An Alternative Dialectical Picture of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Debate: 
A Reply to Mabaquiao

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Abstract: In “Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” Mabaquiao presents the debate between physicalists and anti-physicalists in light of the plausibility of the phenomenal concept strategy vis-à-vis Chalmers’ master argument. He argues that, as it currently stands, the debate is at an ontological stalemate. This paper argues that this indictment is not fair given an alternative picture of the current dialectical status of the debate. Furthermore, it suggests that, given this picture, we could have reasons to favor the anti-physicalists over the physicalists just by following how the debate has currently been pursued.

Keywords: Chalmers’ master argument, phenomenal concept strategy, epistemic gap argument, philosophical burden of proof, philosophical dialectic

Introduction

In a recent article, Mabaquiao offers an indictment of the current status of the debate between physicalists and anti-physicalists. Focusing on the issue about the plausibility of the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) as a defense of physicalism vis-à-vis Chalmers’ master argument (CMA) against it, he argues that the debate is at a stalemate. This, as Mabaquiao contends, is evidenced by Balog’s idea that “[n]either side can, without begging the question against the opponent, show that the other’s position is untenable.”

This paper suggests that, given an alternative account of the dialectic of the debate so far, this indictment seems to be unfair. Furthermore, it suggests that if we were to follow Mabaquiao’s (cum Balog’s) premise, then we should be led to the idea that, despite the ontological impasse that the debate seems to be currently in, there are good reasons to think that anti-physicalists enjoy the dialectical higher ground contra physicalists.

This paper is divided into two sets of excurses. The first set offers a critical rehearsal of Mabaquiao’s take on the whole PCS debate by providing an alternative picture of the dialectic of the debate. The second provides reasons why, given this alternative picture, Mabaquiao’s indictment is untenable, and the current status of the debate between physicalists and anti-physicalists gives the latter a slight dialectical advantage.

**Excursus 1: The Dialectic of the PCS Debate (The Bigger Debate)**

Mabaquiao maps out the debate about the plausibility of PCS in terms of a bigger debate between physicalism and anti-physicalism. There are various versions of each view, but there are certain common elements which identify theories as either. For example, identity theorists and causal theorists both fall under physicalism; Cartesian dualists and epiphenomenalists, on the other hand, both fall under anti-physicalism.

Physicalism is generally understood as the thesis that, fundamentally, everything is physical, while anti-physicalism is the contradictory of this thesis: viz., that not everything is physical. Another way of cashing out the physicalist view is in terms of either an explanatory thesis or a metaphysical thesis. As an explanatory thesis, it implies that everything can be explained in terms of the physical, or that everything is a priori derivable from the physical. As a metaphysical thesis, it implies that everything supervenes on the physical, or that everything is grounded on the physical. Much in the same way, anti-physicalism is usually cashed out in the same terms: either as an explanatory-cum-epistemic gap thesis that not everything can be explained in terms of the physical, or as a dualist metaphysical thesis that not everything supervenes on the physical.

Given these initial characterizations, we could formulate each of these views in terms of the following generalized theses. The physicalist thesis implies that:

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3 Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 54-56.
4 Mabaquiao adds “idealism” as another sort of contender here (see ibid., 55). But in the interest of the debate about PCS, physicalism and anti-physicalism seem to be the only possible contenders.
(PHY) Everything is either a fundamental physical fact, or else could be explained in terms of some other fundamental physical fact.

While the anti-physicalist thesis implies the negation of PHY, such that:

(A-PHY) It’s not the case that everything is either a fundamental physical fact, or else could be explained in terms of some other fundamental physical fact.

Alternatively, the anti-physicalist thesis could be rendered as the view that:

(A-PHY*) There is at least one thing that is not a fundamental physical fact and which cannot be explained in terms of some other fundamental physical fact.

Cashed out this way, we could easily see that the locus of the debate between the physicalist and the anti-physicalist revolves around the issue of whether there are some non-fundamentally physical things which could be explained in purely physical terms. Of course, the physicalist would claim that yes, there are, since everything is physical or could be explained in physical terms; the anti-physicalist would claim no, there aren’t, since there could at least be one non-physical thing that could not be explained in physical terms.

Given the status of the debate between physicalists and anti-physicalists as characterized in terms of this issue, it is quite clear that the philosophical burden to prove her case lies on both parties. It is generally acknowledged in philosophy that at the onset of a debate, no party should have even the slightest dialectical advantage. And given how we have formulated the issue thus far, this is true of the debate between the physicalists and the anti-physicalists.

Given this characterization of the issue, how would a physicalist and an anti-physicalist argue for their respective claims? Some physicalists have opted for two interrelated arguments to prove their claim. One is the argument from parsimony of causal explanations; the other is the argument

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6 Alternatively, the debate might instead focus on whether there is at least one non-physical thing. But since the first formulation captures the second, we could stick with the first formulation of the debate throughout the paper.
from the consistency with current science. There are different versions of these two arguments. But in a nutshell, we could cast both arguments in one overall argument: viz., as an argument from our best science (ABS). The argument goes like this:

1. Our best science tells us that the world is a causally complete physical world.
2. Therefore, everything is explainable in physical terms.

