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KRITIKE is the official open access (OA) journal of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Santo Tomas (UST), Manila, Philippines. It is a Filipino peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary, and international journal of philosophy founded by a group of UST alumni. The journal seeks to publish articles and book reviews by local and international authors across the whole range of philosophical topics, but with special emphasis on the following subject strands:

- Filipino Philosophy
- Oriental Thought and East-West Comparative Philosophy
- Continental European Philosophy
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The journal primarily caters to works by professional philosophers and graduate students of philosophy, but welcomes contributions from other fields (literature, cultural studies, gender studies, political science, sociology, history, anthropology, economics, inter alia) with strong philosophical content.

The word "kritike" is Greek from the verb "krinein," which means to discern. Hence, kritike means the art of discerning or the art of critical analysis. Any form of philosophizing is, in one way or another, a "critique" of something. Being critical, therefore, is an attitude common to all philosophical traditions. Indeed, the meaning of philosophy is critique and to be philosophical is to be critical.

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On Filipino Philosophy and Culture

An Interview with Romualdo Abulad, SVD

Emmanuel C. De Leon

Abstract: In this interview, the readers get the chance to listen to one of the most significant Thomasian philosophers, and undoubtedly, the most prominent Kantian scholar of our country. His passion for teaching, writing, and truth is very evident in this informal chat. The interviewer highlights the intellectual biography of Romualdo Abulad, beginning from his childhood in Lucban, Quezon, his accidental shift to philosophy, his awakening from his Thomistic slumber, and his love affair with Immanuel Kant. A bibliography of leading Thomasian philosophers can also be found at the end of the interview.

Keywords: Abulad, Filipino philosophy, interview, Thomasian philosophers

A Child of Lucban, Quezon

Emmanuel De Leon (Tagapanayam): Magandang araw po, Br. Romy! Salamat po sa pagpapaunlak ng isang interbyu sa gitna ng marami ninyong ginagawa. Unang-una po, narito po ako ngayon upang tanungin kayo ukol sa mga alaala ninyo ng klase ng pamimilosopiya sa Unibersidad ng Santo Tomas at baka sakali po ay mayroon tayong maiulat na kongkretong pamana nito sa uri ng pamimilosopiya na mayroong tayo ngayon sa ating bansa.


Romualdo Abulad: Ah, mukhang marami ano? Let me see. Saan ba ako magsisimula?

De Leon: Ilan po kayong magkakapatid?


De Leon: At kung tungkol naman po sa sistema ng edukasyon noon sa probinsiya, ano naman pong klase ang meron noon sa Lucban?


De Leon: Sinu-sino po silang tatlo?

Abulad: I mean, si Dr. [Emerita] Quito sa pilosopiya, si Dr. [Josephine] Pasricha pagdating sa … Pilosoper siya pero siya rin ang nagturo sa amin ng literatura. At magagaling ang aming mga teachers sa literature noon araw, kasama na si [Cristina] Jingjing Pantoja-Hidalgo. Ang gagaling ng mga teachers namin sa Ingles at literature noon. Pero, natatandaan kong si Pasricha ang nagturo sa akin ng literary criticism. And after that, parang alam ko na kung papaano ako magtuturo at kung paano ako magbabasa ng literature o ng essay. So, Pasricha was one of my most influential teachers. And then,
lately pagdating sa theology, itong ating Kardinal Chito Tagle ngayon. At least may tatlo akong [maituturing na impluwensiya]. And they are really first class.

**De Leon:** Noon pong kabataan ninyo sa elementarya at sekundarya, wala po kayong naging impluwensiya doon?


**On the UST College of Science and the Use of Intuition**


**Abulad:** Eh kasi pagkatapos ng High School ay parang lahat gusto ko eh [laughs]. Kaya noong tanungin ako ng tatay ko kung anong gusto kong kunin [curso sa kolehiyo], hindi ako makasagot agad. Kaya siya na mismo ang nagdesisyon para sa akin at sinabi ng “Magdodoktor ka!” [laughs] So, punteryang ang [pag-aaral ng] Medicine, kaya sa UST. Kaya tinulungan niya ako mag-enrol sa UST. So, sa College of Science ako nagsimula, ‘no?

**De Leon:** Ah, sa College of Science po pala kayo noong 1964?

De Leon: Tama po. Lalo na po sa probinsiya ng Quezon.

Abulad: Right! Lalo sa aming bayan. It is very famous place para sa mga priests.

De Leon: Opo. Halos lahat ng mga pamilya kailangang may kahit isang pari.

Abulad: Totoo ka dyan, totoo ka dyan. So, walang magawa [ang parents ko]. Ang nanay ko naman ... teachers kasi silang pareho. Sila ang main influence ko. Parang nasa dugo ang pagiging teacher sa amin. So, by nature yata, teacher ako [laughs]. You can take away from me everything, pero teacher pa rin ako. By nature, teacher ako; tapos ang influence pa ng parents ko nga. They were very good teachers.

De Leon: Pagkatapos naman po ng dalawang taon sa College of Science dito sa UST, nagshift naman po kayo sa Liberal Arts sa AB?


De Leon: Ah, pumasok po pala talaga kayo sa seminaryo? Dito po sa seminaryo natin sa UST?


De Leon: Philosophy na po ang kinuha ninyo pagkalabas ng seminaryo?


De Leon: So, parang aksidente lang po pala na napunta kayo sa philosophy — dahil lamang sa pagsunod ninyo sa paghimok ng isang Rector [laughs].

De Leon: Bago po dumating si Dr. Quito galing sa Switzerland, ano po ba yung sistema ng pilosopiya na mayroon sa UST?

Abulad: Eh kaya nga siguro ako naging 81 [sa philosophy noong nasa College of Science ako] [laughing out loud]. Pero, I consider myself as a good student—masunurin at ginagawa ko kung anong sabihin ng teacher—kaya natuto naman ako ng Thomistic philosophy. Talagang solid ang aking Thomistic background.

The Awakening from Dogmatic Slumber

De Leon: Noong dumating po si Dr. Quito sa UST, ano po kaagad ang itinuro niya sa inyo?

Abulad: Basta ang alam ko, suyang-suya na ang mga kaklase ko sa Scholastic philosophy. ‘Yun ang maaari mong tawaging “sick and tired.” So, noong dumating si Dr. Quito, parang fresh air [laughs]. Hindi lang naman si Dr. Quito ang dumating. Sa Ateneo, dumating sina Dr. Reyes, kaya phenomenology at existentialism ang naging foundation ng Ateneo. Tayo dito, Dr. Quito almost singlehandedly taught phenomenology at existentialism. Kaagad naging successful ang phenomenology at existentialism [dito sa UST]. And more than that, what I really like about Dr. Quito, almost every semester, may ibinibigay siya parating bagong philosophy sa amin. Noong matapos ako ng Bachelor of Philosophy, immediately pumunta ako sa Graduate School [ng UST]. At, lagi ako nag-enrol kay Dr. Quito. Every semester, may bago kaming [nakukuhang] philosophy sa kanya. Sa kanya ko nakuha ang structuralism, hermeneutics, Marcuse, Marx, Plotinus, at pati Oriental philosophy siya rin ang nagbigay sa amin. Name it! At sa kanya lahat iyan nanggaling.
De Leon: Itinuturing po ang mga nasabi ninyong kurso na “bago” noong panahon ninyo dito sa UST? Fresh air po talaga?

Abulad: Fresh air talaga ito! At, dahil fresh air nga, ‘yung stable system dito ay medyo nayanig. Ang laha tay kasi noon ay halos Tomista eh [laughs]. Solo si Dr. Quito na dumating at hindi naman nila magawang ma-ignore. So, “hero” itong si Dr. Quito noong panahong iyon.

De Leon: Pero, si Dr. Quito po, matatag din ang kanyang pundasyon pagdating sa sistemang Aristoteliko-Tomistiko.

Abulad: Kaya hindi siya mabasta-basta ng kahit na sino diyan. Sinong mga nandiyan [noong panahong iyon]? Sina Antonio Piñon, Salvador Gonzales, Ariston Estrada, mga diehard ang mga yan at mga tried and tested.

De Leon: ‘Yan po ba yung tinatawag na “be-all and end-all” pagdating sa Tomismo?


De Leon: Pero, mukha pong sa nabasa ko mula sa mga isinulat ninyong artikulo, hindi nyo naman po minamasama ang Tomismo, tama po ba?

Abulad: Ah, hindi.

De Leon: Sa inyo pong artikulong may pamagat na “Contemporary Filipino Philosophy” (Karunungan 5, 1998), nabanggit po ninyo ang dalawang mukha ng Tomismo sa Pilipinas. Ipinaliwanag po ninyo ang mayroong mabuti at masamang naidulot ang tradisyon ng pamimilosopiyang matatawag na Tomismo. Wika po ninyo,

Thomism in this country became indomitably stubborn that it started giving the impression that no truth could possibly lie outside of its pre-established framework. In my youth, I saw very clearly how intellectual doggedness could prove fatal to an aging philosophy (3).

Sa sumunod naman pong pahina, sinabi ninyo,
Indeed, one incontestable virtue of a solid background in the system of St. Thomas lies in its formative value. By “formative value” I refer to the fact that student who has an early exposure to Thomism tends to develop a well-organized and lucidly logical manner of thinking, which, to use Kant’s words, constitutes a *conditio sine qua non* for a competent philosophy (4).

Maaari po bang ipaliwanag pa, ano po bang nakikita ninyong positibo sa sistema ng Tomismo?

*Abulad:* Oo. Ganun nga. Kung hindi dumating si Dr. Quito, talagang suyang-suya na ang aking classmates [laughs].

*De Leon:* ‘Yun ang term ano po, “suyang-suya.” [laughs]

*Abulad:* Oo. ‘Yung para bang sa tuwing kakain ka ay pare-pareho ang ulam mo. Eh kahit na masarap ang ulam mo, kapag sobra naman, [nakasuya rin]. Tapos, in the end, sa ‘yo na hindi tama itong sinasabi mo. Parang naging objective tuloy masyado—right or wrong. At wala ka nang kalayaang mag-isip. Especially, you are young [during that time]. Bakit ganyan ang sitwasyon, eh philosophy ‘yan? You can see what kind of trap it could be, ano? Hindi lang ‘yan sa Tomismo maaaring mangyari. Analytic philosophy could be like that too. Kahit na ano. Marxism could be like that also. Lahat na sistema ay maaaring maging dogmatic, na parang sa ‘yan sa ‘yan lamang ang totoo at lahat ng labas dito ay mali. Ah, hindi na ‘yan uubra ngayon.

*De Leon:* Bukod po doon sa sinasabi ninyong tulong ng Tomismo sa pagiging sistematikong mag-isip, ano pa pong nakikita ninyong positibo dito?


Ang hirap kapag ikaw ay naging Tomista, you take everything said by St. Thomas hook, line, and sinker [laughs]. Si Santo Tomas ay hindi naman ganyan. Pinag-aaralan niya ang mga sciences ng kanyang panahon. Kaya nga nakacompose siyang ng *Summa Theologiae*—lahat ng mga ‘yun ay galeng sa mga sciences na available noong panahon niya. Kaya nga, open-minded si St.
Thomas. In fact, pwede mong sabihin na rebolusyonaryo siya—intellectual revolutionary siya—noong panahon niya. Tapos, ipepreso natin siya ng ganun?


Pangatlo, ngayon may encyclical si Pope Francis, itong *Laudato Si’*. Ang inirerekomenda niya ay itong “integral ecology.” Ano itong integral ecology na ito? It’s about time na magkasama-sama ang mga disciplines. Nandiyan ang environmental ecology, social and political ecology, at nandiyan din ang ethical ecology. Lahat ay dapat sama-sama iyan. Para sa akin, si Pope Francis ay isang postmodern na Santo Tomas at hindi medieval. Sabi ko nga, “integral ecology” is another name for philosophy. Hindi siguro conscious si Pope Francis doon. Pero, integral ecology is another name for philosophy. Philosophy is integral ecology. And the best example is still St. Thomas Aquinas. *Summa Theologiae* is the summary of all knowledge, which is not just a philosophy but also a theology.


**Teaching Philosophy**

**De Leon:** Nagtapos po kayo sa UST nang 1969. Tama po?

**Abulad:** Tama.

**De Leon:** Tapos, kaagad din kayong nagturo sa UST …

**Abulad:** Kinuha agad ako.

**De Leon:** Opo. Maaari po ba ninyong ibahagi kung sinong naghikayat sa inyong pumasok sa pagtuturo ng pilosopiya dito sa UST?
Abulad: Gusto ko talagang magturo. Intuition ang aking sinusunod. It comes from me, pero si Dr. Quito yung nag-suggest na “mag-apply ka!” Nag-apply naman ako at magagaling din yung mga kasabay kong nag-apply. Kilala ko na magagaling din sila. Pero, ako ang tinanggap [laughs].

De Leon: Ito na po ‘yung panahon ni Presidente Marcos di po ba?

Abulad: Oo.

De Leon: Anu-ano pong uring pakikibaka ang masasabi ninyo na ginawa ng mga Tomasino noong panahong iyon?


Kasama kami! Kasama kami! Lumalabas kami ng universidad [para makibaka]. Siguro ang administration ay medyo nag-ingat kaya medyo konserbatibo ang tingin. Pero, ang faculty at estudyante ay hindi ganoon. From day one of Martial Law, ayaw na namin [dito]. Nakikita naming hindi ito tama.

De Leon: And then, mas pinili po ninyo mag-Masterado sa Ateneo?

Abulad: Ah, kasi ang aking pilosoper ay si Kant. Nagsimula ako dito sa UST, of course narining ko na [ang turo ni] Dr. Quito. Dahil sa kanya kaya ako naimpluwensiyahang mag-Kant. Sa klase namin sa undergrad hanggang Graduate School, laging sabihin sa amin ni Dr. Quito, “Kapag wala kang Kant, may kulang sa iyong edukasyon.” Ang sitwasyon, dhalal palagay ko naman simula noong pumasok ako ng philosophy ay nag-aaral na akong mabuti; naintindihan ko naman yata ang mga itinuturo sa akin; at binigyan ni Dr. Quito ng pinakamahabang panahon ang pagtuturo kay Kant. And yet, sa lahat ng pinag-aralan ko ang pinakamalabo ay si Kant. Hindi ko siya maintindihan. “I Kant understand.” [laughs].


Abulad: Eh naintindihan ko si Hegel, pero hindi ko talaga maintindihan si Kant kabahit binigyan ni Dr. Quito ng pinakamahabang panahon ang pag-aaral namin kay Kant. Saka, isiniksik sa amin na kapag wala kang Kant ay kulang.
o may lacuna o gap ang iyong edukasyon. So, pinilit kong pag-aralan si Kant. After a while, narealize kong wala na akong matutunan tungkol kay Kant sa UST. At iyon ang nag-move sa akin papuntang Ateneo. Akala ko [laughs], mayroong magtuturo sa akin tungkol kay Kant doon. So, nag-enrol ako doon, especially kay Dr. Ramon Reyes, dahil siya ang supposedly Kant expert doon sa Ateneo. Pero, in the end, wala. Ako pa rin ang mag-aaral kay Kant—on my own. And it took me something like ten years bago ko nasabing kahit paano ay may nakuha na akong linaw kay Kant.

De Leon: Mayroon po bang malinaw na pagkakaiba sa sistema ng pamimilosopiya sa Ateneo at UST noong mga panahon na iyon?

Abulad: Siguro, hindi ako fair dito, pero dahil galing ako kay Dr. Quito eh. Then, pagdating ko sa Ateneo, walang makacompae sa kanya [laughs].

De Leon: Wala pa po ba noon sina Roque Ferriols at iba pang philosophers nila doon?


De Leon: Ganun po pala. Ano po ang sinulat ninyong thesis noon?

Abulad: Tungkol kay Kant din. Pinagcompare ko si Kant at si Shankara.

De Leon: Iyan din po yata ang inyong sinulat na disertasyon?


De Leon: So, andun na po pala noon sina Roque Ferriols.

Abulad: Sina Roque Ferriols, [Manuel] Manny Dy [Jr.], at [Leovino] Leo Garcia—they were already there.

De Leon: Umupo din po kayo sa klase ni Ferriols?

Abulad: Oo. Pero, Ingles ang language niya sa klase namin.
De Leon: Hindi pa po siya nagsisimulang magturo sa Filipino?

Abulad: Nagtuturo na siya sa Filipino, pero ang partikular naming klase ay Ingles ang gamit.

Further Studies


De Leon: Tatlong taon po kayo doon?

Abulad: Dalawa.

De Leon: Ito po yun panahon na nakatayo pa ang Berlin Wall di po ba?

Abulad: Oo. Kaya nga hindi ako nakapunta sa Königsberg dahil sakop yan ng Russia, ng mga komunista.

De Leon: Talaga pong na-in love po kayo kay Kant, ano po?
Abulad: I don’t know if that is “in love,” but I have no regrets. Basta ang nagtulak sa akin kay Kant ay hindi ko siya maintindihan [laughs]. At ‘yung mga naging guro ko, hindi naman nakatulong sa akin. I hope they could teach me more, pero hanggang doon lamang yata ang alam nila, ano? Kaya, sa katupus-tapusan, ako talaga ang nag-aral ng Kant.

De Leon: Sino pong pilosoper sa Germany ang nakadaupang-palad ninyo doon?


De Leon: Pagkatapos po ay lumipat kayo ng De La Salle College?

Abulad: All this time, nasa De La Salle na ako. Dito sa UST ay nagturo lamang ako ng mga dalawa o tatlong taon. Tapos, si Dr. Quito kasi ay na-pirate ng De La Salle [laughs]. Eh noon naman ay kaigtingan nga ng mga social movements dito. Kaya, maligaya na rin ako noong sabihin sa akin ni Dr. Quito na doon na lang din ako sa De La Salle. At, hindi na rin ako komportable sa atmosphere ng university, mas komportable ako sa mas “rebolusyonaryo.” [laughs]

De Leon: Sino po ang mga kasama ninyo sa departamento ng pilosopiya sa De La Salle noon? Ano pong tradisyong pilosopikal ang mayroon noon sa La Salle?

Abulad: Well, sa departamento, si Dr. Quito nga ang number one.

De Leon: Maituturing po ba ninyo siyang founder ng philosophy doon?


De Leon: Kung pagbabatayan po ang dami ng inyong sinulat kasama si Dr. Quito, talagang masasabi po na napakahaling inpluwensiya niya sa inyo.


De Leon: At hindi lang po siguro sa pagsusulat, noong panahon po ninyo, may kultura ng pagsusulat gamit ang wikang pambansa.


The Use of Filipino Language

Abulad: Oo. Meron pa, meron pa.

De Leon: Maaari po ba ninyong ilahad kung paano kayo nagsimulang magsulat ng mga pilosopikal na akda gamit ang wikang pambansa?

Abulad: Kasi unang-una ay Tagalog ako. Pagkatapos, marunong akong masulat. At syempre ang susulatin ko ay pilosopiya. At saka si Dr. Quito ang halimbawa ko. Si Dr. Quito ay Kapampangan, kaya ang Tagalog niya ay Kapampangan din [laughs]. Pero, nagsumikap siyang magsulat sa Filipino dahil naniniwala siyang dapat nating linangin ang sariling ating wika. Galing siya sa mga bansa na ang ginagamit ay sariling wika sa pagtuturo at pagsusulat. Dito sa atin, medyo tayo ... Ano bang term doon?

De Leon: Kolonyal?


De Leon: May rehiyunalismo po ba kayong napapansin?


De Leon: Pero, ang sinasabi po nilang wikang Filipino ay pinagsama-samang lengwahe sa Pilipinas.


De Leon: Nasa diksyunaryo pa lamang po yata [laughs].

Abulad: Oo.
De Leon: Nasabi po ni Dr. Alfredo Co sa kanyang artikulong “Doing Philosophy in the Philippines Fifty Years Ago and Fifty Years From Now,” na marami na ang pinanghinaan sa paggamit ng wikang Filipino sa gawaing pamimilosopiyang. Tama po ba ang sinasabi ni Dr. Co? Kung tama po, isa po ba kayo sa masasabing “pinanghinaan na ng loob”?


De Leon: Mahalaga ang parehong wika para sa inyo?


De Leon: Hindi po ba napapag-iwanan ang Tagalog sa takbo ng pamimilosopiyang sa ating bansa?


De Leon: Ano pong uri ng edukasyon ang inyong kinakalaban?

klase, dahil inaasahan mo ang guro na magturo. Pero, hindi naman nangangahulugan na sa lahat ng pagkakataon ay hindi bagay ang reporting. Istratehiya ‘yan ng pagtuturo eh. Kailangang creative ka. Kaya nga lang sa sistema ng edukasyon natin, nagtuturo tayo 90% dahil sa sweldo [laughs].

De Leon: Nagpapublish para lamang sa promotion [laughs].

Abulad: ‘Yan, tama yan.

De Leon: Br. Romy, gusto ko pong balikan ‘yung mga unang taon ninyo ng pagtuturo dito sa UST noong 1969. Sinu-sino po ang mga nakasama ninyo sa departamento ng pilosopiya noon? May departamento na po ba ng pilosopiya noon?

Abulad: Meron.

De Leon: Pwede po ninyong idescribe kung paano ito noon?

Abulad: Sandali ha! Kasi ang palagi ko lamang nakikita noon ay si Dr. Quito [laughs]. Pero, isa ang aming Faculty Room, dito sa 2nd floor [ng St. Raymund’s Building]. Katabi ‘yan ng opisina ng Dean. Lahat kami nandoon—literature, economics, lahat ng subjects; isa ang Faculty Room namin. Parang ang Department of Philosophy noon ay si Dr. Quito lamang ang natatandaan ko [laughs].

De Leon: Batang-bata po kayo noon. Ano pong istilo ninyo sa pagtuturo?


De Leon: Gumamit din po ba kayo ng wikang Filipino sa pagtuturo?


De Leon: Ano pong dahilan? Dahil po ba walang mga tekstong gagamitin?
Abulad: Isa na ‘yun. Pero, dahil din noong panahon ko nagsimula na rin ‘yung ayaw nila ‘yung paggamit ng TagLish. Gusto nila ‘yung Bilingual. Ang ibig sabihin ng bilingual noon, kung Tagalog ang gagamitin mo dapat Tagalog all the way; at kung Ingles ang gagamitin mo, Ingles all the way. And the reasoning is kapag pinagsama mo sila, TagLish ang ginawa mo, chopsuey, baluktot pareho.

De Leon: So, mas pinili nyo pong gamitin ang wikang Ingles?


De Leon: Mayroon po kayong sinulat na librong Introduction to Philosophy (2001) kasama si Dr. Ceniza?

Abulad: Yeah!

De Leon: Ano pong nag-udyok sa inyong gawin ‘yun? May pangangailangan po ba noon mga panahon na ‘yun?

Abulad: Actually, dito ‘yun [sa UST] nanggaling. Si Dr. Co ang nagbigay sa amin ng proyekto na ‘yan—two-volume work. Isinama ko lang si Dr. Ceniza dahil parang alam namin na he will be going soon—parang may ganoon na kaming premonition sa kanya. ‘Yung first volume ay tungkol sa Cosmology, Metaphysics, at ....

De Leon: Theodicy?


De Leon: Ano naman pong contents noong second volume?

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UST Philosophy Department Before and Today

De Leon: Mga panghuli na po [laughs]. Ah, kung inyo pong paghahambingin ang istilo ng pamimilosopiyanoon at ngayon, kasama na siguro ang hilig ng mga estudyante sa pilosopiya noon at ngayon, ano po ang inyong napapansin? Mayroon po bang pagkakatulad at pagkakaiba?


Alam mo noong nandoon ako sa Aparri [sa conference ng Philosophical Association of the Phillippines], just two weeks ago, nakaninig ako ng ibang parallel sessions. Napuna ko magagaling ‘yung mga batang faculty sa UST. At, maganda ang kanilang philosophical attitude. I think we are succeeding in developing our young faculty here. Balanse sila. Alam nila [ang kanilang pundasyon], pero hindi sila sarado. Hindi sila trapped. Postmodern sila [laughs].

De Leon: Ano pong nakikita ninyong challenges pa sa philosophy sa buong Pilipinas, in general, at sa paraan ng pamimilosopiya natin dito sa Unibersidad ng Santo Tomas?


**De Leon:** Sa palagay po ninyo wala pa niyang mayamang kultura ng matinong pag-aaway?

**Abulad:** Ah, medyo lumalakas na. Medyo nararamdaman ko na nagkakaroon na. So, I’m not worried about the future of philosophy. Kaya lang, ang dami-daming pumupunta sa psychology. Akala ng mga tao, psychology will save the world [*laughs*]. No, it’s philosophy that will change the world.

**De Leon:** Ano po bang advantage kung talagang may grasp ka sa philosophy bilang tao?

**Abulad:** Yeah! Well, on the higher level, walang magaling in any discipline na walang pilosopiya. The best artist has a philosophy, the best scientist has a philosophy.

**De Leon:** Tama po. Nabasa ko po na talagang sinabi ni Albert Einstein na kung ano siya ay dahil sa kanilang inaral na pilosopiya mula sa pagkabata. Hindi nila kinakalimutan ang inaral nilang pilosopiya simula elementary hanggang sa pagtanda nila.

**Abulad:** Yeah! If you are good in your discipline, you will eventually be doing the philosophy of it. Sa buhay, ganoon din. You are as good or as bad as your philosophy. Basahin mo si Marx, ang sinusulat niya ay tungkol sa economics pero isa siyang pilosoper; Si Amartya Sen …ang galing galing ni Amartya Sen, isa rin siyang pilosoper.

**De Leon:** Ano naman po ang inyong “huling habilin?” Hindi naman po pala “habilin,” ano pong inyong mga hamon sa mga batang namimilosopiya ngayon sa Pilipinas?

**Abulad:** Basta galingan ninyo! Kung anong ginagawa ninyo, hindi ko pilipilting maging Tomista kayo [*laughs*]. Kung ano ang ginagawa ninyo … At saka h’wag kayong matatakot sa wika. Kung magustuhan mo, halimbawa, si Kant, ang hamon sa iyo ay pag-aralan din ang wikang Aleman. H’wag kag matatakot sa mga ganoon ding hamon. In fact, walang madali sa philosophy. H’wag nating pipiliin ang isang pilosoper dahil lamang sa siya ay madali sa tingin natin. Pero, sa totoo lang, wala namang madaling pilosoper, ano?! Kung magustuhan mo ang isang pilosoper na ang wika ay French, o German,
INTERVIEW WITH ROMUALDO ABULAD


Abulad: Sige. Goodluck sa iyo. Ph.D. na ba ang tinatapos mo?

De Leon: Opo.

Abulad: Ano ang talagang topic na gusto mong sulatin?

De Leon: Naiisip ko pong idokumento ang mga pamana ng mga pangunahing Tomasinong pilosoper sa takbo ng pamimilosopiya sa Pilipinas.


De Leon: Maraming maraming salamat po ulit.

End of Interview

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On Filipino Philosophy and Culture

Assumptions Related to the Literary Persona in Demetillo’s Barter in Panay: An Epic

Leo Andrew B. Biclar

Abstract: Literature is the bearer of all the treasures in the world—that includes the Filipino’s ideology and philosophy, which are reflected in their own literatures. This literary analysis is a descriptive-qualitative research, employing the Marxist criticism in the assumptions related to the literary persona in Ricaredo Demetillo’s Barter in Panay. Specifically, the literary analysis unveils the relationship between the poet’s milieu and his literary persona, the socio-political phenomena revealed by the literary persona, and the critical views on race and power relations based on the construction of the poet’s literary persona. The findings reveal that Demetillo, by projecting himself in his literary persona, Datu Sumakwel as a capitalist, favors today’s capitalism and displays him to be a bourgeois proletarian. Through the assumptions regarding the literary persona in Demetillo’s literary epic, we can hear the voices of the folks in the past who were the ruling class, and the voices of the modern folks—both the ruling and the ruled in today’s world. The persona’s poetic voice comes from the memory of every Filipino who lives in the here and the now, who passes the folkloric and historical records of ideologies to the younger generations.

Keywords: Barter in Panay, literary criticism, literary persona, Marxist philosophy

Introduction

The Philippines is segmented socially, economically, culturally, and ideologically, with geography not even a functional common denominator. The archipelagic makeup of the country has brought about the heterogeneity of the people with the constituent individuals hardly representing anything like a majority, because every aspect and every part of
it claims to be members of majority, and not one claims to be part of the minority.

Persona as the core element in understanding Philippine literature may be regarded as the medium through which the perception, sensibility, and attitude toward the topics of the language arts, especially the longest and deepest roots of Philippine cultural history—the folk tradition.¹

In literary criticism, a *persona* refers to a person figuring in, for example, in a poem. It could be someone who may or may not represent the author himself. The persona is assumed to be the intellectual or emotional center who speaks, as it were, to the reader or an audience. It is the mirroring device, which the author used to speak in his own name, whose words and ideas may also be fictive so as to produce a consistency between a fictional character and the ideas that he expresses.²

The subject of this literary criticism is Ricaredo Demetillo’s *Barter in Panay* (1959), which he claims as the first true literary epic of the Philippines. *Barter in Panay* is a narrative material having been gathered “from the checkered history of the Filipinos themselves.” Ricaredo states in his foreword to its published version (1961) that his literary epic aims to “project racial urges and desires for freedom, righteousness, and justice for our people.” To fulfill this, he uses principally the myth of “Bornean settlement in Panay under the leadership of Datu Puti and Datu Sumakwel found in *Maragtas*” which contains, by his own description, “the semi-historical, semi-legendary accounts.”

One of the important literary devices employed by Demetillo in his literary epic *Barter in Panay* is the *persona*. In folk literature of known authorship like Demetillo’s, whose poetics are identifiable, the literary persona is not anonymous. The reader can identify the persona in the character of Datu Sumakwel, but his historical origin is difficult to determine for the author constructs him to sense the aspects of the world not only in the past and during the creation of his work, but also in the contemporary period. The author uses him to elucidate the less known to be known, and to discuss tangibly the less intangible in relation not only to his own perception, but to the reader’s as well. It is difficult to determine what kind of people he was addressing at the time he composed his work, and what cultural conditions he merely presupposed. Thus, it is the readers/audience who would assume the matters depending on their perception and reception of the author’s work. In effect, Demetillo’s literary epic leaves a lot unsaid yet expects his readers to know what he does not say. In this regard, Hornedo affirms that the identification of the speaker or persona in folklore and perhaps in a

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² Ibid.
literary epic helps in the reconstruction of the social milieu which produced the material, and hopefully broadens the reader’s understanding of the attitudes and social contexts of the literary constructs. Thus, an attempt to identify the persona in the literary epic or any form of literature is empirical, a critical need, and a pedagogical prerequisite to fully appreciate what the work of art is saying.

Hernando showed a historical evidence of Philippine society’s stratification along lines of power and wealth that created a plurality of social interests and, therefore, of social perspective. With this declaration, it can be assumed that Demetillo as the poet and creative artist of folk literature is addressing his work to a particular society. He uses his characters to suit his purpose of presenting life around him as he sees it. In the process, he sees his contemporary world, and from that vantage point, he speaks through his key characters or creates characters who speak for themselves. In this way, Datu Sumakwel as Demetillo’s persona is born to bring his audience to the different lenses and scenic angles and social stratification of his world and the Filipinos represented in Barter in Panay.

Though a lot can be said about the identification of literary persona, this researcher shall limit its identity as class persona for the present purpose of the study.

**Objectives of the Study**

The study aims to draw assumptions on the characteristics of a literary persona in Ricaredo Demetillo’s literary epic Barter in Panay. Specifically, this literary analysis sought to unveil: (1) the relationship between the poet’s milieu and his literary persona in the text; (2) the socio-political phenomena reveals by the literary persona; and (3) the critical views on race and power relations based on the construction of the poet’s literary persona.

**Theoretical Framework**

This literary analysis is anchored mainly on Marxist criticism and literary theory, grounded on the economic and cultural theory of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels, which are summarized by Abrams in the following contexts:

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
(1) the evolving history of humanity, of its social relations, of its institutions, and of its ways of thinking are largely determined by the changing mode of its “material production”—that is, of its overall economic organization;
(2) historical changes in the fundamental mode of production effect changes in social class structure, establishing in each era dominant and subordinate classes that engage in a struggle for economic, political, and social advantage; and
(3) human consciousness is constituted by an ideology—that is, the beliefs, values, and ways of thinking and feeling through which human beings perceive, and recourse to which they explain, what they take to be reality. An ideology is, in complex ways, the product of the position and interests of a particular class. In any historical era, the dominant ideology embodies, and serves to legitimize and perpetuate, the interests of the dominant economic and social class.

Marxism as a radical materialist philosophy claims that everything in the world that is not material is a consequence or product of some mode of material reality. In the world of humans, what is fundamental is the production and distribution of goods. The production, the social relations, and the institutions which arise because of economic forces structure society into a dominant exploitative class called capitalists, who own the material means of production and distribution, and the proletarian or wage-earning class. This social structure is not a permanent condition but a result of the present era of capitalist economic organization. If the present economic organization is changed, a new social order will emerge. It is with the conviction that the present capitalist era is susceptible to change that revolutionary Marxist ideas and praxis have been actively and aggressively promoted. In the context of promoting that change, Marxist criticism finds its role, for it has an explicit political agenda. It is on this philosophy that the assumptions of the literary persona in Demetillo’s Barter in Panay was conceptualized.

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Research Methodology

The study uses mainly the descriptive-qualitative type of research, employing Marxist criticism focusing on the literary persona used by Demetillo in his *Barter in Panay*. Likewise, the critical analysis is made by employing the close reading approach, wherein the text speaks itself to the reader, and the latter understands its contexts based on the significations of his/her experiences.

Results and Discussion

The Plot of *Barter in Panay*

*Barter in Panay* constitutes Book I of an epic trilogy centered on Datu Sumakwel. Book II is entitled “The Heart of the Emptiness is Black,” which covers the tragic relationship between Kapinangan, wife of Datu Sumakwel, and Gurong-gurong, leading to the killing of the latter by the chief. Book III, Demetillo said, would deal with Datu Sumakwel’s romance with Alayon, a chastened Kapinangan. But it was never written. In this context, *Barter in Panay* presents only a part of the entire epic text that articulates Demetillo’s construct of Bornean, as well as of Aeta identity.

Demetillo’s *Barter in Panay* is a literary epic composed of eleven cantos.

**Canto I.** The opening lines in Canto I establish the position of the persona of the epic, a Bornean “we” (the nearly consistent point of view shifts notably in Canto VIII and X, which take the perspective of the Aetas). Chronologically, the persona is positioned “full ten years from now… / Since at the Siruagan Creek we anchored,” recalling their flight “From far Brunei, where Makatunaw grasped / A despot’s sceptre and a murderer’s sword.” The use of “we” suggests a communal telling of the story, but the line “We struck the rabid billows with our oars,” suggests a male speaker, possibly a maharlika brave (“Ten datus sailed together with their wives; / And with them kindred maharlika braces…/ And many slaves…”). As early as Canto I, Datu Puti speaks of the Bornean offer to the Aetas to barter the Panay land for gold:

Chief Mariudo, lay aside your bow …
Grant to us strangers hospitality:
Water and food for bodies cramped with toil
And, most of all, barter us land for gold …
Canto I also presents the readers with the first descriptions of the Aetas, as well as of pirates. Chief Marikudo demands a hostage as a guarantee of the Borneans’ good conduct while he is away consulting with his elders about the proffered barter. Paibare, a young Bornean boy, offers to go with Chief Marikudo as his hostage.

**Canto II.** Canto II describes the Bornean community in a new territory, with their social structure intact. It devotes many stanzas to Datu Sumakwel’s wife, Kapinangan, who is twenty years younger than the chief, and is “unfulfilled with child.”

**Canto III.** Canto III features and names all ten datus who “sat in the council and debate / Presided by great Datu Puti.” Maliksi, their interpreter and guide, relates to the council the result of his surveillance work on Chief Marikudo and his tribe in Sinugbuhan, the Aeta settlement: “I saw nearly a thousand warriors there, / Twice that our number … all armed / With spears and arrows tipped with poisoned darts.” Further, Maliksi reports that he sees the amazement of the Aetas at the glitter of Paibare’s clothing and ornaments. Maliksi assures the datus that Paibare is treated well by the Aetas. Paibare endears them with his natural kindness. Paibare’s condition in the hands of the Aetas figures importantly in the decision the datus would make on how they would negotiate the barter.

**Canto IV.** Canto IV is a continuation of the preceding canto with focus on the discussion among the datus, Datu Sumakwel (who declares Panay “the land our gods have promised”), Paiburong (who reminds the other datus that “The black tribe holds the true deed to this land”), and Bangkaya (who cautions them against Datu Sumakwel’s aide, Gurong-Gurong’s suggestion that “we can seize, with boldness, all this land”).

**Canto V.** In Canto V, Datu Puti and Datu Sumakwel stay after the dispersal of the others from the council meeting. Datu Puti tells Datu Sumakwel that he feels the strain of being a leader because of his old age. Thus, he wishes Datu Sumakwel to relieve him of the leadership of the group for he would go back to where he buried his first wife in Brunei. Datu Puti and Datu Sumakwel make up their minds “About the terms that we shall ask the blacks / And what to barter in return for land.” Here, Datu Puti reminisces the “situation of Brunei,” particularly the tyrant Makatunaw’s ruthlessness which resulted in the murder of Datu Puti’s first wife.

**Canto VI.** Canto VI relates Datu Sumakwel’s musings about Rishi Lakhsman’s prophecy “That on this island I shall leave a name.” Rishi’s vision includes allusions to subsequent Filipino heroes like Lapu-Lapu, Rizal, and Mabini. Rishi’s prophecy is a revelation of the Filipinos’ future under Datu Sumakwel’s leadership. The canto then digresses to Datu Sumakwel’s thoughts on Kapinangan.
Canto VII. In Canto VII, Gurong-Gurong is “the butt of jests,” despite the fact that “many younger braves approved his plan,” because “they all agreed Sumakwel different / … marveled at his gift / To sway the datus with his arguments.” Envious, Gurong-Gurong entertains the thoughts of being “in Sumakwel’s place” and decides to seduce Datu Sumakwel’s wife in his ruse to usurp leadership “not on the throne but in his wife’s embrace.”

Canto VIII. Canto VIII shifts the focus to Chief Marikudo and the Aeta settlement where the council deliberates “On what the people from the seas desire / That we sell land to them along the coast.” The Aetas assess the might of the Borneans and argue about the wisdom of driving away “These men, intruders on these coasts of ours,” as Girum has suggested. Chief Marikudo warns them of the possibility that the Borneans might “… burn our settlement / And massacre our tribe.” Upon hearing this, Uran suggests “we should barter land. / This island is quite large and we can live / As much up in the highlands as on the coasts.” Polpulan, Chief Marikudo’s father, recounts a fortuneteller’s horoscope: “You will not die until brown strangers come / To barter gold for your patrimony.” He advises them to “Take gold and let the will of gods be done.” Girum is later killed for insulting Chief Marikudo’s father for his alleged cowardice and senility. Heeding the warning of the babaylan (“Blood defiles this place. / Two ghosts flit over us and, unappeased, / They will cast their evil spells”). Chief Marikudo seeks the other chiefs’ advice. He proclaims: “… Let us all find / A new home in the hills …”

Canto IX. In Canto IX, with the literary epic focused back on the Borneans, Gurong-Gurong subtly flirts with Kapinangan. Paibare, the hostage, returns with the news that “Chief Marikudo promises to grant / Us all the coastal plains in exchange for gold!” Soon the Bornean and the Aeta elders meet to confirm the terms of the pact: a salakot and one large batya, both of solid gold, in exchange for the coastal plains. The Aetas retain the hills, including “an outlet to the sea,” for which they will relinquish their right to their houses in their settlement.

Canto X. Canto X contains two extended monologues by Chief Marikudo and his wife about their life stories, upon the urging of Datu Puti in the opening scene of the canto.

Canto XI. In Canto XI, Chief Marikudo begs Datu Puti to relate his own life story. Datu Puti’s narrative recalls the Borneans’ first home, Brunei, and again, the ruthless reign of King Makatunaw that led the ten datus and their families to flee to Panay. Datu Puti states his reflections on their new land where, “we’ll carve destiny / Commensurate with our hope of righteousness” and invites “Chief Marikudo [to] drink with me a pledge.” The literary epic ends with Datu Sumakwel and Kapinangan in an intimate embrace; however, Kapinangan’s thoughts are of young Gurong-Gurong.
Demetillo employed some structural features learned from Western literatures in writing *Barter in Panay*.

The opening canto starts with the landing at Siruagan River and the encounter with Chief Marikudo. Actually, the whole action starts with the tyranny and pillage of King Makatunaw as told by Datu Puti in Canto XI, of which tyranny, all the datus, especially Datu Puti, were the victims. Such technique by the author is a device called *in media res*, where the narration of the story starts from the midpoint rather than the beginning. This creates a nostalgic effect on the narrativity of Datu Sumakwel as the persona of the literary epic. In Canto X, Marikudo narrates his youthful exploits, ending with his marriage to Maniwantiwan. Both episodes in Canto X and Canto XI are told at the banquet in the same manner as the adventures of Ulysses are told by the hero himself to his audience of nobles at the palace of King Alcinous, father of Nausicaa. The episodes are included to complete the panoramic action of the literary epic to signify that a whole people, not just a handful of datus, are involved. By these means, Demetillo lets his contemporary audience take in the action as it were by making them feel involved in it, which, while having taken place in the past, still had strong ethical and social implications in Demetillo’s milieu. The author tries to achieve the same purpose especially in Canto VI where Datu Sumakwel tells of his consultation with Rishi Lakshman, as in Virgil’s epic where Aeneas, in conversation with his father Anchises in the underworld, sees the glorious deeds of his descendants, culminating in the achievement of Augustus Caesar himself. In this canto, the future of the Filipino people would be revealed to Datu Sumakwel in dramatic prophecies regarding the Filipino struggles for liberty and the rise of leaders, both political and artistic, to give luster to the national destiny. Highly entertaining narratives, the modifications add body to the whole epic structure and increase dimensions to the heroic characters of Datu Puti and Datu Sumakwel, as well as their lesser companions, sharers of a magnificent destiny. Thus, all movement of a large migration is given form and evoked by concrete details of which the barter is only the culminating point.

**Literature and Its Society**

Literature is not simply a mimetic discourse of or about nature; rather, nature and society imitate literature. Hence, literature is both mimetic and pragmatic. In a sense, literature does not only connect with the society by being its product, mirror, and source of moral end, but literature also registers the details of society’s internal conflicts especially when the society like ours—the Filipino society—is stratified by economic inequality and/or segmented by cultural differences. Looking at the period to which a literature
was produced, the tone and texture of the text significantly identifies the interests of a class or group for whom, about whom, and/or against whom the literature was created. Authors like Demetillo identify in their works the interests they write for, as well as the point of view from which they look at the world they write about.

It is known historically that at least the larger parts of the Philippines in the Tagalog and Visayan regions were socially stratified before the arrival of the Spaniards. A similar stratification has also been noted among the unhispanized Filipinos who, one may imagine, have carried into the 20th century some reflection of what they were before and during the colonization of much of our country by Spain and later by the United States of America. Instead of losing their stratification and becoming a homogeneous society, and despite the concerted effort to create a homogenously Christian society, the colonized parts of the country have become more clearly stratified, both economically and politically. The Americans came after the Spaniards with the promise of egalitarian democracy. But while Spain culturally segmented the Filipinos by religion, the Americans resegmented the Filipinos by education. If at the inception of Hispanization, the conversion to Christianity paved the way to certain political and social privileges, during the American period, the fast absorption of American cultural ideals became the key to political and social positions. It is clear that Filipinos have always been, in general, socially and culturally stratified and consequently have been more or less plagued over time by the consequences of class disparities and conflicts of interests.

Demetillo and His Society

Hornedo declares that a piece of literature documents the world and the worldview of its author—and in the case of folk literature, the world and the worldviews of the society that created it or carried it on by tradition. The assumption is meaningfully true in Demetillo’s literary epic. As a document of the world of the author (author-society), Demetillo’s Barter in Panay records the interests existing in and experienced by him, particularly by the people in the real world of its origin. In other words, the assumption construed is that Demetillo and the people in his society share their common experiences and interests expressed and recorded through a form of literature.

As a record of the worldviews of the author or as a social segmental author as Demetillo projects through his persona, Barter in Panay indicates the

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8 See Hornedo, Culture and Community in the Philippine Fiesta and Other Celebrations.
9 Ibid.
attitudes and values assumed to be favorable to him and unfavorable to the people or class (particularly King Makatunaw, and either Datu Sumakwel or Chief Marikudo and the class they represent) detrimental, or at least inimical, to his interests. However, Datu Sumakwel, as Demetillo’s literary persona, belongs to both classes—the ruling and the ruled. Assuming that Datu Sumakwel is a member of the ruling class, he represents the Filipino in general and this allegorically legitimizes his aspirations of a just, equal and a liberal society, and disdains whatever puts him in an unfavorable light that may hinder the attainment of his aspirations for his society. To this, he projected the Aeta as the “othered” by describing their skin color—black. Datu Sumakwel, as a persona of the ruling class is solemn, almost humorless and is concerned with legitimizing his assertions for the good of his people. He legitimizes his own interests and that of the Borneans in general by bartering the land with the Aetas for gold.

In the same manner, it can also be assumed that Datu Sumakwel represents the ethos, the voice of the Filipino people, particularly the ruled class. He upholds the dignity or praises the abilities of his own kind, like what he did in the characters of Datu Puti and Chief Marikudo as individuals who are ruling in their tribe. He let the two heroes narrate their own tales (Canto X and XI). Consciously, the persona showed a high reverence to the royalty and nobility of his own class as well as the values of morality they upheld. In doing so, he did it at the expense of those who are outside of his class and/or a member of his own class, that is by dishonoring King Makatunaw as a ruler who caused their subjugation, forcing them to flee and to seek freedom and justice elsewhere. Likewise, he stratified their rule and power in Panay by buying the land from its rightful owners, the Aetas and driving them away to the uplands.

It is also assumed that it is possible for Demetillo, who may represent a member of another class, to write in favor of another class either because he is caused to do so or because, by cultural subjugation, he has come to identify his own interests as a social critic with what he particularly sees as the malpractices and/or immoralities of his society. In this case, it is clear from a moral perspective that the ultimate class origin of the literature is one in whose interest is slanted.

It is also worthy to note that the composition of folk in Philippine history has changed. In precolonial times, folk excluded the datu and sultan, even the maginoo classes, for they were the ruling class in old Philippine society. However, during the colonial era, many of the datus and maginoo fell from power and became reduced to the status of the common people or folk—the classless individuals. In effect, Datu Sumakwel as Demetillo’s literary persona becomes one of the forebearers of these downgraded classes. Thus, Barter in Panay can be classified as folk literature, a literature of the ruling
class in a form of literary epic, eulogizing the virtues of the once ruling class of our society. We thus see literature as the voice of power—seeking to legitimize the ideals, virtues, and philosophical views regardless of whose voice articulates it—and in this instance, it is Demetillo, an educated folk.

The Socio-Political Phenomena Revealed by the Poet’s Persona

What we have to learn from Demetillo as a nationalist-socialist critic in our time is that the poet and/or the critic, with his intellectual knowledge, can operate with ease and freedom what he could use as materials for his possession as a poet. Demetillo writes with the primary purpose of giving pleasure, of sharing memorable experience communicated through a medium of language. He has the gift or talent to identify and isolate what is memorable in his own experience or in the experience of others, which he imaginatively made his own. Demetillo turns these memorable experiences from abstract into concrete, so when we hear or read them, we find them suitably expressing our own pleasurable experiences. Here, our pleasure is not of recognition but of discovery. In any case, to use T.S. Eliot’s words, there is in the literary production of Demetillo “the communication of some new experience, or fresh understanding of the familiar, or the expression of something we have experienced but have no words for, which enlarges our consciousness and refines our sensibilities.”

Thus, the twin pleasures of recognition and of discovery which literature offers lead inevitably to something of even greater value—an enlargement of consciousness, a refinement of sensibility, or to put it in another way, a better and deeper understanding of ourselves.

We are living in the most terrifyingly chaotic epoch of human history. Daily events shatter our ease and complacency; often, after continuous tremors, our responses are deadened into indifference. The events in our midst accent our feelings of uncertainty and our alienation from the people around us whose values are often totally different from ours. Newspapers, the radio, television, and movies around the world force us on surface values that immobilize or coarsen our sensibility as human persons. And these become the concern of the artist of every age. Mass media affect man with a culture that is beneath the level of human intellect and morality, degrade man to a mere organ motivated by sex, a mere semi-mechanical, semi-physiological organism devoid of any divine spark, of any absolute value, of

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anything noble and sacred. All these debasements of morality make man their end victims. In the urban societies of the contemporary world, thousands lead lives of waste and quiet despair. We feel the bluffs leading into the endless abysms of the spirit, stutteringly instructed by frenzied years and decades of violence, horror, and death. All these terrorize us almost daily and deaden our individual sensibility to the point where evil no longer arouses our indignation and good, no longer arouses us to commitment, because many of us feel that it is futile to do so. This picture of Philippine society today is the same picture that provoked Demetillo in the creation of his work.

At the present, the country is passing through a crisis, which puts walls between the people and the government systems and officials, metaphorically and literally. The cases of then President Arroyo, the money laundering scam of Ex-Chief Justice Renato Corona, and the scam of Senators Enrile, Revilla, Estrada, and the like depict the segmental crises of the Filipino values system. As a nation, there are important human values that emanate even people from prison-vigilance against corruption and exploitation, human dignity that deserves better than scurvy treatment, righteous will to bring the goods of the world to everyone. It remains true that the 21st century man will still be subjected to the tensions and the meaninglessness of existence, which in the modern world, crowded and alienating city life, force many to live.

Demetillo, through his Barter in Panay, evokes the emotions and the attitudes that make up an intellectual and aesthetic milieu. His imagination as a modern man—a poet and a critic—tries to find the oblique images that enable Filipinos to confront the gorgons of life’s reality. Time will come when Demetillo and other artists will tilt precariously in the night because of age; however, their works still keep their vigil through the readers/audience, who will defy the darkness of society while creating the proud emblems of human dignity.

At this time, the Filipino people appreciate the narratologies of their fictive and checkered history and continue to aspire for the ideals and cultural values of their ancestors. Though acculturation with the global through education, mass media, and travel have certainly drifted a lot of them into the mainstreams of the modern world, there are still in the Filipino masses a resilient and adaptive Datu Sumakwel, Datu Puti, and Chief MariKudo who always remind them of their true Filipino identity, values, morality, and aspirations, such as the desires for freedom, righteousness, and justice. And they should embrace these traditional values that treat all humanity equal regardless of their social stratification.

In totality, the tones and mood of the literary persona in Demetillo’s literary epic are those of the ruling class. Datu Sumakwel is a distinguished member of the ruling class who projects their attitudes, worldviews, values,
and mores. Demetillo belongs to an elite and bourgeois proletariat, a class which is equal to his literary persona Datu Sumakwel. Through his literary persona, Demetillo moralizes or legitimizes his control over his society. He uses Datu Sumakwel as a didactical element to enshrine his class, entertain his readers, and criticize other characters, groups, or situations. As member of the ruling class himself, Demetillo is not capable of exposing himself and his literary persona to ridicule by telling nasty stories about him. Demetillo is incapable of speaking against the members of his own class who behave badly. Therefore, Demetillo’s literary epic projects not only a tale of the Bornean settlement in Panay Island, but it is created to generally project the acts of the people—the act of the ruling class who possessed the idealistic and heroic characters. Thus, Demetillo’s Barter in Panay is characterized as the literature of the ruling class.

The Critical Views on Race-Power Relations

In the analysis of Demetillo’s representations of the Aeta and the Bornean identities, it is assumed that he was not able to establish himself as a true Filipino socialist of his time. He represented himself in the persona of Datu Sumakwel, a Bornean and a ruling class. This signifies that Demetillo was conscious of the social class of his literary persona who tries to speak on his behalf, because he himself belonged to the elite and was a bourgeois-proletarian. As a Bornean, the persona criticizes the Aeta when:

Chief Marikudo grabbed the salakot / And crowned his head with it – the fit exact. / The gold was startling contrast to his skin. / We dared not laugh, however, at the sight. (Stanza 34, Canto 9).

Daring not to laugh signifies a mockery and discrimination between his race and the Aetas in terms of awareness of the self, skin color, and most importantly of the greediness projected on the “blacks.” In effect, Demetillo projects the ruling class by favoring the Bornean over the Aeta.

Just like Rizal of his time, an ilustrado who critically depicted the Spanish subjugation of the Filipinos in his novels, El Filiusterismo and Noli Me Tangere, Demetillo shows the Filipinos’ weaknesses and ugliness of character through his description of the Aeta identity. Thus, he legitimizes the superiority of the Bornean both in color and values. In the same way, Demetillo is comparable to that group of Filipino ilustrados/elites who gathered together as a revolutionary group against the Spanish government when, in fact, they are not proletarians.
Implicitly, Demetillo by projecting himself in Datu Sumakwel as a capitalist, favors today’s capitalism in his own land. The foreigners serve as the capitalists who buy the prime resort and tourist land from the Aeta—the natives in Boracay and/or El Nido, Palawan. The capitalists transform the lands into resorts while the erstwhile owners are driven out to the margins of the society. In a sense, Demetillo is considered not a serious/true proletarian critic but, instead, a bourgeois proletarian because he favors the Bornean who represents the capitalists, who belong to the same social stratification as he.

