid ang SP?

**Sta. Maria:** During my graduate school days at UPD. The first encounter with SP was actually while I was serving as a research assistant of Dr. Enriquez and Dr. Fumio Watanabe in their project on looking at analogous indigenous concepts in Japan and the Philippines. So ako, taga-listen lamang, I had no idea what they were talking about. Iyong parang, okay, so…Fumio was saying this and Enriquez was saying that. So, I really felt like very useless being there in front of them. But I also felt like I was in front of gods.

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7 Mendoza, *Between the Homeland and the Diaspora*, 93.
8 Guillermo. See Guillermo, “Exposition, Critique and New Directions for Pantayong Pananaw.”
Liwanag: Noong naging research assistant po kayo ni Dr. Enriquez, ito ba ang unang pagkakataong makatrabaho ninyo siya?

Sta. Maria: No naman, I knew Dr. Enriquez for a long time. But I never really participated in his researches before.

Liwanag: Paano po kayo biglang naging research assistant ni Dr. Enriquez? Sino po ang nag-recommend sa inyo?

Sta. Maria: I had a teacher, who was already my friend from my undergraduate years, because we were part of the UIP Anthropological Society. When I shifted to psychology, he became my teacher, and he was part of the SP movement. Nasa movement siya, alam niya kung anong nangyayari, kasi nationalistic din iyon, hindi nag-ingles, nanggaling sa isang past na ganoon ang kanyang upbringing. Siya si Jobart, Jose Bartolome. He is now in GMA. He is actually influential in having that SP perspective in GMA programming. Mga Filipino values. If you look at the GMA’s stories, pati iyong mga Korean series, they are really intentionally promoting Filipino values. Anyway, siya iyong nag-recommend sa akin. “Ikaw, mag-research assistant ka kay Dr. Benito Lim.” Dr. Lim is a China expert. He is always interviewed about China. So, I researched under Dr. Lim, and then I became that “general research assistant.” All of a sudden you are that assistant of everyone. So that was the root. That was how I got into the circle, and into graduate studies. Graduate studies had that kind of atmosphere: indigenization.

Ruiz: Noon pong panahong iyon, nakiisa din ba kayo sa ideolohiya ng SP?

Sta. Maria: No, because my adviser, who got his doctoral degree from the United States of America, was not into it and was even critical of SP.

Liwanag: Ang inyong tagapayo po ba ang dahilan kung bakit naging kritikal din kayo sa SP?

Sta. Maria: Siguro. I was not totally sold. I was not a true-blooded SP. Kasi, you know my background, private school. I entered UPD without knowing how to speak Tagalog, and was bitterly bullied because I could not speak Tagalog. You know how it is. You are talking like that and then, ganon, iyong parang “get away.” Gumaganoon iyong mga tao sayo. SP then was not very clear. I did not understand it very well. Most of my activities then were really with that particular professor who was a clinical psychologist, Dr. Edwin Decenteceo.
Ruiz: Bakit po naging interesado pa rin kayo sa SP, kahit na hindi ito naging malinaw sa inyo noon?

Sta. Maria: To look at psychology as it is actually happening to people around us, to ourselves. And that was not only SP, that was the trend of social sciences, especially in the area of social psychology. Because in social psychology, you talk about how people interact with each other, how people regard each other. And that is where the cultural aspect becomes very prominent. Personality, it is almost universal. Biology, it is almost universal. But how do we relate to each other? How do we see each other? How do we see the world? Doon na pumapasok iyong possible cultural differences. So sinabi na iyan ng mga social psychologists na medyo progressive at that time, ‘60s, ‘70s.

Liwanag: Ano po ang dahilan ng pakikiisa ninyo sa SP noon?

Sta. Maria: I was already interested in that, especially because I had friends. I was interacting with people who are already progressive. I also joined the activist movement but I left it when they started to ask me to swear into the movement.

Ruiz: Paano po kayo natanggap sa Germany para mag-aral sa programang doktorado?

Sta. Maria: I was in De La Salle University already. I was teaching already. Hindi pa ako nagtapos sa masterado, pero I was teaching already, parang part-time probationary. Then my teacher, Dr. Decenteceo, told me that I was having too much fun and he said: “You finish your master’s na.” So, I thought of an experiment, and finished it. After I finished my master’s degree that was when you start to become more permanent at DLSU. Then there was that announcement from the Dean’s Office about that scholarship in Germany. So, I tried to apply.

Liwanag: Kumusta naman po ang iyong karanasan sa Alemanya bilang mag-aral?

Sta. Maria: The German experience was exciting. Why was it meaningful even from the very start? Because I got the scholarship.

Ruiz: Noong nakuha po ninyo ang iskolarsyip, ano ang naging kasunod ninyong hakbang?

Sta. Maria: I went to Dr. Salazar. I sat down with him in the Faculty Center of UPD. On the second floor, there was a canteen, and if you enter there, you are like entering into a Parisian café, where all the intellectuals go. I said: “Sir, I am going to
have a scholarship in Germany, where should I go? Under whom should I study? I want to truly contribute to Sikolohiyang Pilipino.” Sabi niya: “You go to Dr. Eno Beuchelt (1929-1990), he is my friend, he was my classmate. He will know what to do with you.”

Ruiz: Sino po si Dr. Beuchelt at ano ang kanyang field?

Sta. Maria: Dr. Beuchelt was an ethno-psychologist. He was an anthropologist who looked and understood the psychology of the folk. Indigenous talaga.

Liwanag: Paano po ang naging pag-uusap ninyo ni Dr. Beuchelt?

Sta. Maria: So, in Germany, I went to Dr. Beuchelt, and he asked me: “Why are you here?” “Because Dr. Salazar sent me here.” “Why?” “Because he said that I will learn from you.” And then he continued: “What is your dissertation about?” “I want to write something about what is happening in the Philippines, indigenous psychology.” Sabi ko: “I need to see your work.” Natawa siya. Hindi ko naintindihan ang tawa na iyon noon. Pero, baka ang ibig niyang sabihin ay hindi man lang ako nag-research tungkol sa mga naisulat niya.

Liwanag: Paano po ang set-up ng konsultasyon kay Dr. Beuchelt?

Sta. Maria: Pipila ka talaga to see your adviser. Tapos kapag hindi niya gusto iyong trabaho mo, parang balewala ka. Ganoon. You are on your own. But if the professor is interested in your work, you will be discussing the whole time. So, I had to show Dr. Beuchelt my work.

Ruiz: Ano po ang naging komento ni Dr. Beuchelt sa inyong burador?

Sta. Maria: For the first work that I gave him, he told me: “I don not see you here.” I said to myself: “but that is the best kind of work I can give you.” Puro citation iyon. Ganoon tayo dito, hindi ba? Cite ka nang cite dapat. Sabi niya: “No, you have to show me where you are here.” I asked myself: “What does he mean?” But eventually, I understood that I had to write my own ideas into my drafts.

Ruiz: Ganoon po ba ang estilo ng mga Aleman sa pananaliksik? Kailangang makita kung ano ang inyong sariling punto-de-bista tungkol sa isang paksa?

Sta. Maria: That is Germanic. That is so Germanic. Kasi, in many works there is always this phrase “In my mind.” You start the sentence with “In meiner Meinung.” But here you usually refer to “other minds,” hindi ba?
Liwanag: Paano po ang paraan ng pagkuha ng mga kurso at mentoring sa Alemanya?

Sta. Maria: There were courses that I had to take, but you choose your courses that would help in the writing of the dissertation.

Ruiz: Ano po ang advice sa inyo ni Dr. Beuchelt?


Liwanag: Sino naman po si Dr. Tauchmann at ano ang kanyang field?

Sta. Maria: Dr. Tauchmann was an anthropologist. He was a Malayologist and also a friend of Dr. Salazar. And I had to see other professors. After so many weird readings and confusions, I decided to come back to the Philippines and do my data gathering on SP.

Liwanag: Ano po ang nangyari noong bumalik kayo sa Alemanya?

Sta. Maria: When I went back, I learned that Dr. Beuchelt had died. It was losing a father and I thought: “Where will I go from here?” But the university took care of me. They did not just leave me alone. Somebody had to come to Cologne from Trier to take care of Dr. Beuchelt’s students: Dr. Hannes Stubbe, who was also an ethno-psychologist.

Ruiz: Sino naman po si Dr. Stubbe?

Sta. Maria: Dr. Stubbe is talagang true to life ethno-psychologist, and he took care of me. He was absolutely nurturing. But he did not know where to start because it was a different organism that I put in front of him. It was not even ethno-psychology. “What is this?” “It is Sikolohiyang Pilipino.” If you are from the ethno-psychology perspective, that was not even ethno-psychology because you are not dealing with the folk.

Liwanag: Nalaman po ba ni Dr. Salazar ang nangyayari sa inyo matapos ang pagkamatay ni Dr. Beuchelt?

Sta. Maria: When Dr. Salazar found out that Dr. Beuchelt died, he came to Germany. He said: “Oh no, this girl is going to get lost.” I told him: “I do not know where to start.” Sabi niya: “Okay, what you are studying is part of history, and
Sikolohiyang Pilipino is not divorced from that intellectual history. So, ang gagawin mo ay tingnan mo iyong intellectual histories ng iba’t ibang disiplina sa Pilipinas.”

Liwanag: Ano po ang ginawa ninyo batay sa payo ni Dr. Salazar?

Sta. Maria: Gumawa ako ng history ng political science in the Philippines, history of anthropology in the Philippines, history of sociology in the Philippines. Tapos nakita ko, paano nage-evolve iyong ideas at contributions. Tapos, iyon mismong historical indigenization was happening in the social sciences. Hinanap ko doon ang SP. Ipinaliwanag ni Dr. Salazar ang framework sa akin.

Ruiz: Paano po nakatulong si Dr. Salazar sa pagbuo ng inyong disertasyon?

Sta. Maria: Nakita ko ang SP sa anthropological perspective. And I think, I got the viewpoint of Dr. Salazar. Kasi si Dr. Salazar is an anthropologist, historian-anthropologist. So, noong nag-uusap kami, pinapasulat niya ako ng mga 10 to 20 pages bawat dalawang araw. Kasi, he had to leave. He cannot stay there forever. He had to come back to the Philippines. He said: “Show me your work.” Parang Beuchelt pa rin ang reaksiyon niya: “I do not see you.” Ipinaliwanag ko na ang gusto kong gawin ay mag-contribute sa SP. Gusto kong mag-contribute sa pagpapalago ng isang agham na makakabuti sa atin. Hindi iyong babasa ako ng social psychology, tapos iyong social psychology na iyon ay tungkol sa mga Amerikano.

Liwanag: Ibig sabihin po ba ay may ilang puntos din ang SP na sinang-ayunan ninyo?

Sta. Maria: Tama din ang sinasabi ng SP, lalong-lalo na sa social psychology, dahil iyong mga topic at theories at propositions at concepts ng social psychology are truly coming from one culture. Romantic love, social facilitation…mga concepts ito na mahirap i-translate sa Tagalog. Paano natin magagamit itong mga teorya, propositions, at concepts to understand ourselves, when in fact they are not about us? They are not about us at all. So, sometimes you are talking about a world to your students that the students probably will not know about. Indeed, it is about the individual, it is about the human experience, but you have to take into account that these are abstractions about human experience. So, you have to know how it is to be a friend to somebody. When you talk about friendship you cannot talk about friendship that is close to your experience without using our language. Iyong Tagalog.
Ruiz: Gayong sumasang-ayon po kayo sa SP na hindi makabubuti sa mga Pilipino ang kanlurangang babasahin, ano ang kritikal na bahagi ng inyong pananaw sa SP?

Sta. Maria: Batay sa sinabi ko kanina, tama naman ang SP. But it is not SP that owns the license for this kind of thinking. It has already been talked about by non-western and western psychologists who have already criticized social psychology and the western cultural bias of social psychology. Mayroon na talong na nauna. Ito iyong mga philosopher/social scientist na nakatuon sa philosophy of social science. At that time, mga 1970’s o 1980’s, pero hindi iyon itinuro sa amin.

Liwanag: Napagtanto po ba ninyo ito sa proseso ng pagbubuo ng inyong disertasyon?

Sta. Maria: Oo. In the process! Eh, si Dr. Salazar naman, every other day I had to make 10 to 20 pages. I was getting crazy! Anong sasabihin ko next? Tapos magkakape kami at sasabihin ni Dr. Salazar: “Okay, okay...anong masasabi mo ngayon?” I would say: “Alam mo, Sir, parang hindi siya disiplina. Siya ay isang kilusan, isang kilusan na inilagay dito sa Pilipinas, isang kilusan na hindi man lamang intelektwal.”

Ruiz: Ano po ang ibig sabihin ninyo na ang SP ay “isang kilusang hindi man lamang intelektwal”?

Sta. Maria: Politikal ang SP. Hindi intelektwal. Kasi hindi tayo pinapaisip nito. Iyong parang you are practically blind. They will just tell you “believe.” They will just tell you “do it.”

Liwanag: Ganoon po ba ang sitwasyon noon na kapag nagsalita ka laban sa SP ay outcast ka na agad?

Sta. Maria: When you start to say “pero, Sir...,” sasabihan ka agad ng iba ng “ay, huwag kang maganasalita kasi mahu-hurt ang feelings ni Sir (Dr. Enriquez).” So huwag na lang. So, what was the next thing to do? Gawin ninyo ito, gawin ninyo iyan. Iyon ang… that was my experience with SP, and that was actually also experienced by others because there was no discussion.

Ruiz: Ano po ang nangyari ng mga tagasunod ng SP nang mamatay si Dr. Enriquez?

Sta. Maria: I think it is still going on among his students who are very strong advocates of his kilusan. They are still continuing it. They are still writing about it.
Ruiz: Paano po ninyo natapos ang inyong disertasyon?

Sta. Maria: Guided ako ni Dr. Salazar. He was there all the time. He told me to write and he said: “Ito na iyong sinasabi mo, dito ito patungo,” Ganoon.

Liwanag: Mula doon nakita na po ba ni Dr. Salazar ang paninindigan ninyo tungkol sa SP?

Sta. Maria: Oo. I was writing it already. Nakita niya doon pa lang sa unang-unang ginawa kong write-up. Naipakita ko sa kanya kung ano iyong semblance ng SP sa politikal na kilusan at sa intelektwal na rebolusyon. How did things happen in psychology, in the general discipline of psychology? What were the critiques that emerged at that time? In psychology, the use of certain ways of measuring, of using items from one culture to another, were found to be not culturally valid. You cannot ask certain questions in a given culture if these items were constructed within a western perspective. Those were the issues that were already there. Then and there I realized that we should have started that movement a long time ago.

Ruiz: Matapos po ninyo naihayag ang inyong kritikal na pananaw sa SP, ano po ang inyong naging reyalisasyon?

Sta. Maria: I was realizing, for example, that in the 1980’s, long before I went to Germany, when I was still doing my master’s studies, the human development psychologists were already disillusioned or were already critiquing traditional psychological theories because of their cultural biases. These were great psychologists who were writing their theories without culture, without context. So, there were groups of psychologists, cognitive developmental psychologists, who decided to test the great psychologists’ theories in other cultures. They found that there were certain cultural differences. So, they looked for other theories, and they found one in Russia about cognitive development. This is a long story … but cultural perspective is important in psychology. But we never studied this.

Liwanag: Ano po ba ang inilahad ng inyong disertasyon tungkol sa pagiging politikal ng SP?

Sta. Maria: We were exposed to SP, but we did not know its basis. So, when you teach SP, what will you teach? You should be able to train students to see psychological phenomena within a given culture, or within the Filipino culture. Since you are studying psychology in the Filipino culture, how can you form knowledge if you do not know how to do that? You do not even know how to define “culture.” You do not even know how it is to look at the phenomena as something cultural. So, that
was the whole point. It should not be just kapwa, but what is kapwa? How do you define it? How do you study it? If it is a cultural phenomenon, how do you study cultural phenomena? Eh, ang problema, ginagawa nilang value.

Ruiz: Ano po ang naging hakbang ni Dr. Enriquez nang malaman niya ang tungkol sa inyong disertasyon?

Sta. Maria: When I finished my dissertation, tumawag sa akin si Dr. Enriquez dito sa Department of Psychology ng DLSU. Kinausap niya ako: “Anong ginawang mo?”

Liwanag: Paano po niya naunawaan ang inyong disertasyon gayong nakasulat ito sa wikang Aleman?

Sta. Maria: Kinuha niya ang aking dissertation at pina-translate niya sa asawa ni Kidlat Tahimik, kay Dr. Katherine de Guia. Dr. de Guia is also an SP follower, and she is German. She probably got hold of my dissertation and read it.

Ruiz: Iyong translation, na-reproduce po ba iyon, o para lamang ba iyon talaga kay Dr. Enriquez?

Sta. Maria: Para lamang kay Dr. Enriquez iyong. Nakalimutan ko na iyong exact words niya, but in effect he was saying: “Why did you criticize Sikolohiyang Pilipino? Why did you not talk to us first?” I said to myself: “Why should I talk to you? My critique was based on what has been written and published, based on documents.”

Liwanag: Dapat po ba nagkaroon muna kayo ng panayam kay Dr. Enriquez? Sta. Maria: Sabi ko sa kanya: “Sir, nasa Germany ako. Hindi ba dapat, Sir, ito na ang ginagawa natin sa Sikolohiyang Pilipino.” I was very forceful in commenting further: “Why should we not do this kind of thing in Sikolohiyang Pilipino? Should we not examine it already? What are you trying to tell me? That I should not have re-examined it?” I tried to be very calm for I knew that he was already dead angry, so angry. And I knew the consequences of such anger to me in the movement. I felt it. But it did not matter to me.

Ruiz: Mula sa naging pag-uusap na ito, hindi po ba ninyo itinigil ang pagsusuri sa SP?

Sta. Maria: No. Tuloy-tuloy pa rin. There were people who were into that also, who had some sympathy for what I was doing. Mayroong mga taga-Philosophy Department ng UPD who would talk to me and ask me questions.
Liwanag: Sino po ang tumulong sa inyo para maipagpatuloy at mailathala ang ilang bahagi ng inyong disertasyon?

Sta. Maria: I think the one who saved me from total damnation was Dr. Alfredo Lagmay (1919-2005). He is one of the fathers of psychology in the Philippines and a National Scientist. Dr. Lagmay told me: “Made, come here, you write your dissertation in an article. Write it and then present it. I will organize the people and you present your paper to them.”

Ruiz: Ano po ang nilalaman ng papel na hinalaw ninyo mula sa inyong disertasyon?

Sta. Maria: I had to publish that particular paper, which is a very encapsulated form of my dissertation in the Layag Journal in 1996. Indigenization Crisis, that is the title of my dissertation, “The Crisis of Indigenization, was it Resolved in Sikolohiyang Pilipino?” Was it resolved in the end? Ang sabi ko: “No. It was not resolved, because Sikolohiyang Pilipino is a political movement and not a scientific discipline. Indigenization crisis was a crisis of scientific discipline, it was a crisis of a discipline that was western. Because globalization was already starting culturally, apektado kaagad iyong indigenization.

Liwanag: Sa mga dating kaklase ninyo lang po ba naipresenta ang inyong papel?

Sta. Maria: Some of them were my classmates; others were my teachers. So, saving grace, because they were my friends.

Ruiz: Bago po kayo nakumbinse ni Dr. Lagmay, naisip ba ninyong mailathala pa ang inyong disertasyon?


Liwanag: Kapag babalikan natin, ano po ang pinakamithiin ng inyong nailathalang artikulo para sa SP?

Sta. Maria: To be able to contribute to SP. I said to myself: “I am very clear about what SP is, but it is not what we want. It is not a discipline. If it were a discipline, then it should have the following components ….” I was very clear about that. I was not saying “let us use this dissertation to start over again.” What I wanted to say
was “let us start over again, let us read these people, let us examine culture, this is the way to study culture.” Ganoon sana. Pero hindi eh. Na-hurt si father of SP.

Liwanag: Kasama po ba si Dr. Enriquez doon sa presentasyon ng inyong papel?

Sta. Maria: Dr. Lagmay organized my presentation at the Philippine Psychology Research Training House at UPD, that was where SP was housed, in the very home of Dr. Enriquez. So, he was there but not very mad at me anymore. After I read my paper, he said: “Twenty years of Sikolohiyang Pilipino, down the drain.” Then he left.

Ruiz: How did you handle the situation, matapos po mag-walk out si Dr. Enriquez?


Liwanag: Mayroon po bang mga sumangayon sa inyo at nagsulat tungkol sa kritikal ninyong pananaw sa SP?

Sta. Maria: They wrote about it. Dr. Roberto Tangco, for example, in the Philosophy Department of UPD, started writing in a similar vein.

Ruiz: Ano po ang gusto ninyong mabatid ng kabataang gustong pag-aralan ang SP?

Sta. Maria: I think, it is a very legitimate kilusan. I think everybody should have that kilusan at heart. But they should know how to fulfill that other part which is the scientific discipline. Sabi ko nga sa disertasyon ko, iyong kilusan kailangan nandoon sa disiplina. Kasi mas malakas iyong kabila, iyong mainstream psychology. Mas malakas sila. Publication pa lamang, talong-talo na ang SP. Dissemination pa, lalo na. Iyong mga conference ng SP, sila-sila lamang naman din ang nagsasaalita. Pero kung pupunta na tayo sa ibang conference at sasabihing “we belong to SP.” The mainstream psychologists are very intelligent people in their respective fields of specializations. They will know when you are saying crap, but they would not tell it to you because they want to be culturally sensitive. But I had to be critical about SP.
Liwanag: Nakapag-usap pa ba kayo ni Dr. Enriquez bago siya pumanaw?

Sta. Maria: May tumawag sa akin sa phone dito sa Psychology Department ng DLSU, gusto daw kami ni Ms. Ma. Angeles Lapeña makita ni Dr. Enriquez. Isa kasi si Ms. Lapeña sa mga protege ni Dr. Enriquez. I was wondering, bakit ako sasama sa kanya? Baka mapapagalitan na naman ako. But I was willing to take the risk, kasi alam ko na malubha na ang sakit niya. Pumunta kami sa bahay niya, at nandoon na siya sa kama niya. Tumingin siya sa akin at nagsalita: “I realized I was political.” Sabi ko: “Sir…” Pero pinaalis na kami ng nag-aalaga sa kanya dahil sobrang hina na niya. Ms. Lapeña was crying; she was like a daughter to Dr. Enriquez.

Liwanag: Habang ginagabayan kayo ni Dr. Salazar sa inyong disertasyon, napansin ba ninyo na naibba ang kanyang pananaw sa pananaw ni Dr. Enriquez?

Sta. Maria: Yes. I wanted to find out what was that thing between Dr. Salazar and Dr. Enriquez. I wrote a paper about them, “Kaisipang Salazar at Enriquez.” That is one of my favorite papers. I like that paper so much, kasi nakita ko, kitang-kita ko, kung bakit sila nag-away. Mayroon sila basic na labanan. Ito iyong argument: Para kay Dr. Enriquez, ang mga Pilipino sa diaspora ay sakop pa rin ng SP, dahil taglay rin nila ang kulturang Pilipino; pero para kay Dr. Salazar hindi na sila sakop ng SP dapat, dahil wala na sa konteksto ng kulturang Pilipino. Iyon ang bone of contention nilang dalawa.

Ruiz: Sa pagbabad po ninyo sa mga teksto nina Dr. Enriquez at Dr. Salazar, ano ang inyong napagtanto bilang mananaliksik sa larangan ng sikolohiya?

Sta. Maria: When Dr. Enriquez died, I told Dr. Salazar: “You were basically saying the same thing. Why were you fighting each other?” But when I systematically analyzed their writings, using certain common categories as my markers, I saw their differences. The writings of Dr. Enriquez about SP were coming from a psychological point of view; they do not have a clear notion of culture, and universal knowledge was all about generalizability. The writings of Dr. Salazar, on the other hand, were coming from an anthropological point of view; culture is a key concept, and universal knowledge is found in the individual who is bound to his/her context.

Liwanag: Ibig po ba sabihin, dahil magkaiba ang larangan nina Dr. Enriquez at Dr. Salazar ay naging magkakaiba ang kani-kanilang pananaw sa SP? Ano po ang implikasyon nito para sa SP?
Sta. Maria: Yes. Tapos, may nakita akong artikulo na nagsasabi na talagang hindi puwedeng magkaroon ng mixed methodology ang psychology at anthropology, dahil magkakaiba ang tingin nila sa realidad ng isang tao. Kaya kahit na gugustuhin natin na magkaroon ng psychological-anthropological approach, hindi daw talaga yan puwede. Iyan ang problema ng SP. Batay sa argumento ng nasabing artikulo, it will never be successful.

Ruiz: Ano po ang naisip ninyo matapos na aminin ni Dr. Enriquez ang pagiging labis na pagkapolitikal ng SP?

Sta. Maria: Parang what you will feel when you go into a confession. Gumaan ang pakikiramdam ko. Hindi na ako nabibigatan. Parang sinabi ni Dr. Enriquez sa akin na “hindi kita kaaway” at “now, I understand you; naiintindihan na kita.” Kahit hindi niya sinabi na “tama ka,” dahil pinatawag niya ako para na ring sinabi niya sa akin na “gusto kong sabihin sa iyo na tama ka.” But that did not make be happy. It made me pensive.

Liwanag: Ano po ang naging impact ng inyong disertasyon sa SP?

Sta. Maria: It is very difficult to say. SP is still being done from a purely psychological perspective. I did argue with people who do this. For example, to somebody who was doing a study on loob, I said: “What are you trying to do? You are doing a measure of loob, but you have not defined it yet?” Pero pinagalitan ako ng isang batikan na sikolohista sa Pilipinas. Ang tinanong ko sa kanya: “Doktor, anong nangyayari dito? Hindi ba dapat tingnan ang loob bilang isang konsepto na antropolohikal, na kultural?” Sagot niya sa akin: “Iba lamang ang perspektibo mo.” Kaya tumahimik na lamang ako, kasi lumalabas ako iyong nagdala ng bagay na totally alien sa usapan. That was the kind of reaction I am getting from my critique.

Ruiz: Ipinagpapatuloy po ba ninyo ang inyong pagpuna sa SP kung ganooon?

Sta. Maria: Yes. I was made a keynote speaker for a conference on indigenous psychology in Indonesia. In that conference, a group of Filipino psychologists, very young psychologists, probably wanting to enter the Asian cross-cultural psychology field so that they could publish, were doing studies on kapwa consistent with the Japanese studies on ama-e or dependency and attachment. But the Japanese scholar said that he discovered that the Americans also have behaviors similar to amae, and concluded that amae is also found in American culture. I asked: “Do Americans call it amae?” He said, “No.” I asked, “Then why do you claim it is in American culture?” The Japanese psychologist could not answer my question. I asked the Filipino researchers: “You are doing a psychological measure of kapwa, what is your
definition of it?” How were you able to measure a concept or construct without having defined that construct first? You are telling me your measure, but you did not tell me first your conceptual definition of it.”

Liwanag: Ano po ang nilalaman ng inyong keynote sa nasabing komperensya sa Indonesia na may kinalaman sa SP?

Sta. Maria: I said, that there is a fallacy that is happening in some indigenous psychologies. It is like defining a concept by means of the very concept to be defined. Then, I used the argument of that philosopher to show the fallacy, and reframed the same argument using kapwa concept. So that was the same argument that can be used to illustrate the fallacy in indigenous concepts and the study of indigenous concepts.

Ruiz: Ano po ang reaksyon ng mga tagapakinig sa inyong keynote speech?

Sta. Maria: It seemed to me that they were nervous. After that, I have not heard about the study. They may have been nervous not because I criticized them, but because they knew what I was referring to. Whatever their projects are, somebody is telling them this is what we should study and this is how we should study it.

Liwanag: Samakatuwid, mahalaga po ba sa pagtuturo ng SP ay dapat ungkatin din ang kasaysayan nito at pati na ang ideolohiya nito?

Sta. Maria: Oo. Kaya hindi ako pinapaturo ng SP. Hindi ko alam ha. Paranoid lamang siguro ako. Pero iba iyong pagtuturo ko eh. Isasama ko iyong criticism eh, isasama ko iyong critique eh, isasama ko iyong mga pinag-aralan ko sa Germany. Kasi, you cannot study the personality of a culture; there is no such thing as a Filipino personality. It is empirically a failure. Ayon, isasama ko iyan.

Kongklusyon

Sa higit limampung taong pananaig ng SP, napakaraming mga dalubhasa at iskolar ang gumawa ng pananaliksik, sinundan ang ideolohiya at iba’t ibang pag-aaral ng naturang kilusan. Gayunman samu’t saring mga debate at kritika ang umusbong; kasalukuyang wala pa ring resolusyon sa puntong ito. Isa si Sta. Maria na kritikal na sumuri tungo sa pagpapayabong ng larangan at magkaroon ng kontribusyon sa diskurso ng SP. Sa pangwakas na seksyon, matutunghayan ang mga kabatiran ng mga mananaliksik matapos ang naging malalim, makabuluhan, at komprehensibong pakikipanayam kay Sta. Maria.
Una, sang-ayon sa nailathalang artikulo ni Sta. Maria na “Is the Indigenization Crisis in Philippine Social Sciences Resolved in Sikolohiyang Pilipino?,” masasabing hindi naging matagumpay na sa antas ng epektibong kooperasyon sa iba pang mga disiplina ang SP, kaya tila naging paralisado sa sarado at sariling pagtingin sa adbokasiya nito. Higit sa lahat, sa pamamagitan ng mga naging mag-aaral ni Enriquez, mas nanaig lamang ang pagpapakalat ng ideohiya ng SP sa halip na magkaroon ng mas matatag na pananaliksik tungkol dito.


Ikatlo, nakatinding sa magkaibang dahilan at matinding kaingin ang paninindigan ni Sta. Maria at Enriquez. Hiningi ni Enriquez ang pagbibigay-halaga sa sariling wika at pagbubuo ng katutubong konsepto (samakatuwid ang pagkakaluwa ng SP) dahil sa pag-usbong ng mga makabayan nito sa politikal at panlipunan kalagayan ng Pilipinas. Habang hinubog si Sta. Maria ng edukasyong Aleman para maging kritikal sa mga namamayapag ng atifidad at diskurso ng SP.

Ikaapat, hindi katuwiran ang katagalan o pamamayagpag ng isang usapin upang hindi tablan o makatanggap ng kritisismo. Hindi naging lisensiya ng SP ang mahabang paglalakbay at malawak na propagasyon upang ituring ito bilang disiplina. Kinakailangan ng isang mahalagang aspekto ang isang bagay upang bigyang-konsiderasyon ito bilang disiplina. Higit dito ang pagiging adbokasiya ng SP – na may hangaring tumukoy sa sikolohiya nakabatay sa totooong kaisipan, at damdaming mula sa katutubong batis, wika, at metodo ng Filipino.

Ikakapat, hindi katuwiran ang kultura sa pag-aaral ng sikolohiya, samantala, magkakataon ang papel ng kultura sa kilos at kaisipan ng tao. Para kay Salazar, kailangang mapalao ang sikolohiya sa kultura, habang napapaloo na at mahahalaw ang kultura sa prosesong pang-

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individwal, sa prosesong sikolohiko ayon kay Enriquez. Sa kabuoan, nagbunsod ang pundasyon ng pagkakaiba ng perspektiba nina Salazar at Enriquez dahil sa magkaibang kaisipan ng kani-kaniyang disiplina: “ang pagbibigay-diin ng etnolohiya sa pakahulugan at ang pagbibigay-diin ng sikolohiya sa naobserbahang pangyayari ... ang pinanghahawakang prinsipyo ng cultural anthropology, o etnolohiya, ay ang tinaguriang “deep cultural structure” na taliwas sa “general principles of behavior” ng sikolohiya. Gayunman, winika ni Sta. Maria na hindi kinakailangang tingnan ang lente ng pagkakaiba ng dalawa sapagkat “maaari makita sa gitna ng oposisyon ito ang tama at totooong paraan.” Samakatuwid, sa pag-aaral ng kultura at sikolohiya maisasakatuparan ang sikolohiyang Pilipino, kailangan din ng mahigpit na pagtutulungan ng sikolohiya at etnolohiya. Kinakailangang makabuo ng mga interpretatibong balangkas (mula sa sikolohiya) upang makapagbigay ng mga mapanlahat na proposisyon ukol sa konteksto. Kinakailangan din ng interpretatibong metodolohiya (mula sa etnolohiya) na magpapahintulot sa pagsusuri ng panlipunang ugnayan sa loob ng isang kultural na kapaligiran.


11 Ibid., 86-87.
12 Ibid., 87-88.
na sa pakikipag-ugnayan sa kanyang mga magulang. Sa aplikasyon ng modelong ito sa ebolusyon ng teorya ng mga halagahing Pilipino, makikitang sumasalamin ang mga pananaliksik ng kilusang SP sa yugto ng “negative independence.” Sangkot sa SP ang kabuoang pagwaksi ng mga Kanluraning teorya at metodo, ngunit hindi pa natatamasa ang tunay na kalayaan sapagkat matutukoy pa rin sa mga kilos ang impluwensiya ng mga mananakop.14


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14 Ibid., 566-567.
Genocide and the Question of Philosophy

Elenita dLR. Garcia

Abstract: This paper looks into the issues surrounding the concept of genocide and examines Philosophy’s role in it by looking into contemporary scholars’ assessments of its influences that led to the Jewish Holocaust and other genocides. It shows that although Philosophy, in its Western guise, may have contributed to these atrocities, its Eastern counterparts may have something to offer in terms of countering such tendencies. Whether within Eastern or Western traditions, this paper calls for Philosophy to examine itself and effectively address ethical and social issues in history and take on its role of properly shaping the way we think and act.

Keywords: genocides, holocaust, racism, western and non-western thought

Philosophy, Genocides, and Other Atrocities

UNESCO’s Director General from 1999 to 2009, Koichiro Matsuura, during the International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust on 27 January 2009, said that the Organization:

continues to contribute to raising awareness on all forms of discrimination, which includes the fight against anti-Semitism, and all actions and words which might be interpreted as Holocaust denial. Holocaust education should recognize no boundaries in terms of curricular subject, location, and age and group of learners. It

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should inspire our young to challenge anti-Semitism, racism, and extremism rather than to remain silent.\(^2\)

It was in line with this sentiment that UNESCO dedicated World Philosophy Day on November 21, 2008 as a celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights. The General-Director referred to it as “of eminent philosophical importance,” as the 1948 declaration “evokes the universality of human beings and their rights. It also provides an opportunity to revisit today some key concepts that underpin our modernity: human dignity, freedom and universality.”\(^3\)

Eight years afterwards, these words are still worth reflecting on: “What exactly has philosophy done to merit this expectation from an international organization such as UNESCO? Have the hallmarks of reason, critical thinking and thought-clarifying questions helped in the prevention of atrocities throughout the modern world? We would like to say that philosophy has always been at the foundations of all disciplines, dealing with fundamental issues of human life. Unfortunately, it seems like philosophy has actually been silent about the terrible realities that involve moral transgressions, like genocides.

In 2005, John K. Roth edited a compilation of articles that has been subtitled “a philosophical guide” to genocide. The book, *Genocide and Human Rights*, discusses many issues that surround the concept of genocide, generally outlining the temperament of Western Philosophy that might have justified actual genocides in history. Although this paper does not intend to claim that cruelty is directly caused by Western ways of thinking or that non-Western thoughts are never responsible for atrocities, it aims to echo and explore those issues, specifically as it has been committed during the Jewish Holocaust. It therefore inquires into the role of Philosophy in the Holocaust and other known genocides. Further, it intends to show that while there are philosophical views that tend to help facilitate genocidal atrocities, others might be of help in preventing them, particularly basic Eastern views regarding the self, others and the world.


Genocidal Acts: Natal Alienation, Terror, Shame

In 1944, Raphael Lemkin, in his *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, coined the term “genocide,” putting together the Greek “genos,” meaning “race” and the Latin suffix “-cide” that refers to killing. He claimed that two things are accomplished in genocide: first, to destroy the nationhood of the oppressed; second, to replace it with that of the oppressors’. This way, Lemkin showed that genocide does not necessarily involve murder, although mass murders are definitely genocidal. The Nazi project of “Germanization” of Europe clearly counts as genocide even without the mass murder of the Jews.4 The 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defined it in Article II as:

any of a number of acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.5

Claudia Card finds this definition controversial6 because of what it excludes, for instance, political groups. Card reports that the term “political groups” has been dropped from the initial draft because, while one is born into a nation or religion and has had no choice in his or her race, one is not born with an inherent political creed. But protesters have shown that one is also not necessarily born into one’s ethnic, national or religious group. Others, on the other hand, contend that politically triggered killings (also referred to as “politicide”) is an old concept and need not be included in the new term in question.7 More interesting are the other kinds of “murder” that

7 Raimond Gaita also points out that the Soviets bullied the UN into dropping “political groups” from the definition because they didn’t want the mass murders of political
pass for genocide, making the requirement of physical murder unnecessary, just as Lemkin pointed out.

Card further asks: of the wide range of bodily or mental harm imaginable, which ones qualify as genocide? How many people must be killed? Must an intention to eliminate an entire group be successful? Hitler aimed to eliminate all Jews. He did not succeed, yet the Jewish Holocaust of Nazi time is considered the paradigm of genocide. This is because it is a “harm inflicted on its victims’ social vitality.” She continues,

... When a group with its own cultural identity is destroyed, its survivors lose their cultural heritage and may even lose their intergenerational connections...they may become “socially dead” and their descendants “natally alienated,” no longer able to pass along and build upon the traditions, cultural developments (including languages), and projects of earlier generations.8

Card claims that social death is comparable to physical death. She takes natal alienation to be central to genocide.9 The Holocaust is a genocide because although some Jews were not murdered, they nevertheless suffered loss of connection to their culture or faith. The fact that those who survived, either because they migrated to “safe” countries or they reestablished connections with relatives and members of the community after the Holocaust,10—and thus were able to practice their culture again—does not mean that the Nazi crime was not genocidal.11

Raimond Gaita critiques the idea of natal alienation as the essence of genocide because this intention to destroy “… a people’s culture and the imposition of the culture of the conqueror on them can be an expression of respect for them that goes hand in glove with an expression of contempt for

groups during Stalin’s time to be called genocidal acts. Raimond Gaita, “Refocusing Genocide: A Philosophical Responsibility,” in Genocide and Human Rights, 158-159.
8 Ibid., 248.
9 Ibid.
10 For an account in literary fiction (that mirrors actual events in the authors’ lives) of women who are not able to cope with normal life because of their experience in the concentration camps, see Inbar Raveh and Rotem Wagner, I Never Even Lived: A Teaching Unit – Women in Holocaust Literature (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2000). Some committed suicide after a while. Card would consider this a failure to revive social identity and existence—a case of social death.
11 Jewish philosopher Laurence Modekhai Thomas, according to Card, does not consider the Jews to be natally alienated because the Jewish society was able to continue after the Holocaust. Thomas reserves natal alienation to ethnic groups like the slaves who were born into situations that prevent them from having knowledge of and practicing their historico-cultural traditions. See Card, “Genocide and Social Death.”
their culture.” Gaita argues that if Nazism succeeded and became the essential culture of Europe, to bring the Europeans back to the way they were before Nazism was to impose on them—as a “moral and political imperative”—that would also constitute a course of action that would alienate them from their known culture. For Gaita, the Nazi intention to eliminate the Jews was done out of contempt for the Jews: “It was the cool, radical contempt for the very existence of the Jewish people that has made the Holocaust so chilling to many who have studied it.”

Gaita points out that the Nazis’ “Final Solution” was not a project intended for that end-of-war period. It was meant to continue as a post-war policy because it was considered a “civic ideal” to engage in it in times of peace. Similarly, Norman Geras shows that the Holocaust is “chilling” because the atrocities committed threaten the existence of all of humanity; it terrorizes all of us: “They terrorize not just those they put under immediate attack, or those closely threatened by or in the vicinity of such attack, but human beings in general.”

On the other hand, Michael Morgan focuses on the sense of shame that the Holocaust triggered, not only in the prisoners in the camp but also in their liberators. He relates how the prisoners come to know shame through the various ways the Nazis would treat them in the camp. The poet Primo Levi writes about the way he and a couple of other inmates were sent to the laboratory for experiments, and how they immediately noticed their “filth,” compared to the girls that worked there. Levi says,

> Faced with the girls of the laboratory, we three feel ourselves sink into the ground from shame and embarrassment. We know what we look like .... We are ridiculous and repugnant. Our cranium is bald on Monday, and covered by a short brownish mould by Saturday. We have a swollen and yellow face … our neck is long and knobblly … Our clothes are incredibly dirty, stained by mud, grease, and blood ….

Yet, when the Russian soldiers finally freed them, they also felt that shame. Seeing how the victims have been abused, starved and stripped of their identities, the liberators couldn’t smile nor look at anything. They were

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12 Gaita, “Refocusing Genocide,” 158-159.
13 Ibid., 161.
15 Michael Morgan, “Shame, the Holocaust, and the Dark Times,” in Genocide and Human Rights, 313.
silent with that same shame. Although Levi says that the soldiers’ shame is the same as the inmates’, it seems they are triggered by two different experiences, like two sides of the same coin. One is the shame in being reduced to a deplorable state of existence, and the other, shame in not being able to stop it or do anything about it.