Of course, ABS is not a foolproof argument for the physicalist thesis; there are possible objections against ABS that are open for an anti-physicalist. For one, an anti-physicalist might argue that granted the premise, the conclusion still does not follow. For even if an anti-physicalist supposes that our present best science might tell us that everything is explainable in physical terms, she might argue that it does not tell us what our future best science might tell us. As such, it is at least an open issue as to whether our future best science would incorporate some anti-physical explanations of certain phenomena. With this dialectical move, and holding all things being equal, we might say that the anti-physicalist’s reply makes the physicalist argument at least questionable. We do not have room to further evaluate the dialectic of this debate in this paper since our primary concern is the debate about PCS as Mabaquiao sees it. But seeing the overall dialectic here is instructive for our purposes later when we evaluate the dialectic of our target debate.

**Excursus 2: The Epistemic Argument and the PCS Reply**

Now where does Mabaquiao see the PCS debate in terms of this bigger debate? He pegs it as a reply of physicalists to various forms of explanatory-cum-epistemic gap arguments given by anti-physicalists. One point of contention between physicalists and anti-physicalists is about the ontological status of consciousness or qualia. Anti-physicalists argue that this is at least one non-physical thing that could not be explained in physical terms. Physicalists, on other hand, deny this. They argue that consciousness is something that could be explained in physical terms.
In terms of how we have characterized the main issue between physicalists and anti-physicalists, one dialectical move that is often attributed to an anti-physicalist is the argument from the failure of physicalism (FOP).\footnote{A similar argument is presented in David C. Chalmers, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap,” in \textit{Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism}, ed. by Torin Alter and Steven Walter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).} The overall argument structure of FOP looks like this:

1. Either physicalism is true or anti-physicalism is true.
2. If physicalism is true, then everything is either a fundamental physical fact, or else explainable in terms of those facts.
3. There are non-fundamentally physical facts which are not explainable in terms of fundamental physical facts.
4. Therefore, physicalism is not true.
5. Therefore, anti-physicalism is true.

FOP might be taken as a \textit{prima facie} anti-physicalist argument. However, formulated as such, a closer inspection is needed. FOP works on the assumption that the first premise is exhaustive and mutually exclusive. That is, no other possible theory is available, and the two cannot be both false. Only with this supposition will the argument have legs. Furthermore, as Mabaquiao has correctly pointed out, the third premise of FOP needs to be supported by a further argument. Such an argument should imply the anti-physicalist thesis identified as A-PHY\textsuperscript{*} above: viz., that there is \textit{indeed} at least one non-physical thing that resists explanation in physical terms. Mabaquiao identifies one such argument move as a kind of epistemic gap argument (EGA).

The general structure of EGA that Mabaquiao has in mind is the following:

1. There are epistemic gaps (in the sense that there is gap in our description of phenomenal/consciousness facts in terms of a purely physical description of them).
2. If there are epistemic gaps, then there are ontological gaps (between physical facts and phenomenal facts).
3. If there are ontological gaps, then there is at least one thing that is not a fundamental physical fact and which cannot be explained in terms of some other fundamental physical fact.
4. Therefore, there is at least one thing that is not a fundamental physical fact and which cannot be explained in terms of some other fundamental physical fact.

If the premises of this argument are true, then conclusion logically follows. But are the premises true? Or at least, are they motivated? Mabaquiao provides three motivations for the premises of EGA: viz., explanatory gap, knowledge gap, and conceptual gap. This paper would not get into the details of these motivations. But we could have a very broad idea of how they work. Structurally, the argument is motivated as follows:

**EG-Premise**

It is possible to have a description of all the physical facts but fail to have a description of some phenomenal/consciousness fact.\(^{13}\)

**IF-EG-THEN-OG-Premise**

If it is possible to have a description of all the physical facts but fail to have a description of some phenomenal/consciousness fact, then these consciousness facts are not physical processes or physical facts.

**IF-OG-THEN-NP-Premise**

If these consciousness facts are not physical processes or physical facts, then there is at least one thing that is not a fundamental physical fact and which cannot be explained in terms of some other fundamental physical fact.\(^{14}\)

From these, the conclusion is meant to follow.

Note here that the crucial premises of this argument are the first two. That is, the EG-premise and the IF-EG-THEN-OG-Premise. The third premise comes into play only if we want to make the anti-physicalist thesis explicit. But if we do not wish to make it so, then from the first two premises, we could already have anti-physicalism.

Mabaquiao contends that for friends of PCS:

> [T]he epistemic gaps, contrary to the claim of the epistemic arguments, are not brought about by an

\(^{12}\) Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 56-57.

\(^{13}\) That is, given either one of the motivations identified by Mabaquiao.

\(^{14}\) The structural argument here is due to Chalmers. See Chalmers, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap.”
ontological gap but by the peculiar nature of our phenomenal concepts. More specifically, the epistemic gaps are not due to a gap between physical facts and phenomenal facts but to a gap between physical concepts and phenomenal concepts. This gap between physical concepts and phenomenal concepts is precisely brought about by the absence of a priori connections between these two types of facts ...  