Demetillo’s view of the social stratification between the Aeta and the Bornean is a familiarization of the present situation not only in Panay, but in the country in general. In Panay, the capitalists buy the land at a lower/cheaper cost from the natives. In return, they build commercial establishments like hotels, subdivisions, and resorts. The growth of the Zobel-Ayala Land corporations and the sprouting of Henry Sy’s SM Supermalls all over the Philippines are examples of capitalism spreading in the country. While they bring significant economic development to the land, they are either driving away people or hiring them as workers, thus, subjugating them in their own land or territory.

But what has happened to the natives? Since they sold their lands, they lost their patrimony. Obviously, the money did not last long in their hands and they become nomads. Truly, the natives have become victims of capitalists. In some establishments, the natives serve as the employees of the capitalists, yet they are projected as the slaves in their own land. In addition, the Aetas are hired as manufacturers, utilizing their own materials, but they are paid less by the capitalists. Relatively, Datu Sumakwel as the forefather of the Filipino nation, is a metaphoric figure of the Filipino today.

**Conclusion**

What Demetillo, as the author of a fictional work, or what Datu Sumakwel, as his persona, narrates is held to constitute “pretended” assertions of his ideologies, which are understood by his audience. In this view, it is Datu Sumakwel and not the author himself who is committed to the truth of ideologies that he asserts. It is assumed, moreover, that within the frame of a fictional world, literature through the persona created by the author imitates reality by representing in a verbal medium the setting, actions, utterances, and interactions of human beings. Thus, through the persona created by the author, we can respond emotively with our shared experiences and, perhaps, our own utterances.

Through the assumptions regarding the literary persona in Demetillo’s literary epic, we can conclude that Datu Sumakwel carries the voices of the folks in the past who were the ruling class, and the voices of the
modern folks—both the ruling and the ruled in today’s world. Thus, we hear the voice of our ancestors—the past—and its relativity to the present, its timelessness. The persona’s poetic voice comes from the memory of Datu Sumakwel, and every Filipino who lives in the here and the now who passes on this account as a folkloric or historical record of ideologies to the younger generations. The voice in Demetillo’s literary creation depicts a Panay-anon himself and the Filipinos as a whole, and sketches the community beyond the spatial and projects itself into the future that will continue and preserve his legacy and his race. It yields insight into the literary epic’s own preservation and function. In this part, Demetillo’s role as a writer-critic of his time brings not only the historical aspects, but also the class consciousness of the Filipinos through his literary work. His motives as a social critic are constructed through the representations of his literary persona and his relation to it, his literary text, and his society.

The picture of the society today imitates literature through the character representations, situation or plot, and the literary persona of Demetillo’s Barter in Panay. Demetillo’s projection of Datu Sumakwel as an aristocrat and capitalist affirms the assumption that he legitimizes his own race as an elite and bourgeois proletarian whose ideologies and interests of power are further strengthened. Datu Sumakwel upholds the dignity and abilities of his own kind. Notably, Demetillo as the voice represented by Datu Sumakwel does these at the expense of those outside his class—the Aeta. Demetillo should have written his literary epic with the aim of projecting the race-power relationships of the Bornean and the Aeta, so that the later generations—today’s natives, the true-blooded Filipinos—would be illuminated and moved to seek freedom, righteousness, and social justice from those who marginalized them in Philippine society. Thus, the projected result would be: today’s natives will no longer be yesterday’s visitors.

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On Filipino Philosophy and Culture

Ang Pilosopiya ni Emerita S. Quito

Leslie Anne L. Liwanag

Abstract: This paper is a study on how a female professor of philosophy became a leading figure in the development of Filipino philosophy. Emerita Quito, of De La Salle University, is probably the greatest philosopher in contemporary Philippines. This paper contains the following substantive parts: 1) her theoretical and praxiological foundation; 2) her reflective thoughts on Filipino philosophy; 3) her method of philosophizing; 4) her praxiology; and 5) her views about the Philippine society. This paper concludes with a discussion on how her thoughts impacted Filipino philosophy.

Keywords: Quito, manifestations of Filipino philosophy, theory and praxiology, discourse

Introduksyon

Mithiin ng papel na itong maibahagi ang mahahalagang aspekto at puntos ng kaisipan ng pilosopong Pilipina at propesor na si Emerita S. Quito (1929), na hindi maitatatuwang nagkaroon ng malaking ambag sa pag-aaral ng kairalan ng Pilosopiyan Pilipino. Gayunman, hindi naging lihim sa kanya ang kakulangan sa paglaganap ng kahalagahan at kakapusan sa pokus ng larangang ito sa bansa. May layunin ang pag-aaral na itong matukoy ang mga puntos ng pamimilosopiya at diskurso ni Quito upang mapalakas at mapalinang ang araling cultural at araling Pilipino, sa pamamagitan ng tekstwal na proyektong ito ukol sa pilosopiya ng isang lokal na pants.

Intelektwal na Talambuhay ni Quito

Ipinanganak si Quito noong ika-11 ng Setyembre, 1929 sa San Fernando, Pampanga. Bilang bunso sa magkakapatid, hindi ipinagkait sa


Ang mga Obra ni Quito

May dalawang listahang natagpuan ang mananaliksik na maituturing na pinakakomprehensibong mga tala ng mga nailathalang obra ni Quito: una, ang isa sa mga apendiks ng tesis na may pamagat na Ang Kaganapan ng Isang Dalubhasa sa Pilosopiya na nasa Foronda Collection ng Aklatan ng Pamantasang De La Salle, at pangalawa, ang pinakahuling curriculum vitae ni Quito na kasalukuyang nakatago sa Departamento ng Pilosopiya nang magretiro siya sa Pamantasang De La Salle. Gawa ng isa si Quito sa mga unang nagsulong na maging sentro sa pananaliksik ang Pamantasang De La Salle, tunay na napakarami ang kanyang naging

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¹ Janet Jimenez, et. al., Ang Kaganapan ng Isang Dalubhasa sa Pilosopiya (Thesis, Manila: De La Salle University, 1990), 1.

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publikasyon. Sa katunayan, taong 1990 noong gawaran siya ng Pamantasang ito ng isang *festschrift* ("festival of writings") na may titulong *A Life of Philosophy: A Festschrift in Honor of Emerita S. Quito* na naglalaman ng kanyang piling-piling mga publikasyon.

Kasama mismo si Quito sa lupong pumili at sumala sa mga *monograph* at artikulong isinama sa *festschrift*, kaya minarapat na gamitin ito bilang prinsipyo sa pagpapasyang maging bahagi ang mga artikulong kabilang sa kabuoang aklat:

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<td>Ang Pilosopiya sa Diwang Pilipino&lt;br&gt;Ang Kasaysayan ng Pilosopiya&lt;br&gt;Oriental Roots of Occidental Philosophy&lt;br&gt;Four Essays in the Philosophy of History&lt;br&gt;Lectures on Comparative Philosophy&lt;br&gt;Structuralism: A General Introduction&lt;br&gt;Reflections on the Death of God&lt;br&gt;Robert Ardrey: Scientist or Philosopher&lt;br&gt;The Historical Concept of Being and Truth&lt;br&gt;The Philosophy of the Renaissance: Nicolas of Cusa&lt;br&gt;Yoga and Christian Spirituality&lt;br&gt;The Role of the University in Changing Women’s Consciousness&lt;br&gt;Ang Kayamanan ng Wikang Filipino&lt;br&gt;Process Philosophy: An Introduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981-1988</td>
<td>Homage to Jean-Paul Sartre&lt;br&gt;Three Women Philosophers&lt;br&gt;Ang Pilosopiya: Batayan ng Pambansang Kultura&lt;br&gt;An Existentialist Approach to Ecumenism&lt;br&gt;Teaching and Research of Philosophy in the Philippines&lt;br&gt;Values as a Factor in Social Action&lt;br&gt;Structuralism and the Filipino Volksgeist&lt;br&gt;Isang Teoriya ng Pagpapahalaga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Teoretikal at Praksiyolohikal na Batis Ni Quito


Sa puntong ito, masasabing mahalagang makita na naging matapat sa Tomismo si Quito bilang produkto ng institusyong ito—bagay na napatunayan sa kanyang tesis para sa masteral na digri na pinamagatang “The Will and its Relation to Divine Casualty and Knowledge” na isinumite sa Unibersidad ng Sto. Tomas (UST) noong 1956. Tinalakay niya sa tesis na ito ang sinauna pang problema ukol sa kalayaan ng pagpapasaya (freedom of the will). Alinsunod dito ang pagbusisi ni Quito sa depinisyon ng nagustuhan

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2 Emerita Quito, “Kasaysayan ng Pilosopiyang,” in A Life of Philosophy: Festschrift in Honor of Emerita S. Quito (Manila: De La Salle University, 1990), 78.
3 Ibid., 79.
(appetite), ang kagustuhan ng tao, at kung anong uri ng kagustuhan ang nananais ng tao. Pinatunayanang malaya ang pagpapasya ng tao at ito ang nagtatalaga ng limitasyon ng nasabing kalayaan. Nanindigan ang kanyang pag-aaral kung paano nananalatay ang kalayaan gayong may Divine Motion at nagpahayag ng detalyadong rason kung bakit hindi mareresolba ng tao ang ganitong problema.

Dahil lubos ang pagtuon ng UST sa diskursong Eskolastisismo at Tomismo, para kay Quito hindi nito nagawa ang malawakang pagtugon sa mga pangangailangan at mga inaasahan ng mga mag-aaral at guro sa pilosopiya ng bansa. Naunyanyi sa sitwasyong ito si Quito noong mabuksan ang isipan mula sang bumalik siya galing sa Belgium. Bunsod nito, niyanig niya ang mga haligi ng akademya sa kanyang lektyur tungkol sa pilosopiya ni St. Thomas Moore hinggil sa kapwa-Fribourger na si Herbert Marcuse, na nanguna sa ideya ng “Great Refusal.” Aniya: “…it must take the risk of failure for in doing so it can consolidate its strength and expose the banalities of civil obedience to a reactionary regime.”


Buhay nito, isang mapangahas na Quito ang natunghayan nang naging sandigan niya ang Aleman pilosopo at politikal na teorista sa si Herbert Marcuse noong panahon ng Batas Militar. Malaki ang nagging impluwensiya ni Marcuse sa Estados Unidos noong huling bahagi ng 1960s at unang bugso ng 1970s. Sentro sa kaisipan ni Marcuse ang pananaw ng ukol sa ganap na kalayaan ng sangkatauhan (total human emancipation) at pagbubuo ng sibilisasyong malaya mula sa panunupil. Ayon sa introduksyon ni Marjorie Evasco sa mga articulo ni Quito mula 1965 hanggang 1970 sa festschrift, isa sa mga panulat ni Quito na may titulong “Herbert Marcuse and Contemporary Society” ang nagsilbing tila isang papihit ng gatilyo upang pumutok ang mobilisasyong pinangunahan ng mga mag-aaral ng UST at

4 Ibid., 201.
pagtayo laban sa tuluyang pagkalusaw ng kamay na bakal ng pambansang administrasyon.


**Replektibong Pananaw sa Pilosopiya sa Pilipinas ni Quito**

Labis ang atensyon ng bansa sa ekonomikong pagbangon (economic recovery) hanggang sa kasalukuyan, kaya ipinagdiinan ni Quito na hindi nakapagtatakbang ‘di nabibigyan ng wastong kahalagahan ang pilosopiya sa Pilipinas.  

Inihain ni Quito ang pagkakaiba ng *academic* at *formal philosophy*, gayundin ang *grassroot* at *folk philosophy*. Gayong hindi kasalukuyang nananalatay ang *academic* at *formal philosophy* sa bansa, dahil limitado ang karamihan sa mga bulto ng pilosopikal na gawain sa eksposisyon ng dayuhang pilosopikal na teorya, ipinagdiinan naman ni Quito na mayaman ang sisidlan ng *grassroots philosophy* o *folk philosophy*, na hindi pa nasusuri ng mga maka-Kanlurang akademikong. Tinawag ni Quito ang tinaguriang “loose philosophy” bilang “diwang Pilipino” (Filipino spirit), “Volksgeist” (Folk spirit) at “Weltanschauung” (worldview). Naniniwala siyang hindi lamang malalim na ‘di unawang sa sariling pambansa at kultural na identidad ang pagkakabatid natin sa ganitong nibel at pakiwari sa pilosopiya, datapwet din nga mga konsepto, wika, at mga sistema ng pag-iisip na maaaring gamitin sa makapangyarihang diskurso.

Pinagtuunan-g-insin ni Quito ang katanungan kung bakit may kaguluhan nito sa pag-unlad ang *academic* at *formal philosophy* sa Pilipinas. Itinanghal niya ang sampung dahilan na hinati sa 1) mga salik sa politikal at kultural na klima; 2) mga salik na may kinalaman sa institusyional at estruktural na pagkukulang ng ating mga unibersidad at kolehiyo; at 3) mga

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salik na may kinalaman sa propesyonal na kapasidad ng mga propesor sa pilosopiya.

Itinurong dahilan ni Quito ang politika at kultura sa Pilipinas na hindi bukas sa mabusing pamimilosopiya at pilosipikal na pananaliksik. Kung babalikan, dagdag niya na ang kasaysayan ng bansa sa ilalim ng kolonya ng Espanyol, Amerikano, at Hapon ang pumigil sa kalayaang mamilosopiya sapagkat hindi ito sang-ayon sa kanilang interes bilang mga pinunong kolonisador, at nangangambang baka kalaunang tugisin ng mga sinaunang Pilipino ang walang-patawad nilang pananakop sa lupang sinilangan.


Sa kultural na aspekto, nabatid ni Quito na karaniwang nakaangkla ang konsepto ng pilosopiya sa maling konotasyon sa imahen ni Don Anastacio, kilala bilang “Pilosopo Tasyo” sa nobelang Noli Me Tangere ni Jose Rizal.7 Gayunman, sa halip na ipakahulugan ang pilosopiya sa matapang na panlipunan kritisismo ni Tasyo at pagsawalang-bahala sa mga mapanlupig na kaugaliang kolonyal na lipunan, mas ikinakabit ang terminong pilosopiya sa pinagtatawanang imahen ng kabaliwan ng naturang karakter.

Sa mas espesipikong tagpuan ng mga unibersidad at kolehiyo sa Pilipinas, tinukoy ni Quito ang iba pang salik na nakapipinsala sa pag-unlad ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino. Kung ikukumpara sa pamantayan ng Europa, hindi nakauudyok ang mababang sweldo ng mga Pilipinong akademiko para magpursigi sa karera ang matatalinong mag-aaral na magturo sa kolehiyo at manaliksik.8 Para sa mga sumabak naman sa akademya, mababatid na nakagigipit ang karaniwang pagtatalaga ng dalawampu’t apat na oras sa isang linggo para sa isang propesor sa kolehiyo para sa marubdub na pananaliksik at mas seryosong pamimilosopiya.9 Para sa masisipag at


8 Quito, “Teaching and Research of Philosophy in the Philippines,” 710.

9 Ibid.
masisigasig sa pananaliksik at seryosong pamimilosopiya, gayong hindi maikakatwa ang kakapusan sa oras, mapagtatanong kinakapos sa imprastruktura para sa pag-aaral tulad ng grants, professorial chairs, at silid-aklatan ang karamihan sa mga unibersidad at kolehiyo sa Pilipinas.\textsuperscript{10} Dagdag dito, hindi sapat ang pagbibigay ng insentibo sa mga gurong maglathala para sa publikasyon.\textsuperscript{11}

Sa mas partikular pa na konteksto sa propesyonal na kapasidad ng mga Pilipinong gurong maglathala, tinukoy ni Quito ang iba pang nakakaperhuwisyong salik. May kakapusan ang gradwadong pagsasanay ang mga akademikong Pilipino gawa ng napakamahal na pag-aaral sa ibang bansa o maging sa sariling bayan.\textsuperscript{12} Para sa mga naingipagtatulungan ang gradwadong programa sa sariling bansa, nasasadlak sila sa proseso ng inbreeding kung saan matutunan nila ang masaklap na akademikong kasanayang pagiging di-aktibo at di-produktubong propesor sa unibersidad.\textsuperscript{13}

Nalaman din ni Quito ang inkapasidad ng mga Pilipinong gurong maglathala ang propesor sa pilosopiya upang matutunan ang mga pangunahing lengguhae sa Europa bilang malaking hadlang sa pag-unlad ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino, dahil pipigilan nito ang direktang pag-unawa sa kaisipan ng mga nangunang non-Anglophone European na pantas.\textsuperscript{14} Dagdag dito, isang kabalintunaan ang pirming paggamit ng Ingles imbis na sariling wika ng mismong mga Pilipinong gurong maglathala. Ito ang pumipigil sa pag-unlad ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino sapagkat hindi ito sapat upang ipaunawa ang diwang Pilipino at malilimitahan ang komunikasyon sa pagitan ng mga mismong akademikong Pilipino at maging sa iba pang mga Pilipino.\textsuperscript{15}

**Diskursibong Katayuan sa Pilosopiyang Pilipino ni Quito**

Sa pagpapamalas ng diskursibong katayuan sa Pilosopiyang Pilipino ni Quito, babalikan ang pag-aaral ni Demeterio na may titulong “Status of and Directions for “Filipino Philosophy” ni Zialcita, Timbreza, Quito, Abulad, Mabaquiao, Gripaldo, and Co na nagpapaliwanag sa taksonomiya at

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 709.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 710.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 711.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 710-711.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 710.
\textsuperscript{15} See number 10 of figure 3; Cf. Emerita Quito, “Ang Pilosopiya sa Diwang Pilipino,” in *A Life of Philosophy: Festschrift in Honor of Emerita S. Quito* (Manila: De La Salle University, 1990), 200.
Peryodisasyon ng anyo ng Pilosopiya Pilipino gawa ng replektibo at malalim na pananaliksik ukol dito.

Naging klaro para kay Demeterio na hindi posible ang pagsasagawa ng isa lamang ngunit komprehensibong eskemang magbibigay ng kabuoang taksonomiya at peryodisasyon ng bawat pantas, o maging ang pag-uugnay ng isang taksonomiya sa iba pa. Kaya sa pamamagitan ng pagsasantabi ng maliliit na kategorya (tinawag niyang “taxonomizer”) at kronolohikal na tanda (tinawag na “periodizer”), at pagasaayos ng mga anyo ng Pilosopiyan Pilipino, may pagkakataon maisakatuparan ang enggrandeng sintesis sa mukha ng isang dayagram upang mas makinita ang suma ng iba’t iba ngunit makakaugnay na kahulugan ng Pilosopiyan Pilipino.

Figure 1: Ang Labing-Anim na Diskurso ng Pilosopiyan Pilipino ni Demeterio


Ikalima, kaugnay ng praktika ng Logical Analysis, na nakabatay kina Quito at Abulad, ang makapangyarihang metodo ng pamimilosopiyang nakaayon sa orihinal na tekstong Ingle. Nilalayon nitong maresolba ang pilosopikal na tunggalian sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay-linaw sa wiha ta pagpapsurin mga pilosopikal na tekso sa iligal na pagpahayag na karaniwang iginihi. Isang pilosopikal na suliranin sa may eksaktong lohikal na terminolohiya, mithihi nitong maresolba ang mga problema ng mga sumusulok na gawang kalitiha sa lingguwistika. Maaaring magbukas ng iba pang pilosopikal na diskurso at panulat ang posiblisan nito at posiblisa sa konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng konteksto ng 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ng kalagayan gamit ang pilosopiya, kaya lamang makikita sa kasaysayang naging sanhi ang Batas Militar sa Pilipinas upang mapayabong ang mga pananaliksik hinggil dito.16 Ikawalo, sumasangguni ang Appropriation of Foreign Philosophical Theories, na nakabatay kina Timbreza, Quito, Abulad, at Gripaldo, sa kapaksi-pakinabang at may katuturan diskursong lumilikha ng intelektwal na dayalogo sa pilosopikal na teorya ng mga dayuhan at lokal na sitwasyon ng bansa, datapwat mapagtatantong kakaunting mga Pilipinong pantas ang sumusuong sa pilosopikal na diskursong ito. Nagagamit ito sa kontektwalisasyon at malikhaing aplikasyon sa sariling kultura at identidad ng mga nananahan sa panday-panahon sa Pilipinas.

Ikasiyam, pinag-uukulan ng Appropriation of Folk Philosophies, na nakabatay kina Timbreza, Quito, Mabaquiao, at Gripaldo, ang apropriyasyon ng katutubong pilosopiyang may layuning mapayaman ang lokal na mga konsepto at teorya. Alinsunod dito, sumusulpot ang isyung sapilitang paggamit ng pambansang kaisipang Pilipino. Kasamang ito, may kinalaman sa naunang taksonomiya ang Philosophizing with the Use of the Filipino Language, na nakabatay kina Timbreza at Mabaquiao, sapagkat itinutulak pa rin ang kontekstwalisasyon gamit ang wika sa pamimilosopiyang nakaangkla sa karansan ng Pilipinas. Sa kabilang banda, nakitang kahinaan lamang ang limitasyon ng iyansaang mailathala sa mga tanyag na abstraktong dyornal.

Ikalabing-isa, sinasakop ng Exposition of Foreign Philosophical Systems, na nakabatay kina Quito, Abulad, Co, at Gripaldo, ang mainam na panimulang punto ng tekstwal na kalikasan nito para sa apropriyasyon ng mga teoryang dayuhan. Isiniswalat nito ang mga pilosopikal na kaisipang dayuhan upang kalaunang itulak sa pagsasakonteksto ng mga mababatid na mga sistema. Gayunman, may limitasyon pa rin ito para sa mga Pilipinong pantas sapagkat karamihan sa kanila, Ingles lamang ang nakakayang maunawaan wika. Ikalabing-dalawa, sinasaklaw ng Revisionist Writings, na nakabatay kay Gripaldo, ang mga pananaliksik na nagsasagawa ng kontribusyon sa pamamagitan ng paglalampa sa kaisipang mga tanyag ng mga dayuhan pilosopo. Dahilan nito ang pagkakakilalanang at diskusyon ng internasional na komunidad. Subalit sa kasawiang-palad, ilang Pilipino lamang ang nakikipagsalaman sa mga ganiyon uri ng pilosopikal na pag-aaral. Bukod dito, may akses lamang sila sa mga Ingles na panulat at hadlang pa ang eksklusibidad ng ilang archives ng mga espesipikong pilosopo.17

17 Ibid., 210.

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Ikalabing-lima, may katuturan ang Identification of the Presuppositions and Implications of Filipino Worldview, na nakabatay kina Zialcita at Gripaldo, sapagkat may makabuluhang gampanin at direksyon ang Pilosopiyang Pilipino bilang payak na interpreter ng pananaw sa mundo ng Pilipino (Filipino worldview). Gayong malabo ang mithiin ng pilosopiyang ito, mahalagang matapos na itanghal ang pananaw sa mundo ng Pilipino, kailangang ipamalas niya pa kung paano magagamit ang Pilosopiyang Pilipino sa kasalukuyan at sa hinaharap, kaya mas mabigat ang kanyang magiging responsibilidad. Ikalabing-animo, may kinalaman ang Study on the Filipino Philosophical Luminaries, na nakabatay kina Timbreza at Gripaldo, sa pagpapakita ng Pilipinong pilosopikal na corpus sa pamamagitan ng pagpaparaya sa mga Pilipinong magkaroon ng kanilang sariling tradisyong sa kabilang bada, marami sa mga Pilipinong iskolar ang kumukuwestyon sa ingkluzyon at ekslusyon ng ilang Pilipinong pantas sa listahan ng mga tunay na pilosopo.18

Uumpisahan ang pagtuklas sa diskursibong katayuan ni Quito sa pilosopiyang Pilipino sa pamamagitan ng pag-uuri ng kanyang tekstwal na produkson gamit ang iskema ng labing-animo na diskurso ng pilosopiyang Pilipino ni Demeterio. Ngunit bago pa man gawin ang pag-uuri sa mga obra ni Quito, maaari nang tanggaling ang unang atro kadalas na sa iskema ni Demeterio: 1) ang *grassroots o folk philosophy*, dahil malinaw na bilang isang propesor ng pilosopiya na walang kaugnayan ang diskursong ito sa mga obra ni Quito; 2) ang panayam tungkol sa Eskolastisismo at Tomismo, dahil pinag-uusapan dito ang mga naalhatna nang obra; 3) ang panayam tungkol sa iba’t ibang banyagang sistemang pilosopiya, batay sa parehong kababanggit pa lamang na dahilan; at 4) kritikal na pilosopiya bilang hindi-akademikong

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18 Ibid., 211.
diskurso, dahil akademiko ang kabuuan konteksto ng pamimilosopiya ni Quito. Kaya sa halip na labing-anum na diskurso, labing dalawang diskurso na lamang ang gagamitin para sa pag-uuri sa mga obra ni Quito. Makikita sa Table 2 kung ano at ilan ang porsyento ng mga obra ni Quito ang kabilang sa nabanggit na labing-dalawang diskurso ng pilosopiyang Pilipino:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taksonomiya</th>
<th>Titulo</th>
<th>Bilang ng mga Akda</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>“Existential Principles and Christian Morality,”</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Hermeneutics</td>
<td>“Reflections on the Death of God,” at “An Existential Approach to</td>
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<td>Ecumenism”</td>
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Table 2: Mga Titulo, Bilang at Percentage ng mga Akda ni Quito sa Bawat Diskurso ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino ayon kay Demeterio

Ang nilalaman ng Table 2 ay biswal na ipinapakita ng radar chart sa Figure 2:
Mula rito, makikita ang limang nangungunang diskurso ni Quito — ang exposition of foreign systems (66.7%); critical philosophy (18.2%); research on Filipino values and ethics (18.2%); philosophizing using the Filipino language (15.2%); at interpretation of Filipino worldview (15.2%). Samantalang walang nailathala si Quito na obra sa mga diskurso ng logical analysis, appropriation of folk philosophy, revisionist writing, identification of the presuppositions and implications of the Filipino worldview, at study on the Filipino philosophical luminaries.

Metodo sa Pamimilosopiya ni Quito

Para alamin ang metodo sa pamimilosopiya ni Quito, sisipatin ng papel na ito ang paraan na kanyang ginamit sa kanyang limang nangungunang diskurso sa pilosopiyang Pilipino na natuklasan sa naunang seyson: ang exposition of foreign systems, critical philosophy, research on Filipino values and ethics, philosophizing using the Filipino language, at interpretation of Filipino worldview.

Hindi mga problem-based na akda ang mga obra ni Quito na napabibilang sa diskursong exposition of foreign systems, marahil sa dahilang dati na niyang mga panayam sa klase o sa mga okasyon inimbitahan siya ng anomang organisasyong magsalita tungkol sa pilosopiya. Sa konteksto ng kasalukuyang panahon, maaaring maliitin ng mga Pilipinong mananaliksik ang ganitong uri ng mga obra, ngunit mahalaga ang mga ito kapag isasakontekstko sila sa panahon kung kailan nilalabanang mga mga akademikong tulad ni Quito ang hegemonya ng Eskolastisismo at Tomismo. Archival at library research ang pangunahing metodo niya para sa mga akdang napabibilang sa diskursong ito. Pinakinabangan niya nang husto ang kanyang kaalaman sa iba’t ibang banyagang wika para sa pagkalap ng kanyang mga teksto at ipinaliwanag niya ang mga banyagang sistema ng pilosopiya sa paraang madaling maintindihan ng kanyang mga mambabasang walang iba kundi ang mga Pilipinong mag-aaral at guro sa pilosopiya.

Mga problem-based rin na akda ang mga obra ni Quito na napabilang sa diskursong research on Filipino values and ethics. Bilang isang propesor sa pilosopiya, etika, axiolohiya, at bilang intelektuwal, batid ni Quito ang malawak na puwang sa pagitan ng Kanlurang etika at axiolohiya sa isang banda at ng Pilipinong etika at axiolohiya sa kabilang banda. Ginamit niya ang pilosopiya para matalakay ang puwang na ito at mapag-usapan ang posibilidad ng pagtatag ng isang artikuladong Pilipinong etika at axiolohiya na silang tutugon sa mga pagkukulang ng mga Pilipino sa usapin ng panlipunang moralidad at katarungan. Ginamit ni Quito sa kanyang mga akdang napabilang sa diskurso ng research on Filipino values and ethics ang mga metodo at kontekstuwal na balangkas na komparatibong pag-aaral, istrakturalismo, panlipunang kritisismo, at nasyonalismo.


Praksiyolohiya ni Quito

Matapos maunsyami sa Tomismo ng UST at mabilad sa iba pang mga kaisipan sa Europa, tatlong pangunahing obra ni Quito sa anyong aklat at

Noong panahon ding iyong gitna ng pagsasalita at pagtutuklas, nagadsang bisitang propesor siya sa kurso Pilosopiya sa Pamantasang Ateneo De Manila, Kolehiyo ng De La Salle (Pamantasang De La Salle na ngayon), at Kolehiyo ng Asumsyon, kaya naging mas malawak ang kanyang impluwensiya sa mga mag-aaral na nasa kalagitnaan ng aktibong mobilisasyon.


Noong 1978, ang imbitasyon sa Asian Women’s Institute, India upang basahin ang kanyang papel na “The Role of the University in Changing Women’s Consciousness” at ang pagtungo sa Ewha Woman’s University, Korea ang naging dahilan kung bakit nagkaroon ng ugnayan si Quito sa pangkababaihang mga grupo at publikasyon ng monograph hinggil sa kababaihang piilosopo.

Alinsunod dito ang kanyang pagiging mas pamilyar sa matatalas na konseptwal ta na pamamamaraan ng Marxismo sa pamamagitan ng kanyang malalim na kaalaman sa kaisipan nina Marcuse at Sartre. Panahon ng Batas Militar nang mapailalim si Quito sa paghihirokhan ng bansa mula sa paglabag ng karapatang-pantao. Bilang tagasunod ng kaisipan ni Marcuse, naniwala si Quito na kinakailangang siyasatin ang isyu ng karahasan sa lipunan. Kinakailangang wasakin ng indibidwal ang sistema upang makamit ang

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20 Ibid.
kalayaan. Kinakailangang lumabas siya mula sa Establisyamento liban na lamang kung gusto niya talaga ang karanaan ng alienasyon.


Gayunman, kasabay ng masaganang panahon ng dekada sisenta at mas lumalim pang praksiyolohiya ni Quito, mababanaag na naging maamong iskolar siya at umatras siya sa pagkantong usaping politika. Katunayan, ika–8 ng Pebrero, 2002 sa isang open forum ng symposium na may temang “Philosophy as Critique of Society and Institutions” sa UST, nagkaroon ng pambihirang pagkakataon si Demeterio upang tanungin si Quito kung ano ang nangyari sa Pilosopiyang Pilipino noong panahon ng Batas Militar. Hindi inaasahan ng mga kalahok ang kanyang kasagutan nang sabihing nakonsiyensya siya sa pangyayari. Paglalahad niya, dumating pa sa puntong isang ahente ng rehimeng Marcos ang sinadya siya upang alisin ang kritikal na bahagi ng isa sa kanyang ililimbag na aklat. Mula noon, hindi na siya muling nakipagsapalaran sa mapanuring kritisismo.

Bukod sa tumuon ito sa pagiging aktibo bilang Tagapangulo ng Departamento ng Pilosopiya sa Pamantasang De La Salle at nagagawa ng atap na artikulo ukol sa Istrukturalismo, mas umikot na ang kanyang mga panulat sa mga temang may kinalaman sa oryentalismo at oksidentalismo, isipan, propagasyon ng Filipino sa akademya, diwang Pilipino, at ang Diyos.  

Nakaangkla ang pagsasapaktika niya bilang intelektwal sa paglalarawan ni Benda sapagkat akademiko si Quito, gayunman pinatahimik siya ng sistemang tinutuligsa sapagkat nasa ilalim siya ng pamumuno ng rehimeng Marcos. May patatangka si Quito na punan ang pagpapakahulugan ni Said sa mga intelektwal na kinakailangang may

pagsalungat (defiance) upang magkaroon ng sariling paninindigan at boses na nagpapamalas ng kalayaan at maibukod ang sarili mula sa nananaig na puwersa sa lipunan, pero kalunang naging tikom siya sa aktibong politikal na pamamilosopiya. Hindi naman daw ito nakapagtataka ayon kay Timbreza sapagkat may pinoprotektahang pamilaya at mas nanaisin na lamang ang kaligtasan ng bawat isa.23 Sa naging diskusyon ng intelektwal na talambuhay ni Quito, makikitang pumasok siya sa pagtingin ni Bourdieu sa intelektwal na batid dapat ang mga isyung kinakailangang pakialaman, nanahimik nga lamang ang gawa ng dehadong politikal na sitwasyon ng bansa. May angking kultural na kapital si Quito ayon kay Bourdieu gawa ng kanyang kaalamang propesyonal, katatasan sa pagbabasa, at matagal na pinaggugulang panahon sa pag-aaral at pananaliksik.

**Pananaw sa Lipunang Pilipino**


**Kasarilinang Diwa bilang Identidad ng Pilipino**

Buhat ng mga inihaing diskurso at pagpapakahulugan sa Pilosopiyan Pilipino, sinabi ni Quito na maaari ding naging tungkol ito sa karaniwang pananaw, isang diwa, isang pagtingin na nangangahulugang natatangi sa mga Pilipino. Masasakihan ito sa panitikan at siniting, mga halagahan at kaugalian; sa isang salita—isang Weltanschauung.24 Mahalagang

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makita ang kahalagahan ng pananaw (Weltanschauung) para maunawaan ang diwa (Geist) na importante sa pagbubuo ng Pilosopiyaeng Pilipino.

Sa pananaw ni Quito, kakikitaan ng matinding sensitivity at pride na may rason ang mga Pilipino. Ang nasionalistikong katangiang ito ang dahilan kung bakit matiisin ito ng mga mamamayan ng bansa. Matiisin na tipong hindi agarang nagtatangka ng hakbang para sa pagbabago dahil takot sa kabiguan. Mas pipiliin na lamang ng mga Pilipinong manahimik habang nagdudusa kaysa sa mabigong mabago ang sistema. Kaya hindi nakapagtatakang ilang daang taon muna ang nakalipas bago magrebolusyon ang mga sinaunang mamamayan ng bansa laban sa mga mapagsamantalahang mananakop.25


Sa kabilang banda, may betante at kahanga-hanga rin ang pagiging personal ng mga Pilipino.27 Hindi maitatatwa ito sa konsepto ng bayanhan tuwing panahon ng kalamidad, kaagipitan, o kahirapan sa buhay. May kakayahang magbigay kahit pa ang pinakamahirap na Pilipino at maabahagi ang sarili para sa kapwa. Dahilan ng sensitivity ng Pilipino kaya nagiging emosyonal siya at ekstropis. Masasaksahan ito sa mga pinta, musika, literatura, at kahit pa sa pagpapahayag ng pananampalataya. Hindi na kinakailangan ng lubusang kilos o ekspanasyon; madaling mababatid ang nais ipahayag ng bawat isa.

Sa kabilang banda, gawa ng mananakop ng iba’t ibang bansa sa Pilipinas, nagkaroon ng katangiang flexibilidad ang mga Pilipino upang maging sa puntong naikikintal na ang bawat kultura at kaugalian ng dayuhan, habang nasasakripisyo at naaisasaalang-alang ang sariling kultura at identidad. Hanggang ngayon, hirap pa rin ang bawat isa upang

25 Ibid., 515.
26 Ibid., 516.
27 Ibid., 517.
malaman kung ano ba ang identidad ng lipunang kinagisnan, dinakip, at pinatay ng kolonisasyon ang pagbubuo ng sariling pagkakakilanlan bilang Pilipino.

Gayunman, naninindigan si Quito na hindi pa rin tuwirang naiwaksi ang kaibuturan ng pagiging isang Pilipino. Isaprkaktika man ng Pilipino ang relihiyon ng dayuhan, o mananit ng pandayuhan, nagsisilbi lamang ito upang palakasin pa ang kanyang flexibilidad at mabuting kalikasan. Kinailangan lamang ng Pilipinong matutunang pakinabangan ang naging sitwasyon sa kasaysayan kung saan wala silang magagawa.

Tatlo ang pinagmanahan ng kulturang Pilipino: relihiyon ng mga Kastila, teknolohiya ng mga Amerikano, at diwa ng mga Asyatiko.


Walang kasarilingan Pilipino kung pisikal na katangian ang hahanapin sa kanya. Bagkus mayroong kasarilingan diwa (soul identity) ang Pilipino at hango ito sa pilosopiyang taglay ng bayang Pilipino.

Ang Kristiyanismo bilang Relihiyon


Bukod sa hayagang paglalahad ni Quito ng kanyang pananampalataya, hindi niya isinawalang-bahala ang katotohanang kabilang siya sa lipunang napakalawak ang sakop ng Kristiyanismo bilang relihiyon.

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28 Ibid., 522.
30 Ibid., 687.
Aniya, “sumasampalaya tayo sa isang Maykapal.” Mula rito, makikita na ipinagpapalagay na niya na awtomatikong Pilipino-Kristiyano ang magiging mambabasa ng kanyang akdang nakasulat sa wikang pambansa.


**Liberasyon ng Kababaihan**

Inamin ni Quito na napakahirap iwaksi at baguhin ang tradisyonal na paniniwalang nararapat lamang nasa isang tahanan ang espasyo ng babae at ang pangunahing tunguhin niya ang paglululwa ng mga anak. Napakatibay ng naging paniniwalang itong nakabaon sa sistema ng pag-iisip at buhay sa lipunang Pilipino. Ang pinakamalala sa lahat ang implikasyon na kapag itinuloy-tuloy ng babae ang kanyang karera sa pampublikong espasyo, napakalaking kabawasan ito sa kanya bilang isang babae.33


Masaklap ang naging tagpo sapagkat nauwi ito sa pagkakaroon ng isteryotipo ng espasyo sa kaisipan ukol sa kababaihan. Tinrato ng kalalakihan ang kanilang mga asawa na pawang mga tagasilbi lamang at tinitingnan ang kanyang pagkababae bilang isang kahinaan. Sa paglipas ng panahon, kasabay ng ganitong moda ng pag-iisip ang naging moda ng buhay na hindi na kinuwestyon kailman.

Sa pagkakaroon ng mga teknolohikal na pag-unlad, napagaan ang mga gawaing-bahay ng kababaihan. Kahit paano, nagkaroon siya ng kalayaan sa mabigat na gawaing-bahay at nagka-oras sa pag-asa sa ilang grupo, mobilisasyon, mga parent-teacher organization, at maging ang pagkakaroon ng posisyon sa gobyerno at karera sa unibersidad.

Matapos ang Ikalawang Digmaang Pandaigdig, masasabing nagkaroon ng paghalili ang posisyon ng kababaihan. Hindi naging sapat ang kinikita ng kalalakihan upang matugunan ang pangangailangan ng pamilya dahil sa tumagilid na estado ng ekonomiya. Kaya naging uso ang mga nagtatrabahong nanay para makadagdag ng pantustos sa pang-araw-araw.

Sa pagkakataon at maging hanggang sa panahong ito, pinahintulutan ang liberasyon ng kababaihan upang maingat at maitawid ang estado ng pamilya, bukod pa rito ang kontribusyon ngayon niya sa kanya. Sa pananaw ni Quito, malaki ang maaitutulong ng mga unibersidad upang magkaroon ng kalayasan at pag-unawa sa kanilang karapatan, tungkulin, at kakayahang.

Pananaw sa Sariling Wika


34 Ibid., 589.
36 Ibid., 201.


KONGKLUSYON

Umiinog ang pilosopikal na diskurso ni Quito sa pagsusuri ng mga suliraning institusyonal, kultural, at politikal na kinakaharap ng larangan ng pilosopiya sa Pilipinas. Sentro sa kanyang diskurso ang pagsisiwalat ng mga dayuhang sistemang produkto ng kanyang kahalagahan sa iba’t ibang wika. Gayunman, hindi pa rin nakalimot si Quito na maging katalista ng pamimilosopiya gamit ang wikang Pilipino. Naninindigan siyang ito lamang ang makabubungkong na kaibuturan ng mga madaling maaunawaan ng mga kapwa-Pilipinong wala pang pasang kasanayan sa aming antas ng pamimilosopiya, kaya pinapatingkad na nararapat ang paglalathala ng mga pag-aaral sa wikang pambansa. Sa pagsusapi niya sa teoretikal na pamimilosopiya sa academya, winika niyang kailangang masusunod ang pagpapalagay ng Pag-aaral sa kanilang identidad ng maipagmalaki ng bawat mamamayan sa buong mundo.

Para kay Quito, pinakapuso at susi ang wikang pambansa upang mabatid ang katuturan ng pilosopiya. Buhay nito, hinihikayat ni Quito ang paggamit ng inang-wika sa mga pag-aaral upang maipaabot ang kapuluhan maging sa mga karaniwang Pilipino.


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At ikalima, kinakailangan ang pagka-may-bukas-pinto sa ibang kultura, tradisyon, at maging sa pilosopiyang taliwas sa sariling paniniwala upang makita ang kapandahang-loob nito.


Gayong nananahan sa krusyal na estado si Quito, tinapos niya ang pangangapasa ng mga sinaunang pilosopo at nagbigay ng sapat na direktyon para sa mga pantas sa hinaharap. Nakahahanga ang minsang naging impluwensiya ni Quito sa kabataan upang mag-aklas laban sa mga anomalya ng gobyerno, sa pamamagitan ng kanyang eksposisyon sa kaisipang Marcuse. Naging instrumento si Quito upang maging malawak ang kaalaman sa iba’t ibang mukha ng pilosopiya. Gayunman, ipinagdiin niyang iwasan ang pagkakaroon ng mababang pagtatatwa sa sariling kultura, tradisyon, pilosopiya, o pananampalataya.

Mapagtatantong may limitasyon pa rin ang marangal at malaking kontribusyon ni Quito sa pamimilosopiya sa Pilipinas. Kapag susuring mabuti ang radar chart ng bawat discurso ng Pilosopiyan Pilipino, may kahinaan si Quito at walang nailimbag na obra sa mga discurso ng logical analysis, appropriation of folk philosophy, revisionist writing, identification of the presuppositions and implications of the Filipino worldview, at study on the Filipino philosophical luminaries. Buhay ng pagkakatala sa mga hindi problem-based na discurso ukol sa exposition of foreign systems, ginamit na lamang niya ang mga panayam sa klase o mga materyal sa mga imbitasyon sa pagsasalita ukol sa pilosopiya.


teoretikal na pagsusuri gamit ang kanyang mga pag-aaral at panulat. Sa kontemporaryong panahon, maaari nating suugin o punan ang mga nailahad na pagkukulang na ito bilang mga iskolar ng pilosopiya sa bansa.

Datapwat makikita ang kanyang ilang mga pagkukulang, mailalagom na mahalaga pa rin ang naging papel ni Quito sa paglalangkap at kontektwalisasyon ng mga pilosopikal na kaisipan sa larangan ng edukasyon tungo sa kasaganahan ng tekswal na proyekto ng mga susunod pang henerasyon ng kabataan at mananaliksik.

References


Edukasyon bilang Tagpuan ng Katwirang Lungsod at Katwirang Lalawigan

Noel L. Clemente

Abstract: The city-province distinction is usually construed in economic terms: the city is the center of consumption and wealth, while the province the center of production and raw materials. In this paper, I propose that we can also draw the distinction epistemologically; instead of distinguishing between city-dwellers and province-dwellers, we can talk about city-minded and province-minded people. In this perspective, we discover the crucial position of education as the paradoxical interplay of the city mentality and province mentality. After examining this “paradox of education” as witnessed in Philippine history, especially during the Spanish and American occupations, I suggest that we can resolve the paradox by developing our system of education towards a more “nationalistic education,” as per Renato Constantino.

Keywords: Constantino, Rodriguez, city, education

Karanihan, kung hindi man lahat, ng mga lungsod sa kasaysayan ng mundo ay naitaguyod bilang sentro ng kalakalan. Dahil may labis na likás-yaman at produktong hindi kailangang gugulin agad-agad, iniimpok ito, at ikinalakalak, at nagkakaroon ng kita, na kailangang tipunin sa isang kabiser: ang lungsod. Kayâ naman, maraming sosyologo ang gumuguhit ng pagkakaiba ng lungsod at lalawigan sa ekonomikong batayan.


1 Hindi ko sinasabing epistemolohiko ang angkop o mas tamang batayan ng distinksiyon ng lungsod at lalawigan. Hindi ko pangunahing haka sa papel na ito ang paglalagay ng epistemolohikong lente, sa halip, isa itong palagay ng aking punto: kung pagtambisin natin
Sa papel na ito, nais kong suriin ang kabalintunaang kaakibat ng edukasyon bilang tagpuan ng katwirang lungsod at katwirang lalawigan. Sa unang bahagi, ipapaliwanag ko ang gamit ng katwiran bilang balangkas ng pag-unawa ng isang tao, at ipapakita ang sapantaha kong magkasalungat nga ang katwiran ng lungsod at lalawigan. Sa ikalawang bahagi, ilalatag ko ang kabalintunaan ng edukasyon na kalakip ng pagiging tagpuan ng dalawang katwiran, na matutunghayan natin sa kasaysayan hanggang kasalukuyan. Bilang pagtatapos, magmumungkahi ako ng mga maaari nating gawin upang samantalahin itong posibilidad ng edukasyon sa pagtawid sa dalawang katwiran, tungo sa tinatawag ni Renato Constantino na “makabayang edukasyon.”

Ang Lungsod at Lalawigan bilang Magkaibang Katwiran

Katwiran bilang Balangkas ng Pag-unawa


ag dalawa batay sa kanilang pag-iisip, kritikal ang edukasyon bilang tagpuan ng dalawang katwiran.


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Naniniwala sila sa iba’t ibang espíritu at diyos, ipinapaliwanag nila ang kanilang mga karanaan batay sa mga diyos na ito. Sa gayon, ang kanilang relihiyon ang kanilang katwiran. Kung may nagkasakit na bata, halimbawa, naniniwala silang may nagambala o napinsala silang espíritu, at bilang parusa, isinumpa ng espíritu ang katawan ng bata. Ganito nila inuunawa ang mga karamdaman. Hindi natin sila masisi, dahil wala pa naman silang kaalaman sa mga bacteria at virus, at ang tanging batayan ng mga hindi nila maipaliwanag ay ang sobrenatural.

Ang ikalawang antas ng paglakaw: hindi lamang intelektwal o teoretikal ang saklaw ng “katwiran” ayon sa gámit ni Rodriguez; kabilang dito ang praktikal na dimensyon. Kayâ naman, mahalagang aspekto ng katwiran ang sistema ng pagpapahalaga ng mga tao.³ Ginagabayan ng balangkas ng pagpapaliwanag ng taon sa kaniyang kapaligiran ang kaniyang pagpapasiya kung ano ang dapat at hindi dapat gawin. Dagdag sa halimbawa ko sa nakaraang talata, dahil nga ipinapaliwanag nila ang karamdaman bilang kaparusahan ng espíritu nagambala, nagbibigay sila ng alay para sa espíritu bilang kabayaran sa kanilang paggambala rito. Kung tatanggapin ng espíritu ang alay, naniniwala silang babawiin niya ang sumpa sa katawan ng bata, na ikagagaling nito.

Bago ako tumungo sa paglalarawan ng katwiran ng mga tagalungsod at ng mga tagalalawigan, nais kong banggitin ang isa pang mahalagang punto: isinisilang tayo sa isang katwiran; hindi natin ito pinipili.⁴ Sasabihin ni Martin Heidegger: *itinapon tayo sa isang katwiran*. Ipinanganak káyong kabila sa isang kultura na may nakatatag na ng espíritu, at minamana natin ang ganitong katwiran. At sapagkat nasanay káyong tanawin ang mundo at ating mga karanaan sa ating katwiran, hindi natin naisip na may umiiral na ibang katwiran. Minsan, masaklap ngang kapag tinwingkan na natin ang ibang katwiran, itinuturing natin siláng mali, o mas mababa kaysa ating katwiran.⁵

Bilang paglalagom, gagamitin ko ang “katwiran” sa papel na ito bilang balangkas ng teoretikal at praktikal na pag-unawa ng isang taon sa mundo. Itinatapon ang taon sa kaniyang katwiran, at sapagkat parati ninyang tinitingnan ang katalagahan ayon sa kaniyang katwiran, nakakaligtasan ninyang may umiiral na ibang katwiran, at kung makatagpo man siya ng ibang katwiran, madalas, itinuturing niya itong depektibo, kung hindi man mali.

⁵ Ibid., 96.
Dalawang Magkaibang Katwiran ng Lungsod at Lalawigan

Mas madaling maunawaan ang “katwiran” ni Rodriguez sa mga kongketong halimbawa. Sa kaniyang pagpapaliwanag, nagbigay siya ng dalawang magkasalungat na katwiran na maaari nating ihalintulad mamaya sa katwiran lungsod at katwiran lalawigan.

Malaki ang pagpapahalaga ng mga taong relihiyoso sa kabanalan. Naniniwala siláng may (mga) umiiral na higit sa kanila, na mas makapangyarihan at mas tumatagal kay sa mga mortal. Iginagalang nila ang mga puwersang ito, kayá naman naniniwala siláng hindi taong ang nagtatatod na kahulugan at katalagahan. Samantala, mataas naman ang tingin ng mga taong sekular sa sangkatauhan. Para sa kanila, taong ang hindi diyos kaya, at espirito, ang siyang nagdidikit na kahulugan. Naniniwala siláng malaya ang tao na manipulahin ang kalikasan at panahon ayon sa kaniyang pagpapasiya ng ano ang mahalaga.6

Siyempre, hindi naman natín maitutuwa ang katwiran lungsod sa katwiran sekular, at ang katwiran lalawigan sa katwiran relihiyoso; mas malalim ang pagkakaiba sa sentro ng kalakalan, at sa gayon sa sentro ng paggawa at pananalapi, may káya ang garaniwang tagalungsod. Minsan, higit sa may káya, maunlad ang kaniyang katayuan sa búhay. Dahil dito sa kakayahan niyang kumita ng pera at sa karanasan ng maginhawang búhay, malaki ang pagpapahalaga niya sa mga materyal na bagay. Kayá naman, palasak sa lungsod ang kaisipang kumikiling sa kung ano ang mapagkakakitaan. Ito ang dahilhan kayung báháy: may sariling tirahan, kotse, at iba pang ari-arian. Samakatwid, maiuugnay natin ang katwiran sekular sa mga tagalawigan: sapagkat hahamak siláng na libingan, naniniwala siláng na may kapangyarihan sa mundo.7

Kasalungat nito ang katwiran lalawigan. Malayo sa kasukdulan ng impluwensiyá ng ating mga mananakop, napanatili ng karamihan sa ating mga tagalawigan ang kanilang mga katutubong tradisyón. Sa gayon,

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6 Ibid., 94.
7 Sa paglarawan ng katwiran ng mga tagalawigan at ng mga tagalalawigan, hindi ko sinasabing ganito ang katwiran ng bawat isang tagalawigan o tagalalawigan. Inilalarawan ko lang ang nangihirap na iniisip ng dalawang pangkat na taong nabanggit.
8 Hindi ko sinasabing magkatumbas ang katwiran lalawigan at katwiran sekular; sinasabi ko lang na magkaugnay sila; may mga pagsasalita na mga makakatulad, marahil.

Samakatwid, sa isang simplistikong pananaw, maaari nating sabihing materialistiko at indibidwalistiko ang katwirang lungsod, samantalang relihiyoso at kolektibo ang katwirang lalawigan. Sa ganitong perspektiba, maaaring may mga naninirahan sa lungsod na may katwirang lalawigan (e.g., mga iskwater na nanumuhay malapit sa mga pamilya at kamag-anak at kumakapit pa rin sa mga katutubong paniniwala at tradisyon) o mga tagalalawigang may katwirang lungsod (e.g., mga hacienderong nagpapasiya batay sa materyal na pagasahay-ala) sa gayon, napagtatambis natin, hindi kung sino ang tagalungsod at tagalalawigan, kundi sino ang isip-lungsod at isip-lalawigan.

Hindi ko hahamaking magbigay ng komprehensibong paglalarawan ng katwirang lungsod at katwirang lalawigan sa papel na ito. Sapat nang makita nating may umiiral na dalawang magkaibang katwiran sa humahati sa kinalulubad nating lungsod at lalawigan.

Ilang Kabalintunan ng Edukasyon, Mula Noon Hanggang Ngayon

Ngayong naipaliwag ko na ang epistemologikong perspektiba ng pagtingin sa lungsod at lalawigan, matatapat nating nagtatagagpo itong dalawang katwiran sa paaralan. Dala ng isang karaniwang batà ang katwirang lalawigan kapag pumasa siya sa paaralan nahubog na ng

9 Mas mailap ang ideya ng “karaniwang tagalalawigan” kaysa “karaniwang tagalungsod” sapagkat marami tayong magkakaisaibang lalawigan sa bansa, ngunit sasapat na ang ganitong paglalarawan na pakay ng papel na ito.

10 Maaaring magtunog mapanghusga ang mga katangg “isip-lungsod” at “isip-lalawigan” na para bang itong dalawa lang ang maaaring pagpipilian at walang puwang sa bahay. Bagaman may mga kilos at salita na mailap tukuyin kung katwiran lungsod at katwiran lalawigan ba ang pinagmulan, igigiti kong sa pangkalahanan, nakikilala naman natin ang pagkakaiba ng dalawang kaisipang ito.


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katwirang lungsod, sa tulong ng pagkakaroon ng standard curriculum ng DepEd at CHEd para sa lahat ng paaralan ng bansa. Sa gayon, tinuturuan ang mga isip-lalawigan na maging isip-lungsod, at dito nagkakaroon ng tunggalian ang dalawang katwiran.

Higit kong maipaliliwanag ang ganitong kabalintunaan ng edukasyon kung tutunghay natin ang ebolusyon ng edukasyon mula ng itatag ito ng mga Kastila, hanggang samantalahin ito ng mga Amerikano, at hanggang sa kasalukuyang sistema ng edukasyon.