Given the atrocities that are still going on all over the world, it is not surprising that the definition of “genocide” remains wanting and controversial. But as these scholars now address it, by their practice they also address the issue of Philosophy’s role in it. If Philosophy shapes the way we think and the way we view the world, then we will have to accede that it has somehow been remiss in the performance of its role. As Roth shows, many great philosophers have helped advance human rights and fight for human equality. But sadly, many have also helped political regimes that later turned genocidal thrive. It is perhaps about time that Philosophy faced its “shadow,” own up to this responsibility, and address these issues.

Racist Tendencies in Western Thought

Colin Tatz claims that racial theories that favored the Europeans or encouraged racism have existed all throughout history, and they are found in the works of great thinkers from Plato through Aquinas, and the thinkers

16 Ibid., 309.
18 See Plato, The Republic, trans. by C.D.C Reeve (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2004). Hereafter cited as The Republic. Plato believes that there are different classes that make up the city. In a hierarchical order, he identified them as those who love wisdom (the philosopher-kings), those who love honor (the Warriors), and those who love money (the Artisans). Each one also has three soul-parts—the intellectual, the affective, and the appetitive (The Republic, 580d), but the intellect is stronger in those who love wisdom, while appetite is stronger in the lowest class. He also identified them as gold, silver, and bronze, respectively (ibid., 415a) and claimed that only those of gold are qualified to rule while those of the lower classes must be subjected to their rule in order to temper their appetites. Plato also envisioned that the state would monitor the sexual activity and reproduction of the citizens, communally caring for offsprings of good parentage and taking away those of inferior ones or those infants which are deformed—obviously a discourse on eugenics. (ibid., 560c) Plato also spoke of stereotypes, claiming Thracians and Scythians to be “spirited” and that Phoenicians and Egyptians love money, while the people of their “part of the world” truly love wisdom. (Ibid., 436a), thereby insinuating that they are the best people there is.
19 Aristotle, Politics, trans. Benjamin Jowett, in Internet Classic Archives <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.mb.txt>, 9 March 2017. Hereafter cited as Politics. Like Aristotle who thought there were those who were by nature slaves because their souls were not fully formed and were fit only for physical labor, who claimed that “the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different” (Politics, Book I, Part V). St. Thomas Aquinas says of slaves, “Men pre-eminent in understanding naturally take the command; while men poor in understanding, but of great bodily strength, seem by nature
of the Enlightenment period, especially Kant\textsuperscript{20} and Hegel,\textsuperscript{21} have all written on the superiority of their race. David Hume, observing the negroes of his time, saw them to be naturally inferior to the whites, saying that among them there have been no sciences or arts, and likened them to parrots, “who speak a few words plainly.”\textsuperscript{22} And for John Locke, it did not help their case that they were usually of the nomadic, hunter-gatherer tribes that did not understand the value of property and therefore, did not know what to do with land, a business solely for the civilized people.\textsuperscript{23} Even Voltaire explained racial designate for servants, as Aristotle says in his Politics, [667] with whom Solomon is of one mind, saying: The fool shall serve the wise (Prov. xi, 29) (\textit{Summa contra Gentiles}, 3, 81; p. 449) and “under every government the freemen are provided for their own sakes, while of slaves this care is taken that they have being for the use of the free.” (\textit{Summa contra Gentiles}, 3, 1121 p. 489). Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa contra Gentiles}, trans. by Joseph Rickaby, S.J., annotated and abridged version, in \textit{The Catholic Primer’s Reference Series: Of God and His Creatures} (The Catholic Primer, 2005).

\textsuperscript{20} Kant agrees with Hume about the blacks and described them as “vain” and “have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling,” Immanuel Kant, \textit{Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime}, trans. by John T. Goldthwait (Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 313.

\textsuperscript{21} See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, \textit{The Philosophy of History}, trans. by J. Sibree (Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001). Hereafter cited as \textit{Philosophy of History}. In \textit{The Philosophy of History}, Hegel says, “The German nations, under the influence of Christianity, were the first to attain the consciousness that man, as man, is free: that it is the freedom of Spirit which constitutes its essence” (\textit{Philosophy of History}, 32). Furthermore, “The History of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning … The East knew and to the present day knows only that One is Free; the Greek and Roman world, that some are free; the German World knows that All are free” (\textit{ibid}., 121). Of the Africans, he says, “The Negro, as already observed, exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state. We must lay aside all thought of reverence and morality — all that we call feeling — if we would rightly comprehend him; there is nothing harmonious with humanity to be found in this type of character. The copious and circumstantial accounts of Missionaries completely confirm this, and Mahommedanism appears to be the only thing which in any way brings the Negroes within the range of culture” (\textit{ibid}., 111).


\textsuperscript{23} The debate on Locke’s racism ensued because of his well-known contribution to the idea of a liberal government and his apparent support of slavery. “Every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever.” John Locke, \textit{The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March 1, 1669}, in \textit{The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy}, \texttt{<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nc05.asp>}, 7 March 2017, Art. 110. His work on the idea of property is also interpreted by some scholars as having facilitated the removal of the Native Americans from their lands, for they are thought to not understand the idea of property. Known during his time as “savages,” Native Americans were seen by Locke to be like children, idiots and illiterate people. See John Locke, \textit{An Essay Concerning Human Understanding}, in \textit{Some Texts from Early Modern Philosophy} (2012), \texttt{<http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book1.pdf>}, 7 March 2017, Bk. I, Ch. II, Par. 27. See also Julie K. Ward, “The Roots of Modern Racism: Early Modern Philosophers on
differences by conjecturing that not everyone was a descendant of Adam and Eve. Tatz shows that although most of these claims started as mere opinions derived from observations, the development in science and technology allowed them to be backed up by scientific proofs, which later warranted the removal of the undesirable elements of society in the name of self-preservation.

On the other hand, David Patterson sees this as the increased tendency to see the ego as central, allowing for “the philosophical erasure of God,” by the loss of the “human-to-divine” relationship that goes hand in hand with “human-to-human” ones. Without the former, the aura of sacrality is removed from the human, making killing quite easy to do. If the human being is no longer sacred, then there is no thinking twice about exterminating it, as there is no longer any offense in doing so. The ego then becomes the center and all meanings derive from it. Its freedom and autonomy allows it, as the Kantian Categorical Imperative commands it, to turn personal maxims into universal laws. Michael Mack reaches a similar conclusion showing that evil has actually been legitimized by the philosophy of History, specifically that of the Hegelian type, which glorified the Cunning of Reason at the expense of individual happiness. In Hegel, what matters is the Whole: All will be revealed at the end of the rational project. “The refinement of reason goes hand in hand with the development of the mindset that made

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27 David Patterson, “The Philosophical Warrant for Genocide,” in Genocide and Human Rights, 95.

28 Although Kant spoke of cosmopolitanism, a universal community where a violation of rights in one part could be felt everywhere, he also spoke of the difference between civilized and barbaric peoples and believed that only the Europeans have the capacity and the talent to move on in history. He was doubtful about the non-Europeans, especially the blacks and the Native Americans and thought they would be wiped out eventually because they would not be able to face up to the challenges that came their way. See Bernasconi, “Why do the Happy Inhabitants of Tahiti Exist at All?”
Auschwitz possible.” This observation is aptly echoed by Bernasconi who writes,

... neither Immanuel Kant nor G.W.F. Hegel advocated mass killing, but those magisterial figures in the tradition of Western thought unwittingly contributed to the formation of a culture of genocide...by proposing philosophies of history that were designed to give meaning to humanity as a species, while nevertheless embracing an idea of progress from which some races were excluded because they allegedly lacked the talents that would enable them to be full participants in humanity’s future. Their findings “answered” the question of why the “white race” existed, but did little to explain the existence of the races whose historical agency had been denied.

Similarly, Leonard Grob identifies the problem of philosophy as an obsession with ontology at the expense of ethics—the issue that the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas has been critiquing in his works. In this “province of being,” Grob says, the “I” is sovereign and directs everything according to its own meaning-giving power. It has the power to totalize from this point of view, which makes it intolerant of difference. This egoist tendency is what contributes to genocidal thinking. For instance, the Nazis saw the Jews in racial terms and saw them as a whole, not as individuals. Next, they did not give them a human status. Who was to say they were not correct in this assessment? If the “I” is the source of all meaning, and that meaning is the only legitimate one, then one acts on it because one has the power and autonomy to do so. For Levinas, this is the reason that Philosophy especially after the Enlightenment period that espoused this thinking, might have been “a fertile ground in which genocide [could] grow and even thrive.” The only way to combat this is for Philosophy to start examining itself.

Western Philosophy, according to Paul Santilli, is also unable to concern itself with the body, especially the suffering body. Philosophy has always identified itself with the mind that can attain objectivity and

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30 Bernasconi, “Why do the Happy Inhabitants of Tahiti Exist at All?” 139.
universality. The Cartesian split between mind and body, as old as the Platonic forms and shadows, has always been taken for granted, and importance has always been on the side of the intangible. As such, Philosophy has been ill-equipped to deal with issues regarding the body, unless in a scientific, non-existent way. Santilli is quick to note that the proper orientation to suffering is not pity, as pity is, as Hannah Arendt put it, “a self-indulgent arousal of the heart that feeds on the misfortunes of others.” The attitude must be that of solidarity—a recognition that not you alone suffer, but all of us, as we all belong together.33 As Levinas writes of this empathy, it “describes the suffering and vulnerability of the sensible as the other in me. The other is in me and in the midst of my very identification.”34

Philosophy and philosophers do seem to have quite a lot to answer for. Thomas Simon, citing the Serbian case35 as an instance of how professional philosophers helped people harbor racist sentiments, laments this fact,

Sadly, rather than having situations where philosophers help us to understand injustices, we may have far more cases where professional philosophers stand accused of aiding and abetting atrocities. These circumstances suggest that philosophers need to think about their own discipline in relation to the problem of evil and, in particular, about the relationships between philosophy and genocide.36

Although not all philosophers have kept silent regarding these issues, those who wrote and spoke about them may have been few. Philosophy, as Roth realizes, has an important role in encouraging everyone to raise their voices in order to prevent genocide. Having prided itself with critical methods, philosophy must be able to deconstruct racial thinking and

33 Ibid., 225.
34 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, or, Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981), 125. See also, Simon Lumsden, “Absolute Difference and Social Ontology: Levinas Face to Face with Buber and Fichte,” in Human Studies, 23 (2000): 227-241. Here, Lumsden discusses Levinas’ “face to face” as contrasted against the Fichtean transcendental ego and Buber’s I-Thou relationship. He shows that Levinas sees Heidegger’s empathy (Einfühlung) as still a self-relation devoid of true alterity but nevertheless argues for an empathetic relation to the Other as his sense of responsibility is affective rather than cognitive.
35 The philosopher Mihailo Markovic helped push the Greater Serbia ideology and helped Slobodan Milosevic form an extreme form of nationalism. The works of Markovic are intricately woven into the Belgrade regime which has been accused of genocide and crimes against humanity.
have everyone think and act consistently with Philosophy’s role in advancing human rights. Roth acknowledges that Philosophy is not the only discipline that can do this, but it is “the vanguard of those who value and practice thinking that questions assumptions, asks for evidence, and tracks the connections and implications of ideas.” We can therefore no longer ignore this task. Our history and the threat of genocide, as Frederick Sontag shows, should bring to mind and motivate philosophers “to help others to feel the importance of the Socratic injunction, ‘Know thyself.’”

The Self in Non-Western Traditions

Could Philosophy have come to forget its original pursuit of wisdom? So many schools of thought have sprouted that we’ve lost the simplicity of the etymology of the term we use for the discipline, “love of wisdom.” Is it possible the Philosophy—Western, that is—has lost its way, disdaining alternative wisdoms all this time, only to end up defeating itself?

Western Philosophy has always been wary of non-Western, wisdom-seeking traditions. The latter’s very close affinity with religion and the mythical, its focus on the community and the environment, its ultra-practical or ultra-spiritual preoccupations, and its seeming lack of concern for individual freedom, make it suspect in the realm of traditional Philosophy, with its strict demands for logic and objectivity. Yet, as we have shown, the concerns of Western Philosophy for the latter may have contributed to the phenomenon of genocide, especially its paradigmatic instantiation in the Holocaust. The next section briefly looks to the major traditions in the East—Indian and Chinese—to see what insights they can offer to counter these effects.

Hindu Karma

Hinduism believes that there is an immutable law of the Universe that corrects everything through the workings of karma, the law of retribution. Every action engenders its own karmic return. It is therefore imperative that one becomes aware of this in order to avoid negative karmic results. While “… the Law of Karma binds the doer to the fruits of his deeds …,” non-attached living frees one from it. Ultimately, however, proper

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understanding of the karmic cycle should make one avoid karmic returns altogether, positive or negative through the practice of non-attachment. *Karma* is closely connected to the cycle of life or *samsara*. One is reborn over and over again until all karmic produce have been reaped. Then and only then can one achieve spiritual liberation or *moksa*.40

*Moksa* is the realization that one’s self, *atman*, is not separate from the basic substrate of the whole universe, called *Brahman*. Hinduism’s major texts, the *Upanishads*, all point to the eventual realization that *Brahman* is identifiable with *atman* and that ignorance of this is the cause of return to this world in the cycle of rebirth. But multiplicity and difference are illusory. Thus, as the *Bhagavad-Gita* says, to the enlightened one, the gentle brahmana (spiritual person), the cow, the elephant, the dog and the dog-eater (outcaste) are seen with equal vision.41 Similarly, the story of Uddalaka and Svetaketu from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad points to the oneness of everything in the world,

My child, the rivers that run in the different directions rise from the sea and go back to the sea. Yet the sea remains the same. The rivers, while in the sea, cannot identify themselves as one particular river or another. So also creatures that have come from Sat know not that they have come from that Sat, although they become one or the other again and again.42

**Buddhist Karuna**

Opposed to the basic view of Hinduism, Buddhism denies the existence of the *atman*, the self that endures and remains the same lifetime after lifetime of being reborn. Instead, it teaches non-self, or the lack of any permanent substance that exists outside of “causes and conditions.” But it retains the belief in *karma* and still believes that actions reap consequences. Thus, Buddhism preaches compassion or *karuna* not just for fellow human beings but for all sentient beings. It is the supreme *dharma*, or path of

40 *Karma* is not punitive, as it is often perceived. Its intricate link with the cycle of rebirth allows *atman* to work out its energies. It is therefore a process of spiritual liberation, and not oppression. See P.T. Raju, “Religion and Spiritual Values in Indian Thought,” in *The Indian Mind*, 195.


righteousness. In the Metta Sutta (or Maitri Sutra), the text gives an example of how loving-kindness is practiced and how it frees one from rebirth.

Let no one deceive another or despise anyone anywhere, or through anger or irritation wish for another to suffer. As a mother would risk her life to protect her child, her only child, even so should one cultivate a limitless heart with regard to all beings. With good will for the entire cosmos, cultivate a limitless heart: Above, below, and all around, unobstructed, without enmity or hate.43

Basic in Buddhist thought is the practice of thinking good thoughts, speaking kindly and doing deeds of compassion. In mindful practice of these, one cultivates loving-kindness or active compassion, and at the same time, avoids gaining karmic energies that will perpetuate the cycle of rebirth, thereby avoiding harm to other beings that go with these negative energies.44

Confucian Ren

The Chinese preoccupation with social harmony is evident in the Confucian virtue of ren, usually translated as benevolence or righteousness. Based on the component parts of the character that represents it, however, it more appropriately means “consciousness-of-human-other.”45 For Confucianism, this is the ultimate essence which is manifest in various virtuous acts. Together with one’s knowledge of his or her social status and role, and the corresponding propriety that such a role demands, ren makes an individual a cultured one—one who can avoid all faults out of his or her respect for others. He or she is called a junzi or a superior one. For this reason, Confucius emphasized, together with the Golden Rule, the “rectification of names” He says,

If names are not right then speech does not accord with things; if speech is not in accord with things, then affairs cannot be successful; when affairs are not successful, li and music do not flourish; when li and music do not

44 Narayan Hemandas Samtani, trans., Gathering the Meanings: The Compendium of Categories: The Arthavinishcaya Sutra and Its Commentary Nibandhana (California: Dharma Publishing, 2002), Sutra VI, 107-114. The eight-fold path involves right understanding, right thoughts, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration, summarized as thinking, speaking, and acting in a good way.
flourish, then sanctions and punishments miss their mark; when sanctions and punishments miss their mark, the people have no place to set their hands and feet.

Therefore, when a junzi gives things names, they may be properly spoken of, and what is said may be properly enacted. With regard to speech, the junzi permits no carelessness.46

Knowing one’s proper name, one is able to learn how to act, since one’s actions are to be congruent with one’s words and thoughts. This congruence between thought, speech, and action is a strict requirement for the cultured individual. Confucius believes that although it is difficult to achieve, one must strive for its attainment because this is the only way to ensure that one will not do wrong. Confucius relates his own gradual development by saying that although he set his heart on learning the Decree of Heaven, it did not become second nature to him until he was 70: “At seventy, I follow the desires of my heart and do not overstep the bounds.”47

Taoist Wei-wu-wei

Taoism’s emphasis on the Tao as the Way (of Nature) shows that everything is sacred. The Tao works for the general good. It is therefore imperative that one loses his or her mistaken idea of the self as separate from everything else. One is always in a web of connections with others within a community, and within the world in general. Thus, great emphasis is placed on non-harmful thinking, speaking and doing, while letting go of attachments. Although Taoism does not really prescribe what one ought to do in order to achieve this, it does describe what happens when it is not achieved. Thus, the Tao Te Ching, considered to be the manual of Taoist thought, says.

The Tao is infinite, eternal. Why is it eternal? It was never born; thus it can never die. Why is it infinite? It has no desires for itself; thus it is present for all beings. The Master stays behind; that is why she is ahead. She is detached from all things; that is why she is one with

47 Ibid., 2:4, p. 5.
them. Because she has let go of herself, she is perfectly fulfilled.48

The Way goes by reversal. When one tries to do too much, the opposite is achieved. Thus, Taoism teaches *wei-wu-wei*. Literally, it means doing-without-doing, and has been taken to mean no-doing or non-action, as opposed to inaction. This does not mean inactivity or laziness. Rather, it means doing one’s task, no more, no less, and then, letting go. If one overdoes his or her work, the result is usually undesirable. Thus, Chapter 9 says, “Fill your bowl to the brim and it will spill. Keep sharpening your knife and it will blunt. Chase after money and security and your heart will never unclench. Care about people’s approval and you will be their prisoner…”49 One must know when to stop and let go.

Without attachment, one is able to let go of the desire to control. When one doesn’t control, one is most free and most powerful. This allows him or her to know the limits, and therefore, the parameters in which to work. Practicing this, one is not likely to ever run against any boundaries. Chapter 73 aptly says that “the Tao is always at ease. It overcomes without competing, answers without speaking a word, arrives without being summoned, [and] accomplishes without a plan …”50

Finally, the Tao goes by subtraction rather than addition. In various aspects of daily life, it knows that the more one has, in terms of thoughts and possessions, the less peace of mind he or she has. So the Taoist unlearns all the unnecessary things and keeps on embracing the Tao, because as she does this, she embraces all things.

Rushing into action, you fail. Trying to grasp things, you lose them. Forcing a project to completion, you ruin what was almost ripe. Therefore the Master takes action by letting things take their course. He remains as calm at the end as at the beginning. He has nothing, thus has nothing to lose. What he desires is non-desire; what he learns is to unlearn. He simply reminds people of who they have always been. He cares about nothing but the Tao. Thus he can care for all things.51

The Individual is Social

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49 Ibid., Ch. 9.

50 Ibid., Ch. 73.

51 Ibid., Ch. 64.
What we have roughly sketched in the preceding section are only the highlights of some major traditions in the East. What we want to portray is that whatever the foundation of their thoughts is—typically spiritual in India, while practical in China—they all emphasize one thing: the individual is at the same time, social. The individual does not find itself isolated but it defines itself in a nexus of relationships within the world. As such, Eastern thought might offer an alternative framework in which genocidal tendencies might immediately be nipped in the bud, if they come up at all. What we’ve pointed out as the Western preoccupation with ontology and its penchant for giving the “I” a privileged status in determining meaning in the world might be countered with the Eastern attitude that the individual is transpersonal. As such, freedom is truly freedom only if it is afforded to everyone. After all, the self is—transpersonally—everyone.

In characterizing the Chinese mind, for instance, Charles Moore (1967, 5-7) emphasized its extremely humanistic bent. True to the Confucian tradition, he identified the primary philosophical concern of the Chinese as the cultivation of “sageliness within and kingliness without,” showing at the same time, the inseparability of philosophy and life. Chinese philosophy then, Moore says, can actually be summarized as the learning of “the art of social living.” Ethical consciousness is predominant, upholding respect for each individual and abiding by the concept of “original equality and original goodness” of each one. Moore (1967, 7-8) sums it up,

… the Chinese thought-and-culture tradition may be characterized by humanism, by its emphases upon the ethical, the intellectual (primarily with relation to life and activity), the aesthetic, and the social...without any aversion to material welfare and the normal enjoyments of life—and with an inner tranquility of spirit that pervades life in both prosperity and adversity, a tranquility born of a sense of harmony with Nature and one’s fellow men.

Similarly, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan describes as part of the general characteristics of Indian philosophy, from the Orthodox schools to the many schools of the non-Orthodox systems, its belief in the intimate relationship of philosophy and life. In spite of its basic spiritual concern for final liberation,
it is very much concerned with how to live life in peace. Its belief in the four stages of life (asramas), the four supreme ends (purusarthas), and the social organization (varna) make it very similar to the Chinese concern for living harmoniously with others by being mindful of social boundaries and duties (dharma).

In another work, however, Radhakrishnan comments on the changes in human history in the last century, focusing on the not-so-pleasant effects of science, having allowed people to

... solemnize their desires and organize their hatreds by propounding the theory of the predestination of races. This pernicious doctrine of fundamental racial differences and national missions is preventing the development of a true human community in spite of the closer linking up of interests and the growing uniformity of customs and forms of life ...

Like the writers we have mentioned earlier, Radhakrishnan sees the Hegelian theory that what is is right and its accompanying implications as “a denial of moral authority,” and a confusion of what is good with the real and “reduces the distinction between right and wrong to one of strong and weak.” He laments the loss of the ancient rules of war in India where only the ksatriyas or the warrior class go to war and the non-combatants (the other castes) are left alone to continue with their tasks. Thus, although some people are killed, no tribe gets wiped out, because there were always those who tilled the land and kept with their daily tasks. He continues,

... In modern wars whole populations are involved and there are no non-combatants. The forces must act with efficiency and indiscrimination. They may kill and maim, starve and ruin millions of human beings who are absolutely innocent.

Radhakrishnan felt deeply about these issues and acted on them. As

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56 Ibid., 360.
57 Ibid., 363.
a member of the Committee of Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations from 1931-1936, and as an Indian delegate to and later on chair of UNESCO’s executive board in 1948, he wrote and researched on Hinduism and Christianity, and philosophy in general in order to promote peace.

**Philosophy after Genocide: Conclusion**

We do not mean to say that there are no problematic issues in Eastern thought that have influenced social issues. Nor are we saying that non-Westerners are incapable of genocidal thinking. We merely want to call attention to the gems of wisdom in the East that we’ve been ignoring simply because Eastern philosophy does not subscribe to the general tenets and methodologies of Western thought. When thinking well is supposed to lead to acting well, it seems that the worldview that does not allow too many dichotomies between thought and action, body and soul, heart and mind, is a better guideline than the one that does. Sometimes, what we need to confront is not the issue of “what conditions apply” to make something true or real, but whether something has been right or wrong. In this case, the typical Eastern openness to the use of intuition on top of reason, may be a better option when the concern is not ontology or epistemology but ethics. In Eastern traditions, all branches of Philosophy have one ultimate goal: to help us discern what is right and wrong and be able to live harmoniously with others, who are, after all, part and parcel of our self.

Earlier, we’ve mentioned Patterson’s observation that genocide happens because of the philosophical erasure of God, which led to the loss of the holy in the human being. The many schools of thought in the East espouse different views of the divine and some of them are outright atheistic in stance. However, in the East, there is a pervading intuition that *everything*, not just human beings, is sacred. The whole universe is suffused with this subtle essence, whether Tao or Brahman, and each being shares in that spark of the divine within them. If we in the contemporary era, could somehow have this view in the background of thought, then perhaps, we’d think a thousand times before we launch a project bent on harming fellow human beings as well as the environment.

This paper is only a preliminary outlining of the issues that involve Philosophy with genocide. It is only meant to say that such a study is necessary. As Roger Gottlieb says, “it is barbaric to write philosophy *as if the Holocaust had never happened.*” 58 If Philosophy were to continue this way, to justify racial theories and collude with science, to use argumentation only to...
prove the logic of one’s claim without concern for what is right or wrong, then Philosophy would be utterly irrelevant and Richard Rorty would be wrong in saying that “the goal of public philosophy is to find ways for us to be less cruel to each other.”  

59 Gottlieb continues,

… If we are not to repeat these patterns in our own time, we cannot turn aside the kinds of questions I have been raising here by saying, “This isn’t my area. I’m more interested in the relation between epistemology and philosophy of mind.”  

Philosophy has to strive to be relevant again. Whether taking lessons from Western thought or getting inspiration from Eastern wisdom, it must take its skills and virtues toward the betterment of this world through the basic Socratic dictum, “Know thyself.”  If Philosophy were to change for the better, philosophers must examine themselves and find out which path they have taken so far and if that path has led them away from the original goal of the discipline. It must confront these issues, it must care for these issues and use the skill in argumentation to clarify concepts and turn them into practical and positive laws.

As Patterson’s insights show us, if “philosophy” is the “love of wisdom,” we have to ask what it is that we love when we love wisdom. 61 Isn’t Sophia—Wisdom—something higher than we are? Is it not something that imbues all of us with the holy and the sacred, and therefore, what we must love when we love wisdom is the other who is as sacred as we are? Philosophy must rethink itself and find out if its present concerns are matters of consequence. And we who are teaching the discipline must teach it not apart from life but within life and its concerns. This is important because, as Roth reminds us, when Plato said that philosophy began with awe and wonder, he knew that,

Philosophy does not come first but comes to life in the aftermath of preceding experience. Once it comes to life, philosophy takes on life of its own, which can be life-
giving or life-threatening or many other things in between.62

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Thinking with Irigaray: On Asian Women as Objects of Conquest and Exchange

Elaine M. Lazaro

Abstract: Luce Irigaray’s feminism goes beyond the mere assertion of female equality in a male-centered world. She argues that the cultivation of a feminine culture as opposed to a culture partial to the masculine will merely form a dyad. She saw beyond the futile fights for equality in a male-centered world, and hence campaigned for a more intensive revolution and for the recognition of sexual difference. In this essay, I reflect on Luce Irigaray’s feminism while narrating the plight of Asian, particularly but not limited to Chinese, Syrian, and Yemeni women. I mainly aim to explore how Irigaray’s kind of feminism, which carry clear traces of the philosophy of difference and anti-commodification, articulate the subjugations suffered by the said group of women. Using Irigaray’s language, I show here the forms of how the women are rendered territories of conquests, spoils of war, and merchandises or objects of exchange.

Keywords: Irigaray, violence, feminism, philosophy of difference

The Totalization of the Maternal Body

The logic of the same is then a system that negates differences. Luce Irigaray regards it as the most dangerous philosophical, cultural and symbolic construction man has ever contrived because it reduces the subject to one.

—Florinda Trani, “From the Same to the Other”

While banned in 1911, what used to be the “art” of foot binding continued to flourish until the late 1930s in some rural areas in China.¹ Then considered a marker of beauty and status, it was,

¹ Lucy Crossley, “PICTURED: The last living Chinese women with bound feet more than 100 years after the centuries-old symbol of beauty and status was banned,” in Mail Online (8 June 2014), <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2652228/PICTURED-The-living-Chinese-women-bound-feet-100-years-centuries-old-symbol-beauty-status-banned.html>.
however, accomplished with techniques that are rather tortuous. In as early
as the age of four, the girl’s feet were prepared for foot binding by drenching
them in a mixture of animal blood and herbs. Once softened, each foot’s toes
would be curled backward, pressed against the sole until the bones break.
Walking with lotus feet was seen very erotic at the time; it forces the female
to have an unbalanced and fragile gait and to walk in child-like steps.
Resembling hoofs, the shoes used in foot binding alter one’s bone structure,
giving the women a more arched behind. The lotus feet were not cheap
because they needed maintenance. They had to be washed regularly and the
bandages had to be changed from time to time—in private, because while
visually appealing, a bound set of feet smells horrendous.

Meanwhile, in France in the 1970s, Luce Irigaray gave voice,
indirectly, to the horrors of the putrid smell of the lotus feet, and its variations
across cultures, in a book that was also her dissertation, which cost her the
hard-earned place she worked hard for in the academe, *The Speculum of the
Other Woman*. Thus, what was supposed to break through the domination
of the masculine culture only proved the strength of such dominion.

Using a language that somehow resembles the polyphony of poetic-
prose and philosophy, Irigaray tells us the need for a Copernican revolution
in the male imaginary. This revolution is not merely a reversal of what
should revolve around which heavenly body i.e., gender. It is moreover a
critique of what Irigaray describes as man’s self-proclaimed ascent into being
the sun around which the earth is expected to revolve. Thus, the revolution
subsequently signifies man’s self-imposed distance from the very womb or
earth where it came from. This forgetfulness of such material and necessary
relation gives man the illusion that he is in an elect place to treat the female
as an object for his inspection. Irigaray further likens this objectification into
a game of Chinese boxes that is infinitely receding. Man looks for the
definition of the female after his own image, which is a popular narrative
across cultures, such as the Biblical depiction of Eve’s birth from Adam’s ribs.

Nonetheless, the definition of a female sought through man is
something that cannot be found, because the essence of being a female is not
something to be inspected or opened as if it is being concealed. There really
are no representations for her, “no doubt...she is said to be restless and
unstable...it is quite rigorously true that she is never exactly the same.” In
other words, every attempt to find out the essence of the female is a failure
because it is something that cannot be grasped. Irigaray’s take on the female
as a feminine other echoes Levinas’ exposition of the Other as complete

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2 Luce Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, trans. by Gillian C. Gill, (Ithaca New
3 Ibid., 134.
4 Ibid.
alterity, wherein any form of absorption into the same, which even includes subtle forms of terrorism such as negative punning, is considered violence.

Furthermore, the desire to see not only the female’s body for enjoyment, but also to see her essence by gazing at her shows the violence of the primacy of vision in Western thought. In line with this, it must be noted that Irigaray’s speculum refers to a mirror\(^5\) i.e., a mirror or glass reflector upon which a woman sees herself as a mirage that she then presents to the world. Moreover, the term “speculum” also refers to a plastic of metal instrument used in dilating the female genital for inspection. Echoing Levinas in Irigaray’s thought, vision, hence, is in a way enjoyment already. And because the woman is not allowed to speak for her own—unless in a language partial to the male imaginary according to Irigaray—she remains an object or a work of art for one’s pleasure. She is voiceless, and because she is mute, she appears to remain a face, if I may describe it in a Levinasian way, which is a thing among things that conceals her difference instead of exposing it.

This enjoyment of vision or gaze is linked into concepts as if these concepts are hands that grasp. Thus, in Irigaray, there is an intimate link between gazing and grasping.\(^6\) Concepts or terms are “prosthesis” of gazing used to dominate the feminine other. She says that “In a way our language imposes…a verbal construction that does not coincide with the form that it does not have as living.”\(^7\) Irigaray puts into question the predominant language that is partial to the male imaginary. It is a language violent to the female because it cages or grasps her in terms or concepts that attempt to totalize her radical alterity. It grips her and forgets that she is a living and dynamic being that always overflows these concepts because of her difference. Further, these concepts function as hands that hold, which reminds us of that capitalistic attitude to possess, to own, and to hoard. Being gripped in concepts, the woman is boxed and is understood within the terms of the sameness of the order. The woman is hence commoditized, priced, and sold, which is to say she is rendered a material that can be possessed.

About a month before I began to write this essay (circa 2015), there was news about European immigrants, specifically girls who are teenagers or are in their early 20s, who were lured to go to Syria from Europe on their own. Capitalizing on these young girls’ yearning for identity and a sense of complete belonging, the Islamist extremists enticed the young women who


\(^{6}\) Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, 138.

are mostly from Muslim communities, but one was noted to be a Jew, to leave their relatively comfortable lives with the pretext that they will be doing something big, i.e., they will serve for their sisters and brothers in Syria.

When Foad from France discovered that his missing sister Nora kept two Facebook accounts and seemingly lived a double life, he understood that she had gone to Syria. He quit his job in search of Nora, and when he was able to track her down finally, she was not, however, set free. It was apparently easier for young boys to quit. But for girls who are expected to be spoils of war, it would be more difficult. They are considered machines to regenerate the loss of manpower supply. This reaffirms Irigaray’s metaphor of the female as the ‘earth,’ which does not only refer to her body as it is conquered by the penis, but also to her very materiality and to her capacity to reproduce. In this case, she is valued only for her womb, or rather as a womb that would carry a supply of individuals who will be used for further conquests and totalizations in the form of wars and dominations. Incidentally, it is not an accident that there were comfort women in Asia during the world war. These Filipino, Korean, and Indonesian women, among others, were turned into comfort women not only for the soldiers’ biological necessity for sex. This is also because the conquest of these women was symbol of the subjugation of the homeland.

The maternal body is seen as possession, and as Irigaray says, “man’s eye—understood as substitute for the penis—will be able to prospect a woman’s sexual parts, seek there new sources of profit.” Establishing the link between the eye or gazing and possession, it can then be said that the maternal body is prostituted by what I propose to call “the political economy of the same.” It is of no wonder then that the female body is most harassed and debased for example in pornography as if it is not the same body that has spawned a human being. The maternal body, as if it is foreign to men and as if it is not their “origin,” is treated as a property to be utilized, to be named, to be titled, and to be possessed. The political economy of the same, which functions under the logic of identity, is what is at the face of the Western tradition. It is concerned with similarity, possession, ownership, and gathering. The male sex stands for a tradition that is partial to men, more specifically the violent fiction of the masculine. It is the denial of a tradition that could be represented by the female sex, that is, a sex which is not one, and not even two.

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8 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, 133-134.
9 Ibid., 145.
I would like, at this point, to go back to China. While Irigaray was an active participant of feminist movements in Italy—an evidence of how her theory is put into practice—she did not, however, really venture into the experiences of the Chinese or Asian women in general in her feminist philosophy. As such, I reflect here on Chinese, Syrian, Yemen women’s experiences, among others, using Irigaray’s language. This is because the reflections demonstrate the truth in her thought despite that she is European, and that her diving board is primarily the oppressions, such as the invisibility of the European women. At the same time, these reflections suggest that her theory provide tools in understanding women’s places in Asia then and now, and in articulating, if not representing their plight.

In China before, it was evident that a woman’s ownership of lotus feet is a mark that she is treated as a property, which also means that she is only and again valued for her body. One function of the lotus feet that is not aesthetic, as we know from history, is to assure that the wife will not venture into the fields of infidelity for she could not physically do so. It implies that the male is assured that the beneficiaries, i.e., their children of his economic labor, are really his own and not someone else’s because even while a woman with bound feet can still function almost normally, being still capable to do work in the field or to dance, her movements are always limited by her abnormally small feet (ideally only three inches long). She could not take part in civic or social functions, much more to move elsewhere without the accessory of a help.  

Nevertheless, having lotus feet is said to elevate a woman’s stand in a society completely partial to men. “Having a daughter with bound feet conferred many potential benefits both on the girl and her family, transforming the biological disadvantage of being born female into a distinct social advantage by increasing her opportunities for making a lucrative marriage.”

Marie Vento, who commented that historians on the art of foot binding could not seem to locate its true origins, said that what is certain is that it began in the elite classes, which gradually spiraled downward geographically and socially: Poor families, for instance, would then foot-bind their eldest female child so that she could be married off to a man from a well-off clan, while her other younger female siblings were tasked to take care of her and to work in the fields.

While having lotus feet seems to raise a woman’s societal worth in a time and place when and where being a male is equivalent to resembling a

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12 Ibid.
demigod, the foot-bound women only become a symptom of such phallogocentric society. As Irigaray puts it, she only becomes a tool that supports the “projections and projects” of the phallus, which is the illusory and imaginary symbol of the penis that is perfectly tall and erect. For Irigaray, “She prostitutes the unconscious itself to the ever present projects and projections of masculine consciousness.”¹³ That being the case, the lotus feet do not really finally carve a space for women in a male-centered China.

Instead, it only elevates the male since the female only succumbs to his right to pick a wife. This is not at all different from having the power to modify one’s appearance through cosmetic surgery just to meet the requirements of the marriage agencies in contemporary China. These agencies cater to men with money seeking for women who have this and that qualification (e.g., an oval face, between 5’4” to 5’6” in height). The lotus feet, therefore, warn us that what seems to elevate a woman and to make her an equal may actually mar her more if this elevation and equality is still within the terms and conditions of the same. It shows the danger of the attempt to fight for equality in a world whose symbolic order is partial to the masculine because the real problem is beneath, which is the symbolic order that can be seen in language and narratives.

Irigaray saw beyond the futile fights for female equality, and thus what she did first, instead of merely asserting for a female space within a male-centered world, is a cultural anthropology of the same. By examining language, by playing with symbols, and by employing metaphors such as the metaphor of fissures, she traces the origin of a male-centered world. Language and symbols, among others, are what is at the heart of a culture. This being the case, these shape the social order and fuel the logic of identity and sameness. Incidentally, Irigaray also says something related to the lotus feet, which is about the small steps taken by a woman in a world dominated by man, a world that promotes a “lotus feet culture”:

Indifferent one, keep still. If you move, you disturb their order. You cause everything to fall apart. You break the circle of their habits, the circularity of their exchanges, their knowledge, their desire: their world. Indifferent one, you must not move or be moved unless they call you. If they say 'come,' then you may go forward, ever so slightly. Measure your steps according to their need—or lack of need—for their own image. One or two steps, no more, without exuberance or turbulence. Otherwise,

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¹³ Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, 141.
you will smash everything, their mirror, their earth, their mother. You are only a small, insignificant receptacle.  

**Women as Merchandise**

*Hence women’s role as fetish-objects, inasmuch as, in exchanges, they are the manifestation and the circulation of a power of the Phallus, establishing relationships of men with each other?*  
—Luce Irigaray, “Women on the Market”

Irigaray’s metaphor of the maternal body was born only during the second phase of her career. Initially, she played with the metaphor of the lesbian and lesbian relationships as she did an abuse of metaphor of the lips. Such metaphor makes sense when imagining homosexual sexual intercourse: two lips speaking with each other is an image that calls for a new space for feminine discourse, a new language that is free from masculine domination, and a sexuality that is not dictated by the prevailing order. This relationship emancipates the female from being merely seen as a reproduct tool. It capacitates her as a willing, thinking, and acting subject that can speak for her own and who embraces her own sexuality.

Nonetheless, Irigaray ultimately had to abandon the said metaphor, and instead, then reflected on the image of the mother and of the mother and daughter relationship that had very few representations in history in the second phase of her career. She realized that the image of the lesbian, two lips speaking as one, would only isolate the female and the feminine from the order of things, and when taken literally, could even harm humankind in terms of the propagation of the species.

In the third phase of her works, she eventually resorted to the idea of the female lover. Apparently, in the French language, the word *l’amant* stands for a male lover, which depicts the male as an active subject. On the other hand, the female is called *l’aimee* or the beloved, an object of love. In other words, there is no French word that refers to a female lover. Irigaray comes up with an idea that is non-existent in her mother tongue, that of the *l’amante* or the female lover. This emancipates the woman from being merely an object of love or lack of love thereof, but instead asserts her activity and subjectivity. It is the image of a female lover, the *l’amante* that resurrects the cadaver of the two lips metaphor, without this time isolating the female.

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Earlier in this essay, we have talked a lot about the lotus feet. The lotus feet are symbolic of the reduction of the female into a maternal and reproducing body. The lotus feet stand up for a vision that the woman is merely a production machine. But while the being foot bound had socioeconomic roots in yesterday’s China, present-day Shanghai, on the other hand, shows the symptoms of the socioeconomic system of capitalism in its women’s quest for a western face. In a short documentary by journeyman.tv entitled “China’s Tortured Beauties: Make Me Look Western,” modern Chinese women, specifically those who live in or are near Shanghai, are depicted as being obsessed with the Western conception of beauty.

Having flat faces as opposed to the more three-dimensional-looking western visage, these Asian women would not only spend on exorbitantly priced cosmetics to alter their looks, but would even go so far as to undergo knife in surgeries that would give them, for instance, double eyelids and larger eyes. Since they are typically short, while the European models are tall, some Chinese women would even undergo leg-lengthening procedures. The legs would be sawn in half, a metal would be placed in between the broken bones, while the flesh and muscles would be extended. The healing process would be around twelve months; new bones are expected to form around the metal extender.