Mabaquiao follows Chalmers' and Stoljar's characterization of PCS. What is interesting here is that since defenders of PCS do not reject the EG-premise, they are, in effect, taking it in as part of their reply. Roughly this means that they acknowledge that there is an epistemic gap between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts, but even if this is so, it does not follow that this gap is grounded on some ontological gap between phenomenal and physical facts. Furthermore, to explain these epistemic gaps, friends of PCS suggest that, as Stoljar puts it, they are only brought about by our temporary non-possession of certain epistemic connections between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts. 

PCS, thus, implies the following. Our first exposure to some new sensation brings about an epistemic gap between our new phenomenal concept of that sensation, and our old stock of physical concepts. But from this epistemic gap, we could not conclude that there is an ontological gap between phenomenal facts and physical facts, since in principle, we could have a set of purely physical concepts that could explain this new phenomenal concept. In this way, friends of PCS would have put EGA, especially the IF-EG-THEN-OG-Premise, into question. Thus, they have also secured the physicalist view. 

Let us rehearse what we have so far. We have been exploring Mabaquiao’s view of the dialectic of the debate about PCS. This exploration has led us to the bigger debate between physicalist and anti-physicalist. We have seen one argument for physicalism, viz., ABS, and an anti-physicalist counterargument against it. We have also seen one argument for anti-physicalism, viz., FOP. Focusing on the FOP argument, we are led to EGA as the support for the overall anti-physicalist thesis. Now, we have seen the PCS 

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18 Ibid.

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as a physicalist reply to the IF-EG-THEN-OG-Premise of EGA. And, in a way, we have also seen its motivation.

**Excursus 3: Chalmers’ Master Argument Rejoinder**

Where does Mabaquiao, then, peg Chalmers’ Master Argument (CMA) in all of this? Mabaquiao sees CMA as an anti-physicalist’s rejoinder to the PCS argument. In effect, CMA is a reply to the physicalist’s PCS reply to EGA. It is worth noting that if successful, CMA would not only have secured EGA, but also the anti-physicalist thesis as well.

Recall that friends of PCS put into question the IF-EG-THEN-OG-Premise of EGA. In doing this, they have taken upon themselves two tasks, which if fulfilled, would spell the success of PCS. These two tasks are as follows. First, PCS should explain the epistemic gap. That is, it should explain our epistemic situation whenever we are confronted with a new conscious experience. Second, it should explain phenomenal concepts in terms of physical terms. That is, it should show that the IF-EG-THEN-OG-Premise is false.

Chalmers designed the master argument to show that these two tasks are impossible to fulfill. Mabaquiao quotes Chalmers’ position as follows:

> I (Chalmers) think that the (PCS) strategy cannot succeed. On close examination, we can see that no account of phenomenal concepts is both powerful enough to explain our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness and tame enough to be explained in physical terms.

How does CMA work? We would not get into the technical details of the argument, but we could have an idea of its main structure as follows:

1. If it is conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms.
2. If it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then these psychological facts are not part of the physical facts.

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20 Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 60.
21 Ibid. This is a more spelled out version of the argument. Chalmers presents it as a schematic. See Chalmers, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap,” 168. But we should note that a lot is lost in translation once Ps and Qs come into play. As such, we will make explicit the main thought behind CMA.
concepts, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation.

3. Therefore, either these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms, or else they cannot explain our epistemic situation.\textsuperscript{22}

For Mabaquiao, “[I]t is not difficult to see that the entire master argument is based on his zombie hypothesis or the conceivability reasoning concerning this hypothesis …”\textsuperscript{23} As such, he thinks that the primary motivation for CMA has something to do with the conceivability of philosophical zombies—zombies, which are our physical or functional duplicates, but unlike us, lack phenomenology or consciousness.

Furthermore, Mabaquiao thinks that the conceivability of philosophical zombies motivates each of the horns of Chalmers’ dilemma. With regard to the first horn of the dilemma (the first premise), he thinks that this motivation shows “the failure of the PCS as a physicalist defense against the epistemic arguments.”\textsuperscript{24} On the other hand, with regard to the second horn (the second premise), he thinks that the same motivation shows the failure of PCS as a defense of the physicalist view which accepts epistemic gaps but not ontological gaps.\textsuperscript{25}

To this we remark that, yes, CMA as a whole is motivated by a certain conceivability argument (about philosophical zombies), but not as straightforwardly as what Mabaquiao seems to imply. To understand how CMA is so motivated, we must see how Chalmers motivates each horn of the dilemma, and how this informs his overall position quoted above.

Chalmers motivates the first premise (i.e., the first horn) as follows. If one can conceive of a physical or even a functional duplicate (i.e., a philosophical zombie), that is almost similar to us except that, unlike us, it lacks phenomenology or consciousness, then there will be an explanatory gap between physical explanations and their target psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts. This is so since if a philosophical zombie were conceivable; then, since it has no consciousness, it follows that a purely physical explanation could not account for why we have consciousness and

\textsuperscript{22} Mabaquiao formulates CMA in terms of an explicit constructive dilemma. See Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 61-62. But this is an unnecessary complication. As it stands, CMA is already a valid dilemma argument. That is, it instantiates the valid argument form:

(1) If P, then Q.
(2) If not-P, then R.
(3) Therefore, Q or R.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
the zombie does not. From this, the first horn of the dilemma follows. Let us call this argument ZOMBIE1.