**Edukasyon bilang Panangga sa Pang-aabuso ng mga Kastila**

Karamihan ng mga lungsod sa Asya at mga bansang nasakop ng mga Europeo, kasama na ang Kamaynilaan, ay itinatag bilang sentro ng kalakalan ng kanilang mga mananakop.¹³ Upang tustusan ng mga Kastila ang pamahalaan sa kanilang mga kolonya, pati na rin ang sari-saring digmaang kinasangkutan nila, kinalangan nilang kamakamin ang mga likas na yaman ng bansa. Pagkatapos pagtapon-tipunin ang mga katutubong Filipino mula sa kanilang barangay tungo sa mga reduccion, inalis nila ang karapatan ng mga katutubo sa lupa, at pinatawan nila ng malalaking buwis ang pagsasaka sa mga ito. Sapilitan din nilang binibili ang mga produkto ng mga indio—bansag nila sa mga Filipino—sa mas mababang halaga. Idagdag pa rito ang polo y servicios o 40 araw ng sapilitang paggawa kada taon, at ang buwis na hinihingi ng simbahan. Ganap na naitatag ang Maynila bilang lungsod nang gawin itong sentro ng kalakalan sa Kalakalang Galleon.¹⁵ Unti-unting nasira ang katutubong kultura ng mga Filipino, at tuluyang naihanay sa interes ng mga dayuhang Kastila ang itinatag na lungsod.¹⁶ Samakatwid, ang Maynila ay nasa teritoryong katutubo ngunit may katwirang dayuhan.

Kayâ naman, natatakot pag-aralin ng mga Kastila ang mga indio sapagkat natatakot silâng matuklasan ng mga ito ang kanilang kapalalan. Wika ni Apolinario Mabini, “Kung ibig palagiin ng mga Español ang kanilang paghahari, kailangang pamalagii nila ang kamangmangan at

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kahinaan ng mga Filipino.”¹⁷ Taglay ang karunungang nakukuha sa paaralan, mas batid ng isang tao ang kaniyang mga karapatan at magiging maláy siya sakaling may nananamanantalang kaniya. Manapa, kung maalam ang mga indio sa sistemang ekonomiko o politikal ng mga banyaga, baká magkaroon pa sila ng pagkakataong makipagsabayan sa mga ito at makapamuhay nang matiwasay sa lungsod. Kung gayon, mas may dahilan ang mga katutubong mag-alsa laban sa mga mananakop, na siyang ayaw mangyari ng mga Kastila. Edukasyon ang nagsisilbing pananagang laban sa pang-aabuso ng mga Kastila—dahil mamumulat ang indio sa katwirang dayuhan—kayá naman hangga’t maaari, hindi nila hinahayaang makapag-aral ang mga indio.


Bilang paglalagom, naging mahirap ang mga buhay ng mga Filipino sa pananakop ng mga Kastila dahil naging dayuhan sa kanila ang sistemang ginagalawana nila—hindi nila naunawaan ang katwiran Kastila. Yaong mga may kakayahang pinansiyal ay nakapag-aral sa mga lungsod (maging sa mga lungsod ng Europa), upang makasabay sila sa sistemang dayuhan. Lulan ng edukasyon, naunawaan nga nila ang katwiran banyaga, na patúloy na banyaga sa kanilang mga kababayang hindi edukado. Samakatwid, may kaakibat kung naunawaan ang mga katutubo ng mga nasa pag-asa.  


¹⁸ Hindi ko sinasabing tama ang isa—sa asimilasyon at kalayaan—at mali ang isa pa. Sa halip, mahihirwatig sa dalawang ito ang kaibahan ng katwiran ng mga edukado at di-edukado. Kaalaman ang nanaisin ng mga isip-lalawigan na nakararanas ng marahas na pananamantalang mga dayuhan, samantala ang asimilasyon ang pipiliin niyong mga isip-lungsod na may kayamanan at karunungan, at naunawaan na may posibilidad ng mapayapang pag-aruglo ng pamamahala.
katwiran ng mga dayuhan.

**Edukasyon bilang Kasangkapan ng Pananakop ng mga Amerikano**


Bukod sa intelektual na pagpapalaganap ng mga Amerikano sa tulong ng telebisyon at radyo. Nahawa ang mga Filipino pati na rin ang ibang

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20 Ibid., 24.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 23.
23 Ibid., 34.
mga kolonisado sa panlasa sa pananamit, pagkain, at paraan ng pamumuhay ng kanilang mga mananakop. Naging magkakamukha ang mga gusali, manggagawa, at mga kasangkapan, saanman sa mundo. Masisilayan natin ito sa kasalukuyan: halos lahat ay may mga smartphone na, o di kaya tablet at laptop. Sa pamamagitan ng mga bagay na ito, nakikibahagi tayo sa katwirang lungsod.

Sa kasamaang palad, hindi kasing unibersal ng konsumerismong pagpapahalaga ang kakayahang magkaroon ng ganyang mga modernong kasangkapang. Samantalang namana ng lahat ang panlasa ng makabagong daigdig, kasama at lañö na ang mga nasa mahihirap na bansa, wala namang sapat na yaman ang mga mahihirap para maatim ang pamumuhay na ibinabanderang mga mayayamang lungsod.25 Yaong mga walang pambili ng smartphone ay walang kakayahang makibahagi sa katwirang lungsod, halimbawa.

Malinaw na nagtagumpay ang mga Amerikano sa kanilang proyekto ng edukasyon, sa loob at sa labas ng paaralan. Higit pa sa mga konsepto ng agham at balarila ng Ingles, naturuan nila ang mga Filipino ng mga pagpapahalagang taliwas sa katutubong pamumuhay. Mula sa pagiging susing magsasalba sa kahirapan, naging mamahalin ang edukasyon na lunligkha ng mga banyaga sa sariling lupa.

Edukasyon sa Kasalukuyan bilang Di-mabisang Tagpuan ng Dalawang Katwiran


Sinasalamin itong tensiyon ng kasalukuyang pamamayani ng Ingles sa paaralan. Samantalang ito ang pangunahing wika ng edukasyon, hindii naman ito palasak na ginagamit sa pang-araw-araw na bühay. Puna ni

25 Ibid., 30-31.  


28 Ibid.
Pag-aangkop ng Dalawang Katwiran: Tungo sa Makabayang Edukasyon

Namalas natin sa ikalawang bahagi ang kabalintunaan ng edukasyon mula noon hanggang ngayon. Sa bahaging ito, tutuklasin natin ang posibilidad ng produkibong interaksiyon ng dalawang katwiran, upang sumaibayo ang edukasyon sa kabalintunaan iniralan niya.

Pag-aangkop ng Magkaibang Katwiran: Katolisismo bilang Halimbawa


Pag-aangkop rin ni Demeterio ang ganitong pag-aangkop ng postmodernong teoriyang manana natin sa mga dayuhang sa premodernong konteksto ng Filipinas. See Demeterio, “Our Premodernity and Their Tokens of Postmodernity.”

May sariling problematiko ang konsepto ng “makabayan” sapagkat nakasaalalay ito sa konsepto ng “bayan,” na sa kaso ng Filipinas, ay hindi malinaw. Maaaring talakayin ito sa ibang papel, ngunit ipagpapalagay natin sa papel na ito na ang “makabayan” ay yaong pumapanign sa interes ng mga Filipino, sa halip na mga banyaga.


Ibid., 167-169.
kaligtasan upang ibsan ang takot sa mga katutubong masasamang espiritu (aswang, tikbalang, tiyanak).\(^{34}\)

Sapagkat lampas na sa saklaw ng papel na ito ang pagpapalaganap ng Katolisismo, sapat na itong maiikling halimbawang nagpapakita ng posibilidad ng produktibong talaban ng dalawang katwiran. Layunin natin sa papel na ito na maisagawa ang naturang pag-aangkop sa katwirang lungsod at katwirang lalawigan na nagtatagpo sa paaralan.

**Pag-aangkop ng Katwirang Lungsod at Lalawigan: Tungo sa “Makabayang Edukasyon”**

Siyempre, hindi naman natin agad-agad na maisasagawa ang nasabing pag-aangkop sa kasalukuyang sistema ng edukasyon. Pakatandaang nasa konteksto sila noon ng kolonisasyon; kailangang maunawaan ng mga katutubo ang kanilang relihiyon upang tagumpay nilang maipalaganap ito. Samakatwid, mulát ang mga Kastila sa pag-asagawa ng nasabing pag-aangkop sa dalawang katwiran, na hindi natin masasabi tungkol sa kasalukuyang edukador ng bansa.


Nagsisimula ang kamalayan sa katwirang ginagalawan sa kamalayan sa sariling katwiran bilang Filipino. Inilatag ni Quito ang tatlong aspekto ng kamalayan ito na magsisilbing unang hakbang tungo sa

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 185-196.

Kailangan ding repasuhin ang nilalaman ng edukasyon, dahil hindi rin naman kapaki-pakinabang ang ilan sa mga inaaral ng estudyante sa kaniyang hanapbuhay kalaunan. Iba ang sitwasyon sa lalawigan o sa katutubong kultura; nag-aaral ang kabataan ng pagsasaka, pangkisida,

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36 Constantino, “The Mis-education of the Filipino,” 32.
37 Ibid., 33.
38 Hindi maitatangging layunin ng K-12 na makisabay sa pandaigdigang edukasyon; labingdalawang taon din ang pag-aaral sa karamihan ng mga mauunlad na bansa, kaya bakit hindi natin sila tularan? Mahabang usapan ang pagsusuri sa lahat ng aspekto ng programang K-12, ngunit ang interes lang natin sa gayon ay ang paggamit ng katutubong wika sa pagtuturo.


**Pangwakas**

Batid kong hindi ganap na kongkreto ang mga iminungkahi kong hukbhang tungo sa makabangang edukasyon. Sa katunayan, marahil malayo pa tayo sa pagsasaibayo sa kabalintunanang edukasyon. Masyadong malalim ang mga ugit na naitanim ng mga Kastila at ng mga Amerikano, na lumilok

References


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Bataille and Nietzsche on the Limits and Ambiguities of Sovereignty and Power

George Papandreopoulos

Abstract: This paper will argue that both Bataille and Nietzsche embrace a rather idiosyncratic understanding of sovereignty (Bataille) and power (Nietzsche), according to which the sovereign moment is to be identified with a moment of profound loss. For both thinkers, sovereignty and power do not stand alone but are absolutely dependent on forces which threaten their integrity at every moment. For both, the ultimate powerlessness of power, or the loss of sovereignty, does not constitute weakness but precisely the opposite, strength and vitality. Nietzsche occupies himself with the problem of power through his examination of ancient agon, where he organises the limitations of power; through his occupation with the Will to Power, where he constructs an ontology of power; and finally through his meditations on the thought of the return, where the power of time manifests itself in the sovereignty of a moment which has liberated itself from the demands of various cultural and social power structures which have produced the human of the Christian Western civilisation: a human solely occupied with productions and results. Ultimately, this paper aims to elucidate that Bataille’s sovereignty and Nietzsche’s power win nothing specific; but that their sovereignty lies in their resistance to the Western cultural model of understanding life through the optics of productions, wins, and results.

Keywords: sovereignty, power, unproduction, time

1 I would like to thank Professor Douglas Burnham for inviting me to present a first draft of this paper at Staffordshire University and to his students for their valuable comments. I would also like to thank the anonymous editor of KRITIKE for his much helpful comments.
‘Sovereignty’ in Bataille

In his magnum opus The Accursed Share (1949), Georges Bataille develops a very interesting and fruitful concept, that of ‘sovereignty.’ Sovereignty describes the process whereby human existence realigns itself to the wasteful movement of the cosmos. Sovereignty is fundamentally directed against the world of ‘projects,’ the world of utilitarian calculations and capitalist production. It is the necessary outcome of ‘general economics,’ the economic structure of societies around the notions of expenditure and (economic) waste, and the completion of the type of human that ‘general economics’ produces: a squanderer dedicated to nothing but the (unintentional) disruption of life on earth as a productive enterprise. It is in and through his loss (the squandered loses everything including himself), though, that the sovereign individual achieves the summit of an experience that overcomes the petty calculations of the productive-human machines. It is because he wishes nothing more than the immediate enjoyment of the experience of his existence (like the notorious child-murderer Gilles de Rais), beyond the demands posed on him by institutions and ideologies, that the sovereign individual becomes the master, the sovereign of his existence. However, this is not to confuse sovereignty with idleness, however spectacular and charming this idleness could be. Like ‘inner experience’ sovereignty also describes a process, which nevertheless culminates in the experience of the dissolution of all processes. It is a ‘negative project,’ a project that abolishes all projects. Thus the sovereign has to achieve his sovereignty and he has then to implicate himself in a project to oppose all earthly projects.

Hegelian Beginnings

Bataille’s exposition of the notion of sovereignty owes a lot to the profound influence of the (anthropological) reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807) by Alexander Kojeve. In the much-discussed chapter on ‘Lordship and Bondage,’ self-consciousness, after having duplicated itself,

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2 For Bataille the real economic problem of humanity lies not in a lack of resources, but rather in the excess of energy radiating from the sun. It is not that we do not have enough; the problem is that we have too much!


4 He thus differs from the royal sovereigns who ‘find,’ or are offered, their sovereignty.
understands the need to be recognised by another self-consciousness which is not going to be a mirror picture of itself but a free, independent self-consciousness, since the fundamental presupposition of recognition is to set the ‘other’ free, or else recognition is reduced to brute coercion. One is only recognised by another which is wholly other and both self-consciousnesses must mutually recognise each other which means to accept the other as free. This is of course the final and much desired state of recognition, but before that a battle has to take place between the two self-consciousnesses, a battle where the opposing self-consciousnesses have to prove that they are not attached to any particularity whatsoever, including life itself. They both have to prove that they are completely and utterly free, which means they have no commitments, no attachments to anything external to their own existence. A self-consciousness which is attached to life is a self-consciousness which is attached to something external to its own self. Hegel thinks that a self (consciousness) is not characterised by its commitment to life, but by its commitment to its independence; therefore, life (as a biological existence) is treated as something accidental or in any case as something of no particular importance to self-consciousness’s development. In Hegel’s words:

... it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won; only thus is it proved that for self-consciousness, its essential being is not [just] being ... but rather there is nothing present in it which could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is pure being-for-self.

Or, as Alexandre Kojeve puts it in his own anthropological terms: “... to be for one self, or to be a man, is not to be bound to any determinate existence, not to be bound to the universal isolated-particularity of existence as such, not to be bound to life.” The problem arising from the struggle for recognition is obvious. Both self-consciousnesses want their freedom, i.e. they wish to express their contempt for every attachment, including ‘my’ life and ‘your’ life. But however much each wishes to be recognised by the other, if the outcome of the battle is to be the death of one or the other of the parties involved, then recognition cannot take place. Self-consciousness finds itself in the paradoxical condition of being compelled to preserve the other in life in

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6 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §187.
7 Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 12.
order to render ‘him’ able to be participant in a relation where both members have to recognize each other.

Thus, the precondition of the mastery of the master becomes for Hegel the willingness to dissociate self-consciousness from the ‘animal need’ for biological preservation. Bataille agrees that “to struggle without having the satisfaction of animal needs as an object is above all in itself sovereign; it expresses a sovereignty.”8 Bataille speaks, then, for a mastery which is master-full only insofar as it is master-less, only insofar as it “lets itself go.” But the less of mastery rather than expressing, what Nietzsche has called “passive Nihilism,”9 the state of the decline of power that stands “at the door” of modernity, rather expresses Nietzsche’s second suggestion regarding nihilism, which he calls “activer Nihilism,”10 and refers to a “violent force of destruction” [gewaltthätige Kraft der Zestörung].11 This force is able to bring the process of the taming of the human animal12 to its ultimate consequences and thus to the ultimate and much-desired agon between the healthy and the unhealthy forces in man. Bataille understands that Nietzsche’s activer Nihilism is taken over by Hegelian negativity and that negativity is made to correspond, through Kojève, to action13 which opposes the world of animal desire and thus inaugurates man’s participation in human history. Bataille never tires of repeating this Kojèvean lesson: “Action is Negativity and Negativity, Action.”14 The master-less-ness of mastery, then, rather than indicating a vacuum, indicates an active participation in the project of abolishing all projects. Bataille’s master, like Hegel’s, by negating his own life and the conditions of his existence, achieves what Hegel calls mastery and what Bataille would call sovereignty.

Sovereign Uselessness

Sovereignty disrupts in a profound way the world of utility. Its birthplace is neither the petty calculations of the everyday nor the protestant

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
13 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 4.
14 Bataille, “Hegel, Mankind and History,” 123.
15 ‘Profound’ because it is a movement of negativity, therefore of action.
ethic of accumulation, but rather the limitless energy of the universe.\textsuperscript{16} The source of energy is, for Bataille, the sun: “Solar energy is the source of life’s exuberant development. The origin and essence of our wealth are given in the radiation of the sun, which dispenses energy – wealth – without any return. The sun gives without ever receiving.”\textsuperscript{17} Consequently, Bataille parts ways from classical political economy in that he considers sources as excessive and not as scarce. The fundamental economic problem then becomes, for him, the management of the excessive energy of the universe, not the accumulation of capital to counteract scarcity. Following Marcel Mauss’ anthropological readings on the nature of gift in archaic societies, Bataille creates his own version of the Nietzschean \textit{Rangordung}, in which the highest value is awarded to the imprudent consumer of the excessive universal wealth, whereas the lowest value is awarded to the prudent slaves who “reduce their consumption to the necessities.”\textsuperscript{18} The imprudent consumer occupies the highest place in the ladder of this social system, which turns upside down the accumulative ethic of capitalism in the Christian West. The task is to upset the bourgeois values of safety and utility. \textit{At the end there is nothing left}, Bataille tells us, because everything has been gloriously consumed in what resembles Mauss’ \textit{potlatch}, the celebrations of exuberant consumption in which social value depends on the amount of wealth which is wasted.\textsuperscript{19} Bataille believes that \textit{life} can only properly begin when the realm of slave (utilitarian) values has been left behind: “life beyond utility is the domain of sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{20}

Like Bataille, Nietzsche also considers life to be an event of excessive energy and this ‘excessiveness’ will be called \textit{will to power}. In \textit{Twilight of the Idols} (1889) we read: “life as a whole is \textit{not} a state of crisis or hunger, but rather a richness, a luxuriance, even an absurd extravagance \textit{[absurde Verschwendung].}\textsuperscript{21} Following the findings of William Rolph and Wilhelm Roux, who believed that organisms strive for growth and expansion over self-preservation, Nietzsche associates life with the \textit{will to power}, which is understood variously as growth, expansion, appropriation, or

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}, Vol. I, 28.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, Vol. II, 198.
\textsuperscript{19} Marcel Mauss, \textit{The Gift}, trans. by W.D. Halls (Oxon: Routledge, 1990), 47.

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incorporation. What is of interest to us is Nietzsche’s determination to separate the will to power from the will to preservation. He does so because these opposing wills produce correspondingly differing anthropological types. The will to preservation he considers to be a sign of weak, to the point of unnatural, natures. “To wish to preserve oneself is a sign of distress, of a limitation of the truly basic life-instinct, which aims at the expansion of power and in so doing often enough risks and sacrifices self-preservation.” Weak natures, like the bourgeoisie, are solely interested in preserving their type, in preserving the sickness that generates them; they are foreign to life as an event of growth or creativity. Nietzsche is adamant: “The herd strives to maintain a type … The tendency of the herd is toward standstill and preservation. There is nothing creative in it.” On the opposite side stand the strong natures. Their strength is drawn from their ability to control the great number of contrary drives that constitutes them. Yet this strength has no guarantees of endurance. It is because the strong nature encompasses great battles and is the expression of great but competing powers that it is also always on the verge of collapse. Unlike the weak nature, whose one-sidedness protects it from breaking down, the strong type’s multifariousness leaves it exposed. “The higher type represents an incomparably greater complexity—a greater sum of co-ordinated elements: so its disintegration is also incomparably more likely. The ‘genius’ is the sublimest machine there is—consequently the most fragile.”

**On Sovereign Time**

What is the time of unproductive activity? What is the time of the sovereign, of the one who has liberated himself from the demands of utility and has thoroughly embraced the value of the present? Bataille’s response is that it has to be a time which aims at nothing, a time which is defined by no future teloi but only by the sovereignty of the moment, which becomes infinitely valuable. “We don’t see the sovereign moment arrive, when

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23 Which themselves are nothing but unitary, since every will is a union of antithetical forces. See BGE: 19.
24 GS: 349.
26 See Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 966. Hereafter cited as WP. See also KSA: 11: 27[59]. This strength has nothing to do with the strength of the pre-internalised masters of GM’s First Essay. There, and Nietzsche is clear on this, the masters live the one-sided instinctual life of animals. This has nothing to do with the human ‘proper,’ which comes into existence with the first struggle among antithetical forces. On the masters’ externalising power see GM: 1, 10-11.
nothing counts but the moment itself. What is sovereign in fact is to enjoy the present time without having anything else in view but this present time.”

A future-orientated time is for Bataille a servile time, a time that is in the service of production, and in extension of capitalism itself. Servile time demands (but also produces) a certain anthropological type, the same type whose conditions of existence Nietzsche had scrutinised in *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887). That human type, who will control the future for the sake of production, will have to be able to anticipate that future. Anticipation is a key notion since it demands a high degree of calculability, which becomes possible through the reduction of the once-unknown future to something predictable which can be calculated with precision. Like in factory production, products and productive activity are measured, calculated, carefully planned, and executed. The future is thoroughly known. There are no surprises lying ahead. Nietzsche notes that before the rendering of the future as thoroughly known, man has to train himself into becoming “reliable, regular, necessary.” Only this anthropological type will be able to align himself into a future in the service of production. Production requires regularity, which also means that irregularity (and the corresponding anthropological type) must be the synonym of *un*production.

Bataille notes: “In efficacious activity man becomes the equivalent of a tool, which produces; he is like the thing the tool is, being itself a product. The implication of these facts is quite clear: the tool’s meaning is given by the future, in what the tool will produce, in the future utilisation of the product; like the tool, he who serves—who works—has the value of that which will be later not of that which is.” The prioritisation of a future thoroughly associated with productive activity reduces man to the status of the tool. Man’s value is extracted from the transcendent source of an imagined future. Because of that, man lives in a constant state of anguish which comes to be completed by death. Bataille maintains that death only exists insofar as man lives in anticipation of a future ‘attainment’ of oneself. It is because we have placed the value of our individual existence on an imagined projection, which we call ‘future,’ that we die. If we were to live thoroughly in the present, deriving our value solely from what is, we would be able to live without death, escaping the anguish of death. A sovereign existence “escapes death, in that he lives in the moment.” This moment is the moment of the liberation of time from the demands of the future, not only from a productive future but from all future. Bataille stresses that it is the anticipatory structure of human existence that confines man into the logic of productive time and thus also of

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29 GM: II, 2.
31 Ibid., 219.
death as that which lies at the end of the process of production. “The sovereign man lives and dies like an animal,” he lives only in the sovereignty of the moment which has liberated itself from all teloi.

The Complications of Will

The ambiguities of Bataille’s notion of sovereignty, a type of power which is powerful as long as it is willing to let itself go, help us to understand better the usually misunderstood notion of will to power. We have seen, above, Nietzsche’s aversion to the bourgeois idolisation of preservation, which he considers to be not a natural characteristic of human and non-human animals but rather the pernicious effect of culture. In reality, as he notes, “physiologists should think twice before positioning the drive for self-preservation as the cardinal drive of an organic being. Above all, a living thing wants to discharge its strength—life itself is will to power …” This power comes to refer to a notorious series of “appropriation, injuring, overpowering, oppressing, imposing, exploiting …” Even if the kind of power for which Nietzsche speaks here is what interpreters call “metaphysical,” one cannot help but observe that even within the metaphysical model, someone, or rather something (a force), is to oppress and something else is to be oppressed. However necessary Nietzsche thinks that that is for life, it is certainly not particularly pleasant, not only for the one which gets oppressed but also for the one which oppresses. The stultifying effect of power does not only affect political actors but also forces, which, by overpowering other forces and exterminating opposition, ‘unwittingly’ come to remove the reason of their existence as forces within the greater game of power in which they are implicated. Despite power’s notoriety, and Nietzsche’s own inflamed rhetoric, in what follows I would like to argue that Nietzsche had experimented throughout his career with the possibility not only of setting limits to power but also with the prospect of abolishing it altogether, not because of caprice or weakness, but because it is in the very

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32 Ibid.
33 BGE: 13.
34 Ibid., 259.
35 Metaphysical power denotes the ‘being’ of the world, what the world ultimately is.
36 In TI: “What the Germans Lack,” 1. Nietzsche had observed that “power stultifies [die Macht verdummt].”
37 The TI quote refers to political power, particularly the tendency of Germans to dominate, which, as Nietzsche believes, is what ultimately makes them stupid (verdummt).
38 In the most characteristic of the passages supporting the metaphysical interpretation of the will to power, Nietzsche describes power as “a play of forces [Spiel von Kräften] and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing together …” WP: 1067, KSA: 11:38[12].

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nature of power, as I will shortly argue, to flirt with what threatens to annihilate it. Nietzsche’s endeavour to restrict power takes place for reasons internal to the dynamic of the will to power and for reasons external to it. The internal reasons are related to the constitution of will and the constitution of power. The external reasons are related to the two major steps in which Nietzsche deals with power. The first step describes Nietzsche’s early struggle with the notion of agon, the typical case of restricting power, and the second step describes Nietzsche’s meditations on the problem of the eternal return, which I read as Nietzsche’s attempt to deconstruct the linearity of Christian-productive time and thus also to deconstruct the power-structures that have produced the domesticated animal which we have been trained to call ‘man.’ Ultimately, the thought of the return is a thought concerning the possibility of power to exist through that which perennially opposes it and is Nietzsche’s final step in dealing with power.

Let me now briefly examine the internal reasons for the inevitable powerlessness of power. Rather than expressing powerfulness, simple and clear, the notion of the will to power is ambiguous. Its ambiguity rests primarily in the obscurities of its constitution as will, and secondly in Nietzsche’s own idiosyncratic definition of power. To begin with, and strictly speaking, the very utterance of the word ‘will’ is only a sign of the human need to falsify the world by simplifying it, which means by reducing it to the categories of the one and the many, which, however helpful they are for orienting humans in the world, remain nevertheless the expression of prejudices exacerbated by the help of popularising philosophers like Schopenhauer. There is nothing simple or unified in the ‘will:’ “will” is “complicated.” Nietzsche believed that the notion of unity [Einheit] is only something fictional that humans derive from their own psychic experience. In reality, unities are multiplicities structured around hierarchical principles and finding themselves in dynamic antagonism. Interestingly, in his own copy of Lange’s Geschichte des Materialismus (1866), Nietzsche had found and marked the following passage from Goethe: “Every living thing, is not a single thing, but a plurality; even insofar as it appears to us as an individual,
it still remains a collection of living independent beings.”43 That we need unities is not an argument for the existence of such unities, it is only a testament to the various failures of our psychic apparatus. In a revealing Nachlass note, Nietzsche states: “We need ‘unities’ in order to be able to reckon: that does not mean we must suppose that such unities exist. We have borrowed the concept of unity from our ‘ego’ concept—our oldest article of faith. If we did not hold ourselves to be unities, we would never have formed the concept ‘thing.’ Now, somewhat late, we are firmly convinced that our conception of the ego does not guarantee any actual unity.”44 Willing is “something unified only in a word”45 while in reality it describes a battlefield of forces which command and forces which obey, in eternity. This willing, at once one and many, is the outcome of the “synthetic concept of the ‘I,’”46 what, only out of habit, we call ‘I,’ ‘subject,’ ‘ego,’ or soul, all grammatical unities utilised though to express eine tausendfache Complexität.47 Nietzsche recognises the stalemate to which language drives him. For lack of a better word, he speaks of a something [Etwas] which expresses “the center of [a] system constantly shifting.”48 The will of the will to power, then, rather than articulating the determination of the one, expresses a unity only as organisation49 of the opposing forces which seek to express themselves within the system of powers which we call body [Leib] and resembles a society in that it is constructed by many “souls,”50 which is to say by many unified multiplicities manifesting their oneness only in the popularised superficiality of the grammatical level.

We have seen that the ‘will’ that wills power is anything but determinate. And yet will is still directed toward something (Macht). The fact of the directionality of the will should not be confused with some kind of authoritarian determinedness in the heart of the will. The will is directed toward something, because everything is directed toward something, in the sense of moving,51 without implying that movement ever reaches a final

44 WP: 635, KSA: 13:14[79].
45 BGE: 19.
46 Ibid.
47 KSA: 13, 14[145].
48 WP: 488, KSA: 12:9[98].
49 WP: 561, KSA: 12:2[87].
50 BGE: 19. Nietzsche refers here to the notion of the cell-state.
51 “We cannot imagine becoming other than as the transition from one persisting ‘dead’ state to another persisting ‘dead’ state.” KSA: 9, 11[150], trans. by Robin Small in Robin Small, Time and Becoming in Nietzsche’s Thought (London: Continuum, 2010), 4.
Yet the will is not moving toward any direction but specifically toward *Macht*. Why is that? I would like to argue that the will moves toward what mostly resembles it and that is Nietzsche’s own version of power. Will and power are related by their internal structure, which is none other than that of ambiguity. On the one hand, will is certainly the will to overpower something, even when simultaneously will also ‘knows’ that it cannot overpower the opposing force since that would bring the ‘game of forces’ to an unforeseen end. The flux of forces is eternal and will remain so. On the other hand, will is internally related to *Macht*, because there it sees the mirror image of itself. It is attracted by what is ambiguous, as will itself is.

**Power Bound**

The question of power is certainly one of the most important subjects in Nietzsche’s bibliography. Here I am not interested in examining power as a psychological motivator or as a political principle, but solely in shedding light to some aspects of the internal dynamic of power (or the ontology of power), specifically those which will support my claim for the ultimate powerfulness of power. There is no question that power refers to a force of appropriation and overcoming, otherwise Nietzsche would not use the very word “power.” However, Nietzsche makes a distinction which goes usually unnoticed, that between *Kraft* and *Macht*. *Kraft* is essentially a leftover of the “mechanistic view of the world,” itself an anthropomorphisation of nature whereby we assign relations of causes and effects to the world in order to comprehend it. *Kraft* is supposed to express a “primitive energy” which originally creates and sustains nature through relations of regularity and necessity. However, these relations simply do not exist. The only things that exist are relations of power that behave irregularly, unpredictably, and in an undisciplined manner. This ‘power-will’ is not, rather it ‘radiates’ [*diese Strahlung von Machtwillen*] through the whole of being [*das ganze Sein*], and as

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52 “If the motion of the world aimed at a final state, that state would have been reached. The sole fundamental fact, however, is that it does not aim at a final state …” WP: 708, KSA: 13: 11[72].


54 WP: 618, KSA: 11, 36[34].

55 WP: 624, KSA: 12:7[56].

56 Golomb, “Will to Power: Does it Lead to the ’Coldest of All Cold Monsters’?”, 527.
radiation eventually escapes the ‘mechanistic order’ which cannot capture it.\textsuperscript{57}

Because the world does not behave in a mechanical and regular way, \textit{Kraft} is an inappropriate concept to describe the relations permeating nature. “The victorious concept ‘force’ [\textit{Kraft}], by means of which our physicists have created God and the world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as ‘will to power,’ i.e. as an insatiable desire to manifest power [\textit{Macht}] …”\textsuperscript{58} This ‘will to power,’ which expresses “the degree of resistance and the degree of superior power,”\textsuperscript{59} is what is left over after we have extracted from the world our successive layers of anthropomorphisms.

If we eliminate these additions [number, thing, activity, motion], no things remain but only dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their ‘effect’ upon the same. The will to power not a being, not a becoming but a \textit{pathos}—the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting emerge.\textsuperscript{60}

Nietzsche believes, then, that being or becoming can be grounded in something elemental, which, however, is not a being. The etymological richness of the word \textit{pathos} does not help to clarify its relation to power. Is power a quality of things, or perhaps an unfortunate accident? Is power a sensation or a calamity and a defeat?\textsuperscript{61} Certainly Nietzsche seems to prioritise the elemental character of pathos, yet as a distinguished classical philologist and passionate anti-Christian could not remain oblivious to the strong connotations of ‘internal suffering’ that befalls the mind, nor to the later Christianised long history of explicating pathoi as the evil and lustful wishes of the soul that have to be eradicated.\textsuperscript{62}

If power suffers, then, it is because power is, and never was, too sure of itself. My argument concerning power is that it is unstable from the very moment of its constitution as power, because the forces which constitute it are in a constant antagonism with each other, which does not allow for one force to overpower the other. The \textit{agon} in power is eternal. But before explaining

\textsuperscript{57} KSA: 13: 14[79].
\textsuperscript{58} WP: 619, KSA: 11:36[31].
\textsuperscript{59} WP: 634, KSA: 13:14[79].
\textsuperscript{60} WP: 635, KSA: 13:14[79].
\textsuperscript{61} Some of the meaning of \textit{pathos} in George Henry Liddell and Robert Scott, \textit{A Greek-English Lexicon} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1285. See also Γιώργος Μπαμπινιώτης, \textit{Ετυμολογικό Λεξικό της Νέας Ελληνικής Γλώσσας} (Αθήνα: Κέντρο Λεξικολογίας, 2010), 1019.
\textsuperscript{62} See Romans 1:26, Colossians 3:5,1, Thessalonians 4:5.
the hydraulics of power, let us take a step back toward describing the sublimating character of power in relation to force. In one of the most interesting passages on the problem of power, Nietzsche notes:

We are still on our knees before strength [Kraft] after the ancient custom of slaves – and yet when the degree of worthiness to be revered is fixed, only the degree of rationality in strength is decisive: we must access to what extent precisely strength has been overcome by something higher, in the service of which it now stands as means and instrument!

He concludes the aphorism by noting that the characteristic of the “great human being” is his “victory over strength.”63 The aphorism makes clear that the distinctive mark of the human, over its pre-human, animalistic past, is its capacity to sublate the physicality of force by transfiguring it into something higher, namely power. Force is appropriate to slaves because it is something simple, it is only a matter of ‘mechanics,’ whereas power, like will, is complicated.

The complicated character of power arises from its agonistic constitution. In an illuminating Nachlass note, Nietzsche gives his most precise definition of power: “The will to power can manifest itself only against resistances [Widerständen]; therefore, it seeks that which resists it.”64 We have to be clear on how we interpret this crucial passage. Nietzsche says that the precondition for the very existence of power is resistance. Resistance is what generates power. Power only exists because, and for as long as, there is resistance. This makes clear that power does not and cannot stand alone but needs another in order to constitute it as power. Not just any other, but another which actively opposes it. Resistance and power are the two poles that constitute the thing Nietzsche calls Macht. In a similar fashion, in Ecce Homo (1908), where Nietzsche explicates the rules under which one is to launch and conduct war, he notes: “The strength of an attacker can in a way be gauged by the opposition he requires; all growth makes itself manifest by searching out a more powerful opponent.”65 Equally, in a Nachlass note from Spring 1888, he writes: “A quantum of power is designated by the effect it produces and that which it resists. The adiaphorous state is missing …”66

64 WP: 656, KSA: 12:9[151]
Power is dynamic since it always strives for more, for a maximum feeling of power, and is structurally relational. Ciano Aydin stresses the following:

Nietzsche’s principle of the will to power implies that relation is not an additional element of things but, rather, something that constitutes in a fundamental way what a thing is. In other words, there are no first things, which then have relations with each other; rather, things are what they are by virtue of their relations.

The structural relationality of what Aydin calls the ‘thing’, or the nature of reality, produces a dynamic relation of power(s) and resistance(s) which motivates a process where powers, or the drives which constitute power (whose intrinsic characteristic is growth), always “lust for more” through their unbreakable relation. John Richardson has developed the interesting line of reasoning whereby drives, through their striving toward the maximisation of their potency, always aim to achieve some state of power. Yet this state is never actually reached since this would signpost the coming of what Nietzsche has called a state of adiaphoria. If the overcoming of resistances is the principal characteristic of the will to power, then the overcoming of drives brings about a non-state of perennial overcoming, and that will mean that it brings about the overcoming of power itself. As Richardson notes, “To be a will to power, it must already want something other than power.” Due to its internal constitution, as an agonistic interrelation of forces which always strive to rule, will to power brings about its self-overcoming and becomes indeed something other than power, which is to say it becomes what it already was: overcoming. Nietzsche, then, through his building of a paradoxical core-inhabiting power, subverts the traditional understanding of power as achievement, possession, control, or capacity, and turns it on its head. The controlling or possessive power is the power which will eventually overcome control or possession and will become potentiality instead of actuality. Thus, the will to power signifies not the will to this or that end, but rather the will to an end which overcomes itself, to a passage through which the will to power will continue to grow as potentiality.

To put it briefly, Nietzschean power is not there to win anything, but to lose itself, as actuality; and through that act of profound losing, to gain itself as

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67 KSA: 13: 14[82].
69 WP: 481, KSA: 12: 7[60].
71 Ibid., 23.
potentiality. This is why Nietzsche prescribes to his readers to exercise the principle of ‘great suffering,’ which is great insofar as it does not consume itself into masochistic self-flagellation for the benefit of a narcissistic occupation with the self.\textsuperscript{72} Great suffering, as the practice of great losing, becomes the precondition for the enhancement of the whole human species. Paradoxically, Nietzsche seems to suggest, the greatest exercise of power is for the power to be incorporated,\textsuperscript{73} because by this act of incorporation it comes to be transformed into something greater and stronger than it was.

**Eternal Return or Sovereignty in Ruins**

Notoriously, there are as many interpretations of Nietzsche’s infamous thought concerning eternal return as there are readers of Nietzsche’s oeuvre, perhaps even more. Here I am interested in clarifying solely the following aspect of the thought of the return. I wish to argue that this thought is a thought that continuous and completes Nietzsche’s meditations on power. I have shown before that Nietzsche promoted a power which becomes sovereign only after its acceptance of the inevitability of its powerlessness. In a similar fashion, I wish to argue that Nietzsche believes that in order to liberate time from the bonds of linearity\textsuperscript{74} time has to embrace loss and unproduction. That can be done only by liberating time from the bonds of the past, from the demands and the awards of the future, and from a present that is only insofar as it serves something other than the sovereignty of its moment, of the moment. Circular non-nihilistic time is a time directed toward life: not life as a project to be completed in some ideal future time and under certain prescriptions and demands, but rather life as the glorious manifestation of the primordiality of the forces which constitute its eternal flux. Eternal return is an experiment in a time which loses itself, loses the projects of everydayness and the various authoritarianisms of social structures aiming solely in a life concentrating in accumulation and production.

*Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883) opens with Zarathustra’s remarkable statement concerning the necessity of his *going under* [Ich muss …

\textsuperscript{72} “… for your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to be.” Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1. Hereafter cited as UM.

\textsuperscript{73} BGE: 259.

\textsuperscript{74} Linearity is guilty, since it has produced the docile human type depicted in *GM*, a human type which is enslaved into a logic of production and future awards in the name of which the present loses all its value. Ultimately, the thought of the return is the attempt to eternalise the moment, to value the moment, against the eternal transitoriness of valueless moments.
Untergehen is a verb describing not only a descent (toward something), but also destruction. In that sense, Ich muss … untergehen means: “I must destroy [myself]” or “I must perish.” Commentators⁷⁶ are right in underlining the importance of Zarathustra’s descent as the antipode to Platonic/Christian culture which ascends toward [divine] light (or turns toward light, as in Plato’s parable of the cave) in its attempt to approach the transcendent truth. Zarathustra the teacher follows a different path. Instead of ascending, and leaving behind what he finds unworthy of the contemplation of the divine logos, he descends and takes with him (incorporates) everything that has been neglected by the Platonic/Christian culture: the data of experience, the experience of the body, senses, etc. All of the above is certainly true. However, one must not lose sight of Zarathustra’s literal use of untergehen. Zarathustra really has to perish, really has to destroy himself, really has to beat himself to the ground, so to speak, if he is to be worthy of his vocation as the teacher of the one who goes over, the Overhuman.⁷⁷ This literal use of untergehen is reinforced further in the text, when Zarathustra makes an even more remarkable calling to one’s self-destruction: “I love those who do not know how to live except by going under [als Untergehende], for they are those who go over and across.”⁷⁸ Here Zarathustra makes a rather powerful claim: he tells us that, unfortunately, and despite the plethora of self-help literature, ultimately there does not exist a guidebook in life, something that can guide us around this mystery of our lives. But Zarathustra further suggests that he will give all his love only to those who will live by destroying themselves. To be able to live beyond life, beyond the burden of self-preservation, is to want to perish. Ultimately the sovereign, the Overhuman, is going to be the human willing to abandon himself so that he can find himself.⁷⁹ This is what characterises the

⁷⁷ Burnham & Jesinghausen successfully spot this literal and yet neglected use of untergehen. Douglas Burnham and Martin Jesinghausen, Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 16.
⁷⁸ TSZ: Prologue, 4.
⁷⁹ Here the idea of self-sacrifice is prevalent. The Christian-sounding formulation of the sentence is indeed provocative and urges us to clarify the kind of sacrifice Nietzsche speaks about. Does Nietzsche rightly sound ‘too Christian’ with his idolisation of self-sacrifice, or does he speak for something other than what a Christian will understand? In her outstanding essay “Justice and Gift-Giving in Thus Spoke Zarathustra” Vanessa Lemm attempts to provide an answer to the above-mentioned problem. Lemm maintains that the practice of gift-giving in Zarathustra is to be differentiated from that of charity and alms, since while the former promotes the distance between the one and the other, acknowledging thus the “other’s irreducible singularity,” the latter promotes “a hierarchical relationship of domination which not only reinforces dependency
Overhuman. He is not the power that dominates, but rather the power that sacrifices [itself] so that he can further live as power.

In a Nachlass note from 1883, Nietzsche notes: “The absolute necessity of a total liberation from ends: otherwise we should not be permitted to try to sacrifice ourselves and let ourselves go. Only the innocence of becoming gives us the greatest courage and the greatest freedom!” The note is interesting for many reasons and it can be argued that it paves the way to my reading of the thought of the return. The note’s compelling claim is the link between the exigency of man’s disengagement from any logic of teloi and the prospect of absolute freedom which this liberation promises. Improvement is a key notion in Christian religion, and ascetic practices necessarily accompany a life dedicated to self-cultivation with regard to transcendentals aims. In his GM, Nietzsche has shown how the ascetic life that the priest imposes as a value upon the masses of the heteronomous slaves has hindered their realisation of the immensity of the forces which constitute them and has forever sealed them in a protective cocoon against the threat of nihilism, i.e. the threat of having to ‘dare’ to create their own meaning of their existence. But Nietzsche makes also another, perhaps more audacious, claim. He asserts that the freedom one gets from the innocence of becoming is not so much a freedom from X or Y, but rather a freedom to something very specific, namely self-sacrifice.

Lemm further argues that the crucial difference between Nietzschean and Christian sacrifice is the selflessness/ egoism dichotomy. Christian sacrifice is only superficially selfless. In reality, it is the result of an impoverished will. The ‘love for one’s neighbour’ only shows an absence of a self and someone who cannot ‘stand himself.’ Love for the neighbour is a compensation for the absence of the love to one’s self. It is an attempt to “compensate for one’s own interior emptiness.” On the contrary, the Nietzschean squanderer’s self-sacrifice is an expression of an ‘overflowing of the self;’ the squanderer gives (he gives himself not objects) because he is too ‘full of him,’ he is too much and thus he has to give away. Lemm notes that “Nietzsche compares the overflowing of the self ... to the natural movement of a river overflowing its banks. Both movements are ‘involuntary (unfreiwillig);’ they illustrate the idea that gift-giving is not an act which can be traced back to an intentional subject, a conscious decision, or a willful act. Gift-giving occurs inevitably, fatefully, involuntary. The giver of gifts gives him- or herself over to the other not because they are free to give, but because he or she is not free not to give.” See Vanessa Lemm, “Justice and Gift-Giving in Thus Spoke Zarathustra”, in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Before Sunrise. ed. by James Luchte (London: Continuum, 2008), 165-181.

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petty, i.e. to himself. Man is the animal who is ready, at all times, to let himself go, to sacrifice himself.

We have seen above how Zarathustra’s inaugural speech conveys the ambivalence of a movement that has to be a going under so that it can eventually be also a going over. Transitions and movements of this sort are prevalent throughout TSZ and they reach their peak at every mention of the thought of ‘the return.’ The chapter “The Convalescent” is one of those characteristic moments of Nietzschean dialectics where opposites meet only to be melted into a whole which is going to move the narrative forward. The chapter is concerned with the fate of the lowest, of that which does not deserve existence since all it can do is to accuse and debase it. Zarathustra is horrified at the idea that he may himself have to be what he loathes most: an accuser of humanity. Why does Zarathustra even dare to contemplate such a defeatist thought? How could he, the eulogist of all joy that comes from attending to the needs of the earth and of those who live according to nature’s (chaotic) demands, turn against his own mission? Yet Zarathustra confesses to his animals, life’s enigmatic teaching: “Ah, my animals, this alone have I learned so far, that for the human, its most evil is necessary for its best” and that the human “must become better and more evil.”82 The West has advanced so far by a process of exclusion, which was originally based on the Platonic teaching concerning the contemplation of the Forms. Nietzsche wishes to overturn the Platonic/Christian model of exclusion by advancing an interpretation of the human which is based on incorporation. The new type of the human advanced by Nietzsche is not going to exclude the other but incorporate it; that is the meaning of Zarathustra’s advice to become more evil. We have to welcome what until now has been deemed unworthy, evil, inferior; only by this process of incorporation eventually we are going to learn; the rest is cowardice, in the most Kantian sense. Naturally, the process is not going to be easy. In a note from 1887 Nietzsche observes: “The time has come when we have to pay for having been Christians for two thousand years.”83 The thought of incorporation is difficult to swallow even for Zarathustra. He literally chokes at the idea of a “great loathing for the human.” And yet he has to accept the greatest of all thoughts, that the love of his fate and the eternal return of all things demands also the return of the most despicable, of the most nauseating form of human animal, the return of the lowest: the last human, the complacent bourgeois, the Christian, the socialist, the democrat, the cultural philistine. “Ah, disgust! disgust! disgust!” cries Zarathustra at the realisation of the necessity of the eternal return of the smallest human being.84

82 TSZ: The Convalescent.
84 TSZ: The Convalescent.

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To be sure, Zarathustra does not endorse the return of something changed, but the return of the same conditions that bring about life as a possibility of growth and incorporation. A few lines further, Zarathustra insists that he will eternally return to “this self-same life [zu diesem gleichen und selbigen Leben] … not to a new life or a better life or a similar life.” Is this equivalent with the return of the identical? Nietzsche clearly believes that the life which returns is the same as the life already lived. Yet his rhetoric gets ahead of him, since it promotes something qualitatively different to what even Nietzsche believes that he endorses. The typical example is “The Drunken Song” from the fourth part of *TSZ*. There Zarathustra praises *Joy*, for it wants all eternity. A life of joy seeks to incorporate in it everything that up to now has been left outside the corpus of ‘approved’ life for the humans. Joy wants all that life has to offer, beyond judgments and exclusions. Indeed, “so rich is joy that she thirsts for woe, for Hell, for hate, for disgrace, for the cripple, for world …” You superior humans, it is for you that she yearns, this

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85 Ibid.

86 The matter concerning the return of the same as identical is famously much discussed by Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze argued that the eternal return does not refer to a return of identical events, but rather on the event of the return itself. What returns in the return is not ‘facts’ but the very act of returning, which returns as eternally differing since being and becoming are intertwined: “That everything returns is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being …” That Deleuze heavily relied on mistaken French translations for his undoubtedly original exposition of the return is now well-known. (For more on this issue see: Paolo D’Iorio, “Nietzsche et l’éternel retour. Genèse et interprétation”, in Nietzsche. Cahiers de l’Herne (Paris : L’Herne, 2000), 361-389. For an English translation, see Paolo D’Iorio, “The Eternal Return: Genesis and Interpretation,” trans. by Frank Chouraqui, in Nietzsche Circle: A Philosophical Community (April 2011), <http://www.nietzschecircle.com/Pdf/Diorio_Chouraqui-FINAL APRIL 2011.pdf>, 4 April 2016. However, this does not minimize his contribution to efforts to provide Nietzsche with a way out of the deadlock that his apparent insistence on the sameness of the same in which returns had trapped him. Deleuze was certainly right in insisting that a type of identical sameness would remove from Nietzsche his right to an educational philosophy of overcomings, which is something that we still ought to safeguard today. But Deleuze makes also another, rather problematic, move in two steps. First, he invents a dichotomy that is highly unlikely to ever have existed in Nietzsche’s work, that between active and reactive forces, and in a second step he understands what he calls ‘reactive forces’ as essentially nihilistic. This requires him to deny the eternal return of ‘the reactive’ as inconsistent and contradictory to Nietzsche’s affirmative philosophy. On the first step: “Neither the word nor the concept of ‘reactive forces’ ever appears in Nietzsche’s philosophy.” See D’Iorio, “Nietzsche et l’éternel retour. Genèse et interprétation.” Cf. Marco Brusotti, “Die ‘Selbstverkleinerung des Menschen’ in der Moderne : Studie zu Nietzsches ‘Zur Genealogie der Moral,” in Nietzsche-Studien, 21 (1992), 83, 102-103; Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 1962 ed., trans. by Hugh Tomlinson (London: Continuum, 1986), 46-47 passim. To be sure Nietzsche does speak for reactive affects or reactive men, as in GM: II, 11, but this has nothing to do with the concept of a reactive force. Rather than reactive [Kraft] Nietzsche utilizes the concept of resistance [Wiederstehen] in order to express the antithetical and yet interrelated life of the Macht, as in KSA: 13: 14[79] and 12: 9[151]. On the second step, see Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 64-65.
joy, intractable, blissful for your woe, you that have failed! For failures does all eternal joy yearn."87 The passage raises many problems in relation to the thought of the return. What does it precisely mean that joy seeks the return of hate? It possibly means that joy, which wishes the return of all things, wishes also the incorporation of such a fundamental source of human knowledge as hate. According to Nietzsche’s agonistic model of life (power), one (one person, one culture) is the locus of antithetical forces fighting for victory. The ‘victory’ of a force is the recognition of the power of the other force. Joy, then, would not be a joy at all if it didn’t seek the other which completes it. It needs the other the same way the master in Hegel’s Phenomenology needs the slave in order to recognise him. However, Nietzsche goes one step further. Joy also needs Hell [Hölle]! Is the mention of hell made in order to exaggerate the conditions of resistance that joy needs in order to express itself, or as a premonition of the Christian condemnation that awaits this overfull joy which seeks all eternity? What does it mean precisely to suggest that, through the thought of the return, humanity should wish also the return of hell? Does it mean that humanity should seek the return of the conditions that will bring her [humanity] down?

The next line further complicates the matter. Zarathustra, turning to the ‘superior humans’ (those who pave the way to the Overhuman but who are not yet Overhumans themselves), warns them that “it is for you that she yearns this joy … for your woe, you that have failed! For failures does all eternal joy yearns.”88 What does it precisely mean to say that joy, which wants all eternity, seeks also the eternal return of failures? According to the agonistic model of power, a force, as long as it resists, can maintain itself both in life and in the agon. But what about failures? What about those who have simply failed to maintain themselves in the agon? Do they disappear? Here Nietzsche seems to suggest that even the most nauseating element in life will return also, because the joy of life, the willingness to incorporate the whole range of human experience, is so great that joy will not exclude anything. Nietzsche is on thin ice here. On the one hand he has repeatedly asserted the return to this ‘self-same’ life which is not going to be either ‘new’ or ‘similar,’ and on the other hand he declares the return of failures as if what has failed is not going to change the kind of life that one lives! To seek the return of all woe and all hell is not simply to seek the return of conditions of resistance as the agonistic model of power would demand; it is to actively seek that which can potentially fundamentally upset the very conditions of life as an agonistic relation of powers. It is not the case that the return wishes the return of an opposite. The return here seeks that which will perhaps challenge the very

87 TSZ: The Drunken Song.
88 Ibid.
conditions of the return itself. Otherwise a ‘hell’ is not hell, but something simply unpleasant.

As we have seen above, Nietzsche believes that the will to preserve something signifies a weak nature, it is a sign of a declining life that resists the possibility of coming in contact with what can fundamentally challenge it. Nietzsche seems to suggest that a life that is too full of itself should not be afraid to prepare or even to welcome the conditions of its self-annihilation. The chapter “The Drunken Song” is Heraclitean in the most precise fashion, because it upsets every rule of logic, and yet it wants its central suggestion to be taken seriously: that joy, a life beyond the exclusions of the Western/Christian paradigm, is not afraid to seek its own failure as well.

But the above cannot be a declaration of pessimism and a testimony of defeat. If it were that, then Silenus would have had to be right after all, and man’s short sojourn upon the earth would be in vain. On another occasion, Nietzsche has warned all those who tend to spend themselves extravagantly (the ‘higher types’) that they should learn to conserve themselves, since this is the “greatest test of independence.” To say that one has to be ready to wish failure is not the same as saying that one has to wish the eternal return of the conditions of failure. The former is getting ready to accept defeat while the latter wishes to incorporate the whole of life back to the cultural paradigm of the present. But Nietzsche is also telling us something else: that the wish of the return of the conditions of failure brings back the issue of the agonistic relation not only to one’s own self but also to one’s contemporaries. Ultimately one has to conserve himself against the fashions and the clamouring crowds of his times so that he can be ready to throw himself toward the right sort of agon. To be sure, there are competitions of all kinds, and then there are agons. Competitions are what the Roman crowds in the Colosseum (and their contemporary equivalents in public arenas) craved: in some cases, an exhibition of sheer power, in other cases, exhibitions of (so-called) beauty, possessiveness of things, etc. The end of competition is the annihilation of the other. In agonistic contests, on the other hand, the aim is the consolidation of the power of the one through the consolidation of the power of the other. There is a dialectic of forces at work here aiming again at an eternal overcoming, not at a final stage of closure. “And all the people laughed at Zarathustra.” Zarathustra comes to learn to conserve himself and

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89 See footnotes 23, 24.
91 BGE: 41.
92 TSZ: Zarathustra’s Prologue, 3.
not be wasted in pointless competitions. The crowds will never be ready to hear his message. He has thus to conserve himself for those who are ready (if any is), he has to prepare himself for the right sort of agons, for worthy opponents,93 whose opposition to him will ultimately honour him.