A link can be seen between the dominating attitude of capitalism, and the culture that totalizes the female. As the female is bombarded by images of what is supposedly beautiful through various forms of advertisements in media and social media, she develops anxiety and insecurities that are curable by purchasing commodities and availing of beauty services. Ironically, this cycle in turn turns the woman into a commodity herself. As Zimmerman, in her article “Revisiting Irigaray’s Essay ‘Women on the Market’” puts it, “Woman is not born a commodity, but rather becomes one. This is Luce Irigaray’s argument.”

For Zimmerman, there is a scholarship gap on Irigaray’s engagement with Marxism. Moreover, there appears to be a desertion of Irigaray’s Marxist feminism because of Marxism’s veering away from essences. (Irigaray also pointed in the article mentioned above that Marxism’s language of exchange pivots on male). Zimmerman argued that, “Revisiting Irigaray’s and Marx’s critiques of commodity in capitalism gives feminists the tools to understand the mechanism by which capitalism and patriarchy intersect to produce simultaneously in the twenty-first century late capitalism and postfeminism that conceal the continuous subordination of women.”

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19 Ibid.
In line with the criticism on Irigaray as an essentialist mentioned above, it must be noted that Xu argues that these criticisms result from a lack of understanding of Irigaray’s method.\textsuperscript{20} Irigaray’s essentialism, for Xu, cannot be denied as it is really obvious in her works, but he contends, citing Lacan (whom Irigaray disagreed with), that biological essentialism is but a mimicry to the very-sexed order that she criticizes. Irigaray’s emphasis on the biology of the female, which seems to tie the feminine identity to her genitalia or sex, made her unpopular in movements that emancipate the female from her body. Accordingly, Irigaray’s feminism is a sort of a victim mindset. Whether Irigaray’s essentialism is merely mimicry or not, it cannot be denied, nonetheless, that women’s oppression, no matter what her sexual preference is, is historically tied to her genitals, and that her genitals, her sexuality, and her capacity to bear a child make her different from a man.

But going back to the discussion between commodification and women’s body, Irigaray’s philosophy shows that Western thinking positioned man as the subject and the earth as the object. It is for this reason that man has always felt free to apply his techniques upon the earth, thinking that the earth is an inexhaustible resource for things. It is important to note, however, that Western thinking is not something inherent in the west in terms of geography. For Levinas, who influenced Irigaray, particularly in her concept of alterity, Western thinking is instead an attitude, and something that can be possessed by whoever, in whichever time or place.

The danger with this kind of thinking, however, lies with the fact that this kind of attitude towards nature is easily applicable towards an other person. When the other is treated like an object for one’s utilization, or when she is being applied with techniques, then she is being treated like an earth for one’s utilization. Stephen Pluhacek characterizes man as essentially an economic being, i.e., as a gathering, a conglomeration of flesh and blood and historical existence. As an economic being, man is also predisposed to gather and to possess.\textsuperscript{21} And yet, being “economizing beings,” there is also a danger to apply such economizing to an other that is not a “thing” to be possessed and hoarded. “This gathering takes various forms—war, patriarchy, matriarchy, consciousness, egology, representational structures—which must be brought into question.”\textsuperscript{22} It is from this questioning that “a new way of living and thinking can perhaps be discerned.”\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 48.
Moreover, as was already said earlier, Irigaray likens the woman to the earth. Both the woman and the earth are exploited by man as his-tory would show. Apparently, this danger in exploiting the woman as if she were an object, just like the earth and nature, is also possible within the confines of one’s home. When a woman is nearer, she becomes more fragile. It is easier to apply this to one’s dwelling when proximity is no longer seen as an alternative to the domination of seeing, as an experience of something other that cannot be related to the self. In one’s dwelling, the nearness of the Other, instead of a manifestation of her otherness, could be used for domination. This proximity to the feminine other shows that she is vulnerable and that she is truly alter or completely different, but it is also this proximity that puts her into danger. It is of no wonder then that the Yemen child brides experience abuse within the confines of their home. For, while in some other parts of the world, women are slowly being able to assert their alterity, in other parts of the world, such as in Yemen, women are still being drastically treated as if they were objects for disposal.

A critique on the too much generosity and welcome of the other is the displacement of who or what is at home. For to welcome the other, there is a presupposition that one must have his place in under the world. While such criticism poses the danger of totalization, the danger of the rebirth of another genocide, it is valid if it does not intend to harm the stranger coming from a strange land and when we are talking about the primacy of the ethical encounter, the beginning of one’s recognition of an other. The fear of being displaced in one’s home or being at-home is not something harmful towards the other when such fear is only a fear for oneself, in a way that one can no longer welcome or one is no longer capable of welcoming since oneself is also at a loss and disposed. What I am here trying to articulate is that the child, the child bride particularly, has to first have a home, has to understand her being at-home being amoral. It is only by first having an at-home can one begin to welcome the other. It is by first by being emplaced.

It is not uncommon in Yemen to marry off girls as young as eight or ten to men who could pass as their fathers or grandfathers. These families are often very poor and would be grateful to have one mouth less to feed, and thus by disposing their young girl, it benefits them economically. Many of these child brides would end up working for the families of their husbands as if they were slaves. Some (because some do not even) arrive at the hospital a few days after marriage because their fragile, small, but rather flexible and writhing young bodies were not able to take the consummation of such socioeconomic marriage. Their bodies were bodies still growing and not mature ones designed to carry a child. It is a form of violence to expect a child to carry in the body of her home someone other than herself.
While Irigaray said that it is in fact in “the first moments of drawing near to one another that the other moves us the most, touching us in a global, unknowable, uncontrollable manner,” we often end up, however, in making the other “our own—through knowledge, sensibility, culture. Entering our horizon, our world, the other loses the strangeness of his or her appeal.” Irigaray follows the thread of connecting the Western attitude to possess, which is guided by the logic of the same. The woman, usually associated with nature, nurture, and the earth, is easily seen as another victim of the capitalistic tendency to explore resources that eventually lead to exploitation.

It is of no wonder then that women are traded in the market just like the child brides. Women are priced and bargained and sold as merchandises not just in prostitution dens, cabarets, or cheap and sketchy bars. Women are traded and sold by the media, for example. They are being sold to the other women who are in turn sold to the capitalists, who would profit whenever they succeed in appealing to her insecurities, her flaws, and her very materiality (and as such we cannot here deny that her identity is essentially linked to her body). Fermon echoes Irigaray when she says that traditionally, women have always been “commodities, objects but never subjects of exchange.” While men are seen as entities that could rightly govern themselves, women are seen as children-like, and like objects and children, they are subject to being governed.

Epilogue

Let them have oneness, with its prerogatives, its domination, its solipsisms: like the sun … Our vital energies are spent in this wearisome labor of doubling and miming. We have been destined to reproduce—that sameness in which, for centuries, we have been the other.
—Luce Irigaray

At the heart, however, of a culture that merely uses the woman as an object of exchange, and a culture that functions merely on the logic of object exchange are symbols, such as language. For Irigaray does not merely attempt to create a space to cultivate a culture specifically caring of the female; instead, what she did is an anthropology of a culture that is partial to

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24 Ibid., 45.
26 Ibid., 124.
the masculine. By masculine, Irigaray is not simply referring to individuals who are born with penises. Masculinity is a character that can be possessed by every human being, symbolized by the perfectly straight penis. This “one” sex is a metaphor for a kind of worldview that reduces what is completely alter into the same. One way of diagnosing such culture is by examining language and symbolic objects, both of which are symbols. A culture, of course, is only mediated and thrives in symbols. Irigaray is not being biased to the female sex.

Even in as early as her *Speculum of the Other Woman*, Irigaray has been giving hints that the male is also a victim of his very “projects and projections.” The male gender is also oppressed by the order of things that revert to the violence of the same. For instance, the male is being perpetually challenged to be able to prove that literally and figuratively, he is an erect and sturdy phallus that points upward directly. The sturdy and rather narrow definition of masculinity would confuse a lot of men and would force a great number to theatrically play that part of being macho lest they risk being mistaken for someone with a different gender preference.

Irigaray’s project seems to be an attempt to find cracks into the sturdiness of the same by first characterizing the opposite of sameness or the masculine. However, Irigaray is not merely positing a binary or a second voice to break the monotony of the dialogue of the same. Instead of being another symbolic object to symbolize the new order of things, the female sex in the image of fissures does not simply become an other to the same, for its very otherness lie in the fact that it does not only mirror the sameness of the same. It comes from elsewhere and surprisingly possesses an otherness that is not only irreducible, but also too many in such a way that it does not simply succumb to the totalizing gaze of the same.

The oneness of the penis is an attitude. It is the same attitude possessed by those who totalized the victims of the Holocaust. It is the same attitude possessed by those who keep on interpreting the world in his own terms, based on his own comfort and preference and ambitions. The oneness of the penis that resists otherness is the attitude of playing deaf, of being tired of listening, of pretending to listen.

A culture that thrives in the symbolic dominion of the penis is partial to men and is very violent to women, but it does not mean that the males are exempted from its oppressive dominion. Even men who do not act like alpha males (who rather act theatrically sometimes) can be victims, especially when they are dubbed as gay or homosexuals even though their sexual preference is not really such. Males are also expected to play their part in prolonging the illusion of the oneness of the penis. In a sense, although the male culture is of
course essentially partial to men and is basically oppressive to women, which is the reason why Irigaray argues for a female culture, the male culture does not exempt all men from its oppression.

Because language is a symbol, just like gestures and symbolic objects, and because it is a foundation of a culture, it reflects in the everyday reality. By exemplifying how language is partial to men, she is actually showing that the everyday life is saturated by that partiality. Irigaray says:

If we continue to speak the same language to each other, we will produce the same story. Begin the same stories all over again. Don’t you feel it? Listen: men and women around us all sound the same. Same arguments, same quarrels, same scenes. Same attractions and separations. Same difficulties, the impossibility of reaching each other. Same … same …. Always the same. If we continue to speak this sameness, we speak to each other as men have spoken for centuries, as they taught us to speak, we will fail each other.29

Irigaray declares that the female should free themselves from the language spoken by the male, which is the same language used to speak about them, to price them and to measure them.30 It is only by means of breaking into this monologue that there is a possibility of new thought, a new frame of mind, new social structures, and new spaces for interaction. If the language partial to the male would continually dominate the world, then there will be no new thought. It can even be said that there really is no thinking amidst this consensus.

For that reason, her way of writing can be comparable to that of Friedrich Nietzsche, who was also very influential to her works. Nietzsche’s way of writing is often characterized as aphoristic, if not poetic. She wrote in the same manner, doing an abuse of poetic license here and there in an attempt to speak a different language, being true to her own desire of carving a space of discourse for women. Thus, she says:

Speak just the same. Because your language doesn’t follow just one thread, one course, or one pattern, we are in luck. You speak from everywhere at the same time. You touch me whole at the same time. In all senses. Why only one song, one discourse, one text at a time? To

30 Ibid.
seduce, satisfy, fill one of my 'holes'? I don't have any, with you. We are not voids, lack which wait for sustenance ...\(^{31}\)

Furthermore,

Let's quickly invent our own phrases, so that everywhere and always, we embrace.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{31}\) Ibid., 73.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 77.


Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility 2.0: Moral Foundations and Implications

Robert A. Montaña

Abstract: Recent trends in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSoR) have centered on key international personalities who have analyzed the failures of the traditional modes of CSoR practices and, in the light of these, have proposed novel directives to adjust to contemporary demands. One of these is Wayne Visser – founder and director of Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility (CSuR) International, and professor and advocate of sustainability and responsibility in business. His analysis in The Age of Responsibility of the failures of CSoR 1.0 from the Triple Curses of Modern CSoR, the characteristics of the ages and stages of CSoR, and the five principles which characterizes the fulfillment of CSuR 2.0 as a response to these failures, have caught the attention of present academic theorists on CSoR. This paper argues that: first, the failures of CSoR 1.0 emanate from an evolutionarily reductionist understanding of human nature, including its domino effect on the concept of the corporation as a juridical entity; second, a successful transition from CSoR 1.0 to CSuR 2.0 requires more of a philosophical-ethical process rather than a corporate-systemic one; and third, that the principles characterizing CSuR 2.0 presuppose a subjective and principled adherence to the Gewirthian idea of self-fulfillment through a methodological-cognitivist and virtue-based moral philosophy. From this perspective, I would explain why true sustainability ought to go beyond the harmonious relationship between society vis-à-vis ecosystems that merely leads to survival and corporate continuance; and why it should also be a reflection of a genuine love for humankind by leading us back to the contemporary application of the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) towards self-fulfillment.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility; corporate sustainability and responsibility 2.0; self-fulfillment; moral foundationalism
Clarifying the Concept

The assumptions of Chomsky’s generative grammar have opened up possibilities on how concepts such as “social responsibility” could be the product of a fusion between personal instinct and Piaget’s morality of cooperation. Faced with the urgency of the failures of this concept’s implementation, with global catastrophe at our doorsteps, definitions abound and discussions are organized in order to create novel business models in the hope that these attempts may somehow avert the seemingly irreversible effects of game theory on man’s actions. The earth has moved nearer towards the destructive environmental cycles of Venus not because of the unfortunate effects of random selfishness in the conduct of economic and political decisions but because of a paradigm shift in the understanding of what success is. For thousands of years, man has left nature generally untouched in conducting his mundane affairs. Yet the industrial revolution has reversed the passive nature of this endeavor, leaving man in a quagmire after a little more than a century, paralleling—in the words of Deleuze and Guattari—a body without organ that shoots this poison to the farthest corner of man’s existence. Now with this social cancer in its critical stage, responsibility is redefined as an attempt to stop mankind from mishandling nature further because, as Visser pointed out, the required scalability to maintain saturation levels has not been centrally planned. At the doorstep of extinction, sustainability instantly became an integrated word in explicating the conceptual notes of social responsibility.

The argument presented by Visser begins with why CSoR has failed. Of course, failure is one side of two binary concepts, the other being an ideal

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1 Noam Chomsky avers: “Human language is based on an elementary property that also seems to be biologically isolated: the property of discrete infinity, which is exhibited in its purest form by the natural numbers 1, 2, 3 … Children do not learn this property; unless the mind already possesses the basic principles, no amount of evidence could provide them.” See Noam Chomsky, New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 3-4.

2 Wayne Visser asserts: “I take CSR to stand for Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility, rather than Corporate Social Responsibility, but feel free use whichever proxy label you are most comfortable with.” It seems that there is an attempt by Visser to change how CSoR is viewed by also altering its definition. See Wayne Visser, The Age of Responsibility: CSR 2.0 and the New DNA of Business (UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd Publication, 2011), 7.

3 Wayne Visser presents a critical perspective in the introduction of one of his latest writings: “Let me begin by declaring that, after 20 years of working as a CSR practitioner and academic, I remain a CSR sceptic. By this I mean that I am not convinced that CSR – which I define as the way in which business consistently creates shared value in society through economic development, good governance, stakeholder responsiveness and environmental improvement – has been effective. In short, if CSR is viewed as a strategy for remedying the negative impacts of economic activity, it has (so far) failed.” See Wayne Visser, CSR 2.0: Transforming Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility (London: Springer, 2014).
definition. CSuR, for Visser, “is the way in which business consistently creates shared value in society through economic development, good governance, stakeholder responsiveness and environmental improvement,” and is also “an integrated, systemic approach by business that builds, rather than erodes or destroys, economic, social, human and natural capital.” Ayn Rand would require the contextualization of this “shared value” and “approach” which, definitely, would go beyond mere expressions found in corporate information drives, where the euphemisms and greenwashing in annual reports are contrasted by the holistic failures of the entire ecosystem. Visser would introduce additional significations that ought to restructure the signifier-signified relation but as Barthes’ semiotics would warn, the sign is already, in and by itself, a thought paradigm through which this value and approach should make a drastic turn. When significations go awry, then destructive virtual-reality sets in, as what the misuse of financial derivatives has done to the business world when it created a pseudo-real or casino economy where trading has paradoxically leaned more towards speculation than reality, remarkably exceeding the Pareto ratio.

Grounding is important in definitions, and sometimes distinctions are created to integrate experiential relations as when absolute poverty ($-x per day) is enhanced with reports on relative poverty experienced by peoples (set by the European Union as those living below 60% of the median household income). Sally Engle Merry expressed the need for assessment tools which call for quantifiable representations even for issues covering social justice where measurable indicators are preferred over qualified debates on the matter, in cases for instance where corporate intervention is included and standardization is required. To place CSuR then both in its qualified and quantified senses, such ought to be contextualized in terms of failures, progressions, and referents. Andrews, in a study on Ghana’s new oil find, emphasized that an “agent-oriented configuration” for CSoR—where

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4 Ayn Rand explains it in this way: “The process of concept-formation does not consist merely of grasping a few simple abstractions, such as ‘chair,’ ‘table,’ ‘hot,’ ‘cold,’ and of learning to speak. It consists of a method of using one’s consciousness, best designated by the term ‘conceptualizing.’ It is not a passive state of registering random expressions. It is an actively sustained process of identifying one’s impressions in conceptual terms, of integrating every event and every observation into a conceptual context ...” See Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” in The Ayn Rand Reader, ed. by Gary Hull and Leonard Peikoff (U.S.A.: Plume, 1999), 89.

5 Roland Barthes expounds that signification “can be conceived as a process; it is the act which binds the signifier and the signified, an act whose product is the sign. This distinction has, of course, only a classifying (and not phenomenological) value: firstly, because the union of signifier and signified, as we shall see, does not exhaust the semantic act, for the sign derives its value also from its surroundings ...” See Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology, trans. by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill and Wang Publications, 1964), 48.

policies emanate from the bottom-up or the grassroots level—could immensely benefit the field. Such inverted pyramids are not new to critical thinking on political structures, but this is quite novel to corporate directives that are used in predefined models. Thus, to get around what Visser termed as our “global dishonesty,” corporate success vis-à-vis CSoR policy implementation must expose rational consistency, dispelling the forms of Baudrillard’s hyper-reality that blindly lead us to a corporate Disneyland on the edge of perdition. From Enron to the Lehman Brothers, from the recent Volkswagen scandal to the Philippine experience of Ponzi schemes and predatory network marketing, there is a need to go back to Gilbert Keith Chesterton’s reminder that it is a fallacy to consider politics and ethics as mere expressions of economics, that it is human nature that exposes the true directives of business, and that its rectification is the key to true sustainability in the fullest sense.

The ages and stages of CSR—envisioned by Visser—moves from the age of greed characterized by the defensive stage; age of philanthropy with the charitable stage; age of marketing as the promotional stage; age of management in its strategic stage; and age of responsibility as the systemic stage. Philosophically, I construe these transitions as reflective of the idea that persons and corporate identities are subject to the selfish-altruistic interactions imposed by evolutionary fundamentals, with the latter ages as reactions against unsustainable practices that have established clear patterns of extinction-level miscalculations. These ages and stages are based on foundational assumptions and could further be enhanced by piercing through the philosophical-ethical directives from contrary assumptions.

**Evolutionary Interactions and its Failures**

Visser noted that the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008 overturned the supposed unwavering faith in greed as the mover of the invisible hand that stabilizes the market forces governing capitalism. Before this, however,

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7 Nathan Andrews averred: “The findings from this study suggest that CSR initiatives can benefit immensely from an agent-oriented configuration that sees social responsibility from a bottom-up or grassroots perspective.” While needs-based initiatives are already integrated in CSoR plans, its overall structure remains top-bottom. See Nathan Andrews, “Community Expectations from Ghana’s New Oil Find: Conceptualizing Corporate Social Responsibility as a Grassroots-Oriented Process,” in *Africa Today*, 60:1 (2013): 63.

8 Gilbert Keith Chesterton argues: “The materialist theory of history, that all politics and ethics are the expression of economics, is a very simple fallacy indeed. It consists simply of confusing the necessary conditions of life with the normal preoccupations of life, that are quite a different thing. It is like saying that because a man can only walk about on two legs, therefore he never walks about except to buy shoes and stockings.” See Gilbert Keith Chesterton, *The Everlasting Man* (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1925), 137.
especially at the beginning of the financial derivatives trading during the 70’s, there seems to be an unwritten *laissez-faire* mandate to leave greed alone, with the fear that tinkering with this basic instinct of peoples could lead to financial collapse. Besides, for the businessman with the standard notion of success, greed works and is the useful expression of selfishness that permeates the constitutive core of nature.

The evolutionary basis for selfishness goes deeper, down to the basic unit of heredity or to our very genes as Richard Dawkins has argued. This trait, handed down through thousands of generations by adaptive replication, has been utilized to explain why individuals and groups—functioning as survival machines—in their attempt to survive and pass on the characteristics of their “immortal coils,” have behaved positively in the face of success or correctively in cases of failures. In Dawkins’ analysis of decisions in aggressive situations with complex rivalries, stable strategies are naturally created, leading to combinations of acts such as probing, retaliations, and bullying.9 In the corporate world, for instance, predatory pricing by rogue individuals threaten price stability and are thus dealt with by the commune with retaliatory acts by means of compacts and penalties. To avoid such retaliation—when greed reaches its tipping point and threatens to destabilize communal strategies—a reactive-philanthropy could open up more accessible channels for the much needed trickle-down of resources.

Evolutionary narrative on group selection has shown that individual selfishness has generally worked for most species until after communal survival would require the sacrifice of one altruistic member, as in the case of bees. As applied to humans, this may possibly be the foundation for moral thinking, as Neil Levy had implied,10 and could be the basis for cooperation

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9 An evolutionist would interpret Visser’s transition to another age as progression. Dawkins, speaking about invasions in gene pools explains: “Occasionally, a new gene does succeed in invading the set: it succeeds in spreading though the gene pool. There is a transitional period of instability, terminating in a new evolutionarily stable set – a little bit of evolution has occurred. By analogy with the aggression strategies, a population might have more than one alternative stable point, and it might occasionally flip from one to another.” Here Dawkins further explains that merit is judged against its contribution to the evolutionary stable set. With this perspective, it would not be surprising that tipping points between transitions are experiences of the failures of the previous CSoR age. See Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 93.

10 Neil Levy, however, sets a middle ground between moral rationalists and evolutionists: “Morality comes to us as a product of our evolutionary history. This history systematically favored (genetic) selfish behavior and eliminated genetic altruism. Yet it gives us the very concept that leads us to condemn selfishness and approve of selflessness. Evolution provided us with a concept we can turn back against evolution. From the mindless and mindlessly selfish rose beings capable of rationality and morality.” This position implies that part of the cooperative strategy is mandated not by mere evolutionary altruism but also by reason. See Neil Levy, *What Makes Us Moral? Crossing the Boundaries of Biology* (Oxford: One world Publications, 2004), 88.
between and among groups. Since game theory examples—specifically the *prisoners’ dilemma*—have shown that selfishness in scenarios of pluralistic conflict and distrust could lead to disastrous results for all, then cooperation could end up being an alternative choice.

The kind of generosity required by philanthrocapitalism could easily be sustained by overflowing capital; however, as a strategy for those in the middle-market and below, an interactive exchange of goodwill becomes necessary. Opportunity costs in favor of social responsibility that eventually tilt the balance for survival would require sustainable cooperation between and among the shareholders and the stakeholders of companies. As Robert Axelrod has averred, cooperation among egoists even without friendship, foresight, or central authority is evolutionarily possible and, in order to understand this phenomenon, he organized a Computer Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament for a viable program in a game theory scenario. With participants from various academic fields joining the contest, the simplest of all the programs (TIT for TAT)—where a player begins cooperatively and then follows the behavior of the other player—won after multiple rounds. Axelrod noted that during the first world war, even antagonists on opposite trenches paradoxically practiced a live-and-let-live policy despite orders for aggression. Subtle practices such as pattered attacks, spontaneous ceasefires, apologies, and the like showed tendencies towards a cooperative attitude as a *status quo* despite the overall hostile policy of the war.\(^\text{11}\)

Theoretically, then, TIT for TAT should be sufficient enough as an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) in the corporate world, where cooperation becomes the standard of transactions and deviants are dealt with collectively. While the Age of Greed would be disastrous, the Age of Philanthropy ought to have provided the evolutionary counter-balance to extreme rapacity and should have provided sufficient equity for social justice. Yet the latter is still nowhere in sight.

Altruism is at the forefront of both individual and institutional philanthropy that has elevated conventional standards of generosity by sheer volume, yet Visser has reacted to philanthrocapitalism with a caveat as it presents a vicious cycle of superior mentalities providing solutions to problems created by their systems. True enough, such approach has created comfort zones in slippery slopes that have stifled creativity against much-

\(^{11}\) Robert Axelrod explained, however, that the evolution of cooperation has different bases compared to generic notions of evolution: “The mechanisms for evolution involved neither blind mutation nor survival of the fittest. Unlike blind mutation, the soldiers understood their situation and actively tried to make the most of it … The strategies were based on thought as well as experience … Thus the evolution of strategies was based on deliberate rather than blind adaptation.” Other scholars would soon share with Axelrod the idea of reason as a counter-force against the mandates of hereditary instinct. See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1984), 84.
needed systemic sustainability. To treat philanthropy as strategic would, in Kantian terms, be acting out a hypothetical imperative merely in accord with one’s duty as profit inclinations are pursued. On the other hand, Visser noted that while venture philanthropy is essentially strategic, its link with social issues and its sustainable outlook could lead to an accessible path towards sufficient scalability—a characteristic of the Age of Responsibility. Issue-based managerial decisions have been deliberated by scholars such as Thomas Jones who provided such a management model where ethical decision making by individuals in organizations are analyzed in accord with the intensity of perceived moral issues.

The failures of CSoR 1.0—practiced as incremental, peripheral, or as an economic objective—still reflect a systemic approach that attempts to attribute to corporations the same genetic structure of evolutionary individuals. In this case, however, comfort zones are created whereby management of responsible actions are standardized, set aside as sole responsibilities of foundations, or justified on the basis of some vague future qualitative benefit for the corporation. It is quite paradoxical why time-tested management factors that have led to the success of great businessmen were not applied to such an urgent and essential objective as to preserve the saturation points of our ecosystem. Among these as listed by Napoleon Hill are desire, imagination, and organized planning that lead to the “crystallization of desire.” Visser’s issue with the incremental pacing of CSoR is its inability to establish sufficient scalability where Peter Drucker’s Management by Objectives (MBO), W. Edwards Deming’s 14 key principles of management that led to the movement for Total Quality Management (TQM), and the present accreditations done by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) have not created sufficient conditions to

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12 Roger Scruton, interpreting the nature of these imperatives explained: “Obedience to a hypothetical imperative is always obedience to the condition expressed in its antecedent. It therefore always involves heteronomy of the will. Obedience to a categorical imperative, however, since it springs from reason alone, must always be autonomous.” Similarly, philanthropy as strategic would also be heteronomous. See Roger Scruton, *Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 68.

13 Thomas Jones explains the concept: “Moral intensity is a construct that captures the extent of issue-related moral imperative in a situation. It is multidimensional, and its component parts are characteristics of the moral issue such as magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity, and concentration of effect.” Here it could be surmised that, while Jones’ concept of intensity does not stray far from Bentham’s idea, the former has nonetheless included novel integrations such as consensus and probability. See Thomas Jones, “Ethical Decision Making by Individuals in Organizations: An Issue-Contingent Model,” in *The Academy of Management Review*, 16:2 (1991) 372.

substantially lower global temperatures, drastically lessen poverty, and improve non-governmental services.\textsuperscript{15}

The conceptual projection through desire and imagination that Hill envisioned, when applied to contemporary problems, could have pierced through micro-management towards a more globalized oversight—and such could no longer be subject to certification very much like a universal form of the “Master Mind” principle espoused by Hill. It is fortunate that ISO has opened up its horizon of thought by creating the ISO 26000:2010 (Social Responsibility). Aware of the extended nature of such responsiveness, ISO has explained that no certifications but only guidance and clarifications could be provided. With no accreditation, however, a paradigm shift in corporate thinking is still needed for such guidance to translate to actual policy and action.

Critical philosophy would, however, view this scenario as an issue of power inequalities. Axel Honneth explained in his lecture on “Social Freedom, Morality and Markets” at the University College Dublin that in the case of economic dependency, market participants may be unable to decide upon contracts, leading to what moral economism would view as a market failure that needs reforms. In this sense, CSoR becomes more real and achievable as systemic hindrances to holistic human development are set aside. Honneth further concludes with Hegel that the possibilities of self-consciousness require a proto-morality that recognizes effectuation of change only through the self-restriction of the other and that, after the realization of mutual dependency, a struggle commences that creates what is termed as the “space of reasons” or, loosely, shared rationality.\textsuperscript{16} As with all forms of guidelines, ISO remains passive and, as such, needs an already existing conviction or “shared rationality” on the part of the corporate world to establish sustainable structures of equalities that would open up capabilities on the part of market participants to put objectives up to scale, ultimately disregarding the thought that CSoR is a project-based peripheral endeavor.

In discussing such a corporate response from the firm perspective, Abagail McWilliams et al. revealed that, drawn from a cost-benefit analysis, there is a level of CSoR that maximizes profits while satisfying the stakeholders, and this can be derived by setting the level at a point equal to increased revenue from increased demand. I argue, however, that while this may exude practicality, this point is severely limiting and may lead to variances and non-sustainability of CSoR commitments. Justifying CSoR within the confines of economic and financial viability is a circular trap inasmuch as responsibility cannot be simply treated as a dependent variable.


in a regression line. Responsibility is a moral directive and if such is reduced to a component of a feasibility study, it ceases to be an avenue through which the necessary cultural conditions for economic development to thrive are created. From this perspective, the traditional assumption that business decisions are geared towards maximization of pragmatic objectives, upon closer scrutiny, is just the tip of the iceberg—the underlying reason being moral and then eventually psychological and cultural.

The Keynesian emphasis on “animal spirits”—partly spurred by the Great Depression—exposes the unseen psychological factors that affect decisions, ultimately redirecting macroeconomic movements. George Akerlof (who was awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics), together with Robert Shiller, described five different aspects of animal spirits which affect economic decisions: confidence, fairness, corruption and antisocial behavior, money illusion, and stories.\(^{17}\) The classical viewpoint that merely relied on pure utilitarian motives and rationality ultimately was unable to “save the appearances” provided by economic phenomena. Yet, if the Keynesian paradigm eventually ends up more adaptive even in our contemporary times, then these aspects—which are intertwined with moral and psychological requirements and failures—are part of reality, reducing purely Return on Investment (ROI) arguments into insignificance both as an objective and as a model.

On the other side, expounding on the idea of trust and the effect of culture on economics, Francis Fukuyama reacted against the view that the two successful economies, America and Japan, were individualistic and statist, respectively. He noted the strong adherence of the Americans to voluntary associations and the Japanese dependence on the prewar zaibatsu and the postwar rise of the horizontal and vertical keiretsu networks as indications of strong intermediary associations. The trust relations thus created function as a social capital—the main factor and ingredient for the kind of sociability that spurs cooperation for mutual enrichment.\(^{18}\) Here we

\(^{17}\) This argument is a break from traditional textbook-type economic theory. The authors explained: “We see that animal spirits provide an easy answer to each of these questions. We also see that, correspondingly, none of these questions can be answered if people are viewed as having only economic motivations which they pursue rationally – that is, if the economy is seen as operating according to the invisible hand of Adam Smith.” See George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, \textit{Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 6.

\(^{18}\) Francis Fukuyama clarifies, however, that certain political conditions would be conducive for this mutual enrichment. He averred: “The concept of social capital makes clear why capitalism and democracy are so closely related. A healthy capitalist economy is one in which there will be sufficient social capital in the underlying society to permit businesses, corporations, networks, and the like to be self-organizing. In default of this self-organizing capability, the state can step in to promote key firms and sectors, but markets almost always work more efficiently when private actors are making the decisions.” See Francis Fukuyama,
could see that trust, as an offshoot of fairness leading to confidence, appears to be a precondition of success, and disregarding the complexities of positive human relations in the corporate world would not only reduce participants into mere calculating machines, but also misjudge the future projectile of social responsibility. This inverse relationship is noted by Peter Singer when he argued that Japanese corporations, successful as they are, achieve their objectives not by setting their eyes on financial matters but on industriousness.19 Zygmunt Bauman opines that the relationship between culture and management is a paradox inasmuch as culture conflicts with management whenever the latter restricts its creativity while culture creators need the former to fulfill their objectives.20 These positions expose the more expansive nature of culture and its relations, why corporate endeavor ought not to function independently, and how mere utilitarian considerations in business and economic motives would impair the effective implementation of true social responsibility.

The qualitative sphere that governs responsibility reduces the capability of standard business feedback mechanisms that should be able to determine levels of returns for investments in such endeavors. Qualitative and quantitative attempts to link CSoR with financial returns yielded various and sometimes conflicting results due to the inability of data gathering to isolate real-world social and cultural factors in establishing descriptions and statistical correlations. Jean B. McGuire et al. admitted that measuring CSoR as a concept is difficult and suggested the possibility of a reverse analysis where financial performance is treated as a variable that affects social responsibility.21 If this latter study is validated, then the cart moves in front of the horse and CSoR becomes just a proportionate activity vis-à-vis economic capacity, leading us back to incremental responses coupled with the lack of scalability. From another point, Kenneth E. Aupperle et al. empirically tried to correlate CSoR with profitability, utilizing a forced-choice instrument in the attempt to minimize bias. Utilizing Archie Carroll’s Four-

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19 Peter Singer, How are we to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest (New York: Prometheus Books, 195), 118-119.

20 Zygmunt Bauman seems to imply the existence of a conflict between creativity and efficiency, including their mutual need for each other. He argued: “Culture creators have no choice but to live with that paradox. However loudly they protest against managers’ pretensions and interference, the alternative to seeking a modus co-vivendi with administration is to sink into irrelevance.” See Zygmunt Bauman, Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 199.

Point Model, the study surprisingly found an inverse relation between the economic and ethical components, signifying that the non-economic components were virtually set aside whenever attention is moved towards the economic. Overall, however, no statistically significant relationship was found between social responsibility and profitability. In an analysis regarding the marketization of poverty, Anke Schwittay averred that the marketization of poverty—where poverty alleviation is projected in terms of those at the Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) being treated as market targets—would not be able to eradicate poverty as drivers of circumstances are not dealt with. Marina Welker and David Wood, in their analysis of shareholder activism and alienation, noted the multiple lives that shareholders face—with one side being pragmatic and the other being moral. With this, sometimes their moral selves are subverted by the constrictions of their roles, and at worse, they end up being calculating machines, lessening the possibility of activism towards what is right. These studies expose the need to subvert interest-based objectives—as espoused by evolutionary theories—to the holistic moral framework of man even in business undertakings. Failures of

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22 This model divided the social responsibility categories into: discretionary, ethical, legal, and economic. The author, however, clarified the complex nature as regards the scope of the ethical: “Although the first two categories embody ethical norms, there are additional behaviors and activities that are not necessarily codified into law but nevertheless are expected of business by society’s members. Ethical responsibilities are ill defined and consequently are among the most difficult for business to deal with.” See Archie Carroll, “A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance,” in *The Academy of Management Review*, 4:4 (1979): 500.

23 New methodologies to deal with such a study have been suggested by the authors: “Still, this study has not been able to corroborate the claims of either advocates or critics as to the value social responsibility may have for industrial organizations. Perhaps its merits simply do not show up on the ‘bottom line’; perhaps superior methodologies or new quantitative approaches are required. It could very well be that the intangible benefits of corporate social responsibility tend to evade scientific inquiry. Perhaps this issue, whether or not corporate social responsibility is related to profitability, will never be completely resolved.” We could observe here that attempts to quantitatively correlate CSoR with other business factors lead researchers to the weaknesses of current methodologies in dealing with complex qualitative relations governing responsibility. See Kenneth E. Aupperle, Archie B. Carroll, and John D. Hatfield, “An Empirical Examination of the Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Profitability,” in *The Academy of Management Journal*, 28:2 (1985): 462.

24 Although marketization may indirectly benefit those in the BOP, it may also distract the corporation in tackling the structural causes of poverty. Anke Schwittay explains: “Similarly, for market interventions to be regarded as solutions to poverty, the latter must be presented in a marketized way. The resulting emphasis on (potential) economic and financial returns as dictated by the legal profit-maximizing requirements under which U.S.-based TNCs operate leads to their inability to take historical, political, and sociocultural structures of poverty into account.” See Anke Schwittay, “The Marketization of Poverty,” in *Current Anthropology*, 52:53 (Supplement to April 2011): S73.

attempts to define, quantify, and measure qualitative-relational entities assert the need for dimensional shifts in understanding. Acceptance of this nature eventually becomes the tipping point for a rational directive that moves CSoR to a higher level.

The Ages of Marketing and Management as Rational Transitions

At first glance, one would expect the stages to be progressive as these begin with the Age of Greed, ending with the Age of Responsibility. It is quite surprising then why Visser would categorize the Age of Marketing or Misdirection—with its opportunistic tendency to turn philanthropy into a public relation spin—way above the Age of Philanthropy itself. The latter seems to be superior in many ways most especially because it is accompanied by the noble motives of their innovators and proponents. On the other hand, shifting the attention of stakeholders towards what is admirable for the corporation is the main objective of personal relation projects, and whenever any truth would be detrimental for any form of beneficial dressing, exposing such would not be managerially sound. Even logic abhors red herring and anecdotal fallacies because these hide certain elements that go against linguistic honesty and transparency. Implications would, however, expose the good alternate-reality towards progression. Corporations reacting with such deceptions betray their fear from the greater moral awareness demanded by their stakeholders as regards managerial decisions. Speaking on the need for an attitude towards truth for both the positive and the negative scenarios in the business world, Adrian Henriques stresses that such transparency is a moral baseline rather than a mere add-on activity to be integrated conditionally.26 Satya Menon and Barbara Kahn, in their analysis of corporate sponsorships of philanthropic activities, observed that for advocacy advertising, higher ratings for CSoR were derived when there is lower congruence between the sponsor and the issue; and for cause promotions, the reverse was noted.27 This shows that consumers subtly demanded honesty and dissociations with the brand whenever issues of a


27 Paradoxically, it seems that Advocacies—while they deal with more pressing and noble issues for societal change—end up being a riskier managerial choice. The authors conclude: “In particular, we found that cause promotions yielded higher ratings of CSR than advocacy advertising. We found evidence that this was because consumers elaborated more about the possible motives behind advocacy advertising than they did about cause promotions, which they viewed as a more usual business promotion because the promotion focuses on purchase of the product.” See Satya Menon and Barbara Kahn, “Corporate Sponsorships of Philanthropic Activities: When Do They Impact Perception of Sponsor Brand?” in Journal of Consumer Psychology, 13:3 (2003): 325.
general nature are presented. With these studies, we could infer a greater illocutionary force for such moral assertions with commissive and directive points as regards the act and its objective, respectively, to be accomplished regardless of consequence. With a commissive point, there is a subjective adherence to morality; with a directive point, it attempts to create a new state of affairs, and this ought to lead to significant change towards greater trust and respect.

The shifts in the ages proposed by Visser have raised questions as regards the metaphysical statuses of individuals and corporations, on how goodness could be attributable to both, to what extent their actions can be said to be moral, the extent of culpabilities of legal personalities that utilize oxymoronic deceptions, the nature of the corporate veil and on how such can be lifted or pierced. The Age of Management is determined by how corporations become moral agents and on why, despite Visser’s observation of the ad nauseam proliferation of sustainability-governing codes, there seems to be an apparent lack of coherence to ensure effective change. Presenting novel perspectives on the social life of the corporate form, Marina Welker et al. noted that the latter has vast and substantial influences on contemporary lives, having the establishment of demarcation lines between the economic and the moral as one of the momenta of socio-anthropological research.28 Thomas Donaldson and Lee Preston, in deducing the implications of the Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation, concluded that despite the difficulty in linking the stakeholder management to corporate performance, such can still be found in its normative base.29 We could surmise from this conclusion that corporations establishing competitive advantages must conceptually integrate intangible aspects (such as respect and reputation when implementing the Resource-Based View) and property rights (considered as human rights when considering the Market-Based View), paralleling an individual person who ought to establish human and social virtues, respectively, for him to live a moral life.

Responding to scholars who espoused the normative argument, Ronald Mitchell et al. argued that any claim to legitimacy ought to include stakeholder power and urgency of claim, explaining that while power and legitimacy may overlap, these are nonetheless distinct.30 This position

30 The power relations implied in this paper are primarily based on current management literature: “... scholars who attempt to narrow the definition of stakeholder emphasize the claim’s legitimacy based upon contract, exchange, legal title, legal right, moral right, at-risk status, or moral interest in the harms and benefits generated by company actions

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exposes the tendency of management scholars to avoid purely qualitative elements as bases for legitimate claims, yet in situations where morality is embedded in cultures, including international agencies that are guided by ideal charters, legitimacy becomes a power in itself. This is why even powerful yet corrupt corporations had to create PR frontlines to project some form of licit façade. This can be seen, for instance, in mining. According to Catherine Coumans, mining companies engage in CSoR partly due to increasing awareness and pressure from communities against environmental damages.31 In the Philippines, the struggles of Gina Lopez—who was initially appointed as the chief of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) by President Rodrigo Duterte but was eventually rejected by the Commission on Appointments (CA)—reflect the difficulties in ideally and strictly enforcing environmental compliance for sustainability from mining corporations down to small scale miners. From these positions, we could observe that stakeholder power is primarily based on moral and cultural legitimacy and only secondarily dependent on other economic factors.