Structurally, ZOMBIE1 looks like this:

1. If philosophical zombies are conceivable, then there is an explanatory gap between physical explanations and their target psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts.
2. If there is an explanatory gap between physical explanations and their target psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms.
3. Therefore, if philosophical zombies are conceivable, then psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms.

Again, this argument is valid. But notice how the conceivability of philosophical zombies functions in ZOMBIE1. Chalmers uses it in terms of “a connection between conceivability and explanation,” such that: if some physicalist explanation “makes transparent why some high-level truth obtains (e.g., truths about consciousness) given that the low-level truths obtain (e.g., truths about physical facts), and since it is conceivable that low-level truths obtain without high-level truths obtaining, then this sort of transparent (physicalist) explanation will fail.”

Furthermore, given this appreciation of ZOMBIE1, we might now have a good conceptual handle of why Chalmers thinks that no account of phenomenal concepts is tame enough to be explained in physical terms. Given ZOMBIE1, since philosophical zombies are possible, then no physical explanation of psychological facts are possible. A fortiori, no phenomenal concepts could be physically explained as well.

Chalmers motivates the second premise (i.e., the second horn) with what we will label as ZOMBIE2. Structurally, the argument proceeds this way:

1. If it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal

27 ZOMBIE1 is an instance of this valid argument form:
   (1) If P, then Q.
   (2) If Q, then R.
   (3) Therefore, if P then R.
29 Ibid.
concepts, then philosophical zombies would have the psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts.

2. Philosophical zombies do not share our epistemic situation.

3. If philosophical zombies have the psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts but do not share our epistemic situation, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation.

4. Therefore, if it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation.\(^\text{30}\)

\textit{ZOMBIE}_2 is valid.\(^\text{31}\) But what is interesting about it is how philosophical zombies are employed in the argument. We might notice that, unlike in \textit{ZOMBIE}_1, the conceivability of philosophical zombies is not the main premise of the argument; rather, it is merely assumed given the connection of conceivability and explanations (as in \textit{ZOMBIE}_1). Chalmers tells us that what is doing the real work in the argument is the second premise.\(^\text{32}\) So let us focus on that.

The claim that philosophical zombies do not share our epistemic situation needs a bit of clarification. And Chalmers does this as follows.

We can say that two individuals share their epistemic situation when they have corresponding beliefs, all of which have corresponding truth-value and epistemic status. A zombie will share the epistemic situation of a conscious being if the zombie and the conscious being have corresponding beliefs, all of which have corresponding truth-values and epistemic status.\(^\text{33}\)

Two things are noteworthy here. First, the phrase, “epistemic situation” refers to an individual’s beliefs, their truth status (i.e., whether it is

\(^{30}\) Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, 176. As in \textit{ZOMBIE}_1, “references to (philosophical) zombies should be put within the scope of a conceivability operator” (\textit{ibid.}). That is, all instances of “philosophical zombies” in the argument should be read as “conceivable philosophical zombies.”

\(^{31}\) \textit{ZOMBIE}_2 is an instance of this valid form:

1. If \(P\), then \(Q\).
2. \(R\)
3. If \(Q\) and \(R\), then \(S\)
4. Therefore, if \(P\), then \(S\).

\(^{32}\) Chalmers, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap,” 176. In the original Chalmers argument, our second premise is his fifth.

\(^{33}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 177.
true), and their epistemic status (i.e., whether they are justified, warranted, etc.). In this way, two individuals share their epistemic situation if for some belief (which includes its truth status and epistemic status) that one has, the other has as well. Now, Chalmers asks, do we have good reasons to think that a conscious being and its philosophical zombie duplicate, share the same epistemic situation? He thinks that we do not.

If Chalmers is right, then, given that we and our philosophical zombie duplicates share a common belief, our duplicates differ from us either in terms of their truth status or epistemic status. Chalmers illustrates these two differentiae as follows. Consider the belief about one’s own consciousness. Let the sentence, “I am conscious” depict this belief. Uttered by a conscious being, like you and me, the sentence is determinately true since you are definitely conscious. On the contrary, when uttered by your zombie duplicate, this sentence is systematically false since zombies, by definition, are not conscious. Furthermore, since you and your zombie duplicate have different truth statuses, it follows that both of you have different epistemic statuses as well, since your belief is justified, while your zombie duplicate’s is not.

Thus, given that the premises of ZOMBIE2 are plausibly true, its conclusion follows: i.e., if it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation. And this is exactly the second horn of CMA. Furthermore, the articulation of ZOMBIE2 provides us with a conceptual handle of Chalmers’ claim that no account of phenomenal concepts is powerful enough to explain our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness. Taken in terms of ZOMBIE2, the claim implies that PCS would not have the resources to explain a conscious being’s epistemic situation since its zombie duplicate does not share our epistemic situation even though both share the same psychological features necessary for phenomenal concepts.

To reiterate, Mabaquiao rightly describes the conceivability of philosophical zombies as the primary motivation for CMA. But this

34 Chalmers makes further a distinction about what it means to have the same corresponding belief, and clarifications about zombies having beliefs in the first place. But we will set these issues aside since they would not affect the overall structure of his argument. For details see ibid.