**Conclusion**

Zarathustra comes to the people with the sole purpose of presenting them with the gift of the possible arrival of that which will overcome the human without though leaving behind the human. Among the characteristics of this human of the future is its fundamental disregard for the preservation of its type. In order to go over the human of the future has first to go under, and this is where his overcoming lies. “I love him whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and does not give back again: for he always bestows and would not preserve himself.”94 The Overhuman is a sovereign, but a sovereign without dominion. He has urged his disciples to abandon him95 and he keeps nothing to himself: “I, a squanderer with a thousand hands ...”96 He knows that his sovereignty is his failure to persevere. He is not of the kind which endures. It is because higher types are concentrations of extreme contradictory forces that are pulling the centre apart that they are not meant to last.97

In this paper I have argued that Nietzsche, and his disciple Bataille, embrace an understanding of power that temporarily establishes itself through its willingness to ‘let itself go.’ Bataille develops his notion of sovereignty based on the Hegelian suggestion of a life that counts only to the extent that is willing to dissociate itself from the bounds of biological preservation. Bataille further suggests that it is because the cosmos is fully charged with excessive energy and lacks nothing that humans and their societies can exist in a state of permanent consumption, something that naturally upsets the laws of political economy and the current global spread of capitalist/accumulative logic. I have argued that this move by Bataille was anticipated by Nietzsche. Rather than a type of power which imposes and dominates, Nietzschean power serves only the sovereignty of a moment which escapes the utilitarian calculations of the present. Inevitably, this power belongs wholly to the future; it belongs to “the Zarathustra-realm of a

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93 *EH: Why I Am So Wise*, 7.
94 *TSZ: Zarathustra’s Prologue*, 4.
95 *TSZ: On the Bestowing Virtue*, 3.
96 *TSZ: The Honey Offering*.
thousand years.”\textsuperscript{98} In contrast, the present belongs to the rabble,\textsuperscript{99} which understands sovereignty and power solely in the context of wins and losses, of ‘stuff’ which one accumulates as one marches forward. Bataille, with his development of the idea of excessive energy, and Nietzsche, with his idea of the eternal return, have both resisted the teleological, and for both of them also moralistic, structure of history in favour of a perennially self-consuming and self-generating model that originates itself in the primordial battle of forces constituting the \textit{agon}. Through my analysis of Bataille’s and Nietzsche’s views I have shown that the type of power they are contemplating opposes the type which was cultivated by the Western historical paradigm. Bataille’s sovereignty and Nietzschean power demand the cultivation of conditions of resistance\textsuperscript{100} and thus render themselves ambiguous, complicated, and multifarious.

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\textsuperscript{98} TSZ: The Honey Offering.

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The Ethics of Engaged Pedagogy:  
A Comparative Study 
of Watsuji Tetsurô and bell hooks 

Anton Luis Sevilla

Abstract: This article is a comparative study of bell hooks’s “engaged pedagogy” with Watsuji Tetsurô’s systematic ethics. The purpose of this comparison is twofold. The first reason is to examine the relational view of ethics that underlies hooks’s thought in order to explore her deliberately “un-academic” work in a philosophically rigorous way. The second reason is to examine the fundamental connections of Watsuji’s ethics of human existence to an education for human becoming. This comparison will be carried out in two stages. First, I will examine the connections of hooks and Watsuji on the level of society and relational structures. Second, I will delve deeper into the existential/spiritual level in the ethics/education of emptiness.

Keywords: Hooks, Watsuji, bell hooks, critical pedagogy, Buddhism

Introduction

In this article, I shall be exploring the “engaged pedagogy” of bell hooks and the “ethics of emptiness” of Watsuji Tetsurô through a comparative study of key themes that appear in their work. This serves two purposes: The first purpose is to clarify the theoretical and philosophical grounds of hooks’s astute but casual (and deliberately “un-academic“) critique of contemporary educational trends, and in so doing highlight the importance of engaged pedagogy in more scholarly domains. I think this cannot be accomplished using a primarily individualist or universal mode of ethics (as is common with most readings of deontology or utilitarianism) but is better served by a relational form of ethics that stresses concrete relationships as the site of ethical character and behavior. I think Watsuji’s ethics is particularly well suited for this task.

Second, while clarifying hooks’s pedagogy via Watsuji, this article
also examines the fundamental connection between Watsuji’s ethics and education—the human becoming (Jp. ningen seisei) necessary in order to realize Watsuji’s vision for human being (Jp. ningen sonzai). This will both highlight Watsuji’s practical applications as well as develop them further.

However, allow me to point out the practical context behind these theoretical concerns. While this situation is likely shared by other former colonies in Asia and the Americas, the Philippines is in the difficult position of having a culture with both individualist as well as group-centric (pakikisama) elements. It also has a political situation that requires the development of both individual criticality as well as improved national consciousness and solidarity.¹ This situation is perhaps further complicated by an overwhelming focus on the individual and the universal in philosophical discourse, often to the neglect of intermediary elements like the family, the ethnic group, or the state.² Many philosophers and pedagogues have been working to address this one-sidedness, and this article is part of the broader project of suggesting an ethical and educational model that accounts for and addresses both the individualist (liberal) and collective (communitarian) aspects needed for our flourishing.

I will begin this article by introducing the two thinkers. I will then proceed to do an analysis of their ideas. First, on the level of the structures that govern the relationship between individuals and groups, I will examine hooks’s view of nurturing criticality through the mutual recognition of subjects. Then, I will compare this to Watsuji’s notion of the double-negation of individuality and totality, and suggest points in which each system of thought can contribute to the other. Second, I will proceed deeper to the murkier domain of spiritual/existential depth. There, I will discuss hooks’s idea of “engagement” as a spiritual, healing relationship. I will analyze this through Watsuji’s view of emptiness, and what it means to share in emptiness via culture.

**The Structure of Education and Ethics**

These two thinkers may seem to have very little in common, and as far as I know there is no research connecting the two.³ But I argue that upon

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¹ For example, see Agustin Martin G. Rodriguez, *Governing the Other: Exploring the Discourse of Democracy in a Multiverse of Reason* (Metro Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2009).


³ However, I owe the connection between bell hooks and Watsuji Tetsurô to the following, which mentions but does not develop this connection: Erin McCarthy, *Ethics Embodied:*
closer examination, they can mutually reinforce each other in many ways. Here, I focus on two main issues. First is the “double-negative” movement as it occurs in the structure of education.

bell hooks’s Vision for Education

In *Teaching to Transgress* (1994), bell hooks begins with her experience of racially segregated education. She grew up right during the turning point of racial integration policies in the apartheid South (of the United States of America), and went through her elementary and middle school years in an all-black environment. In schools like Booker T. Washington, her experience of education was one that was as personal as it was political. Almost all her teachers were black women, and as members of a marginalized race, they taught their students with a passionate sense of purpose in hopes of liberating black America from its oppression. “We learned early that our devotion to learning, to a life of the mind, was a counter-hegemonic act, a fundamental way to resist every strategy of white racist colonization.”

And in order to teach their students in such a liberatory manner, these teachers engaged their students: got to know the students and their families, and responded to them on the basis of that singular recognition.

With racial integration, this engaged and liberatory sort of teaching disappeared. Bussed to white schools, studying under mostly white teachers and alongside white classmates, black students were exposed to a very different notion of education. According to hooks, education became merely about transmitting information, with no real sense of concern for, nor cultivation of the students themselves. hooks describes this kind of education as the “banking system of education,” where education is characterized by knowledge as mere information, which is simply memorized by students and regurgitated come examination time. She describes this education as acritical and remarkably boring—not due to a lack of entertainment but due to the absence of any attempt to make it connect to the inner lives of each student.

This terminology (“banking”) shows her debt to the founder of critical pedagogy, the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, who opposed the “banking system of education” because he believed it was primarily a tool for maintaining systems of oppression. The method of lecturing to docile students became the preferred mode of education in the United States, much to the chagrin of those who believe in more engaged and liberatory forms of teaching.

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6 For a brief introduction to Freire, see Madonna M. Murphy, “Paulo Freire (1921-1997),” in *The History and Philosophy of Education: Voices of Educational Pioneers* (New Jersey: Pearson, 2006), 383-391.
students acknowledges only the subjectivity of the teachers, and thus reinforces a sense of subservience on the part of the students. This allows oppression to go unchecked. Against this banking method, Freire suggested a “problem posing method,” where the teacher presents problems, which students try to solve together with the teacher through multi-directional communication and dialogue. Here, the object and method of learning is open to negotiation. In this way, students learn not mere information, but knowledge connected to their own subjectivity and their lived praxis.

hooks, who studied with, collaborated with, and critiqued Paulo Freire,7 was deeply influenced by his theory of education. However, her approach to critical pedagogy has a slight twist. In her version, which she refers to as “engaged pedagogy,” there is a much stronger focus on emotional elements of a classroom:

The first paradigm that shaped my pedagogy was the idea that the classroom should be an exciting place, never boring. And if boredom should prevail, then pedagogical strategies were needed that would intervene, alter, even disrupt the atmosphere. Neither Freire’s work nor feminist pedagogy examined the notion of pleasure in the classroom.8

Her books all suggest, from different angles, how to make pedagogy more exciting, and thus more engaged—emotionally, intellectually, and even spiritually—with students and their experiences. There are four main elements she suggests here.9 First, an exciting class cannot be stuck to a set agenda. Rather, it must have the flexibility to respond to the changing needs of the class, to dwell on things as is necessary, and to even skip over other things when they are deemed to lack a real connection with the class. This, thus, depends on a second element, that each student be seen not merely as an individual but as a singularity.10 Because each student has a different context and trajectory, a class that is truly interesting must be flexible in responding to this singularity. However, no matter how much the teacher tries to respond to each student, if the students resist this and content themselves with desiring “mere information,” it is impossible for the class to

7 See hooks, “Chapter 4: Paulo Freire,” in Teaching to Transgress.
8 hooks, Teaching to Transgress, 7.
9 Ibid., 7-11.
10 I use “singularity” in the way used by Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy, in order to indicate the individual that, while radically relational, is unique and irreplaceable, and hence irreducible to the “individual” that is merely a unit of something universal (like reason or utility or biological existence).
be exciting. This shows a third element, that the responsibility for an exciting class is not located merely in an individual but between individuals. This connects to a fourth element: an exciting class must be a place of the mutual recognition of subjects, where each person learns to value the other and to respond as one subject to another.

Only when these four elements—flexibility, responsiveness to singularities, mutual responsibility, and mutual recognition—are present can a class be truly engaging. Thus, hooks’s vision for exciting education is not a call for entertainment or “emotional labor,” but rather of authentic intersubjective connection in a manner that mutually cultivates criticality.

Watsuji and Relational Ethics

The idea of a class that is engaging and engaged seems intuitively appealing, but a closer look at it shows that it is rather complex, if not confusing. What does it mean to be responsive to a student as a singularity? What does it mean for responsibility to be shared in a pedagogic situation? How can one have mutual recognition between singularities? These elements can be clarified by examining the structure of human relationships in hooks’s view of how education should be. But hooks does not directly discuss such a structure.

In order to examine this structure, I wish to turn to Watsuji Tetsurō, and suggest features of his ethics that might reveal the underlying structure to the relationships hooks argues for.

1. The Dual-Structure. hooks’s vision of pedagogy demands a curious interlinking of both individuality and totality, of criticality and solidarity. hooks sees that students need to learn to be critical, to get beyond the established ways of thinking of the group, and to think for themselves. However, this does not imply that students become anti-social monads, concerned only for themselves. Rather, she tries to create a connection between people as creative members of society.

One of Watsuji’s insights is to point out that while both individuality and totality are necessary for human existence, it is no simple matter putting these two together. What does it mean to combine these two incongruous elements, as hooks seems to do?

The relationship with the other that is now under consideration is a negative relationship in both cases. The essential feature characteristic of the independence of an individual lies in rebelling against the whole, and the essential feature characteristic of the wholeness of
the whole lies in its negating the independence of an individual. Hence, an individual is one whose individuality should be negated for the sake of the whole that is to be established, and the whole is that ground against which an individual rebels to establish itself.\(^\text{11}\)

The only way one can learn to think for oneself is to be able to gain some distance from the collective, which is why children leave home and why ascetics move into the mountains. However, the only way to realize solidarity is to suspend one’s individual differences, at least to a certain extent. In other words, if one insists on speaking a language not shared by others, or if one refuses to adjust to shared cultural or even moral codes, that is, if one insists on one’s difference (Fil. *ayaw makisama\(^\text{12}\)), then solidarity becomes impossible.

How then is creative solidarity possible? For Watsuji, such a creative solidarity is only possible through the tensional but productive relationship of individuality and totality, where one distances oneself from society in order to see the demands of the totality that other members might not realize, then negating one’s separateness by trying to integrate this individual realization with the group. This cycle between individuation and recommitment continues infinitely as we try to dynamically realize a society of togetherness that at the same time makes space for the individual’s creative capacities. However, this cycle can often be difficult, and pioneers can be ostracized and martyred in the course of trying to integrate their ideas into the whole.\(^\text{13}\)

I suggest we can understand hooks’s view of engaged pedagogy as calling for such a “dual-negative structure,” where individuals are given room to individuate and realize their unique perspectives, but are called to return to challenge the whole, in an endless process of critical individuation and creative solidarity.

However, hooks’s discussions suggest the need for a social basis of criticality itself, which Watsuji tends to lack. During Watsuji’s time, one strong tradition in education was to devote a long period of time adhering to set forms (*kata*). It is only after having perfected the form that a student could

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\(^{12}\) The Filipino translations show an emotional nuance that the English tends to lack. Insisting on difference seems almost a virtue in English. But *ayaw makisama* means a refusal to partake in togetherness by insisting on one’s difference. The same nuance is seen in the Japanese phrase *jibun katte*.

\(^{13}\) For more on the idea of creative solidarity and the tension of individual and group, see Anton Luis Sevilla, “Watsuji’s Balancing Act: Changes in His Understanding of Individuality and Totality from 1937 to 1949,” in *Journal of Japanese Philosophy*, 2:1 (2014), 105-134.
dare to go beyond the form.¹⁴ This made it very difficult for all except the most established experts to individuate and try to creatively contribute to the whole without risking social backlash and even martyrdom.

What hooks suggests is that without the support of the community itself, most individuals will not even have the strength to turn away from their group on their own, with the exception of a few rebels (and pioneers). In order to create a society that allows for self-criticism and growth, we need to be able to *educate criticality* (and not just hope that it appears somehow). We need to teach the young that it is acceptable to think differently, that it is good to criticize.

This inter-subjective education requires a much deeper sort of bond than mere *pakikisama* (Jp. *nakayoshi*, En. getting-along). Rather, it requires a deep connection between singularities that creates a space of *trust* that allows for difference.

### 2. Trust and Truth.

This brings us to the second point of contact between Watsuji and hooks: trust and the truth. Part of Watsuji’s attempt to free ethical theory from its one-sided individualism was to show how ethical acts are not merely responses to some remote ideal (like a categorical imperative or to an axiological system) or to one’s own utilitarian needs, but a truthful response to the trust of a concrete other.¹⁵ However, one of Watsuji’s innovations with this idea of trust and truthfulness was to see it as not grounded merely in individual goodness nor in social convention, but in the dynamic interplay of both. This is clear, for instance, when one makes promises to another. While in general, one trusts on a social level that the other will do what he or she promises, there are times when the circumstances change, and doing what one promised actually harms the other party. (A classic Greek example is when a friend lends you a weapon on the condition that you return it when he needs it, and comes to take it back while clearly in a fit of rage.) While many might see this as a failure of the trust relationship, Watsuji sees this as the very unfolding of a deeper form of trust: Not “I trust that you will do as you promised (social convention),” nor “I trust that you will do what is right, regardless of your promises,” but “I trust that you will bring your conscience to bear upon the very promises that bind us, that you will respond to me both as a *thou*, and as part of ‘we.’”

hooks’s vision of educating criticality is, thus, a concrete expression of this “dual-structure of trust,” where the teacher trusts that the student will learn, but at the same time learn for him/herself in a critical manner. The

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truthful response of a student then includes both the receptive openness to the demand to learn and the active criticality of taking that learning beyond its given state.

3. Relational Responsibility. Furthermore, for Watsuji, truthfulness is a response to trust, which means that without trust, truthfulness is not even possible. This is what makes Watsuji’s ethical system radically relational. In such a model, “good” cannot be accomplished by the good will standing alone before the categorical imperative, nor the virtuous person realizing the values of society. Rather, good happens “between” people, the first step through trust and the second step through truthfulness. Watsuji gives the concrete example of the parent-child relationship: If a child does not trust his/her parents, the parents will not have the opportunity to raise their children filially (Jp. kō). In the same way, if the parents do not trust that the child has learned from his/her upbringing, the child will not have the opportunity to mature and show filial piety (Jp. oyakōkō) to his/her parents. Thus, filial piety is not a virtue of a child or of a parent but between parents and children.16

In the same way, one cannot account for the virtue of “engaged teaching” in the subjectivity of the teacher alone. No matter how much a teacher may pour his/her heart out to the students, if they do not open up to the teacher and allow themselves to be moved, to share in the journey offered, then “engaged pedagogy” remains unrealized. There is no “good teacher” without good students. In many western theories (like deontology, virtue ethics, or even some readings of Levinas), this may seem like an abdication of responsibility. But from the point of view of Watsuji and hooks, the insistence that responsibility should be shouldered by an “I” faced with a “thou” already presumes that the I-ness of the I can exist without its relationship with the thou, and thus prematurely closes the singularity unto itself. Through the discourse of mutual responsibility, one does not abandon one’s responsibility, but rather recognizes its fundamentally relational character, and the contingency and tragedy that such a relationality might entail.

The Unity of Ethics and Education

Above, we have seen how bell hooks’s engaged pedagogy can be understood through Watsuji’s radically relational ethics, particularly in the ideas of the dual-negative structure, trust, and truth. But at the same time, it suggests that education is indispensable for ethics. In Watsuji’s view, ethics is

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16 See Watsuji Tetsurō, Watsuji Tetsurō zenshū, vol. 10 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten), 399-402.
something that is impossible without community. By bringing ethics home to concrete communities like families, towns, and nations, he not only tries to cure ethical theory of its abstractness, but also tries to rescue relationality from its blindness to its own worth. Every relationship bears the possibility of being the ground for the realization of the good. Each and every relationship can be a space for self-emptying (Jap. *jiko o kûzuru*), for love.

However, can there be community without education? In *Democracy and Education* (1916), John Dewey writes:

Society not only continues to exist *by* transmission, *by* communication, but it may fairly be said to exist *in* transmission, *in* communication. There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common.17

Not only is social life identical with communication, but all communication (and hence all genuine social life) is educative. To be a recipient of a communication is to have an enlarged and changed experience. One shares in what another has thought and felt and in so far, meagerly or amply, has his own attitude modified.18

To put it simply, education creates continuity and builds connections amongst human beings. In its broadest sense, it is the sharing (Fr. *partage*)19 of people that creates togetherness; it is communication as “comminication.” Society *lives* in this communication, in the simple education that occurs between friends, between siblings, between parent and child. The educational system, in all its complexity, has grown from this fundamental need for life and experience to be shared.

This has radical implications for Watsuji’s thought, for that means that *ningen* (the human as both individual and social) is inseparable from education. Education is that which makes community possible, and hence what makes ethics possible. And thus, each educative space—from the

classroom to the home to the internet—bears the possibility of being the space for cultivating the dual-structure of criticality and solidarity, of the trust between subjects that makes space for truth.

**Emptiness and Engagement**

Above, we have examined the connections between Watsuji and hooks on the level of structure, as seen in the interaction between individuality and totality. However, interwoven within hooks’s engaged pedagogy are various ideas such as the sacredness of teaching, care for the soul, spiritual community, and so forth. These are ideas that are not easily discussed within the ambit of secularist structural discourses. Rather, they require a depth dimension, one that we might call the “spiritual” or “existential” dimension.

**Engaged Pedagogy**

In the chapter on “Engaged Pedagogy,” bell hooks opens with the following words:

To educate as the practice of freedom is a way of teaching that anyone can learn. That learning process comes easiest to those of us who teach who also believe that there is an aspect of our vocation that is sacred; who believe that our work is not merely to share information but to share in the intellectual and spiritual growth of our students. To teach in a manner that respects and cares for the souls of our students is essential if we are to provide the necessary conditions where learning can most deeply and intimately begin.

Where does this vision of education come from? If hooks’s vision of “exciting education” as a resistance to the tedium of the banking system of education comes from Paulo Freire, the notion of education as “engaged,” as a spiritual relationship between teacher-students and student-teachers, comes from her reading of Thich Nhat Hanh.

Thich Nhat Hanh (Thích Nhất Hạnh, 1926- ) is a Vietnamese Zen Buddhist monk who became one of the most famous figures in the struggle to end the Vietnam War. He coined the term “Engaged Buddhism” to refer to a Buddhism that, in every aspect of its contemplative practice, is engaged with

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the suffering of all human beings as they go through their everyday lives.\textsuperscript{21} He thus tried to heal the gap between the spiritual practices of household-leavers with the compassion for householders.

I see three core elements to hooks’s appropriation of Engaged Buddhism: First, the notion of healing in education; second, the notion of the wholeness and well-being of the teacher; and third, the unity of theory and praxis that founds these.

1. Healing Education. If a teacher is not merely giving information but opening up real problems shared by both teacher and student and creating a space to cultivate criticality, then the teacher is not merely connecting with the intellectual life of the student but with the entire human being he/she is faced with. The teacher is caring for the whole student as he/she wrestles with reality, a dynamic of the spirit that has corporeal, volitional, and affective components in addition to mere cognitive ones. This “intimate learning” is what requires hooks’s (weighty) demand for the “care of the soul” and of “spiritual growth”: by soul/spirit, she is not referring to an isolated part of the human psyche, but rather to the human being in its wholeness.

Caring for the student as a whole person is thus something closer to “healing.” She writes, “In his work, Thich Nhat Hanh always speaks of the teacher as a healer .... Thich Nhat Hanh offered a way of thinking about pedagogy which emphasized wholeness, a union of mind, body, and spirit.” Education heals the brokenness of an individual in his/her imagined separation from the world, the fractures of experience. It heals the fragmentation of mind, body, and spirit by cultivating an environment wherein the questioning of the mind is unified with the needs and movements of the body and the spirit. And it heals the division of self and other by creating an environment where restoration of one’s own integrity is shared with others through communal learning and discussion. In Teaching Critical Thinking (2009), hooks refers to this as “sharing one’s inner light,” a process in which people share their process of spiritual growth in a space of radical openness and mutual learning.\textsuperscript{22} (This wholeness and communality is something that Dewey’s theory of interest and educational epistemology suggests but does not explicitly develop.)

In Teaching Community (2003), hooks’s view is succinctly captured in her citation of Parker Palmer:

\begin{quotation}
\text{Sallie B. King, Socially Engaged Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009), 5-6.}
\end{quotation}

\begin{quotation}
\text{bell hooks, Teaching Critical Thinking: Practical Wisdom (New York: Routledge, 2010), 20.}
\end{quotation}
Education is about healing and wholeness. It is about empowerment, liberation, transcendence, and renewing the vitality of life. It is about finding and claiming ourselves and our place in the world ... I want to explore what it might mean to reclaim the sacred at the heart of knowing, teaching, and learning—to reclaim it from an essentially depressive mode of knowing that honors only data, logic, analysis, and a systematic disconnection of self from world, self from others.23

We see here the connection of her critique of the banking system of education (as something that fragments the knowing self from the experiencing self) and the stress on the “sacred” foundation of education.

2. The Wholeness of Teachers. What demands are made on teachers, if they are to participate in this sort of education? hooks writes, “Thich Nhat Hanh emphasized that ‘the practice of a healer, therapist, teacher or any helping professional should be directed toward his/herself first, because if the helper is unhappy, he or she cannot help many people.’”24 If a professor has psychological blocks surrounding particular academic issues (for instance, if a sexist teacher is teaching a class on feminism), it will be difficult for the professor to help students approach these issues with a sense of openness (and the tendency will be to talk about the topic in as detached and objective a manner possible, or distort it in order to cover up the professor’s own guilt). While this does not require that an educator be fully healed of all issues, it requires that the educator at least be honestly engaged in dealing with these blocks. This is similar to the practice of psychotherapy, wherein the person of the counselor and his/her wholeness and willingness to deal with his/her own psychological issues play a decisive role in his/her ability to deal effectively with the problems of a patient.25

On one hand, the thought of being accountable not only for the information one carries but for one’s very personhood can weigh heavily on the minds of professors. hooks writes:

Part of the luxury and privilege of the role of teacher/professor today is the absence of any requirement that we be self-actualized. Not surprisingly,

24 hooks, Teaching to Transgress, 15.
professors who are not concerned with inner well-being are the most threatened by the demand on the part of students for liberatory education, for pedagogical processes that will aid them in their own struggle for self-actualization.26

But while it may be difficult for those who have “sacrificed their humanity for tenure” to respond to the demand to cultivate humanity via their own humanness, engaged pedagogy is not only for the sake of students. Just as the banking system of education tends to “objectify” students into mere repositories for information, it objectifies teachers as well into mere sources of information and implementers of curricula, making it difficult for the vocation of teaching to be a path of inner growth.

hooks writes, “The objectification of the teacher within bourgeois educational structures seemed to denigrate notions of wholeness and uphold the idea of a mind/body split, one that promotes and supports compartmentalization.”27 Perhaps even more than students, teachers-in-training and graduate students are often forced into a massively competitive environment, with unhealthy work hours, where they barely have time to digest the information they learned due to the speed in which they have to assimilate information. This can result in an academic culture that tends to denigrate any clear personal connection and sense of value-judgment in one’s research, for the sake of maintaining “objectivity.” Conversely, this can lead to very personal theories (like black feminist theory made by a black woman) as being relegated to the realm of the particular—as mere personal narratives that have nothing to do with “universal theory.”28

Recently, there has been a spate of news articles on the rates of suicide and psychological disorders in graduate school. While this needs to be supported with empirical studies, perhaps one can hypothesize that engaged pedagogy’s bridging of personal life and theory might prevent the former from being sacrificed for the latter and improve the well-being of teachers and future teachers as well.

3. The Unity of Theory and Praxis. A third point we see here is that “healing education” and the wholeness and well-being of teachers point to the unity of theory and practice. In hooks, we see there are only two logical explanations for why the banking system of education would teach

26 hooks, Teaching to Transgress, 17.
27 Ibid., 16.
28 These examples can be seen in various stories shared by hooks all throughout the teaching trilogy. These stories show, in a personal fashion, hooks’s own experience of discrimination, and the forcible separation of the personal and the “universal.”

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information and theory alone, without connecting them to real life. The first is the idea that information and theory can be learned independently from real life, and then applied to real life situations in the future. Dewey’s *Democracy and Education* is almost entirely dedicated to debunking this on the basis of educational epistemology and psychology. The second possibility is that the educational system does not intend to help students become self-actualized individuals. Rather, information is merely a convenient and arbitrary tool to have students compete with each other and thus allow for stratification (or a reproduction of preexisting strata) by sorting the wheat from the chaff. This is the very “oppression” that Paulo Freire tries to address in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1968).

The separation of theory from praxis is thus either epistemologically mistaken or a tool for domination. hooks argues against this separation, asserting that theory is something that is born from life and is inseparable from praxis. She writes,

> I came to theory because I was hurting—the pain within me was so intense that I could not go on living. I came to theory desperate, wanting to comprehend—to grasp what was happening around and within me. Most importantly, I wanted to make the hurt go away. I saw in theory then a location for healing.30

For hooks, theory is a path to allow the self to find its home in the world through understanding. There is thus an essential connection between hooks’s idea of theory and the idea of contemplation in Thich Nhat Hanh: Both theory and contemplation are responses to the fundamental human situation of suffering and separation, and are attempts to recover the original unity of self and world.

In Thich Nhat Hanh, the realization of the true nature of self as “empty” necessarily results in compassion: One sees one’s connection to other people and their suffering, and tries to help them be free from suffering as well.31 Thus contemplation is tied to compassion. In the same way, in Freire, the theoretical understanding of the human condition of oppression and the resulting alienation of both the oppressor and the oppressed is inseparable from the praxis of overcoming this alienation.32 hooks takes both these elements and thus argues for a view of theory that is both inspired by liberation and that tries to realize liberation both individually and

29 hooks, *Teaching to Transgress*, 64.
30 Ibid., 59.
32 hooks, *Teaching to Transgress*, 14.
The Culture of Emptiness

Watsuji’s brief remarks on the idea of education are found interspersed amongst his discussions of culture. People who share in culture are a cultural community, or a “spiritual community” (seishinteki kyōdōtai) in the German sense of geistliche: anyone who shares in my Geist is my friend.33 This is important because cultural community is the most inclusive: Unlike blood relations or growing up together, culture, the Geist of a community can be learned. Thus in Ethics III, this spiritual community plays a key role in bridging even the gaps between nations, in an attempt to form an international order. The most inclusive sense of community—and correlatively, the most inclusive space for realizing ethics—relies on the mediation of culture.

Watsuji talks about four aspects of culture: language, art, scholarship, and religion. There is nothing abstract or “high-culture” about these aspects—by learning these, an individual acquires the capacity to communicate and to share in the sensibilities, knowledge, and beliefs of a group, allowing for a sense of shared identification with others. These four elements are learned in every aspect of social life, but the institution that takes the transmission of these as its goal is, of course, the educational system.34 He writes,

In this way, these days, the people around us who call each other friends (yūjin) are usually acquaintances from “school.” … Even though schools may not truly realize a community of love for wisdom (chie no ai), people are still inculcated with the same knowledge and the same way of thinking as well as the same spiritual training (seishinteki kunren) in school. Though it may remain at this level, it is still the foundation for spiritual community. In other words, it is only on the basis of this

33 Geist and seishin are nearly identical, but both are difficult to translate into English. They are translated as “mind” or “spirit,” but can lead to misunderstandings. For example, geistliche and seishinteki mean “spiritual,” but not in the religious sense of spirituality. It is closer to the use of Geist in geisteswissenschaft—literally, spiritual science, that includes philosophy, history, philology, social science, etc. So spiritual community means any community bound not merely physically but with these elements related to meaningfulness and mind.

34 Some may argue that the school does not or should not teach religion. However, post-secularism has critiqued the idea that liberal democracy is religiously neutral. It has its own “beliefs” and values, which are taught by supposedly “secular” education systems. hooks also discusses these issues, but I leave this to another paper.
that people can arrive at the possibility of being friends.\textsuperscript{35}

From the actual circle of people we call friends to the very possibility of spiritual community, education plays a key role in the propagation of a shared culture. However, Watsuji’s view of culture has three key qualifications that would alter any idea of education that seeks to transmit it.

1. \textit{Returning to the Absolute}. First, Watsuji sees culture as a return to the absolute. For instance, Watsuji does not see art as mere arbitrary expressions that are eventually canonized as a culture’s aesthetic ideals. Rather, when an artist makes art, he or she is expressing “formless form” (katachi naki katachi) as form. As an expression in form, art is unique and singular, bearing the stamps of both the individual artist as well as his/her accumulated experiences of art. But as expressing formless form, art is grounded in something universal, something absolute. What is this formless form? Watsuji explains:

We must grasp this at the most foundational layer of human existence. Therein, humanity is originally one and transcends all distinctions (sabetsu). However, there too is the origin of all distinctions, and at the same time is all distinctions themselves. Because of this, human existence is, in its extreme, emptiness, and develops itself as a movement of return (kirai). Emptiness is the dynamic of emptying emptiness and becoming being (yû), and emptying being and returning to emptiness.\textsuperscript{36}

Formless form is none other than emptiness, which expresses both the fundamental unity of humankind—a unity captured by mystical experiences of Buddhist monks, Christian mystics, and Sufis alike—and at the same time the self-articulation of this unity as difference. The beauty of art comes from its attempt to express this dynamic through form. Similarly, scholarship (be it in the sciences or in the humanities) is an attempt to understand the absolute as \textit{truth}, that is cognitively/epistemologically (rather than aesthetically). And religion is an attempt to directly return to this in terms of feeling and experience.\textsuperscript{37}

The implication for this is that each element of culture has a certain depth. When teaching each subject of the curriculum—from Pythagorean geometry to Machiavelli’s \textit{The Prince} (1532)—one is teaching how individuals

\textsuperscript{35} Watsuji, \textit{Zenshû}, vol. 10, 575. Translation by the author.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ibid.}, 544. Translation by the author.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}, 540-560.
and communities tried to grasp the foundations of human existence, the truth beneath it all. Thus, learning too ought to have the spiritual character proper to the content. It is not a mere abstract gathering of information but, in a sense, a coming home to the foundation of human existence, guided by those who came before us. This task, as hooks argues, has a clearly sacred character.

2. The Unity of Culture in Emptiness. This brings us to a second point: The various facets of culture connect with each other at the root, and thus cannot be abstracted from each other without reducing them to a mere superficial resemblance of what they originally are. In Watsuji’s view, art, science, and religion are fundamentally one (and language is a common element they all share) in that they are all attempts to express the absolute (which he refers to as emptiness) in taste, thought, emotion, and experience. And if one recalls, this “emptiness” is not only the ground of culture but the ground of ethics as well. This implies that the various factors of cultural experience and thus of human experience—cognitive, aesthetic, affective, volitional—are not separate, but are one as expressions of emptiness.

The implication of this for education is that first, the various subjects of the curriculum are united in this depth. If we are to communicate these subjects with this in mind, we must be careful not to lose the essential connectedness of the various specializations of the curriculum. Second, this unity is not merely within the curriculum, but between the curriculum and human life. Theory (the science of human life) cannot be separated from praxis (ethics), nor from the affective and aesthetic elements of human life (excitement, pain, etc.).

Finally, a unified curriculum that is rooted in the human yearning for the absolute cannot be merely for a loosely-knit “profit society,” but must be committed to a deeper engagement between human beings. This is in line with Watsuji’s critique of Gesellschaft as a “state of privation” of community. Influenced by Ferdinand Tönnies’s Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Watsuji argues that a truly ethical community cannot merely be a “profit society” wherein individuals band together in order to secure their egoistic interests.

Ningen sonzai makes its appearance in a defective form of solidarity. Here, societies of mutual interest arise (Gesellschaft), or what could be called egoistically connected societies. These societies, although drawing lessons concerning communal structure from the community of sonzai, do not make sonzai communal. Here, trust, sincerity, service, responsibility, obligation, and so forth are made use of formally but have no substance. That is to say, they are systems of social
ethics, without thereby being socially ethical. For this reason, they can be called deprived forms of social ethics.\textsuperscript{38}

This is something Watsuji found in the utilitarian, liberal, and capitalist view of society. He also saw its negative influence on schools.

The schools at present are extremely deficient in many things [in order to be a] community in scholarship (gakumon ni okeru kyōdōtai). Rather, they can be said to betray a strong Gesellschaft character. Scholarship is becoming a means for livelihood, and school is becoming a place for business (shokugyō). Rather than trying to come together (gōitsu) for the sake of scholarly inquiry, researchers compete for that position. Rather than trying to collaborate in their pursuit of knowledge, students do everything they can to get jobs. As a result, schools are even administered as profit-making enterprises. However, this shows that schools have lost their original meaning, and not that schools are originally as above.\textsuperscript{39}

While Watsuji did not directly discuss the ethical imperative of schooling in detail, we see that it plays an essential role in building an ethical community of shared tastes, beliefs, knowledge, and values—one that is lost with the degeneration of education into a mere means for capitalist society.

3. The Dual-Negative Structure in Culture. However, with the discussion of education’s role in building cultural community as Gemeinschaft, one may worry that education is thus a form of indoctrination, wherein the individual is subjugated to the shared mindset of the whole. Wouldn’t this be the very politics of domination that Freire and hooks clearly denounce? This is clearly not the case, however, if we examine a third point: For Watsuji, sharing in culture is dynamic—a constant re-expression of the inexpressible—that thus requires that one maintains the tension between creativity and solidarity.

This can be seen in Watsuji’s idea of cultural products and cultural production. For Watsuji, cultural life is mediated by preexisting cultural products: books, novels, sculptures, theological treatises, and so forth. However, these are not shared in a static manner but are constantly

\textsuperscript{38} Watsuji, Ethics in Japan, 25.
\textsuperscript{39} Watsuji, Zenshû, vol. 10, 575.
reinvigorated through cultural production in which language, art, science, and religion are made anew. In this act of production, a singular individual, bearing the influences of the culture around him/her, tries to return directly to the absolute—the one, the true, the good, the beautiful. It is this personal insight that he/she tries to express and communicate in a way that connects but creatively reconstructs preexisting cultural products. Thus, new art is made, new theories are discovered, and fresh life enters even the traditional world of religion.  

What we see here then is that the sharing in cultural life is dynamic, and involves both individual creativity and solidarity with others. It does not reduce the individual to the collective, as the Gemeinschaft theory might make it seem. 

The view of culture we have seen above can help us understand the spiritual/existential side of hooks’s engaged pedagogy. Education conveys culture. But culture is not merely a special domain of “cultured people” but the means by which we connect with others in communities. It has to do with how we communicate, how we share in feelings and tastes, and how we coordinate our volitional lives with each other. Thus, there can be no separation between theory and praxis—everything we learn (theory) ought to be a means for life (praxis). But this “life” is not merely cognitive or economic. Rather, it has to do with how we relate with others with the entirety of our being. As such, education is involved with the entirety of the students’ being. And this holism has a depth, in that all of these facets of culture are different ways of expressing the inexpressible, the very foundation of our being in emptiness. Thus, education becomes inseparable from an involvement with the soul, a nurturing and a healing of the entire person. (And while Watsuji fails to examine this point, such a holistic engagement would involve not only the whole student, but the whole teacher as well!)

However, this cultivation of the entire person cannot be one-sided. If our engagement with culture involves critique and creativity through each person’s realization of emptiness, then culture must be conveyed in a way that it can be accepted, explored, and then critiqued and creatively transformed. This allows us to pull together both strands of hooks’s engaged pedagogy—the critical communality she derives from Freire and the focus on wholeness and healing she derives from Thich Nhat Hanh. We engage the spiritual depths of human persons in a way that allows them to engage the culture they share from the depths of their being, and thus participate in a critical and creative way. It is only through this engagement that we can build a genuinely spiritual community, rather than a mere society of mutual self-
benefit.

Conclusion

In this article, we have examined two levels of bell hooks’ vision of “Engaged Pedagogy.” The first was the structural level, primarily influenced by Paulo Freire. It entailed four main elements in order to make a truly exciting and engaged education possible: flexibility, responsivity to singularities, mutual responsibility, and mutual recognition. We have seen how the structure of this relationship can best be understood via Watsuji Tetsurō’s ethical theory, wherein ethics is seen as a realization of the dual-negative structure of individuality and totality, where truth is seen as a response to trust, and where goodness is realized in a purely relational manner. Individualist or universalist accounts of ethics as found in deontology, utilitarianism, or even virtue ethics (insofar as virtue is seen as an individual’s virtue) would not be able to account for the relational structure hooks demands.41

The second level was spiritual/existential, this time largely influenced by Thich Nhat Hanh. It entailed three main elements: education as healing, the wholeness of the teacher, and the unity of theory and praxis. This too can be best understood through Watsuji’s notion of culture (and education as the communication of culture). As the medium of human connections, culture is seen as tying together theory and practice. Furthermore, culture is seen as having a depth aspect, wherein all forms of culture are expressions of emptiness. Thus, an education that communicates such a culture would be a total involvement between student and teacher, including this sense of spiritual depth. And this culture, being something that is dynamically transformed, once again requires both criticality and solidarity—bridging the spiritual level to the structural.

Through this we have seen that while bell hooks may not articulate a metaphysics or a systematic theory of ethics, her view of education presumes a sophisticated relational ethics. Furthermore, we have seen that while concepts like “double-negation” and “emptiness” in Watsuji’s ethics may seem ambiguous, this ambiguity is a direct response to the paradoxical challenges of becoming human. By examining them side-by-side, we can see that hooks’s pedagogy is as astute as Watsuji’s ethics is concrete.

However, this is not to say that these two thinkers are identical. Watsuji was not a feminist. At times, he was dangerously nationalistic and an

41 It is also possible to link hooks’s pedagogy with the ethics of care. However, I question the ability of care ethics, at least in the form Noddings presents it, to respond to existential crises and spiritual concerns, due to the overwhelming focus on “natural care” and forms of pain that are easily understood. I will leave this to another paper.
enemy of multiculturalism. hooks would probably be uncomfortable with this, and her views of the “neutrality” of spirituality would probably be rejected by Watsuji. But what I wish to argue is that at the core of their projects lies the view of the human being, of reality, and of education that is characterized by a profound sense of relationality and depth, which is more than relevant today.

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Neoliberalism and the Paralysis of Human Rationality

Ian Raymond B. Pacquing

Abstract: The neoliberal character rests on the credo—"There is no alternative." There is no alternative to deregulation, free trade, individual entrepreneurship, and competition. This is believed by economists and intellectuals as the only way for humanity to be liberated from the feudal past. It is argued that this new economic liberalism reclaims the lost humanity of man. It is therefore through neoliberal perspectives that freedom and human creativity are realized. There is no other way but to engross oneself in this economic mainstream as transnational companies, through the help of IMF and the WB, continuously occupy the social sphere. Economically, as individuals adapt to this capitalist mainstream, they assimilate their environment in accordance to the character matrix predominantly enforced by neoliberal apologists. Consequently, human potentialities are being absorbed into a system controlled by the very socio-economic apparatuses of modern society. Human reason becomes its very instrument as it is refashioned into a reified system of thinking. Human consciousness is captured in a single dimensional space propagated by this liberal economy. Individual growth, creativity, spontaneity, and productivity are all incorporated and hobbled in order to transmit the structures of neoliberal paradigm.

Keywords: Neoliberalism, autonomy, freedom, reification

The 16th and 17th century British thinking propagated by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Adam Smith presented a kind of liberalism that celebrated the unique nature of being human.¹ Their insightful

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discourses dealt with the inherent quality of human individuals, which centered on freedom and liberty. However, this type of philosophy was transformed into a kind of liberalism, which is grounded on the market economy. Liberalism then follows an economic model that behaved according to a peculiar kind of rationality, which we may refer to as the "capitalist" rationality. Such economic model is based on the assumption that a free market of various capitalist competitors maximizes consumers' satisfaction. This model purports to liberate human beings from the shackles of the feudal past. In fact, this was also the thought of Mises and Hayek who embraced neoliberal thinking. Both of them argued that the meaning of human freedom is to engage the individual at the level of the economic mainstream. It is to allow human potentiality to grow and nourish as the individual immerses himself in the market economy. As a matter of fact, the famous economist Amartya Sen argues that freedom and liberty is nothing but the upliftment of human life through capitalist constructs. Though economic efficiency speaks about income and utility, human freedom would be nothing if the government does not focus on individual entitlement, capabilities, and rights. Even if these same economic theories deal with civil liberties without emphasizing economic security for the people, it becomes just a theory. Moreover, the onslaught of capitalist mentality compelled reiterated the classical adage that men should not be used as a means towards an end. Whatever happens to one ought to be viewed in the light in which any other citizen would view us. Commentators on Smith would say that the surpluses as a result of his entrepreneurial prowess would rather benefit the rest of the community instead of being pocketed for material affluence. The surplus of the entrepreneur should rather enhance the growth of the community instead of enriching the entrepreneur himself. Cf. Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 12-13. Further, the negative notion of freedom as the absence from regulatory arm of the government finds its expression in the thought of Thomas Hobbes who argued that individual liberty is the absence of any form of coercion, force, or control that would impede the active participation and cooperation of man in his society. Cf. Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan*, ed. by J.C.A Gaskin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 139.

2 Cf. Richard Peet, *Unholy Trinity* (Manila, Philippines: IBON Books, 2004), 3. Further, the work of Irving Kristol argues that in a capitalist economy, all individuals are endowed with the same political rights. However, as far as economic rights are concerned, the individual depends on economic factors that ultimately determine winners and losers in the market competition. This is the reason why some professional courses, according to Kristol, are paid better than others. Economically, the standard for success depends on what capitalist society projects and not what the individual wants. See Irving Kristol, “A Capitalist Conception of Justice,” in *Business Ethics*, 3rd ed., ed. by W. Michael Hoffman and Robert E. Frederick (New York: McGraw Hills, Inc., 1995), 68


Fukuyama to argue that ideological battles in the distant past have ended, and we have to accept that freedom and liberty, which is a fundamental faculty of the individual, must be enshrined within the realm of capitalism. In fact, Fukuyama says that the liberal market economy, which is the basis of capitalist enterprise, is the final arrangement of modernity.\(^5\)

Since the early 1930s, liberalism has acquired a new dimension, which is now anchored on an economic liberal rationality. Modernity acquires a rational behavior, which centers on one axiom, i.e., freedom of the market means freedom for everybody to achieve the dream of fulfilling human individuality and autonomy.\(^6\) It emphasizes on this peculiar human quality, which allows every individual to pursue what is beneficial for his growth and survival. In this context then the free market assumes that the economic sphere is a *conditio sine qua non* for the fulfillment of human life. Traditional liberalism has been transformed into an inherent feature of a globalized market economy. At this outset, the capitalist strategy is to allow transnational companies to be incorporated into the global market. It is here that human freedom is redirected and takes its course towards global corporate governance.\(^7\) This so-called global corporate governance is a characteristic of 21\(^{st}\) century capitalism. Capitalism deals with the free enterprise where economic experts meet together to enforce, control, and regulate certain economic plans and programs by particular institutions that share a common ideology.\(^8\) This liberal economic paradigm is otherwise known as neoliberal economy. It is an ideology that tries to incorporate human modes of productions into one global economy.\(^9\) As such, the


\(^6\) Cf. Peet, *Unholy Trinity*, 3. The apologists of neoliberalism argue that the philosophy of Adam Smith is based on his view that human nature is actually striving for peace, and this is achieved through economics. The dream of a peaceful society embarks the role of economics as part of the moral dimension of humanity. It is through economic principles that human individuals facilitate the peaceful exchange among all of the goods necessary for life. See also Raquel Lazaro, “Adam Smith: Anthropology and Moral Philosophy,” in *Revista Empresa y Humanismo*, 13:1 (2010), 145-184.


\(^8\) Cf. Peet, *Unholy Trinity*, 3. This global governance is the result of what transpired in the Bretton Wood Agreement in 1944. It must be remembered that the world suffered from two world wars. It is the purpose of this agreement to avoid international conflicts to happen again. Anup Shah, “A Primer on Neoliberalism” in *Global Issues* (22 August 2010), <http://www.globalissues.org/article/39/a-primer-on-neoliberalism>, 8.

\(^9\) Cf. Peet, *Unholy Trinity*, 3. Neoliberalism was conceived by Mises in the early 1930s. However, it was Hayek and Friedman who managed to bring it into fruition when the so-called Bretton Woods Agreement happened just after the end of WWII. The Agreement resulted in a global-based policy that would help war-torn countries to economically develop. Cf. Michel Beaud, *Introduction to The History of Capitalism*, trans. by Tom Dickman and Anny Lefebvre (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 214. Geuss describes ideology this way: “In addition
freedom and liberty of every individual follows this economic compass for growth and productivity. In fact, Mises says that the neoliberal agenda, which is based on individual liberty, must be put into action in order to achieve “free trade in a peaceful world of free nations.”

Modern capitalist thinking believes so much on the capacity of the individual as the architect of history and, thus, the agent of modernity. For neoliberals, freedom and the market become so inseparable that the realization of one depends on the other. Paul Treanor argues:

Liberals believe that the form of society should be the outcome of processes. These processes should be interactive and involve all members of society. The market is an example, probably the best example, of what liberals mean by process. Liberals are generally hostile to any 'interference with process.' Specifically, liberals claim that the distribution of wealth as a result of the market is, in itself, just.

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10 Mises, Preface to Liberalism, xvi

The free will and liberty to enter into an agreement with one’s fellows constitutes what he calls the political economy. Cf. Beaud, The History of Capitalism, 33.

On the other hand, some political and economic theorists distinguish political from economic liberalism. Political liberalism refers to the fundamental rights of the individual as he actively participates in the social process. On the other hand, economic liberalism refers to the active engagement of the individual in the market to uplift his material sustenance. It is progressively improving his material situation within the ambit of trade and commerce. However, the distinction of the two cannot be separated in reality. There are political decisions that affect the individual’s economic life in the same way that we cannot talk of an economic right without taking into consideration the individual’s political rights. Cf. Edwin van de Haar, Classical Liberalism and International Relations Theory (New York: Pelgrave MacMillan, 2009), 18.

Further, the negative notion of freedom as the absence of the regulatory arm of the government finds its expression in the thought of Thomas Hobbes, who argued that individual liberty is the absence of any form of coercion, force, or control that would impede the active participation and cooperation of man in his society. Cf. Hobbes, The Leviathan 139. Fromm commented on this negative aspect of freedom. Modernity for Fromm has not achieved its goals for the intention is always geared towards freedom from which is the absence of coercion or control. However,
Traditionally, liberalism could be construed as imbibing political, social, or even religious human expressions. However, with the Great Depression in 1939, the notion of liberalism was gradually altered to include the economic aspect of society. The very purpose was to jack up employment under the guise of freedom and liberty. Furthermore, freedom and liberty serve as the cornerstone of uplifting the material aspect of human life. It is in this context that this economic liberalism prioritizes modes of production as sources for improving the material welfare of society. It champions the entrepreneurial individual and the organizational efficiency of the market.

Because of the structures of this economic liberalism, Margaret Thatcher strongly believed that there is no such thing as society, and everything must be reduced to and for the individual, private property, personal responsibility, and family values. It is only the individual with all the capacities rooted in him that matters in neoliberal paradigm. Consequently, the market economy, which anchors its beliefs on ‘ideals,’ becomes exemplary, says Žižek, since the market enterprise considers human nature to be egotistic. It is egotistic in a sense that the individual may create and produce anything under the domain of neoliberal agenda. Nothing

Fromm asserts that freedom also entails the freedom to, i.e., the freedom to march towards the vision of the human race. Cf. Fromm, FF, 33-38.

Cf. Elizabeth Martinez and Arnaldo Garcia "What is Neoliberalism: A Brief Definition for Activist," in CorpWatch, <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=376>. Moreover, economic liberalism was enshrined by intellectuals, says Foucault, because the state was in need of “the requirement of reconstruction, that is to say, the conversion of a war economy back into a peace economy, the reconstruction of destroyed economic potential … of new technological information which appeared during the war, and new demographic and geopolitical facts.” Cf. Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at College de France 1978-1979, ed. by Michel Senellart, trans. by Graham Burchell (New York: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2008), 79.

Cf. Peet, Unholy Trinity, 4.

Harvey described this nature of neoliberal paradigm as embedded economic liberalism. As such, it becomes a strategy for economic and industrial proficiency. Cf. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 11

Cf. Ibid., 23. However if we look at the motives behind the implementation of neoliberal agenda under the guise of human freedom and liberty, there is a collusion between government and corporations to engage themselves in amassing profit at the expense of liberty and individuality. In other words, there is a deceit that is hidden behind every good intention in the neoliberal dream. Birch and Mykhnenko commented that, “The very idea that markets are self-organizing, efficient, and liberating is no longer credible, but illustrates the extent to which neoliberalism—as shorthand for market-like rule—is an economic, political, and ideological project pursued by certain groups (such as governments and corporations) to construct a reality that is perceived to be founded in the inherent properties of economic markets.” Kean Birch and Vlad Mykhnenko, “Introduction: A World Turned Right Way Up,” in The Rise and Fall of Neoliberalism: The Collapse of an Economic Order, ed. by Kean Birch and Vlad Mykhnenko (New York: Zed Books, 2010), 2.

prevents the individual from expressing his humanity as long as it is done within the market enterprise.\textsuperscript{18} Further, as the individual becomes the epitome of this market ideology, more are craving for and claiming governmental protection of their rights disguised under the name of freedom and liberty. However, as Perelman argued, though the individual is protected by the government, his rights must be subsumed into trade and commerce as sources of power and social mobility.\textsuperscript{19} As a matter of fact, even Erich Fromm recognizes the fact that through the capital, the individual sees himself as the subject and agent of social mobility.\textsuperscript{20} The capital is seen as one among the necessary factors for individualizing freedom and liberty. Through the capital, neoliberal agenda moves towards the empowerment of the individual through economic growth and welfare. As Stanley Fischer, Deputy Managing Director of the \textit{International Monetary Fund}, argues: “free capital movements facilitate a more efficient global allocation of saving and helping channel resources into their most productive uses, thus, increasing economic growth and welfare.”\textsuperscript{21} In fact, the noted economist Joseph Stiglitz observes that in order to achieve economic growth and welfare, the global market should be free from any governmental control, and to realize this, the only role given to the state is to enforce policies and contracts, which are beneficial to the market.\textsuperscript{22}

The Bretton Wood Agreement of 1944 signals the conception of neoliberal thinking. This agreement among nations became crucial in realizing the vision of neoliberal philosophy. It has to be noted that the brutal and relentless expansion of Europe and America ceded when 44 nations agreed to institutionalize the market economy.\textsuperscript{23} In order to maintain peace, equality, and regional stability, the agreement wanted to restore the structures of capitalism and at this time, it must be done with a ‘human face.’ However, it was in the early 1980 that neoliberal structures came into full force declaring that \textit{There is No Alternative} (TINA) to this economic system.