Presenting the principles of CSoR, Donna Wood explained that in the institutional level, the principle of legitimacy defines the relation between business and society, with the latter providing the enforcement structure for compliance; in the organizational level, public responsibility refers to how businesses ought to improve their spheres of involvement; and in the individual level, managerial discretion is the application of personal morality of managers in their decisions.32 In another study, Kyung-Nan Koh explored the possibility of participatory management and how it can semantically shift the corporation’s designatum to a social person capable of being a moral agent despite retaining its denotatum as a legal entity by internalizing CSoR discourse.33 These arguments lead us to a serial relationship between two corporate worlds: the rigid, mathematical, and objective-oriented paradigm

and that, in contrast, scholars who favor a broad definition emphasize the stakeholder’s power to influence the firm’s behavior, whether or not there are legitimate claims.” While I affirm that such power relations could indeed influence managerial behavior, the overall moral-cultural pressures would eventually determine the latter. See Ronald K. Mitchell, Bradley R. Agle, and Donna J. Wood, “Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts,” in The Academy of Management Review, 22:4 (1997): 862.

31 Catherine Coumans, “Occupying Spaces Created by Conflict Anthropologists, Development NGOs, Responsible Investment, and Mining,” in Current Anthropology, 52:S3 (Supplement to April 2011): S30.
of thought for efficiency and effectiveness; and the business decision as an extension of the decisions of persons as moral agents. Ethical academicians and management theorists must work hand-in-hand in determining the fusion of both horizons for a more adaptive business milieu. A new archetype of thought must be built upon the framework of corporations as agents of care, acting as intermediaries for the fulfillment of the holistic human person.

The Age of Responsibility as Human Self-Fulfillment

It is noteworthy that the examples provided by Visser to introduce the Age of Responsibility exposed tipping points of awakenings as regards the proponents’ shortcomings and on how redirecting their paradigms of thought can rectify these: Ray Anderson of Interface changed his mindset after reading Paul Hawken’s *The Ecology of Commerce*; Anurag Gupta was deeply affected by the earthquake in Latur in 1993 and sympathetically provided earthquake resistant designs; and Harold Lee Scott Junior shifted Wal-Mart’s direction towards green policies after meeting with Peter Seligmann of Conservation International. Their decisions and programs have led to the Principles of CSuR 2.0.

Visser averred that the realization of Systemic CSuR 2.0 is characterized by five principles, namely: creativity utilized correctively for social and environmental balance; scalability which is sufficient for the herculean tasks at hand; responsiveness beyond routine and the normal comfort zones of management; glocality being ideally-global yet locally-applicable; and circularity in perspective where waste is totally recycled, imagining the earth more as a spaceship with limited resources rather than as a vast land with unlimited wealth. Here, we could construe that Visser is arguing that the full potential of the human mind—the source of management and survival principles—must effectively and efficiently reach the tipping point for man to be able to pull himself up from the quicksand of perdition.

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34 CSuR 2.0 was patterned by Visser in accord with Web 2.0 – a revolutionary concept for web applications characterized by sharing, user-friendly designs, and collaborative structures. In one of his online articles, he wrote: “The field of what is variously known as CSR, sustainability, corporate citizenship and business ethics is ushering in a new era in the relationship between business and society. Simply put, we are shifting from the old concept of CSR – the classic notion of ‘Corporate Social Responsibility,’ which I call CSR 1.0 – to a new, integrated conception – CSR 2.0, which can be more accurately labelled ‘Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility.’ The allusion to the Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 is no coincidence. The transformation of the internet through the emergence of social media networks, user-generated content and open source approaches is a fitting metaphor for the changes business is experiencing as it begins to redefine its role in society.” See Wayne Visser, “The New Era of Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility,” in *CSR International Inspiration Series*, 1 (2008).
emanating from the social and environmental damage incurred by his own hand.

Malcolm Gladwell, writing about tipping points, explained that the emergence of ideas that eventually made differences should be treated as epidemics, as they spread like viruses. Indeed, for even in the Philippines, the concept of sustainable responsibility can be seen, for instance, in Holcim’s Continuous Emissions Monitoring System that go beyond the Philippine requirements for the Clean Air Act; or in the Agos Hydraulic Ram Pump Project of Coca Cola Philippines that is able to transport fresh water to upland communities utilizing water pressure without electricity or fuel; or in the recycling and conservation processes in the factories of Nestle Philippines, among others.

I argue that tipping points leading to CSuR 2.0 cannot be effectuated by mere economic and financial objectives, but rather by the realization that the business world works within a larger moral framework—that it is a means towards the self-fulfillment of man as seen from the eyes of Alan Gewirth.

Bringing back the attention of the corporate world towards humanistic considerations places economics and finance within the proper level for the understanding of the true nature of the morality that governs these; and this also situates these elements within the purview of reason and the immediate implications of generic action. Gewirth, presenting a foundationalist argument for human rights, argued that action has a normative structure, having the generic features of voluntariness and purposiveness. The rational implications of action and its generic features lead to the supreme moral principle. These are, to wit: an evaluative judgment is made about the necessary goodness of the agent’s freedom and well-being as constitutive of the generic features of his action; with such evaluative judgment, a deontic judgment on a right claim for these features are made, leading to generic rights; and with the application of the Principle of Generalizability, he accepts that all other prospective purposive agents have similar rights to freedom and well-being. With this, Gewirth formulates his PGC: “Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself.”


36 Generally formulated as when a person has a certain right because of a quality, and the latter being justificatory for such a right, those all other persons having such a quality ought to have that right. In law, this appears as the Principle of Equity where all those similarly situated must be treated similarly.

37 Gewirth considers the PGC as the supreme moral principle because, unlike other moral principles, it is universally applicable: “Since the generic features of action are involved in the necessary structure of agency, and since the agent must hold that he has rights to these
The application of the PGC mandates agents not only to respect their own generic rights and the rights of others, but also—negatively—they should refrain from interfering with the exercise of these rights. I have argued elsewhere that real-life applications of this negative duty eventually lead to positive action, ending up indirectly towards fulfillment.  

Gewirth further explains that compliance with these mandatory positive and negative duties lay down the pre-conditions that would allow agents to fulfill their reasonable aspirations and capacities, whereby reason grounds universalist morality as an essential part of the latter. If this argument is plausible, then reason itself, with its minimal deductive capacities, would establish human self-fulfillment both as a moral objective and as a foundation even in his business and corporate endeavors.

Yet, capitalism in its present form does not have this paradigm and, for this reason, Muhammad Yunus described it as a “half-developed structure” for failing to see the multi-dimensional nature of man. With this enlightened viewpoint, it would not be surprising then for Visser to include Grameen Bank—founded by Yunus—as one of the iconic leaders of the Age of Responsibility for prioritizing the BOP in microfinancing.

Although Gewirth has introduced novel relations in the understanding of self-fulfillment by relating it with various forms of moralities, reason, and the PGC, the generic idea has nonetheless been conceptualized earlier. Both Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas emphasized the actualization of the potentialities of human capacities as the basis of happiness, both through the cultivation of virtue and through the contemplation of the highest good, respectively.

While corporate thinking is generally secular, the corporate man is a multi-faceted being that yearns for things that go beyond what technologies can offer. Thus, management scholars, despite the need for qualitative precision as requirements of efficiency and effectiveness, must not lose sight of this holistic reality and objective. In fact, too much exactitude and systematization in the corporate world have created neither a moral nor a sustainable environment. George Ritzer, in exposing the McDonaldization of Society, observed that the process utilized in fast food restaurants have

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features simply insofar as he is a prospective purposive agent, he rationally must accept that his recipients also have these rights insofar as they too are prospective purposive agents. In this regard, the PGC is unlike those moral principles whose contents are contingent and normatively escapable in that they reflect the variable desires or opinions of agents.” See Alan Gewirth, *Reason and Morality* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 48, 135.

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dominated other aspects of society including, *inter alia*, politics, education, health care, and family. Due to its dimensions (efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control) it has provided convenience and consistency as regards the quality of its products; however, its rationality has paradoxically produced irrationalities. The sustenance of this system has required enormous piles of wastage and trash and has stifled creativity through bureaucratization. Production, manufacturing, health and educational systems have created similar systems and have generated proportionate irrationalities. We could surmise then that Ritzer’s observations strengthen the argument that setting aside the other dimensions of human interactions and reducing these to the standard profit-based business model would take its toll not only on sustainability but also on fulfillment as a whole.

The integrated process required to realize the objective of the corporate world as an avenue for self-fulfillment presupposes an adherence to the understanding that applied ethics is both normatively cognitive and regulative.

Jürgen Habermas espoused a form of communicative interaction where one’s maxims are discursively tested and guarantees are reciprocally given as a process that would validate actions and decisions. Universalist ethics generally suffers from solipsistic tendencies sourced either from the individual or his own object of authority; the validation process espoused by Habermas, however, would be able to set the parameters of action by setting up a participative process. A common enlightened objective for self-fulfillment—once it becomes an accepted paradigm for the corporate world—would be able to escalate into a tipping point enough to establish Visser’s principles that would catapult CSuR to the Age of Responsibility.

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Neoliberalism and our Precarious Culture

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Abstract: The fluidity, contradictions, and multiplicity of the neoliberal structures fragment the historical continuity of our culture. The signifying chain, which our culture serves, is shattered and hence there is a constant need to regain our lost identity. However, the massive concentration of the market economy dissuades us from achieving this end. Psychoanalytically, we regress into the pregenital stages of human development, which give rise to narcissistic traits. Social narcissism finds its expressions through the accumulation and possessions of lacuna of “images” and “appearances” that serve to cover existential issues in contemporary life. Reliance on surface reality, this modern-day psychopathology deadens our individual convictions on social and political issues, as well as our fidelity in emotional matters. As a consequence, we lose concern over things that might be equally or more important for the survival of our society—tradition.

Keywords: neoliberalism, culture, narcissism, transference

I. The Neoliberal Paradigm

After World War II, Friedrich Hayek called for a meeting in what was called The Mount Pelerin Society in which our so-called freedom and liberty should be grounded on the market economy.1 Liberty and freedom, which lead towards the self-determining individual, must now follow a peculiar kind of rationality, which we may refer to as the capitalist...

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1 The real reason why both Mises and Hayek argued for freedom in the market was to protect capitalist agenda of the U.S. which was threatened by the presence of socialism and communism. The fundamental rights of the individual must prevail over any regulation from external authorities including the State. Hence, historians, economists, philosophers, and political scientists have met in what is called Mont Pelerin Society to discuss what could possibly protect the freedom of the individual and the State from a totalitarian form of government. See Dieter Plehwe and Tom Mills “Defending Capitalism: The Rise of the Neoliberal Thought Collective (Part 1),” in New Left Project (12 March 2012), <http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/defending_capitalism_the_rise_of_the_neoliberal_thought_collective_part_1>.
rationality. Such economic rationality believes that the free market of various capitalist competitors maximizes consumers’ satisfaction. In fact, Friedman, Hayek and Von Mises took these human faculties of liberty and freedom as the cornerstone of their political and economic treatises from which neoliberal thinking takes its course. Both argued that neoliberalism pushes human potentiality, creativity, and productivity to grow and nourish along the market economy. Such philosophy is centered on one axiom, i.e., freedom of the market means freedom for everybody to achieve the dream of fulfilling one’s own autonomy. In this context then, the free market assumes that the economic sphere is a conditio sine qua non for the fulfillment of human life. Leys even asserts that the purpose of this economic restructuring is something material, i.e., “radical transformation in both the structure and the management of the world economy … creating for the first time in history a truly unified global capitalist economy … reflecting the interests of transnational capital.”

Taking the individual as the cornerstone of the neoliberal economic agenda, neoliberal apologists argue that there is no alternative to deregulation, free trade, and individual entrepreneurship, and competitions. As such, there is no such thing as society, and everything must be reduced to

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2 The difference between the classical laissez-faire liberalism and neoliberalism is that the former wanted “to roll back the state, to let private enterprise make profits relatively unhindered by legislation (e.g., safety at work, trade union rights, minimum wage, etc.), and unhindered by the tax costs of a welfare state. On the hand, neoliberalism needs a strong state to impose the policies enunciated by the market capital. See Ravi Kumar and Dave Hill, “Introduction: Neoliberal Capitalism and Education,” in Global Neoliberalism and Education and its Consequences, ed. by Ravi Kumar and Dave Hill (New York: Routledge, 2009), 3.

3 See Richard Peet, Unholy Trinity (Philippines: IBON Books, 2004), 3. Further, the work of Kristol argues that in a capitalist economy, all individuals are endowed with the same political rights. However, as far as economic rights are concerned, the individual depends upon economic factors that ultimately determine winners and losers in the market competition. This is the reason why some professional courses, according to Kristol, are paid better than the others. Economically, the standard for success depends upon what capitalist society projects and not what the individual wants. See Irving Kristol, “A Capitalist Conception of Justice,” in Business Ethics, 3rd ed., ed. by W. Michael Hoffman and Robert E. Frederick (New York: McGraw Hills, Inc., 1995), 68.


5 In fact, Fukuyama says that the liberal market economy which is the basis of capitalist enterprise becomes the final arrangement of modernity. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992), ix.

6 Cf. Peet, Unholy Trinity, 3.


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and for the individual, private property, personal responsibility and family. Further, this philosophy ignores morality, religion, arts, and culture, which provide values and elevate humanity above the animal condition. Within this context, neoliberalism wants to achieve a society in which every individual, with a minimum dependence on discretionary authority of his rulers, would enjoy the privileges and responsibility of determining his own conduct within previously defined frameworks of rights and duties. However, I argue that unlike the vision of the Enlightenment, neoliberalism has produced and continuously fabricates social reality because of a particular social psychic matrix which Fromm calls the social character. This brings me to the second part of this essay.

II. Erich Fromm’s Notion of Social Character

The massive concentration of the capital has brought changes in the way we see reality. For how an individual relates to the world is coursed through that psychic matrix called the social character. It is an energy which is released by the individual for survival, channeled into various paths that enable the individual to react adequately to the task demanded by the market economy. Further, it must be noted that the socio-economic forces, according to Fromm, serve as the fulcrum in the unconscious institutionalization of character. As Wiggerhaus observes “What connections there are between the social development of humanity, particularly its economic and technical development, and the development of

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10 Fromm argues that The Enlightenment period was believed to be the answer to man’s bewilderment. He says, “pride in reason as man’s instrument for his understanding and mastery of nature; optimism in the fulfillment of the fondest hopes of mankind … by virtue of his reason he has built a material world the reality of which surpasses even the dreams and visions of fairy tales and utopias …” See Erich Fromm, Man for Himself (New York: Holt and Company, 1947), 4.
11 Cf. Rainer Funk, Erich Fromm: The Courage to be Human (New York: Continuum, 1982), 19
13 Fromm argues that individual psychology is also a social one. He says, “... the personality structure of the individual is determined by social factors and on the other hand, with the extent to which psychological factors themselves influence and alter the social process. The two sides of the problem are indissolubly bound together. The personality structure, which we can recognize as affecting the social process, is itself the product of this process ...” Cf. Erich Fromm, “Man’s Impulse Structure and Its Relation to Culture” in Beyond Freud: From Individual to Social Psychology, ed. by Rainer Funk (New York: American Mental Health Foundation, 2010), 17.
its mental faculty, particularly the ego-organization of the human being?”

The oscillation between the economic forces and the mental development of society brings forth the formation of the social character. Following Fromm, Ozzane says:

In studying the psychological reactions of a social group, we deal with the character structure of the group, that is, of individual persons; we are interested, however, not in the peculiarities by which these persons differ from each other, but in that part of their character structure which is common to most members of the group. We call this character the social character.

Naturally, the function of society is determined by its economic and political goals, and it has the ways and means to direct its members to attain such goals. It also has the power to suppress the rights of its members or it can further develop them by means of instituting programs that would cater to the individual’s full growth and development. To attain such goals, its members must be guided accordingly. Society then must project an inner compulsion for the realization of such goals, which are economic, political, social, and cultural. Thus, reforms through legislations of laws, policies, or ordinances become inevitable. Through them, citizens acquire behavioral patterns that jibe with the demands of the social constructs. In other words, individual instinctual drives must adjust and adhere to these social structures in order for society to run smoothly. Any individual has to partly repress or postpone, though unconsciously, his sexual desires for the advancement of society. At this point, the interplay between the satisfactions of these drives within the social-economic structures led Fromm to assert that there is a connection between the material forces of society and the psychic apparatus of men. The dialectic relation of these two results in what Fromm calls social character. He then says:

In speaking of the socio-economic structure of society as molding one’s character, we speak only of one pole in the interconnection between social organization and man. The other pole to be considered is man’s nature.... The social process can be understood only if we start out

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with the knowledge of the reality of man, his psychic properties as well as his physiological ones ....

Further, Wilde opines that “The social character develops as an adaptation to changes in socio-economic structure, and in turn, it influences the formation of ideas, doctrines, and even individual concepts. Reciprocally, the ideological superstructure then reinforces particular social characters that are functional for the further development of the socioeconomic structure. The social character operates as an internalization of external necessities and Fromm sees it as the harnessing of human energy for the tasks of a given economic and social system.”

Hence, why particular members of society are motivated to want to act as they have to act and finding gratification in acting is the very function of the social character. Social character is the psychic force built between the material base of society and its superstructure. It is through this psychic force that “thinking is not an exclusively intellectual process, and that it is bound up with the entire character structure. Doctrines, ideals, or even individual concepts have an “emotional matrix” rooted in the character structure of the individual, and the fact that ideas have an emotional matrix is regarded as the key to understanding the spirit of a culture.

Taken in these contexts then, we ask how neoliberal structures affect the Filipino culture. What is the influence of the institutionalization of an economic rationality on the Filipino ways of expressing their social identity? Does this economic rationality lead towards fulfillment and development of common identity, which is manifested in one’s culture? This leads me to the third part of this paper.
IV. Neoliberalism and our Filipino Culture

The Philippines has fully embraced neoliberal policies as early as the ‘90s.

Since there is now a disowned responsibility of the sovereign state, neoliberalism pushes the individual and communities to govern themselves in a manner dictated upon them. One needs to become an “economic atom who dances to the tune of economic management.”

In this sense, what is now carved in the conscious mind is a kind of rationality that caters to the demands of a capitalist structure. Human reason has just become another tool in the apparatus of production, and thinking has been reduced to the level of the economic mainstream.

As a result, “the agential exercise of our choice over what to consume, our control over what we desire, our consent to the forces that enable our choices and ignite our desires and the unbridled circulation of capital and knowledge that is meant for our accumulation are primary markers of middle-class modernity.”

Honneth describes this as the “commercialization” of everyday life so that human and individual...
relationships “interact with a lifeless object without a trace of inner sentiment or any attempt at understanding the other’s point of view.”

26 As we adapt ourselves to the demands of neoliberal ideology, we acquire character traits that resemble the socio-economic structure. We possess the character of entrepreneurship, commercial competencies, and individual competition which now become our social behavior in the social sphere. Thus, neoliberalism as philosophy, Giroux suggests, is a “market ideology driven not just by the accumulation of capital, but also by an ability to reproduce itself as a form of biopolitics reaching into and commodifying all aspects of social and cultural life.”

28 Human consciousness is altered and commoditized at the service of this economic paradigm. Our individual and social identity is now set aside.

Neoliberal structures do not exempt our traditional values which serve as the locus of our emotional experience as belonging to an ethnic community. Our beliefs and traditions are dissuaded from a praxis which we could ultimately call “ours.” Giroux contends that the relentless attack of...
neoliberalism on our values resulted in the commodification of life so that “social relations between parents and children, doctors and patients, teachers and students are reduced to that of supplier and customer just as the laws of market replace the non-commodified values capable of defending vital public goods and spheres.” 33 Further, with the multiplicity, fluidity, and contradictions brought about by modern market economy, 34 our efforts to establish links with others within our social and traditional interpersonal structures disappear. 35 As a result, everything, including the self, becomes spilling and thrilling in the process of the capital. 36 Our traditional values absorb the character imprint of the capital where our ontological center is amassed into one common desire, which is money. 37 With the dictates of the private capital, we unconsciously live our lives in accordance with measurability, quantifiability, and instrumentations. 38 Neoliberalism creates in us the character of trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other’s heels. 39 It is no longer a reasoned argument arising from public discourses; it is no longer freedom to enjoy one’s own liberty; it is no longer the creative and productive potentials, which emanate from the individual himself. Rather, it is a homogenous economic discourse where human faculties are subsumed and dominated through the private capital. What we have is a corporatist culture and we assume a characterology in consonance thereof. 40 This corporatism hijacks the unique character of our traditional cherished values so that our individual and social relationships as belonging to a group, community, or ethnicity lead to social coma and political realities in terms of their desirability, significance, importance, worth, or merit. Cf. F. Landa Jocano, Filipino Value System (Quezon City: Punlad Research House, 1997), 19. 33 Henry A. Giroux, “Neoliberalism, Youth, and the Leasing of Higher Education”, 30-31. 34 I use neoliberalism and market economy synonymously in this essay. 35 Cf. Stephen Frosh, Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis, and the Self, 6-7. 36 Cf. Ibid. 37 Cf. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 318-326. 38 Cf. Deborah Cook, Adorno, Habermas, and the Search for a Rational Society (New York: Routledge, 2004), 10-11. The hybridization of capital has led to the movements from social to the political and the juridical which have defined constituent processes. The movement of the capital takes the form of control that enunciates the relationship between the state and its constituents. Neoliberal policies reify life so that our thoughts, actions, and feelings are swayed into one paradigm. It attracts our psychic energies to imbibe an economy which is thought of as liberating and thus humanizing. These policies build a character where we are cajoled into believing that we become all the more free. Cf. Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies (U.S.A.: Duke University Press, 2009), 55. See also George Lukacs, “History and Class Consciousness 1920” in History and Class Consciousness, ed. by Andy Blunden, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Meril Press, 1967), 12. 39 Cf. Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope (New York: Rinehart and Holt, 1970), 39. 40 Cf. Henry Giroux, Zombie Politics and Culture in the Age of Casino Capitalism (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Co., 2011), 22.
All of these happen because of our unconscious libidinal motivation which serves as the characterological trait of neoliberal structures. Consequently, our culture, which provides for the development of the self, is now dissolved. The signifying chain of our traditions and beliefs which we muster in order to allow a meaningful representation of reality has been dissipated. Panfilova explains that “under globalization, cultures are unified, national and cultural differences are eliminated and borders between cultural and ethnic groups are obliterated. Under these circumstances man is deprived of his usual base of socialization and lack of identity appears.” What neoliberal values project are just the surface materiality of images and appearances that would appear and reappear as a matter of the massive concentration of the capital. San Juan says that “all happens for the benefit of consumerist pleasures, solipsist jouissance, and other hedonistic games that foster the status quo of domination and subordinations.”

Taking these into context, I argue then that there is a disparity on how we practice our values privately and within our own community, and the way we behave in public, which is in accordance to the demands of neoliberal bureaucratic forces. We live and engage our public lives under a western capitalist imprint camouflaged under the banner of Filipino culture. For instance, in our own community, we practice our values in accordance to the real Filipino spirit. We uphold and cherish them most when interacting with our fellow Filipinos. Further, we practice them in the context of commonly shared meanings of things, events, or actions that would bring the best in us.

41 Cf. Ibid.
44 Cf. Ibid.
46 Cf. Peet, Unholy Trinity, 2.
47 E. San Juan, From Globalization to National Liberation: Essays of Three Decades (Manila: UP Press, 2008), xii.
48 Jocano argues that these two models simultaneously exist but they function separately. See F. Landa Jocano, Issues and Challenges in Filipino Value Formation (Quezon City: Punlad Research House, 1992) 4-5.
49 F. Landa Jocano says that our performance in social and economic developments compared with other Asian countries is not well. Our “damaged culture” which pulls back the Filipinos towards regression can be traced back in history. The Western model of transacting our socio-economic life clashes with our own traditional values. See F. Landa Jocano, Issues and Challenges in Filipino Value Formation, 4-5.
as Filipinos. These cherished values become the fundamental elements of how we share and express our own culture as a class or group bounded by a common identity. Without these cherished values, we are divested of our identity and of our need to collaborate with the very fabric of the universe in order to bestow meaning, purpose, and dignity upon our existence. Values which are rooted in one’s culture speak of the very unconscious region which is ingrained as elements of individual and social identities. Collectively, we, Filipinos, become accustomed to these traditions where we can experience our fellows because we share one common possession which is our culture.

Nevertheless, the social character emanating from the concentration of the capital deadens these cultural aspirations to the extent that we now need to dance to the tune of economic management. In this sense, our psychic energies become canalized under these neoliberal arrangements. The psychic matrix reproduced therein becomes our logic for legal and civic transactions; we unconsciously follow them as if this becomes the natural flow of social life. Thus, consciously, we imbibe the true spirit of our traditions, but unconsciously, we are swayed by the social character ingrained in us by the market economy. We are enmeshed in a network of neoliberal means and we lose the vision of the end which alone gives us significance. Hence, psychologically, our culture and the neoliberal character could not supplement each other, much less sustain each other. We now encounter “an inner incongruence in our sentiments and attitudes

52 In his book *On Being Human*, Fromm says that this humanistic experience consists in the feeling that nothing human is alien to one, that “I am you,” that one can understand another human being because both of us share as our common possession the same elements of human existence ... the broadening of self-awareness that humanistic experience brings about—including as it does the transcending of consciousness and the revelation of the sphere of the social unconscious—enables man to experience himself in the full dimension of his shared humanity. Cf. Fromm, *On Being Human*, 11.
53 Political life is subsumed under the power of the collective dimension of the market economy so that “command must be exercised to an ever greater extent over the temporal dimension of society and hence over the dimension of subjectivity.” This happens because there is no firm place to stand on in order to make sense of the world. Thus, the only real for now is the philosophy of the globalizing order of the capital where the values are aggregated into one common plane which is money. Cf. Hardt and Negri, 318-326.
54 Pines argues that the “the dominant ideological forms of thought represent something like the “common sense” of a society; they are the given, customary conceptions through which social agents comprehend their social experiences, and the normative ideals which social agents utilize for articulating their moral and political claims on one another.” Christopher Pines, *Ideology and False Consciousness* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), 65.
caused by the clash of values in the models we use to conduct our behavior.”56
Either we follow those exogenous models or invoke our inner absolutes as
our guide in our daily lives.57
The contradictions, fluidity, and multiplicity of the market economy
shatter the historical continuity of our culture. Lasch argues that “we are fast
losing the sense of belonging to a succession of generations originating in the
past and stretching into the future. It is the waning of the sense of historical
time-in particular, the erosion of any strong concern for posterity.”58 The
signifying chain that our culture rightly serves in linking our past, present,
and future snaps and the terrifying concentration of neoliberal ideology
disallows an integrated and meaningful reality to be built.59 In neoliberal
structures, there is a crushing of socially interactive framework of mutual
recognition and adaptation.60 Its power annihilates social spaces and brings
about the saturation of images that would appear and reappear as an
expression of a capitalist ideology.61 In other words, we are not structured in
stable and integrated ways; instead, we are full of contradictions, fluidities,
frustrations, and impulses.62 Hence, neoliberal character dissuades the very
locus of interactions, “throwing previous assumptions and traditions to the
wind, undermining accepted ideas and modes of relationship between
people and people, and between people and things.”63 As a result, there arises
a disassociation and an emotional withdrawal which result in the alienation
of the self, which in turn is transformed into a wish not to be oneself.64
An alienated person, says Fromm, is estranged from himself, out of
touch with himself. The individual does not experience himself as the center
of his world. He rather creates an artificial world for himself. In the alienated
individual, life is denied because of “unsatisfactory adaptation of instincts to
social reality.”65 Control, creativity, independent thought is all baulked and

56 Jocano, Issues and Challenges in Filipino Formation, 4-10.
58 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1979), 5.
60 Cf. Robert Dunn, Identity Crises: Social Critique of Postmodernity (London, University
61 See Peet, Unholy Trinity, 2.
63 Ibid., 6.
64 See Frederick Weiss, “Self-Alienation, Psychoanalysis and the Wholeness of Man,” in
Fortschritte der Psychoanalyse. Internationales Jahrbuch zur Weiterentwicklung der Psychoanalyse,
ed. by A. Heigl-Evers, vol. 1 (Göttingen: Verlag für Psychologie – Dr. C. J. Hofgrefe, 1964), 6. We
may also add that in an alienated self, powerlessness and isolation engulf the individual towards
psychoanalytic regression and thus he needs somebody to make him secure. Cf. Erich Fromm,
Greatness and Limitation of Freud’s Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 42.
65 See Fromm, “Psychoanalytic Characterology and Its Relevance for Social
Psychology,” 165.
the inevitable result is a fight or flight on the part of the worker, apathy, destructiveness, and psychic regression.\textsuperscript{66} With an instrumentalized rationality coupled with a fragmented form of cultural life, there exists emptiness within.\textsuperscript{67} We seek worship figures that are considered savior and helpers even if, in reality, they may be half-mad.\textsuperscript{68} To the extent that the neoliberal structures restrict the libidinal satisfaction of an individual, madness pushes us towards corresponding intensification of pregenital impulses, which force the libido to flow backward to the pregenital zones.\textsuperscript{69} However, we could no longer go back in the pre-individual state; instead, we have to move forward in history.\textsuperscript{70} By doing so, we have to redirect our psychic energies to find stability as to our social and individual identity.\textsuperscript{71} Identity is the lasting refuge and honor amidst the precariousness of our culture.\textsuperscript{72}

However, I argue that since the social characterology of the market economy has turned our values and traditions into a \textit{world-less} universe, the locus of the self is devoid of any human base, which is now unbearable.\textsuperscript{73} Our mental-emotional maturity and even our intellectual development are derailed because of the impact of the market economy. In other words, the instability of our culture results in a disembedded life.

Since everything solid melts into air and we are devoid of any ontological center to uphold our social identity, there is a need to make up

\textsuperscript{66} Cf. Lakshmana, \textit{Democratic Planning}, 1. See also Fromm’s \textit{The Sane Society}, 124-130.
\textsuperscript{67} Cf. Lasch, \textit{The Culture of Narcissism}, 13.
\textsuperscript{68} See Fromm, \textit{Greatness and Limitations of Freud’s Thought}, 42.
\textsuperscript{69} For Fromm, the pregenital areas remain to be extraordinarily strong. The rejection or satisfaction experienced in early childhood makes the individual fixated either in the oral or anal stages of life. These fixations are intensified by the spirit projected by capitalism. See \textit{Ibid.}, 178-184.
\textsuperscript{70} See Erich Fromm, “A New Humanism as a Condition for the One World” in \textit{On Being Human}, 75.
\textsuperscript{71} See Fromm, \textit{Greatness and Limitation of Freud’s Thought}, 42. Psychoanalytically, culture is what Fromm describes as the all-nurturing mother who loves, caresses, protects her all her children equally. These human qualities can only be attained if man is rooted with his fellow man and rooted in nature. He says is it surprising to find in the average adult a deep longing for the security and rootedness which the relationship to his mother once gave him? Is it not to be expected that he cannot give up this intense longing unless he finds other ways of being rooted? To find his identity, man may be rooted in the family, clan, and later on in the society, nation, church which assume the same function which the mother had originally for the child … The person who does not belong to the same clan is considered as alien and dangerous—as not sharing in the same human qualities which only the own clan possesses.” See Fromm, \textit{The Sane Society}, 37-40.
\textsuperscript{73} Cf. Panfilova, “Identity as a Problem of Today,” 2.
for the self from the onslaught of the market economy. The self, says Lasch, contracts into a defensive core in order to search for an emotional equilibrium. Psychoanalytically, to search for this emotional state is a pressure to regress towards passive and primeval state where the world remains uncreated and unformed. Fromm maintains that with an individual without any form of security, it is but natural to regress and to sublimate libidinal desires by seeking worship figures considered as saviors or helpers. This means that the social characterology acquired from the prevailing conditions of modern capitalism brings about anxiety and tension, with which the only way to cope is to sublimate or regress and bring out narcissistic traits, which is a contemporary psychopathology. Narcissistic traits become a survival strategy in which the self is at the brink of breaking down because of the persecutory demands of the socio-economic environment. With the thrill and dread of a world falling apart, we unconsciously withdraw our desires back to the self in which case, we become a narcissist. Frosh argues:

... in a society in which everyone’s selfhood is undermined by the rapidity of cultural, economic and technological change, by uncertainty over who controls what (accompanied by a sense that someone or something is in control of each of us), by fascination with

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76 See Fromm, Greatness and Limitations of Freud’s Thought, 42.

77 In Freud’s psycho-sexual development, the infant is described as primarily a narcissist. He cannot distinguish yet the difference between the “I” and the “not-I”. He and the objects around are considered to be one. Hence, whatever he desires, it must be fulfilled. There is a feeling of grandiosity and omnipotence rooted in the symbiotic absorption in the mother as far as the infant is concerned. See Frosh, Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis, and the Self, 104. However, in the process of individuation, the child gradually experiences hunger, frustrations, and helplessness which are so different from his former state of grandiosity and omnipotence. Soon the child now realizes that satisfaction of his desires lies outside of the “I” i.e., there exists a “not-I” which is the source of one’s satisfaction or frustration. Cf. Lasch, The Minimal Self, 166-167. However, a ‘stuck’ self, still fixated on archaic grandiose self-configurations and narcissistically-cathected objects, is at the source of narcissistic pathology. See Frosh, Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis, and the Self, 107.

78 Since everything ruptures to constant changes because of the massive concentration of the capital, Frosh argues that our culture brings about a spinning of the self which is actually in the form of violence with which each of us has to struggle in order to survive. See Frosh, Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis, and the Self, 77.

fantasies centred on interchangeable images, and by a severing of roots and traditions in the context of an increasing sameness of culture ... social uncertainty produces individual disease; personal emptiness leaves one open to the fragmenting and demeaning impact of collective regression.80

Regression into a “child-like” manner aspires for a security and this aspiration is the point of what Fromm calls transference. The presence of neoliberal paradigm in our midst leaves us with nothing but a strategy for survival. Within the market economy, our subsistence is coursed through either sublimation or reaction formation.81 As neoliberalism feeds our narcissistic desires, we sublimate our libidinal drives back to the anal stage where love for possessions is of great importance. The market intensifies our delight for having possessions through “images” and “appearances,” which find expressions in the unlimited influx of goods and services. We alter our perception not just of the self but also the world outside the self. Lasch argues that we “create a world of mirrors, insubstantial images, illusions increasingly indistinguishable from reality. The mirror effect makes the subject an object; at the same time, it makes the world of objects an extension or projection of the self.”82 The “I” reconstructs itself so that reality would all depend on “I am me, in that I am me, and you are you, in that you are you.”83 In this case, through these ‘images’, the “I” creates its own lifestyle and sphere of experiences. The individual tends to embrace only those who fall on the same “I” category. In other words, we transfer our security, productivity, freedom, and will unto this superficial neoliberal construct.84 We have created

80 See Frosh, Identity Crisis: Modernity, Psychoanalysis, and the Self, 103.
81 See Fromm, “Psychoanalytic Characterology and Its Relevance for Social Psychology,” 164-166. The sublimation of the anal eroticism is a continuation of the original love for feces since this is the first possession of the child. In adult life, this finds “expression in love for possessions … People enjoy a possession only if no one else has anything like it. They are inclined to regard everything in life as property and to protect everything that is “private” from outside invasion. This attitude does not apply to money and possessions only; it also applies to human beings, feelings, memories, and experiences. The strength of the underlying libidinous tendencies, which associate property with the private sphere, can readily be gauged by their rage over any invasion into their private life, their “freedom.” See Ibid., 170-173.
82 Lasch, The Minimal Self, 30.
84 For Fromm, in the individuation process, the helplessness and powerlessness of the child is a symptom of a need, i.e. a need for a security in the person of his parents. However, it is often neglected, according to him, that it is not only the child who is in need of security. The parents too feel helpless and powerless in the midst of the social forces surrounding them. Fromm says, “What is often overlooked, however, is the fact that the adult is helpless too. In
for ourselves illusions which introject unto our lives. The very texture of human lifeworld is schematized in accordance with nuggets of enjoyment in the form of superficial images and appearance.\textsuperscript{85} Hence, reality is made into objecthood, which includes the self.\textsuperscript{86} Never has been in the history of humanity that our age is characterized as the unlimited enjoyment of freedom in the sense that with the help and use of computer technology, unlimited production and unrestricted happiness turn into the nucleus of modern life.\textsuperscript{87} Nevertheless, says Fromm, all of these only obscure real issues that beset life, for they provide only temporary relief from our helplessness, boredom, and anxiety due to the colossal effect of modern capitalism.\textsuperscript{88} Secondly, with the onslaught of large scale companies and gigantic organizations, modern capitalism atomizes human beings so that recourse is to defend the ego through the phenomenon of transference. In this sense, we shut off from our horizons and begin to gaze at the horizon of the other. There is no reality within, any identity to hold on, but our reality is grounded and depends upon higher entities like institutions or the state.\textsuperscript{89} Fromm says that we “become a part of a larger unit, a pendant, a particle, at least a small one, of this ‘great’ person, this ‘great’ institution, or this ‘great’ idea.”\textsuperscript{90} Survival for us is to become a part, if not \textit{in toto}, of great dominance. Just to feed those narcissistic desires within, we become subalterns who cannot express our own, and whenever we want to, we just repeat the ideological narratives of authority.\textsuperscript{91} This is the reason why, in Fromm’s thinking, our lives always revolve around the psychic apparatus of domination and control, without which, we feel a meaningless existence. We need externalities to confirm who we are. We need the power from the “other”—whether it is a unit, a pendant, an article, or great institutions or people—just to allow our own individuality to grow and

\textsuperscript{85} See Dean, \textit{Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies}, 50.


\textsuperscript{88} See Fromm, \textit{On Being Human}, 53.


\textsuperscript{91} See San Juan, \textit{From Globalization to National Liberation}, 2. Fromm also comments that the bureaucratic capitalist machine has dislodge human rationality since every individual is under the illusion of having opinions when in fact he just repeats what this gigantic bureaucracy tells him. See also Erich Fromm, “The Automaton Citizen and Human Rights,” in \textit{Fromm Forum}, 12 (2008): 11-16.
develop. All of these just nourish the psychic regression caused by the precariousness of our culture.

Conclusion

The cause of neoliberal expediency is something not to be taken for granted. Although the real intention in alleviating human life and raising the dignity of man is a much-celebrated milestone on human history, we cannot disregard the fact that the negative impact of the market economy on our lives sent us into a vast vacuum where the thrilling, trampling, spinning, and elbowing become the value in order to survive. The shattering of our traditional values as Filipinos deepens the void, which in turn propels us into regression. There is nothing solid when neoliberal propaganda subsumes every facet of our lifeworld, i.e., when our consciousness is transposed into instrumentalities—“with how we are doing things; we are no longer concerned with why we are doing things. We build machines that act like men and we want to produce men who act like machines.”92 The routinary events that envelop life and the rationalizations that arise therein separate the individual from his real self, i.e., the self which is productive and creative, and the self that wants to transcend to find its unity and purpose.93

Put simply, neoliberalism has “paralyzed human rationality to the point where [our] pride in a common humanity had subsided.”94 There is no longer a ground, a security, or an orientation in which every individual person can establish his identity. The core of one’s humanity collapses so that human life now becomes a point of no boundaries. The characterology brought about by modernity silenced the unconscious expression of man’s deepest expression, i.e., his humanity. As a consequence, we lose concern over things that might be equally or more important for the survival of our society—tradition.95 To end this paper, I want to emphasize that becoming to be, i.e., becoming more man, “is” more, has more access to being and “be” more fully human in all dimensions of his existence, in everything that characterizes his humanity—all of these are done through our own cherished values and traditions.96 It is within these values and traditions that we acquire

96 See De Torre, Work, Culture, Liberation, 17-18.
consciousness on issues, conviction on matters of the intellect, and fidelity in emotional matters.97

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Abstract: Although Arendt’s literary sensibilities incline toward classical German poetry, and although she explicitly eschews self-conscious self-presentation in her writings, a distinctly modernist writerly ethos surreptitiously courses through Arendt’s work. Stuttering between narration and citation, interrupting its categorical self-confidence by exposing its overdrawn distinctions to unavoidable complications (e.g., by shadowing its privileged normative terms with perverse counterparts and further pursuing a counter-fetishistic destabilization of its normative orientation by shading its fundamental terms into intermediary semantic zones and dialectical inversions), indulging in eccentricity and experimentation while struggling against the temptation for writing to close in on itself and presume to model redemption, such writing everywhere testifies to a constitutive disorientation. Such disorientation, I will suggest, is both materially-historically conditioned and an immanent necessity of Arendt’s work, and once understood as such, brings the significance and stakes of this work into view anew.