35 A weaker formulation might suffice here as well. Instead of claiming that a zombie’s report about its self-consciousness is systematically false, we might just claim that it is indeterminately true and indeterminately false. But this weaker formulation implies the same thing: viz., that you and your zombie duplicate have different truth statuses; hence, have different epistemic situations.

motivation, as we have seen, is twofold. On the one hand, if philosophical zombies are conceivable, then PCS fails as a physicalist explanation of how phenomenal concepts are derivable from psychological facts. On the other hand, if PCS succeeds as a physicalist explanation, then you and your zombie duplicate would not share an epistemic situation even if both of you share the same psychological features necessary for phenomenal concepts. The former is CMA’s first horn; the latter is its second horn.37

Excursus 4: Carruthers & Veillet’s Reply to CMA

Let us take stock of what we have so far. The dialectical structure of the PCS debate as we have pictured thus far takes the PCS as a physicalist reply to the anti-physicalist’s EGA. To be successful, PCS should not only explain the phenomenal concepts we employ in terms of physical terms, but also the epistemic (gappy) situation we are in when confronted with some new conscious experience. And as we have seen, CMA shows precisely that any (physicalist) account would fail in both fronts.

Given this, how would a defender of PCS reply to CMA’s dilemma? Dialectically speaking, there are different possible replies.38 One is to show that at least one of the horns of the dilemma is faulty; and thus, show that the argument is unsound. Another is to show that the whole thing is unmotivated, or rests on a faulty assumption; and thus, show that the argument has no legs. Yet another reply might be to just wave your hands and put your foot down. Mabaquiao does not present the third of these options, and rightly so; rather, he presents Carruthers and Veillet’s reply and Balog’s reply. The first shows that the second horn of the dilemma is faulty; the second shows that the whole argument has no legs. Offhand, we should note that although Mabaquiao’s indictment rests solely on Balog’s reply, it is still instructive to see how the former reply works as a secondary premise for Mabaquiao’s claim.

37 In fairness to Mabaquiao, his discussion of the second horn of the dilemma follows almost the same line of thought that we have seen above. But his discussion is in the context of his presentation of the objection made by Carruthers and Veillet. See Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 63-67. In his dialectic of the debate, he sees the second horn in terms of a reply to CMA. In our context, the second horn (and the motivation of it in terms of ZOMBIE) is seen as part of Chalmers’ overall master argument. This distinction of contexts is important to note here since, dialectically speaking, in Mabaquiao’s picture, ZOMBIE appears as a defensive dialectical move. In contrast, in our picture, it serves as a persuasive dialectical move to further motivate CMA.

38 Chalmers has actually outlined most of them in the “reactions” section of his work. See Chalmers, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap,” 180-189.
Mabaquiao takes Carruthers and Veillet’s reply to CMA as mainly questioning the second horn of the dilemma.\(^{39}\) Recall that the second horn tells us that if it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation. And the key motivation for this as we have outlined above is ZOMBIE\(^2\). Carruthers and Veillet argue, in effect, that the second premise of ZOMBIE\(^2\) is false, or at least questionable. That is, they question the premise that philosophical zombies do not share our epistemic situation.\(^{40}\) But what is their main argument for this? We shall call their argument the argument from twin-earth (ATE).

Mabaquiao outlines ATE as follows:\(^{41}\)

1. Oscar and Twin Oscar share the same epistemic situation.
2. If Oscar and Twin Oscar share the same epistemic situation, then so should Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers.
3. Thus, Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers share the same epistemic situation.
4. Thus, philosophical zombies do share our epistemic situation.

The first premise of ATE is motivated by the famous twin earth thought experiment for semantic externalism due to Putnam.\(^{42}\) Semantic externalism is the view that the meaning of linguistic expressions is largely determined by factors external to the speaker. That is, the meaning of the word, like “water,” is not just found in the internal mechanisms of the speaker, but to some environmental factors, like the causal history of the expression. This extends to the question about mental states and mental content. An externalist about mental states or mental content tells us that “in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g., beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way.”\(^{43}\) The twin earth thought experiment is often cited as a motivation for both versions of externalism. The thought experiment asks us to consider Oscar, an Earth-bound individual, and his twin, Twin Oscar, who lives on twin earth. As Mabaquiao illustrates:

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\(^{39}\) Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 65.


The only difference between normal earth and twin earth is that the chemical composition of water in normal earth is H\textsubscript{2}O, while in twin earth it is XYZ. In this case, when Oscar and Twin Oscar utter the same sentence, “water is refreshing,” their respective sentences are both true and justified in similar ways given their respective natural environments. Consequently, in regard to Chalmers, Oscar and Twin Oscar share the same epistemic situation despite the fact that the contents of their beliefs are not the same—Oscar’s refers to a substance consisting of H\textsubscript{2}O, while Twin Oscar’s refers to a substance consisting of XYZ.\textsuperscript{44}

In effect, this tells us that given Chalmers’ definition of an epistemic situation, we have to say that Oscar and Twin Oscar do share the same epistemic situation—albeit, about different contents and different natural environments. But do we have reasons to grant that Oscar and Twin Oscar indeed share the same epistemic situation? On the one hand, yes, if we are just going for an externalist view of mental states and mental content such that both Oscar’s and Twin Oscar’s belief about the refreshing-ness of water is true and justified by different sets of considerations in each of their environments. On the other hand, no, if it turns out that mental states and mental contents are internally justified; i.e., there could be no environmental facts about mental content. Carruthers and Veillet hold that Chalmers is taking an externalist view of mental states and mental content since the latter envisages that the meaning of self-consciousness reports, e.g., “I am conscious” is determined by phenomenal states.\textsuperscript{45} So, we grant the first premise for now.