\textsuperscript{18} Hayek argues that the “object of most Western thinkers has been to establish a society in which every individual, with a minimum dependence on discretionary authority of his rulers, would enjoy the privileges and responsibility of determining his own conduct within a previously defined framework of rights and duties.” Cf. Hayek, \textit{The Constitution of Liberty}, 3.


\textsuperscript{20} Cf. Fromm, \textit{FF}, 38


that modernity has to offer.\textsuperscript{24} Everything falls under the name of freedom and liberty. Although the market is the ‘venue,’ neoliberal thinking adheres to freedom as the fundamental political value.\textsuperscript{25} Leys asserts that the purpose of this economic restructuring is something material, i.e., “radical transformation in both the structure and the management of the world economy … creating for the first time in history a truly unified global capitalist economy … reflecting the interests of transnational capital.”\textsuperscript{26}

Nevertheless, considering these modern economic structures, I maintain that with this ideology of neoliberalism,\textsuperscript{27} humanity is pushed further towards abstraction and quantification of its potential. The human regression towards reification is brought about by the fortification of the internal structures of the economic policies of neoliberal ideology. Its homogenizing and hegemonizing factors, psychoanalytically speaking, dislodge human rationality because its historical reference is transformed into a reified discursive system of thinking. It is implicitly expressing that the only measure to live freely and humanely is to engage oneself in the market enterprise. Hence, human thoughts, actions, and feelings are swayed and instrumentalized into this economic paradigm. In fact, the psychologization of humanity through the embedded neoliberal economy “has reduced human beings to fungible, commensurable values, expunging what makes them particular or unique.”\textsuperscript{28} It attracts individual psychic energies to imbibe an economy which is thought of as liberating and thus humanizing. It builds a character where humans are cajoled into believing that they will all the more be free. Human freedom is actualized when one allows oneself to engage in the market economy. Hence, a person allures himself in the exchange of commodities that takes place within the market sphere. With digital

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\item \textsuperscript{24} Cf. Jason Hickel, “A Short History of Neoliberalism (And How We Can Fix It)” in \textit{New Left Project} (09 April 2012), \texttt{<http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/a_short_history_of_neoliberalism_and_how_we_can_fix_it>}, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Jodi Dean, \textit{Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies} (U.S.: Duke University Press, 2009), 51.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Neoliberal ideology is actually a reversion to the old capitalist thinking advocated by Adam Smith. In the works of Harvey, Hardt, and Negri, they argued that neoliberalism is actually a continuation of Smith’s capitalist enunciation of economic life. However, this neoliberal concept was extended into a globalized economy where participant nations should abide by the rules and policies of a global corporate structure, which in return is protected by the laws and policies of the state. Cf. Harvey, \textit{A Brief History of Neoliberalism}, 5-10. This collusion between the state and corporation forms what is called corporate empire where the economic, social, political, and cultural aspects of life overlap. Cf. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, \textit{Empire} (London: Harvard University Press, 2000), xiii.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Deborah Cook, \textit{Adorno, Habermas, and the Search for A Rational Society} (London: Routledge, 2004), 11.
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technology within everybody’s reach, every individual becomes the master of himself. Anybody who criticizes this way of living is not ‘identical’ to the normative apparatus of neoliberalism. In fact, its mythological aspect would denounce any critical stance that would conceal its exploitative and dominative agenda. Further, with the neoliberal thinking, and although freedom and liberty serve as the core of this economic system, human individuality is annihilated and reified by the production of commodities.\textsuperscript{29} While it is a fact that modernity moves towards human freedom from the old feudal system and a renewal of human individuality and independence, the neoliberal paradigm has unconsciously restrained human beings, engendering fear, anxiety, and compulsion.\textsuperscript{30} We experience ourselves as


\textsuperscript{30} According to Chomsky, the dialectic between these industrial corporations and the U.S. “activist” foreign policies fortify and extend U.S. power through subversion, international terrorism, and aggression. This dialectic is a way to ‘Americanize’ human life. Cf. Noam Chomsky, \textit{Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies} (London: Pluto Press, 1989), 12. As far as the political situation is concerned, Martha Sieburth also observes, “This first decade of the 21st century, we have experienced instead extremely unstable global situations, with terrorism since September 11, 2001, becoming even more widespread. Train bombs exploded in Madrid on March 11, 2004, and in London in 2005. In September 2008, the ETA Basque separatist movement resumed bombings after having signed a peace ceasefire in 2006. The wars in Iraq and the incursion of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan have dramatically weakened the U.S. economy, and the continued saga between Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East … violence has become an accepted way of life and global destabilization is becoming more and more “normalized.” Martha Seiburg, Foreword to \textit{Revolutionizing Pedagogy: Education for Social Justice Within and Beyond Global Neo-liberalism,} ed. by Sheila Macrine, Peter McLaren, and Dave Hill (New York: Falgate Macmillan, 2010), x. According to Stiglitz, the principles of neoliberal politics needed to be rethought because they cater no longer to the less developed people of the world but to the interest of those people who are in power. See Joseph Stiglitz, Preface to \textit{Globalization and Its Discontents,} (New York: Allen Lane/Penguin Books, 2002), ix-xii. The fact that the ‘Uruguay Round’ in 1995 collapsed because of the imbalanced distribution of goods and services especially in agricultural products to developing countries, which now indicate that the ruling elite, which belongs to U.S.-based transnational companies, gets the better share. (For further discussion why U.S. and EU had unresolved trade conflicts and needed to come up with a resolution in terms of agricultural products, see “Understanding the WTO,” in \textit{World Trade Organization,} <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm>). The effects of these economic inequalities are best described in the riot in Genoa, which led to bloodshed. See Cf. David Schweickart, \textit{After Capitalism} (US: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 6. Further, Schweickart adds, “In the face of massive and violent police retaliation, they shut down the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) opening ceremony, prevented President Clinton from addressing the WTO delegates, and compelled the WTO to cancel its closing ceremonies and adjourn in disorder and confusion. Since then, protests, self-consciously linked to the Seattle upheaval and to each other, have erupted in Quito, Ecuador (January 2000), Washington, D.C. (April 2000), Bangkok (May 2000), South Africa (May 2000), Buenos Aires (May 2000), Windsor/Detroit and Calgary June 2000), Millau, France (June 2000), Okinawa (July 2000), Colombia (August 2000), Melbourne (September 2000), Prague (September 2000), Seoul (October 2000), Davos, Switzerland (January 2001), Quebec City (April 2001), and most recently (as of this
inhabited and driven by forces that are mysterious to us. These mysterious forces include economic forces that structure our lives as beings who must

writing—there will have been others by the time you read this) Genoa (July 2001). [Post September 11 update: A sizable contingent of protestors trekked to far-off Qatar in November 2001, where nervous WTO ministers decided to hold their post-Seattle meeting, while tens of thousands more rallied in their own countries—some thirty countries in all—to analyze and criticize the WTO agenda. In New York City in February 2002, some fifteen thousand rallied against the World Economic Forum being held there, while thousands more went to Porto Alegre, Brazil, for a “World Social Forum,” which billed itself as a counter-WEE. Despite media pronouncements to the contrary and despite the fact that governments are using the “threat of terrorism” to make protest more difficult, the events of September 11 have not derailed this “movement for global justice.” In the Philippines, when the Ramos-Macapagal regimes, through Roberto de Ocampo as Secretary of Finance and NEDA Chief Cielito Habito, made the country a party to the ASEAN Free Trade Area and eventually joined the World Trade Organization in 1995, domestic casualties occurred. Bello says, “The list of industrial casualties included paper products, textiles, ceramics, rubber products, furniture and fixtures, petrochemicals, beverage, wood, shoes, petroleum oils, clothing accessories, and leather goods. By the early years of this decade, the country’s textile industry had shrunk from 200 to less than 10 firms.” See Walden Bello, “Neoliberalism as Hegemonic Ideology in the Philippines: Rise, Apogee, and Crisis” (Plenary Paper presented at the National Conference of the Philippine Sociological Society, Philippine Social Science Center (PSSC) Building, Quezon City, Metro Manila, 16 October 2009. See also Walden Bello, “Neoliberalism as Hegemonic Ideology in the Philippines: Rise, Apogee, and Crisis,” in Focus on the Global South, <http://focusweb.org/node/1534>, 3. Although neoliberalism has globalized the world, there are other vital dimensions: global climate change, the decay of the ozone layer, and the pollution of the oceans all bring the world’s people closer together, if only because decisions made in one place shape other places. The result is an odd and novel situation. See Geoff Mulgan, “The Age of Connexity,” A Globalizing World? Culture, Economics, Politics, 2nd ed., ed. by David Held (London: Routledge, 2004), 11. If one does not conform to the demands of neoliberal thinking, political and cultural consequences follow. Perkins says, in addition to this, the effects of this imperial status drip to those countries which have been promised infrastructures, health, education, and military partnership. As a superpower and through WTO, IMF, and WB, the U.S. offers loans to developing countries. These loans are given to help infrastructure projects, which developing countries cannot financially sustain. Foreign contractors and engineers go and help build airports, highways, parks, electric plants, etc. What these developing countries do not know is that the loans are pegged in the U.S. dollar. It is then coursed through different U.S transnational companies, which help build these infrastructure projects. In other words, U.S. promises aids through these transnational companies. Consequently, the amount of dollars that leaves the U.S. treasury reverts to them immediately through these mighty corporations. Moreover, the loans that come through foreign aids are now being paid with collateral and interest. Now, this is the rub—U.S. knows very well that these countries cannot pay and thus declared to default on their payments. The longer they cannot pay, the better since the interests grow. This economic and political strategy in the international scene is a deception in order to build an empire. As more and more countries are ensnared in debt, the more they become loyal to the U.S. economic hegemony. Thus, U.S. democratic terms expand as a matter of its political sovereignty. Those countries, which cannot pay their debts, are obliged to kowtow to the dictates of U.S. hegemony. Hence, they have to open their natural resources for U.S. control, their votes in the U.N. are stricken over in favor of the U.S., and U.S. military base are installed—these are just among the many consequences of this loyalty. Cf. John Perkins, Prologue to The Confessions of an Economic Hit Man, (California: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc, 2004), xiii,
sell labor power to others.\textsuperscript{31} Consequently, this ideology entails a twisted notion of freedom characterized by the accentuation and internalization of dependency, as opposed to integrity and autonomy.\textsuperscript{32} The engagement of modernity in these economic structures involves a mouse trap where humanity acquires freedom from the old structures yet caged in a new system where human individuality is lost.\textsuperscript{33} As it was pointed out by Mark Blyth, neoliberal thinking with its own material monetary base as developed by Friedman\textsuperscript{34} isolates human nature from its real vocation: activity and productivity.\textsuperscript{35}

In this context, I agree with what Marx said in his *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*,\textsuperscript{36} and later on developed by Fromm in his *Beyond the Chain of Illusion*—that human consciousness is affected by the internal logic of the material base of society. According to Fromm, while human beings emancipated themselves from the shackles of the past, their


\textsuperscript{33} Fromm argues that although industrial capitalism was a freedom from, it does not answer the freedom to. Cf. Fromm, *FF*, 33. On the same breadth, Schmidtz and Brennan argue that although freedom, from its classical connotation, would always entail freedom from, what liberals have forgotten is the freedom to. Cf. David Schmidtz and Jason Brennan, *A Brief History of Liberty* (London: Wiley and Blackwell, 2010), 7.

\textsuperscript{34} Cf. Peet, *Unholy Trinity*, 4.


\textsuperscript{36} Marx says, “Capital is, therefore, the power to command labor, and its products. The capitalist possesses this power not on account of his personal or human properties but insofar as he is an owner of capital. His power is the purchasing power of his capital, which nothing can withstand.” Cf. Karl Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, trans. by Gregor Benton, in *Marxist Internet Archive* (1993), <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/epm/1st.htm#s2>, 17. Further Marx laments that the industrial or neoliberal construct pushes the worker into such condition, i.e., the working class who is made to subordinate himself to the capitalist. The more capital is invested, the more amount of labor is extracted from the worker. Consequently, the more he has to sacrifice his time and freedom and work as a slave. Cf. Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, 7. On the contrary, the more capital means there are, the more labor is imputed, and the more workers there are, the more division of labor is demanded. For Marx, it is only the capitalist who is at a better advantage in this kind of situation. Under these existing working conditions, remunerations and benefits do not remove the fact that structures of capitalism make the worker regress to inhuman situations. Psychologically, Fromm says, “increase in wages does not restore their lost human significance and worth.” Cf. Erich Fromm, *Marx’s Concept of Man* (London: Continuum, 1961), 34.

\textsuperscript{37} It is not only in the *Beyond the Chain of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud* (1962); we can also read the arguments of Fromm from his other monumental works like *Fear of Freedom* (1941), *Sane Society* (1956), *Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics* (1947), *Art of Loving* (1956), and *Revolution of Hope* (1968).
lives have, however, become more quantitative and, as such, individuality and autonomy are undermined. While the cornerstone of capitalist agenda was the promise of freedom, this is challenged by how the capitalist mind frame has taken over human lives. Humanity is now threatened by the vast monopoly and superior strength of capital and, thus, the more an individual becomes isolated and aggravated. The very faculties which are supposed to deliver humanity towards a better society have been reified by the very characterology of modernity. How the material productions of society are restructured to achieve a common end affects how human beings view themselves, others, and their world. It must be noted that the dialectic between the substructure and the superstructure of which the modern individual is a part psychologically sways human energy to follow the inner logic enunciated by neoliberalism. As individuals recreate society, their creativity manifests itself in their own human productivity. However, through their own production and creativity, the effects of neoliberal thinking commercialize everyday life so that human and individual relationships “interact with a lifeless object without a trace of inner sentiment or any attempt at understanding the other’s point of view.” Individuality has become instrumentalized at the service of this economic paradigm. The conscious elements of human adaptation and assimilation to his or her immediate environment have yielded to the commodification of life.

38 The neurotic symptoms of contradictory strivings from what Freud called sexual libido and the need for human survival positioned Fromm to call modern society as the pathos of normalcy. The conflict between human necessities arising from acts of survival and necessities arising from the postponement of pleasure lead humanity to insanity for the reason that “all behave irrationally in this irrational world.” In his study of modern capitalism, Fromm found out that the economic modes of productions would force us to behave irrationally and thus neurotically. This neurotic behavior leads humanity towards the formation of automaton—beings which are abstracted and quantified by forces of the modern industrial capitalism. Cf. Erich Fromm, “Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology,” in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. by Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 2002), 477. This comment is also seen in Fromm’s Crisis of Psychoanalysis (1970). See Erich Fromm, “Crisis of Psychoanalysis: Essays on Freud, Marx, and Social Psychology,” in Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, ed. by Stephen Bronner and Douglas Kellner (London: Routledge, 1989), 247.

39 Axel Honneth, Refication: A New Look at an Old Idea, ed. by Martin Jay (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 18. However, Honneth argues that an objective understanding of person and of the world is possible without gearing towards reification. Objectification is a prerequisite in an emphatic engagement of the individual with the world for there is already, in the process of assimilation, an antecedent act of recognition between the infant and his surrounding world. For Honneth, the antecedent recognition is an objectification process without falling within the realm of reification. Honneth comments, “If everything within a society is reified just because it urges the adoption of an objectifying attitude, then human sociality must have vanished complete.” Thus, Honneth would redefine reification as an amnesia which forces us the ability to understand the behavioral expression of others as making demands of us. Cf. Honneth, Refication, 50-70.
moral and ethical aspects of human relationships are objectified and commodified.\textsuperscript{40} In the observation of Chomsky, the systematic use of capitalist propaganda in order to alter and regiment the consciousness of the people is a mark of the neoliberal agenda.\textsuperscript{41} Further, while these assimilation and adaptation are products of the individual conscious actions, there lies in the unconscious libidinal structure of society hidden motivations which are enunciated by neoliberal thinking. Though the objects that modernity produce do affect human consciousness, we cannot disregard the fact that the world that the consciousness perceives is a world that has already been changed by a ‘capitalist’ consciousness. The dialectic between the material modes of productions and the productive and creative faculty of human individuals cannot be discounted. As Wiggerhaus argues, “What connections there are between the social development of humanity, particularly its economic and technical development and the development of its mental faculty, particularly the ego-organization of the human being?”\textsuperscript{42} It is for these reasons that I contend, following Frommian philosophy,\textsuperscript{43} that the socio-economic foundations of modernity accentuate a particular characterology that redirects the social psychic apparatuses towards dependency, submission, conformity, and paralysis of human rationality.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{40} Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, 19.


\textsuperscript{44} Fromm says, “We are concerned with instrumentalities—with how we are doing things; we are no longer concerned with why we are doing things. We build machines that act like men and we want to produce men who act like machines." Erich Fromm, “Freedom in the
of neoliberalism attract individual impulses to acquire a dependent character of which modernity is unconscious.\textsuperscript{45} As a matter of fact, the individual conscious action speaks of the great humanist values, such as love, freedom, and equality; however, unconsciously, one is motivated to act in accordance with the conditions of those material forces articulated by neoliberal philosophy. There is then a contradiction between the humanistic desire that gears towards human growth and the socio-economic foundation from which the survival of society rests. As Lawrence Freidman observes, neoliberal thinking has “paralyzed human rationality to the point where the pride in a common humanity had subsided.”\textsuperscript{46}

The inner logic of the material forces of society becomes, what Fromm calls, the “bedrock of man’s social character.” A social character leads to particular behavioral traits of society. The interaction between the social character and the collective unconscious results in how human beings think and act to achieve the goals which society aspires. The psychic energy of society is redirected to follow the social economic pattern, and in return, human consciousness becomes hobbled and reified. Human reason, which could have led modernity towards human potentials, is paralyzed as a result of a characterology built within the ambit of neoliberal philosophy.\textsuperscript{47}

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\textsuperscript{46} In fact, many commentators like Giddens argue that the neoliberal construct is the ‘Americanization’ of human life to the extent that transnational companies that come to dominate the socio-cultural lifeworld of individual localities are based in the U.S. and in the North. We take for instance McDonalds and Coca-Cola dominating the local mainstream. This would show that it is really an affair of the North where the South doesn’t have any active role. That is why Giddens argues that globalization (neoliberalism) “would see it as destroying local cultures, widening world inequalities, and worsening the lot of the impoverished. Globalisation, some argue, creates a world of winners and losers, a few on the fast track to prosperity, the majority condemned to a life of misery and despair …” Anthony Giddens, “Lecture 1,” in \textit{Runaway World} (London: Profile Books, 1999), as cited in Allan Cochrane and Kathy Pain, “A Globalizing Society,” in \textit{A Globalizing World? Culture, Economics, Politics}, ed. by David Held (London: Routledge, 2004), 12.


\textsuperscript{47} One needs to know that global finance, for instance, is regulated and controlled by the \textit{International Monetary Fund} and the \textit{World Bank}. It is in these two institutions that the financial infrastructures of the global market are coursed through. On the other hand, the United Nation’s assistance to developing and war-torn countries like Iraq and Israel must be aligned with the policies of these two institutions. However, the fortifications of these lie in the modes of communication that we have. Considering that global telecommunication companies like Google and Microsoft are based in the U.S., the power to regulate and control world economy, politics, and culture is still dependent on the dictates of the sole superpower of the world, i.e., the U.S. This is the reason why each locality, or even regional city, is at the mercy of these powerful institutions, which have powerful structural effects severely affecting the sovereignty of nation states. See Cochrane and Pain, “A Globalizing Society,” in \textit{A Globalizing World?}, 17.
ideology of neoliberalism is a product of an economic psychologization to the extent that the oppression and exploitation in the world are camouflaged by ‘images and appearances,’ which seem so natural and normal for an ordinary individual.\textsuperscript{48} I contend, therefore, that if we fail to understand both social character and social unconscious, it is impossible to know and understand social pathologies, which continuously affect human lives. Ignoring the social character and the social unconscious, social pathologies are just considered as the normal flow of social and human transactions. Social pathologies\textsuperscript{49} would just be transformed into social ‘common sense’ in which case humanity acquires an irreversible pattern that leads to death and decay.\textsuperscript{50}

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Arato, Andrew, and Eike Gerhardt, \textit{The Essential Frankfurt School} (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 2002),


\textsuperscript{48} Cf. Parker, \textit{Revolution in Psychology}, 48. It is in this process of ‘images and appearances’ that an individual relates, transcends, and becomes rooted on images and appearances. It is a character of 21st century man to repeat these ‘images and appearances’ as a matter of reasoned arguments and carefully analyzed opinions until they are converted into common sense. Consciously, the individual thinks, reasons, and argues as a matter of human discourse. But with the internalized ideology, he is just replicating the falsity of this ideology. He cannot see the contradictions that lie within because his personality is a reflection of that very ideology that categorized him. The social characterology of this economic system has removed his “I” as a form of self-identity. Fromm lamented this fact and he foretold decades ago that the fate of the 21st century has already been sealed. If man cannot see the illusions or ideologies that muster and control his energy, then he is doomed towards perdition. Cf. Fromm, \textit{Revolution of Hope}, 27.

\textsuperscript{49} Social pathology is the description used by Fromm to imply the illusions brought about by an irrational social characterology as it reifies and hobbles the consciousness. Cf. Fromm, \textit{Sane Society}, 60-80. In his \textit{Revolution of Hope}, he narrates how the social character of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century capitalism ‘commodifies’ reason as an instrumentality of the modes of production in order to perpetuate its legitimacy in the modern world. Cf. Fromm, \textit{Revolution of Hope}, 55.

\textsuperscript{50} William Martin Kennedy, \textit{Implications for Counselling from Erich Fromm’s View of Man’s Ethical Responsibility} (Ph.D. Dissertation, Austin: University of Texas/ Erich Fromm Document Center), 147.


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Ontology or Ethics: The Case of Martin Heidegger and Watsuji Tetsurô

Kelly Louise Rexzy P. Agra

Abstract: The title of this paper namely ‘Ontology or Ethics: The Case of Martin Heidegger and Watsuji Tetsurô,’ in principle, if not in fact, aims at shedding light on the relation between ethics and ontology. As a thesis, this paper claims that their relation boils down to the question of the being of the human being, which consequently and necessarily serves as the departure point towards answering the problems of ontology (i.e., the meaning of Being) and ethics (i.e., the rationale behind human relations). In trying to divulge the presuppositions underlying this claim, I will use Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics beginning from his analytic of Dasein and Watsuji Tetsurô’s ethics as the study of ningen (人間).

Keywords: Heidegger, Watsuji, ontology, ethics

Introduction

The title of this paper namely ‘Ontology or Ethics: The Case of Martin Heidegger and Watsuji Tetsurô,’ in principle, if not in fact, aims at shedding light on the relation between ethics and ontology. As a thesis, this paper initially claims that their relation boils down to the question of the being of the human being, which consequently and necessarily serves as the departure point towards answering the problems of ontology (i.e., the meaning of Being) and ethics (i.e., the rationale behind human relations). In trying to divulge the presuppositions underlying this claim, I will use Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics beginning from his analytic of Dasein and Watsuji Tetsurô’s ethics as the study of ningen (人間).

Having delineated such a task, two important matters must be addressed. First, what exactly do the terms ‘ontology’ and ‘ethics’ mean? The answer to this is drawn from Heidegger’s take on ontology as the inquiry
concerned in clarifying “the meaning of Being”\(^1\) for that entity—the inquirer—whose “definite characteristic” involves an “understanding of Being”\(^3\) and from Watsuji’s rendering of ethics as “the order or the pattern through which the communal existence of human being is rendered possible”\(^4\).

From this horizon of discourse, the second concern could be derived—Why Heidegger and Watsuji? This question is to be treated in its three aspects: (a) a question of the individual significance of their discourses in relation to ontology and ethics, (b) a question of the significance of the and between Heidegger and Watsuji, or in other words, the question of the relation of their thoughts to one another, and (c) a question of the merit of comparing their thoughts as regards the question of the relation between ontology and ethics.

**The Heidegger-Watsuji Relation**

In response to the question of the significance of Heidegger and Watsuji’s thoughts on the basic trajectory of ontology and ethics, it is to be said that the reason for choosing them is on one part historical (i.e., history of philosophy), and another, cultural (i.e., they are coming from different cultural orientations). The historical reason is focused on Heidegger’s ontology as having been able to create a break within Western philosophy in his delimitation of the question of Being. Heidegger, in his magnum opus *Being and Time*, restructures the question as a question, which essentially begins in the question of the being of the inquirer itself. This inquirer, whom Heidegger calls *Dasein*, is for him the very condition for the possibility of any conception or understanding of Being. Heidegger writes,

> ... to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity—the inquirer—transparent in his

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1. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (USA: Harperperennial Modernthought, 2008), 19/1; 31/11. Hereafter cited as BT, followed by the page number as found in the Maquarrie-Robinson translation, and the page number in the German edition as indicated in the margins of the translation.

2. The italicization of the preposition *for* is in order to remain consistent to Heidegger’s delimitation of Being as the category or the lens from which we experience or think about anything. It is not an abstract autonomous concept that makes possible existence, but rather something like a transcendental category of thought used to designate or refer to that which exists, or to existence in general. As a category of thought, it is of major importance to stress that for Heidegger, Being necessarily becomes an always and already Being for an inquirer.

3. Heidegger, BT, 32/12.


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own being. The very asking of this question is an entity’s mode of being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about—namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its being, we shall denote by the term Dasein.\(^5\)

The being (way of existence) of this Dasein which Heidegger refers to as the being (entity, existent) whose being (way of existence) involves inquiring about Being (category of thought referring to that which exists), is for Heidegger, what must first be elaborated as a preliminary step before one can go on and inquire about Being in general. He points out, that “the ontological analytic of Dasein in general is what makes up fundamental ontology, so that Dasein functions as that entity which in principle is to be interrogated beforehand as to its being.”\(^6\) This delimitation of Heidegger about this foundational concept of Metaphysics is in itself a breakthrough in philosophy that it transformed what was known as Metaphysics into ‘ontology.’\(^7\) It has re-appropriated the question of Being to that being only for whom Being makes sense. In other words, the question of Being for Heidegger becomes an anthropocentric question. It is in this way that Heidegger’s thought as one of those philosophies, which directly confronted the question of Being, receives a special place in ontology.

The choice of Watsuji, on the other hand, is cultural insofar as he is an Eastern thinker who actually presented a systematic thesis and book on ethics. Watsuji, a Japanese philosopher who, like his contemporaries, also went to Germany to study philosophy, was likewise influenced by the systematic approach of Western philosophy while embodying Eastern values. Adopting Watsuji’s perspective is like taking an outsider’s point of

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\(^5\) Heidegger, BT, 27/7.

\(^6\) Ibid., 35/14.

\(^7\) This statement departs from the standpoint that at least for Heidegger, Metaphysics had been pinned down to the idea of man as the ‘rational animal’. He writes in his book *What is called thinking*, “Man conceived as the rational animal is the physical exceeding the physical”—that is, man raising himself above the animal, the sensual, the physical that he is, through reason.----“in short: in the nature of man as the rational animal, there is the passing from the physical to the non-physical, the supra-physical: thus man himself is the metaphysical.” Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?* trans. by J. Glenn Gray (New York: Perennial, 2004), 58. Hereafter cited as WT, followed by the page number.

On a side note, it must be pointed out that the relation of Heidegger to the philosophical tradition that deals with ethics could be linked with the criticisms his philosophy received, most particularly that of Levinas’ which is summed in the expression “ontological imperialism,” and the fascist tendencies of his thinking which are often being connected to his Nazi affiliation. However, since this is not the issue of the paper, the discussion on this topic is suspended.
view that is not simply critical towards Heidegger from within his tradition, but rather from a different philosophical idiom.

Graham Mayeda, in her book *Time, Space and Ethics in the Philosophy of Watsuji Tetsuro, Kuki Shuzo, and Martin Heidegger*, argues that although already contained within Heidegger’s discussions in *Being and Time*, the ‘social nature’ of existence was less emphasized by Heidegger, and it is from this that the extension of Heidegger’s discourse by Watsuji (and also by Kuki Shuzo) comes with great significance.⁸ Mayeda adds that Watsuji was able to pick up Heidegger’s tendency towards individualism and through his critique, was able to stress the importance and primordiality of the social dimension of existence.

To elucidate further the point of choosing Watsuji as the counterpart of Heidegger, the second aspect of the question must be probed, namely: Why Heidegger and Watsuji? Aside from direct references by Watsuji to Heidegger’s philosophy in his work *Rinrigaku (Ethics as the Study of Ningen)*, the influence of Heidegger to Watsuji’s style of writing and method of thinking and explaining could be greatly observed.⁹ Given that Heidegger’s hermeneutic and phenomenological approach to philosophy during that time had been very prominent amongst the Japanese thinkers, Watsuji was not spared from the Heideggerian influence. Such reception of Heidegger’s philosophy of *Dasein* sat well with the developing philosophy of *ningen sonzai* (人間存在) in Japan, and this is one of the main reasons why Watsuji, who was one of the pioneering thinkers of this philosophy, receives special attention when dealing with the ethical import of Heidegger’s philosophy. Meanwhile, also in a very similar fashion to Heidegger’s philosophical career, Watsuji was at the same time alleged to have committed to nationalistic ideologies during the turbulent periods in Japan. The accusation was an effect of his reactions against Western imperialism of East Asia and Japanese imperialism and nationalism, which simultaneously occurred during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Japan. It is precisely because of such allegation that Watsuji’s works on ethics¹⁰ had in way been questioned in the same fashion that Heidegger’s *Being and Time* was stripped off of its merit at the outbreak of the Heideggerian-Nazi controversy.

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⁹ During Watsuji’s time, Heidegger’s influence in Japan was wide ranging. His hermeneutic and phenomenological approaches had been very influential to the Japanese thinkers and Watsuji was included in such epochal disposition. In 1927, when Watsuji studied in Germany, he also read the newly published *Being and Time*.

¹⁰ This includes an essay entitled *Ethics*, which he wrote in 1931, an expansion of such treatise in *Ethics as the Study of Ningen* published in 1934, and a three-volume work also entitled *Ethics* published in 1934, 1942, and 1949.
Such direct influence between Watsuji and Heidegger; the ethical import Watsuji was able to draw from Heidegger’s philosophy; the divergence of Watsuji’s culture and thought tradition from Heidegger’s; and their political issues are the very reasons why this paper picks up Watsuji as a philosopher who could help give insights on the relation of ethics to ontology, particularly to that of Heidegger’s ontology.

**Heidegger: Ontology and the Analytic of Dasein**

What is the structure of being of that being who “is in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being”? This is the overarching theme of the written and published portion of Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time*—a work intended to be of two parts but which ended up completing only its preliminary task: “the interrogation of those entities which have the character of Dasein.” As has been pointed out, for Heidegger, the interrogation of Dasein’s way of being is in order to set properly the grounds from which the inquiry about Being could be undertaken. But what does Heidegger mean by the term *Dasein*?

Heidegger refers to the being of man as *Dasein*. The term is a combination of two terms, *da* and *sein*, which literally means ‘being-there’ and refers to the being of persons in contrast to the being of entities (of things). For Heidegger the meaning of *Dasein’s* existence is “temporality.” This simply means that its structural way of being is to be ‘in time.’ At the very onset, Heidegger already demarcates that time is the horizon for any interpretation of Being. “Time,” he says, is “the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it.” Therefore, if *Dasein* means ‘being-there’ and being ‘in-time,’ the term acquires the meaning: ‘being-there-in-time.’ It is under this sense that this paper approaches Heidegger’s ontology of *Dasein* in terms of temporality. Insofar as his *Being and Time* is concerned, this paper argues that Heidegger presented three dimensions of temporal existence: *being-in-the-world, being-with, and being-towards-death.*

*Being-in-the-world* is the basic existential structure of *Dasein*. It signifies that *Dasein* is “thrown into a there” within which he is born, is

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12 Ibid., 65/41.
13 However, in traditional German philosophy, *Dasein* would generally refer to the Being or existence of any thing. (See footnote 1 in *Being and Time*, Macquarrie-Robinson translation, 27). The difference between being and entities is of prime distinction for Heidegger. It is what scholars refer to as the ‘ontological difference.’
14 Heidegger, *BT*, 38/17.
15 Ibid., 39/18.
16 Ibid., 39/17.
17 Ibid., 344/297.
raised, dwells, and dies. This ‘there’ is the world. This ‘world,’ for Heidegger, is not a physical place wherein one simply stands, moves, or wanders about, but rather, a relational space ‘within which’ one encounters things in their ‘manipulability’ and ‘presence’ and it is what gives them their connectedness. Heidegger distinguishes this world from three other senses of the world, namely: the world as “the totality of entities,” the world as “the being of such totality,” and the world as “the general concept that embraces all possible worlds.” In presenting Dasein as being-in-the-world, Heidegger designates the world as the world of familiarity. It is the world wherein “the factical Dasein can be said to live,” and from which Dasein derives its basic intelligibility and sense of anything. It is the world closest to it, which it could claim as its world, but which it has not created on its own. This signification implies that beforehand, there is already a relational context of things and individuals into which one can only be factically submitted. As Heidegger writes, “Dasein, insofar as it is, has always submitted itself already to this ‘world’ which it encounters, and this submission belongs essentially to its being.” As such, it is only when one learns to participate within this “system of relations” that one starts owning such world. In this sense, in Heidegger’s perspective, as many as there are individual Daseins, so there shall be as many worlds. And this world is the ‘within which’ that makes the coherence of our experience possible.

Heidegger argues: “Dasein’s understanding of Being pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of something like a ‘world,’ and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which become accessible within the world.” This means that insofar as Dasein has an understanding of Being, this understanding is always within the context of a ‘world.’

As a being thrown in a world, Heidegger characterizes such ‘being-in’ as a ‘being-with’ (the second dimension of temporality). This signifies that as one lives in a world, one encounters things, but along with things, one likewise encounters people. He writes,

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18 In the Macquarrie-Robinson translation, ‘manipulability’ and ‘presence’ are respectively translated as ‘readiness-to-hand’ and ‘presence-at-hand.’ However, for the sake of clarity, I will use ‘manipulability’ and ‘presence’ in order to have a signification that is closer to an English reader.

19 Heidegger’s discussion of the worldhood of the world is the theme of Being and Time’s Division I, Chapter III. The four significations of the world are found in Section 14 Heidegger, BT, 93/64-65.
20 Ibid., 93/64-65,
21 Ibid., 120-121/87.
22 Ibid., 122/88.
24 Heidegger, BT, 33/13.
If [something] is manipulable, then there lies in the kind of Being which belongs to it (that is, in its involvement) an essential assignment or reference to possible wearers, for instance, for whom it should be ‘cut to figure.’ Similarly, when material is put to use, we encounter its producer or ‘supplier’ as one who ‘serves’ well or badly.  

Heidegger, in trying to uncover the ‘who’ of Dasein, turns to who Dasein is proximally and for the most part. For him, this is nothing but to ask: “Who is it that Dasein is in its everydayness?”

In laying bare the answer to this question, Heidegger presents that the structure of Dasein’s being in its everydayness manifests as a ‘being-with’ (Mitsein) and ‘Dasein-with’ (Mitdasein). He discusses that these structural items of being-in-the-world highlight the fact that along with the equipment to be found when one is working on something, those others ‘for whom’ the work is destined are encountered too. This dimension of Dasein’s existence highlights the social belongingness of human life. The world, within which we encounter things, is the same world within which we encounter others who have the same kind of being as us (Dasein). It is not only things that are present in this world but human beings as well. Dasein, in existing in the world, is essentially with others. Dasein is a Dasein-with others. Heidegger argues that “knowing oneself” is grounded in this “being-with.” As we are always within a world-context, we also are always within a social-context. In every conceptual and practical activity one engages into, one always already participates within a social whole. He stresses: “even if the particular factual Dasein does not turn to others, and supposes that it has no need of them or manages to get along without them, it is in the way of being-with.” Under this signification, Dasein can only come to know itself as someone who is with-others and as such, that the world is disclosed to it as a “with-world”—it is always ‘with’ things, always ‘with’ people. The very reason why it can have any conception of the world at all is because of this ‘with-ness.’ In understanding the who of Dasein, one should not fall into the trap of conceiving it as an isolated “I” in that it could be understood apart from its relation with others. Understanding who one is, apart from one’s relation to others with whom one is primarily socialized is impossible, for even isolation

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26 Ibid., 149/114.
27 Ibid., 153/117.
28 Ibid., 160/124.
29 Ibid., 160/125.
30 Ibid., 155/118.
is still based on the understanding that one is initially ‘with’ others. Heidegger stresses, “even Dasein’s Being-alone is Being-with; […] it is simply a deficient mode of being-with.”

For Heidegger, we are inescapably social beings. However, although this signifies our primordial embeddedness in a society, it is also against this backdrop of being-with that Heidegger starts to run through his distinction between the authentic self and the they-self (das Man). He stresses that precisely because the world is always a world we share with others, our being as individual Daseins can so easily be dissolved into the kind of being of others, in such a way that we become simply inscribed in the they and assume an inauthentic self which is the they-self. This they-self, for Heidegger, is the kind of being we, in our everyday life, inhabit. In this way of existing, we simply “take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking.” In the they-self we become “lost in … publicness”. He writes,

Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein gets interpreted, and it is always right … because it is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and thus never gets to the ‘heart of the matter.’ By publicness everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone.

Heidegger argues that, “Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence,” that is, “in terms of a possibility of itself; to be itself or not itself.” In being itself, Dasein lives authentically. In not being itself, Dasein lives inauthentically. As has been pointed out though, in its everydayness, Dasein is a being-with. And as a being-with, Dasein exists just the way others exist. The public way of doing and interpreting things by virtue of our being thrown in a society we never choose becomes an integral aspect in shaping our being, our decisions, actions, outlook; it shapes our life. Averagely, we act according to standards or traditions. How people around us use and view things will be the way we use and see things precisely because our being

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31 Ibid., 156-7/120.
32 Ibid., 224/179.
33 Ibid., 164/126-127.
34 Ibid., 220/176.
35 Ibid., 165/127.
36 Ibid., 33/13.
constitutes a certain kind of passivity with regard to the world and the society we have grown in. Inauthenticity, characterized by our absorption in the world when we engage in work, when we are busy, excited, or ready for enjoyment, is what dominates how we are every day. In our everydayness we exist as they-self.

In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a ‘world-in-itself’ so that it just beholds what it encounters. The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibilities of having a disposition – that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world “matter” to it. The they prescribes one’s disposition and determines what and how one ‘sees.’

In the public way of interpreting things, “Things are so, because the they says so.” Here, it seems that the they is being signified by Heidegger in a pejorative sense and gives the impression that Heidegger is altogether hostile to public life. However, just like language is an essential aspect of our life that is in itself a product of this sense of ‘public understanding,’ the force of this anonymous public to which we belong and which we ourselves constitute is something that is impossible to exist without. An average understanding, as a result of this, is something that Dasein has grown in, with no possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed. This is the basic facticity into which Dasein has been thrown and fallen Harrison Hall, explains this phenomenon and writes:

38 Ibid., 212/168.
39 Richard Polt, in his introductory book to Heidegger’s philosophy, makes a good explanation for this confusion and differentiates the ‘they’ as an existential and the ‘they-self’ as a modification of the ‘they.’ He argues that the ‘they’ is constant: the ‘they’ is always familiar with a range of social expectations and interpretations that mark it as belonging to a culture. Meanwhile, when one exists as the ‘they-self,’ as one would most of the time, one simply accepts these expectations and interpretations, and lets one’s world be structured by them. From this delineation, one could understand then that the ‘they’ as an existential is a mode of Dasein’s existence and that the ‘they-self’ and the authentic self are but modifications of the ‘they.’ See Richard Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999).
40 Heidegger, BT, 213/169.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 223/179.
43 Ibid., 220/176.
For Heidegger, we are always choosing from among the cultural possibilities and against the cultural background of intelligibility into which we have been thrown. That is, we are always understanding (taking a stand on) our being on the basis of our thrownness or facticity. Human being is essentially self-interpreting being (in-the-world). But for the most part this self-interpreting is not only implicit – it is anonymous (‘public’ in Kierkegaard’s sense). We choose, frequently without realizing we are choosing to do ‘what they do’ … But when we choose to interpret our being in the public way – living in the world of the they [das Man], doing ‘what they do’ because it is either the ‘right’ or the comfortable thing to do – we ‘fall’ into the inauthentic way of being (BT 221-224).

In this sense, although Dasein’s being-with implies our belongingness to communal life, it also implies our sense of passivity to the community we belong to. In being embedded in a social community, our tendency is to simply assume the public way of doing and understanding things. This is where the third dimension and ultimate form of temporality comes with great significance—for it is here where Heidegger delineates how Dasein could possibly and actually reclaim itself from its lostness—i.e., Dasein’s realization of itself as a ‘being-towards-death.’

Being inscribed in time, Heidegger remarks, means that one is already “old enough to die.” Death he says is “the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there.” It is, as he writes, the “possibility of absolute impossibility.” Heidegger furthers: “As possibility, death gives Dasein nothing to be ‘actualized,’ nothing which Dasein, as actual, could itself be. It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything, of every way of existing.” It is the end of existence and as such, the end of projection and comportment. Heidegger, in presenting the possibilities of existence in terms of ontical and ontological possibilities,

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45 Heidegger, BT, 289/245.
46 Ibid., 294/250.
47 Ibid., 294/250.
48 Ibid., 307/262.
49 Ontical possibilities are the social roles we assume in our particular lives as specific individuals, i.e, as student, daughter, teacher, etc. The ontological possibilities, on the other hand,
uses two phenomena through which authenticity becomes possible, namely: anxiety and death.

Anxiety and the ‘anticipation’ of an impending death are the very keys, which Heidegger outlines as that which can be used against the enveloping dominion of the they-self. Among the two, Heidegger first presents anxiety as the kind of disposition that is capable of individualizing Dasein. He argues that in anxiety, the world as a system of relations, a network of significance, a world with others, simply shrinks away. Anxiety, as an unease about one’s being-in-the-world, brings Dasein “face to face with its being-free for the authenticity of its being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is.”\textsuperscript{50} He explains,

That which anxiety is anxious about is being-in-the-world itself. In anxiety what is environmentally manipulable sinks away and so, in general, do entities within-the-world. The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of others. Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about – its authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities.\textsuperscript{51}

Meanwhile, the other phenomenon that opens the possibility for Dasein to be its authentic self, i.e., anticipation, is that experience which for him “one becomes free for one’s own death.”\textsuperscript{52} As it is in anxiety, the uncanniness one feels in the experience of death, as the experience of being face to face with oneself, is the very experience that individualizes man from this social absorption. It opens the utter reality that existence is not an infinite expansion and that in just one uncertain moment, it can be curtailed by death. Such being-towards-death epitomizes how Dasein as being-in is a being-in-time. Heidegger notes,

\begin{itemize}
\item refer to a typology of Daseins’ way of being, which have been referred earlier as the authentic self and the they or inauthentic self.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Heidegger, \textit{BT}, 232/188.
\item \textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ibid.}, 232/187.
\item \textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, 308/264.
\end{itemize}
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the ‘they self,’ and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death—a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the they, and which is factual, certain of itself and anxious.53

This theme of death in relation to authenticity and inauthenticity is very critical for Heidegger. Inauthenticity, which he describes as our everyday way of being and constitutes our being-among-one-another, including our absorption to the they-self, is our way of being simply submitted to the general category of ‘society’ instead of being ‘members’ of a society. It is then against this backdrop of inauthenticity that Heidegger divulges the counter attitude or self-determination of Dasein that at once makes Dasein authentic, i.e., resoluteness. “Resoluteness,” he says, “signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one’s lostness in the they.”54 Through it, Dasein projects towards its “ownmost Being-guilty” in being lost in the publicness of the they.55 It is the counter approach to life, characterized by being directed by an undying passion for something that is at the very core for ‘one’s own life.’ In the experience of realizing death and anxiety, the they, which we normally appeal to, but which is precisely ‘no one,’ cannot offer any assistance. We are simply brought ‘face to face with ourselves’ and are at once individuated. Heidegger makes it clear that no one can take our dying away from us.56 At the moment of death, we alone shall face it, and this is similar with life. Inasmuch as no one can die for us, no one could also live for us. Such is the very root of his call for authenticity. As individuals, we must be resolute enough to ‘free’ ourselves from the ‘illusory’ comforts of norms and conventions, and ‘seize’ the possibilities provided for by our facticity. In resoluteness, one is resolved to reaffirm and defend that which one resolves at, against one’s tendency to fall back to irresoluteness and inauthenticity. To be resolute in one moment, like the sense we get when one speaks of a New Year’s resolution, is never enough. It is a constant struggle to become someone you choose to. It is a battle of maintaining oneself in resolution, ready and open for the possibilities of life; resolute in choosing one possibility among the many with an understanding of one’s utmost capacities and

53 Ibid., 311/266.
54 Ibid., 346/299.
55 Ibid., 343/297.
56 Ibid., 284/240.
potentialities. It involves an understanding of one’s Situation as a thrown and finite individual, who must seize and make the most out of one’s life. Resoluteness is the way of being whereby we can embrace the finitude of our existence and project towards what is significant for us, finally free to face, with all uncanniness and anxiety, the being that is us, “a being in time.”

Resolution, however, is not rigid stubbornness. An authentic person is free to change her mind—but she will do so only because she lucidly grasps her Situation in relation to who she chooses to be, and not because of whim, cowardice, or social pressures. To be resolute is not at all a kind of rebellious decision to deviate from the average way of interpreting and dealing with things. Although Heidegger’s writing gives the reader this impression, what Heidegger aims to emphasize is one’s ability to be oneself and own one’s actions, be responsible for it, even if one can never have the power over what is initially given. It is not an empty decision to be different; even following one’s tradition and having the same view of things with others are still accounted for as authentic expressions of oneself as long as one understands these practices, understands them in relation to one’s self-determination. It requires a sense of assessment of the things one considers significant and a kind of self-understanding of one’s potentialities-for-Being. Heidegger, in this sense, affirms that resolutions remain dependent upon the they and its world. Resoluteness, as an authentic being-one’s-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating “I.” The resolution Dasein asserts is precisely a disclosive projection of how one uniquely and firmly assumes, appropriates, and co-determines one’s own social, cultural, and historical determination. Dasein is an embodiment of the society itself and is determined by it, but it is at the same time a singular being capable of fashioning its own way of being a confluence of different forces of influence.

Authentic being one’s self in the sense of resoluteness then does not signify here an exceptional condition for Dasein that has been ‘detached’ from the they. This means that since the they-self signifies not only our passive absorption to the social whole but also our very belongingness to such relational existence, being authentic means not simply succumbing to the dictates of public life but instead, participating actively in the formation of one’s own existence and life. Thus, Heidegger writes,

57 Situation with a capital “s” is contrasted with what Heidegger calls as ‘general situation.’ In the latter, the inauthentic individual only sees what is general based on his average understanding of things. The authentic Dasein, however, understands his Situation that he is a thrown individual who can project and own up the possibilities provided for by his thrownness.


60 Ibid., 345/6/299.

61 Ibid., 348/298.
The term ‘irresoluteness’ merely expresses that phenomenon which we have interpreted as a being-surrendered to the way in which things have been prevalently interpreted by the ‘they.’ Dasein as the they-self, gets ‘lived’ by the common-sense ambiguity of that publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything but which has always made its decision. “Resoluteness” signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one’s lostness in the “they.”

As such, resoluteness makes Dasein the Dasein that he is: a being thrown in a world where he encounters things and people, who like him, have as their way of being the capacity to make sense of their lives inasmuch as existence is not an endless and pre-determined feat. It is under this sense of ontology as first probing into human existence that Heidegger’s statement in his later work gains relevance: “Every philosophical doctrine of man’s essential nature is in itself a doctrine of the Being of beings. Every doctrine of Being is in itself alone a doctrine of man’s essential nature.” The human being, as the departure point in uncovering the meaning of Being, for Heidegger, receives a very crucial place, and as such becomes the very foundation of his fundamental ontology.

Watsuji: Ethics as the study of Ningen (人間)

The main problem that Watsuji undertakes in his philosophical engagement is the question of ethics. In the beginning of his book Rinrigaku, he argues that the problem of modern ethics is its tendency towards individualism. For this, he claims that individuality constitutes only one moment of the existence of human beings. Watsuji, in opening the vista for a systematic conception of ethics, immediately pinned down the question of ethics as precisely the question of the “laws of the social existence of ningen (人間).” Ningen (人間), as the Japanese term for the human being, is the subject who inquires precisely about the question of ethics, and is also that which is itself being inquired about. For Watsuji, ethics, therefore, as primarily focused on the being of the individual subject, is at the same time anchored on the communal subject. Watsuji refers to this character of the human subject as

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62 Ibid., 346/299.
63 Heidegger, WT, 79.
64 Watsuji, WTR, 9.
65 Ibid., 11.
'subjective community,' which points to the human subject being an embodiment of the interconnection of human acts within a community.

In his *Rinrigaku*, Watsuji begins with the statement: “The locus of ethical problems lies not in the consciousness of the isolated individual, but precisely in the in-betweenness of person and person. Because of this, ethics is the study of *ningen* (人間).” Rinri (倫理), as Watsuji interprets, is the Japanese term for ‘ethics.’ It is a compound term that is composed of the two characters *rin* (倫) and *ri* (理). *Rin* (倫) refers to *nakama*, which means ‘fellows,’ and *ri* (理) signifies ‘order,’ literally: ‘order of fellowship.’

*Nakama* (仲間), for Watsuji, signifies ‘a body, or a system of relations’ that a definite group of persons have with one another, but not only that; it also denotes the ‘individual persons’ within this system. He traces this to the Chinese Five Relationships wherein he sees that the relationships ruler-subject, husband-wife, senior brother-junior brother, senior friend-junior friend, father-son all define a particular and unitary belongingness with one another. For him, one can draw from the Five Relationships the signification that a ‘relationship’ is constituted by persons, and that it is that which constitutes the persons within the relationship. This means that, for instance, in the father-son relation, their fellowship as two individuals forming a unique kind of relationship (father-son) presents that every relationship constitutes a being with another person: a person being with another person. Moreover, the fellowship constitutes the individuals’ inasmuch as it is only in that relationship that the father can actually be a father to a son, and the son, be a son to a father. In this sense, as Watsuji explains, *rin* (倫, fellowship) then signifies “the manner of interaction through which people have definite practical connections with each other.” Rin (倫) is that which connotes individuals’ relatedness in a given social sphere.

In conceiving fellowship as such, one cannot discount the fact that within that connection, there emerges a distinct manner of action which the persons involved undertake. This is what is meant by the second character *ri* (理). It signifies the ‘reason’ or ‘order’ or relational ‘pattern’ which appears as a repeated and exclusive way of interacting with each other carried out by persons within a particular relationship, and which varies from one relationship to another.

From the combined senses of the two characters *rin* and *ri*, Watsuji then defines *rinri* as “the order or the pattern through which the communal existence of human beings is rendered possible.” As the Japanese term that denotes ethics, *rinri* suggests the interconnectedness of people within a society characterized by a dynamic relational pattern that governs human

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66 Ibid., 10.
67 Ibid., 11.
68 Ibid.
existence. It is the given order of fellowship in a community, which manifests a certain sense of being with one another.

It is exactly from this meaning of ethics that Watsuji draws his stand as regards the connection of is and ought, or in Western paradigm, of ontology and ethics. For him, “human existence as such infinitely aims at the realization of communal existence by virtue of the fact that human beings are ningen (人間).” The relational patterns involved in social existence, he claims, are not to be treated simply as given laws that are fixed and complete in themselves. They are rather to be ‘infinitely’ aimed at. Watsuji stresses that although the pattern of practical connections is already realized, it is at the same time “a pattern yet to be achieved.” Although ethics is already what is, in the sense of what Watsuji calls ‘laws of social existence’ or our primary way of relating with one another, it is also regarded as what should be achieved ‘infinitely.’ The derivation of this standpoint of Watsuji comes from the fact that such ‘law’ is actually an unwritten law, whose sole support lies in the mutual will of individuals within a relationship to act in such manner repeatedly. Once one of them breaks off that sense of agreement, the ‘lawness’ of the relational pattern at the same time disintegrates. Thus for Watsuji, inasmuch as rinri (倫理) is what is, it is also what ought.

Rinri (倫理) without the human beings which it interconnects, however, is not possible. This leads to another major term used by Watsuji in his ethical system: ningen (人間). What precisely does he mean by ningen? Ningen (人間) is also a compound term composed of two characters: hito (人) meaning man, and gen or aida (間) meaning betweenness, literally ‘man-in-betweenness.’ It was mentioned earlier that for Watsuji, ethics is at once a ‘study of ningen (人間).’ If we take the literal meaning of ningen (人間) it would signify man, and the study of ningen (人間) or the study of man would be anthropology. However, Watsuji emphasizes that this literal meaning does not necessarily fully coincide with the Japanese connotation of the term. For the Japanese and for him, the meaning of the term ningen (人間) presents a very crucial dimension of the existence of man that is not immediately implied by the English term ‘anthropology.’ This is the “betweenness of human beings, that is, the ‘public.’” Watsuji points out that this sense of publicness inscribed in the term is the connotation used in classic Japanese literature most especially in Buddhist sutras. However, as time went by, this signification also transformed and came to signify the ‘individual.’ From

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69 Ibid., 12.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 This can be understood in the sense of a son disobeying his father, for instance, or a broken marriage, or in the betrayal of loyalties between a ruler-subject relation.
73 Watsuji, WTR, 14.
here, Watsuji then takes these two senses of the term as ‘public, social, or communal,’ and ‘individual’ and uses them as the basis for what he states as the dual-structure of the nature of *ningen* (人間): as both an individual and a member of the society.\(^74\)

It is in here that Watsuji makes a crucial distinction. He stresses that *ningen* (人間) as an individual differs completely from society. As an ‘individual,’ *ningen* (人間) is truly the individual person that is within a society. But, insofar as *ningen* (人間) also refers to the public, it is also the ‘community’ which exists between person and person, and thus signifying ‘society’ as well and not just isolated human beings.\(^75\) This complex nature of *ningen* (人間) is what led Watsuji to assert that it refers not merely to an individual ‘human being’ nor merely to ‘society’ but to both. Individuals are basically different from the society and yet as they also constitute the society, they also are the society. The term *ningen* (人間), insofar as it refers to individuals singly, also refers to them generally, or better yet, publicly.