Keywords: modernism, narration, nihilism, fetishism

I. Introduction

Broaching the question of Arendt’s modernism is hardly an unfamiliar gesture in the scholarship. Under this heading, some commentators have focused on Arendt’s anti-metaphysical cleaving to contingency, plurality, and the inaugural potential of natality. Others have stressed her prizing of conscientious individuation over social functionality and the importance of judgment to the accomplishment of such individuation. Still others have drawn attention to the plane of secular immanence projected by her inter-articulated conceptions of promising and power and to the negative dialectic of founding and refounding evident in her work on civil disobedience. But, perhaps, the most well-known of such discussions stresses Arendt’s reluctant concession of nostalgia for agonistic Athenian democracy in the face of the challenges and concomitant rational potential of modern
political life. Engaging the details of these interpretations is not my primary concern here, though it is notable that all such commentators address the topic of Arendt’s modernism at the level of thematic content. My suggestion in the following will be that Arendt’s modernism is to be located not just in the content of her political thought but in the register of her writerly practice. Given the dominant trends in the reception of her work, such a suggestion, if not immediately deemed implausible, would seem to involve no small irony. For, at first blush, what if anything seems remarkable about Arendt’s writing is its eminently unpresuming character. Fragmentation, parataxis, dense allusion, poignant elision, and disjointed narration are certainly not prominent features of Arendt’s writing. Indeed, to address the social contouring and political significance of Arendt’s writerly modernism cannot but seem a fool’s errand or worse: not just a matter of barking up the wrong tree but an egregiously abusive overinterpretation.

Certainly, Arendt’s literary sensibilities incline toward classical German poetry, of which, in fact, she had a great deal memorized. She clearly seems to favor the transmissible insights of a Dante or an Augustine rather than the stuttering expressions of dialectical crisis pursued by a Proust, a Mallarmé, a Beckett, or a Woolf. Indeed, what writerly modernist could characterize poetry, as does Arendt, as words to live by? Although Arendt invokes and occasionally pursues sustained meditations on authors such as Conrad, Melville, Proust, Faulkner, and Kafka, her writings seem oriented by premises contrary to theirs. Rather than departing from, and then continuing to thematize and sustain, the anguish of collapsed literary conventions for the sake of resisting, on the one hand, too quick, and consequently aesthetically unconvincing, recuperations of social signs and narrative forms of intelligibility, and on the other hand, complicity with a mystifying image of coherent social bonds and life practices that such signs and forms would be taken to token, Arendt’s writings are premised on the promise of understanding. They seek to transmit the joy of understanding, which is the joy of worldliness at once regained and renewed, rather than self-administer the shocks—the chaos and confusion—to which modern experience is unavoidably subject and aesthetically exploit art’s enforced marginality in a program of masochistic homeopathy. Arendt’s writings manifestly cleave to, seeking to make meaningful and thus orientative, the vicissitudes of experience, even, or especially, when this involves engaging atrocities so extreme and forms of social suffering so entrenched and opaque that they seem to exceed the measure of human judgment. Such writings manifestly seek to relieve epistemic and evaluative anxiety rather than amplify, interrogate, and channel it into turbulent form. Arendt writings succeed on their own terms when the demonic phantasmagoria emanating from rends in the fabric of self- and world-intelligibility are dispelled; when stories salvage...
from oblivion the significance of singular lives; when sufferings prone to
defensive repudiation, whether by means of socially enforced neglect or
mystifying consignment to the irrational or to the merely factual, are
elaborated in critical histories of the present that can serve as supports for the
reactivation of subjectivity and solidarity under duress, return us to the
horizon of our agency. In short, Arendt’s writings may struggle under the
pressure to understand but, it would seem, not under the pressure of
language’s inherent infelicities or emphatically modern liabilities.

To be sure, Arendt was not simply oblivious to modernist
developments. Auden was an intermittent interlocutor, and Arendt wrote
some wonderful essays on Brecht and Kafka. But as with her relationship to
Benjamin, in such cases she seemed capable of genuinely appreciating and
even approving of formal developments and corresponding political insights
that are kept at arm’s length in her own writings. Painterly and musical
modernism are nowhere explicitly discussed; Arendt was extremely averse
to Adorno; and she considered the darkness of the human heart
impenetrable; thus, she considered the sorts of Freudian speculations that
sponsor the modernist aesthetics of say, surrealism or Virginia Woof, utterly
implausible. And quite strangely, despite her interest in the history of
revolutions, neither the events in the streets of Paris in the summer of ‘68 nor
their political and intellectual aftermath show up in her reflections. Worse
still for a discussion of Arendt’s writerly modernism, Arendt explicitly resists
self-conscious self-presentation. Rather than deploy signs of authorial
presence to interrupt aesthetic delectation or the illusion of transparency, or
reflexively underscore the intimacy of literary potentiation with social
alienation, for instance, by means of writing that tends toward exhaustion
and unraveling as it allows itself to get caught in its self-referential circuitry,
tending toward listlessness, emptiness, and indulgent self-fascination,
Arendt tells stories, extends legacies, provides illuminating etymologies,
resists oblivion, judges. Her writings address the promise of understanding
to readers presumably prepared to receive it.

In comfortable language, Arendt demonstrates time and again that
we can make sense of our lives even when extraordinary pressures put our
familiar forms of understanding and habits of evaluation out of play or
render their reinvention a condition for their continued validity. Such
writings judge, lest we lose confidence in our capacity to judge. Without a
hint of the self-indulgent pathos of genius, they propose themselves as
exemplary. Their palpable efforts to come to terms with political horror and
tendentially self-occluding social catastrophe signal a prima facie resistance to
nihilism that sets her writings apart from the dominant trends of modernism.

Nonetheless, in the following I will claim that a distinctly modernist
writerly ethos surreptitiously courses through Arendt’s work; furthermore,
that attending to her writerly modernism is the key to unlocking the significance and stakes of Arendt’s central concepts; and more precisely, that the significance and stakes of her central concepts come into view only when understood as besieged and beleaguered mediations of social relations under duress, that is, mediations of the tendential dissolution of mutual interest about which, for all of her acute attention to world alienation, she remained in a way unknowing. In short, Arendt’s central concepts are, in her idiom, powerless, and it is as an unknowing expression of such powerlessness that her thinking achieves its peculiar consistency and exerts its claim on the present. Ironically, if her central concepts are sites of imperiled resistance to the tendential dissolution of mutual interest which they unknowingly bear, or closer to her idiom, if such concepts can be understood as worldly residues of worldlessness, then the historical-material conditions for her writing form its constitutive blind spot. Or to give the claim one last gloss: statelessness is the extreme and thematically articulated expression of the disaster by which her writings are everywhere haunted, and in unknowing responsivity to which her writerly modernism takes shape.

II. Elements of Arendt’s Writerly Modernism

The following may be considered the central elements of Arendt’s writerly modernism. First, Arendt’s texts stutter between narration and citation. A typical Arendtian text pursues a narrative elaboration of its central theses so coherently and comprehensively as to strike the reader as being readily amenable to paraphrase. These are eminently teachable texts; dramatic narratives that lend themselves to dramatic reenactment. *The Human Condition*, for instance, is clearly a story about world alienation. It is with this topic that the book begins and ends. Its twin genealogies of the rise of the social and the interiorization of subjectivity do not presume sociological or historical validity. Rather, they seek to make sense of seemingly separate and inadequately attended yet central features of our present condition, including our interpretive and evaluative dispositions within it, and of the obdurate opacity of our suffering under it. Narrative elucidations of the meaning of events conducing to and sustaining the decay of worldly meaning is the way *The Human Condition*, like much of her writing, pursues its counter-reifying ambition, and so generates its palpable urgency. And like *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, and to some extent *On Revolution*, *The Human Condition* even reads somewhat like a detective novel: we start with the murder of a vaguely familiar yet unknown (i.e., uncanny) character—in Arendt’s text, this would be plurality, action, or individuation; broadly, a “fully meaningful” human life—whose loss it is the task of the story to make increasingly gripping and increasingly wide in the scope of its significance as
the backstory of the fatality unfolds. As the investigation presses forward, a number of plausible culprits are considered, or else hinted at, and dismissed; and in this way an atmosphere of suspense and suspicion is generated. Finally, it ends up that the true culprit would not have been considered a plausible one at the beginning of the story—in part because of who we have become in the aftermath of the loss; the loss impedes our capacity to detect it—and the fate of the victim is bound up with dynamics much more complex and wide-ranging than could have been foreseen. As we learn that this fate was thoroughly implicated in complex historical legacies, swept up in forces of immense scope, and yet would not have come to pass were it not for specific, contingent events, the murder comes to feel at once fated and almost accidental: although it could have been otherwise, danger was never far off. While not all of Arendt’s texts read like detective novels, they all have a story to tell and the moral of the story is, for the most part, the precarity of agency and politics, thus of meaning—their propensity to collapse under external pressures and so their ongoing need of renewal.

Nevertheless, one of the regular means by which such stories unfold introduces a hesitation, and accumulatively a wavering, into the narrative itinerary. A privileged medium of Arendt’s narrative constructions is citation, which would not be remarkable in the least were it not for the ambiguity of authorial attitude it subtly though consistently introduces. It is notable that Arendt regularly gives expression to what are widely considered her central claims by means of citation. And not only that, citation is so prevalent in Arendt’s work that the presumption that citation merely means to bring particularly apt expressions to bear on points Arendt deems especially worthy of remembrance withers under the weight of their uneconomical exorbitance. Arendt’s citational proclivity extends well beyond mnemonic pragmatics, decorousness, and intellectual credentialing. While the frequency of citation in Arendt’s writing might be dismissed as simply a rhetorical shortcut (no need to concern herself with phrasing if she is going to say what the cited passage already says) or an exercise in academic good conscience, upon closer inspection Arendt’s citation-studded prose may give one pause, for it is often unclear exactly where Arendt stands with respect to the material she cites. *Her narrative voice is itself a figure in the text in need of interpretation.* This ambiguity is compounded by her seemingly contradictory attitudes toward similar issues in different moments of her work—an issue to which we will return. For now, the point is that Arendt’s citations interrupt the smoothness of the narrative syntheses they at once facilitate. The minor material interruption of the narratives they punctuate provide pause sufficient to open a slender space of questioning, which is precisely the opening needed to notice the ambiguity of authorial attitude toward the content they convey. Arendtian citation is thick material mediation.
The slight stutter operated by citation is most evident when, as is sometimes the case, the citation bears on the point being developed yet remains off-balance in its context—relevant but incompletely assimilated. In such cases, the citation, so to speak, smells of the workshop. Consider, for instance, her repeated citing of Dante and Augustine to make decidedly secular points. A citation that contributes to narrative development but can be seen doing so, that fails to be seamlessly absorbed into the forms it yet yields (or yields to), might be considered an analogue of techniques of material self-reference by means of which modernist artworks interrupt their sliding into semantic transparency and formal integrity, that is, into semantic and syntactic coherence that, were it too coherent, would thereby become false, ideological, mere semblance.

At other moments in her writing, specifically when citation seems unnecessary, when there seems to be no reason not to paraphrase or just put the point directly, citation calls attention to itself by dint of its excessiveness, thereby interrupting, but briefly, the text’s narrative momentum; generally, its upsweep into ideality. In such instances, little quotation marks become small bits of dead weight that draw attention down to the text, resisting just for a moment the passage into narrative or thetic ideality. While slight enough to be easily ignored (glossed over), the material residue that such citations may become by means of their signifying excess opens the space for a question about the author’s attitude toward the meaning of the material they mediate. By means of their quiet blockages of the narratives they mediate, and so the points presumably pressed and perspectives elaborated by such narratives, Arendt’s citations raise a question about her judgment of what is unfolding before our eyes. The slight disjunction between material and message that Arendt’s citations make event resists the plentitude and immediacy of the symbol, bending her texts in the direction of allegory.

Even when the citations fit closely enough with the content of the claims pressed by means of them to avoid raising any red flags, it is their snugness of fit that may raise a question about Arendt’s attitude toward the material. Why so much ventriloquism if the point she wants to make is one she wholeheartedly affirms? Why cite primary or secondary sources when the particular juncture of the historical narrative being developed is not particularly contentious? The excess of citation yields a moment of suspicion by raising such questions as, Who is speaking? From where? To whom? And to what end or ends? The presence of others’ voices becomes a mumbling echo of another scene, a recurrent albeit each time fleeting gesture toward what becomes, accumulatively, an outrageously expansive intertextuality.

Let us be clear: These citations draw along with them not so much their original addressees and agendas, but the bare residue of such, the simple fact of it. Precisely because unpacking the intertextual references such citations
put into play is unnecessary for the comprehension of Arendt’s texts, because what these citations bear with them idles in the economy of an Arendtian narrative, the idling excess of citation becomes noticeable, indeed self-remark, and thereby a quiet counter-pressure against the idealizing itinerary of the narrative and the presumption that the author’s commitments and convictions are laid bare by it. Interrupting, but barely, the passages they yield, citations in Arendt’s texts are remainders of non-identity in the identical; squandered or excessive forces in a textual economy unable to fully regulate its resources. The blockage they effect is too quiet to be considered an analogue of the formally ugly, but they do disrupt what otherwise might have been eloquence—the all too ample allure of beauty. Arendtian citation might then be considered an analogue of painterly abstraction.

Without providing secret passageways to judgments different from those the manifest content of the text proposes, or entirely undermining these judgments, the stagnation Arendt’s citations introduce by virtue of their variable manners of excessiveness generates a textual stutter, the space-time of a shapeless question. They open a dimension of unaccountable inexpressivity and disorient the directionality of the text by multiplying its structures of address. Such citations make manifest a gap between material sign and social meaning, and thereby perhaps register a breakdown of compelling convention, of a sensus communis: They mark rather than repair the social rending of sign and significance.

Once the question of authorial attitude is broached and amplified acuity to textual specificity demanded by citational exorbitance, a crucial feature of Arendt’s narrative practice becomes perspicuous. Her judgments, which are so thoroughly implicated in her narratives, emerge so naturally from them, that it is often not certain whether or in what sense these judgments are hers. In this free indirect discourse (style indirect libre) the line is blurred between the narrator’s voice and the voices narrated. While there is no denying that judgments that arise as commentaries on or inferences from the narrative material or in the voice of authors cited are often affirmed by Arendt, even warmly embraced, whether that implicit affirmation is sufficient to attribute them to her as considered convictions or declared opinions is an open question. Where exactly Arendt stands with respect to various judgments emerging within her narratives is not entirely certain, much less clear upon close inspection than it initially seems. Notably, the narrative voice that mediates these judgments, like the citations from which narrative content is so frequently forged, interrupts, while not simply thwarting, the presumption that they reveal the author’s opinions, that narrator and author are one and the same. Perhaps such judgments do not so much disclose the author’s principles or opinions as searchingly elaborate, test, or provocatively propose claims in which she is interested. The
suggestion that narratively embedded judgments do not necessarily disclose the author’s commitments, reveal her self and is more strongly supported by those judgments emerging amidst her narratives that consideration of other sectors of her work strongly suggests that she is extremely reticent about, even directly opposed to. Which brings us to the next feature of her writerly modernism.

The second feature of Arendt’s writerly modernism to which I would like to draw attention is the way her texts interrupt their conceptual self-confidence by exposing their overdrawn distinctions to unavoidable complications and undertake sustained discussions of phenomena that exceed, complicate, and to an extent confound the conceptual orientations they elaborate. While its significance has yet to be explored, this feature of Arendt’s writerly modernism has been noted by a number of prominent commentators. Peg Birmingham, for instance, notes that “At the end of The Human Condition Hannah Arendt reveals that not all has gone as expected in her analysis of the distinction between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa, a distinction that at the beginning of the text is sharp: the vita contemplativa is characterized by the quiet and silent gaze of nous, while the vita activa is characterized by its restless activity within the world of appearances. Yet at the conclusion of the text, she quotes a curious sentence that Cicero ascribed to Cato: ‘Never is a man more active than when he does nothing, never is he less alone than when he is by himself.’ The sentence is curious insofar as it is about thinking. The end of “The Human Condition, then, apparently unravels its beginning—a beginning that made a firm distinction between the life of action and the life of contemplation: thinking is now recognized as an activity and one, moreover, that is not essentially solitary.”¹

While illuminating, Birmingham’s example fails to bring to the fore the extent to which, and the sometimes remarkable rapidity with which, Arendt’s claims yield to qualifications, reservations, or direct contradictions and inversions. For instance, in the space of a sentence Arendt characterizes action as both greatness and danger,² the decay of tradition as at once an unburdening and an uprooting. Sometimes the unsettling of conceptual confidence is less explicit. For instance, while The Human Condition strongly suggests (without ever directly declaring) that a necessary condition for human self-realization, for a “fully meaningful life,” is a balanced involvement in labor, work, and action, and The Origins of Totalitarianism likewise gives the strong impression that there are basic conditions that must be satisfied for a life to be a human one, in The Human Condition Arendt also

claims that *anything that touches the human thereby becomes a condition*, which is
to expand the concept of a condition to the point where the notion of *basic conditions* or *minimum necessary conditions* for a human life becomes implausible, indeed evaporates. That these complications are sometimes less than explicit, and when direct, often emerge at some distance from the concepts or claims they qualify or contradict, will be of concern later. Coming back to Birmingham for the moment, what is potentially misleading in her description of the unraveling of the initially stark opposition of the *vita contemplativa* and the *vita activa* is that this unraveling would seem to be an anomaly, a surprising and “curious” complication rather than a fundamental feature of Arendt’s writerly practice. And even with respect to Birmingham’s example in particular, it is not just the *ontology* of thinking that yields to qualifications, but its value as well. While there is no denying that *The Life of the Mind* means to retrieve the value of thinking from relative suppression within the action-orientation of *The Human Condition* and *On Revolution* and emphasize its contribution to a meaningful and minimally moral life, thereby challenging the adequacy of the categorical tripartition operative in *The Human Condition* (the architectonic of labor, work, and action) and its condensation into the binary of preemptory biological urgency and disclosive freedom/public happiness in *On Revolution*, as we will shortly see, even in *The Life of the Mind* thinking is characterized as a dangerous enterprise, capable of perverse permutations and indeed of becoming a vehicle for the destruction of the very values it might have realized.

A more capacious but still extremely limited acknowledgement of the consistent complicating of overwrought distinctions in Arendt’s texts and therewith their immanent undermining of their categorical self-confidence comes from Mary Dietz in her contribution to the *Cambridge Companion, “Arendt and the Holocaust.”* Labor, work, and action, she notes:

> each presupposes a multiplicity of interconnected elements that defy attribution in terms of a settled meaning or unified synoptic picture. The concept of labor or *animal laborans*, for example, is the sum of the following multifarious elements: the blessing of life as a whole, nature, animality, life processes, (human) biology, (human) body, (human) metabolism, fertility, birth, reproduction, childbirth, femaleness, cyclicality, circularity, seasons, necessity, basic life needs (food, clothing, shelter), certain kinds of toil, repetition, everyday functions (eating, cleaning, mending, washing, cooking, resting, etc.), housework, the domestic sphere, abundance, consumerism,
privatization, purposeless regularity, the society of jobholders, automation, technological determinism, routinization, relentless repetition, automatism, regularization, non-utilitarian processes, dehumanizing processes, devouring processes, painful exhaustion, waste, recyclability, destruction (of nature, body, fertility), and deathlessness. The concept of work or *homo faber* is the sum of the following multifarious elements: the work of our hands, the man-made world, fabrication, (human) artifice, (human) creativity, production, usage, durability, objectivity, building, constructing, manufacturing, making, violation, maleness, linearity, reification, multiplication, tools and instruments, rules and measurement, ends and means, predictability, the exchange market, commercialism, capitalism, instrumental processes, utilitarian processes, objectifying processes, artificial processes, vulgar expediency, violence, predictability, deprivation of intrinsic worth, degradation, disposability, destruction (of nature, world), and lifelessness.3

While both capacious and succinct, Dietz’s account of the intermediary semantic zones and evaluative gradients across which Arendt’s central concepts span fails to do justice to the consistency with which Arendt’s texts confound the categorical orientations they elaborate and complicate the claims they urge. Understandably, Dietz opts for the drama of detailing polysemy and evaluative volatility precisely there where Arendt’s concepts seem most stable and univocal; and all the better for the drama, these are among the most well-known of Arendt’s concepts. But it is not only Arendt’s most characteristic claims that shade into intermediary, and at the limit, contradictory semantic zones and give way to value inversions; nearly all her judgments do. For instance, while throughout *The Human Condition* in particular, as well as in a number of other works, Arendt suggests that public happiness—i.e., participation in forums in which matters of common concern are established and negotiated with regard to their institutional elaborations—is a necessary condition for a “fully meaningful” life, and in *On Revolution* claims this directly, her testimony concerning her limited engagement in conventional politics and longstanding disinclination for it cuts against the claim that a life divorced from politics is to that extent a life

deprived of meaning. As she once said publicly, “there are other people who are primarily interested in doing something. I am not. I can very well live without doing anything. But I cannot live without trying to understand whatever happens.” Even in the text where she most emphatically presses the claim that public happiness is a necessary condition for a fully meaningful life, namely, On Revolution, she qualifies it extensively, at one point directly retracting it.

Examples of such qualifications, reservations, and contradictions abound, accumulatively contributing to an impression that Arendt is, so to speak, categorically incapable of sustaining a judgment, let alone a coherent conceptual and evaluative orientation. The impression is not one of fickleness or fastidiousness, as if Arendt suffered from some sort of pathological suggestability or overenamorment with nuance, but rather of an inarticulate pressure or elusive disquietude that prevents her claims from consolidating, her texts from reposing in themselves or mutually reconciling. Without a hint of high dialectical drama, which is to say, in an entirely untheatrical way, but also without the subtle grace and nimbleness that would make such complications and contradictions seem intentional, perhaps pedagogically motivated or otherwise strategic (say, expressions of a profound phenomenological sensibility, as with Benjamin), Arendt’s concepts and claims accede to ambiguities, denials, and value inversions, that is, to a fundamental restlessness.

Consider Arendt’s claim that every life can be narrated; thus, every life is singularly significant, indeed historical insofar as history is composed of stories of singular beings who stretch each in their own way from birth to death. Ever since it has come to function as a premise in readings such as those pursued by Adriana Caverero that infer from it an expansive, indeed boundless understanding of the political, and thus deliver to us an Arendt who can be read against herself on the issue of her reputed agorocentric elitism, the claim that every life is narratable has attained much notoriety. Yet even this now characteristic Arendtian claim is qualified repeatedly, albeit, as with most such qualifications, tacitly and at a certain distance from the more assertive articulations of the claim qualified. “Whenever an event occurs that is great enough to illuminate its own past,” Arendt claims, “history comes into being. Only then does the chaotic maze of the past happenings emerge as a story which can be told, because it has a beginning and an end.” If “past happenings” are ordinarily a “chaotic maze,” as the text quietly implies, and

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if “history comes into being” only with the dawning of an event “great enough to illuminate its own past,” then history, which is to say, emphatic human significance, and the narratable lives of which history is composed, are rare. Far from affirming that each life, let alone the multitude of events of which each life is composed, expresses an irreplaceable, narratively relatable, and so presumably principle-disclosive, thus socially significant individuality, a meaning that makes a claim on others’ attention if there is to be meaning at all, Arendt here verges on a vision of monumental history in which the rare disclosive power of exceptional events redeems the chaos and confusion of the mundane, filtering otherwise chaotic happenings through its interpretive matrix whereby they become meaningful moments in privileged narrative. As she says in *Between Past and Future*, “the subject matter of history is … the extraordinary.”

In a related vein, in some very well-known passages Arendt gives voice to a conception of the political as both expansive and ubiquitous. Politics would seem to include whatever transpires between any individuals linked in a web of appearances. Any remotely meaningful encounter that leaves a residue of a relationship is political. Yet elsewhere, and again in an understated way, Arendt contradicts the claim, suggesting that the political is highly rarified, limited to expressive self-disclosure in the context of institutionally secure contexts of public deliberation. Adding to the complexity, Arendt occasionally implies that the political can be characterized as neither ubiquitous nor rarified because it is not a proper concept but historical through and through; in short, what counts as political will depend on context, and this introduces an unsurpassable ambiguity in the counting of matters political through which its ubiquity or rarity would be established. Consider the following passage from *The Life of the Mind*: “at these moments, thinking ceases to be a marginal affair in political matters. When everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does and believes in, those who think are drawn out of hiding because their refusal to join is conspicuous and thereby becomes a kind of action. The purging element in thinking, Socrates’ midwifery, that brings out the implications of unexamined opinions and thereby destroys them—values, doctrines, theories, and even convictions—is political by implication.” Here, so little is the political conceived as self-same, let alone autonomous, that it seems to involve not a distinctive action but a different reception of that which otherwise has no claim to a political character. Or as Arendt says elsewhere:

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6 Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 43.
Life changes constantly, and things are constantly there that want to be talked about. At all times people living together will have affairs that belong in the realm of the public—‘are worthy to be talked about in public.’ What these matters are at any historical moment is probably utterly different. For instance, the great cathedrals were the public spaces of the Middle Ages. The town halls came later. And there perhaps they had to talk about a matter which is not without interest either: the question of God. So, what becomes public at every given period seems to me utterly different.8

Here the public and political are not just mutable but absolutely equivocal, without proper place or content.

Not only the consistency with which Arendt’s claims yield to complications and contestations but the manner (the timing and spacing) of these complications and contestations is notable. Most often, these complications are either tacit or direct yet deferred, set off at such a distance from the claims they complicate that they may easily go unnoticed. Tacit and deferred complications are difficult to detect, which suggests that they are not simply intended as nuances, elements of a pedagogical program of incremental sophistication. Indeed, they may not be intentional at all but rather indices of an unknowingness that is perhaps as significant a feature of Arendt’s writings as her set pieces and stated positions. Such tacit and deferred complications place demands on the reader for an acuity and presentness to the text(s) that they make extraordinarily difficult to discharge—demands that Arendt herself regularly fails to satisfy. The profusion of tacit complications would keep the reader mildly suspicious and in suspense, paradoxically expecting the unexpected, were they readily detectable; but since they are not—they are far less dramatic and far less frequently sustained than the claims they qualify—the demand they bear is an exceptionally weak one, easily overwhelmed by the attractions of the manifest textual drama and the much more readily identifiable claims staked out. Compared with, say, the emphatic rehabilitation and rethinking of judgment, natality, plurality, power, public happiness, and the like, the urging of critical caution is remarkably muted. Likewise, deferred complications place a demand on the reader to hold in mind the whole of Arendt’s work precisely in order to remain mindful of its nonresolution into a consistent and coherent whole; yet because they are so distant from, and often less prominently pronounced and sustained than the claims they

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qualify, their interruptive force and the demand for an impossible syncretism this force mediates is manifestly outmatched by the attractions of the claims and conceptual orientations it would unsettle.

Jointly, tacit and deferred qualifications which are less subtle sophistications of initially overstated points than sites of conflict, ambiguity, and impasse in texts incapable of ideal resolution may be considered weak means of resistance to impulses to identification. Insofar as they interrupt the presumptive identity of the concepts, theses, and judgments they elaborate, Arendt’s texts impede identification with their claims and with the narrator of these claims. In effect, they show the narrator to be as unreliable as the narrative content, diminishing the attractiveness of both to identificatory investment. Yet the mediation of such resistance is weak and wavering, easily swamped by interest in the unique and promising positions Arendt’s texts manifestly stake out; and this is very much to the point. The texts’ weak and wavering expressions of resistance to identity and identification, their mumbling mediation of demands for demystification, impedes any confidence that this resistance will be effective. The weak, barely articulate nature of these demands for demystification is precisely what causes them to reverberate upon themselves; by virtue of their weak self-interruptive force, the texts forego of any fetishism of the nonidentical. To anticipate a point to which we will return, Arendt’s texts refuse to model redemption. By giving weak voice—stuttering and faltering expression—to demands for resistance rather than propose themselves as exemplary instances of resistance, as if what is merely aesthetic in them could be emulated politically, taken up in collective practice, they refuse the mystifications of aesthetic ideology: refuse to paper over of the gap between aesthetically modulated resistance and political transformation and thus mystify the tendential eclipse of the political. The residues of resistance these writings bear express necessarily inchoate—because disoriented—longings for social and political transformations they know not how to achieve. Not even within the arena of their textuality are these texts confident in their capacity to resist a false totality. Call this their anti-aesthetic aesthetic: they receive and bear from sources they are unable to fully specify longings for transformations they know themselves unable to effect even aesthetically and which they seek to release from their infelicitous aesthetic rehearsals into a collective political practice they know does not exist. The unknowingness of Arendt’s writings with respect to themselves images our unknowingness about how we might effect political change under conditions of tendential mutual disinterest. Arendt’s texts are not allegories of reading capable of containing at a higher level the disruptions and unanticipatable complications they enact. Their aesthetic discomposure is the signal of their relentless yet subdued refusal of consolation.
Sometimes, however, complications are introduced in a way that is neither exactly tacit nor deferred but rather so incredibly rapid that there is no time to take their toll. The immediacy of these complications outpaces the time of reflection; their textual ramifications and general significance seems as little attended by Arendt as they are available to her readers. For instance, Arendt says of the decay of metaphysics that it “would permit us to look on the past with new eyes, unburdened and unguided by any traditions.”

Note the quick, easy to glance over juxtaposition, indeed the crashing conjunction of motifs of liberation and abandonment, promise and disorientation. The unburdening effected by the demise of tradition is also a disorienting uprooting, a loss of guidance. Here we witness normative terms (emancipation and nihilistic disorientation) colliding with a breathless immediacy. The altogether meager “and” is hardly capable of mediating the terms between which it is stuck. There is no space for breathing in this conjunction, no time for thinking; the immediate apposition of “unburdened” and “unguided” is jarring, giving rise to a slight shock that repels reflective mediation, induces the reader to simply move on. It is precisely the immediacy of their colliding that suggests that the tension or contradiction of emancipation and disorientation is not available to mediation, that there is no way to soften the blow, to tally gains and losses, or to calculate a response. In effect, the experience of disorientation thematically addressed is redoubled by its feeble and confused reflective uptake. We are left unknowing. Yet what comes through this hypertense conjunction is an experience of collapse but not despair, perhaps even a breath of hope. Unburdened by tradition, we are still in some way oriented by the past, still “look on the past” and thereby project a future, albeit without guides or “banisters.” The demise of tradition may result in an irreparable loss of the past that tradition had preserved and therewith the futures onto which it may have opened; but to look on the past “unburdened and unguided” is still to be keyed to the past, to experience the past as yet promising a future—perhaps one that can come into view only now, “with new eyes.” Indeed, to be “unguided by any traditions” is perhaps not to be outside of tradition altogether but rather to experience a certain freedom to reinvent or renew tradition(s) if what this lack of guidance “would permit us” to do is “look on the past with new eyes.”

The chaos and confusion of a present unable to appeal to “any traditions” as it projects and pursues a future is not to be minimized; the future projected may be but a stale repetition of a present disoriented because it has squandered its past. But the past is still the past, the text suggests—indeed a bit hyperbolically, in a way that echoes Arendt’s manic denial in *Eichmann in Jerusalem*—that the stories of those who suffer may be sucked into “holes of oblivion.” And our eyes,

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while differently focused, are at least “permitted” to look upon it. The past, then, is not entirely past; it still may claim the attention of the present even if all we can make out as we gaze upon it are broken legacies and latencies now lost: the pale ghosts of the past we have become. “[U]nburdened and unguided by any traditions,” it is unclear whether we are at the end of history or the beginning, what she calls in Between Past and Future “the beginning of a beginning.”

The wavering of Arendt’s texts with regard to their most well-known, orientational claims is most explicit when such claims are explicitly evaluative. Arendt’s texts consistently shade their privileged normative terms into intermediary semantic zones and shadow them with perverse counterparts. Although Arendt’s judgments are frequent and decisive, her texts seem unable to sustain a judgment. With respect to the shadowing of central normative terms with perverse counterparts, consider, for instance, Arendt’s notion of principles: examples of principles include “honor or glory, love of equality, which Montesquieu called virtue, or distinction or excellence … but also fear or distrust or hatred.”  

Or consider her notion of public life. While participation in deliberations concerning matters of common concern is, according to Arendt, a condition for a fully meaningful life, even the pinnacle of such a life, a flourishing public life, she suggests, requires an agonistic spirit that may devolve into self-glorifying, social status-seeking ambitions. Interest in outdoing others for the sake of mere reputation may corrode from within and eventually usurp interest in the res publica. Merely appearing to outshine others in order to enhance one’s reputation would be the dialectical devolution of public spirit into an instrumentalization, and so a loss, of the political, which is at once an instrumentalization, and so a loss, of the self. Because subjectivity is intersubjectively mediated, or in Arendt’s terms, because self-disclosure through speech and deeds is routed through webs of appearances (the interpretive responses of a plurality of others), efforts to become the author of one’s story displaces action by work, the world by spectacle, the res publica by a fetishized sociality. In her considerations of the spirit of the laws, Montesquieu may be in the foreground but the dark shadows of Machiavelli and Rousseau are never far off.

Likewise, anticipating Habermas on the quasi-transcendental necessity of sincerity for public-political life, but cutting against Habermas’ hypostatization of the political as an empirico-transcendental postulate, Arendt claims that public life requires sincere advocacy of opinion, that is, expressions of genuine conviction, yet suggests that the sincere advocacy of opinion may devolve into its opposite if conditions allow it to become enshrined as ideology. It is this worry, I take it, that lies behind Arendt’s

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10 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 152.

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seemingly strange, presumably way overwrought claim in Between Past and Future that many opinions are to be preferred to truth, even were there such a thing in matters political. Like much of the reception of Arendt’s work, responses to this peculiar line are split between overenamored affirmation and facile dismissal. As far as I am aware, the only readers who take note of it explicitly are those too ready to receive it, namely, those who applaud Arendt for establishing opinion as an intrinsic and unconditional good, a viable secular successor for theologically or metaphysically cast notions of the Good. Inoculated against the spectacular strangeness of this locution by their eagerness to affirm the unconditional validity of a secular intrinsic good and thus make it a true match for its theological and metaphysical forebears, such readers project a horizon of fetishism onto Arendt’s text, belying their claims to have discovered in it a fully secular good. To others, this line is too surprising, indeed rather shocking. Consequently, it is dismissed as rhetorical excess. Perhaps subtending both the anxious affirmation and the facile neglect of the manifest hyperbole with which Arendt underscores the value of opinion is a shared reticence to contend with the historicity of the political that it suggests. While the referential extension of “the political” is a contentious issue in Arendt scholarship, in part because Arendt was unclear and seems to have changed her mind about where and when politics transpires, presumably, the meaning of the political is the stable and central point in Arendt’s thinking. “Debate,” Arendt declares in Between Past and Future, “constitutes the very essence of political life.” Yet if the public expression opinion, the basic medium of political life, can under certain conditions unwittingly contribute to the anti-political ascendancy of ideology, then nothing about politics can be confidently expressed in categorical terms. The political is again revealed as irreducibly equivocal. With this in view, it is perhaps less surprising than many commentators have found it that Arendt occasionally advocates withdrawing from public life, e.g., when this amounts to complicity with evil; only seemingly contradictory that, especially in her later work, she stresses the political value of thinking rather than opposing politics and thought; and much less of an issue than many commentators have supposed that she sometimes stresses action and sometimes judgment as the basic element of politics. Politics does not partake of the elemental. While the prominent positive valence of the political coupled with the insistence on its intermittence and tendential eclipse by the social makes it an object of longing, its equivocity subtly suggests our incapacity to specify that for which we long, making of our unknowingness a diagnostic register of our suffering. To anticipate a theme to which we will return, by making of the political an object of inchoate longing, Arendt’s texts

\[\text{**Ibid.**}, 241.\]
frustrate. Frustration may indeed be a medium through which they give convoluted expression to demands they cannot directly press.

As a brief parenthesis, consider in this context Arendt’s resonant, indeed alarming silence regarding mediation generally. She is not only unclear about the referential extension of her terms, about how, for instance, the categories of labor, work, and action apply to various practices. More tellingly, “action” means imprescriptable mediation insofar as it involves the inventiveness of both the one who initiates and those who take up that initiative—in short, the condition for action is plurality and plurality means the spontaneous and unprecedented uptake of spontaneous and unprecedented initiatives. Likewise, there is no blueprint that could be applied to the development of a council system insofar as a council system is the spontaneous institutional expression of singular experiences of solidarity. In view of the silence they keep regarding mediation, a silence perhaps preserved rather than betrayed by the historical and arguably phantasmatic nature of their textual elaboration, Arendt’s central concepts begin to seem like variations on Bilderverbot, enactments of an aniconic imperative and thus forms of resistance to precipitous confidence in our power to project a future of healing from a present of suffering.

Arendt’s discussions of thinking display a similar propensity to loudly proclaim the virtues of that which, more quietly and at a certain distance, she shows to be problematic, indeed worrisome and dangerous, even an impediment to the very values it might have realized. Thinking yields considered judgments, openness to others, and contributes to character development; it yields meaning and orientation, binds a self to itself by binding that self to its past, its experiences, and as such it may function as a moral emergency break. It is to these positive aspects that Arendt is most frequently attentive. Yet thinking can also dissolve conventions and certainties. Socrates’ thought, Arendt notes, had a “destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, measurements for good and evil, in short on those customs and rules of conduct we treat of in morals and ethics.”12 It is “dangerous and resultless” insofar as it can equally be a conduit for cynical withdrawal into a sense of self-confident superiority for having peered into the abyss, thus a conduit for self-amplifying skepticism or nihilism.13 While it may yield orientation, it may also dissolve worldly orientation: “The business of thinking is like the veil of Penelope; it undoes every morning what it had finished the night before.”14

12 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 434.
14 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 45.
So too with the value of the new. While natality is described in glowing terms, there are certainly novel developments that Arendt unequivocally denounces. Most obviously, the “horrible originality” of totalitarianism which, she says, “exploded our traditional categories of political thought (totalitarian domination is unlike all forms of tyranny and despotism we know of) and the standards of our moral judgment (totalitarian crimes are very inadequately described as ‘murders’).” Likewise, nuclear fission, Arendt underscores, is an emphatically novel development, which like action, initiates a series of unpredictable consequences. While Arendt frequently stresses the value of spontaneity and sets it against the boredom and misery of an over-administered social status quo, Origins of Totalitarianism is clearly an account of elements crystallizing spontaneously, in a way that could not be foreseen, into totalitarian rule.

In comparison with the insane end-result—concentration camp society—the process by which men are prepared for this end, and the methods by which individuals are adapted to these conditions, are transparent and logical. The insane mass manufacture of corpses is preceded by the historically and politically intelligible preparation of living corpses. The impetus and, what is more important, the silent consent to such unprecedented conditions are the products of those events which in a period of political disintegration suddenly and unexpectedly made hundreds of thousands of human beings homeless, stateless, outlawed and unwanted, while millions of human beings were made economically superfluous and socially burdensome by unemployment.

Even the notion of a good in itself, of which action and judgment are presumably expressions, is problematized by the long shadow cast by its perverse double: the decidedly non-utilitarian character of the camps.

[I]t is not only the non-utilitarian character of the camps themselves—the senselessness of ‘punishing’ completely innocent people, the failure to keep them in a condition so that profitable work might be extorted
from them, the superfluousness of frightening a completely subdued population—which gives them their distinctive and disturbing qualities, but their anti-utilitarian function, the fact that not even the supreme emergencies of military activities were allowed to interfere with these ‘demographic policies.’ It was as though the Nazis were convinced that it was of greater importance to run extermination factories than to win the war.¹⁸

It is essential to note just how undramatic Arendt’s detailing of such dialectical inversions tends to be. What would be a dramatic chiaroscuro effect if immediately juxtaposed becomes a slight strain on conviction, a nagging uneasiness or unplaceable perplexity, by virtue of the distance ordinarily maintained between Arendt’s emphatically extolled terms and their dangerous doubles. Dialectical devolutions are never so far off that the concepts they perversely permute are effectively insulated from their unsettling reverberations, yet they tend to emerge at a sufficient distance to secure their esteemed counterparts against suspicion. The space between the textually prominent, positively construed concepts and their less noticeable gradations and negations grants to the former the time of their promise, the unencumbered articulation necessary for the force of their claims to be felt. By dint of their deferral, complications allow for the experience of promise pitched to the point of exigency; thus, when they arrive, they tend to be registered as a dim frustration or a gnawing uneasiness rather than a direct negation that would sweep away a once promising claim. Disturbing what might have been sleepy identification with, that is, a too immediate enthusiasm for, the promising conceptual orientations the texts elaborate, the muted dissonance introduced by deferred complications is just strong enough to allow the experience of promise to shade into a suspicion of seduction and then, perhaps, a worry about one’s availability to it. Thereby a question may be raised about the adequacy of the orientation the text projects with respect to the problematics it addresses. The initially retroactive, then anticipatory suspicion of seduction may affect a mild counter-fetishistic detachment and thereby preserve our availability to frustration, that is, to both the promise of the text and its non-fulfillment by the resources it has at its disposal. To suffer frustration is to be preserved for a future that Arendt’s texts cannot but demand yet certainly cannot foresee in the manner of a series of steps from here to there. To suffer such frustration is to undergo the

promise of her work as projecting a future that the enthusiasm her work elicits is both necessary for and an impediment to.