The second premise of ATE seems to be the crux of the argument.\textsuperscript{46} It tells that if we accept that Oscar and Twin Oscar share the same epistemic situation, then we should also accept that Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers share the same epistemic situation. But what’s the motivation for this conditional? Carruthers and Veillet argue that some conscious being, e.g., Chalmers and his zombie twin, Zombie Chalmers, share the same epistemic situation since, like Oscar and Twin Oscar; each of their self-consciousness report is true and is epistemically justified though by different environmental factors. For Chalmers, it is justified by his having genuine phenomenal states;
for Zombie Chalmers it is by having schmenomenal states (that is, functionally like phenomenal, but not really phenomenal states).\footnote{Carruthers and Veillet, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy,” 11-12.}

Mabaquiao quotes a summary of their argument as follows:

The content of one of Chalmers’ phenomenal concepts will turn out to involve a phenomenal state, whereas the content of his twin’s corresponding phenomenal concept can’t possibly involve such a state. According to Chalmers, it seems plausible that the content of a zombie’s phenomenal concepts would be schmenomenal states (these would be states that have the same physical, functional and intentional properties as Chalmers’ states but that aren’t phenomenally conscious). The physicalist would then argue that Chalmers’ and Zombie Chalmers’ corresponding beliefs have the same truth-values and are justified in similar ways, but they are quite importantly about different things. So Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers can share the same epistemic situation after all, just as do Oscar and his twin.\footnote{Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 66.}

But is ATE reasonable? Chalmers argues that this proposal either deflates the phenomenal knowledge of conscious beings, or inflates the corresponding knowledge of zombies.\footnote{Chalmers, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap,” 185.} In effect, given the context about the knowledge of self-consciousness, if Carruthers and Veillet are right that we share the same epistemic situation with our zombie twins, then either our knowledge that we are self-conscious is less than what it actually is, or that the zombie’s knowledge that it is self-conscious is more than what it actually is. Furthermore, since neither of these consequent is true, it follows that we still do not share the same epistemic situation with our zombie twins. As Chalmers puts it, “If a theory predicts that a nonconscious zombie would have the same sort of introspective knowledge that we do, then this is reason to reject the theory.”\footnote{Ibid., 187.}

But why think that neither consequent is true? Chalmers could go on either two tracks here. First, by definition, zombies do not have consciousness. So, by definition, any self-consciousness report made by the zombie is systematically false. Thus, zombies do not know that they are conscious. Second, perhaps, our zombies do have a functionally similar schmonsciousness, but even so, this is not as rich as our consciousness. Thus,
since our consciousness is phenomenally rich, then it is not less than that of the zombie’s.

Carruthers and Veillet have an objection against this Chalmers line of defense:

If Chalmers’ epistemic situation is partly characterized in terms of the presence of this state (a phenomenal state), which we can imagine Zombie Chalmers to lack, then this amounts to saying that it is an important part of Chalmers’ epistemic situation that he has phenomenally conscious mental states, whereas Zombie Chalmers doesn’t. And doesn’t that now beg the question? For this is something that is supposed to be granted on all hands. Defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy, too, allow that we can conceive of someone who is physically, functionally, and intentionally identical to Chalmers (that is, Zombie Chalmers), but who lacks any of the phenomenally conscious mental states that Chalmers enjoys. And we claim to be capable of explaining how such a thing can be conceivable in a way that doesn’t presuppose the existence of anything beyond the physical, the functional, and/or the intentional.\(^5^1\)

In effect, Carruthers and Veillet object that Chalmers’ strategy of claiming the richness of our conscious experience (as oppose to our zombie twins) already begs the question against the defender of PCS. Recall that defenders of PCS aim to explain phenomenal concepts in physical terms, but if Chalmers already insists that there is already an in-principle difference between a conscious being’s phenomenology and its zombie twin, then, at the onset, the dialectic is already lopsided.

But there is a way that we could remedy Chalmers’ dialectical move without sacrificing its intent. This remedy circumvents the begging the question objection, and, at the same time, highlights the main point of the CMA, and, to some extent, EGA as well. Recall that the main premise of ATE is the second premise: the move from the sameness of Oscar and Twin Oscar’s epistemic situation to the sameness of Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers’ epistemic situation. Grant that Oscar does externally share the same epistemic situation as Twin Oscar. We grant this since the content at stake is not a self-consciousness report; rather it is a report about the “refreshing-ness” of water

(or t-water in Twin Oscar’s case). Now should we grant that this report has the same epistemic features as reports about self-consciousness? Prima facie, it seems that we cannot.