This dual structure of *ningen* (人間) as being both individual and social is referred to by Watsuji as “the absolute totality of *ningen* (人間).”\(^76\) For Watsuji, this double structure of *ningen* (人間) reveals that it is precisely “a movement of negation”\(^77\) that is constitutive of two moments: the negation of the totality of *ningen* (人間) in order to arrive at individuality, and the negation of this individuality in order to return back to communal existence. The first moment as the negation of the totality of *ningen* (人間) is, for Watsuji, a negation aimed at establishing ‘individuality,’ that is, self-awareness. However, this moment, by the time it reaches such awareness, is again negated and returns to the totality of *ningen* (人間) which is properly communal life. He explains that this double negation comes about precisely because the moment one arrives at self-realization, one at the same time realizes that one is already socially embedded and thus belongs to the totality of *ningen* (人間).

This double negation that starts from the negation of totality if only to return to it again is what Watsuji calls the movement of ‘absolute negation’ that leads to the derivation of the “true reality of an individual, as well as of totality” — “emptiness.”\(^78\) Emptiness is the real feature of the totality of *ningen* (人間) inasmuch as it is a continuous movement from totality to individuality and then back to totality. Under this sense, the elements of this totality, that

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74 Watsuji writes: “The Japanese language ... possesses a very significant word, namely, *ningen* (人間). On the basis of the evolved meaning of this word, we Japanese have produced a distinctive conception of human being. According to it, *ningen* (人間) is the public and, at the same time, the individual human beings living within it.” Watsuji, WTR, 15.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid., 23.

77 Ibid., 22.

78 Ibid., 23.
is, the individuals and the social whole, “subsist not in themselves, but only in the relationship of each with the other.”\textsuperscript{79} The individual’s individuality is negated for the sake of the whole that is to be established, and the whole is that ground against which an individual rebels to establish itself.\textsuperscript{80} Inasmuch as this is a continuous self-negation; therefore, this negative structure is what renders the continuous formation of human beings.\textsuperscript{81} If it is the case for Watsuji that ethics is the study of ningen (人間), and if the absolute totality of ningen (人間) is absolute negativity, then the basic principle of ethics for him is the realization of the absolute totality of ningen (人間)\textsuperscript{82} ‘as’ absolute emptiness.\textsuperscript{83}

In the process of uncovering this meaning of ningen (人間), Watsuji elucidates his critique of Heidegger and begins with the question of whether it is appropriate to immediately associate ‘publicness’ with the ‘society’ or the ‘community.’ In this, he stresses that the term ‘public’ is one of the central problems of modern philosophy and points to Heidegger’s idea of the ‘world.’ He writes,

> When Heidegger characterized human existence by means of the phrase being in the world, he made use of the concept of intentionality prevalent in phenomenology, as the jumping-off point. He carried this structure a step further, to transfer it to existence, and understood it as having to do with tools. Therefore, we can say that he set the pattern for explicating the subjective meaning of what is called the world. But in his philosophy, the relation between person and person lies hidden behind the relation between person and tools.\textsuperscript{84}

In this critique, Watsuji emphasizes that Heidegger overlooked the ‘person to person relation’ that composes the world and focused only on the individual human person in its relation with things as tools.\textsuperscript{85} He goes on stressing that it was only Karl Löwith who uncovered the hidden anthropological dimension of Heidegger’s idea of ‘world’ that deals with

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 101-102.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 117.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 17.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{85} This aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy had not been elaborated in the preceding section for the fact that the writer is of the opinion that Heidegger’s philosophy does not take as its central point this relation of human beings to things in terms of their presence and manipulability but is only an aspect of the task to disclose human’s ways of being in the world.

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mutual relations. This was when Löwith clarified that in Heidegger’s philosophy: “a human being is a person ‘together with others,’ and the world is mit-Welt (with-World), that is, the public, whereas being in the world means ‘to relate with others.’”86 Watsuji continues that if this is the case, then this kind of anthropology that deals with relation between oneself and the other, as ‘mutual relations’ of persons instead of with ‘individual’ persons, is bound to become “the basis for the framing and understanding of ethical problems.”87 Because precisely for Watsuji:

... the essential feature of life consists in the fact that persons assume an attitude of behaving themselves in relation with one another, and this attitude includes within itself the basic behaviour of human beings, that is to say, their ethos.88

In conceding this way, Watsuji asserts that since such ethos is an ethos of the human being, ethics as a study of the ethos of the human being becomes a study of human existence as embedded in a world with others.

It is in following this clarification of Löwith about the idea of the world that Watsuji links the Japanese term seken (世間), which means ‘the public,’ and the term yonnonaka (世の中), which means the world, to the German word Welt. He argues that, “Welt is not just the world of nature, but of community existence, namely, of a society in which persons are related to each other.”89 He emphasizes that the analysis of in-der-Welt-sein (being-in-the-world) is not only about the relation between persons and tools but greatly, “an analysis of community life” itself.90 Welt which originally meant ‘a generation’ and a ‘group of people,’ is to a large extent similar with the signification of the character se (世) in seken (世間) or yo (世) in yononaka (世の中) which connotes something that is both temporal and spatial — temporal in signifying ‘a generation,’ and spatial in signifying ‘a society.’91 Moreover, in seken (世間), the characters ken92 or aida (間), which pictographically shows being ‘in between’ or betweenness, and naka (中) in yononaka (世の中) which shows being ‘in’ or in-ness, also highlight the anthropological nature of the world that is not only spatial but very importantly, deeply relational.

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86 Watsuji, WTR, 17.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., 17-18.
92 If one can notice, the character ken had been referred to earlier as gen in the term ningen. This is so because the Romanization and pronunciation of Japanese characters differ depending on how it is used in a compound term.

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Combining the terms’ spatio-temporal sense with their social dimension, therefore, denotes that for Watsuji, the world itself implies a world of someone characterized by what Watusji refers to as “living and dynamic betweenness”\textsuperscript{93} with one’s fellow human beings in time and space.

As ethics then is concerned with ningen’s (人間) embeddedness in a spatio-temporal-world-with-others, Watsuji goes on to explain a final term that is fundamental to the groundwork of his ethics—the Japanese term for existence—sonzai (存在). The compound term roughly means “the subjective self-subsistence” of the self (son, 存) “within some place” (zai, 在).\textsuperscript{94} As has been presented, ningen (人間) implies the dual structure of man as being in between social existence and as an individual human being. For Watsuji, what is referred to as the place the subject must stay in is precisely the human relations which characterize the very being of the subject. If it is tenable to hold that son (存) is the self-sustenance of the self and zai (在) as remaining within human relations, he remarks that sonzai (存在) precisely means the “self-sustenance of the self as betweenness.”\textsuperscript{95} Under this signification, Watsuji interprets that because sonzai (存在) deals precisely with how ningen (人間) is to sustain itself in human relations, sonzai (存在) represents the very way of existence of ningen (人間).\textsuperscript{96} Therefore, if ningen (人間) signifies a dual structure and if sonzai (人間) is a ‘remaining’ to this dual structure, ethics as a study of ningen (人間) is aimed at safeguarding the possibility of ningen sonzai (人間存在, human existence), which means the human being remaining within the state of betweenness.

Having outlined the meaning of the four terms that consist the very core of Watsuji’s discussions on ethics namely: rinri (倫理, ethics), ningen (人間, human being), seken (世間, public) or yonononaka (世の中, world), and sonzai (存在, existence), one can now proceed to ask—What characterizes ethics for Watsuji? To this question, he singles out four features which basically comprise his method: (1) Ethics is a study of ningen (人間) asking about ningen (人間); (2) Ethics is the study of ningen (人間) conceived as the practical interconnection of acts; (3) Ethics is a science that must translate practice into a definite proposition, “… is …”; and (4) Ethics can only grasp subjective reality if it proceeds through the study of the practical and concrete expressions of ningen sonzai (人間存在).

The first characteristic of ethics that Watsuji mentions appears to be in close affinity to Heidegger’s delimitation of the question of ontology, could be said to project a very distinct resemblance. What Watsuji emphasizes when he redoubles ningen (人間) in his statement “ethics is a study of ningen (人間)
asking about \textit{ningen (人間)}"\textsuperscript{97} is similar to the Heideggerian \textit{Dasein} that asks about its own being as it asks about Being. Ethics, as the study of the human being, is at once a study of this human being asking about its existence; ethics asks about the “fundamental structure of the \textit{sonzai (存在)} of \textit{ningen (人間)}.”\textsuperscript{98} He follows the Heideggerian statement that “inquiry is a cognizant seeking for an entity both with regard to the fact that it is and with regard to its being as it is”\textsuperscript{99} and reiterates: “first of all, learning in general, that is, to ‘ask’ already belongs to the \textit{sonzai (存在)} of \textit{ningen (人間)}.”\textsuperscript{100} Watsuji further writes: “Questioning belongs to the \textit{sonzai (存在)} of \textit{ningen (人間)}, to the way of being of \textit{ningen (人間)};”\textsuperscript{101} and concludes: “the primary characteristic of the method of ethics consists in the point that the asking activity and what is asked are one.”\textsuperscript{102}

The second characteristic of ethics that Watsuji points out is “ethics as the study of \textit{ningen (人間)} conceived as the practical interconnection of acts.”\textsuperscript{103} In this feature of ethics, Watsuji brings to the fore again the dual structure of \textit{ningen (人間)} inasmuch as he describes it as not only an ‘individual subject’ but at the same time, and very importantly, a ‘practical interconnection of acts.’\textsuperscript{104} He says that “the \textit{sonzai (存在)} of \textit{ningen (人間)} is from the beginning to end a practical acting subject, as well as subjective interconnections.”\textsuperscript{105} This means that ethics inquires about subjectivity but highlights that this subjectivity is subjectivity as betweenness. In this sense, Watsuji emphasizes that in the study of \textit{ningen (人間)}, we are not dealing simply with singular subjectivity, but rather a subjectivity made possible only insofar as it has been a product of the interplay of an entire network of relational everyday activity within a given social community.

The third feature of ethics for Watsuji that determines the method of ethics is the fact that “ethics is a science that must translate practice into a definite proposition, ‘… is …’”\textsuperscript{106} What Watsuji meant by this is that “ethics is not a science that deals only with the objective meaning-content of noematic objects” rather, “it is a science that deals with human reality.”\textsuperscript{107} However, since human practical life is ‘not yet’ a science, ethics must transform it into one. This is where Watsuji’s Western influence makes a distinct presence. His

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{99} Heidegger, \textit{BT}, 24/5.
\textsuperscript{100} Watsuji, \textit{WTR}, 29.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
claim is that ethics can only be a science “by transforming human reality into logos.”\textsuperscript{108} It must, he says, “translate practice into a definite proposition.”\textsuperscript{109} However, he tempers this direct theorization of ethics by asserting that even if it is a logos or proposition, it must not be forgotten that these are still “subjective realities” and “cannot really be absolutely objectified.”\textsuperscript{110} This way, Watsuji affirms ethics (rinrigaku) as a science (gaku), but only a science whose ‘absolute objectivity’ cannot be guaranteed by virtue of the fact that the study is a study of ‘dynamic’ practical existence.

The last feature of ethics that Watsuji singles out is that “ethics can only grasp subjective reality if it proceeds through the study of the practical and concrete expressions ofningen sonzai (人間存在).”\textsuperscript{111} In following the third characteristic as a science of the practical acts ofningen (人間), Watsuji stresses out that such practical acts can only be derived from the “expressions of sonzai (存在) already carried out within the realm of practice.”\textsuperscript{112} What mediates the sonzai (存在) ofningen (人間) as subjective reality and its scientific understanding are precisely these ‘expressions’ that are “expressions of betweenness.”\textsuperscript{113} Watsuji, here, highlights the fact that these expressions are the “things of daily life,” the “everyday experience of human beings,” and as such constitute within themselves a certain sense of understanding, or logic, or order, that makes it capable for a science to grasp subjective reality.\textsuperscript{114}

Using these four characteristics that determine ethics, Watsuji sums up how ethics must be viewed and understood. He writes,

As an inquiry toningen (人間), ethics turns back to the person inquiring (first). Hence, it must subjectively grasp the subjectiveningen (人間)(second). What is more, the object of science is exclusively concerned with meaning connections (third). Hence, the subjective grasp must use as its medium “the expressions ofningen’s (人間) sonzai (存在),” which expressions are like a melting furnace through which subjectiveningen (人間) is transformed into its meaning connections (fourth).\textsuperscript{115}

These four perspectives are for Watsuji what constitute rinrigaku. It is an inquiry of the human being about itself which leads to the realization of

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 39.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 40.
its being as ‘subjective community.’ Watsuji’s idea of rinrigaku does not ‘draw’ judgments about human existence, but instead, ‘goes back’ to the very expressions of subjective-communal life within which we always already live in, and recognize how they express how we come to have any practical understanding at all. In ethics, insofar as Watsuji is concerned, one is not concerned in ‘creating’ a science of how we ought to relate within a society, but in understanding how we ‘already’ relate and how we are to remain in such relatedness. An ethical act is an act that is grounded in and triggered by one’s historicity, not a principle that is yet to be realized.

**The Heidegger-Watsuji Tension**

What can now be singled out from this presentation of the two philosophers’ views on ontology and ethics? Here, it has been laid out that for Heidegger, ontology insofar as it deals with the question of Being, necessarily embarks on the question of the being of Dasein. In the same manner, for Watsuji, inasmuch as ethics is the study of the laws of social existence, it is hence a study of *ningen* (人間) within relational existence. What this signifies to us is that intimately, both ontology and ethics take as their foundational standpoint, the standpoint of the human being. This human being is not like the traditional subject in Western philosophy which both Heidegger and Watsuji were critical about, but instead a human being that is living in a ‘world’ within which he encounters and relates with other beings who share and express the same way of being as his.

The objects of ontology and ethics are Being and social existence, respectively, and yet both embark on the point of elucidating first and foremost the existence of Dasein and *ningen* (人間). Towards the disclosure of the basic existential structures of Dasein and *ningen* (人間), it can be recognized that Heidegger and Watsuji also share the recognition of our primary embeddedness in a world and at that, the social existence which constitutes us. The basic concepts of the human being, existence, the world, and our being with others comprise a big chunk of their philosophies that one is led to think that there is really no gap between their thoughts.

However, obvious as these similarities might be, it is to be noted that the similar contention Heidegger and Watsuji share in this exposition of the human individual seems to differ when Watsuji argues against Heidegger when dealing with the concept of authenticity.

Watsuji interprets that if for Heidegger, death is the source of authenticity insofar as it individualizes Dasein from the *they-self*, for him, such authenticity is incomplete. His claim is that, “What Heidegger calls
authenticity is, in reality, inauthenticity.”¹¹⁶ He further adds that authenticity is only realized when the ‘self,’ that is arrived at in this individuation becomes annihilated, that is, when “inauthenticity becomes further negated through the non-dual relation of self and other.”¹¹⁷ Authenticity for Watsuji requires not only breaking past the they-self through realizing oneself as a being-towards-death, but in taking further another negation which basically leads the self back to the totality from which it has been negated. In this sense, Watsuji writes, “the finitude in question is no longer a finitude appearing in ‘being in its death’ but is rather a finitude of an individual that stands in relation to others.”¹¹⁸ The totality of a human being is not the individual as bounded by death, but the self-emptying individual that stands essentially related to others. Totality lies not in individuality but rather in communality. Thus Watsuji asks: “If one is concerned with only individual being, then how significant can this preparedness for death be?”¹¹⁹ The self-realization of the finitude of an individual being is of no significance by itself, for it only receives significance in its relation to others. Rather than affirming your individuality, death should affirm your belongingness to a community wherein your death has significance and makes sense. In one sense, it can be said that this expresses the Japanese tendency to regard death as something that is not to be feared but is even the source of honor. In dying for one’s community, one does not become a completed ‘individual’ but becomes a ‘member’ of such community.

Although Watsuji’s critique of Heidegger seems convincing, Watsuji seems to have missed a key element in Heidegger’s elucidation of authenticity. Heidegger, when referring to the individuating power of death, precisely indicated that death “individuates only in such a manner that, as the possibility which is not to be outstripped, it makes Dasein, as being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-being of others”¹²⁰ For Heidegger, in death, one does not only realize one’s individuated self but also the fundamental truth that such authentic self is grounded in one’s being-with-others—the totality of Dasein lies in these two interdependent aspects of its being. As he asserts: “It is only when people are resolute that they can authentically be with one another.”¹²¹ It seems that when Watsuji singles out how Heidegger’s conception of authenticity is incomplete, he is interpreting the phenomenon of death as the physical curtailment of one’s life. For Heidegger, death is not simply the end of one’s life. In death, life—as a life in

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 225.
¹¹⁷ Ibid.
¹¹⁸ Ibid., 227.
¹¹⁹ Ibid.
¹²⁰ Heidegger, BT, 309/264.
¹²¹ Ibid., 344/298.
the world, as a life with things, as a life with others, as a life that is not an infinite expansion—is at the very core affirmed. When Heidegger talks about death, he is not concerned about a biological fact; he is referring instead to an ‘ontological disposition.’ *Dasein* relates to death as a ‘possibility’ that, once fully affirmed, could radically change how *Dasein* understands and relates to his present that will consequently reorient *Dasein’s* future choices and interpretation of the past. It is in this line of thinking that Heidegger could be interpreted to propose an identity-based ethics grounded in the affirmation of one’s temporal existence. Death for Heidegger is the seal that the meaning of *Dasein’s* being is temporality and that all of *Dasein’s* understanding of Being is derived from temporality. In this way, Heidegger does not say that because *Dasein* is individuated he is already authentic because the social existence from which it first belongs makes it inauthentic, and then proceeds on to live a life at a distance from everyone else. Rather, in being individuated, *Dasein* at the same time realizes that it is, in its everyday living, a being-with-others. *Dasein’s* authenticity does not lie on its being individuated and no more, but in the fact that wholly, *Dasein* “realizes” his basic existential structure as an individual ‘with’ others. As he says, “A lively mutual acquaintanceship on the basis of being-with often depends upon how far one’s own *Dasein* has understood itself at the time; but this means that it depends only upon how far one’s essential being with others has made itself transparent and has not disguised itself.”

It is only in the acknowledgment of *Dasein’s* groundedness to its historicity and temporal existence that authenticity, rather than an extraction from inauthentic communal life, is actually an affirmation of it as an ontological condition from which it will never be able to extract itself. Inauthenticity is actually the very condition of *Dasein’s* possibilities. So that it is not at all a question of authentic or inauthentic existence, but rather, authenticity ‘within’ inauthenticity.

**Epilogue: Ethics and Ontology**

Given such proximity and divergence in Heidegger and Watsuji’s philosophies, what has remained now is the question of the relation of ethics and ontology. Seen from how Watsuji divulged the different aspects of ethics, one can say that ethics is a question of values that are at the very core socially embedded. How Watsuji battled with what he claims as the individualistic tendencies of Heidegger’s thinking is very much reflected in how he argued for the understanding of social reality as a tension between the values of individualism and communality. If for him, Heidegger still has traces of individualism, ethics must in its core strive to balance that with one’s

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authentic social belongingness. In his perspective, ontology and ethics are fused because what is studied in ontology is the existence of the human individual-in-a-world-with-others, and by that very sense, it is already a study of the ethos of the individual that is at the same time social. It is also a study not only of is but also of ought because insofar as the meaning of ‘existence’ for him is ‘to remain,’ ‘to self-sustain’ within human relations, this must be the sustenance in a balanced way of one’s dual nature as a self and as someone belonging to a community. Given that this dual nature can be easily overpowered by the domination of one of its elements over the other, ethics and human existence as such are an infinite battle to keep the elements in equilibrium. But apart from this, it has to be emphasized that the two, one’s individual and communal existence, are not separated but are inter- or co-dependent.

Meanwhile, if ethics is a tracing to the very end the practical consequences of a conception of the structure of the human being’s existence, in Heidegger’s case, ontology does not push it that far. It only describes the basic structure of how values or practices emerge or are disclosed in the first place. To uncover the ethical dimension of existence is for him not the task of ontology. Its elucidation of human existence is only a preliminary task in answering the main questions of ontology, namely, “What is the meaning of Being?” Heidegger writes,

... the analytic of Dasein remains wholly oriented towards the guiding task of working out the question of Being ... If our purpose is to make such an anthropology possible, or to lay its ontological foundations, our Interpretation will provide only some of the ‘pieces,’ even though they are by no means inessential ones. Our analysis of Dasein, however, is not only incomplete; it is also, in the first instance provisional. It merely brings out the being of this entity, without Interpreting its meaning. It is rather a preparatory procedure by which the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Being may be laid bare.123

If ontology uncovers in the process the being of Dasein, it may touch upon ethics but that is not ontology’s goal. Ethics is a different field which ontology cannot fail to intersect with insofar as both studies take the human being as their departure point. This is the reason why Levinas, for instance, criticizes Heidegger. Levinas thinks that Heidegger’s Being flattens out the

123 Ibid., 38/17.
dimensionality and dynamicity of Others. Levinas writes in *Totality and Infinity*:

To affirm the principle of *Being*, over the *existent*, is to already decide the essence of philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with *someone* who is an existent (the ethical relation) to a relation with the *Being* of the *existent*, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of the existent (a relationship of knowing) and subordinates justice to freedom.

However, this is not the point of Heidegger; ontology is not about *Dasein’s* particular ‘relation’ with others, but rather the ‘structure’ of its being that describes how come it is in the first place related to others, or that it can only understand itself in relation to others. It is not to make relationality subordinate to the structure or to impersonalize it for the sake of ‘domination,’ but only to proximally make sense what makes ethics possible in the first place. And although it tries to understand the structure of our relations or how we are related to others, it does not however determine how we ‘ought to relate’. This latter requirement is now the subject matter of ethics not ontology. But since there are a lot of nuances and intricacies in this philosophical debate between Heidegger and Levinas, and this paper is one that is focused on Watsuji and Heidegger, the elucidation of this theme shall be allotted for another research.

Overall, the sense this entire elucidation aims at is the reassertion of the divergent objectives of ontology and ethics despite them having almost similar preliminary content as presented in the case of Heidegger and Watsuji. One of them describes human existence because only in doing so can one understand that very thing which this human is concerned about: *Being*, (ontology); while the other one is concerned in describing human existence because in doing so, one sees that it is once and for all a social being and in being such, this individual’s most important concern is how to remain in such relational existence in order to be a true *ningen* (人間), that is at once social and individual (ethics). Ontology is a description of the situation of the human within a society. Ethics is the study of how humans can remain and live in harmony within that social world.

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126 See Gans, “Ethics or Ontology: Levinas or Heidegger,” 117-121.
Having this as food for thought, can it really be said that apart from the distinction of Heidegger and Watsuji on the category which they use in summarizing their philosophical projects, their thoughts are actually disjunct? I claim that they express close proximity. From this backdrop one can also realize a possible insight about comparative engagement as an approach to philosophy. Inasmuch as the difference between Heidegger and Watsuji’s labelling of ontology and ethics is something that cannot be easily reconciled for it requires another rigorous presentation of the signification of ethics and ontology, this kind of difference can actually be said to offer a very challenging feat to comparative philosophy. When comparative philosophy is able to highlight the impasse of formalizations such as this, the distance between ideas, and where incommensurability becomes a true incommensurability, it is at the same time opening the possibility for the expansion of philosophy and a brave attempt to figure out what might be considered as universal. Comparative philosophy in highlighting discontinuities in thought, at the same time highlights the ruptures, the cracks in our cogitations and hence the opening for a new project for thinking. For it is when we see where things do not follow, where exceptions exist, that thought is once again summoned to choose, decide, and make a stand.

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Abstract: The issue of statecraft is central to the works of Machiavelli, and his primary contribution to contemporary practice and theorizing is an exposition of the inevitable complexities behind this human endeavor. States rise and fall because of failures in leadership tied with the moving contours of the political arena itself. Key to Machiavelli’s analysis of statecraft is the internal relations between Virtù and Fortuna. I intend to show that Machiavelli’s contribution to the modern notion of state-building is not only an exposition of the innards of court politics, but also a development of the classical notion of virtù-Fortuna into a vital component that gave statecraft and, to an extent, politics in general its spirit of eternal motion. Machiavelli paved the way for a modern notion of statecraft by exposing the primary problem that gives it meaning through its inherent irresolvability—statecraft as determined by the convergence of virtù as a conscious effort with the basket of constantly moving objective factors we call Fortuna. Specifically, I argue that virtù and its dimensions seek to penetrate Fortuna and expose its concrete components, hence, making these factors recognizable, understandable, predictable, and eventually, vulnerable to acts of establishing and sustaining control.

Keywords: Althusser, Machiavelli, leadership, state-building

The issue of statecraft is central to the works of Machiavelli and his primary contribution to contemporary practice and theorizing is an exposition of the inevitable complexities behind this human endeavor. States rise and fall because of failures in leadership tied with the moving contours of the political arena itself. Simply put, a leader can fail without destroying his/her state, or he/she can succeed where others failed. Key to Machiavelli’s analysis of statecraft is the internal relations between Virtù and Fortuna. However, there is a lack of an organized schema that can explain the different dimensions of the internal relationship between Virtù and Fortuna. Formerly, an attempt was made by Wood to posit a reconstruction of
Machiavelli’s *virtù* through two thrusts, namely, its relationship with necessity and with war.¹ He illustrated that, for Machiavelli, necessity produces *virtù* through a cycle facilitated by the contradiction between discipline as a keystone for *virtù* given by the necessities of survival, and idleness/luxury as a result of a successful transition from stability to wealth.² Concerning war and the nature of *virtù*, Wood argued that reflective of Machiavelli’s usage of ancient warrior-statesmen as illustrations, *virtù* “therefore, is a set of qualities, or a pattern of behavior most distinctively exhibited under what may be described as battlefield conditions”³ in the context of actual warfare or politics. What I would like to note from these two thrusts is that *virtù*, when taken in isolation, often leads to fragmentary reconstructions emphasizing some aspects at the expense of others. Moreover, in relation to Wood, I note that, for Newell, disorder marks Machiavelli’s originality in comparison to Christian theology and Humanism. For him, Machiavelli saw disorder as fundamental to an understanding and execution of statecraft, that is, statesmen must realize that *Fortuna*’s unreliability should be harnessed through freeing selfish impulses and acting in accordance, not to utopian delusions but to the reality of political disorder.⁴ Simply put, disorder, instability, and unpredictability are necessary factors in providing a more nuanced understanding of this concept’s passage through Machiavelli. To elaborate, Machiavelli’s *virtù*, when understood from a relational perspective, steers away from an atomistic conception of individual will; one’s *virtù* is both insufficient in the constant struggle for power and does not necessarily entail the abandonment of collective activities as means of satisfying individual interests. Specifically, *Fortuna* as the primary external factor facing *virtù* can be understood as a key in achieving a more holistic understanding of Machiavelli’s framework.

Though insightful, Wood fell short in relating *Fortuna* as another important concept utilized by Machiavelli in his analysis of *virtù*. For this reason, I will extend Wood’s relational analysis towards *virtù* and *Fortuna* as two central concepts within *The Prince* and the *Discourses on Livy*. Furthermore, this goal is necessitated by later analyses that gave due weight to the interaction between *virtù* and *Fortuna* in efforts to better understand Machiavelli’s contribution to the modern concept of politics.⁵ Hence, I will

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try to fabricate a framework for the internal relationship between Machiavelli’s virtù and Fortuna. In trying to achieve this, I will pursue the following goals, namely, to illustrate (1) that the varied dimensions of virtù could be organized and synthesized in relation to Fortuna, and (2) that Machiavelli’s notion of statecraft is founded on the eternal struggle caused by the internal relations between virtù and Fortuna. For both objectives, I argue that in exposing the concrete bases of Machiavelli’s Fortuna, I could provide a more nuanced portrait of virtù and its dimensions; that is, when used in both offence and defense, it seeks to penetrate Fortuna and expose its concrete components, hence, making these factors recognizable, understandable, predictable, and eventually, vulnerable to acts of establishing and sustaining control. In line with these, I intend to show that Machiavelli’s contribution to the modern notion of state-building is not only an exposition of the innards of court politics, but also a development of the classical notion of virtù-Fortuna into a vital component that gave statecraft and, to an extent, politics in general its spirit of eternal motion. By juxtaposing the absence of guarantees and absolute security with the urgency and principles of achieving a semblance of these conditions, Machiavelli paved the way for a modern notion of statecraft by exposing the primary problem that gives it meaning through its inherent irresolvability—statecraft as determined by the convergence of virtù as a conscious effort with the basket of constantly moving objective factors we call Fortuna. Machiavelli’s contribution stands firm as the problems he exposed remain and will probably remain unresolved.

Dialectics in Machiavelli

For a dialectical analysis of Machiavelli, we turn to Althusser who illustrated in *Machiavelli and Us* that Machiavelli’s importance is based on his analytical approach bent on dissecting political conjunctures and placing political practice within such a framework deprived of any source of guarantee and defined by over-determination; that is, the image of the political arena that can be deduced from Machiavelli’s works is defined by the absence of linear causality and the primacy of constant change and struggle. Focusing on Althusser’s schema, I would like to note three basic thrusts, namely, his arguments on Machiavelli as a theorist of the conjuncture, his reconstruction of Machiavelli’s arguments on history, and lastly, his discussion on the interplay between Fortuna and Virtù. Firstly, for Althusser, Machiavelli was the first to think within and of the historico-political conjuncture that faced him. To be specific, Machiavelli’s approach to the
question of statecraft was to grasp the complexities facing it as based upon the confrontation and constant struggle between the results of human forces.

Second, in extracting Machiavelli’s theoretical framework and comparative approach, Althusser’s synthesized the former’s general theory on history into three interacting theses, namely, the immutability of human and natural things, the continual motion of human affairs, and the cyclicality of human affairs and the typology of governments driven to change by the wheel of Fortune (i.e., the inevitability of corruption and the de/centralization of power). For the first two theses, he argued that these were Machiavelli’s philosophical assumptions that allowed him to conduct comparative analysis; immutability allowed Machiavelli to isolate constants among cases while the assumption on constancy of change facilitated the identification of variations. Furthermore, while the first two theses pinpointed the contradiction that Machiavelli stumbled upon and recognized in his analysis of both the political arena and political practice, the third thesis was the product of the contradiction between the first two that Machiavelli accomplished by transforming the classical typology of governments into a cycle of governments. This cycle is based on a pattern defined by an incumbent’s descent into corruption and the contraction or expansion of the number of rulers (i.e., distribution of power). Now from these theses, Althusser extracted Machiavelli’s fourth thesis or his political position. For him, Machiavelli was concerned with a state that transcends the cyclicality of government so as to ensure its durability and endurance; that is, the problem of a state’s duration (specifically that of achieving stability and order in the omnipresence of external instabilities and disorders, and internal threats to what was achieved) was central to Machiavelli’s discussion on the cyclicality of history as the product of the constancy of change and man’s will and struggle to survive or benefit from it. Simply put, Machiavelli wanted a state that, through virtù, will endure despite the constancy of change in its government, that is, a state similar to Rome that endured despite the drastic transitions that took place in it.

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7 Ibid., 34-6.
9 On Machiavelli’s adaptation of Polybius’ notion of the cyclicality of the Aristotelian typology of governments, see Althusser, Machiavelli, 36-9.
10 Ibid., 34-5.
11 Ibid., 40-2.
12 Ibid., 41-2
13 I note that it is within the reason of state that Machiavelli’s arguments on state virtù was expounded. For a review of the literature on Machiavelli’s contribution to this theoretical trend, see Peter Breiner, “Machiavelli’s ‘New Prince’ and the Primordial Moment of Acquisition,” in Political Theory, 36 (2008), 66-92; Harvey C. Mansfield, “On the Impersonality of
Althusser ended his discussion by positing Machiavelli’s new prince as the bearer of virtù as the capacity to harness change (i.e., Fortuna) in establishing an enduring state. In relation to this, he discussed three possibilities regarding the engagement between virtù (as the subjective conditions) and Fortuna (as the objective conditions of the conjuncture) in the context of Machiavelli’s new prince. First is a correspondence wherein the material of favorable Fortuna finds a proper form in the virtù of an individual, hence, allowing the establishment of a durable state. Second is a non-correspondence wherein the absence of virtù gives Fortuna a free hand to take and/or give an individual power. Lastly is a deferred correspondence wherein the virtù of an individual could allow him/her to reclaim the power that Fortuna might take. Regarding the latter, I would like to note that, for Althusser, virtù draws its distinction from its inherent goal of mastering Fortuna, that is, of transforming the material of Fortuna, specifically of political conjunctions into the durability of a state by laying its foundations through virtù in correspondence or non-correspondence with Fortuna. In summary, Althusser opened two intertwined opportunities for a dialectical reconstruction of Machiavelli’s framework, namely, the concrete factors behind Fortuna and the inner-relatedness of virtù and Fortuna. However, his analysis was limited by the fact that to answer how Fortuna manifests itself does not completely answer what Fortuna is; a question, I believe, was already answered implicitly by Machiavelli. For this reason, he was able not only to dissect virtù in the proper context of a concretized sense of Fortuna, but also to herald a modern conceptualization of statecraft that exposed both the social bases of change and cyclicality, and its dynamic root in the struggle between virtù and Fortuna. Hence, at the point where Althusser failed to specify Fortuna’s concrete foundations, my reconstruction of Machiavelli would come in to further shed light upon the roots of its engagement and internal relations with virtù. Thus, I will illustrate that while virtù emerges out of the political conditions shaped by Fortuna as a set of internalized practices and principles, the latter’s human component is founded on the interactions between those pursuing their own interests through their expression or lack of virtù; Fortuna is as human as virtù.


Althusser, Machiavelli, 74-6.

I note that for the following authors, the internal relationship between virtù and Fortuna could be defined as the latter providing conditions of chance, disorder, and instability for the former’s expression as discipline, audacity, improvisation, and innovation: Newell, “How Original Is Machiavelli?,” 628-9; Charles D. Tarlton, “Azioni in modo l’una dall’altra: action for action’s sake in Machiavelli’s The Prince,” in History of European Ideas, 29 (2003), 126-7, 136; Wood, “Virtù Reconsidered,” 169-70.
On Virtù and Fortuna: A Conceptual Framework

Aligned with the literature reviewed, my analysis will have two dimensions. First, I will illustrate how Machiavelli saw the struggle between virtù and Fortuna as a form of socio-political relation. Second, through Machiavelli’s political psychology, I would further shed light on the internal relations between virtù and Fortuna by fabricating a framework categorizing and synthesizing the different dimensions of virtù that could be found in Machiavelli’s discussions on princes and citizens (on principalities and republics). Regarding the first level of my analysis, I begin by distinguishing Fortuna from necessity, with the former subsuming the latter as its bridge to virtù. Virtù as acting towards Fortuna is about recognizing and reacting to necessity; that is, virtù could either be an anticipation of Fortuna by foreseeing future necessities or an adaptive reaction to it. The absence of virtù causes a subject to be solely driven by necessity without understanding and recognizing Fortuna as the factor and logic behind it (i.e., the constancy of change). But what is it that must be recognized?

Here we arrive at my contention that Fortuna, for Machiavelli, consists of both human and natural factors that are from a subject’s perspective uncontrollable and unpredictable. This is aligned with the current literature that takes Fortuna as an external factor facing virtù and an elaboration of Kocis’ argument that Fortuna is mere literary or explanatory device. Though I agree with the latter’s premises that led to such a conclusion (specifically his illustration that it served the purpose of establishing a notion of the world as being vulnerable to human exertions), I contend, on the contrary, that for Machiavelli, Fortuna is an important concept that referred to concrete factors. This is primarily based on my observation that his discussions on Fortuna in both The Prince and the Discourses, as well as in some letters, are situated before or after an examination of the activities of others directly related to the subject. I argue that Machiavelli’s belief on Fortuna is directed at the unpredictability and uncontrollability of the

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19 Ibid., 46-52 for details on Machiavelli’s usage of Fortuna as a concept.
cumulative effects of external factors. Focusing on its human component, two arguments made by Machiavelli can illustrate my contention through Fortuna’s capacity to give opportunities for the realization of virtù. First, for Machiavelli, Fortuna could favor a prince by creating enemies that he could crush, thus, elevating his status. Hence, in harnessing Fortuna, Machiavelli stated “that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity for it, should astutely nourish some enmity so that when he has crushed it, his greatness emerges the more from it.”

Second, in the Discourses, Machiavelli argued that virtù in its most general sense has a quality of excellence and strength that passes from people to people, from one state to another. He illustrated that in the interplay between virtù and Fortuna, the dissolution of one’s virtù is the harbinger of favorable Fortuna for another. This other (ex. neighbors of a falling state), in facing the latter, is given the opportunity to internalize virtù, thus, transferring to a new bearer who succeeds in internalizing and expressing it to harness the favorable Fortuna. Simply put, the degradation of one is the favorable Fortuna of another; the idleness of the Medes, the disunity of the Athenians, and the slavery of the Hebrews all allowed their respective princes in such conjunctions to emerge as anti-thetical entities that internalized what was lost by their targets. Hence, I believe that for Machiavelli, Cyrus became the epitome of the vigor lost by the Medes, Theseus sought the unity of a divided people, and Moses embodied the autonomy and nationhood lost by the Hebrews under captivity.

Regarding Fortuna’s malevolence, I argue that in relating Chapters 24, 25, and 26 of The Prince with each other, Machiavelli related the fall of the princes of Italy with their lack of virtù or the inability to at least resist or alleviate the damages of Fortuna embodied by the constant intrusion of foreign powers tied and facilitated by their dependence on mercenaries (two factors that aggravated the volatility of political and military affairs). Thus, when Machiavelli urged the House of Medici to lead Italy he was referring not only to the political positions held by that family, but also to the conjunction of external conditions calling for their leadership, that is, in Althusserian terms, the possibility of a correspondence between Fortuna and virtù.

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22 Machiavelli, Prince, 85.
23 Machiavelli, Discourses, 123-125.
25 Ibid., 49, 96-97, 104.
26 Ibid., 102.
From these examples I argue that, for Machiavelli, the concept of *Fortuna* subsumes all these concrete and interacting factors under the general characteristics of uncontrollability and unpredictability, hence, serving as a vital concept defining the attributes of the socio-political environment that a subject must deal with. At an aggregate level, these concrete factors for Machiavelli, specifically their deliberate activities (including other expressions of *virtù*), their interaction with each other, and their subsequent impact on a subject could be summed up with the notions of instability and insecurity. *Fortuna*, simply, is the weaving of the activities and characteristics of external factors (both human and natural) that in the end will actively subsume the subject as part of its web. This notion of *Fortuna’s* ontological primacy over *virtù* was deduced from the eternity of *Fortuna’s* movement against the mortality of man. To be specific, when taken as an aggregate in motion, the concrete factors behind *Fortuna* surpass the temporality of the same factors when taken as particulars.\(^{27}\) In line with this, I argue that *virtù* for Machiavelli involves an effort to understand the patterns weaved before by studying history, and by unweaving a specific conjunction in the web by deducing what is deliberate (what was and what could be conducted by others), and acting accordingly either as a response or an anticipation of what was exposed.

Regarding *virtù*, I will now present a conceptual framework based on the schema proposed by Fischer in his extraction of the political psychology in Machiavelli’s work. Fischer argued that two categories could be deduced to define the character of the Machiavellian man, namely, necessary or natural properties, and accidental or contingent attributes.\(^{28}\) The former was defined as qualities inherent in men, which includes the following: (1) *animo* as the motivation or energy behind actions, (2) the mind, which as a guide for our actions includes memory, ingenuity, and imagination, (3) *virtù* that refers to the higher degrees of the first two qualities, (4) man’s sense of individuality, (5) desires, (6) humors, and lastly (7) ambition and license.\(^{29}\) Furthermore, for Machiavelli, variations in the degrees and particulars of these qualities would, on one hand, account for the different ideal types of political actors ranging from the vulgar to the prince and, on the other, contribute to the success or failure of a political entity. Concerning accidental attributes, Fischer argued that these are acquired qualities that take external forces into account (ex. the imposition of an other’s will).\(^{30}\) This category refers to the different habits that Machiavelli took into account in relation to the issue of a collective’s *virtù* (i.e., cooperative habit) and eventual

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\(^{27}\) See Lukes, “Fortune Comes of Age,” 33-50.

\(^{28}\) Fischer, “Machiavelli’s Political Psychology,” 794-797.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., 799-818.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 797.
corruption. This issue will be pursued by my analysis but, in summary, Fischer provided a framework that could be utilized to give a systematic exposition of the virtù-Fortuna issue at the level of the individual, a level that Machiavelli shared in The Prince.

For the purposes of this paper, I found it necessary to distinguish virtù from a subject’s inherent characteristics in order for the former to be internally related with Fortuna without dragging the complexities of the subject with it. I argue that, contrary to Fischer’s inclusion of virtù as an internal and necessary quality, virtù could be considered as a set of principles and practices (a mentality or mind-set, and behavior) that are internalized in accordance to the demands of an external factor (i.e. Fortuna) and a subject’s inherent attributes; the former, as would be discussed later on, determines what should be internalized, while the latter determines whether the internalization will be successful. One illustration of this distinction was Machiavelli’s discussion on the manner of choosing ministers and handling court politics (on advice and flattery) wherein he distinguished between a ruler’s intelligence and two principles, namely, a balance between autonomy and openness to advice in making decisions, and keeping ministers and courtiers under one’s control (specifically for ministers whose interests must be solely for service to their prince).31

In summary, Machiavelli portrayed intellectual capacity as a factor that will determine whether such principles will be effectively internalized and practiced, and whether the practice could lead to success indicating virtù and resulting in survival of a prince. Moreover, I also contend that at the center of Machiavelli’s separation of virtù from iniquity/criminality/wickedness is not the issue of amorality but that of the difference between cruelty and inhumanity as personal characteristics, and as an expression of virtù’s amoral dimension. From the perspective of social philosophy, Machiavelli’s exposition on the amorality of virtù should be understood as neither a conclusion nor a claim to an absolute truth, but as a door to a perspective that takes social relations as interdependent with the question of power, the latter being inherently amoral but inevitably shapes and is shaped in turn by the political dimension of morality. Simply put, from the discussion above I note that Machiavelli stands between social and political philosophy by focusing on the processual relationship between social behavior and political activities. We will again discuss Machiavelli’s case for and against Agathocles, but for this part of our discussion, I note that for Kahn,32 the case of Agathocles was a rhetorical strategy that destabilized the idea of virtù for it to be aligned with the unstable political reality that

31 Machiavelli, Prince, 92-95.
Machiavelli grasped and presented. I further contend that this strategy was used to establish a distinction between the manifestation of raw personal character supported by non-political virtù (for Machiavelli, Agathocles had physical and mental virtù) and the manifestation of subjective conditions within the framework of political virtù. Hence, as would be elaborated later on, though the semblance of Agathocles’ savagery could be found in Cesare Borgia’s career, Machiavelli portrayed the latter as a man of virtù because his savagery was in accordance with political necessities and calculative prudence.33

Thus, for the first level of my analysis I propose a framework built upon four factors. The first two that could be placed under the category of agency are the subject with its necessary attributes, and virtù as a set of internalized principles and practices linked with the subject through contingent attributes. The last two under the category of object are Fortuna as the aggregate of all external concrete factors that are uncontrollable and unpredictable, and necessity as the form Fortuna takes in close temporal proximity to a subject. I would also like to note that in line with Althusser, it is in the absence of absolutes that Machiavelli grasped the eternal motion built on partiality. Hence, the focus of the second level of my analysis would be the internal relationship between Machiavelli’s agency and object, specifically, the constant interplay, struggle, conflict, and engagement between virtù and Fortuna with the goal of achieving stability and durability.

**Virtù: A Dissection through Fortuna**

At this point I note that, for Machiavelli, though the Roman Empire was said to be founded on good Fortuna and a strong military, he deemed that “it ought to be perceived that where good discipline prevails there also will good order prevail, and good fortune rarely fails to follow in their train.”34 From this statement of his perspective in dissecting the foundations of the Roman Empire, I deduced the notion of Fortuna being harnessed by acting upon other political actors through an imposition of discipline and the subsequent establishment of order (two results of virtù). Thus, moving to the particulars of virtù-Fortuna I argue that the internal relationship between these two can be defined in two ways. First, virtù is an imposition of a form (i.e., order, stability, and duration for a state) upon the matter of Fortuna,35 and second, the latter’s contingent nature ensures that the process will be partial in completion and continuous or cyclical in character. Though I am

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33 Machiavelli, *Prince*, 26-30
34 Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 105.
35 See Althusser, *Machiavelli*, 75-76; Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 158-61. Their discussions however are focused on the New Prince and innovation.
convinced about the validity of these interpretations, attempts to go down the ladder of generality through this path led to an overemphasis on certain dimensions of virtù and incomplete reconstructions of Machiavelli’s analytical framework, that is, an emphasis on the new prince and a portrayal of Machiavelli as an early proponent of modern ideas ranging from constitutionalism and liberal republicanism to radical populism. For these reasons, I intend to provide a more detailed and systematic reconstruction of Machiavelli’s analysis of virtù-Fortuna that would encompass both of these factors and their engagements with each other.

For my reconstruction, I argue that first, Fortuna could only be recognized as such via virtù as prudence/foresight. To elaborate, a person must have a relatively high degree of animo and mental capacity (memory, imagination, and ingenuity) in order for him to attain and further develop this aspect of virtù when he/she turns his/her attention to the outside world. Furthermore, without recognizing Fortuna through virtù as prudence/foresight, Machiavelli argued in his case against the princes of Italy that a subject is reduced to necessity and swept by it instead of preparing, resisting, harnessing, and adapting to it. The absence or eventual exhaustion of virtù as prudence/foresight ends with a subject’s slavery to necessities outside his/her control and prediction, eventually losing power in the process; that is, in Machiavelli’s medical terminology, he/she is shackled to the effects of a sickness that matured and grew worse because of a his/her shortsightedness. At this point, the internalization of Fortuna through virtù takes another step because of the inevitable impact of Fortuna’s movements upon a subject. If virtù as prudence/foresight allows a subject to see the principles and patterns behind necessity (i.e., Fortuna), virtù as control (the will and capacity to attain and sustain control) allows him/her to target and act towards the specific concrete factors constituting Fortuna. Thus, through prudence/foresight, a subject recognizes problems and/or opportunities, and through control, he/she will act accordingly with more specific targets in sight.

Second, I note that for Machiavelli, the dimensions of virtù correspond to the characteristics of Fortuna because the former realizes itself only through the latter, that is, the opportunities and/or problems provided by nature and/or significant actors who are either directly or indirectly attached to the subject. If his/her necessary properties are lacking, virtù will

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be deficient as was in Machiavelli’s portrayal of King Louis XII of France.\textsuperscript{39} However, even if there is an alignment between inherent capacities and \textit{virtù}, or a high degree of necessary properties in Fischer’s terms, Machiavelli using the case of Cesare Borgia’s fall, posited two interrelated arguments, namely, that \textit{virtù} will never be absolute and that \textit{Fortuna} could exploit any weakness.\textsuperscript{40} In summary, I contend that for Machiavelli, it is through the activities of others (through their failures, successes, expressions of \textit{virtù}, or their lack of it) that a subject could manifest his own internalization of \textit{virtù}, or in other words, if \textit{virtù} is understood as a set of principles then its practice (as the result of its internalization and eventual expression) necessitates an other that will both qualify and facilitate it. \textit{Virtù}, as Machiavelli’s works suggests, can neither be analyzed nor practiced without an other, and this schema is central to his socio-political framework.

To illustrate this process of internalizing and expressing \textit{virtù}, I reiterate that a relatively high degree of the necessary properties exposed by Fischer allows its bearer to be a worthy subject and see beyond necessity and recognize his goals (i.e., ambition) in relation to the dynamics of \textit{Fortuna}. To be specific, along with an understanding of what he/she must face, a subject also gains an insight on how he/she could face \textit{Fortuna} as the imposing figure of unpredictability and uncontrollability. Machiavelli sees in the subject, may it be princes or citizens, a synthesis of \textit{Fortuna}’s power with the will and struggle to resist, if not overcome it, through prudence and foresight on one hand, and the search, attainment, and maintenance of control on the other and one’s self. Therefore, I contend that \textit{virtù as prudence/foresight} corresponds with the constant motion of \textit{Fortuna}, while \textit{virtù as control} is concerned with shaping the behavior and/or character of its concrete factors. The former could be illustrated through Machiavelli’s arguments on the need to predict causes and address future problems. For him, “when recognized in advance—a gift granted to prudent men only—illnesses appearing in a state are quickly healed; but when they are not recognized and are allowed to intensify so that everyone recognizes them, they can no longer be remedied.”\textsuperscript{41} Moreover, \textit{prudence/foresight} also finds material via the careful study of history that Machiavelli advocated in both \textit{The Prince}\textsuperscript{42} and \textit{Discourses}; that is, in Althusserian terms, \textit{prudence/foresight} is about having a grasp of a present conjunction, understanding its possibilities, and studying similar conjunctions and conditions faced by one’s predecessors.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 15-16.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 21-22, 58-60.
\textsuperscript{43} Machiavelli, \textit{Discourses}, 31-33.
For virtù as control, I contend that for Machiavelli, this dimension consists of the will, capacity, and struggle to determine one’s own behavior and the behavior of targeted others. An illustration of this dimension is the need to determine the flow and benefit from the results of class conflict or the contradictions between the interests/goals and perspectives of the nobility and commoners, the former was portrayed by Machiavelli, as more devious, ambitious, and aggressive than the latter with more simple/ordinary goals tied to a more defensive behavior.\textsuperscript{44} For him “in every city these two diverse humors are found, which arise from desire neither to be commanded nor oppressed by the great, and the great desire to command and oppress the people.”\textsuperscript{45} Moreover, the latter sees themselves as equals to the prince, thus, they present numerous dangers to a prince’s leadership especially if they are greedy and resistant, if not rebellious.\textsuperscript{46} Hence, with virtù as the search for and maintenance of control, a prince must impose upon these entities the identity of subjects by protecting the commoners through institutions (i.e., legal institutions that will protect the people and act as mediator between these two conflicting classes), and by making the rich/nobility realize that he could make, destroy, or replace them.\textsuperscript{47}

Before moving on to its sub-dimensions, I note that first, virtù is anticipative and responsive, reflective of the expression of prudence in controlling. Second, its two primary dimensions (prudence/foresight and control) are inseparable though distinct from each other; that is, these two correspond to the ideal and practical aspects of human activity. Hence, these two should also be considered as categories that, once made to engage Fortuna in theorizing political practice, gain specificity in terms of other sub-dimensions that are either anticipative or responsive, resulting from the interaction between the two primary dimensions of virtù and the conditions laid down by Fortuna. Lastly, an underlying theme in Machiavelli’s The Prince and Discourses is the absence of guarantees or a cosmic fate for political actors, and for this reason, he exposed how virtù could lead either to success or failure in relation to Fortuna’s demands on the subject. I contend that through Althusser’s notion of correspondence between Machiavelli’s virtù and Fortuna, four secondary dimensions of the former’s engagement with the latter could be deduced. Moreover, these four are expressions of the interdependence of the two primary dimensions, and of virtù’s anticipative and responsive (aggressive and defensive) natures.

The first one is virtù as adaptation and three points could be made as an elaboration. First is that Machiavelli, in trying to explain the differences

\textsuperscript{44} Machiavelli, Prince, 38-39.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 39.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 38-41.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 74-75.
in the results of similar policies, argued that a prince’s success or failure is partially determined by his capacity to cope with the times instead of being dependent on *Fortuna*.\textsuperscript{48} He stated that:

> the prince who leans entirely on his fortune comes to ruin as it varies. I believe, further, that he is happy who adapts his mode of proceeding to the qualities of the times; and similarly, he is unhappy whose procedure is in disaccord with the times … for if one governs himself with caution and patience, and the times and affairs turn in such a way that his government is good, he comes out happy; but if the times and affairs change, he is ruined because he does not change his mode of proceeding.\textsuperscript{49}

Second is that, for Machiavelli, a prince must not only understand and recognize all possibilities brought in by *Fortuna’s* motion (*prudence/foresight*), but also have the capacity and the will to make available and utilize all possible means for the preservation of power.\textsuperscript{50} He must be both a lion and a fox for the former is strong but lacks prudence, while the latter lacks strength but has keen senses, and must know how to use both law and force.\textsuperscript{51} Also, it is in this sub-dimension that we find the capacity to switch between anticipative and responsive mechanisms.