What begins to become clear is not just that values are unlimitedly available to corruption and perversion, that principles offer no security, thus that the gods are truly dead. Contingency, plurality, and the consequent urgency of judgment are important motifs in Arendt’s work, but something more seems at stake in the complications, contortions, and internal contestations her texts repeatedly if unknowingly enact. Were the point merely to induce attention to contextual, these immanent impasses would not be so subdued and spaced out; these convolutions and anti-idealizing interruptions, so opaque. By shading its fundamental terms into intermediary semantic zones and dialectical inversions and interrupting its narrative upsweep with desublimating elements, Arendt’s texts quietly, indeed unknowingly, conduct a counter-fetishistic destabilization of their normative orientation, thereby giving indirect expression to the desiccated sociality that makes its reticence with regard to their normative authority mandatory. Were this writing to wholeheartedly accede to the normative impulses it elaborates, presume to action guidance, it would presume a public available to and capable of normative redirection despite its repeated and insistent thematization of world alienation—the tendential privatization of subjectivity and its colonization by consumerism; the eclipse of the political by the radiant rise of the social; the withering of interest in and of institutions capable of implementing collective deliberation—or it would presume a poietic power to elicit such an audience, to sovereignly interpelate a public for whom its interventions would carry authority, either way concealing and perhaps further consolidating the sufferings that motivate its outrage and reorienting efforts in the first place. To presume a public available to and capable of normative redirection would not just contradict the fundamental terms of its social diagnosis; it would mystify the social order it indict by affirming false latencies. Whatever the force of its denouncement, writing that affirms itself as readymade route to recovery thereby affirms the world it indict on the grounds of its place in it. When the material—institutional and desirative—conditions for collective deliberation and self-determination have collapsed under the weight of administered interests, when the political is tendentially eclipsed by the rise of the social, full-throated voicings of exemplary authority, confident claims to speak in “a representative voice,” are fated to ideological collusion. In such times, resistance to aesthetic heroism is a condition for writing that carries conviction that remains capable of resonating with its addressees. When conditions conspire to make normative injunctions into facile manipulations, manifest powerlessness becomes the medium of a continuing claim on the present, an echo of freedom sounding the depths of its suppression. Or in the words with which Arendt
opens *The Life of the Mind*, which is an epigraph drawn from Heidegger: “Thinking does not bring knowledge as do the sciences. Thinking does not produce usable practical wisdom. Thinking does not solve the riddles of the universe. Thinking does not endow us directly with the power to act.”

By resisting its confidence in the remedies and critical perspectives it proposes, in their capacity to rationalize, resolve, realize, reclaim, reconstruct, or reinvigorate the meaning of modernity, and by refusing a stable normative vision and therewith the intimation of its coherent practicability, that is, by interrupting identification with the normative perspectives these writings pursue, their claim to exemplary authority, such counter-fetishistic writing inscribes the impasses of the present as irremediable by any means at our disposal, thereby suggesting that we are as unknowing with regard to how to redress our stagnant, tendentially self-concealing suffering, what she calls the boredom of abundance, as are Arendt’s texts with regard to their internal operations.

It is not incidental that revolutionary councils are always figured as spontaneous irruptions: figures of the anachronic *par excellence*. Nor perhaps does Arendt’s imaginative blending of Homeric distinction and Athenian democracy merely signal philological feebleness. That the Greco-Roman past she sets against the oversocialized unsociability of the present *never was*, that her images of antiquity are manifestly utopian constructions, is perhaps to the point. If, following Benjamin’s account in the *Trauerspiel*, allegory is an idea that differs from itself with each iteration, its successive forms becoming redundant as each contingent construction binds its efficacy to its reworking of materials familiar at some specific time and place, then Arendt’s writings, especially in their moments of normative enthusiasm, might be considered allegories anticipating their anachronism. Their advance anticipation of their obsolescence *is*, in part, their usefulness in the present.

The lasting impasses inscribed in and by the indeterminacy, perverse permutations, and reciprocal contestations of normative content figures the “grim” present as unavailable to determinate negation (that is, to sublation in the strong sense) insofar as any strategies conceivable within the present, thus sufficiently continuous with it to be politically plausible, will bear such impasses into the future, making them all the more stinging and difficult to negotiate as they become increasingly less intelligible as a result of the confidence with which their remedy is proposed. Call this a writerly resistance to parable.

Now, there is no doubt that returning us to the horizon of our agency is central to Arendt’s project, hence her repeated targeting of metapolitical reductions (to History or metaphysics) and instrumentalizations (via residually liberal capitalism, consumerism, interest group politics, conscience) of the political; and there is no question that she considered
power (collective initiative) capable of overwhelming strength—e.g., the civil rights movement, the American Revolution, to a limited extent the American opposition to the war in Vietnam. In her writings, there is not the faintest hint of a cynical repudiation of our prospects for removing concrete injustices and thereby furthering progressive political legacies. But what the counter-fetishistic dimension of her writings suggests is that the realization of genuine values or implementation of undeniably important initiatives is liable to repeat and perhaps retrench the very dangers it presumes to resolve; that with respect to the future, we are necessarily unknowing. That, however, puts the point too formally, for at issue is not the absolute exposure of the future as such but the specific liabilities of futures projected by a present of mutual disinterest (merely instrumental interest). So, to be more precise, Arendt’s counter-fetishistic writing, by unsettling the value horizons it projects, suggests that no horizon that can be projected from the present—our present—can be unconditionally affirmed because so doing would both capitulate to and conceal the dissolution of mutual interest and of the institutional mediations that might make of dissent something other than lyrical; it would be an extorted reconciliation. To vary a phrase with which Arendt was no doubt familiar, danger lies in the saving power. To resist the reduction of denunciatory and demanding normative perspectives into actionable programs or “warm recommendations” is to resist the domination effected by the present’s manner of inheritance of the past, that is, the groping enthusiasm that blinds itself to the aporias it inherits. Self-impeding or -interrupting normative suggestions give expression to a necessarily ineloquent dissatisfaction, thus, a necessarily groping desire for transformation.

Between past and future is a present of suffering that disfigures the proposals for its remedy. Arendt’s texts resist both nostalgic fantasies of return to conditions well lost and irrecoverable anyhow, and utopian fantasies of a future that will have impossibly leaped over its own shadow. If she was not aware of how her texts conduct this resistance, the idea is one she explicitly affirms. As she says, “the thread of tradition is broken and ... we shall not be able to renew it”;19 “What you are left with is still the past, but a fragmented past, which has lost its certainty of evaluation .... It is with such fragments from the past, with their sea-change, that I have dealt”;20 “all efforts to escape from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are in vain.”21

Yet in giving voice to the unacceptable as unacceptable—this being the difference between somewhat inchoate protest and teeth-gashing yet

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19 Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 212.
20 Ibid.
ultimately quiescent despair—Arendt’s writings refuse to indulge impulses to despair; and this leads us to the fourth element of Arendt’s writerly modernism.

Arendt’s texts indulge in eccentricity and experimentation while resisting the temptation for writing to close in on itself and presume to model redemption. With respect to the eccentricity of her writings, consider her idiosyncratic rehabilitation of ancient Greek and Roman political experiences; her concentration on action and meaning rather than security, order, and administration; her insistence that the life of the mind matters for political thought; her highly unusual account of the origins and meaning of totalitarianism and of Eichmann’s banal evil doing; the prominent place of treatments of literature in her historical phenomenology of totalitarianism; or her meditations on marginal figures both in Between Past and Future and in the vast preponderance of her book reviews. Her work is certainly not traditional political philosophy, nor exactly political journalism; it has certain essayistic features but is more narratively continuous and constrained in its imaginative variations of its subject matter than are essays. In response to a question about where she locates herself on the liberal-conservative spectrum, she denies the significance of the question and says that such questions will not help us get at the central issues of the day. With respect to the experimental features of her writing, consider the methodological anomaly of her historical phenomenologies; her continual reworking of her basic conceptual schemes (the categorical tripartition of The Human Condition—labor, work, and action—becomes the binary of preemptory biological urgency and public happiness in On Revolution) and searching expositions of her central concepts; and her highly imaginative reconstructions of Grecian and Roman experiences. While narratively inclined, Arendt’s texts are somewhat loosely compiled, veering toward parataxis while remaining centered on their primary themes. They are forever testing different perspectives on their subject matters, altering the angle of vision and even the judgments rendered. Yet as eccentric and experimental as they may be, Arendt’s writings resist the temptation to coil tightly around themselves and precipitously bask in their counter-fetishistic accomplishments, their preservation of the muted insistence of the non-identical, or contemplate only their paralysis and the catastrophes to which it testifies. Refusing both self-satisfied intransitivit y (modeling utopia) and “melancholic immersion” (retreat into reified interiority), either way a desperate, extorted urge to affirm enforced abjection, these writings relentlessly refuse consolation. They do not presume to be an alternative to reality, an aesthetic restitution of what reality wants for. On the contrary, by sustaining of both transitive and intransitive, normative and self-critical dimensions—call this their irresolute modernism—they forswear any claim
to aesthetic self-sufficiency and so the intimation that the resistance and reorientation they accomplish textually are in any way adequate. Ironically, only in view of their de-fetishizing dimensions can the utterly conventional features of Arendt’s writings—relatively consistent categorical orientation, citations yielding (to) narrative meaning, and so forth—come into view as a site of the texts’ recursive self-application of it insistently negativity, its negative dialectic moment. It is the preponderance of such conventional features, their saturation of the textual foreground that prevents counter-fetishistic gestures from giving way to picturesque disorder, a fetishization of fragmentation.

Arendt’s texts are hardly as straightforward as the consensus of her commentators—even those attentive to the contradictions, tensions, and problematic zones of her texts—would lead us to believe. Reading Arendt is a demanding undertaking. Following her texts means enduring and keeping track of unstable normative attitudes and unpredictable tensions; it means experiencing the promise of understanding and of political guidance—a moment of seduction, interpellation, and identification, indeed often a moment of accession to fantasy—as well as the nonfulfillment of that promise, the relentless but quiet complicating and undercutting of the orientation afforded. Thus, to follow her texts requires that one remain sufficiently invested in their promise—sufficiently seduced—to keep the moments of orientation and disorientation, renewal and reservation, from coming apart and devolving, respectively, into facile affirmative enthusiasm and capitulating despair in the guise of aesthetic self-satisfaction. To follow her texts is thus to keep ourselves available to frustration. Arendt’s texts are somewhat frustrating and must be if they are to preserve us for a future they cannot foresee, certainly cannot motivate on their own, yet cannot but demand. Our frustration becomes the medium for the furtherance of demands these writings cannot coherently envision yet cannot concede; it is thus an alternative to both ameliorism and fantasy. While the demands we could level, precisely because we can level them, are insufficiently demanding, either betrayals or fantasies, frustration preserves the exigency of protest from resolving into immediately actionable yet merely palliative programs or implausible imaginary projections. These are texts to be suffered.

Together, the various elements of Arendt’s writerly modernism suggest that Arendt’s seemingly straightforward style is itself but a moment of an unremittingly ironic textuality, the lead-up to the complication or negation, and so frustration, of what it so eloquently lays out. Arendt’s manifestly “down to earth,” oftentimes quasi-journalistic style is a medium of abstraction: a medium in which implausible, unworkable, even unformulatable, thus socially abstract content is conveyed, thus a medium in which world-alienation is ironically inscribed. The eminent readability of
Arendt’s prose is belied by the textual contortions and confusions everywhere evident upon closer inspection. If irony is the pairing of expectation and frustration, then irony is indeed Arendt’s medium—not her medium of choice, to be sure, but the medium in which her writings accomplish themselves most fully. Arendt’s aporetic modernism is the accomplishment of sustained syncopation.

III. The Social-Mimetic Content of Aesthetic Form

What resounds in Arendt’s rhetorical convolutions, her conceptual and normative confusions, is a social-mimetic diagnosis of the intersubjective and institutional conditions that impede, debilitate, or disfigure judgment and action, and at the level of textuality, work against a more full-throated voicing of her normative vision. Let us be clear: It is not that Arendt had, and held in reserve as if to protect under cover of privacy, a normative vision that due to various social prohibitions she could not risk expressing publicly. Her situation is not analogous to that of, say, Spinoza. Rather, her normative vision was condemned to fracture and fragmentation by the want of adequate conditions for its expression, specifically, by the want of entrustment to interlocutors invested in, and because afforded institutional channels for its implementation, capable of deliberating, matters of common concern. “Works and deeds, events and even words, through which men might still be able to externalize … the remembrance of their hearts,” Arendt claims, “have lost their home in the world.”22 Arendt’s texts suffer from the want of a robust public sphere, for it is circulation in the public sphere (in the emphatic sense) that transmutes mere ideas into opinions. If a want of solidarity, of intersubjective and institutional uptake, fractures what might have been a compelling normative vision into mutually complicating or contesting claims tending toward both exaggeration and quiet self-critical deflation, then the material conditions for expression are not external to spiritual content but constitutive of that content, form and deform it. Ironically, although Arendt is perhaps best known for rehabilitating and rethinking the existential-political value of judgment, she could almost never consolidate a judgment. Though certainly one of the more committed writers (in the Sartrean sense) in recent memory, she could almost never commit to—unreservedly elaborate and sustain—a judgment or conceptual framework.

In part, that Arendt’s conceptual orientations and evaluations remain forever unconsolidated signals the consistency of her writings with the normative commitment to plurality they directly declare. Cognitive and evaluative diversity that remains on the near side of disarray because it is

22 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 44.
restricted to developing different perspectives on topics of common concern
is the textual consequence of having internalized a vast plurality of
judgments. However, a certain nervousness is perhaps detectable in Arendt’s
advance deliverance of her claims to diverse perspectives, her rather
hyperbolic performance of plurality. Overabundant citation, relentless
differential evaluation, and conceptual unsteadiness are certainly textual
manifestations of plurality, forms of resistance to thematic, narrative, and
normative unity. But in virtue of their profusion and exorbitance, one may
wonder whether they anxiously enact that which they fear will not be
forthcoming; namely, a diversity of concerned responses to the matters under
discussion, a public sphere. So, extraordinary and excessive are Arendt’s
enactments of plurality that one comes to wonder whether the ongoing
staging of plurality is not to some extent but a spectacle, thus a performative
denial of that to which it would attest, and by means of this performative
denial, a social diagnosis that could not be fully voiced. Unhappily, and
especially when or to the extent that the voices or opinions expressed idle, the
relentless accession to plurality resonates with the self-consuming
temporality of the spectacle. Frequently fleeting or at least wanting for
sustained thematic development, just capable of puncturing the text’s
conceptual or normative self-confidence, the voices that arise to interrupt the
too smooth surface of the text flicker, fade, and are replaced. Rapidly. The
nonidentical is eerily interchangeable.

If and to the extent that the ongoing performance of plurality in
Arendt’s texts anxiously heads off the disaster of public indifference (or
relegation to merely academic interest) to which it is fated given the want of
intersubjective and institutional conditions for her normative claims to count
emphatically as judgments, opinions, or actions by being judged and
responded to, taken over as law or principle, by others capable of collectively
deliberating matters of common concern, then what seems a self-
relinquishing opening to the opinions of others is a perverse performance of
narcissistic control. It is perhaps not incidental that the alternative views and
voices that repeatedly emerge are rarely developed. The textual fantasy of
limitless plurality conducted through the proliferation of its phantoms
registers, in the mode of denial, the need of plural voices, along with the
expectation that they will not be forthcoming or not of the right sort. To some
extent, this is plurality as semblance, a panicky insistence on the presence of
what is long lost or perhaps little more than a fantasy in the first place. The
point here is a Kantian one: The condition for genius, the Kantian analogue
of Arendt’s notion of judgment and action as yielding novel meaning, is
succession; if the new rule the work portends is not taken up, instituted
through the fidelitous yet equally original responses of compelling
successors, then, effectively, there has been no new rule, or in Arendt’s idiom, no action or judgment.

Of course, Arendt has always had readers, and to some extent a readership. But a readership is as little a public, in the robust sense, as communities of taste or shared ethical sensibilities are replacements for politics; and Arendt knew this. It is the unknowing elaboration of this insight that inflects every text she wrote. It is not incidental that the ancient Greek polis, long lost and irrecuperable anyhow, if not something of a fantasy in the first place, is Arendt’s vision of an instituted public sphere; nor is it incidental that she draws attention to the domination involved in maintaining that institution, that is, to the legal injunction to take sides in every factional dispute, the compulsion to participation. Tellingly, her image of a functional public sphere is manifestly dysfunctional and set in the remote past. In contrast to Sartre, who claims in What is Literature?, that literature is an adequate institution for inducing judgment, by which he means self-disclosive and in part self-determinative freedom, Arendt, while clearly tempted by that thought, could never fully go in for it.

Arendt’s objective or writerly complicity with the nihilistic forces of oversocialized unsociability is her realism, a way for her writing to keep in touch with the empirical world, maintain its relevance, precisely when writing, or more broadly, public deliberation, has become largely irrelevant to the reproduction of the social status quo. “[U]nder the circumstances of the twentieth century,” Arendt claims, “the so-called intellectuals—writers, thinkers, artists, men of letters, and the like—could find access to the public realm only in time of revolution.” 23 And her realism is a modernism insofar as it mimetically acknowledges and elaborates what cannot be directly thematized: Social reification is given expression as the nonalignment of author and narrator, author and reader, ultimately, mind and world. Arendt’s writing palpably suffers from the destitution of desire for self-disclosive collective deliberation through which collectivities work out what matters to them collectively and so who they are. If, following Plato, philosophy begins with and is sustained by desire, then Arendt’s writerly modernism is a testing of the possibilities of political expression when desire for it is wanting.

While what Arendt seeks to accomplish with her writings is, in a certain way, a direct, point-by-point reversal of the tendencies of totalitarianism, these writings show that the shadow cast by totalitarianism envelops us still: The elements of totalitarianism are also those of a society of laborers without labor. In all forms of totalitarianism, says Arendt, “the human masses sealed off in them are treated as if they no longer existed, as if what happened to them were no longer of any interest to anybody, as if they

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23 Ibid., 8.

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were already dead.”

“Terror enforced oblivion.”

Or as she says elsewhere, “One could defend oneself as a Jew because one had been attacked as a Jew. National concepts and national membership still had a meaning; they were still elements of a reality within which one could live and move,” yet Auschwitz opened “an empty space where there are no longer nations and peoples but only individuals for whom it is now not of much consequence what the majority of peoples, or even the majority of one’s own people, [who, let me add, because one is little concerned with them, and they with you, are not exactly a “people,” let alone “one’s own people”] happens to think at any given moment.”

“A life without speech and without action,” she claims in The Human Condition, “is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men.”

Arendt’s most sustained elaboration of this thought takes place in Origins of Totalitarianism, where she claims that:

The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective. Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are the rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to a community into which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging is no longer a matter of choice, or when one is placed in a situation where, unless he commits a crime, his treatment by others does not depend on what he does or does not do. This extremity, and nothing else, is the situation of people deprived of human rights. They are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion.

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24 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 455.
25 Ibid., 443.
27 Ibid.
29 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 296.
30 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 4.
suspicious actor[s] of life.” 31 And however acute our judgments, wanting for fellow feeling, we cannot form opinions. Of stateless persons, Arendt writes, “their freedom of opinion is a fool’s freedom, for nothing they think matters anyhow.” 32 “[T]he right to have rights,” Arendt continues, “means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions.” 33 What Arendt texts thus demand, impossibly, is “what,” she says, “we must call a ‘human right’ today,” namely, mutual interest and institutions adequate to its mediation, for, she says, “[i]ts loss entails the loss of the relevance of speech.” 34 This right cannot be directly demanded, for love cannot be the object of a command, but its claim on us can yet be conveyed. The right to have rights is the stuttering expression of a demand that cannot be fully voiced, but without which whatever we can directly demand becomes propaganda for nihilism.

If Arendt’s writings are as complicated, self-contesting, and demanding as I have suggested, it is perhaps because, in Arendt’s words, “only within the framework of a people can a man live as a man among men without exhausting himself.” 35

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31 Ibid.
32 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 296.
33 Ibid., 296-297.
34 Ibid., 297.


The Deceptiveness of the Verb To Be and the Conception of Metaphor in Nietzsche’s Philosophy

Patrizia Piredda

Abstract: This article aims to show the relevance of Nietzsche’s philosophy of metaphor. Against the metaphysical tradition, Nietzsche understands that language develops from evolution and realizes that its fundament does not rest in logical principles but rather in metaphors, and that false beliefs derive from erroneous values. In order to understand the role of the verb “to be” in constructing false beliefs, I analyse Nietzsche’s interpretation of Parmenides’ philosophy of being. Nietzsche claims that the logical consequence of Parmenides’ metaphysical thought, according to which our language descends from the true transcendent world, is that concepts represent the essence of things. I claim that, for Nietzsche, this belief is erroneous, as far as he states that there is no essence or substance, no transcendent world beyond the empirical one, which our language comes from. Our language as well as our knowledge derive from our body, which demonstrates that the body is one with the soul. Insofar as we develop our language by creating metaphors starting from our bodily sensations, Nietzsche considers metaphors as the fundament of our language and points out that they become concepts only to express the same meaning.

Keywords: Nietzsche, theory of metaphor, philosophy of language, metaphor and ethics

Almost one century after Nietzsche, one of the most relevant theorists of metaphor, George Lakoff, speculates whether our language is purely abstract and metaphysical (or transcendental, the term used here), or if our body and metaphors are the conditio sine qua non of language, by posing this question: “Do meaningful thought and reason essentially concern the nature of the organism doing the thinking—including the nature of its body, its interactions in its environment, its social character, and so
This study aims to show the reason why Nietzsche’s thought is fundamental for the development of the theory of metaphor of the twentieth century, by focusing on such aspects of Nietzsche’s thought as the empirical and naturalistic approach to speculation, the refusal of the hiatus between soul and body, of ontology and metaphysics, and finally the idea that our language is embodied.

Such speculation arises from an essential dichotomy within the Western tradition, in which the idea of the division between body and soul, subject and object, superficiality and depth is rooted: it has been fixed by Christianity and crystallized by the Cartesian separation between res cogitans and res extensa, in which the body is considered a mere non-thinking machine. From this perspective, our language was conceived as having no connection with our body: Since it came to us from a transcendent dimension, it was seen as perfect in itself in purely theoretical terms. In the twentieth century, the attempts within the field of logic to create an impeccably enclosed system, in which language should be perfectly regularized, still adhered to the scheme of dualism. The perfection of language consisted in the idea that the identity of words and objects, which means that a word has only one meaning, exists: according to Wittgenstein’s first conception of language as expressed in the Tractatus, where the philosopher writes that “in the proposition a name is representative of an object,” that “objects can only be named” and that therefore, “signs are their representatives […] I can only speak about them.” Consequently, whenever it is possible to use a word in two or more different ways, as in everyday life, or whenever two words “that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way,” errors and confusion are the result. This is the case in which the verb “to be” seems a copula, “as a sign for identity, and as an expression of existence”; therefore, “in order to avoid such errors, we must make use of a sign-language that excludes them by not using … in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification.”

Even though in the Tractatus Wittgenstein conceives language as founded on the homology (or formal identity) between words and facts, that is, between propositions and states of affairs, in the Philosophical Investigations he considers language as a cauldron of language-games, linked in a complex net by similarities of different linguistic families. Our language, in other

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3 Ibid., §3.221, p. 15.
4 Ibid., §3.323, p. 18.
5 Ibid., §3.323, p. 18.
6 Ibid., §3.325, p. 19.
words, is created by a metaphorical process and it is described as labyrinth-like—“an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.”7 All elements of this labyrinthine city are different language games, some of which linked by some sort of familiarity. In this metaphorical city, the homology between words and facts is only one language-game amongst many possible ones. By means of this change of perspective, Wittgenstein paves the way to the modern conception of metaphor considered as a cognitive process of the human being.

Aristotle was the first philosopher to understand that metaphor is not only a language figure but also a fundamental cognitive process, which permits to achieve that non-rigorous knowledge necessary to perform good actions, i.e., phronesis (wisdom). After centuries, during which it has been considered as a mere rhetorical ornament, metaphor was rehabilitated in the eighteenth century by Giambattista Vico, even though “only in the twentieth century did psychologists and linguists question and make further investigations into what Vico had examined.”8 As Christian Emden writes, even today authors who are interested in the philosophical study of metaphor rarely mention Nietzsche’s position, and in general “the implications of his approach have not always been taken seriously—at least partly because his position is far from clear.”9

The Nietzschean contribution is fundamental because his conception lays the foundation for modern thought by understanding that the importance of metaphor consists in a particular way to use the verb to be, thanks to which one can nullify the value of the concept of truth, the identity of words and things, the division between subject and object, body and mind, and senses and intellect. To sum up, according to Western traditional philosophy, we organize reality through categories and concepts, which are independent of the human body. This belief is described in synthesis by Damasio in Descartes’ error as:

the abyssal separation between body and mind, between the sizable, dimensioned, mechanically operated,
infinitely divisible body stuff, on the one hand, and the unsizable, unidimensioned, un-pushpullable, nondivisible mind stuff; the suggestion that reasoning, and moral judgment, and the suffering that comes from physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from the body.\textsuperscript{10}

Because humans believe that the “capacity for disembodied reason” makes them different from animals, they maintain that their quintessence is transcendent reason and consequently believe that “our essential humanness has nothing to do with our connection to nature or to art or to music or to anything of the senses,” but with the metaphysical world alone.\textsuperscript{11}

At the time of Nietzsche, reason was generally considered the noble part of humans, i.e., the part that elevated them above the animal condition, ruled by the power of passions and material needs, to the condition of the divine. According to Nietzsche, Parmenides is the father of such a dichotomy, since he represents a watershed between two different ways of thinking: the pre-Socratic philosophy, above all Anaximander’s view, according to which the Being and non-Being coexist; and Socratic philosophy. If at first Parmenides seems to follow Anaximander’s philosophy,\textsuperscript{12} he later on turns to the pure absolute abstraction of logics and affirms that only Being exists while Becoming does not: Being is unity or the good, while Becoming is duality or the illogical coexistence of good and evil. He arrives to deny the existence of the empirical world because it is characterized by the becoming in which there are good qualities like light, “fieriness, warmth, weightlessness, rarification, activity and masculinity”\textsuperscript{13} and bad qualities that are the negation and the absence of the good ones. The system of values derived from this dichotomy is quite clear: what is, i.e., what exists, is good; what is not, i.e., what does not exist (the negation of what exists), is bad. Nietzsche states that Parmenides denies that the negation of a quality can be real (i.e., can exist), because if negation is ontologically non-being, it cannot therefore be anything: by following this logical inference, he establishes the tautology $A = A$ ($A$ is $A$)


\textsuperscript{12} Unlike the other Pre-Socratic thinkers, Anaximander believes that the principle of all things (aperieon) is not something material like water or fire but rather the immaterial without limits; aperieon semantically indicates both the infinite and what has no limits but is not immobile. In fact, the eternal movement of the aperieon creates the opposites (hot-cold, wet-dry, and so on) and from them the world comes into being.

\textsuperscript{13} Friedrich Nietzsche, \textit{Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greek} (Washington: Regnery, 2001), §9, p. 72.
and states that “only total perversity of thinking” could have committed this “crime against logic” \(^{14}\) by thinking that \(A = \text{non } A\) (\(A\) is not \(A\)). Moreover, what is not cannot be thought about, it does not therefore exist because only thinkable things are, and what exists cannot be destroyed or changed because in this case it would become “non-being.” This logical reasoning leads to admit that the \(it\ is\) is unique, immutable, and eternal, while the \(it\ is\ not\) is multiple, mutable, and transient. From an epistemological point of view, the conflict between \(to\ be\) and \(not\ to\ be\) derives from the different knowledge that we acquire either from our senses or reason. Although by observing and experiencing the real world, Parmenides sees that it is composed by different and caduceus things, his reason forces him to admit that multiplicity does not exist. On the one hand, there is the truth of tautology and logical principles, like \(\text{tertium non datur}\), according to which one thing either is or is not; on the other hand, there is mendaciousness, according to which the non-existent coexists with the existent, which is to say that both Being and Becoming exist.

In Parmenides’ view, such a logical confusion is created by our senses because they produce only illusions; therefore, “nothing may be learned from them” since “all the manifold colourful world known to experience, all the transformations of its qualities, all the orderliness of its ups and down, are cast aside merciless as mere semblance and illusion.” \(^{15}\)

From the Parmenidean division of real and illusory world derive the metaphysical traditional thought and the Christian religion that identifies the Being with God, or the eternal and stable truth. This idea is expressed by the proposition \(\text{God is that who is, i.e., tautologically speaking, God is the same as himself:}\) God is God. With the advent of Christianity, the figure of Christ resolves this contradiction, since as a man he is destined to die (thus representing Becoming), but as the son of God he is also destined to eternal life (thus embodying Being). The mortal part of Christ is the body, while the perpetual part is the soul that can be also called \(\text{nous}\) (intellect) or \(\text{psyche}\). The separation between body and mind, as well as the positive value accorded to the latter, confirmed by the power of the logical identity, was thus definitively established. Eventually, by taking the habit of using the verb \(to\ be\) as the manifestation of substance (Being), concepts “instead of being corrected and tested against reality (considering that they are in fact derived from it) […] are supposed to measure and direct reality,” \(^{16}\) and thinking has been identified with the Being. If reality is Being and Being is thought, then thought is reality and also possesses its characteristics like stability, universality, and undoubtedness; in other words, we are real because we

\(^{14}\) Ibid, §10, p. 77.

\(^{15}\) Ibid, §10, p. 79.

\(^{16}\) Ibid, §12, p. 87.
think and not because we have a body, or, as Descartes states: *cogitamus ergo sumus*.

The metaphysical division between body and mind was based on a dualism that postulated limitedness, imperfection, partiality, and instability as the essential characteristics of the body; whereas, on the other hand, limitlessness, perfection, impartiality, and stability constituted transcendent reason. Because of reason, one can believe it possible to abstract oneself from the practical world, and by so doing, observe, evaluate and understand reality. By means of reason, one can believe to be able to grasp the essence of things and to describe them in an objective and universal way, thereby eventually attaining the *Truth*. Nietzsche is aware of the difficulty in extirpating such beliefs based on the power of the verb *to be* that creates the illusion of identity because, as Maturana and Varela wrote a few decades later, “we tend to live in a world of certainty, of undoubted, rock-ribbed perceptions: our convictions prove that things are the way we see them and there is no alternative to what we hold as true. This is our daily situation, our cultural condition, our common way of being human.”

We are born into a predetermined system of traditional values, which we need to consider true since they cannot be questioned before we start believing that they are valid. As soon as we are born, we are trained to believe in the validity of these *truths* and not to doubt, even if they are misleading. In fact, for Nietzsche these so-called *truths* are nothing but artificial beliefs by which we represent and interpret the world.

Once they are acquired as true, these beliefs can be changed only by letting doubt filter into the mind. Doubt allows wondering whether what we have been taught is the *Truth* or something else; in other words, because of doubt, we have the possibility of reaching beyond the limit of metaphysics, i.e., of realizing that *ascertained Truth* is only a value created by us, a paradigm among a wide range of possible paradigms. According to Nietzsche, to be anchored in the paradigm of *Truth* has a moral value and means to live a decadent life. The ethical responsibility of philosophers consists in


18 According to Nietzsche, moral values have been created when the so-called slaves, viz., people who do not have the courage to accept the eternal return which would force them to carry the responsibility for what happens (knowing oneself, good and evil, the non-existence of God, and freedom), ruled over society with feelings of resentment against the gayness of life. Nietzsche writes in *The Genealogy of Morals*: “The revolt of the slaves in morals begins in the very principle of resentment becoming creative and giving birth to values – a resentment experienced by creatures who, deprived as they are of the proper outlet of action, are forced to find their compensation in an imaginary revenge.” Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals, Good and Evils* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1918), “Good and Bad,” §10, p. 18. Moral values have been created not to give power to the best individual (a wise man who possesses courage, freedom, knowledge of himself, and is able to direct and create his own destiny, to carry the responsibility...
unmasking false truths. In order to do that, they should stop using the verb 
*to be* as the metaphysical tool for establishing identities of words and objects, 
and they should rather use it as the metaphorical connection between 
different elements. By transferring the attention to this different perspective, 
philosophers would be able to destroy the metaphysical *Truths* and to open 
the door to radical renovation. From Nietzsche’s perspective, philosophers 
must neither follow nor create systems, truths and values; instead, their 
activity should be the therapy that permits to discover and extirpate errors 
and false beliefs. Philosophy must “emphasize the *relativity* and 
*anthropomorphic* character of all knowledge, as well as the all pervasive ruling 
power of *illusion*.”19 Philosophical activity is a constant process of self- 
education that proceeds not by logical deductions but “by means of 
metaphor.”20 Unfortunately, according to Nietzsche, philosophers very often 
fail to do this because they cannot get rid of the weight of the traditional 
language of ontology and of its consequent moral system of values that in 
*Zarathustra* are metaphorically referred to as “lead-drop thoughts.”21 
This impediment derives from the lack of sense for history, from a refusal to accept 
the *becoming*, from a need to find a cause-effect relationship in everything, 
and from an inclination to conceive things *sub specie aeterni*. By thinking thus, 
such philosophers “kill and stuff the things they worship, these lords of 
concept idolatry—they become mortal dangers to everything they 
worship.”22 Rather than admitting the impossibility of perceiving and 
knowing the substance of things that do not exist, these philosophers state 
that the cause of this impossibility lies in the limitations of the body and 
senses: the latter are fluid and prevent us from seeing the truth that is eternal, 
universal and fixed. The moral motto that derives from this metaphysical

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19 Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Philosophe: Reflections on the Struggle between Art and 
Knowledge,” in *Internet Archive*, <https://archive.org/stream/StruggleBetweenArtAndKnowledge/ThePhilosopher_djvu.txt>, 
aph. 41.


21 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra. A Book for All and None* (Cambridge: 

22 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer*, in *The 
Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
view calls on people to “get rid of sense-deception, becoming, history, lies … say no to everyone who believes in the senses … and above all, get rid of the body, this miserable idée fixe of the senses! Full of all the errors of logic, refuted, impossible even, although it is imprudent enough to act as if it were real.”

Moreover, philosophers tend to confuse the last thing (the abstract truth of the concept) with the first thing (the sensation), since they do not suppose it possible that supreme values might derive from something inferior to them. Thus, at the end of the process of abstraction from a thing to a word, there is a total revolution which “is the last, emptiest, most meagre idea of all, and it is put first, as cause in itself, as ens realissimus.” Finally, philosophers are wrong in thinking that there is causality between subjects and objects, since these are linked only by an aesthetic relationship which is “an allusive transference, a stammering translation into a quite different language. For which purpose a middle sphere and mediating force is certainly required which can freely invent and freely create poetry.”

For Nietzsche, we cannot attain objective knowledge because there is no metaphysical place or omniscient mind where objective knowledge, including our language, is stored. What we call knowledge is only an interpretation made by humans, forged by our senses, feelings, and perceptions; and human language is not poured into the brain from outside but depends on the evolution of the human being. However, they tend to

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23 Ibid., 167.
24 Ibid., 169.
26 As Emden demonstrates in Nietzsche’s Naturalism, Nietzsche was deeply interested in the nineteenth-century science by which he was definitely influenced, above all by Darwin’s theory of evolution. Nevertheless, Nietzsche did not share with the English naturalist the idea that evolution is caused merely by natural selection. According to Emden, however, Nietzsche has not an anti-Darwinian position, because he “is highly critical of popular Darwinism, in particular its social and political conclusions.” Christian Emden, Philosophy and the Life Sciences in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 43. From the biological point of view, since organisms have to constantly find strategies in order to stay in homeostasis, they have to adapt to their environment. The human being is a complex organism shaped in depth by culture and by social rules. By taking into account these premises, Nietzsche discerns between those who have the will only to live, viz., a fable and sick form of life aimed at adaptation, conservation and stabilization of existence; and those who possess the will to power, which urges the human being to evolve, viz., to know and to realise him-herself. This individual is not that who gains the upper hand in society, but the best, who freely provokes a gap between him-herself and the mass of mediocre individuals. For Nietzsche, therefore, evolution is caused not only by the principle of natural selection because the role of our environment is not sufficient to elucidate how variation happens: evolution is caused also by the will to power. Eventually, Nietzsche substitutes the moral values of our society with the values of naturalism stric
to sensu. In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche writes: “Every naturalism is morality – which is to say: every healthy morality – is governed by an instinct of life […] but anti-natural morality, on the other hand, which is to say almost every morality that has been taught, revered, or preached so far,
forget what the origin of language is and to convince themselves that language descends from the metaphysical Platonic world. According to this perspective, there exist two different kinds of concepts: those which we discover through experience (a posteriori), and those which are innate in our mind and represent what is fixed, eternal and objectively true (a priori). It is clear that the exclusion of the body and senses in favour of an ontological and metaphysical conception of knowledge leads to consider the observing subject as separate from the observed object, and to admit the existence of a univocal language founded on logical principles and on the correspondence between words and things. Nietzsche does not deny that words can represent things; for example, the word *table* represents an object that is constituted by a surface and four legs on which it is possible to place things, but Nietzsche denies that the word *table* can be used only to represent a table, i.e., that it represents (or is) the substance of the object “table.” By denying that names are the *ousia* (Being), Nietzsche calls into question the validity of the metaphysical system that confers a value of truth on the word, according to which the word is not a mere conventional expression, but the truth. From this perspective, if a word has no relationship of identity with the object, it must then be deceitful and false. In Nietzsche’s view, this conception of language is completely inappropriate and false, insofar as it implies that the word is an ontological expression for the thing. It also implies that the subject should not only be in an ontological relation with an object, but that the subject should also hold the predominant position, from which he can observe the object and seize its substance. This is impossible for Nietzsche, as he expresses in *The Will to Power*:

> The logical-metaphysical postulates, the belief in substance, accident, attribute, etc., derive their convincing force from our habit of regarding all our deeds as consequences of our will—so that the ego, as substance, does not vanish in the multiplicity of change. But there is no such thing as will. We have no categories at all that permit us to distinguish a “world in itself” from a “world of appearance.” All our categories of explicitly turns its back on the instincts of life – it condemns these instincts.” Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer*, “Morality as Anti-Nature,” §4, p. 174. For a deeper insight into the relationship among Nietzsche, naturalism and evolutionism I suggest Christoph Cox, *Nietzsche. Naturalism and Interpretation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) and Ronald Osborn, *Humanism and the Death of God: Searching for the Good After Darwin, Marx, and Nietzsche* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
reason are of sensual origin: derived from the empirical world.27

If we wanted to continue to use the concept of substance and to affirm that the name is indeed the essence of the object, then we would be admitting that the essence should be limited to the most commonly used meaning, since the word can be effectively used in different ways and with different meanings. The problem is that we use the same grammatical form, is, to represent different things, among which the logical identity of word and object (the table is red) coexists with the metaphor (the sea is a table). From the point of view of logic, the link of the two metaphorical members realized by the verb to be is a contradiction that creates confusion and falsity, since it affirms that A is A but also that A is –A (that A is not identical to A), because there is no relationship of identity between the word and the object. Consequently, if one for example affirms that children are men, one speaks the truth because children as a subcategory of men (the human being in general) stays in a relationship of identity with men; but if one affirms that children are angels, one speaks the false because children is not a subcategory of angels. For Nietzsche, this kind of reasoning is highly problematic, if not misleading, because it is set on an already given value of the verb to be. For Nietzsche, the etymology of the concept of being reveals not a metaphysical but rather an empirical birth since the verb esse, in his opinion, originally meant to breathe. He writes that man “comprehends their existence [of things] as a ‘breathing’ by analogy with his own” and even if the “original meaning of the word was soon blurred” it is still clear that “man imagines the existence of other things by analogy with his own existence.”28 Practically, it happens that man “projects his conviction that he himself breathes and lives by means of a metaphor, i.e., a non-logical process, upon all other things.”29 One believes that the verb to be creates real identity, while it only expresses connections and relationships between things; also, “the ‘is’ in a synthetic judgment is false; it includes a transference. Two different spheres, between which there can never be an equation, are placed next to each other.”30

Moreover, Nietzsche thinks that contradiction does not exist in nature but is rather a merely useful principle for communicating effectively; if one cannot simultaneously affirm and deny the same thing, it is only because one lacks the ability to do it. In fact, the principle of contradiction, considered as the most certain one, presupposes an already given definition

28 Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greek, §11, p. 84.
29 Ibid., §11, 84.
of reality, according to which “opposite attributes could not be ascribed to it. Or the proposition means: opposite attributes should not be ascribed to it. In that case, logic would be an imperative not to know the true, but to posit and arrange a world that shall be called true by us.”31 Thus, logical principles are not the innate fundamentals of our language; they are instead the instruments with which we can create a linguistic interpretation of reality: “Logic is the attempt to comprehend the actual world by means of a scheme of being posited by ourselves; more correctly, to make it formulatable and calculable for us.”32 The fact that people need to believe in logic and in its principles and categories demonstrates “only their usefulness for life, proved by experience: not something that is true.”33 Therefore, the belief that one can possess the essence of things by means of language, and that it is possible to state a truth about reality, is in itself false: “We believe that when we speak of trees, colours, snow, and flowers, we have knowledge of the things themselves, and yet we possess only metaphors of things which in no way correspond to the original entities.”34

For Nietzsche, there exists no ontological link between subject and object, or between word and thing. No concept is innate in us, all conceptual thought instead derives from our way of perceiving and interpreting reality; it derives from our ability to see connections, similarities and dissimilarities amongst things, since “all the knowledge which is of assistance to us involves the identification of things which are not the same, of things which are only similar. In other words, such knowledge is essentially illogical.”35 This means that the ground of knowledge is the net of the analogical associations in which objects can no longer be conceived as things in themselves, but as things connected with each other into a net of relationships. Since the word indicates “the most general relationship which connects all things, as does the word ‘nonbeing’,” we can use the verb to be to indicate different meanings: “I may say of a tree that ‘it is’ in distinction to things which are not trees; I may say ‘it is coming to be’ in distinction to itself seen at a different time; I may say ‘it is not,’ as for example in ‘it is not yet a tree’ when I am looking at a shrub.”36 To ground language and knowledge into analogical associations coming from our bodily experience, basically consisting of emotions and sensations,37 also means to deny another deceitful metaphysical value, namely the supremacy

31 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, aph. 516, p. 279.
32 Ibid., aph. 516, p. 280.
33 Ibid., aph. 507, p. 276.
36 Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greek, §11, p. 83.
37 This will also ground the thesis of Descartes’ Error, where Damasio claims that it is not possible to talk about consciousness without taking into account emotions and feelings.
of the human being due to his reason, from which a further dichotomy is derived: according to this vision of life, passions and sensations of the body diminish the human toward the animal state, while reason elevates it toward the perfection of God. The gulf between these visions is clear: sensation/irrationality/descending/evil are opposed to reason/rationality/rising/good. Nietzsche is aware that attributing primacy to the rational faculty and to the soul serves to mask the decadence of our society and to create the illusion of a state of stability necessary to keep our social equilibrium alive. In practical terms, when concepts are not used to enhance the comprehension of the net of relationships that constitutes our reality, but are rather conceived as the representation of the essence of things, they therefore create confusion. Amongst erroneous concepts, Nietzsche also includes those that are logical, since “certain and clear concepts allow the sick some hope: they find the order and stability reassuring. Thus, many of our thought patterns provide us with comfort. Logic, for example, convinces us that the world is predictable and orderly.” Knowledge begins with the senses and develops by two analogical steps: “the stimulation of a nerve is first translated into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a complete leap from one sphere into the heart of another new sphere.” The first passage leads from a sensorial perception to an image; the second from an image to a word. This double passage involves different abilities, such as the aesthetic recognition of forms, and memory, and consists precisely in seeking out “some likeness between one thing and another, to identify like with like. Memory lives by means of this activity and practices it continually. Confusion (of one thing with another) is the primal phenomenon. This presupposes the perception of shapes.” In other words, knowledge is a network of metaphors in which “the most accustomed metaphors, the usual ones, now pass for truths and as standards for measuring the rarer ones. The only intrinsic difference here is the difference between custom and novelty, frequency and rarity.”