Carruthers and Veillet have assumed that Chalmers is an externalist when it comes to Oscar and Twin Oscar. We have granted this. But is Chalmers also an externalist about himself and Zombie Chalmers, especially with regard to reports about self-consciousness, e.g., “I am conscious”? To this we say no. In effect, what is at stake in the second premise of ATE is precisely how wide externalism about mental content could be. To have an externalist view of mental content is one thing, but to have a very wide or broad externalist view is an entirely different thing. A wide externalist view of mental content tells us that all mental states and mental contents are partly determined by external factors.52 Chalmers might contend that externalism does not extend to reports about self-consciousness. Rather, we must accept a sort of narrow conception of mental content when it comes to self-consciousness reports.53 What does this view amount to?

In a nutshell, in this conception, “narrow content is intended to capture a subject’s perspective on the world, the way the world is according to the subject.”54 That is, in the context of self-consciousness reports, it implies the conscious subject’s first-person perspective about his/her own self-consciousness. How does this bear with the Carruthers and Veillet’s ATE?

As we have mentioned, the critical premise in ATE is the conditional second premise that if Oscar and Twin Oscar share the same epistemic situation, then Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers should also share the same epistemic situation. Both the antecedent and consequent are motivated by an externalist view of mental content, but the consequent, unlike the antecedent, has a narrower conception of mental content. Since Zombie Chalmers lacks a first-person perspective, it follows that it has a different epistemic situation from Chalmers who has it.

Alternatively, we could put the main point in terms of EGA. Epistemic gaps arise precisely because there is an ontological gap between the physical and the phenomenal. This ontological gap rests on the gap between phenomenal states, which are uniquely from a first-person perspective, and non-phenomenal states, which are uniquely from the third-

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53 This leads to Chalmers’ two-dimensional semantics of which we would no longer touch on. For details of this, see David C. Chalmers, “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics,” in Two-Dimensional Semantics, ed. by Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Josep Macia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

person perspective.\textsuperscript{55} As a consequence, we could interpret the anti-physicalist thesis as the thought that one can never have a full explanation of reality without taking in the first-person perspective. This thesis is of course what EGA and CMA both hold.

\textbf{Excursus 5: A Question of Philosophical Burdens and Dialectics (Mabaquiao’s Indictment and Balog’s Reply to CMA)}

This result seems to extend to Balog’s reply to CMA and as a consequence to Mabaquiao’s indictment of the debate. But before getting into how this result would affect the Balog-cum-Mabaquiao’s position, it would be prudent to articulate the position first.

Mabaquiao presents Balog’s reply as a kind of undercutting argument against CMA. The thought is that there is a hidden ambiguity in CMA. If this ambiguity is resolved, this would undercut the bite of the dilemma and, thus, show that CMA, as a whole, rests on a simple conceptual mistake. Mabaquiao takes in Balog’s apparatus in terms of two general languages: a purely phenomenal language and a purely physical language.\textsuperscript{56} Let us now see how they work in disambiguating the two senses of the premises.

Recall that CMA tells us that:

1. If it is conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms.
2. If it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation.
3. Therefore, either these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms, or else they cannot explain our epistemic situation.

Balog re-conceptualizes the premises in terms of the two languages, and figures that the only way for this argument to work is to cast the first premise in phenomenal terms and the second premise in physical terms. As such CMA would be transformed as:

\textsuperscript{55} In this way, it seems that Mabaquiao (as well as Carruthers and Veillet) seems to miss this point when he tells us that “the master argument equivocates between first-person and third-person phenomenal concepts.” Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 63.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 68.
1. If it is conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet, *phenomenally*, miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then, *phenomenally*, these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms.

2. If it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet, *physically*, miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then, *physically*, the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation.

3. Therefore, either *phenomenally*, these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms, or else *physically*, they cannot explain our epistemic situation.\(^{57}\)

But what do these languages mean? One way to re-formulate Balog’s point is to consider these languages in terms of the first-person and third-person perspectives, where, as we have pointed out above, the former is phenomenal; the latter is physical (i.e., non-phenomenal). Cast in this way, CMA would look like:

1. If it is conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet, *from the first-person perspective*, miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms *from the first-person perspective*.

2. If it is not conceivable that we have all the physical facts and yet, *from the third-person perspective*, miss out on the key psychological facts necessary to explain phenomenal concepts, then the psychological facts cannot explain our epistemic situation *from the third-person perspective*.

3. Therefore, either these psychological facts are not explainable in physical terms *from the first-person perspective*, or else they cannot explain our epistemic situation *from the third-person perspective*.

But what is Balog’s motivation for this move? That is, what is her justification for re-conceptualizing CMA in terms of phenomenal and physical conceptualizations?\(^{58}\) Her overall motivation seems to be found at the onset of her essay:

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\(^{57}\) As before, we let the thought of CMA inform the whole formulation here. See footnote 21.

\(^{58}\) Mabaquiao explores another motivation in terms of how Balog’s re-conceptualization defends PCS against CMA. But I think there is more into Balog’s motivation than a mere defense of PCS.
... I argue that his Master Argument does not provide any new reasons to reject the PCS, that is, any reasons that go beyond those presented in the original anti-physicalist arguments—which the PCS is designed to rebut. I also argue that, although the PCS shows that the physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up physicalism in the light of the anti-physicalist arguments, the anti-physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up the anti-physicalist argument in the light of the PCS either ...59

Two things are noteworthy here. We could surmise from the first part of her motivation that Balog thinks that CMA is nothing more than a redressed EGA. This implies that since PCS is already designed to rebut EGA, and since nothing new is offered by CMA as a defense of EGA, then PCS, as it stands, already answers the anti-physicalist’s argument. But the second part of her motivation is telling as well. She holds that both the physicalists and anti-physicalists would not be rationally compelled to shift their view given the other’s (counter-) arguments. This implies that physicalists and anti-physicalists would be on a theoretical impasse.