Lastly, Machiavelli expressed his distrust towards man’s capacity for adaptation by pointing to a tendency for habits and inflexibility.\textsuperscript{52} He argued that a man “cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to or also because, when one has always flourished by walking on one path, he cannot be persuaded to depart from it”\textsuperscript{53} thus, leading to his eventual fall once external conditions change. I deduce two other possible interpretations of Machiavelli’s perspective on adaptation, namely, that he posits a required “unnatural” effort from the part of a prince, or that Machiavelli simply gives the constant motion of politics (i.e., *Fortuna*) primacy over human efforts and their results. Although for the latter, I note that despite *Fortuna’s* impenetrability, Machiavelli counseled man to always “hope and, since they hope, not to give up in whatever fortune and in whatever travail they may find themselves.”\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{48} Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 239-240.
\textsuperscript{49} Machiavelli, *Prince*, 99-100.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 68-69.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 69.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 100-101.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 100.
\textsuperscript{54} Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 199.
In relation to the first one, *virtù as moral flexibility* could be understood in several ways. First is that for Machiavelli amorality is an attribute based on a subject’s understanding, albeit a negative one of human nature. This in turn facilitates his/her practice of *prudence/foresight*, specifically, his/her identification of the possible actions that others might take in relation to him/herself. To illustrate, Machiavelli argued that “a man who wants to make a profession of good in all regards must come to ruin among so many who are not good” and because of this a prince must “learn to be able not to be good, and to use this and not use it according to necessity.” Second, *moral flexibility* allows a subject to effectively practice adaptation by having control over the direction of one’s own actions instead of it being tied to, if not weighed down by, the moral standards of others. Reflective of the distinction made earlier between *Fortuna* and necessity, as well as the human component of the former, another way to interpret this dimension of *virtù* is to recognize the necessity for a subject to appear as an embodiment of publicly accepted virtues. Behind this need is the common people whose power and interests a prince must deal with. Chapters 15 until 19 of *The Prince* were dedicated to this dimension of *virtù* and I would like to highlight two points. First is that for Machiavelli, a prince must be prudent in adapting the distinction between vice and virtue for the sake of sustaining control. A prince must appear to be the bearer of virtues accepted by the public, albeit “one should not care about incurring the fame of those vices without which it is difficult to save one’s state.” However, he must avoid hatred emanating from acts of terror or vices offending the private sphere of others. Second, in his discussion on fear and love, Machiavelli emphasized the need to sustain control over affected others, first by relying on fear as something one controls, and second by emphasizing the need to avoid hatred. Machiavelli illustrated that love, unlike fear, is under the control of the one giving it and that hatred, unlike fear, is an emotion that is controlled and could be utilized as a resource by the affected other. The latter could also be illustrated by his warning that the memory of freedom and liberties lost could be used to stir up hatred and disorder in a newly conquered domain.

Lastly, in relation to *virtù as adaptation*, moral flexibility allows a subject to utilize all possible means to attain and sustain power in the context of changing socio-political conditions. For Machiavelli, a subject must act in accordance with two factors, namely, attaining and sustaining power as a primary goal, and the inevitable attachment of public opinion with the

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56 Ibid., 70.
57 Ibid., 62.
58 Ibid., 66-67.
59 Ibid., 20-21.
effectiveness of means employed. Moreover, I reiterate that for Machiavelli the use of force (violence and cruelty) must appeal to the idea of public good (i.e., stability, order, and security) as was in the case of Remirro d’Orco and the need to be swift and decisive in inflicting violence upon the acquisition of power.\(^6\) Also, for Machiavelli, force must be replaced by institutions that would safeguard the public good and sustain the power attained through force and/or cunning.\(^6\) In summary, these interpretations could be subsumed under the notion that *virtù as adaptation* and *moral flexibility* allows a subject to be actively flexible in responding to an event or seizing an opportunity it offers. Moreover, these two allow a subject to recognize boundaries that would ensure that public opinion, as a component of *Fortuna*, remains under his control, thus, depriving opponents of any moral justification for conspiracies.\(^6\)

*Virtù as the search for glory*\(^6\) embodies Machiavelli’s intimate attachment to the idea of a new prince,\(^6\) his supposed adoption of an archaic moral code of emulating excellence,\(^6\) and the anticipative aspect of *virtù*. For my part, I highlight that the search for glory and prestige should be understood as a form of control over the nobility and the commoners, and a policy emerging from an anticipatory sense of prudence. Machiavelli, using the case of King Ferdinand of Aragon, stated that as an upstart, great and ambitious campaigns justified by religious claims allowed him not only to give proof to his abilities, but also to express *virtù as control* over public opinion and the activities of spectators by imposing a sense of predictability over one’s subjects, first by providing a stimulus to public opinion instead of allowing it to be absolutely spontaneous, and second by giving a direction to the produce of one’s subjects.

Lastly, *virtù as audacity*\(^6\) as an anticipative sub-dimension like the previous one, represents Machiavelli’s attempt to posit a way to penetrate *Fortuna* by advocating an aggressive stance (i.e., adopting an anticipatory

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 29, 39-40.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 82.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 72-73.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., 87-91.


\(^{65}\) See Terence Ball, “The Picaresque Prince: Reflections On Machiavelli and Moral Change,” in *Political Theory*, 12 (1984), 521-36. I note that, in isolating the concept of *virtù* for analysis, he argued that neither Machiavelli nor his prince was amoral. Instead, similar to the character of Don Quixote, Machiavelli’s prince embodied a moral code of heroism through emulation.

\(^{66}\) See Tarlton, “Action for Action’s Sake,” 123-36 who highlighted the audacious improvisations required from a prince. Though I disagree with his reduction of *virtù* into audacity, I note that though *Fortuna* could require this mode of action, its unpredictable movements for Machiavelli could also require the contrary, thus, necessitating a more encompassing understanding of how a virtuoso should behave.
strategy and offensive tactics). This was also attached by Machiavelli to
impetuosity as a necessary attribute inherent in actors like Julius II\textsuperscript{67} and the
Gauls,\textsuperscript{68} but it was in the former and in the Romans that such an attribute
became a \textit{virtù}; that is, Julius used it to avoid a political impasse while the
Romans used it to complement their \textit{virtù as prudence}/foresight.\textsuperscript{69} Now this
alignment was due to the fact that Machiavelli was convinced “that it is better
to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman … And one sees
that she lets herself be won more by the impetuous than by those who
proceed coldly. And so always, like a woman, she is the friend of the young,
because they … command her with more audacity.”\textsuperscript{70} This stance was due to
his positive interpretation of \textit{Fortuna}’s inherent uncertainties as the bearer of
both opportunities and difficulties, tied with his disapproval of defeatist and
dependent policies.\textsuperscript{71} Moreover, \textit{virtù as audacity} also satisfies the lion that a
prince must have as a part of his overall adaptability, that is, to use the ways
of man and beast, and to be both a lion and a fox. An illustration of this is
Machiavelli’s brief account of how Alexander VI, in trying to gain power and
territory in the Italian peninsula, facilitated the entry of the French that
subsequently destroyed an already fragile balance of power, thereby giving
himself the opportunity to utilize French forces to seize territories in the
context of an aggravated flux.\textsuperscript{72} I see this as Machiavelli’s illustration of a
subject’s capacity not only to survive a wave of destruction but to initiate and
benefit from it, or in other words, invoke the destructive and usually
equalizing power of \textit{Fortuna} instead of merely waiting for it.

In summary, the relationship between \textit{Fortuna} and \textit{virtù} is founded
on the latter as a set of principles and practices that allows internal capacities
(necessary properties) to be used effectively for the search and sustenance of
power, and on the former as an aggregate of both relatively static (i.e.,
nature/geography) and constantly moving (ex. the activities of others) factors
that serves as the objects of \textit{virtù as control}, and the source of material (i.e.,
problems/worries and opportunities) for \textit{virtù as prudence}. \textit{Virtù} is
internalized through a study of history, that is, the patterns defining the rise
and fall of states, and the actions of great men within their respective
environments. However, its existence is not solely based on such principles
and practices. \textit{Virtù} is also expressed as a combination of both responsive (as
adaptation and moral flexibility) and anticipative practices (as the search for

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 367-69; Machiavelli, Discourses, 240.
\textsuperscript{68} Machiavelli, Discourses, 292-293.
\textsuperscript{69} Machiavelli, Prince, 11-13.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 101; See Machiavelli, Discourses, 304-305.
\textsuperscript{71} See Timothy Lukes, “Lionizing Machiavelli,” in \textit{AmericanPoliticalScienceReview}, 95
(1984), 562-75 for a review of works that re-claimed and highlighted the Lion of Machiavelli’s
Prince.
\textsuperscript{72} Machiavelli, Prince, 27.
glory and audacity), and in these modes we find a reflection of the fickle nature of Fortuna or, to be specific, the impact of the socio-political environment (i.e., the absence of guarantees and absolute security, and the constancy of change) on a subject’s modes of expressing virtù (i.e., engagements with Fortuna and its concrete components).

**Virtù as Autonomy**

I conclude this paper by synthesizing all the dimensions discussed above into virtù as autonomy, or the will and capacity to attain and sustain self-determination through both anticipative and responsive means. This could be illustrated in two ways—first, through Machiavelli’s arguments on militias and the strength of principalities and second, through his arguments on new princes and the need to deal with class conflict. First, for Machiavelli, mercenaries and their commanders are dangerous not only because of their adverse practices but also because their loyalty lies not with the prince but with money, and their commanders, if they have both military and political virtù, could easily depose their employers. However, in using loyalty and military virtù as standards, he concluded that auxiliaries or soldiers borrowed from a foreign power “are much more dangerous than mercenary arms. For with these, ruin is accomplished; they are all united, all resolved to obey someone else.” Dependence on mercenaries and/or auxiliaries embodies the lack of virtù that caused the subjugation of the Italian peninsula by foreigners; mercenaries are antithetical to military prowess while the usage of auxiliaries is a step towards being under the control of a foreign entity. Hence, for Machiavelli, virtù as autonomy will eventually lead a subject towards the use of militias because “without its own arms, no principality is secure; indeed, it is wholly obliged to fortune since it does not have virtue to defend itself in adversity.” In relation to this, virtù as autonomy was also implied in Machiavelli’s usage of self-sufficiency as an indicator of strength for principalities. Furthermore, Machiavelli considered a state as strong if it has enough resources and military capacity that a leader with virtù could transform into cohesion during a crisis. In summary, a subject’s search for autonomy must manifest itself in terms of resources and control over one’s means of coercion.

Thus, upon its acquisition and to address the questions of durability and stability, power must be secured through institutions (laws and policies) that are either inherited or must be built upon the ashes of an old regime.

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73 Ibid., 48-49.
74 Ibid., 55.
75 Ibid., 57.
76 Ibid., 42-3.
Applied to both princes and republics is Machiavelli’s emphasis on the need for institutions that will make them distinct from social/class forces; a prince must strive to be autonomous from the nobility and the commoners, while a republic must be built and sustained by neither of these classes but the results of their constant conflicts. Machiavelli took the existence of these classes as a given or a permanent fixture that provides material for the forms imposed by the virtù of princes and leading citizens. An example of this is Machiavelli’s narration of how the office of Tribune emerged out of the conflict between the nobility and the commoners. Tribunes eventually contributed to the stability of the Roman Republic because it served as the institutionalized power of the commoners that kept a balance between these two classes, and mediated between the commoners and the institutionalized power of the nobility embodied by the senate and the consuls. For a prince, on the other hand, I note two of Machiavelli’s points elaborated in Chapters 9 and 19 of The Prince. First is that though the people are much less dangerous than the nobility, Machiavelli made it clear that a prince could and should never depend on either one.

Second, for Machiavelli, domestic conflict among different sectors is a given, and from it a state will always be vulnerable to disruptions that will threaten the stability, duration, and autonomy of princes and republics. Therefore, placed in the context of Fortuna, virtù as autonomy sums up what a republic or prince should strive for and maintain through virtù in general. Moreover, a lapse in the sub-dimensions of virtù will eventually end up in Fortuna subjugating a subject’s autonomy; that is, a gap in one’s control over others or a relapse into short-sightedness are, for Machiavelli, opportunities for Fortuna to sweep princes and republics away and expose them to an uncontrollable and unpredictable deluge driven by the will and virtù of others.

**Conclusion: Machiavelli and the Struggle for Autonomy**

In placing the different dimensions of virtù in the context of Fortuna as founded upon nature and the virtù/non-virtù of others, I contend that Machiavelli’s contribution to the modern concept of politics is the notion of the eternal struggle for autonomy as fundamental to statecraft. I argue that,

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77 Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 15-26. Chapters 3 to 7 are preliminary examinations of Machiavelli on the Roman Republic that examined how domestic conflict could result in the sustenance of liberty and how the government, in order to achieve this result, should stand above classes through representation on one hand, and separating such classes through mediating institutions on the other.


for Machiavelli, this endeavor is comparable not to the act of stopping a river but to exertions to remain afloat or control its direction. Furthermore, with *Fortuna* as the overarching term used to tackle the grave and aleatory character of the aggregate effects of these others’ activities and engagements with the subject and with each other, Machiavelli concluded that a subject’s drive and capacity to attain and sustain self-determination will always be at the expense of others and for this reason such others will either surrender or resist. Autonomy, control, and predictability are both goals of *virtù* and results of others’ reaction to its expressions by a dominant subject, but this *virtù* itself is framed in accordance to a grasp of control and predictability as necessities posited by the nature of *Fortuna*.

Thus, I conclude that for Machiavelli, the eternal struggle for autonomy is partially based on *Fortuna* as the constancy of uncertainty (i.e., the unpredictability of the actions of others in pursuing heterogeneous interests through differing capacities) and as the embodiment of a mélange of uncontrolled set of social relations with direct or indirect effects upon a subject’s pursuit of his/her interests. For future inquiries, by establishing the centrality of autonomy in the dialectical relationship between *virtù* and *Fortuna* and recognizing the republican and democratic leanings of Machiavelli (or at least ideals that can be extracted from his works), this study would like to posit the possibility of conceptualizing freedom as a *virtuoso* struggle that can be both collective and individual but necessarily social and to an extent aleatory. Simply put, future inquiries can address how Machiavelli’s conceptualization of *virtù* and *Fortuna* can inform us about the socio-political dimension of freedom.

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**References**


Belief as ‘Seeing As’

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Abstract: Wittgenstein’s exposition on aspect seeing (widely known as “seeing as”) can be regarded as perhaps one of the least discussed topics among his thoughts. In this light, this paper wishes to contribute to the development of Wittgenstein’s notion of “seeing as.” The thesis of this paper is that although “seeing as” can be normally understood in two ways—as a visual experience and as an attitude—there is another way in which “seeing as” can be understood, that is, as a belief. In this sense, “seeing as” is not a distinct action from believing, that is, believing is “seeing as.”

Keywords: Wittgenstein, Moore’s paradox, aspect seeing, seeing as belief

Understanding the Concept of ‘Seeing As’

In Part II of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein begins his exposition on “seeing as” by making a distinction between the two uses of the word “see:”

The one: “What do you see there?”—“I see this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness between these two faces”—let the man I tell this to be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself.

From this distinction, his succeeding discussion implies two notions of “seeing as,” namely, “seeing as” as a visual experience and “seeing as” as an attitude.
However, before proceeding any further in the discussion of the implications of this distinction, there is a need at this point to elucidate first some very important items that will facilitate the flow of the discussion in this paper. Hence, a clarification of terms is in order.

‘Seeing As’

“I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience ‘noticing an aspect’.”

Noticing an aspect is the experience generally being referred to by the term aspect seeing or seeing an aspect. It can be considered as a commonly occurring phenomenon although barely recognizable. However, seeing an aspect is best manifested and readily recognized when one encounters ambiguous figures like picture puzzles or optical illusions such as in the image (“Facevase”) below:

In the image presented, at first glance, one can initially see a white cup (chalice or vase), however, after a while, it may happen that one cannot see the cup anymore, but instead, one sees two faces facing each other. Here, it can be said that one initially saw the aspect that is the cup (Aspect A) and later on saw the aspect that is the two faces (Aspect B).

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4 Ibid.
The phenomenon of seeing an aspect, such as when one saw Aspect A, is referred to by Wittgenstein as the *dawning* of an aspect. For instance, is the image below that of a duck or of a rabbit?

Wittgenstein used the image of the duck-rabbit in his discussion of aspect-seeing in the *PI*. Years later, the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, who was introduced to the works of Wittgenstein by one of his colleagues in UC Berkeley, used the duck-rabbit to explain his notion of “paradigm shift” in the history of science, which he dubbed as “scientific revolution.”

The subject of a gestalt demonstration knows that his perception has shifted because he can make it shift back and forth repeatedly while he holds the same book or piece of paper in his hands. Aware that nothing in his environment has changed, he directs his attention increasingly not to the figure (duck or rabbit) but to the lines on the paper he is looking at. Ultimately he may even learn to see those lines without seeing either of the figures, and he may then say (what he could not legitimately have said earlier) that it is these lines that he really sees but that he sees them alternately as a duck and as a rabbit ... as in all similar psychological experiments, the effectiveness of the demonstration depends upon its being analyzable in this way. Unless there were an external standard with respect to which a

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switch of vision could be demonstrated, no conclusion about alternate perceptual possibilities could be drawn.\textsuperscript{7}

However, in science, a paradigm shift leads to problems, problems lead to crisis, and crisis results in revolution—a scientific revolution. For Kuhn, a paradigm is an achievement that “was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve. Achievements that share these two characteristics I shall henceforth refer to as ‘paradigms,’ ...”\textsuperscript{8} Thus, a paradigm shift—or a scientific revolution—is a revision of an existing scientific paradigm that is tantamount to the seeing of another paradigm that was not seen before (e.g., the Copernican revolution).

However, unlike aspect-seeing, which begins with the dawning of an aspect, Kuhn points out that paradigm shift does not involve seeing as but is characterized by seeing it. Furthermore, he emphasized that it is also different from Gestalt although the latter can be seen as a prototype.

The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new tradition of normal science can emerge is far from a cumulative process, one achieved by an articulation or extension of the old paradigm. Rather it is a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the field’s most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its paradigm methods and applications. During the transition period there will be a large but never complete overlap between the problems that can be solved by the old and by the new paradigm. But there will also be a decisive difference in the modes of solution. When the transition is complete, the profession will have changed its view of the field, its methods, and its goals ... Others who have noted this aspect of scientific advance have emphasized its similarity to a change in visual gestalt: the marks on paper that were first seen as a bird are now seen as an antelope, or vice versa. That parallel can be misleading. Scientists do not see something as something else; instead, they simply

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{8} Wittgenstein, \textit{PI}, 10.
\end{itemize}
see it ... In addition, the scientist does not preserve the gestalt subject’s freedom to switch back and forth between ways of seeing. Nevertheless, the switch of gestalt, particularly because it is today so familiar, is a useful elementary prototype for what occurs in full-scale paradigm shift.ª

Nonetheless, although essentially different from Gestalt, the paradigm shift is similar to Gestalt in terms of the immediacy of the switch. “Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, the transition between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic and neutral experience. Like the gestalt switch, it must occur all at once (though not necessarily in an instant) or not at all.”¹⁰ Meanwhile, the parallelism of Kuhn’s paradigm shift with the views of Wittgenstein on aspect-seeing can only reach as far as the fact that from “the start they [both] presuppose a paradigm”¹¹—the duck or the rabbit or the old scientific paradigm.

Going back, the dawning of an aspect is the immediate recognition of an aspect, as the experience when one immediately recognized Aspect A. When, for instance, one is presented with the image above and asked, “What do you see here?”, one will always instantaneously see something and, without thinking, respond, “A cup,” for instance, upon immediately seeing Aspect A or more precisely, upon the dawning of Aspect A on the person. This kind of response is what is referred to as the report of perception. However, there are instances wherein one, upon saying that one sees a white cup, might suddenly exclaim, “No wait, two faces facing each other!” At this instance, it is clear that one has shifted from seeing Aspect A to Aspect B, but this time, the utterance of the person is not anymore merely a report of perception but it is already an exclamation or avowal. Although both report and exclamation are expressions of perception, they are different in the sense that an exclamation can be called as an expression of thought.

But since [exclamation] is the description of a perception, it can also be called the expression of thought.—If you are looking at the object, you need not think of it; but if you are having the visual experience expressed by the exclamation, you are also thinking of what you see.¹²

² Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 84-85.
¹⁰ Ibid., 150.
¹¹ Ibid., 127.
¹² Wittgenstein, PI, 197.
In the second instance, one is not only having a visual experience of Aspect B, but is also thinking about what is seen – one is “occupied” with what he sees. This assertion by Wittgenstein will shed light on critical points in the subsequent discussion of the notions of “seeing as.”

Meanwhile, in cases where one continues to see only Aspect A of the image, Wittgenstein calls this experience as the continuous seeing of an aspect or continuous aspect perception. If questioned further, one might explain the features of Aspect A which are similar to the features of a real cup; or one might draw another image of a cup to show how Aspect A resembles a cup; or one might even get an actual cup and match it up to the image presented. On the other hand, the experience of shifting from seeing Aspect A to seeing Aspect B is called the phenomenon of changing of aspect or conversion. In this instance, one will not refer to a cup anymore but might refer to pictures of faces or even point to one’s own face.

One may point out that what has just been described is similar to the propositions of Gestalt psychology. Conversely, it could never be more different. It is precisely Gestalt psychology as represented by the work of Wolfgang Köhler that Wittgenstein criticizes. In Gestalt psychology, one sees things in segregated wholes, wherein certain aspects “belong together,” as Gestalt advocates put it:

Consider the Rubin vase. You can see it either as a vase, or as two profiles, but never as both at the same time. That this is so is the consequence of the way in which lines in the visual region ‘be-long’ to the area that is perceived as figure. In current psychology this phenomenon is often referred to as ‘border ownership’ or the ‘one sidedness of edges.’

Köhler points out that in both experiences (in seeing the vase and in seeing the profiles), one sees a new visual object each time. But Wittgenstein questions this and argues that in seeing the aspects (of the vase at one time and the profiles at another), there is no new visual object because the object of perception has not changed. This is the paradox of aspect perception. Further, Köhler argues:

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13 It is important to note that Wittgenstein’s criticisms against Gestalt psychology focused on the work of Köhler, aptly titled Gestalt Psychology (1929).

Whenever we say to ourselves or others: ‘What may that something be, at the foot of that hill, just to the right of that tree, between those two houses, and so on?’ we ask about the empirical meaning or use of a seen object and demonstrate by our very question that as a matter of principle, segregation of visual things is independent of knowledge and meaning ... it follows that my knowledge about the practical significance of things cannot be responsible for their existence as detached visual units.15

In this sense, one initially sees objects as meaningless entities—like blotches on paper—and attaches them with meaning. For instance, when one looks at a “pen,” one perceives the “pen” not as a pen, but as an organized whole. Only when one attaches a meaning to the “pen” can a pen be perceived as a pen, that is, a tool used for writing. One, then, perceives the pen in connection to its use and not just a meaningless object perceived. But seeing and meaning are independent of each other. As Köhler puts it, “segregation of visual things is independent of knowledge and meaning.” On the other hand, Wittgenstein points out that seeing does not come without meaning; that is, a purely visual experience sans meaning is not possible. Rather, “we see things with their meaning.”16 In the same way, when one looks at blotches on a piece of paper, one does not see the blotches only in a purely visual experience, but sees the blotches as meanings, for instance, “It looks like a butterfly” or “I think I see a face.” Thus, it is “contrary to Köhler—precisely a meaning that I see.”17

In another note, there are also cases wherein one is able see Aspect A of the image but is unable to eventually see Aspect B and vice-versa. This is what Wittgenstein refers to as aspect-blindedness. However, it is not a possibility for a person to be completely aspect-blind because one always recognizes an aspect. Even a person who is deprived of sight can recognize an aspect through touch or hearing.

“Seeing As” as a Visual Experience

Earlier, it was mentioned that two notions of “seeing as” are implied

15 Wolfgang Köhler, Gestalt Psychology (New York: Liveright, 1929), 82.
from Wittgenstein’s distinction of the two uses of the word “see.” One of them, which shall be discussed in this section, is the notion of “seeing as” as a visual experience. In the *PI*, Wittgenstein gave the following observation about visual experience:

What is the criterion of the visual experience?—The criterion?
What do you suppose?
The representation of “what is seen.”

He further added that the “concept of representation of what is seen, like that of a copy, is very elastic, and so together with it is the concept of what is seen.” This can be taken to be a precise description of seeing an aspect. In the case of the image presented above, when two people try to look at it and one sees Aspect A while the other sees aspect B, it can be said that there is a “sense in which they are seeing the same thing and another sense in which they are not.” Indeed, this can be proven when one asks them to describe what they see; surely they will come up with two totally different descriptions although they are both looking at the same image. In other words, the representation of what is seen follows what is “actually” seen.

The concept of “seeing as” as a visual experience is best captured in the statement, “I see this” where this can stand for a cat, as in “I see a cat”; or a tree as in “I see a tree”; or a man as in “I see a man”; and so on. In other words, “seeing as” in the sense of a visual experience can be regarded as merely “plain seeing.” Hence, one plainly sees a cup while another plainly sees two faces facing each other. This also explains why in the instance of a conversion, the person undergoes a new visual experience, despite the image not changing. “If you search in a figure (1) for another figure (2), and then find it, you see it (1) in a new way. Not only can you give a new kind of description of it, but noticing the second figure was a new visual experience.” Thus, one sees Aspect A during a particular visual experience and Aspect B in another particular visual experience, but never at the same instance since “the impression is not simultaneously of a picture-duck and a picture-rabbit” (as in Wittgenstein’s example where the image used is that of a duck-rabbit).
“Seeing As” as an Attitude

The concept of “seeing as” as an attitude is the second of the two notions of “seeing as” implied by Wittgenstein’s distinction of the two uses of the word “see.” Wittgenstein illustrates the distinction between “seeing as” as a visual experience and “seeing as” as an attitude through the following remarks:

A wall covered with spots, and I occupy myself by seeing faces on it; but not so that I can study the nature of an aspect, but because those shapes interest me, and so does the spell under which I can go from one to the next.

The double cross and the duck-rabbit might be among the spots and they could be seen like the figures and together with them now one way, now another.24

In this case, when Wittgenstein speaks of “a wall covered with spots,” he is, in fact, reporting a visual experience of seeing a wall covered with spots. But when he speaks of seeing “the double cross and the duck-rabbit ... among the spots,” he, at this point, is seeing in terms of a particular attitude, which in that particular instance, influences what he sees. “The apparent paradox of aspect seeing was at least in part generated by the fact that what was seen in the usual sense had not altered but what was seen in the sense of being allied to thinking had. Aspect change was not an alteration of perception but of attitude.”25

John Hick attempts to describe the difference between these two notions in simplified terms:

If I am looking at a picture, say the picture of a face, in sense number one I see what is physically present on the paper—mounds of ink, we might say, of a certain shape, size, thickness and position. But in sense number two I see the picture of a face. We could say that in this second sense to see is to interpret or to find meaning or


significance on what is before us—we interpret and perceive the mounds of ink as having the particular kind of meaning that we describe as the picture of the face, a meaning that mounds of ink, simply as such, do not have.  

Thus for Hick, “seeing as” is partly a matter of plain seeing and partly a matter of interpretation. I agree with Hick’s understanding of the first sense of “seeing as”; however, I believe that he was somehow a bit off in his understanding of its second sense. I have my doubts that it will be entirely correct to say that Hick misunderstood the second notion of “seeing as” because he associated it with interpretation. I think that he used the term interpretation in a very loose sense. It cannot be blamed since Wittgenstein himself employed the use of the term: “what about the double cross? Again, it is seeing according to an interpretation. Seeing as.” Malcolm Budd shares this view:

The notion of interpretation that Wittgenstein expounds is too strong to do the work he intends it for. A better conception would not restrict interpreting to the making of a conjecture, but would allow in cases in which we are only entertaining a supposition, merely imagining or making-believe that a figure is intended a certain way …

Nevertheless, to set things straight and more clearly, unlike interpretation which implies process, seeing in terms of an attitude is instantaneous. One sees Aspect A (or Aspect B) in that same instance when one looks at the image and not after a series of seeing and thereafter interpreting the meaning of what is seen. Wittgenstein firmly established this point: “Do I really see something different each time, or do I only interpret what I see in a different way? I am inclined to say the former. But why?—To interpret is to think, to do something; seeing is a state.” To distinguish between seeing and interpreting, Wittgenstein points out that “seeing has genuine duration: one can ask for how long one saw the drawing as a duck

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27 Wittgenstein, LWPP, 15.
29 Wittgenstein, PI, 212.
before it changed to a rabbit, whereas it sounds incongruous to ask for the
duration of an interpretation”\textsuperscript{30} But is it possible to see without thinking?

Does a baby think as it looks at its mother’s face? Does a person think as one
stares \textit{blankly} outside the window? The science of sight is that the brain
\textit{processes} the visual sense data to make them an organized whole so that one
may perceive the world as one ordinarily does. But this processing does not
require the person to do something, that is, to think. Thinking is an act that
one does voluntarily. It is doing something with what one sees. One can
analyze what is seen, remember it, memorize, or express it. This is thinking.

Seeing is different.

It was mentioned earlier that “if you are having the visual experience
expressed by the exclamation, you are also \textit{thinking} of what you see.”\textsuperscript{31} This
is in direct connection with what Wittgenstein calls a \textit{well-known impression}.\textsuperscript{32}

In simple terms, it is more likely that one will not recognize an impression
that one does not know of. One might be looking at a cup, as in above, without
seeing it. “Does someone who doesn’t recognize a smile as a smile see it
differently than someone who does? He reacts to it differently.”\textsuperscript{33} Here, it
becomes quite clear that in “seeing as” as an attitude, seeing seems to be “half
visual experience, half thought.”\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Moore’s Paradox}

In one of his letters to G. E. Moore,\textsuperscript{35} Wittgenstein commented on the
“absurdity” of Moore’s assertion, “There is fire in this room and I don’t
believe there is,” which he later called “Moore’s Paradox.” He pointed out
that it “isn’t the \textit{only} logically inadmissible form and it is, under certain
circumstances, admissible”\textsuperscript{36} and commended Moore for having made such a
discovery.

In the \textit{PI}, Wittgenstein begins his discussion on the expression “I
believe” with an analysis of Moore’s Paradox. According to a commentator
on Wittgenstein, Garth Hallett, Wittgenstein has purposely “left [the

\textsuperscript{30} Severin Schroeder, “A Tale of Two Problems: Wittgenstein’s Discussion of Aspect
Cottingham and P.M.S. Hacker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 358.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, 197.
\textsuperscript{32} Wittgenstein, \textit{LWPP}, 16.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{34} Wittgenstein, \textit{PI}, 197.
\textsuperscript{35} See Ludwig Wittgenstein, \textit{Ludwig Wittgenstein: Cambridge Letters – Correspondence
with Russel, Keynes, Moore, Ramsey, and Sraffa}, ed. by Brian McGuinness and G.H. von Wright
discussion on] ‘I believe’ till [after his discussion on expression of emotions, apparently because ‘Moore’s Paradox’ suggested the possibility of a fuller, more complex development, one which could not conveniently be incorporated in the earlier section.’  

However, apart from this explanation, I believe Wittgenstein did this with the intention that his discussion on “I believe” may serve as a guide in order to understand his discussion on the following section, on “seeing as.” In other words, his thoughts on “seeing as” need to be seen in the light of his thoughts on “I believe.” For such reason, the only manner of proceeding is by clarifying what Wittgenstein thinks of the expression “I believe” in relation to his analysis of Moore’s Paradox.

Moore’s paradox can be put like this: the expression “I believe that this is the case” is used like the assertion “This is the case”; and yet the hypothesis that I believe this is the case is not used like the hypothesis that this is the case.

So it looks as if the assertion “I believe” were not the assertion of what is supposed in the hypothesis “I believe!”

Here, Wittgenstein distinguishes between two ways of understanding the word “I believe,” which also clarifies how one should treat the idea of “believing.” The first distinction shows that the “expression ‘I believe that this is the case’ is used like the assertion ‘This is the case’” is an assertion that corresponds to something that is true in reality, as in “I believe that fire is hot” which is, of course, true, hence, the assertion can simply be taken to be understood as “Fire is hot.” The second distinction, however, which points out that “the hypothesis that ‘I believe this is the case’ is not used like the hypothesis that ‘this is the case’” signifies that the speaker’s use of “I believe …” is not to assert something that corresponds to something true in reality, but is, in fact, stating one’s state of mind. Thus, an assertion that “I believe that fire is cold” cannot simply be taken to be understood as “Fire is cold” but as something that the speaker wishes to “believe” about the fire.

The distinction can be understood more easily when one tries to look at the difference between the language-games of someone who works as a chef, for instance, and someone who works in a circus—say someone who walks over burning charcoals with bare feet—a fire walker. For the chef, the

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38 Wittgenstein, PI, p. 190.
belief that fire or burning charcoal is hot is merely brought about by what he usually experiences—the heat of the fire and of the burning charcoal. However, in the situation of someone who works for the circus, in order to perform the feat, he needs to “believe” that the burning charcoal is cold and does so.\textsuperscript{39} Through believing that the charcoal is cold, he is able to walk over the burning charcoal barefoot without feeling the heat. Here, it can be said that “one can mistrust one’s own senses, but not one’s own belief.”\textsuperscript{40} Wittgenstein points out that “[t]he language-game of reporting can be given such a turn that a report is not meant to inform the hearer about its subject matter but about the person making the report.”\textsuperscript{41} Hence, when one says that “I believe that fire is hot,” the assertion does not only convey that fire is hot but also the internal disposition of the speaker who believes about the fire being hot.

In essence, the paradox of Moore’s assertion that, “There is fire in this room and I don’t believe there is” puts to light the characteristic of “I believe …” to show a person’s state of mind. “‘I believe …’ throws light on my state. Conclusions about my conduct can be drawn from this expression.”\textsuperscript{42}

From this elucidation of how the expression “I believe …” should be understood in Moore’s Paradox, Wittgenstein draws out his thoughts on what believing is:

This is how I think of it: Believing is a state of mind. It has duration; and that independently of the duration of its expression in the sentence, for example. So it is a kind of disposition of the believing person. This is shown me in the case of someone else by his behaviour; and by his words. And under this head, by the expression “I believe …” as well as by the simple assertion.\textsuperscript{43}

From this statement, we can draw out four characteristics of belief: a) it is a state of mind; b) its duration is independent of the duration of the expression in the sentence; c) it is a kind of disposition; and d) it is expressed by words and behavior.

\textsuperscript{39} Notice that I wrote the word believe here in quotation marks, as in “believe.” The reason is that I did not want to use the term “see as” in this paper this early because I am worried that it might still be premature to do so and decided to use it later after the link between belief and “seeing as” has been established. Nevertheless, what I mean in this sentence is that the fire walker needs to see the burning charcoal as cold in order to perform his feat.

\textsuperscript{40} Wittgenstein, PI, 190.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 191.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 191–192.
Belief as 'Seeing As'

In light of the elaborations made above, there appears to be a third concept of “seeing as” that one cannot help but notice since a “concept forces itself on one.” And this concept is what this paper wishes to argue—belief as “seeing as.”

There are those who may find the link between belief and “seeing as” in discussions concerning religion, for instance, John Hick, who in his paper “Seeing-as and Religious Experience” enlarged the concept of “seeing as” to “experiencing as” in order to justify the validity of religious experiences and, of course, the belief in God, which can be conveniently called faith. It is not
difficult to agree with Hick that interpreting, or more appropriately, finding meaning is not purely visual but involves all our senses. However, this only works when one speaks of “experiencing as” because in an experience, “the finding of meaning does not occur only through sight.” But speaking of “seeing as” is entirely independent and different because in “seeing as,” meaning is not sought; it is immediately recognized. Moreover, there exists a link between belief and “seeing as” which does not require one to extend the concept of “seeing as” in order to conveniently justify this connection. The connection between belief and “seeing as” lies in Wittgenstein’s definition of the term “belief” itself.

As previously mentioned, Wittgenstein’s thoughts on “seeing as” need to be understood, bearing in mind his thoughts on “I believe.” “‘Seeing as…’ is not part of perception. And for that reason it is like seeing and again not like.” When one takes this into consideration, it seems to appear that the notion of “seeing as” as a visual experience will fall short of the characteristic of “seeing as” not being a part of perception. Obviously, when one speaks of “seeing as” as a visual experience, one is virtually talking about perception.

One must be careful, however, to think that Wittgenstein, in relation to “seeing as” as a visual experience, is talking about pure perception. Pure perception, as Husserl puts it, is achieved through the “narrowing of an impure percept which throws out symbolic components [and] yields the pure intuition which is immanent in it: a further reductive step then throws out everything imagined, and yields the substance of pure perception.” In other words, pure intuition (wherein all the properties of an object are fully apparent) minus imaginative content results in pure perception, or that “which completely depicts its object through its freedom from all signitive [properties of an object that are not intuitively presented or are subject to interpretation] additions, holds in its intuitively presentative content a complete likeness of the object. This likeness can approach the object more or less closely, to a limit of complete resemblance.”

In this light, “seeing as” — even as a visual experience — is not strictly a matter of pure perception; hence, as pointed out earlier, it is “precisely a meaning that I see” and just recently, “it is like seeing and again not like.” Conversely, to be “not part of perception” seems to suggest something that is internal; something which is somewhat a state of mind, wherein the signitive substance, “which corresponds to the sum total of the remaining, subsidiarily

46 Wittgenstein, PI, 197.
48 Ibid.
given properties of the object, which do not themselves become apparent” is present. If this is the case, then we only have “seeing as” as an attitude left to consider.

“Seeing as” as an attitude, on the other hand, seems to fulfill the said requirement. But how? As mentioned earlier, the vital link here is the definition that Wittgenstein gave to the term “belief.” It can be recalled that, earlier, the discussion was able to derive four characteristics of belief from Wittgenstein’s definition:

a) It is a state of mind;
b) Its duration is independent of the duration of the expression in the sentence;
c) It is a kind of disposition; and
d) It is expressed by words and behavior.

Let us now try to figure out how these characteristics will fit in our discussion of “seeing as” as an attitude.

It was pointed out a while ago that “seeing is a state.” However, if one takes a closer look at “seeing as” as an attitude, one can see that attitude only gives “color” to what is seen. It merely influences what is seen so that a person takes it to be one thing or another, but it seems that it is still part of perception. One can perhaps consider it to be a notch higher than visual experience or regard it to be some sort of “mental perception.” Ironically, however, this description appears to point to the right direction. Isn’t it that this kind of description—of “seeing as” as an attitude as a mental perception—fits Wittgenstein’s description of “seeing as” as “like seeing and again not like”? One sees in the image above the aspect of a cup (or of the two faces) and the experience can be described as truly “like seeing and again not like.” If this is so, then we can say that, indeed, “seeing as” as an attitude is a state—a state of mind. “To me it is an animal pierced by an arrow.” That is what I treat it as; this is my attitude to the figure. This is one meaning in calling it a case of ‘seeing.’ With this, “seeing as” as an attitude has obviously met the first characteristic of belief.

Meanwhile, as one tries to dig deeper into Wittgenstein’s thoughts, one can notice that Wittgenstein’s remarks on conviction is the key in finding the link between “seeing as” as an attitude and at least two of the other three remaining characteristics of belief. What is conviction? In ordinary English parlance, conviction is understood as a strong belief and is normally related to the ideas of emotion and behavior. Simply, conviction derives from human

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49 Ibid., 317.
50 Wittgenstein, PI, 205.

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emotion and is manifested in human words and actions. These characterizations also appear in Wittgenstein’s thoughts; take for instance Wittgenstein’s Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology (1992), wherein he says:

The belief, the certainty, a kind of feeling when uttering a sentence. Well, there is a tone of conviction, of doubt, etc. But the most important expression of conviction is not this tone, but the way one behaves.

Ask not “What goes on in us when we are certain …?”, but “How does it show?”

Here, Wittgenstein mentions a certain feeling towards the utterance of a sentence, which hints the presence of conviction as well as the importance of behavior, which is the expression of the conviction. From this observation, it is safe to assume that Wittgenstein treats conviction in the same manner that was stated earlier—that it is related to the ideas of emotion and behavior. By introducing the concept of conviction in the picture of the general discussion of “seeing as” in the PI, Wittgenstein is trying to establish a connection between “seeing as” and two other characteristics of belief, namely, expression and duration, through the idea of conviction.

Conviction has two elements—behavior and emotion. On the one hand, by setting a connection between “seeing as” and behavior, Wittgenstein gives the impression that “seeing as” has the characteristic of expression as does behavior. For instance, in the case of the image above, when asked “What do you see?”—a person’s normal behavior when one sees, say, Aspect A will be to respond, “I see a cup”. If asked further, “Why do you say it is a cup?”—one will most likely point out the characteristics of a cup that is similar to what one sees or maybe draw a picture of a cup and compare it with the image or even, perhaps, get a real cup and explain the similar features of the cup that the person is holding and the image that one sees. Obviously, it can be seen from this person’s expression, both in words and actions, that his behavior towards what he sees in the image is that of a behavior that he would normally have towards a real cup.

On the other hand, by creating a link between “seeing as” and emotion, Wittgenstein seems to imply the idea that “seeing as” has the characteristic of duration which is independent from the duration of the expression in a sentence as does emotion. For example, when a person is angry, the duration of the emotion or the anger that he feels is independent...

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51 Wittgenstein, LWPP, 21.
from its duration in the expression, “I am angry at you!” Thus, even if he has expressed what he feels, the emotion still lingers. The idea is the same with “seeing as” that even if the expression, “I see a cup” has passed, the experience of “seeing” the cup still persists. This appears to be a convenient analysis if the idea of conviction perfectly fits the description of “seeing as” as an attitude. So how does it fit the picture and what makes it fit?

“One feels conviction within oneself, one doesn’t infer it from one’s own words or their tone.”—What is true here is: one does not infer one’s own conviction from one’s own words; nor yet the actions which arise from their conviction.52

Here, Wittgenstein clearly points out that one’s conviction does not originate from one’s words or actions. Rather, it is the other way around—one’s words and actions originate from one’s convictions. Hence, there is indeed a place for the element of conviction in the discussion of “seeing as” and that position is, by nature, essential. With this clarified, we are still left with the task of unveiling the connection between attitude and disposition.

I think that the notion of disposition is intimately intertwined with the idea of attitude. Ordinarily, disposition relates to various terms such as nature, character, temperament, temper, outlook, and personality. All these terms are oftentimes used synonymously and interchangeably. But then, how are disposition and attitude related? Let us examine the following statement:

… what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between them.53

This means that to see the image above as an image of cup and not merely ink smudges on a white background is not to see something other than ink smudges on a white background. It is to see the image in relation to pictures of a cup, in relation to real cups, in relation to other depictions of a cup, and so forth. What, then, enables one to see this way? It is something within a person—the tendency of a person to see things in relation to something. The general term is “disposition” but, more precisely, “attitude.” If the person’s attitude changes, the disposition of the person also changes and vice versa. Does this mean that the terms “disposition” and “attitude” carry the same meaning? I say yes. This can be better understood through the

52 Wittgenstein, PI, 191.
53 Ibid., 212.
help of another important idea in Wittgenstein’s concept of “seeing as”—physiognomy.

But the expression in one’s voice and gestures is the same as if the object had altered and had ended by becoming this or that.

I have a theme played to me several times and each time in a slower tempo. In the end I say “Now it’s right”, or “Now at last it’s a march”, “Now at last it’s a dance.”—The same tone of voice expresses the dawning of an aspect.54

A similar assertion is:

But if a sentence can strike me as like a painting in words, and the very individual word in the sentence is like a picture, then it is not such marvel that a word uttered in isolation and without purpose can seem to carry a particular meaning in itself.55

Remember that the “concept of an aspect is akin to the concept of an image.”56 Physiognomy is a term used by Wittgenstein to refer to “images” or “meanings” that can be recognized in the structure of words, music, paintings, poetry, sarcasm, and so on. The first remark above describes this concept wherein one is able to grasp the “aspect” or physiognomy of music and identify whether it is a dance, or a march, or a chant, and so forth. The second remark talks about meanings in particular sentences and words that dawn on someone with the vividness of pictures (such as when one is able to appreciate poems). Normally, these “images” can easily be grasped by most people. However, there are cases wherein some people cannot grasp such physiognomy. As discussed earlier in this paper, such instances are cases of aspect-blindedness.

Wittgenstein defines aspect-blindedness as “lacking in the capacity to see something as something”57 and adds further that it is “akin to the lack of a ‘musical ear.’”58 However, this is not a physiological defect or a psychological incapacity of some sort; I think it is a lack in the tendency of a

54 Ibid., 206.
55 Ibid., 215.
56 Ibid., 213.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 214.
person to see something as something. A certain discrepancy in personal attitudes among people exists here. Wittgenstein clearly articulates this point:

Is he supposed to be blind to the similarity between two faces?—And so also to their identity or approximate identity? I do not want to settle this. (He ought to be able to execute such orders as “Bring me something that looks like this.”)

Ought he to be unable to see the schematic cube as a cube?—It would not follow from that that he could not recognize it as a representation (a working drawing for instance) of a cube. But for him it would not jump from one aspect to the other.—Question: Ought he to be able to take it as a cube in certain circumstances, as we do?—If not, this could not very well be called a sort of blindedness.

The “aspect-blind” will have an altogether different relationship to pictures from ours.59

For instance, a person may see a cup in the image above but is unable see the two faces because he lacks the disposition to see the faces. One who reads a poem but cannot appreciate lacks the disposition to appreciate poems. One cannot notice sarcasm because he lacks the disposition to notice such nuance. In other words, a person may lack the attitude to grasp certain aspects and, thus, treats some things differently than most people do. Ultimately, when one is disposed or has the attitude to see a cup in the image above, the aspect of the cup will dawn on him. Indeed, one sees a cup because one’s disposition—one’s attitude—forces the image of the cup on him; as Wittgenstein puts it, “it forced itself on me.”60 At this point, we can see that “seeing as” has met all the characteristics of a belief and, thus, has adopted a third notion, that is, “seeing as” as a belief. This brings our project of fully establishing the notion of belief as “seeing as” to near completion.

The final step towards the completion of this project is to apply this new-found understanding of “seeing as” as an attitude—or more appropriately, belief as “seeing as.” Obviously, the best and most suitable subject for this application is Moore’s Paradox.

59 Ibid., 213–214.
60 Ibid.
In the case of Moore's Paradox, the assertion that "There is fire in this room and I don't believe there is" is a case of "seeing as" as an attitude—a case of belief as "seeing as." This claim can be proven by "the way one behaves." In this kind of situation, it is somehow difficult to deny the existence of fire in the room; however, this is not impossible. Obviously, since the assertion concerned is a belief statement, there is no doubt that we are dealing with a state of mind—the belief that there is no fire in the room. Recall that belief as "seeing as" is "like seeing and again not like" because seeing seems to be done by the "mind's eye." In other words, it is "seeing and thinking in the aspect," wherein the visual experience of seeing an aspect is influenced by one's attitude. Hence, in this case it is one's attitude—or disposition—that led the person to see that there is no fire in the room. It can probably be said, in addition, that the circumstance wherein the assertion was expressed might also supply the reasons why a person was able to express such an utterance.

Nonetheless, apart from reason being unnecessary in belief as "seeing as," the important point here is that a person's mere utterance of such statement is evidence enough to say that his attitude towards the fire in the room is that it does not exist since his utterance is the expression of his attitude towards the fire in the room. Unfortunately, since the only material that is available for this paper to work on the application of belief as "seeing as" is the statement of Moore's Paradox, it is difficult to ascertain whether the duration of the attitude is independent from that of the expression since this can only be determined after the assertion has been expressed. Nevertheless, assuming that the person continues to act as though there is no fire in the room, then, it can be said that, indeed, the application of belief as "seeing as" fits Moore's Paradox perfectly like how a particular puzzle piece would fit on a puzzle.

Thus, is "seeing as" a distinct action from believing? Given the analysis above, the answer is no. In light of the foregoing discussions, the conclusion reached is that "seeing as" is not a distinct action from believing, that is, believing is "seeing as."

Belief as "seeing as" is a commonly occurring phenomenon around us. In fact, it seems that one of the most potent examples for this is that which is dear to us—Philosophy. To use the words of Wittgenstein as quoted by Russell Goodman, "Working in Philosophy—like working in architecture in many respects—is really more a working on oneself .... on one's way of

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61 Wittgenstein, LWPP, 21.
62 Wittgenstein, PI, 197.
63 Ibid., 14.
234 BELIEF AS ‘SEEING AS’

seeing things.” Indeed, working in Philosophy can be seen as working in a hodgepodge of beliefs as “seeing as.” Philosophers argue for their respective beliefs which are products of what they see in the world (“seeing as” as a visual experience) that are influenced by how they see the world (“seeing as” as an attitude). Simply put, Philosophy is an age-old enterprise of belief as “seeing as.”

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Authentic Historicality and National Socialism in *Being and Time*

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**Abstract:** This paper will explore ‘Heidegger’s controversy,’ which has perplexed the scholars for a long time. We need to see whether we can distinguish Heidegger, ‘the philosopher’ from Heidegger ‘the Nazi.’ I would like to suggest that the notion of *Geschistlichkeit* in *Being and Time* shows the intimate connections between the fundamental ontology of *Dasein* and Heidegger’s sympathy for National Socialism. The paper will argue that the analysis of ‘authentic historicality’ in *Being and Time* shows the link between the authenticity of *Dasein* and Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism.

**Keywords:** *Dasein*, *Geschistlichkeit*, historicality, repetition

**Introduction**

“*Heidegger Controversy*” remains a perplexing issue for any scholar who deals with the thoughts of Martin Heidegger. This is so because Heidegger’s life shows us a confounding combination of profound philosophical thoughts and questionable political conduct. Heidegger’s brief engagement with National Socialism during Second World War and his subsequent silence about the issue have baffled the thinkers. ‘Heidegger Controversy’ fueled up this year again after the publication of the controversial *Black Notebooks*. Heidegger Chair in Freiburg University resigned on the moral ground, citing its allegedly anti-Semitic content. Ever since Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism, scholars heatedly debated his involvement with the ideology of National Socialism. On the one hand, there are thinkers like Theodor Adorno, Jurgen Habermas, Emmanuel Levinas, and Herbert Marcuse who argue that there is a direct connection between Heidegger’s philosophy and his conservative political thoughts.1 On the other hand, scholars like Hannah Arendt, Richard

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1 Adorno establishes the relationship between Heidegger’s political leanings and the philosophical concepts in *Being and Time*. He argues that Heidegger’s emphasis on authenticity
Rorty, and Jacques Derrida argue that we cannot reduce Heidegger’s philosophical thoughts to his conservative political opinions and his brief engagement with National Socialism should be seen as a ‘folly’ on the part of the thinker who tried to involve in the political realm. We, therefore, need to differentiate or even salvage Heidegger’s thinking from his occasional political pitfalls.

Heidegger’s sustained silence on this issue and his provocative statement regarding the holocaust of Jews later in Question concerning the Essence of Technology further complicates the matter. Given the complex and controversial nature of the problem, the present paper will take the moderate position regarding the “Heidegger Controversy.” I will try to show that although Heidegger’s thoughts cannot be legitimately reduced into the Nazi ideology; nevertheless, the fundamental ontology of Dasein in Being and Time does have the political aim which could be churned out from the analysis of authentic historicity. Hence, we cannot discard Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism as an aberration of a philosopher. His support for National Socialism stems from his philosophical ideas, which are very clearly evident in his infamous Rector Speech, along with works like Being and Truth, Introduction to Metaphysics, and Black Notebooks. He saw National Socialism as a historical possibility, which can make German people authentic. To comprehend the connection between his philosophical and political ideas, we need to analyze his notion of ‘authentic historicity’ in Being and Time. On the basis of this analysis, we shall argue that the notion of co-historically and destiny does have the basis of a strong and exclusive community, which can overcome the pitfalls of everydayness and can realize its historical essence.

**Historicality and Care**


culminates in the notion of Geschichtlichkeit or Historicality.\(^3\) Historicality is a technical term, which Heidegger defines in terms of fundamental ontology of Dasein. In the earlier sections of Being and Time, Heidegger argues that the ontology of Dasein should be understood with respect to temporality. Heidegger defines the being of Dasein in terms of Care structure.\(^4\) Care is the structural unity, which defines the existence of man as being-in-the-world. The specific component of Care is ‘ahead-of-itself.’\(^5\) This structure of care as ‘ahead-of-itself’ specifically comes into picture when Heidegger discusses anxiety as fundamental attunement. Heidegger brings in the issue of Care in Being and Time after the discussion of anxiety.\(^6\) Anxiety is a specific type of disclosure, which individuates Dasein. It makes possible for Dasein to become authentic.\(^7\) In this way, Dasein realizes itself as the possible. According to Heidegger, Dasein’s basic structure as possibility is because Dasein is fundamentally ‘ahead-of-itself.’ The ‘ahead-of-itself’ has to be seen in Dasein’s specific relationship with Death. Death is the non-relational possibility which individuates Dasein and it projects itself as ‘ahead of itself’ in anticipation of ‘running its course,’ which Heidegger calls as Vorlaufenheit.\(^8\)

Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue. The phrase ‘is an issue’ has been made plain in the state-of-being of understanding-of-understanding as self-projective Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This potentiality is that for the sake of which any Dasein is as it is … ontologically, Being towards one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being means that in each case Dasein is always ‘beyond itself’ … as Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself. This structure of Being, which belongs to the essential ‘is an issue,’ we shall denote as Dasein’s Being-ahead-of-itself.\(^9\)

‘Being-ahead-of-itself’ points towards the most fundamental

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\(^4\) Ibid., 227.

\(^5\) Ibid., 236.

\(^6\) Ibid., 228.

\(^7\) Heidegger defines anxiety as a distinctive way in which Dasein is disclosed. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 228.

\(^8\) According to Heidegger, Dasein’s being is constituted by the ‘not yet’ because of its relationship with death. Hence, it projects itself as ‘ahead-of-itself’ while ‘running its course’ (Vorlaufenheit). By including ‘ahead-of-itself’ in care structure of Dasein, Heidegger defines the existence of Dasein in terms of possibility. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 287.