Nietzsche develops his view of the function of metaphor in the notes for a book which he never finished, the Philosophenbuch (The Philosopher, 1872-1875), and in his two short essays Über das Pathos der Wahrheit (On the Pathos of Truth, 1872) and Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn (On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense, 1873). In these books, Nietzsche affirms that

41 Ibid., aph. 149.
“knowing is nothing but working with the favourite metaphors”, and that knowledge is the habit of using some metaphors instead of others. By being repeatedly used to express one same meaning, metaphors become stable images archived in the memory as abstract schemata, in which all particular characteristics of singular objects are lost: “the omitting of what is individual provides us with the concept, and with this our knowledge begins: in categorizing, in the establishment of classes. But the essence of things does not correspond to this: it is a process of knowledge which does not touch upon the essence of things.” When the original impression of data deriving from the senses is transformed, it is “petrified for this purpose; it is captured and stamped by means of concepts. Then it is killed, skinned, mumified and preserved as a concept.” This process is necessary because abstraction is a fundamental way for humans to create language, since “it is compatible with very many appearances and is for this reason very rough and inadequate to each particular appearance.” When the object is completely stripped of its characteristics and is represented as a general and abstract image, new metaphors cease to occur because when we experience the object again, it is immediately represented in our brain by an already given image/concept: “All the forms which the brain and the nervous system have once produced are often repeated in the same way from then on. The same nervous activity produces the same image again.” Thus, what we call knowledge is the crystallization of original metaphors into schemata, which constitute a sort of model with which we interpret the world. Concepts are necessary because without them it would not be possible to attain any knowledge. However, this does not mean that we must consider them true and that we should consequently consider metaphors false. Concepts are born from an intuition that was at first a metaphor derived from the body and created by the imagination, which for Nietzsche “consists in the quick observation of similarities.” In a second moment, we attribute to metaphor values: from this moment on, we think that the metaphor represents something true, stable, and universal. In other words, as soon as we start attributing always the same meaning to one metaphor, we also start using it as a concept and it thus becomes a stable knowledge within or system of values. Actually, what we call truth is nothing but the remains of the original unstable movement of metaphors:

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42 Ibid., aph. 149.
43 Ibid., aph. 150.
44 Ibid., aph. 149.
45 Ibid., aph. 144.
46 Ibid., aph. 66.
47 Ibid., aph. 60.
What, then, is truth? A movable army of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which have been subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, and decoration, and which, after they have been in use for a long time, strike a people as firmly established, canonical, and blinding; truths are illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors which have become worn by frequent use and have lost all sensuous vigour, coins which, having lost their stamp, are now regarded as metal and no longer as coins.48

The need of humans for believing in something eternal and true comes to be the necessary lie to hide the fact that our language is produced by us, for us, “with the same necessity with as a spider spins … All that conformity to law which we find so imposing in the orbits of the stars and chemical processes is basically identical with those qualities which we ourselves bring to bear on things, so that what we find imposing is our own activity.” 49

By grace of the illusion in believing that the stability of logical principles founds language, the risk of making confusion is actually considerable. We create this kind of mistake almost automatically because, being used to employing language in a fixed and structured way, we forget that the process of its formation is metaphorical and we use no longer the verb to be as a means to connect different elements in metaphors but as the ontological expression of identity:

Only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor, only by virtue of the fact that a mass of images, which originally flowed in a hot, liquid stream from the primal power of the human imagination, has become hard and rigid, only because of the invincible faith that this sun, this window, this table is a truth in itself – in short because man forgets himself as a subject, and indeed as an artistically creating subject, does he lives with some degree of peace, security, and consistency.50

On account of habituation, one forgets “the conventional origin of language, truth, values and forms of life, by enclosing them within traditions and customary habits that are silently accepted and shared…habit permits

49 Ibid., 150.
50 Ibid., 148.
the definitive consolidation of linguistic meanings and truths, and this all happens because their artificial and illusory origin has been forgotten.”\textsuperscript{51} One can say that “all explaining and knowing is actually nothing but categorizing”\textsuperscript{52} meant to create strong knowledge in order to prevent instability and incertitude. Therefore, if we were aware of how we begin to know, we would notice that even if we believe that our knowledge and language are created by rationality, they actually form in an illogical (or better pre-logical) way and that the body and senses play a fundamental role in this process.\textsuperscript{53} As Christian Emden notes:

Nietzsche implicitly suggests that the figurative quality present in the early stages of linguistic development has not been lost completely, and although most aspects of the eighteenth-century debate were marked by the belief that one can observe a shift from myths to logos in the history of thought and language, Nietzsche had to contend that myth, and therefore metaphor, remained prominent paradigms of conceptual thought.\textsuperscript{54}

In conclusion, after having analysed the problem of the link between the dichotomy concerning soul and body in western society and the role of the verb \textit{to be} and the relationship between the latter and knowledge, one can affirm that for Nietzsche the verb \textit{to be}, and in particular in its third-person form \textit{is}, a number of perils hide, which can produce misleading knowledge that could be difficult to extirpate after it becomes dogmatic. Nietzsche’s interpretation of metaphor unfolds a reflection fundamental for clearly recognising mistakes that bring us to believe that the false is true. Nietzsche’s observations on metaphor permit us, therefore, to undertake that endeavour aimed at \textit{showing the fly the way out from the bottle} because, as Wittgenstein writes:

\begin{quote}
We see colours, we hear sounds, we perceive spatiality as up and down, left and right, and so on because our body is made in a determined form. Other animals perceive spatiality in a different way and see and hear different colours and sounds because their form of life and their body are different: Nietzsche writes that “if we could communicate with a midge we would hear that it too floats through the air with the very same pathos, feeling that it too contains within itself the flying centre of this world.” Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” 141. Our language and knowledge too, therefore, derive from our body: according to Nietzsche, in origin, they are “The stimulation of a nerve is first translated into an image: first metaphor! The image is then imitated by a sound: second metaphor” (ibid.).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{52} Nietzsche, “The Philosophe: Reflections on the Struggle between Art and Knowledge,” aph. 141, 47.
\textsuperscript{53} We see colours, we hear sounds, we perceive spatiality as up and down, left and right, and so on because our body is made in a determined form. Other animals perceive spatiality in a different way and see and hear different colours and sounds because their form of life and their body are different: Nietzsche writes that “if we could communicate with a midge we would hear that it too floats through the air with the very same pathos, feeling that it too contains within itself the flying centre of this world.” Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” 141. Our language and knowledge too, therefore, derive from our body: according to Nietzsche, in origin, they are “The stimulation of a nerve is first translated into an image: first metaphor! The image is then imitated by a sound: second metaphor” (ibid.).
\textsuperscript{54} Emden, \textit{Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body}, 64.
So long as there is a verb “be” that seems to function like “eat” and “drink”, so long as there are adjectives “identical,” “true,” “false,” “possible,” so long as there is talk about a flow of time and an expanse of space, etc., humans will continue to bump up against the same mysterious difficulties, and stare at something that no explanation seems able to remove.55

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The Revolutionary Spinoza: Immanence, Ethology, and the Politic of Desire

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Abstract: This article is a reconstruction of Spinoza’s materialist ontology using Deleuze’s philosophy, towards a revolutionary ethics of desire. In the first part, I discuss the nature of Spinoza’s radical ethics in conjunction with Deleuze’s immanent ethics. Moreover, I elaborate Spinoza’s philosophy of ethology and notion of agency (conatus). In the last part, I explain how these concepts have influenced Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation of an immanent, minortarian, and collective politics of desire. In addition, I explicate how this radical theory of ethics can engender the diagramming of a nomadic politics or a revolution-to-come.

Keywords: ethology, conatus, schizoanalysis, cartography

I. Spinoza’s Materialist Ontology and the Plane of Immanence

The philosopher, Deleuze describes in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, appropriates the ascetic virtues of chastity, humility, and poverty, and lives it as the creative expression of his own singularity.¹ Spinoza utilizes these virtues not to achieve moral ends or religious pathway towards an afterworld, “but rather the ‘effects’ of philosophy itself … as there is absolutely no other life for the philosopher.”² Meanwhile, in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, Deleuze considers Spinoza as the ‘prince of all philosophers.’³ This man deserves this noble description because he provides “the best plane of immanence … the purest, the one that does not hand itself over to the transcendent, the one that inspires the fewest illusions, bad

² Ibid.

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feelings, and erroneous perceptions.”⁴ To be specific, Deleuze finds in Spinoza the radical possibility of thinking and social existence emancipated from the fetters of the State.⁵ This can be perceived in the *A Theologico-Political Treatise,* where Spinoza formulates a philosophy that critically appraises the degenerate status quo.⁶ For instance, he questions his fellowmen why they choose their own enslavement and perceive it as freedom—a convergent theme problematized by Deleuze and Guattari in the entire *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.*⁷

Spinoza’s audacity should not surprise us when Negri, in *Savage Anomaly: the Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics,* considers him as the anomaly of the century, “an anomaly of victorious materialism, of the ontology of being that always moves forward and that by constituting itself poses the ideal possibility for revolutionizing the world.”⁸ Albeit life can achieve a certain degree of optimization within a democratic or a liberal society, the philosopher must not limit himself or herself with it. Following Deleuze, “the philosopher solicits forces in thought that elude obedience as well as blame, and fashions the image of a life beyond good and evil, a rigorous innocence without merit or culpability. The philosopher can reside in various states, he can frequent various milieus, but he does so in the manner of a hermit, a shadow, a traveler.”⁹ In this manner, dissonance and nomadism are legitimized as cardinal virtues in Spinozist philosophy. In the other works of Deleuze, these aforementioned virtues are analogously conceptualized. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* he conceives the virtues of affirmation and revaluation as the new values in the tragic world of Dionysus that is liberated from the fetters of Christianity (transcendental philosophy).¹⁰

A life characterized by fecundity and dynamism is termed by Spinoza as *Nature.* This major Spinozist thesis hinges on the idea of a single

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⁵ If ever he speaks about the perils of a revolution, it is about the perdition and disappointments of Cromwell’s revolution and the possible *coup d’etat* by the House of Orange. In his words, “During these periods, ‘revolutionary’ ideology is permeated with theology and is often, as with the Calvinist party, in the service of a politics of reaction.” Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy,* 9.


substance bearing inestimable modes of singularities and attributes, in the same manner that it conditions the possibility of a plethora of becomings.¹¹ In *Ethics*, Nature is understood as substance and cause (*Natura naturans*), and as effect and mode (*Natura naturata*).¹² These two conditions allow us to talk about Nature in general. Naturalism, in the context of Spinozism, satisfies the univocity of attributes (where the attributes in the same form constitute the essence of God as naturing nature and contain essences of modes as natured nature); the univocity of the cause (where the cause of all things is affirmed of God as the genesis of natured nature in the same sense that he caused himself); and the univocity of modality (where necessity qualifies both the order of natured nature, as well as natureing nature’s organization).¹³

The philosopher John Duns Scotus shares with Spinoza the fundamental belief that *Being is univocal*. Their ontological theorization of univocity is a valiant antipathy directed to a long history of western philosophical tradition systemically influenced by Platonic metaphysics or transcendental philosophy. What Deleuze derives from Scotus is the idea that it is only in univocity where genuine difference becomes possible. Deleuze explains in *Difference and Repetition* that, “The essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single and same sense, but that it is said, in a single time and same sense, of all individuating differences or intrinsic modalities. Being is the same for all these modalities, but these modalities are not the same …. The essence of univocal being is to include individuating differences, while these differences do not have the same essence and do not change the essence of being.”¹⁴ Meanwhile, Spinoza treats univocal being with pure affirmation, instead of neutrality or indifference, as it is “identical with unique, universal and infinite substance.”¹⁵ If transcendental philosophy erects a 38th parallel between mind and matter, for instance, then they metamorphose as attributes belonging to a single substance in the milieu of Spinozist univocity.

Spinozist univocity plays a very important role in Deleuze’s formulation of the concept of immanence. Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence is indispensably influenced by Spinoza’s ontology that is not merely materialist, but also pantheistic, atheistic, yet ethical in nature. Spinozist ontology is pantheistic because Nature and God are comprehended as identically responsible for the productions of all affections. It is atheistic since it denouncedates consciousness, values and sad passions, and more

importantly, a Creator outside being. Lastly, it is ethical because Spinoza, in Deleuze’s perception, opens us to a life of pure immanence: “We will speak of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence.”16 Under a life of univocity, the world turns into a democratized plane for all beings. Outside the Spinozist universe, the philosophical theme of immanence parallels with Bergson’s notion of the Whole (as constitutive of monistic time, infinite durations, and pure virtuality) and Nietzsche’s tragic world of Dionysus.17 For the former, the Whole is a plane where space and duration, perception and memory, the past and the present, recollection-memory and contraction-memory are understood in the yardstick of virtual coexistence.18 For the latter, the deified world is a world of pure becoming whose governing principle is the Eternal Return.19

Deleuze explains that the title of the last chapter, “Spinoza and Us” of Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, means being in “the middle of Spinoza.”20 Precedent to Deleuze’s characterization of micro-politics as a “politics of the middle,” is the recommendation that the most profound way to comprehend Spinozism is by way of the middle. In his words:

Generally one begins with the first principle of a philosopher. But what counts is also the third, the fourth, or the fifth principle. Everyone knows the first principle of Spinoza: one substance for all the attributes. But we also know the third, fourth or fifth principle: one Nature for all bodies, one Nature for all individuals, a Nature

18 Cf. Ibid., 91
19 Deleuze defines the Eternal Return as “the being of that which becomes. It is the being of becoming itself, the being which is affirmed in becoming.” Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 48. A similar description can be seen in Difference and Repetition: “The eternal return is not the effect of the identical upon a world to become similar; it is not an external order imposed upon chaos of the world; on the contrary, the eternal return is the internal identity of the world and of chaos.” Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 299.
20 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 122. Being at the middle of Spinoza is analogous to the Humean project of becoming-multiple. In Dialogues, Deleuze and Parnet characterize Hume’s empiricist philosophy as a practical philosophy of “becoming-multiple, instead of being-one, a being-whole or being as subject.” Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 132.

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that is itself an individual varying in an infinite number of ways.\textsuperscript{21}

A philosophy of the middle exhibits Deleuze’s radical reconstruction of Spinoza’s monism. It is not simply a conservative asseveration of a single substance, but rather a diagramming of a common plane of immanence where all bodies, minds, and individuals are situated.\textsuperscript{22} In this realm, the “plane of organization or transcendence” and the “plane of immanence,” are not perceived as dual opposites, but of a multiplicity of dimensions, lines, and directions in an assemblage.\textsuperscript{23} The former’s legitimacy emanates from a transcendental sphere—a divine plan in god’s mind and an evolution in a society’s organization of power.\textsuperscript{24} The plane of organization always involves genetic or structural subjectivity formations, which can only be inferred from what it gives.\textsuperscript{25} The plane of immanence, on the other hand, comprises of innumerable collectivities, individuals, and bodies, subjected to multi-faceted combinations or relations. Deleuze thinks that the plane of immanence is Nature’s plane of composition.

In this regard, instilling oneself in the middle of Spinoza implies two things. First, it entails Spinoza, including Deleuze’s underlying belief that thought is devoid of any primordial origin whatsoever, but only of outside by which it is connected; and, second, being in Spinoza’ middle means situating oneself in the immanent modal plane. And since this plane is not founded on any metaphysical principle, then relations forces and bodies are defined in accordance to their material performances and variations, i.e. on their ability to affect and be affected by other bodies whether by virtue of cultivation or decomposition. The ceaseless transformation of the plane of immanence, in Gatens’s view, “fragments the normative work of the plane of organization which, in turn, refolds and re-expresses this undoing by attempting to block and contain in molar forms the mobility and dynamism of the molecular.”\textsuperscript{26}

“Immanence” is a very significant and overarching term in the entire Deleuzian canon.\textsuperscript{27} Deleuze’s theorization of immanence, greatly influenced

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\item \textsuperscript{21} Deleuze, \textit{Spinoza: Practical Philosophy}, 122.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Cf. Deleuze, \textit{Spinoza: Practical Philosophy}, 128.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Cf. Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Gatens, “Through a Spinozist Lens: Ethology, Difference, Power,” 165.
\item \textsuperscript{27} \textit{Immanence} in the Deleuzian philosophy is interchangeably used with “empiricism.” In relation to this, Vincent Descombes in \textit{Modern French Philosophy} describes the project of Deleuze as a quest for a transcendental empiricism. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Empiricism and Subjectivity: An

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by Spinoza’s nature, is perceivable in his anti-juridical position against State philosophy. In *Savage Anomaly*, Negri ingeniously describes Spinoza’s relationship with Deleuze as an “encounter with continuity,” which likewise presupposes not only Deleuze’s, but also Negri’s profound indebtedness to the anti-juridical philosophy of Spinoza.28 The anti-juridical philosophy of Deleuze is an appendage to his over-all criticism of transcendental morality—the morality responsible for the marginalization of the materiality of life and the creative potentialities of the body. Spinoza is a critical witness to this type of morality prevalent in Western scholarship, especially in the juridical tradition. In essence, juridical scholarship implies that “forces have an individual or particular origins; that they must be socialized to engender relation that adequately correspond to them; that there is a mediation of Power; and that the horizon is inseparable from a crisis, war or antagonism for which Power is presented as the solution, but the ‘antagonistic solution.’”29

Before Kant, Hobbes is one of the foremost prophets of transcendentalism latently manifested in his social contract theory. For Hobbes, the Power of the State is determined by its power of legitimization. The State configures its legitimacy as a metaphysical guarantor based on the rational individuals’ will (*Leviathan*). On the contrary, Spinoza asserts that an individual’s natural right refers merely to his/her act of self-preservation (*conatus*). Contra Hobbes, he argues that an individual’s *conatus* and man’s rights are not transferrable to another, especially to a metaphysical authority.30 Similarly, in the Hobbesian territory, the only thing common to each individual is one’s desire for self-preservation, especially when a common object of interest exists. In this sense, it appears that the State’s power is merely shaped by its actual capability or desire of self-preservation that thereby voids the idea of arriving at a collective rationality, which is nothing but a whimsical idea.

However, in order to distantiate Spinoza from the accusation of anarchism, it must be made clear that he does not categorically negate any effort of the State to harmonize individual relationships in the form of ethical standards and public policies. What he opposes is the State’s project of

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advancing its totalizing and narcissistic interests using the ploy of achieving communal cohesion under the authority of the Leviathan. In other words, he only repudiates all transcendental configurations that overlay on the initiative of the multiplicity of a transcendent synthesis. Against the various juridical mystification of the State, he formulates a kind of immanent horizon characterized by active forces, relations, and possibilities. Spinoza describes the state as a product of a purely natural process, in consonance with the cultivation of natural right and personal life. In this vein, the state’s genealogical configuration is nothing but a product of secularized procedures and struggles, and not of metaphysical or divine-laden processes. For example, ethical relation and difference between bodies in the State are defined not in accordance to an overarching transcendental principle. Rather, the relation and distinction between bodies “relates to the kind of affections that determine our conatus.” In the study of ethology, the behavior of bodies in the plane of immanence is governed by the power of self-preservation. However, the numerous bodies’ perseverance entails a necessary encounter with other bodies. It can be argued, therefore, that the aptitude and movement of bodies may vary depending on the quality and quantity of other bodies they associate with. Likewise, this creative encounter posits the idea that even the power of self-preservation is not immune from the affections from the exterior.

This characterization inspired Spinoza to re-configure democracy under the rubric of materialism and production—the politics of the multitude. This mature phase in the philosophy of Spinoza, from the A Theologico-Political Treatise onwards, constitutes a radical materialism of bodies and surfaces where praxis constitutes being as an incessant reconstruction by human praxis.

II. Ethology: An Immanent Philosophy of Agency

Spinoza’s materialist ontology is an ethology or an ethics situated in the plane of immanence. In this plane, there is only a single immanent substance: the human individual—a mode of nature’s attributes and a

31 For Deleuze, compact is one of the states of value judgments where individuals attempt to unite with parallel bodies. Cf. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 257; Cf. Armstrong, “Some Reflections on Deleuze’s Spinoza: Compositions and Agency,” 144.
33 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 261. In Ethics, Spinoza writes, “Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being.” Spinoza, Ethics, 159.
34 Cf. Ibid., xviii.
35 Cf. Ibid., xvii.
fragment of a protean and interrelated whole. But it is important to accentuate that in this plane, the individual does not enjoy a privileged position in relation to other entities, in the same manner that subjectivity is not limited to the realm of rationality. Univocity of being promotes an ontological democracy, where everything metamorphoses into bodies, whose value is gauged not according to one’s rational and discursive capacities, but on speeds, as well as the ability to affect and to be affected. 36 The same description is found in Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative work, A Thousand Plateaus, where they claim that in the study of ethology, bodies are not defined according to some logico-biological categories such as genus and specie: “It is no longer a question of organs and functions, and of a transcendent Plane that can preside over that organization only by means of analogical relations and types of divergent development. It is a question not of organization, but of composition; not of development or differentiation but of movement and rest, speed and slowness.” 37 Similarly in Anti-Oedipus, they opine that ethology can be comprehended in the realm of desiring-production. In this realm, a dichotomy does not exist between man and nature, or the human and the nonhuman. Instead of perceiving them as binary opposites, they are already perceived as part of a whole process of life: “Not man as the king of creation, but rather as the being who is in intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of being, who is responsible for even the stars and animal life, and who ceaselessly plugs an organ-machine into an energy-machine, a tree into his body, a breast into his mouth, the sun into his asshole.” 38

Furthermore, Deleuze explains how the concept immanence in the Spinozist universe achieves an ontological status. Substance, attributes, and the modes are understood in relation to expression, rather than to a transcendent organization of emanation. 39 Substance is not privileged in relation to any attributes, in the same fashion that no attribute is superior to another. An attribute expresses a particular essence. As Deleuze argues, “The essence that is expressed is an unlimited, infinite quality. The expressive

36 Cf. Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 125.
37 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 255; Cf. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 40.
38 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 5.
39 Cf. Miguel de Beistegui, Immanence – Deleuze and Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 47. The term “expressionism” in Deleuze’s Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza originally bears an artistic French and German genealogy seen in the works of Artaud and Bacon. As Macherey opines, expressionism opposes the “subtle distribution of impressions over a horizontal plane on which they appear to float weightlessly … the vertical force of expression revealed in the violence of utterances and gestures that present through more or less systematically organized distortions the most strident aspects of reality and life.” Pierre Macherey, “The Encounter with Spinoza,” in Deleuze: A Critical Reader, ed. by Paul Patton, 143.
attribute relates essence to substance and it is this immanent relation that the intellect grasps. All the essences, distinct in the attributes, are as one in substance, to which they are related by the attributes.”  

Meanwhile, in *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, Deleuze elucidates the concept “expression” as double-edged hermeneutical device that capacitates us to interpret texts, relations, and events, not limited to the frontiers of representation, identity, linearity, and teleology. In understanding history, for instance, we must not merely interpret it as a linear progression of events towards a grand purpose or simply as a culmination of a single Unitarian concept. Neither should we reduce it into perpetual becoming. Craig Lundy’s *History and Becoming: Deleuze’s Philosophy of Creativity* offers a profound articulation of Deleuze’s expressionist reading of history. He interprets Deleuze’s philosophy of history as irreducible to either historicism or nomadic becoming. This novel kind of historical philosophizing does not conform to either aforementioned dualism, but operates in-between. History as historicism and nomadic becoming, Lundy writes, “will emerge in the middle to compose a productive composite or differential history/becoming.”  

Expression or expressionism dismantles the logical stratification and arboreal scheme of things towards a relational and minoritarian reading (or the in-between) of understanding things, on a parallel level of expression. At the macro-level, being a Spinozist entails embracing bare life in its concealed, unconscious, and marginal appearances in the history of philosophy: “There is a philosophy-becoming which has nothing to do with the history of philosophy and which happens through those the history of philosophy does not manage to classify.” Indeed, a Deleuzian notion of immanence develops as a kind of creative heterogenetic ontology that extends Spinoza’s concept of expressionism by depicting how substance produces its very own modes and characteristics via a twofold process of differentiation.

Ethology, moreover, is a philosophical perspective that does not presuppose a reality beyond the contours of life’s materialities and is irreducible to the epistemological regimentations of Platonic, Cartesian, and

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42 In *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, Deleuze writes that, “The way Spinoza understands the notion of expression ... lies perhaps at the heart of his thought and style, and is one of the secrets of the *Ethics*: a two-sided book, with its continuous succession of propositions, demonstrations, and corollaries on the one hand, and its violent, broken chain of scholia on the other.” Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, 337. See also Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 28-29.
43 Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 2.
Kantian metaphysics. Since metaphysics is the handmaiden of morality, Spinoza’s ethology transforms as an antithetical and ontological ethics of singularities and becomings. In addition, because the locus of morality is the universal Subject or the mechanistic organism, ethology serves as a venue for a micro-politics of the subject that focuses on the fissures molded from its incessant relation to itself and to other assemblage of bodies.

Speaking of assemblage of bodies, the body assumes the position of being the new model of philosophizing in the study of ethology. In Ethics, Spinoza asserts that:

For indeed, no one has yet determined what the body can do ... from the laws of Nature alone, insofar as Nature is only considered to be corporeal, and what the body can do only if it is determined by the mind. For no one has yet come to know the structure of the body so accurately that he could explain all its functions .... This shows well enough that the body itself, simply from the laws of its own nature, can do many things which its mind wonders at.

Spinoza’s adjuration to make the body as the new model signifies its ability to surmount all our logical abstractions pertaining to it, including thought’s capability to go beyond consciousness. Deleuze opines that, “there are fewer things in the mind that exceed the consciousness than there are things in the body that exceed our knowledge. So, it is by one and the same movement that we shall manage to capture the power of the body beyond the given conditions of our knowledge ... and the power of the mind beyond the given conditions of our consciousness.” The various powers and possibilities of the body can only be unleashed through perpetual syncretism and struggles with other bodies. This inspires Spinoza to develop the concept of agency.

The reason behind Spinoza’s formulation of agency is two-fold. Historically, it seeks to revolutionize the decadent multitude of his time; and philosophically, it aspires to antagonize the traditional or transcendental notion of subjectivity that enormously shaped western philosophical thinking. His philosophy of agency critically aims to salvage the body from its marginalization in the history of western morality. Since the ancient times, the body is subordinated to the logic of the mind or consciousness. Its
contingent attributes such as corporeality and mutability are pondered as
deabilities of the human condition without painstakingly exploring its great
and unrepeatable potentialities. Writ large, this historico-philosophical
violence depicts transcendental philosophy’s supremacy over immanence in
the entire western philosophical scholarship—ostensibly reflected in
morality.

Spinoza’s agency is integrally informed by the dynamics of
materiality of life. This radical attribute influenced Deleuze’s appropriation
of the concept of agency as something assemblagic and collective. A
Deleuzian appropriation of Spinozist agency deals the processes of
collectivization that produces composition or combination of individuals
with greater power and multiplicity, and individuals as modalities of these
greater individuals.\(^{48}\) The encounter of agencies (bodies) may increase or
decrease their capacities and may craft novel or degenerate constellations,
affects, and intensities. Nietzsche calls this event as the experience of “chaos”
within oneself that not only entails one’s reflexive relation with oneself, but
also the rupture of one’s egoistic or transcendental-laden self as a pre-
condition to a life of becoming.\(^{49}\) In the Spinozist human agency, the
individual is disposed to associate (actively or passively) with other bodies,
which will fortify his or her resilience.\(^{50}\) Following Deleuze, “we experience
joy when a body encounters ours and enter into a composition with it, and
sadness, when … a body … threatens our own coherence.”\(^{51}\) In other words,
an individual agency’s mode of existence can be pondered as bad, servile, or
weak, if he or she is incapacitated to exercise his or her power of acting. And
it is to be considered as good, free, or rational when he or she exhibits his or
her capability for being affected wherein its power of acting increases and
strengthens, thus, crafting active affections and adequate ideas.\(^{52}\)

\(^{49}\) Friedrich Nietzsche, _Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None_, trans. by Walter
\(^{50}\) In Deleuze’s view, passive affections are classified as a second level effect where “the
affections designate that which happens to the mode, the modifications of the mode, the effects
of other modes on it.” Deleuze, _Spinoza: Practical Philosophy_, 48.
\(^{51}\) Ibid., 19.
\(^{52}\) Hence, a discussion on the characteristics of ethological relations inevitably brings us
back to the two fundamental questions of Spinoza’s _Ethics_ according to Deleuze, namely, “What
must we do in order to be affected by a maximum of joyful passions?” and “What must we do
in order to produce in ourselves active affections?” The first problem heartens us to organize
relations and opportunities where bodies can be affected by a maximum quality and quantity of
joyful passions. But at the end of the day, we must realize that joyful passions are not enough
because the continuous production of joyful passions does not guarantee bodies’ full possession
of their respective powers of action. Rather than merely experiencing joyful passion, we must
search for the means in order to fashion within ourselves active affections—the main point of the
second problem. See Deleuze, _Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza_, 273-274.
Nevertheless, the complexity remains that creative and noble consequences find no guarantee and transparency in a world of immanence because there are no default attributes of the mind, body, and relations. Since constellation of bodies may equally foster unwanted or debased affections, Spinoza formulates the theory of common notions or compact in order to regulate or condition life-affirming encounters and possibilities. According to Deleuze, “When we encounter a body that agrees with our own, when we experience a joyful passive affection, we are induced to form the idea of what is common to that body and our own.” He suggests that with the help of joyful passions, the idea of what is common to our own and the bodies external to us are created. Meaning to say, agreement or unity between two or more bodies is coextensive with utility.

When two bodies clash based on a common concern of preserving their composition and scarcity of resources, they transform into enemies. However, rather than interpreting this encounter of bodies event in a Hobbesian fashion, Deleuze approaches this problematic differently. Two or more bodies, he claims, must recognize that compact is in their rational long-term mutual self-interest. Gillian Howie, in Deleuze and Spinoza: Aura of Expression, lucidly summarizes Deleuze’s reasons why is it that compact is in the two bodies’ mutual self-interest:

First, all men have relevantly similar natures, these natures are agreeable thus each will be affected with joy in the encounter. Secondly, this means that the quantity of active passions will be increased in each individual and the individual’s power of action will be increased. This is in the interest of each individual. Finally, the individual bodies unite and through this third relation compose a single body. Although each body is preserved in the new combination, the new body is “twice as strong.”

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53 In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze asserts, “But this is only our body in its own relation, and our mind in its own relation, and the other bodies and other minds or ideas in their respective relations, and the rules according to which all these relations compound with and decompose one another; we know nothing of all this in the given order of our knowledge and our consciousness.” Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 19.

54 The theory of common notions is an ethical activity that seeks to organize good encounters, composing relations, forming powers, experimenting. Cf. Ibid., 19.

55 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 283; Cf. Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 55.

56 Cf. Ibid., 264; Cf. Gillian Howie, Deleuze and Spinoza: Aura of Expression (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 145.

57 Ibid., 145-146.
Moreover, such an adequate idea of the common notion allows us to be in possession of our power of action, because “a mind that forms an adequate idea is the adequate cause of the ideas that follow from it.” Accordingly, a certain kind of “feeling which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and [adequate] idea of it.” In the wider context of political relations, ethology seeks to render a basis from which to rethink the political in a non-hegemonic or non-normative way that would evade the reduction of variations or differences to relations of oppression and domination.

The human individual, in the study of ethology, is configured along two axes: kinetic and dynamic. In the former, the individual is perceived as composite of other bodies and whose attribute is relational (speed and slowness) in nature. In the latter, the individual is seen as a gradation of power in the sea of other bodies that can affect and be affected by that individual. Similarly, the body’s identity is conceived as an open-ended reality because of its unceasing dialogue with the exterior world. Since the body is an immanent reality, its internal configurations depend on its aptitude to affect and be affected by others. According to Deleuze, “a body’s structure is the composition of its relation. What a body can do is the nature and the limits of its power to be affected.”

The individual in the Spinozist philosophy is understood as the complex organization of the existing mode in any attribute. This mode bears a singular essence, which is likewise a degree of power. Albeit characterized by singularity, the individual’s essence is relational in nature. Deleuze elucidates the potentialities of the body in terms of what Spinoza calls as modes. As a kind of modality, the body is characterized by an essence perceivable as a gradation of power containing various immanent parts. The single substance’s expression through modes only bears these parts by virtue of its capability to affect and be affected in a particular relation. Because the modes are off-springs of endless relations, then it would simply diminish

58 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 283.
59 Ibid.
62 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 92.
63 Cf. Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 76.
64 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 76.
when it no longer contains this ability for they are themselves active affections: “The mode passes into existence when its relation actually subsumes an infinity of extensive parts ... determined to enter into characteristic relation ... through the operation of an external determinism. The mode ceases to exist when its parts are determined from without to enter into a different relation, which is not compatible with the former one.”66 In short, the individual is composed of unlimited extensive parts. But these parts are not constitutive of individual essences in themselves because they are organized only on the basis of extensive determinism.67 Despite the twin possibilities of a body to decompose or strengthen itself after a certain encounter with another, the fact remains that in every relation, there exists an eternal truth, where “Nature in its entirety is conceived as an Individual that composes all relations and possesses all the sets of intensive parts with their different degrees.”68

At this point, I must underscore that despite Spinoza’s radicalization of metaphysics, he does not espouse the privileging of the body over the mind or consciousness. His repudiation of the primacy of the mind over the body does not want to fall into a vicious circle of privileging the body over the mind just to give slavish justice to the former. Deleuze escapes this philosophical quicksand by introducing the concept of “parallelism.” He opines that parallelism “does not consist merely in denying any real causality between the mind and the body, it disallows any primacy of one over the other.”69 Ethics bluntly invalidates the conventional belief that the body’s activities and attributes are merely dependent on the workings of the mind. Deleuze argues that “what is an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind. There is no primacy of one over the other.”70 His notion of parallelism demonstrates that the body exceeds the epistemic registers that we have of it, in the same fashion that thought exceeds the consciousness that we have of it. This is the reason why Deleuze suggests that the traditional notion of the philosophy of consciousness must re-think its hubris and blindness in relation to the body. Consciousness is caused by determinate affections—the consciousness of the conatus on the striving of things and man to preserve its being is produced by affection towards joy or sadness, “and since the affections,” Deleuze explicates, “are not separable from a movement by which they cause us to go to a greater or lesser (joy and sadness), depending on whether the thing encountered enters into a composition with us, or on the contrary tends to
decompose us, consciousness appears as the continual awareness of this
passage from greater to lesser, or from lesser to greater, as a witness of the
variations and determinations of the \textit{conatus} functioning in relation to other
bodies or ideas.\textsuperscript{71} As a footnote to the aforementioned explanation, Deleuze
states that “One seeks to acquire a knowledge of the powers of the body in
order to discover in a \textit{parallel fashion}, the powers of the mind that elude
consciousness, and thus to be able to compare the powers.”\textsuperscript{72} Thus, the
principle of parallelism adheres to the univocity of being and aims for the
discovery of an “unconscious of thought just as profound as the unknown of
the body.”\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{III. Politics of Desire as a Cartography of a Revolution-to-come}

At this juncture, I deem it necessary to construe the relationship
between Spinoza’s immanent ethics and Deleuze’s theory of desire. In the
domain of individual agency, desire as \textit{conatus} illustrates the individual as
determined by its power to be both the subject and object of affection
“provided that we do not separate essence from action, a conatus can be
comprehended as the essence of a being or its degree of power. Actions
themselves constitute a person’s affirmation of life and his will to exist.”\textsuperscript{74} In
Deleuze’s mature writings, the body (as \textit{conatus}) becomes constitutive of
various desiring-machines. Desiring-machines are parts which are unrelated
to any whole connected to other desiring-machines, some within body, some
in the natural and the social world.\textsuperscript{75} Contrary to conventional
psychoanalysis’ devaluation of desire, Deleuze and Guattari describe it is a
revolutionary force and social process of experimentation capable in crafting
connections and nomadic subjects that defy Oedipalization.

At the macro-level, Deleuze and Guattari stress in \textit{Anti-Oedipus} that
desire or desiring-production cannot be divorced from socio-political
productions.\textsuperscript{76} This gives merit to Smith’s recommendation in transfiguring
the relation between Spinoza’s ethics to Deleuze’s theory of desire into a
political concern. If the philosophy of transcendence symbolizes impotence,
degeneration, and enslavement, then a Deleuzian ethics would investigate
and analyze the conditions that engender people to desire transcendence or

\textsuperscript{71} Deleuze, \textit{Spinoza: Practical Philosophy}, 21.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{74} Parr, ed., \textit{The Deleuze Dictionary}, 266.
\textsuperscript{75} Cf. Ronald Bogue, \textit{Deleuze and Guattari} (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 91;
Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{Anti-Oedipus}, 7.
\textsuperscript{76} Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{Anti-Oedipus}, 68.
oppression. The book *Anti-Oedipus*, as a philosophical product of the 1968 student protest, seeks to answer this political problem. In Foucault’s *Preface* to the aforesaid book, he mentions three adversaries of Anti-Oedipus. Among the three, he asserts that the most dangerous enemy is *Fascism*: “Not only historical fascism (Hitler and Mussolini) … but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our every day, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates us.” 77 The desire for transcendence found in Deleuze’s early literatures transfigures into the desire for fascism or domination in his mature writings. Based on the student revolt’s socio-historical context, *Anti-Oedipus* actualizes as their critique of the French people’s herd instinct or desire to be exploited, especially in the post-1968 era. 78 This enables them to conceptualize their immanent ethical theory or politics of desire as an antagonism against all reductive psychoanalytic and socio-political analyses that remain configured under the principle of transcendence or Oedipality, towards the multiplicity of desire.