But do we have reasons to accept the first part of Balog’s claim? In a way, we could answer in the affirmative. CMA is really a re-articulation of the main point of EGA. Both are premised on the idea that if epistemic gaps exist, then there are ontological gaps as well. But even if this is so, an anti-physicalist might still react against the implication that we have drawn. In effect, the anti-physicalist would argue that PCS has yet to resolve the issue at hand. It has not provided a physicalist explanation of the existence of epistemic gaps; it has not provided a compelling account of our epistemic situation. Alternatively, supposing that PCS has given an account for these, we could still say that it has not resolved the issue about the first-person perspective, and whether it is reducible to the third-person perspective. As such, the physicalist position would still be untenable.

To this, Balog replies that this is precisely what the re-conceptualized CMA tells us. But if we were to follow our version of Balog’s re-conceptualization, then Balog’s position would be confusing. Our re-conceptualized first horn of the dilemma illustrates the problem of PCS from the first-person perspective to the effect that there seems to be no physicalist explanation for epistemic gaps from a first-person perspective. Our re-conceptualized second horn, on other hand, illustrates the problem of PCS

from the third-person perspective to the effect that we cannot have a third-
person account for our first-person epistemic situation. But, as Balog tells us,
“this is perfectly compatible with physicalism!”\textsuperscript{60} In effect, what she is telling
us is that this is precisely why CMA does not offer any new arguments for
anti-physicalism, since this has been EGA’s point all along. That is, that there
is a gap between the first-person and third-person perspective. But if this is
Balog’s point, then she has already accepted EGA.

Furthermore, given this reply, it seems that it is not feasible to grant
Mabaquiao’s point that PCS has at least “save[d] the viability of physicalism
from the epistemic arguments.”\textsuperscript{61} In fact, given our articulation of Carruthers
and Veillet’s reply, on the one hand, and Balog’s reply, on the other hand, we
have to say that the attempt of defenders of PCS to account for the first-person
perspective in terms of the third-person perspective is highly suspect.

This leads us now to Balog’s second point, and Mabaquiao’s
indictment that the debate between physicalists and anti-physicalists is at a
stalemate (or theoretical impasse). We may take this claim as implying
something akin to what in the freedom of the will literature has called a
“dialectical stalemate.” A dialectical stalemate, as described in that literature,

\begin{quote}
[a]rising when opposing positions within a reasoned
debate reach points at which each side’s argument
remain reasonable, even compelling, but in which
argument runs out; neither can rightly claim decisively
to have unseated the legitimacy of the other side’s point
of view.\textsuperscript{62}
\end{quote}

But is this the case between the physicalist and the anti-physicalist?
Has their debate reached a theoretical dead end? In reply, Balog has this to
say:

The anti-physicalist appeals to the anti-physicalist
principles, the physicalist appeals to the conceivable
ity of a purely physical world with phenomenality. Both can
show that, once granted that one core assumption, their
view is consistent and can rebut challenges from the
other side. Neither side can, without begging the
question against the opponent, show that the other’s
position is untenable. Where you end up depends on

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{61} Mabaquiao, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument,” 72.

\textsuperscript{62} See Joseph Keim Campbell, \textit{Free Will} (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), 62. But this seems to
run contrary to Balog’s characterization above.
what you take as your starting point. And, as far as I can see, neither side has a privileged start. What this means is that the physicalist can resist the Master Argument. The Master Argument is no more able to refute the PCS than the physicalist is able to refute the anti-physicalist principles. This is a stalemate, as far as this dialectic goes, but a stalemate is enough to make physicalism a viable option.63

To some extent, an anti-realist might agree with all of Balog’s statements except for the last part: that “stalemate is enough to make physicalism a viable option.”64 Yes, it is true to some extent that an anti-physicalist would not shift his/her position given PCS. Yes, it is true that physicalist might not refute anti-physicalist principles. Yes, physicalists might resist CMA. But even if we grant all these, given Balog’s premise that “[n]either side can, without begging the question against the opponent, show that the other’s position is untenable,”65 the burden is still on the physicalist.

As we have pictured the debate thus far, we have presented EGA as an argument for anti-physicalism. PCS, on the other hand, is the reply to EGA. Furthermore, CMA is a reply to PCS. Now granted that CMA could be resisted, and that there’s a theoretical impasse, does it follow that physicalism is viable? Well, it does not. If we grant Balog’s premise that “neither side can, without begging the question against the opponent, show that the other’s position is untenable,”66 then since PCS begs the question against anti-physicalist, given that we re-characterize EGA in terms of the gap between first-person and third-person perspectives, it follows then that the dialectical burden still resides on the physicalists. S/he needs to still show that PCS does not beg the question against EGA. So, it is not true that a dialectical stalemate would make physicalism a viable option. On the contrary, if there were such a stalemate, it would favor the anti-physicalist who argues for EGA.67

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References

64 Ibid., 20.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
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