Deleuze and Guattari’s politics of desire is collective and assemblagic—a micro-politics indisputably indebted to Spinoza’s ethology. Despite Spinoza and Deleuze’s close affinity with Nietzsche’s anti-nihilist philosophy, *Anti-Oedipus* does not epitomize solitary existence. As Mark Seem elucidates in his Introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*:

*Anti-Oedipus* is not the superman …. Where Nietzsche grew progressively more isolated to the point of madness, Deleuze and Guattari call for actions and passions of a collective nature, here and now. Madness is a radical break from power in the form of a disconnection. Militancy, in Deleuze and Guattari’s framework, would learn from madness but then move beyond it, beyond disconnections and deterritorializations, to ever new connections. A politics of desire would see loneliness and depression as the first things to go. Such is the anti-oedipal strategy: if man is connected to the machines of the universe, if he is in tune with his desires, if he is “anchored,” “he ceases to worry about the fitness of things, about the behavior of his

77 Ibid., xii.
78 In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari write, “For many French intellectuals, the hyperactivism of post-May gave way to a mid-seventies slump, then a return to religion or political conservatism in a foreshadowing of the Reagan eighties.” Deleuze & Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, xi.
fellow-men, about right or wrong and justice and injustice.\textsuperscript{79}

Deleuze and Guattari’s positive theorization of desire is an integral factor in the conceptualization of the principle of “schizoanalysis.” Its primary goal is to radically penetrate and dismantle the various segmentarized concepts, zones, and relations already Oedipalized by fascism or in today’s time, by advanced capitalism. The task of schizoanalysis, they assert, “goes by way of destruction—a whole scouring of the unconscious, a complete curettage. Destroy Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, the puppet of the superego, guilt, the law, castration.”\textsuperscript{80} More importantly, it aspires to search for the unscathed deterritorialized constellations of desire or the “flows that have not been reduced to the Oedipal codes and neuroticized territorialities, the desiring-machines that escape such codes as lines of escape leading elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{81} In other words, schizoanalysis aims at emancipating desire from being totalized by manifold and multifaceted expressions of fascism or Oedipus. They believe that schizoanalysing desire can translate into a radical politics that can instigate contemporary individuals and collectivities to formulate multiple constellations, as well as to become dynamic conduits of forces.

The politics of desire is a micro-politics. Briefly, Deleuzian micropolitics composes of three intersecting lines, namely: the segmented, supple, and the abstract line. The first line, rigid segmentarity, illustrates our binary, linear, and circular condition in the society.\textsuperscript{82} The second, the molecular line, depicts supple segmentarity, since they are contextualized, localized, and web-like. Deleuze and Parnet claim that molecular lines are the cracks between segmentarities or minortarian fluxes with thresholds capable of fashioning rhizomatic becomings and micro-becomings.\textsuperscript{83} Lastly, the third line is called the abstract line. It is a line capable of escaping segmentarities and thresholds toward unforeseeable destinations and nomadic intensities. The last line is the line of abstract detachment and absolute becoming or deterritorialization. In sum, the three lines transverse each other across all organizations, groups, and individuals.

Specifically, micro-politics is a quest for the nomad or nomadic line that would spawn genuine and revolutionary transformation. When the second line metamorphoses as the overarching principle of politics,

\textsuperscript{79} Mark Seem, Introduction to Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{Anti-Oedipus}, xxv.
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ibid.}, 311
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Ibid.}, xii.
\textsuperscript{82} Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, 209; Cf. Deleuze and Parnet, \textit{Dialogues}, 124.
\textsuperscript{83} Cf. Deleuze and Parnet, \textit{Dialogues}, 124.
instability is of high possibility. Of course, it cannot also be the first line because segmentarity or segmentarized politics is the fortress of State philosophy—the nomad’s nemesis. Does this entail then that the third line, the abstract line, is the nomadic line? In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari opine that “from the viewpoint of micro-politics, a society is defined by its line of flight, which are molecular.” To avoid further confusion, we must refer back to our primary characterization of the nomadic line as the creative and radical symbol of transformation. In this manner, it appears that it would be more suitable to delegate the nomad in the perpetually shifting and amorphous space in-between the striated and the supple lines. Micro-politics rejects neither the first nor the second line; it stays in-between them. Thus, micro-politics operates in-between the actualization of incessant transformation, polysemy, and fluidity, as well as the creation of organizations and collectivities, towards a mapping of a people and world-to-come.

**IV. Conclusion**

Deleuze and Guattari’s politics of desire is vitally inspired by Spinoza’s ethology. Ethology is not only an evaluative, but also a selective principle—a cartography. In this sense, individual agencies and collectivities are diagrammed in the plane of immanence, in such a manner that “a body is defined only by a longitude and a latitude: in other words, the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential (latitude).” A Deleuzian cartography diagnoses the composition of an individual and collective bodies through their extensive and intensive abilities, as well as their motion and power of affects. Since bodies are a composite of many other bodies, which in turn consist of other bodies, they may constitute the extensive parts of broader socio-political assemblages, which likewise have their respective characteristic intensive attributes. In short, Deleuze’s cartography selects
bodies (individual, collective, political, aesthetic, economic, revolutionary, etc.) and diagnoses them in terms of composition and decomposition.

Deleuze’s politics of desire implies a cartographic revolution. By virtue of schizoanalysis, it must similarly diagram nomadic bodies and relations whose desires escape Oedipalization. Since the plane of immanence is characterized by expressionist agonism, bodily, and assemblagic connections are always fluid. And because it is open to all kinds of constellations, vigilance must always be at work, especially when connections are disabled to foster creative lines of flight, as well as adulterated or polarized by more subtle forms of fascism. In the light of contemporary revolutionary praxis, cartography transfigures into a mapping and selection of assemblages (a la Nietzsche’s philosophy of the eternal return as an ethical doctrine) or bodies across cultural, geographic, and epistemological distinctions, which are capacitated in dismantling existing relations that fossilize movements, thwarts constellations, and reifies radical action. But we should not be oblivious to the reality that in a post-control society epoch where capitalism is already axiomatic and exponentially high-speed, this task is like confronting the impossible.

Lastly, a revolution is a creative and rhizomic mapping constitutive of a differential and cultural collectivity that is bereft of any fixed essence or unitarian goal. A Deleuzian brand of revolutionary cartography is not merely a reactionary brand of resistance like the Communist Revolution. It is because it involves an epistemological rupture from our “old image of thought,” as Deleuze explicates in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, as well as the chaoticization of our desire and relations totalized by *Oedipus*. If the term “purpose” or “utopia” occupies any place in the discussion, it is in the form a differential and self-reflexive principle that would guide and empower us to incessantly create concepts capable of transforming the present. Even though there is no guarantee that these concepts will engender more freedom in the future, and that today’s revolutionaries would not metamorphose as tomorrow’s conservatives or oppressors, we revolutionaries must not be discouraged in untiringly laboring for a revolution-to-come. Borrowing from Deleuze and Parnet:

Instead of gambling on the eternal impossibility of the revolution, ... why not think that a new type of revolution is in the course of becoming-possible, and that all kinds of mutating, living machines conduct wars, are combined and trace out a plane of consistency, which
undermines the plane of organization of the World and the States.89

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89 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 147.


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Article

Thomas Pogge and the Limits of Negative Duty

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Abstract: Thomas Pogge’s philosophy on global justice is considered as a radical proposal that makes use of institutional, justice-based arguments from John Rawls and extends it to the global sphere that even Rawls is hesitant to undertake. This proposal of extending justice to the global sphere provides a more comprehensive grasp of the global poverty situation that takes into consideration not only factors at the nation-state level but also international agencies, international agreements, regional assemblies and other international actors. From the political philosophy’s perspective, however, Rawls insist that his proposal only asserts a negative duty-based institutional approach. While this is a welcome proposal for many, especially for defenders of a liberal political philosophy, there are also those that have challenged the limitations of his negative duty-based approach as a strategy and as a philosophical response to global poverty. This paper will show that various critiques have misunderstood Pogge’s proposal but some have also pushed his theory towards the positive duty-based dimension, which he does not deny but simply avoids as a matter of strategy. The argument here is that Pogge’s global justice approach cannot escape the demand for positive duty especially as a demand of justice from citizens of affluent countries, and this is a very significant though underdeveloped aspect of his theory.

Keywords: Pogge, global poverty, global justice, negative and positive duty

I. Introduction

The prevalence of poverty at the global scale, which has brought 360 million related deaths for the past 20 years after the Cold War with 18 million added annually, is a significant cause of concern.\(^1\) It also poses

a challenge to various academic disciplines including philosophical and moral thinking on how to seriously understand and provide conditions for possibility that can create solutions to the problem. The challenge to philosophical thinking involves appropriate framework for analysis given that, as pointed out by Thomas Pogge, the usual framework that considers state factors as the root cause of poverty is no longer sufficient to explain the problem. Furthermore, the usual interactional moral analysis that ascribes explanations and solutions to individuals or collective actors is also insufficient. There are those, like John Rawls, that argue for an institutional mechanism in addressing fair distribution but are not so keen in applying the framework at the global scale. The concern on global poverty, which leads to the question on justice and just distribution, is a complex one that the state-centric framework is rendered limited.

It is in the context of the limitation of the state-centric approach that Thomas Pogge’s institutional response provides a landmark proposal in the discourse on global justice by proposing not just state centric nor international affairs analysis but institutional analysis at the global scale. This proposal has altered the understanding of social justice in that it gives primacy to institutional structures in the analysis of global justice. What Pogge proposes is to assess global institutions as to how responsive they are in upholding the rights of the global poor. Pogge claims that the existing global structure is the primary reason for the prevalence of poverty and it is in altering the rules of the global order that significant solution can be given to the poverty problem.

Pogge’s claim, however, is that this proposal of upholding and protecting the rights of the global poor only demands negative duty especially to affluent countries that include the state and its citizens. This negative duty includes changes in the institutional structure so that it prevents harming the global poor. It is opposed to the aid strategy that gives direct assistance to those in conditions of poverty. This direct active intervention is considered as positive duty.

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2 Ibid, 13-14.
3 John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971) and The Law of Peoples (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999). The limits of Rawls international justice proposal are also extensively discussed by Thomas Pogge in “Rawls on International Justice” in The Philosophical Quarterly, 51:203 (2001): 246-253, by pointing out that Rawls creates a dualism that is the application of institutional justice at the state level but not at the international or global level.
4 Pogge, Politics as Usual, 10-25.
It is important that discussion of rights needs a parallel discussion of duties. This is not just for purposes of philosophical reasoning but also for practical considerations. This is so since in the discourse on global poverty, it is important to identify not just who are affected by injustice, whose rights need to be protected but also who are responsible for the existence of poverty that need to respond to the problem. The notion of duty then is an important consideration in the discourse on global justice to identify those who are responsible for the injustice at the global scale and to identify also who are most responsible for responding to this problem.

It is in the given proposal of Pogge to address global poverty through the institutional negative duty-based moral demand of justice as opposed to the positive duty aid and direct assistance approach that we ask the question: Is negative duty enough? Is Pogge’s proposal only limited to negative duty as he claims, and can his proposal be successful by founding it in negative duty alone? As a response to the question, I would assert that Pogge’s institutional proposal is limited if it hinges on negative duty alone. More than the problematic argument for negative duty, global poverty cannot be fully remedied by claims of negative duty alone. I will further argue, however, that Pogge’s institutional approach does not necessarily deny positive duty, but this aspect of his argument is underdeveloped. This paper would show that while greater responsibility lies on the affluent countries, including both their government and citizens, the responsibility is for everyone.

I would develop this thesis in three parts. First, I will discuss Pogge’s moral position that argues for a negative duty-based institutional approach. This part will include extensive discussion on his understanding of global justice, human rights and its correlative duties as well as the claim to universality of this duty. Next, I will present various questions to Pogge’s proposition that is grounded on negative duty. Critique and counterproposal are discussed by Cruft, Tan, Chandhoke, and Caney. Finally, I will provide a critical reflection that shows the area in Pogge’s argument that can be further developed towards a greater possibility of positive duties that will provide a more comprehensive understanding of global justice.

II. Pogge’s Institutional Approach

Thomas Pogge’s pivotal proposal provides a significant leap in the discourse on global justice that for several centuries has been limited to justice at the national level or, at most, at the international level. What are usually discussed are the interactions of a state with another state, which is referred to as international relations. This involves the role of states in forging treaties and agreements with another state. This is more specifically discussed using the language of international justice or international ethics. This is a more
advanced analysis from the explanatory nationalism, which anchors reasons for poverty on the internal structure of the state, which includes persistence of corruption, lack of transparency, and limited natural resources and human capabilities.6

The prevalence of poverty is also discussed in the context of ethics rather than justice. This means that we associate reasons for poverty with the direct cause, which includes individual or collective actors. However, following the principles invoked by Rawls, we have to pay closer attention to institutional matters as matters of justice, and matters related to the conduct and character of individuals or groups, as matters of ethics. Pogge also invoked an institutional approach in the analysis of global poverty and in the process argued for an institutional approach in the understanding of justice.7

Furthermore, it is important for Pogge to distinguish between the institutional and the interactional approach. The interactional approach points to actors, both individual and collective, as responsible for the existence of poverty. The institutional approach, however, does not do away with the interactional aspect but points to a bigger reality that includes institutions that are responsible for the persistence of poverty.8 The institution he refers to is the global order that must be primarily addressed for problems of poverty to be given solution.

The current set-up at the international level, however, is more complex than what is presented by explanatory nationalism and international relations. It is not only the internal state factors nor state-to-state relations that are responsible for the existence of poverty but also other actors in the field. In the recent analysis, multinational corporations as well as supranational bodies like IMF, EU, and World Bank have also been a significant factor in the existence and persistence of poverty. This complex reality, which Pogge would refer to as the global order, is responsible for poverty.9

Pogge points to this complex reality at the global level because of the growing interdependence of the aforementioned actors. The rising international agencies, which we have referred to as supranational bodies, interact with Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). They also are party to the creation of rules, policies, treatise, and agreements that before, lie only on state-to-state relations. These policies are responsible for the flow of capital and resources that, for Pogge, are primarily responsible for the persistence of poverty at the global scale.10

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6 Pogge, Politics as Usual, 10-56.
7 Ibid, 14-19.
9 Ibid, 14.
10 Ibid.
Pogge would focus primarily on the global institutional order for it is this system that also perpetrates the poverty levels at the national level. It is also this global institutional order that must be addressed for global poverty to be significantly addressed. This is more properly elaborated by Pogge:

By breaking down the traditional separation of intra-national and international relations and extending institutional moral analysis to the whole field, the concept of global justice also makes visible how citizens of affluent countries are potentially implicated in the horrors so many must endure in the so-called less developed countries: how global institutional arrangements they uphold are implicated in the violence and hunger that are inflicted upon the global poor. ¹¹

The timeliness of this moral claim that Pogge makes is striking because of the existence and persistence of global poverty on the one side of the globe while there is a growing sense of affluence in another part of the globe. This level of inequality is also widening in that the rich countries are getting richer and the poor countries are getting poorer. Finally, there is also to reiterate his institutional approach where the analysis would show that the growing global interdependence has led treaties, trade agreements, and schemes of supranational entities as also highly responsible for the existence of this global poverty. A more complex analysis of global justice, then, is needed. ¹²

This persistence of global poverty, heightened by growing inequality, led Pogge to claim that there is significant harm done to the global poor so much so that it constitutes what he considers to be a violation of human rights. The institutional moral analysis he undertook generates the conclusion that injustice results from the violation of the rights of the global poor that is elaborated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR). ¹³

This claim to rights is discussed by Pogge while being mindful of the distinction and interrelation of legal human rights and moral human rights. His emphasis is on the latter in that it has a more universal claim. The former can be limited due to the differences in context like religion and culture where a legal formulation is developed and adopted. ¹⁴

¹¹ Ibid, 19.
¹³ Ibid, 50-52.
¹⁴ Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 54.
He would further emphasize that moral demands are supposed to be unrestricted, that is, it should not be dependent on culture, religion, moral tradition, or philosophy. This means that rights have to be appreciated and recognized by everyone. It is his claim then that those espoused on the UNDHR are moral rights that should be afforded to everyone. His reference to the provisions in UNDHR makes Pogge ascribe to legal rights insofar as it is founded on a well-argued set of moral rights. The provisions in the UNDHR show the closer interrelationship of legal and moral human rights even if the latter has a more universal claim. UNDHR is a clear example where legal human rights are grounded on moral human rights.\footnote{Ibid, 53.}

A better understanding of Pogge’s notion of human rights is to understand his claim as appreciating the move from natural right to human rights. This is important since the notion of human rights, unlike natural right, is detached from the notion of historical antecedents like Medieval Christianity. In other words, what Pogge is proposing is highly secular. This is also further affirming the proposal of Rawls that these rights are political and not metaphysical.\footnote{Ibid, 56-57} The strength of this argument, however, is due to the claim that these rights are universal primarily because it treats all human beings as equal and therefore they can be afforded the same set of rights as everyone else enjoys.

Pogge also referred to the violation of these human rights as official disrespect. This means that the violation of these rights is done by formal institutions like governments and states. Government, however, is referred to in broader terms to include also the other agencies that constitute this government, which also includes its other functions such as the judicial, executive, and legislative branches. All these actors are responsible for supporting or allowing a particular policy by the global order to continue to harm and create injustice on the poor. Examples of these include the borrowing resource privilege which, for Pogge as well as other authors, shows and promotes the persistence of poverty by supporting the persistence of factors at the local level. This particular policy supports dictators in continuing their corrupt practices that are creating and aggravating poverty conditions.\footnote{Ibid, 59. An empirical basis of this is also presented by Dambisa Moyo in \textit{Dead Aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa} (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009), 3-70, where she extensively discussed poverty in Africa and her analysis of the roots of the problem.}

However, while Pogge is proposing a universal recognition of human rights, he is minimalist in conceiving a correlative duty. This means that while he ascribes to all human beings the right to a quality of life, he is minimalist...
in ascribing duty or responsibility to those responsible for the creation of injustice and for responding to this injustice. He is ascribing the duty to those who are primarily responsible, that is, the government and citizens of affluent countries. Furthermore, his claim is that this set of duties should be conceived in negative terms as negative duties, which are opposed to the positive ones. In here, Pogge is trying to deal with the tension between the Libertarians, who are proposing a minimal set of negative duties that simply means a freedom from harm, as opposed to the maximalist that promotes not just self-restraint but active effort to fulfill human rights. This maximalist proposition is often put forward by human rights advocates or those involved in provision of aid. The aid and relief strategy can be considered as a response based on positive duties. Positive duties are also upheld by ideologies that are socialist and communist in orientation.\textsuperscript{18}

For Pogge, his institutional approach transcends the language and terminologies of the libertarian and the maximalist. This is because he conceives negative duty also in institutional terms, which also ensures meeting the justice demand. It is not limited to the conventional understanding of negative duty that is just non-interference, which seems to limit the libertarian argument. He also pointed out that in the United States, most especially, citizens are not amenable to positive duties insofar as active intervention would lead to lessening of their economic opportunities and drastic change in their lifestyle. It is for this reason of acceptability at a wider scale that Pogge would ground his proposition on a negative duty rather than positive duty. This means that what is demanded of the governments and citizens of affluent countries are minimal or what he would consider as noncontroversial. It is something that is expected of them and would not demand a Herculean effort or a great amount of sacrifice. It is, in other words, a minimal demand of responsibility. Thus, his proposal also transcends the lack of extensive acceptability that faces the maximalist position.\textsuperscript{19}

Moreover, consistent with his Rawlsian background, Pogge would also propose that this negative-duty approach is institutional rather than interactional. Going back to our distinction between interactional and institutional analysis earlier, Pogge puts a primary ascription and blame of the persistence and existence of poverty on global institutions without necessarily removing the responsibility from state actors and even citizens. The primary reason for the realization of justice is altering the institution or its rules and not the conduct and behavior of individuals or groups.\textsuperscript{20}

Consistent with his institutional analysis, Pogge would also point to the sense of growing interdependence as crucial in understanding what he

\textsuperscript{18} Pogge, \textit{World Poverty and Human Rights}, 64-67, Politics as Usual, 27-30.
\textsuperscript{19} Pogge, \textit{World Poverty and Human Rights}, 64-65.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, 65.
would refer to as synergestic harm. Synergestic harm is understood as a greater harm that can only be felt in the combination of factors. In the context of global poverty, it is important to point to the growing sense of interdependence, for the factors at the local level can be aggravated by the factors at the international level. This is again illustrated by the example of borrowing resource privilege, where the existence of poverty due to corrupt dictators is worsened by their capacity to borrow money without a check and balance as to how they spend this money. Mostly it is spent to support their stay in power and therefore the continued and worsened existence of poverty.  

Furthermore, Pogge’s institutional approach promises greater effect with minor changes. This means that minor change in the rules of the global order, which will also have minimal effect on the citizens of affluent countries, can have a significant effect in lowering poverty levels at the global scale. This is also due to the sense of negative duty, which does not demand so much from the citizens of affluent countries. Because of this minimal demand, then, this proposition will have a greater degree of acceptability and greater applicability.

Pogge, thus, would consider his institutional analysis, which points to the problem and solution at the global level that entail alteration of the rules of the global order and ascription of rights to all human beings but negative duties to affluent countries, as creating the conditions for global reform where solution for the poverty problem can be achieved. This, he points, is superior to the positive-duty proposition.

III. The Inevitability of Positive Duties

While many hailed Pogge’s institutional proposal as pivotal in the discourse on global justice, it has also elicited reactions from various critics. One of the primary criticisms is the question with regard to Pogge’s proposal to morally ground his global justice argument on a minimal negative duty. Rowan Cruft, in particular, questions Pogge’s human rights proposal if it can be solidly defended without correlative positive duties because, for him, positive human rights need corresponding positive duties. Cruft claims that Pogge’s proposal cannot avoid the recognition of a derivative positive duty. This sentiment is also shared by Kok-Chor Tan and Neera Chandhoke. Both of them assert that it seems as if there is more to Pogge’s proposal than negative duties. Both claim that grounding Pogge’s institutional approach on negative duties alone will be insufficient. I will also discuss the proposal from

21 Pogge, Politics as Usual, 46-50.
Simon Caney, who actively proposes the inevitability of positive duties in dealing with the issue of global poverty. He would, however, show that Pogge’s proposal does not necessarily discount this possibility.

A. Negative and Correlative Duties

Cruft directly questions Pogge’s proposal in the context of properly understanding negative and positive duties. He contends that often negative and positive duties have to be understood first in the context of negative and positive rights. Negative rights are often rights of non-interference or freedom from harm while positive rights are rights to assistance. Although Pogge recognizes that rights can possibly be stated and defended in positive terms, he contends that duties should only be in the negative.23

In further analyzing Pogge’s proposal, however, Cruft would show that even negative rights entail positive duties. He illustrated it by showing that negative rights would even entail derivative duties that include remedial duties that include duties to offer compensation and reparation for rights violation. Another duty is the duty to stop, and still another is the precautionary duty that means making sure that no amount of harm or injustice will happen in the future. These remedial duties are examples of duties of assistance. However, what is being pointed out here is that negative rights cannot avoid the idea that it entails positive duties both of non-interference and even assistance.24

Furthermore, the negative right also entails a fourth derivative duty, which is other-directed precautionary duty, which refers to duties to take action so that other people comply with the idea that no harm should be undertaken. This means that, in the context of global justice, the act of making people comply with the demands of global justice entails positive duties and not mere negative duties alone. As Cruft would clearly state: “Pogge’s claims that human rights entail only negative duties can be read as denying that human rights ever entail other-directed precautionary duties.”25

What Cruft would show is that Pogge’s negative-duty proposal would mean that it’s a denial that other people have to comply with the duty not to harm. It would simply mean that I only check myself if I ever comply with the principle of non-interference. If this is the case, then it makes Pogge’s proposal unattractive to serve the purpose of arguing for an institutional

24 Ibid, 29-34.
25 Ibid, 32.
global justice proposal since it cannot demand responsibility from the affluent. It gives them an incentive to opt out.\footnote{Ibid, 34-36.}

Cruft would also show that what Pogge is referring to is the individual aspect of rights and duties. Given this individual reference then, the individual definitely has other features that deserve protection and this can be attained both by duty of protection and duty of non-interference. This goes back to the claim made by Cruft in the earlier part his paper that rights have to be grounded on a person’s needs and interests. If this is the case, then the duty that should meet these rights that responds to basic interests is not just non-interference but assistance as well.\footnote{Ibid, 29-37.} This is where the inevitability of positive duties comes in.

Tan is another one who questions Pogge’s proposal if it can stand the ground of critique without invoking positive duties in the face of the need to restructure the global order in the light of existing prevalence of poverty at the global scale. He would question the proposal of Pogge that seems to be much indebted to the libertarian position. Pogge is so engrossed in responding to the Libertarians. In the process, however, he is alienating defenders and promoters of human rights, who are actively campaigning for more direct assistance and positive duty-based approach. Pogge seems to run against the tide of the human rights revolution. In fact, Tan would point out that Pogge might have treaded a mistaken path by ascribing to libertarians when, in fact, the latter position is devoid of any possibility of fully defending human rights. Tan further argues that there seems to be more than just negative duty needed to compel the rich to cooperate. There needs to be a more morally binding basis for universal claims of human rights that is not only binding on the rights level but also in the level of duties. Like rights, duties should be universally implemented.\footnote{Kok-Chor Tan, “Rights, Harm and Institutions” in \textit{Thomas Pogge and His Critics}, ed. by Allison Jaggar (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 46-65.}

Furthermore, Tan challenges Pogge’s notion of harm. He showed that Pogge’s notion does not seem to show that the global poor are really harmed. What he simply showed is that they are disadvantaged. Being disadvantaged, however, is not equivalent to harm. Thus, there is no serious claim for injustice. This illustration by Tan showed that Pogge’s negative duty proposal and the inability to provide clear arguments for harm make Pogge’s position unable to demand from the rich to be responsible for the poor. This makes the demand for global justice untenable.\footnote{Ibid.}

Chandhoke also shares the sentiment of Tan that like human rights, duties should also be universally embraced. The idea of culpability that
Pogge invokes, which is directed only to affluent countries, should be complemented by the recognition of the universal duty to address poverty and human rights violation. What is problematic in Pogge, however, as pointed out by Chandhoke, is that by invoking negative duties, Pogge already limits the sets of duties. By arguing for a limited understanding of duty, Pogge seems to run contrary to the demands of cosmopolitan justice.  

Chandhoke also reads Pogge as a liberal philosopher, therefore, the tendency to dismiss any Marxist proposal. However, in the process, he disregards interventions that can be construed as direct and as radically changing the system. While Pogge agrees with Marxists on the causes of world poverty, he is non-receptive to the idea that the persistence of capitalism for example is the primary reason and therefore a radical change in the system is needed for global justice to be attained and global poverty solved.  

Cases provided by Chandhoke would show that positive duties are what drive activists to undertake protests that lead to institutional reforms.

B. The Case for Positive Duties

The case for positive duties was well argued for by Simon Carney. He argued that Pogge’s institutional approach that morally demands negative duties has a strength that transcends the limits of explanatory nationalism. Invoking Pogge, Carney argues that the institutional approach has a strength that can demand justice as opposed to explanatory nationalism whose basis is belongingness to the same culture or religion. This limited basis is not necessarily a demand of justice but more a demand of charity.

However, Carney argues that negative duties alone cannot fully account for a comprehensive theory of global justice and on the practical side cannot account for the full eradication of poverty. Not unless there is the claim for positive duty can negative duty fully address the problems of global poverty.

Carney criticizes the wholly institutional approach associated with Pogge in that it is simply limited to those who share in the same institutional scheme. If this is the case, it falls prey to a non-binding moral theory in that those who are not included in the institutional scheme have no moral demand and those who are affluent have the tendency to opt out and therefore justice

31 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
cannot be demanded of them. Carney refers to this a way of penalizing people by way of birth, and it also brings out problems of malign incentives.\textsuperscript{34}

The idea of penalizing people by virtue of birth means people who are not included in the scheme of institutional cooperation may not benefit from this approach. In other words, they are excluded simply because their place in the social lottery marginalizes them insofar as they are excluded from this scheme. This places the poor in an unfavorable situation. The idea of malign incentives, on the other hand, means that those not included in the scheme of cooperation have greater incentive to opt out. This means that those who are affluent are given incentive not to participate or own responsibility simply because they do not belong to the global scheme of cooperation.\textsuperscript{35}

Carney, however, is clear that Pogge does not deny positive duty. He shows that Pogge’s institutional approach should include demand for positive duties so as to provide a comprehensive understanding of global justice that can fully respond to problems of global poverty. He clearly states his position as a hybrid position between the wholly institutional approach and explanatory nationalism. He clearly stated this as

\begin{quote}
... the Hybrid Account (the General Version): this maintains that (a) persons have a negative duty of justice not to foist an unjust global order on other persons (the institutional component); and (b) persons have a positive duty of justice to eradicate poverty that does not arise from the imposition of an unjust global order (the interactional approach).\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

This hybrid position also accounts for interactional aspect in that global poverty and injustice have to take into consideration the other aspects that Pogge mentioned but did not pursue. These include local factors within the state that include presence of corrupt dictator, limitations in natural resources, and lack of capacities among others. This part is what is missing in Pogge’s account as illustrated by Caney but is essential in analyzing causes of poverty and responding to it comprehensively.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, 288.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 275-302.
IV. Critical Evaluation

The exposition of Pogge’s understanding of global justice and the critiques to his proposal give us an opportunity to understand global justice in more comprehensive terms. The need for comprehensibility is not just to meet the criteria of theory but also to make it more responsive and realistic. A more strategic framework that is promoted by Pogge may work for a particular period and respond to a particular aspect, but definitely, it is insufficient to respond to the overwhelming need of global poverty. This proposal, however, would entail a more faithful reading of Pogge, which some of his critics failed to fully appreciate. However, consistent with our search for comprehensive framework, I have shown the limits in Pogge’s theory. This is not to show that his theory is a dead end but simply to illustrate that some aspects in his theory might be underdeveloped.

Pogge’s responses to his critics illustrate how particular aspects in his work are either misunderstood or underdeveloped. First, he showed constantly in his responses to Tan and Chandhoke that he is clearly not eliminating positive duty. The reason why he would ground his argument on negative duty is for strategic purposes. This is because, as stated earlier, he would like his theory to meet the criterion of feasibility, that is, it can be acceptable to as wide audience as possible. The fact that the demand of responsibility is on the affluent countries and many affluent countries are unable to embrace positive duties, then coming up with a defense of negative duty is more feasible. Pogge would also be wary of additional argument supporting positive duty since this argument has already been raised and defended by numerous authors. Different philosophers have argued for positive duties but problems of global poverty persist. Pogge must have seen that it’s high time to undertake a different strategy.

It is clear that what Pogge proposes in his negative duty-based institutional approach is simply a strategy. However, in missing out on positive duty, Pogge is either guilty of throwing the baby out with the bathwater by focusing on one and disregarding the other aspects or, at the very least, is blind in his inability to fully elaborate an aspect of his theory. I would argue, then, in complementing Pogge’s proposal that his notion of negative duty is not an end in the argument of global justice. Negative duty is only a strategic aspect of his theory. However, just like his critics, I argue that his theory may be incomplete unless it is able to elaborate the place of positive duties as complement to negative duties. I also agree with Pogge that

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negative duties have a greater role but positive duties need not be fully eliminated from the picture.

The second cluster of critique constitutes a misreading of his notion of duty where negative duty is grounded. Cruft, Tan, and Chandhoke seem to equate Pogge’s proposal of duty to the traditional notion of rights-harm-duty interrelationship. This traditional notion shows direct causal relation that rights are violated when harm is done; therefore, a corresponding duty is demanded. In the context of global justice, a sense of direct causality should also be established to illustrate that harm is committed to the global poor, which constitutes a violation of their rights, thus, entailing positive duties to correct this harm. Moreover, the understanding of negative duty does not limit it to mere avoidance alone but also includes a more positive intervention that can prevent from further harming the global poor.

As a response to this, Pogge is clear that he is not just referring to harm alone when he talks about global injustice. The strength of the institutional approach is in showing that social justice should be included, which his critics have missed out. Pogge specifically states that:

To be sure, this conclusion does not flow from my account of institutional harming alone (which by itself, as we have seen, is quite inconclusive). It follows from this account of harm plus a specific account of social justice: only if foreseeably and avoidably producing certain large socioeconomic inequalities renders a global institutional order unjust can contributing to its design or imposition be an instance of harming.39

Furthermore, Pogge also showed that negative duty is illustrated here in that the changes in the institutional structure of the global order are needed to prevent harming the global poor.

Finally, Pogge made it clear that he also was remiss especially in disregarding the interactional aspect of his theory. He apologized for this especially in his response to Cruft.40 Again, this shows that Pogge might have been guilty of throwing the baby out with the bathwater by way of oversimplification or, upon second look, he recognized that some aspect of his work is not headed in the right direction. This recognition, then, constitutes an important part in the development of a theory of global justice in that similar with Caney’s claim, the interactional aspect need not be

39 Ibid, 195.

eliminated for it can account for dealing with causes that cannot be accounted for by the institutional approach. This is where positive duty is greatly needed, that is, to respond to the limits of negative duty-based institutional approach.

However, a more faithful understanding of Pogge’s work, which includes the underdeveloped aspect of his theory, was presented by Jiwei Ci. Ci contends that while Pogge claims that his theory is noncontroversial in that it only pushes for a negative duty. It is, however, radical in that it challenges the dominant moral mindset of Western society. The dominant moral reasoning in the West is still anchored on interactional analysis that even if included should be considered limited. This analysis gives much room for Westerns to excuse themselves from responsibility in that no direct causality can be attributed to the character and behavior of individuals and groups to the existence of poverty. The institutional approach, then, challenges this mindset by making the affluent morally accountable and primarily morally accountable which demands, at the very least, negative duty so that changes in the global structure can be undertaken.41

As a summative way of stating my position, which is parallel to what is being proposed by Caney, negative duty is pivotal in the global justice discourse in that it provides a strategic move for problems of global poverty to be remedied. However, global justice should not do away with positive duties for a more comprehensive response to the poverty problem. A step further than Caney, however, I have shown that Pogge has put forward a more affirmative notion of negative duty in that it also includes institutional reform. It is this proposal that makes global justice inclusive of all, both as rights claimants and duty bearers even if greater demand is expected of those who are affluent.

V. Conclusion

This study has shown that the issue of global justice is still very young and is in its development stage. This is illustrated by the fact that Pogge’s proposal builds from what is limitedly available, that is, the usual ascription of causes of poverty to national factors, which he refers to as explanatory nationalism. A further development, albeit limited, is provided for by international justice literature. Yet even this account cannot support a comprehensive analysis because it is limited only to state-to-state interaction. The role of other supranational bodies is not well accounted for in their contribution to global poverty. Furthermore, Pogge showed the

interdependency of these actors and showed their capacity to effect synergistic harm. This is where the confluence of these various factors creates grave effect on the conditions of the global poor.

The institutional proposal of Pogge, then, shows how the discourse has rendered the previous theoretical discourses insufficient, which requires a new framework of analysis. His proposal also shows its strategic strength, in that, by accounting for the institutional approach in the negative duty, it can have greater acceptability. However, it also shows that some loopholes are present, in that, this notion can be misunderstood as referring to harm alone without the social justice aspect. Furthermore, it has shown that despite the comprehensive strength of negative duty, it cannot do away with positive duty because there are reasons for global poverty beyond the negative duty-based institutional approach.

What is not fully elaborated, then, is the aspect in Pogge’s work, which shows the reimagining of negative duties to include institutional changes. Another is the aspect in his work, which does not include interactional aspect. The interactional aspect is what can account for the other reasons for global poverty. By pursuing these aspects further and further elaborating them, global justice can hopefully be demanded of and for all.

References


LIMITS OF NEGATIVE DUTY

Book Review

Aguas, Jove Jim S. Person, Action and Love: The Philosophical Thoughts of Karol Wojtyla (John Paul II). ¹

Jovito V. Cariño

Before his elevation to the Chair of St. Peter, Karol Wojtyla had an active and sustained philosophic career as attested by his stint as Chair of Ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin; his graduate lectures that covered various themes and philosophers including Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Kant, Scheler, Bentham and Hume; not to mention his investigations on phenomenology and Thomism. His penultimate graduate lectures, in fact, on the subject matter of sexual ethics, given between 1957 to 1959, became the groundwork of his first book, Love and Responsibility. When he was appointed Vicar Capitular of Krakow, Wojtyla spent less and less time for his academic engagements save for those very rare occasions as when he took part in the Harvard Summer School in 1969 and in the International Thomistic Congress in 1974 where he drew the attention of the Jesuit Thomist Josef Pieper who in turn introduced him to an eminent professor of Regensburg, Josef Ratzinger, the future Benedict XVI. Despite, however, his intense pastoral preoccupations, Wojtyla found the time to put together his masterpiece Person and Act, later to be called The Acting Person. The book was the product of Wojtyla’s attempt to marry the Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of person to Schelerian theory of consciousness. Stated philosophically, it was a project aimed at overcoming the Cartesian bent of phenomenology by restating its inherent unity with the very objects of thought. His intellectual engagements, however, had to take the back seat when he was elected to the papacy in 1978 and eventually became a leading global figure of exceptional charisma and influence that was felt and appreciated even beyond the realm of the Catholic Church. John Paull II became such a towering figure it might not be too inaccurate to say that his pastoral gains as the successor of St. Peter easily eclipsed the contributions of the abruptly interrupted philosophic career of Karol Wojtyla.


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What Aguas did in his first major publication was precisely to restore Wojtyla in his rightful place among the best contemporary minds in the Catholic philosophic tradition and it is rather fortuitous that his book came out on the very year that the latter, together with John XXIII, was canonized. Observers commonly underrate Wojtyla as a marginal intellectual figure owing to his subdued presence in the mainstream philosophic debates of his time. Nothing, however, is farther from the truth, and Aguas amply demonstrates why. *Person, Love, Action* is a careful, thoughtful retrieval of Wojtyla’s fundamental insights. There are indeed philosophers who acquire their reputation on account of the questions they leave unanswered like Descartes, Hume, or Kant. And there are those who make a name by their perseverance not to leave any possible answer unsaid. Wojtyla belongs to the second type of thinkers. His legacy lies not so much on the new problems he poses but on the new perspectives he introduces and brings to bear on problems, either old and new. This is fairly evident in Wojtyla’s attempt to bring phenomenology, existentialism, and Thomism into harmonious discourse to come up with an ethical theory or better yet, a philosophical anthropology that is simultaneously phenomenological, existential, and Thomist without necessarily becoming a mere extension of any of these strands. As pointed out by Aguas in his description of Wojtyla’s philosophical anthropology: “The understanding of man is grounded on the interrelation of being and consciousness and this interrelation serves as the basis for us to build on the ground of the experience of man our conception of person and action. The stepping stone of Wojtyla in his investigation therefore is the experience of man. And by starting from this point, he is able to avoid the controversy between subjectivism and objectivism, he starts beyond the dichotomy of being and consciousness.”

Wojtyla’s intervention comes at a crucial time when Catholic philosophy was in a dire need for an appropriate grammar that would articulate its fundamental philosophical tenets without compromising its essential content. The solution came with Wojtyla’s ingenious reconciliation of the new horizon offered by phenomenology and the appraisal of the human person espoused by Catholicism via the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. In his book, as pointed out earlier, Aguas emphasizes that Wojtyla’s maneuver involves more than just a happy interface between two seemingly opposed thought systems. He finds in it instead a creative attempt to transcend the tension between the subjective bent of consciousness and the traditional Catholic metaphysical position that sustains and is sustained by Aquinas’ philosophical anthropology. Such endeavor results eventually not so much in a superimposition of one domain over the other but in a new hermeneutic space that makes it possible for consciousness to recognize the limits of its subjective dimension as it begins to recognize its constitutive
aspect, that is, the “constitutive aspect of the dynamic structure, that is, of the acting person.”

It should be noted at this point that Wojtyla is neither the first nor the only Catholic thinker that attempts to bring phenomenology and Thomism to a fusion. Before him, there was Edith Stein (the future St. Teresa Benedicta of the Cross whose canonization would be presided by no less than John Paul II himself) who early on had explored this possibility after veering away from Husserlian phenomenology due to its transcendental leanings. Stein found in Aquinas an ontology that could mitigate both the inadequacies and excesses of a philosophy dogged down by the problems of a self-indulgent consciousness. What Stein failed and Wojtyla succeeded to work out was a systematic treatment of such fusion’s theoretical possibility. This is something not yet apparent in Wojtyla’s first book, *Love and Responsibility*, owing to its pedagogical and apologetic orientation. It would not be until *The Acting Person* that its foundation and structure would acquire their fuller form. As reported by Aguas: “The outcome would be what Wojtyla would regard years later as a way of doing philosophy that ‘synthesized both approaches,’ namely, the metaphysical realism of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas and the sensitivity to human experience of Max Scheler’ phenomenology.”

And, I suppose, this is where the edge of a seasoned doer of philosophy like Aguas would come in, for I see no other way of showing the depth and breadth of Wojtyla’s accomplishment as a philosopher except through an actual rehearsal of the latter’s philosophic itinerary which cuts across various philosophical systems and episodes of the history of philosophy. Wojtyla’s nuanced handling of Aquinas’ insights, for example, can easily weigh down someone unless he has the skill and the appropriate comfortability with the arcane medieval system of thought. Aguas, thankfully, has both, enabling him thus to re-package an otherwise difficult treatise into a material worthy of Wojtyla’s name.

*Department of Philosophy, University of Santo Tomas, Philippines*
Book Review

**Ferriols, Roque,**

*Sulyap sa Aking Pinanggalingan*,

ed. by Leovino Ma. Garcia

_Jovito V. Cariño_


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