\(^9\) Ibid., 236.
constituent of Dasein. Dasein is the only entity for whom its own being is an issue; this is because it involves ‘ahead-of-itself’ in the care structure. That is why anxiety becomes a specific kind of disclosure for Dasein in which it realizes itself as ‘possibility.’ However, the ‘ahead-of-itself’ is not some kind of exceptional capacity of Dasein; rather, it is the part of Dasein’s facticity as Heidegger defines it as “ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world.” In his words, ‘existentiality is essentially determined by facticity.’ Heidegger tries to show that the ontological constituent of Dasein as ‘ahead-of-itself’ can only be grasped through taking the issue of temporality into account. Dasein can be ‘ahead-of-itself’ because there is primacy of future in temporality. Hence, Care is basically temporal in nature. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care.

Care structure is the unity of the past, present, and future. However, the past, present, and future are not used as mere modifications of time; rather, they are defined in existential manner. Heidegger does not simply mean that existence is temporal as it would have been naive and commonsensical. To be human means to exist in time. It is true not only for humans but also for any other existing living forms. We cannot think of any form of existence which is independent of time. Heidegger, however, gives twist to this commonsensical understanding of time by calling it temporality. Temporality is the way in which human existence relates itself to time. Heidegger defines human existence as Care in order to show the relationship between human existence and time. However, this relation is possible only by understanding time in an ontological manner. In Care structure, time has been described as an ecstatic unity of the past, present, and future, which has the primacy of the future. According to Heidegger, it is only the future which gives unity to the past, present, along with future. He says that, “The primary phenomena of primordial and authentic temporality is the future.”

Heidegger’s notion of temporality rejects the ordinary understanding of time in which the primacy is accorded to the present. In ordinary understanding of time, the past and the future are defined as no longer now and the upcoming now. Hence, the past and the future become the modifications of present. Heidegger, on the other hand, argues that in order to grasp the real essence of time, we need to understand time as ecstatic temporality. In ecstatic temporality, time is not understood as separate moments of the past, present, and future; rather, time is understood in terms of its unity of the past, present, and future. Here we need to understand what Heidegger means by the term ‘unity.’ It is not just adding up of the three moments of time together. The unity is basically ecstatic in nature in which

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 374.
12 Ibid., 378.
each moment becomes itself only by flowing outside itself. According to Heidegger, unity of time should be located in the care structure of Dasein. Time flows from the future to the past and then to the present.

Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care. The items of care have not been pieced together cumulatively any more than the temporality itself has been put together ‘in the course of time’ out of the future, the having been and the Present. Temporality ‘is’ not an entity at all … it temporalizes itself … Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having-been, and the Present, the “ecstases” of temporality … its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases.\(^\text{13}\)

Of all entities, Dasein alone has relationship with the future, which Heidegger defines as ‘being-ahead-of-itself.’ However, the projection of the future is possible only through the ecstatic or its inherent unity with the present and the future, which makes possible the phenomena of temporality for humans. The projection towards the future brings Dasein to its facticity, to its past; hence, only on the basis of the future and the past, it comes to have the present as present. Hence, the present is not an isolated patch but is stitched to the past and flows towards the future. Heidegger, therefore, comes out of the abstract or formal notion of time by making it as the very ground on which humans interpret themselves. The Da of Dasein, its ‘being-there,’ is disclosed to Dasein because it is temporal in nature. The ‘there-ness’ of Dasein as the facticity, falleness, and projection is possible on the basis of ecstatic temporality of Dasein. The world is disclosed to Dasein as the network of possibilities because of the ecstatic unity of the past, present, and future.

The temporal analysis of Dasein brings Heidegger to the problematic of history. Since we do not relate to time in abstract manner but in existential way, the question of history becomes of paramount importance. According to Heidegger, History should be understood in relationship with temporality.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 376-77.
\(^{14}\) In analyzing the historicality of Dasein, we shall try to show that this entity is not ‘temporal’ because it ‘stands in history,’ but that, on the contrary, it exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 428.
In *Being and Time*, Heidegger starts from the common understanding of ‘past’ in which past has been interpreted in terms of bygone, elapsed, which is no longer present now. We call such past as dead.\(^{15}\) This notion of past is based on the understanding of past as the modification of the present. The past as such does not have any ontological status; its being is dependent on the present. When a present moment passes away, the past comes into existence. Heidegger questions such an understanding of past and tries to understand past in its own terms. Humans never relate to the past as bygone or dead; rather, for them the past is conceived in terms of tradition which affects them. Therefore, they interpret themselves in terms of the past. Bernard Stiegler elaborates this point in *Time and Technics* wherein he argues that the notion of historicality in Heidegger should be understood in terms of the non-lived past of the ancestors which ‘affects’ individuals.

Dasein is temporal: it has a past on the basis of which it can anticipate and thereby be. Inherited, this past is “historical”: my past is not my past; it is first that of my ancestors, although it is in essential relation with the heritage of a past already there before me that my own past is established. This historical, non-lived past can be inherited inauthentically: historicality is also a facticity. The past harbors possibilities that Dasein may not inherit as possibilities. The facticity implied by heritage opens up a twofold possibility for self-understanding. On the one hand, Dasein can comprehend itself on the basis of an understanding of existence which is banal and “opining” (subject to everyday opinion). On the other hand, Dasein can “possibilize” this past, in that it is not its own, insofar it has inherited it: it is then on the basis of its possibility—such that its past is constituted therein—that it inherits possibilities of “its” factual past. Dasein is in the mode of “having-to-be” because it never yet totally is; inasmuch as it exists, it is never finished, it always already anticipates itself in the mode of “not yet.” Between birth and death, existence is what extends itself [Er-streckung] between “already” and “not yet.”\(^{16}\)

Heidegger calls the understanding of past in terms of bygone or no longer as inauthentic historicality. It understands past as the modification of

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 430.

present. Historians study past in this way when they study fossils, artifacts, or antique objects. These objects used to be the part of some civilization but now they are no longer part of the present. Hence, they are called past or antique objects. According to Heidegger, such an understanding of past does not deal with the fundamental question of why history is important for humans. History cannot be reduced to a discipline in which we study the past. Rather, we need to analyze the question of what history has got to do with the human existence. The objects do not become historical only because they are old and outdated; rather, they become historical because through them, the life-world of the earlier generation shows itself. Hence, the past can be properly grasped through understanding its relationship with human existence. Heidegger argues that we can understand history in an authentic manner by relating it with the care structure of Dasein, which shows the relationship between history and temporality. Heidegger calls this basic relation between history and temporality ‘Historicality.’

Disclosing and interpreting belong essentially to Dasein’s historizing. Out of this kind of Being of the entity which exists historically, there arises the existentiell possibility of disclosing history explicitly and getting it in our grasp. The fact that we can make history our theme—that is to say, disclose it historiologically—is the presupposition for the possibility of the way one builds up the historical world in the human sciences.17

According to Heidegger, historicality belongs to the fundamental nature of Dasein. It is because of the historicality of Dasein that history, as such, has become the issue for it. We do not relate to past as simply gone and lost in the time. Rather, past is interpreted as ‘having been.’ According to Paul Ricoeur, Heidegger differentiates between two kinds of pasts. One past is that with which historiographer deals with; another past is what Heidegger calls as ‘having-been’ and belongs to our existence as ‘care.’18 This ‘having been’ of the past is possible because of the care structure of Dasein, which involves the primacy of the future. Only because Dasein is futural in its constitution can it have the past.

The past is not a present time that has passed by; rather, the past’s being is set free only through its state of having been. The past reveals itself as that definitive state of

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17 Heidegger, Being and Time, 428.
one’s having been that is characteristic of futuralness, a futuralness which one resolves to embrace through grappling with the past. Authentic historicity is not a matter of presencing something, but that state of being futural in which one readies oneself to receive the right impetus from the past in order to open it up. In such futuralness histriological investigation enters the present; it becomes the critique of the present.19

Heidegger, therefore, is not interested in history as a discipline; rather, his problem is why history does matter to humans and how they relate to it. According to him, only when Dasein tries to live authentically does the past become the storehouse of possibilities. Hence, the past becomes a living past only with reference to the question of authenticity.

According to Heidegger, the authentic historicality for a Dasein can only be possible when it finds out its authentic existence by pulling itself out of Dasman, they. “They” or Dasman is the term Heidegger uses for the ‘average, public understanding.’20 ‘They’ provides average possibilities for a Dasein to behave and think according to the prevalent social norms. Dasein’s average behavior remains dominated by Dasman. It is the general understanding or the intersubjectivity, which guides and controls the individual values and choices. According to Heidegger, although such an understanding is our ontological characteristic, it also makes us forget the most important ontological question— “What does it mean to be?” Only when the average everyday world of absorption in activities gets suspended in the rare mood of ‘anxiety’ can we ask this question.21

The task of fundamental ontology in Being and Time, therefore, is twofold; first, to analyze the humans in their average, public mode; second, to explore the true meaning of existence other than the public mode of existence. In the second division of Being and Time, the question of death, authenticity, resoluteness, and historicality is discussed with regard to the meaning of existence. The second division takes up the question of authenticity in the face of Death.

However, we need to understand that for Heidegger, death does not mean the physical death but the awareness of one’s own finitude. The analysis of death shows that Dasein becomes aware of its facticity. Dasein realizes its ‘mineness’ only when it is delivered to its finitude in the face of its

19 Heidegger, Being and Time, 80.
20 Ibid.,164.
21 Heidegger defines anxiety as a specific type of disclosure as it individuates Dasein and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 235.
inescapable mortality. Dasein either lulls itself again into the average public life, being unable to face its individuation, or it may gather itself and become resolute. This resoluteness, however, should not be confused as the ‘resolve’ to do something. It is not some practical action; rather, this is the ontological mode in which Dasein becomes ready to own up oneself, which is the actual meaning of being authentic, Eigentlichkeit.

While Heidegger defines resoluteness mostly in abstract terms, in the sections on historicality, he explains the resoluteness as Repetition. Resolute Dasein does not become a transcendental entity but realizes the truth of its existence in terms of its falleness. It cannot dispense with its facticity, its historicity. The being of Dasein is inextricably woven with the historicity to which it belongs. When it becomes resolute, it chooses the past possibilities which have not been realized. In this way, he ‘repeats’ the possibilities latent in the tradition by not simply reproducing them but repeating them with the futural projection. This is what Heidegger means by ‘authentic historicality.’ Only by relating with history in an authentic manner does Dasein become authentic.

Heidegger, therefore, introduces the notion of “Repetition” in the context of the authentic Historicality. The notion of Repetition becomes crucial as it links Dasein’s resoluteness to the historical possibilities. According to Heidegger, Repeating is going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there. Repetition, accordingly, is not a matter of making actual again what has been previously actualized. Therefore, it is not reduplication of a previous act. In Heidegger’s words, Repetition is not ‘bringing back again’ what is the old.

But when one has, by Repetition, handed down to oneself a possibility that has been there, the Dasein that has-been-there is not disclosed in order to be actualized over again. The repeating of that which is possible does not bring back again something that is ‘past,’ nor does it bind the ‘present’ back to that which has already been outstripped. ARISING, as it does, from a resolute projection of oneself, Repetition does not let itself be persuaded of something by what is “past,” just in order that it, as something which was formerly actual, may recur.23

22 Heidegger says, “the resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the Repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us.” See Heidegger, Being and Time, 437.
23 Ibid., 437-38.
Since the being of Dasein has been defined as possibility, Repetition is always focused on the possible. Dasein is authentically itself inasmuch as it projectively anticipates the possible. The simple reduplication which reproduces something already actualized is precisely a movement away from the origin, precisely the de-generation which is the source of the inauthentic, the second-hand, the fallen. Repetition is always an originary operation by means of which Dasein opens up possibilities latent in the tradition, bringing forth something new. In Repetition, Dasein is productive of what it repeats; it does not simply go over old ground. The self produces itself by Repetition. In Repetition, Dasein discloses its own being and that of the historical situation in which it belongs. Repetition is a first, a breakthrough, a retrieval which pushes forward, which opens what was previously closed and held in check. Repetition is a new beginning, which aims at the possible.

**Heidegger and Politics**

The notion of authentic historicality is intimately connected with the issue of Resoluteness in *Being and Time*. Resoluteness results from the readiness of Dasein to face anxiety, which is its fundamental attunement. Only in the readiness to face anxiety does Dasein become resolute. Resolution should not be understood as the psychological capacity. As Heidegger defines resoluteness as the ‘readiness to become anxious’, we need to see the connection between resoluteness and anxiety.

According to Heidegger, in the mood of anxiety, what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away and entities in the world lose their significance. The ‘world’ could offer nothing more in the form of ‘present-to-hand’ and ‘ready-at-hand’ and nor can the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety, thus, takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted.

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25 John Caputo defines Repetition in the sense of Deconstruction which dismantles the past. ‘Repetition’ answers’ what is calling to it in what has been, ‘responds’ to what is possible, makes a ‘rejoinder’ which consists in bringing forth something for which Dasein has up to now only obscurely groped. The rejoinder (Erwiderung) is a rebuff (Widerruf) of the inertial weight of the past. It is a living response which speaks against, protests, disavows the weight of a tradition which has become leaden and lifeless; effecting the possible is ‘revolutionary,’ while clinging to the past is conservative. There is thus a deconstructive moment in Repetition, a moment of counter-movement, of rebuttal. … Repetition aims at not the actual but the possible.” Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutics*, 91.
Anxiety, hence, makes impossible any comportment towards the world either as present-to-hand or ready-to-hand.26

Heidegger links the concept of ‘Nothing’ with anxiety in order to show the groundlessness of the human existence. In anxiety, Dasein faces the Nothing. Nothing is encountered as its own finitude. It realizes that ‘nothing,’ which is available in the everyday world of Dasman, can ground its existence. Dasein realizes that nothing but only it grounds its own existence. It gives meaning to life and there is no meaning independent of its existence. This makes Dasein resolute, and it ‘owns up’ its existence, which is called ‘being authentic’ by Heidegger. That is why Heidegger says that in anxiety, Dasein realizes that ‘it is the null basis of its nullity.’27

The issue of Repetition is intimately linked with the question of authenticity. Only an authentic Dasein can repeat. For an inauthentic Dasein, there would be no anxiety or resoluteness; hence, it cannot repeat. Heidegger’s account of Repetition therefore calls for the productive relationship with the past in which one dismantles the past in order to show up the possibilities inherent in it.28 The hermeneutic engagement with the past enables one to dismantle the fossilized structures and contexts of the past and to see the past in terms of possibility. The source of this productive relationship with the past has to be located in the ontological structure of Dasein who relates with the past with reference to its existence.

However, what problematizes or at least questions the ‘deconstructive Heidegger’29 are the notion of ‘destiny,’ ‘people,’ and ‘co-historizing’ in his account of authentic historicality. These notions show us the conservative aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy and force us to see the relationship with Heidegger’s philosophical ideas and his sympathy for National Socialism. I will therefore try to show that the ‘Authentic historicality’ does involve Heidegger’s passion for the German fatherland and National Socialism.

26 However, the absence of comportment does not point towards solipsism; on the contrary, in anxiety Dasein realizes its fundamental situation of ‘being there.’ Heidegger makes it clear, “The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the “nothing and nowhere,” does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that the entities within-the-world are of so little importance in themselves that on the basis of this insignificance of what is within-the-world, the world in its world-hood is all that still obtrudes itself.” See Heidegger, Being and Time, 231.

27 Ibid., 330-31.

28 Dana Villa compares the notion of Repetition in Heidegger and Walter Benjamin by analyzing it in relationship with the past. See Dana Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

29 The deconstructive or radical nature of Heidegger’s thinking is argued by Caputo. Caputo argues that Heidegger’s notion of destruction dismantles the fossilized and rigid structures of tradition. See Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutics.
What distinguishes Heidegger’s analysis of resoluteness from other existentialist thinkers is the concept of fate, which he makes an essential ally of resolution. Unlike Sartre and other existentialist thinkers who make ‘choice’ essential for the authentic existence, Heidegger defines resoluteness as ‘giving up’ some definite resolution in accordance with the demands of Situation.

Resoluteness cannot be interpreted as autonomy. Heidegger’s account of resoluteness should not be mistaken as being resolute to start a new course of action, which is not available in the everyday world of Dasman. For an authentic Dasein, the past is replete with the possibilities. However, it does not mean that Dasein can make a random choice out of sheer caprice; rather, in authenticity, Dasein comes to face its ‘there’; it realizes that it has been thrown into the facticity or the historical situation which it cannot avoid. This is what Heidegger means by ‘fate.’ Hence, being resolute, Dasein gives itself up to fate. Hence, it discovers not some abstract freedom but a kind of situated freedom in the specific historical context.

Authentic Dasein sees the past as heritage; it does not forget the past in the chattering of They. It realizes itself as a part of the community. Its fate is inextricably interwoven with the fate of the community. Paul Ricouer defines the notion of Repetition as the link between the individual and the collective history. According to Ricouer, there is aporia in phenomenology between the lived time of an individual and the historical time of the ancestors. Only through the ‘narrativity’ in the form of stories or myths is the individual able to own up the past of ancestors. Through the various narrations in the form of myths and traditions, the lived time of the ancestors becomes a part of the historicity of Dasein. Hence, we can argue that through the concept of Repetition, fundamental ontology makes transition to historicity. In inauthentic mode, Dasein is a part of They. He acts and behaves as the everyday structure of Dasman requires of him. Only when he individualizes himself in the face of death does he discover the truth about its existence. As he says, in anxiety Dasein discovers its ‘thereness.’ The truth

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30 Heidegger defines fate in terms of the ‘finitude of one’s existence.’ See Heidegger, Being and Time, 435.
31 Heidegger defines Situation as ‘something which cannot be calculated in advance.’ See Heidegger, Being and Time, 355.
32 Throughout the explanation of Care in Being and Time, Heidegger interprets Freedom as a kind of making choice in a specific situation. He defines Care structure as ‘being-ahead-of-itself-being-in-the-world’. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 236.
33 Paul Ricouer tries to establish the relationship between the individual past and the ancestral past through the concept of narrativity. He writes, “In this way, a bridge is constructed between the historical past and memory by the ancestral narrative that serves as a relay station for memory directed to the historical past, conceived of as the time of people now dead and the time before my death.” See Ricouer, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, 114.
about his existence is his throwness and facticity. He becomes truly historical when he realizes that the past is an inalienable part of his existence. However, this past not only belongs to him and his lived experiences but also includes the past of the ancestors, which is the past of the community. Hence, fate and destiny are interlinked with each other. That is why, for an authentic Dasein, the question of existence involves a historical choice where he has to choose not only for himself but also for his community.

Therefore, the analysis of ontology in Being and Time ultimately boils down to the question of making a historical choice for one’s community. This makes the analysis of fundamental ontology inherently political. Hence, the concept of Repetition is basically political in nature. Dasein stands in history where it sees itself involved in the historical current, which is its fate, and it responds authentically to its facticity by repeating the possibilities from the collective past by which its community can realize its true essence.

The relationship between Heidegger’s thoughts and National Socialism can therefore be analyzed through the notion of Historicality, which shows the deep connections between his political views and philosophical ideas. Heidegger invokes the community in his political speeches. One of the most controversial of Heidegger’s acts is his taking up the Rector’s position in Freiburg University in 1933. In his notorious Rectoral Speech, “The Self Assertion of the German University,” he almost speaks up like a Nazi ideologue who is urging his countrymen to work for the Fuhrer.34 What is more striking is that the various terminologies used by Heidegger in his Rectoral address have been already deployed in Being and Time. Terms like ‘Volk,’ ‘Destiny,’ ‘History,’ ‘Spirit,’ ‘Resoluteness,’ and ‘Strife’ were freely used in connection with the spiritual mission of the German nation. The interesting aspect is that Heidegger urges the students to fulfill the historical mission, which is reserved for the German nation as only it only has the spiritual strength to guide the world. He says, “But it is our will that our Volk fulfills its historical mission.”35

In this regard, it is important to take up the issue of Black Notebooks which again fueled up the Heidegger controversy. Black Notebooks reveals the deep connection between Heidegger’s philosophy and his anti-Semitism. It is not the case that the controversy regarding Black Notebooks conclusively proves Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism, but it highlights the fact that Heidegger cannot be read independently of his political views. In Black Notebooks, Heidegger associates the spirit of calculation of modern age with the Jewish worldview. The growing rootlessness of the modern age can only be countered through the conception of the ‘homeland’ rooted in

35 Ibid., 38.
German tradition and language. Heidegger hoped to overcome the rootlessness of the modern age or the inauthenticity of Dasse

The usage of these terms suggests that the resoluteness of Dasein in *Being and Time* is not merely a formal category but has to be understood in the context of National Socialism. The kind of meaning Heidegger gives to these terms while supporting National Socialism clearly shows the political implications of these terms, which Heidegger may have had in his mind while writing *Being and Time*. It can be argued that in *Being and Time*, Heidegger must be looking up to National Socialism as a kind of a historical possibility by which Germany could realize its historical mission. That is why the question of Repetition holds so much importance for a resolute Dasein in *Being and Time*. Heidegger defines Repetition as the historical possibilities, which have been there but were not actualized. In the light of the Rectoral address, we can say that Heidegger must have seen in the National Socialist movement the possibility of Repetition of the historical destiny of the German nation. It is true that Heidegger soon got disenchanted with the National Socialism and its policy of racism, and he resigned from the rectorship after one year. Yet his sympathy for the National Socialism remained unabated as it is evident from his lectures *Introduction to Metaphysics*. In these lectures, Heidegger while discussing the question of Being, makes reference to the ‘inner greatness’ of the National Socialism. He analyzes the condition of Germany with reference to the ideologies prevalent at that time. According to him, on the one hand, there is USSR and its communism. On the other, there is USA and its consumerism. Heidegger was contemptuous of both of these alternatives and made the case for a third alternative, which is only possible by understanding the great cultural and spiritual wealth of Germany.

Our people, as standing in the center, suffer the most intense pressure—our people, the people richest in neighbors and hence the most endangered people, and for all that, the metaphysical people. We are sure of this vocation; but this people will gain a fate from its vocation only when it creates in itself a resonance, a possibility of resonance for this vocation, and grasps its tradition creatively. All this implies that this people, as a historical people, must transpose itself—and with it the

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36 For the discussion on *Black Notebooks* and Heidegger’s anti-Semitism, see Jesús Adrián Escudero, “Heidegger’s *Black Notebooks* and the Question of Anti-Semitism,” in *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual*, 5 (2015), 21–49.
history of the west—from the center of their future happening into the originary realm of the powers of Being.\(^{37}\)

In various reflections on *Black Notebooks*, the issue of Germany remains a central question where Heidegger repeatedly asks the question “who are we?” Heidegger time and again gets back to the question of historicity and culture which defines the essence of Dasein. In *Black Notebooks*, Heidegger differentiates between Germans and Jews on the basis of their homeland and groundlessness. Germans are rooted in their homeland (*Heimatland*) and their native soil (*Vaterland*), while Jews are characterized by diaspora, migration, and exodus, which Heidegger calls as groundlessness (*Bodenlosigkeit*). The urban and ungrounded way of Jewish life represents a danger for the people’s community. The homeland can only be secured by reconnecting with the German culture and tradition and Heidegger saw this possibility in National Socialism.\(^{38}\)

The question of Being in Heidegger, therefore, seems to point towards the historical struggle with which Dasein or more aptly German Dasein is engaged. Heidegger’s notion of historicity suggests that the true essence of Germany can only be realized through this struggle. In this struggle, the idea of Repetition connects the individual fate with the destiny of the community and he is able to relate with the historicality in an authentic manner.

### Dasein and Violence

Heidegger defines struggle or violence as an essential feature of Dasein through the analysis of the Greek Tragedy *Antigone*. Heidegger argues that human beings are uncanny in nature and they are capable of doing utmost violence and, thereby, capable of changing the established courses and only in this strife the ‘political’ is born. Because of being uncanny, humans run against the limits imposed on them. According to Heidegger, the notion of political could be understood only with reference to this struggle. Hence, the fundamental essence of humans is to be *apolis*, that is, to run against the limits imposed by the State. Heidegger shows it through the character of *Antigone*. *Antigone* defies the order of the King who decrees that her brother should not be given burial as he waged the war against the State. According to Heidegger, the defiant act of *Antigone* shows the true nature of...
humans as deīnon, which is basically going against the limits imposed on it by using violence. This violence is not physical violence but the violation of the limits imposed by the polis.

Every violent taming of the violent is either victory or defeat. Both throw one out of the homely, each in a different way, and they first unfold, each in a different way, the dangerousness of the Being that has been won or lost ... The one who is violence-doing, the creative one, who sets out into the un-said, who breaks into the un-thought, who compels what has never happened and makes appear what is unseen, this violence-doing one stands at all times in daring.39

The ‘violence’ inherent in Dasein struggles with the established political course and makes it uncanny or uncomfortable with the established political ethos. We can connect it with the notion of authenticity developed by Heidegger in Being and Time. Authenticity also involves a kind of struggle with the established norms of Dasman. This is evident when we analyze the authenticity of Dasein with respect to the community. Authenticity requires that one should be resolute to decide for oneself, not as one feels or desires but with respect to the historical possibilities one has inherited. Only by ‘repeating’ the past can one own up the history in an authentic manner. Hence, the authenticity of the existence demands that Dasein has to take into account the historicity in which it is fallen and has to rescue itself from being leveled down by the inauthentic life of Dasman. Heidegger saw the possibility of authenticity in National Socialism and felt that it would let the true essence of the people emerge. Dasein has to become resolute in order to actualize this historical possibility.40

Dasein can either slip back into Dasman or become resolute. However, as we have discussed earlier, this resoluteness does not make Dasein solipsistic but rather makes him realize that its individual fate is inextricably linked with the destiny of its community. Dasein, therefore, becomes resolute by relating to the existence in an authentic manner. Although Heidegger differentiates between existential and existentiell aspects, he does not reduce resoluteness into some definite resolve. Therefore,

resoluteness remains like an empty rule, devoid of content. Heidegger does not prescribe what kinds of actions are resolute or irresolute. Hence, resoluteness remains at the formal level. In order to give existentiell form to this existential category, Dasein has to decide on the singularity of its historical situation.

This authentic Dasein can only relate to the community in an authentic way. However, Heidegger gives this existential interpretation a somewhat existentiell dimension by introducing the notion of Repetition. Repetition gives a particular direction to the resoluteness that it has to realize the possibilities, which have been there in the past. Although open to ethical interpretation, the notion of Repetition runs into trouble when we analyze it in the light of Heidegger’s sympathy for National Socialism. Heidegger, in many of his writings, has remained obsessed with German culture and hoped for the realization of the German essence. In his Rectoral Speech, he calls Nietzsche and not Edmund Husserl as the last German philosopher, which shows his narrow notion of Germany. Hence, it is difficult to assume that the notion of Repetition or destruction of tradition in Heidegger’s scheme would result in a more comprehensive approach. Heidegger’s ontology sought to find out the essence of man and culminates in the German man. It does not mean that Heidegger’s thoughts can be reduced to Nazi ideology and that he should be treated as a Nazi ideologue. Heidegger, in his thoughts and actions, remained distant from the crude Nazi ideology and its official biologism. However, his temptation to National Socialism is the failure of understanding it as the historical possibility which can fulfill the ‘spiritual mission’ of the Nation. Even after the debacle of Germany in Second World War, Heidegger retained his fondness for German poets and the exclusive greatness of German language. It seems that ‘thinking’ can take place only in the German or Greek language and via the German poets or Greek thinkers.

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41 Martin Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” 33.
42 In response to the question of whether he believes that Germans have a special task, he responds—“I am thinking of the special inner kinship between the German language and the language of the Greeks and their thought. This is something that the French confirm for me again and again today. When they begin to think, they speak German. They assure [me] that they do not succeed with their own language.” Martin Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel’s Interview with Martin Heidegger (1966),” trans. by Maria D. Alter and John Caputo, in The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, 91-116.
43 Alain Badiou criticizes Heidegger’s constant reference to the German poets like Trakl and Holderlin by calling it as poetic ontology, haunted by the loss of origin. See Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. by Oliver Feltham (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 10.
Concluding Remarks

To conclude the paper, we can say that the notion of Geschistlichkeit in Being and Time should be understood from the perspective of authenticity. Heidegger’s emphasis on authentic existence is basically the attempt to find the meaning of existence which remains forgotten in the everyday inauthentic life. Heidegger’s differentiation between the authentic and inauthentic level of existence is based on Dasein’s capacity to individuate itself from the everyday world of Dasman. According to Heidegger, the everyday world of Dasman reduces Dasein into the ‘nameless and faceless’ entity where everyone can replace anyone. However, this tranquil world of Dasman is broken by anxiety which individuates Dasein by jamming the comportment towards the entities. Only a ‘resolute’ Dasein, who is ready to face anxiety, can connect itself with the idea of ‘authentic historicality.’ The notion of ‘authentic historicality’ in Heidegger highlights the importance of the past in terms of living tradition, which affects humans. However, the idea of authentic historicality in Being and Time also shows that Heidegger’s thinking, despite its radical nature, remains captive to the nostalgia for the German nation and culture. Heidegger’s thoughts, while claiming to be formal, in some way or another still responds to the situation of Germany of that time. Heidegger’s notion of authentic historicality, therefore, could not be studied independently of its political implications, which are evident from the analysis of the concept of Repetition and Destiny in Being and Time. Heidegger’s analysis of ‘authentic historicality,’ therefore, presents before us a curious mixture of fundamental ontology and conservative politics.

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A Need for New Algebraic System of Logic Based on Al-Ghazali’s Reasoning

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Abstract: A qualitative nature of logic based on al-Ghazali’s teaching is reviewed. It is shown that its structure is not the same as the well-known two-valued logic which satisfies the well-known Boolean algebra. Unfortunately, it is this classical logic that has been adopted by those who discuss or use the nature of the al-Ghazali’s logic or reasoning ever since. The more appropriate logic for the al-Ghazali’s logic is the modal logic and hence the algebraic structure of this logic is reviewed. However, it is shown that even this logic, which was originally contributed substantially by Islamic scholars, in particular Ibn Sinna, and further improved by twentieth century Western scholars, is not yet fully suitable for the al-Ghazali’s logic. A new algebraic system of logic is still very much needed for characterizing the al-Ghazali’s reasoning.

Keywords: Al-Ghazali’s logical system, Islamic logic, algebra of logic, modal logic

Introduction

It is well known that al-Ghazali (who lived in the year 450 H-505 H/1057 AD-1111 AD), known in Latin as Algazel/Algazels, provides a new system of reasoning, which requires a Muslim not to uphold determinism in an absolute sense such that the principle of natural causality (al-sabab al-tabiaht) is no longer governed by certainty (due to a situation whereby, using al-Ghazali terminologies, the sunnaht or ‘adaht is subjected to taqdyr or dharuraht). This has been discussed by many especially after his well-known Tahafut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) and Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) by his intellectual nemesis, Ibn Rusyd (Averroes), and still attracted many recent scholars.1 There are more

1 See the following: B. Abrahamov, “Al-Ghazālī’s Theory of Causality,” in Studia Islamica, 67 (1969), 75-98; J. al-Haqq, “Al-Ghazālī on Causality, Induction, and Miracles,” in Al-
than 60 PhD theses (in English) on various aspects of al-Ghazali’s scholarship and at least six of them are directly on the al-Ghazali’s causality principle.\(^2\) The earliest is perhaps by Majid Fakhry in his 1949 PhD thesis (published in 1958). Al-Ghazali’s causality principle has also extended its application to the quantum domain as several scholars have argued strongly for the compatibility of the al-Ghazali’s causality principle with the indeterminism and uncertainty in quantum theory.\(^3\) In this paper, we show that this extension is untenable. However, the gist of al-Ghazali’s reasoning has already been accepted and practiced by most Muslims throughout the world by adopting the expression “insya Allah” (God willing) in every implicative statement.

As far as the claim that al-Ghazali’s reasoning is a new system of logic (formally different from the logic inherited from the Greek, the Aristotelian logic), it can be traced back to Rescher\(^1\) (1964, 1967, 2007), and the recognition of al-Ghazali’s sophisticated criticism on induction (qiyaṣ and istiqra’) in a way


very much similar to Hume, one of the celebrated British philosophers in the 18th century, is probably first discussed by Islamic Council of Europe (1982). However, many subsequent authors such as Spade and Hintikka, Nakamura, Fauzi, Mas, Black, Zaidi, al-Haqq, and many anonymous and undated authors in the internet have taken it for granted. More importantly, none of them provide an explicit algebra, which could be seen as actually different from the Boolean algebra or isomorphically to the naïve set algebra which represents the classical logic (Greek logic or the Aristotelian logic) and the classical modern-scientific logic, or a non-Boolean algebra such as the von Neumann algebra or its improvements (each of which represents supposedly a quantum logic, a non-classical modern-scientific logic). It is interesting to note that even al-Ghazali himself seems to be self-contradictory when one considers his opinion on the nature and role of logic during his time as already mentioned by Shaharir and detailed by Griffel, and El Bouazzati, particularly in believing, as understood by these authors, the neutrality and universality of the Greek logic. The nature of logic as understood, elaborated, and thought to be modified or extended by al-Ghazali and studied by those writers mentioned above has not been rigorously examined based on the algebraic structure of a system of logic. In this paper we show what aspects of the Boolean logic, the quantum logic and other algebras of logic, which are still incompatible with the al-Ghazali’s logic. Thus, it shows (more explicitly than previously shown by Shaharir)

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11 See Al-Haqq, “Al-Ghazālī on Causality, Induction, and Miracles.”
15 See Shaharir bin Mohamad Zain, “Keperluan teori kebarangkalian baru yang lebih serasi dengan sistem nilai sendiri,” in Prosiding Seminar Kebangsaan Sains Matematik Ke-15 -
the non-uniqueness and the non-neutrality of logic and, more importantly here, al-Ghazali’s logic is indeed a new paradigm of logic and needs for a new algebra.

The Incompatibility of the Classical Logic with al-Ghazali’s Reasoning

Even though the subject matters, the events, or the statements in al-Ghazali’s universal discourse of logic can be considered as well defined to a certain extent, their occurrences are subjected to some form of uncertainty. Therefore, the classical logic (the usual logic or the traditional Greek logic) is obviously not suitable for the al-Ghazali’s logic since all the statements in the former logic involve certainty. Typical statements (involving statements A, B, and C), which are of interest in any mathematical formulation of an algebra in a system of logic, are as follows:

1. A and B, symbolically $A \cap B$ or $A \land B$; and a statement which involves a countably infinite number of “and”, i.e., $(A_1 \text{ and } A_2 \text{ and } \ldots \text{ and } A_{\infty})$

   symbolically $\bigcap_{i=1}^{\infty} A_i$ or $\bigwedge_{i=1}^{\infty} A_i$

2. A or B, symbolically $A \land B$; and a statement which involves a countably infinite number of “or”, i.e., $(A_1 \text{ or } A_2 \text{ or } \ldots \text{ or } A_{\infty})$

   symbolically $\bigcup_{i=1}^{\infty} A_i$

   or $\bigvee_{i=1}^{\infty} A_i$

3. not A, symbolically $A^c$, C(A), Com(A), $\neg A$, or $\sim A$

4. (A and B) or C, symbolically $(A \cap B) \cup C$ or $(A \land B) \lor C$

5. (A or B) and C, symbolically $(A \cup B) \cap C$ or $(A \lor B) \land C$

6. If A then B, or A implies B; symbolically $A \rightarrow B$ or $A \implies B$

For the classical logic (normal logic, Greek logic or the Aristotelian logic) whose algebra is known as the Boolean algebra (after the inventor of the algebra, Boole in the 19th century), the statements using “and” and “or,” 1 and 2 above, are assumed to be commutative, namely:

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1’. “A and B” is surely/certainly/definitely/deterministically well-defined and surely/certainly/definitely/deterministically is equal to “B and A”,

2’. “A or B” is surely/certainly/definitely/deterministically well-defined and equal to “B or A”;

whereas statements using a combination of “and” and “or”, 4 and 5 above, are distributive, namely:

4’. “(A and B) or C” is surely/certainly/definitely/deterministically equal to “(A or C) and (A or C)”; and

5’. “(A or B) and C” is surely/certainly/definitely/deterministically equal to “(A and C) or (A and C).”

Perhaps more importantly, especially with reference to the al-Ghazali’s logic, as far as the classical logic is concerned, the implicative statement or causal statement, statement 6 above, is understood as a “strong then,” or “strong implication” which means “surely/certainly/definitely/deterministically then or implies” which in turn means a strong consequence or a strong cause-and-effect principle. In other words, statement 6 means:

6’. “B is surely/certainly/definitely/deterministically caused by A” or “B is surely/certainly/definitely/deterministically a consequence of A”, or “A necessarily causes B”.

Lastly, implicit in the negative statement, negation of a statement, namely statement 3 above, it is assumed that:

3’. A statement and its negation are mutually exclusive, i.e., there is a law known as the law of excluded middle. In other words, a statement can only either true or false and, thus, the relevant system of logic is also known as the two-valued logic in order to differentiate from other n-valued logic (n=3,4,…), which was first developed by Tarski in the 1930’s, infinite-valued logic in probability theory (rigourously established in the 1930’s), and the possibility theory (first formulated by Zadeh in the 1960’s).

Now, in al-Ghazali’s reasoning or argumentation such strong commutative, distributive, and consequential (causative) laws are not allowed. Thus, the classical logic and its algebra (the Boolean algebra) briefly described above are inappropriate and not applicable to the al-Ghazali’s logic. But it seems that al-Ghazali and especially his followers until today still
accept the Aristotelian logic (and its algebra) without any sign of serious reservation except perhaps with a slight modification to a statement involved by adding the word “*insya Allah*” (God willing) instead of surely, certainly, definitely, or deterministically. In fact, more than a century ago, Homes already had an opinion that al-Ghazali himself had tried to reconcile his faith in Islam with the classical (the Greek/Aristotelian logic) through his other well-known writing, *al-Kimya al-Sa’adaht* (The Alchemy of Happiness). How proper is this attitude? Is it mathematically valid? The problem is of course the modeling of “*insya Allah*.” For a start, one would incline to interpret “*insya Allah*” as possible or probable (perhaps the most common translation to the original al-Ghazali’s word, *mumkin*), which means presumably to include that of “possible” in the possibility theory (based on the fuzzy statements by Zadeh in the 1960’s) and that “probable” in the classical probability theory (based on the Boolean algebra rigorously formulated by Kolmogorov in the 1930’s although the relevant probability concept was first introduced by Galileo in the 17th century) and for some even naively to include that of “probable” in the quantum probability (in atomic physics as formulated by Schroedinger in the 1920’s). However, it is well known that (since the early twentieth century) the Aristotelian logic is no longer valid the moment that the word “possible” is brought into the realm of the Aristotelian logic. In fact, there is a new logic known as the modal logic, which has been developed to replace it. Still another model for “*insya Allah*” is perhaps the expression “not necessary” because it is said that al-Ghazali rejects “the principle of necessary causal connection” in the Aristotelian logic and that al-Ghazali also used the terms *dharuraht* (improperly translated as ‘necessity’) and ‘*aadaht*’ (habit) in describing his theory of natural causality, whereas others may prefer the term “contingent” as a better translation for *mumkin*. As far as the “probable” in the sense of a quantum mechanical statement is concerned, the situation is even worse since it is also well known that some quantum statements actually do not satisfy the Boolean algebra, in particular statements involving “and” and “or”. Hence, statement 4 and 5 above, do not satisfy the Boolean distributive laws (statement 4’ and 5’ above) at all. So for the moment let us exclude the quantum mechanical statements.

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17 See Mas, “Quiyas: A Study in Islamic Logic.”
18 See Rayan, “Al-Ghazâlî’s Use of the Terms Ḍārûrah and ‘Âdah in His Theory of Natural Causality.”

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Let us examine the gist of the modal logic\(^{20}\) in order to see its inappropriateness to the algebraic structure of the al-Ghazali’s reasoning for the classical statements (the non-quantal mechanical statements), which was first developed axiomatically by Lewis in 1913 but only became an acceptable system of logic in the 1940’s, especially after the work of Kripke.

**The Incompatibility of the Modal Logic with al-Ghazali’s Reasoning**

Modal logic is the study of the deductive behavior of the expressions ‘it is necessary that’ and ‘it is possible that’ and ‘it is probable that.’ Aristotle put some thought on the logical nature of these statements and came to the conclusion that “possible is neither necessary nor impossible” and brought into his syllogism (known as modal syllogism) with some light into it but proved to be impractical even after Theophrastus (after Aristotle, i.e., the end of the third century BC) changed the meaning of “probable” into simply “not impossible” so that Aristotle’s modal syllogism becomes simpler. Muslim scholars during the Islamic Civilization, especially Ibn Sina, have substantially contributed to the improvement of the Aristotelian modal logic as it can be seen in one of his monumental works, *al-Isyarat wa al-Tanbihdaht*, which was translated by Inati.\(^{21}\) Obviously, the modal logic formulated by Ibn Sina was not fully understood by others during or even long after his time, partly due to its incompleteness and partly due to his contradictory conviction in his own theory in relation to his belief on the certainty of the laws of nature. It is not known when the first Western scholars (and who they were) realized that the Greek modal syllogism is of no use, but since Lukasiewicz (a logician, died in 1956), it has been a common knowledge that Aristotle’s modal syllogism is “incomprehensible due to its many faults and inconsistencies, and that there is no hope of finding a single consistent formal model for it.”\(^{22}\) Obviously, they do not know the work of Ibn Sina mentioned above, or they simply unjustly ignored it. This is another matter, which we do not intend to discuss here. Meanwhile, al-Ghazali must have had


rigorously challenged the Greek modal syllogism with his new theory of natural causality mentioned above. But however intense the concern of Muslim scholars were with regard to the modal statements, hence, Arabic grammar and logic, it looks as though the Muslims scholars were somehow just happy to use the Greek logic simply with some reservations. The world had to wait until early twentieth century before new axiomatic modal logic emerged from the Western logicians who were apparently not challenged by the al-Ghazali’s logic at all but simply reacted towards the state of the (Western) mathematical logic itself which has many unsolved paradoxes in particular “the problem of false premises imply many correct implications.” With the new modal logic, a partial solution to this problem has been obtained. However, in the present modal logic, the possibility and probability modalities are regarded as of the same status even though linguistically there is a subtle difference between the two terms and indeed different mathematical models have been established for them (“possibility” is for a fuzzy statement which is not an element of a Boolean algebra, whereas “probability” is for a crisp statement or classical/Aristotelian statement which is an element of a Boolean algebra).

Normally in modal logic, only two operators are introduced:

\[ \Box \quad \text{for Necessarily and } \Diamond \quad \text{for Possibly.} \]
Thus the expression “necessarily \( p \)” or “it is necessary \( p \)” is denoted by a prefixed “box” (\( \Box p \)); whereas a prefixed “diamond” (\( \Diamond p \)) denotes “possibly \( p \)” or “it is possible \( p \).”

Further, it is assumed that:

“necessarily” is the same as the expression “not possible that not”
“possibly” is the same as the expression “not necessarily not”; or symbolically

\[ \Box p \text{ is equivalent to } \neg \Diamond \neg p \]
\[ \Diamond p \text{ is equivalent to } \neg \Box \neg p \]

This is known as the Axiom 0 in the modal logic. This is obtained from presumably a logical conclusion such as “It is possible that it will be an accident today if and only if it is not necessary that it will not be an accident today”. This axiom is also often stated in the following ways:

necessary is equivalent to not possibly false; and

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23 See Gyekye, “Al-Ghazali on Causation.”
possible is equivalent to not necessarily false (regardless of whether it is actually true or actually false); or (reading the axiom from right to left and replacing “not p” by X)

“It is not possible that X” is logically equivalent to “It is necessary that not X”; and “It is not necessary that X” is logically equivalent to “It is possible that not X.”

Then it is found that several other axioms are needed to obtain a reasonably good system of modal logic, now known as the normal modal logic, such that one can prove that “If a statement is necessary that the statement is true”; “If a statement is necessary, then it is necessary that the statement is necessary”; and “If a statement is possible, then it is necessary that the statement is possible”. This modal logic gives the nature of “possible”, “necessary”, and “contingent” as follows:

contingent is equivalent to not necessarily false and not necessarily true (i.e., possible but not necessarily true). The words “possible” and “contingent” are considered as the two sorts of truth. The normal modal logic also gives the following important theorems:

T1.1. The necessity of A and the necessity of B are strongly equivalent to the necessity of A and B, or symbolically

\[(\Box A \land \Box B) \leftrightarrow \Box (A \land B).\]

T1.2. The possibility of A or the possibility of B is strongly equivalent to the possibility of A or B, or symbolically

\[(\Diamond A) \lor (\Diamond B) \leftrightarrow \Diamond (A \lor B).\]

T2.1. If A strongly implies B, then the necessity of A strongly implies the necessity of B and the possibility of A strongly implies the possibility of B, or symbolically

\[(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Box A \rightarrow \Box B)\text{ and } (\Diamond A \rightarrow \Diamond B).\]

T2.2. If the necessity of A strongly implies B, then the possibility of A strongly implies the possibility of B, or symbolically

\[(\Box A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Diamond A \rightarrow \Diamond B).\]

T2.3. If the possibility of A strongly implies B, then the necessity of A strongly implies the necessity of B, or symbolically

\[(\Diamond A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Box A \rightarrow \Box B).\]
T3. It is not true that the necessity of A or B strongly implies the necessity of A or the necessity of B; and the possibility of A and the possibility of B strongly imply the possibility of A and B. Symbolically, these statements are as follows:

\[ \Box(A \lor B) \rightarrow (\Box A \lor \Box B), \text{ and} \]
\[ (\Diamond A \land \Diamond B) \rightarrow \Diamond(A \land B), \text{ where } \rightarrow \text{ denotes “not strongly-implies.”} \]

Now, it is clear that, as far as the algebraic structure of a known modal logic is concerned, it is NOT just a Boolean algebra augmented with the “modal algebra” of the “box” and the “diamond.” For example, even though necessary statements are commutative with respect to (w.r.t) “and” (Theorem T1.1) but not w.r.t. “or” (Theorem T3); whereas possible statements are commutative w.r.t “or” (theorem T1.2) but not w.r.t “and” (Theorem T3). Similarly, with the “not necessary statements,” they are only commutative w.r.t. “and” (by T1.1 and T3). Of course, the distributive laws in modal logic are invalid as well. Contingent statements are also noncommutative. The modal logic is a 3-valued logic because there is another state, the “contingent state,” other than possible and necessary.

The non-Boolean nature of the present modal logic is unsatisfactory especially since it is inconceivable to have the following with regard to the possible, not necessary, or contingent as a model of insya Allah:

\[ (\text{insya Allah }A) \text{ and/or } (\text{insya Allah }B) \neq (\text{insya Allah }B) \text{ and/or } (\text{insya Allah }A) \]

Many algebraists are happy to define a modal algebra as a Boolean algebra of ordinary naïve sets with an operator “necessary” which preserves “and” or also Boolean w.r.t “and” for “set of necessary sets of statements.” But it does not solve our problem of identifying a correct modal algebra for al-Ghazali’s logic.

More importantly, of course, we would like to have the “strict implication” or “strong implication” to be replaced by the “insya Allah implication” which the author was hoping to model by “possible” or “not necessary,” viz. “possible implication” or “not necessary implication.” However, none such statement is found in the present modal logic. The nearest statement in the modal logic in this regard is an implicative statement of the form given by “a possible statement strictly implies another possible statement” such as in the theorem T2 above. This is, of course, not sufficiently satisfactory.
Conclusion

Based on the discussion above, it is necessary to examine the exact meaning of mumkin (the Islamic possibility), dharuraht (the Islamic necessity), taqdyr (the Islamic fate), and insya Allah (the Islamic will of God) so that a new axiomatic modal logic could be formulated to improve or even replace the present algebraic structure which would be most suited for al-Ghazali’s logic. With regard to mumkin, there is an interesting Malay manuscript MS1659 (according to the code of the manuscript by Malaysian National Library, elaborated in the References under the subheading Manuscript) believed to be written by a well-known Malayonesian scholar in the 17th century ‘Abd al-Ra’uf Singkel, entitled Mutiara yang Putih (White Pearl), on page 137-146, in which the four types of mumkins namely mumkin mawjud, mumkin wajidwu anqadhy, mumkin sayyuwajid, and mumkin innahu lam yuwajid are introduced and explained. This manuscript, among other means, is perhaps relevant for obtaining some ideas towards solving this problem, namely, the problem of modelling the logical structure of insya Allah using mumkin.

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‘No theme requires more pure logic than love”: On Badiou’s Amorous Axiomatics

Jeremy De Chavez

Abstract: In thinking the relation of love and affect, one experiences a strong intuition that they are locked in a passionate mutual embrace, and that they carry out their clandestine coupling in the dark alleys of the ineffable. The work of Alain Badiou, however, challenges such an “anti-philosophical” position, and posits that the truly philosophical way to approach love is through logic. In this essay I offer a timely explication of Badiou’s thoughts on love, which is occasioned by the recent challenge posed by critical discourse to rethink love and is animated by the conviction that such a rethinking entails locating love in the domain of thought rather than in a domain beyond cognition and representation. At a time when love is threatened by accusations of being nothing more than a “cruel optimism,” Badiou’s thought is a philosophical defense of love by underscoring its kinship to thought and to truth.

Keywords: Badiou, love, affect, event

The Effect of that woman on me was as unpleasant as a displaced irrational number that has accidentally crept into an equation.
—Yevgeny Zamyatin, We

The concept of love has always been somewhat of an embarrassment for Philosophy because it has displayed a persistent obliviousness to demands for an account of itself. Whereas love is friendly to the poet, the priest, and even the psychoanalyst, it has offered only mute resistance to the cold interrogations of Philosophical inquiry. Indeed, one may observe that when some philosophers speak of love they seem afflicted with the very symptoms found so often in the love-struck: tongue-tied, confused, cryptic. Regarding this poverty in the thinking of love, Jean-Luc Nancy observes that “the impossibility of speaking about love” has already been “violently

recognized.”

Indeed, the universal consensus seems to be that love resides in the domain beyond the thinkable, the “experience par excellence of a vague ineffable intensity or confusion.” In refusing concession to that consensus, we must ask: What is the relationship of love to thought?

As a way to initiate this discussion, let us turn to the film *The Mirror has Two Faces* (1996), an academic love story that appears to suggest that if academics pattern their love lives after their professional lives it could only lead to bland and disengaged coupling; that is, the life of the mind is diametrically opposed to a life of amorous intensity. The film is about ugly duckling Romantic Literature professor Rose Morgan (played by Barbra Streisand) who, because she is convinced that she does not deserve the kind of passionate love that she professes in her classes, hesitantly agrees to a painfully rigid Platonic marriage with Mathematics professor Gregory Larkin (played by Jeff Bridges). Allowing his profession to structure his personal life, Gregory insists on a relationship that subtracts the unpredictable madness that seems to always accompany the stirring of passions. It was only till Rose loved herself enough to demand only pure and unfiltered passionate love that advocate of risk-free love Gregory was transformed into a tweed jacket wearing Romeo. In the end, as conventional love narratives go, they supposedly lived happily ever after.

One is inclined to expect a profound lesson from *The Mirror has Two Faces*—it is, after all, an academic love story; however, the film offers a rather banal one: that knowledge is the hurdle lovers have to surmount to achieve genuine amorous bliss. It is instructive to add that the tension between love and knowledge stands in stark contrast to the rapport between love and stupidity. Stupidity, writes Avital Ronell, is “linked to the most dangerous failures of human endeavors”; yet, the only moment when the prohibitions on stupidity are lifted is when one is in love, a moment in fact when stupidity “sparkles with life.”

This essay is an attempt to rethink the fraught relationship of love and knowledge by offering a timely explication of Alain Badiou’s thoughts on love. This discourse on love is occasioned by the recent challenge posed by critical theory to rethink love and is animated by the conviction that such a rethinking entails locating love in the domain of thought rather than in a domain beyond cognition and representation. At a time when love is

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3 Peter Hallward, *Badiou: A Subject to Truth* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 185.

4 *The Mirror has Two Faces*, directed by Barbra Streisand (1996; NY: Sony Pictures, 1998), DVD.

threatened by accusations of being nothing more than a cruel optimism, Badiou’s project offers a philosophical defense of love by underscoring its kinship to thought and therefore to truth. It is important to mention, however, that Badiou also redefines truth as a process generated by events that occur within a situation. Further, events, as far as Badiou is concerned, occur only in four fields: science, art, politics, and love. In this essay, I begin by outlining the general trajectory of Badiou’s philosophy while highlighting and unpacking several crucial terms that are necessary for my explication of Badiou’s amorous axiomatics.

Standard among critical expositions of Badiou’s work is the inclusion of a tedious discussion of Mathematics, Set Theory in particular (which in turn is often accompanied by some kind of apologetic gesture by the explicator for his/her lack of expertise in Mathematics!). However, I shall proceed with the rather audacious claim that most of Badiou’s ideas, even the central ones, may be sufficiently explained with minimal reference to mathematical theory. This gesture follows Alex Callinicos who claims that Badiou’s “main philosophical claims can be stated and assessed without a deep immersion in mathematical logic.” But why does Badiou use mathematics as the privileged language of ontology in the first place? For Badiou, “[Mathematics] pronounces what is expressible in being qua being” for its transpositionality is able to describe the “general situation of all conceivable situations, regardless of their particular contexts or contents.” Following the (sincere) gesture of humility of some of Badiou’s explicators, I have to confess my discomfort (alarmingly close to being a phobia) with the mathematics. However, if I may hazard an observation, another reason why I think mathematics works well for Badiou is because its structure and logic functions as a wonderful counterpoint to the unsystematically creative and productively chaotic nature of the event. Although one could use mathematics to formally describe the conditions of an event (i.e. love requires a Two that is not a One plus a One but a One and another One), the evental appearance of love itself cannot be measured (i.e. it is meaningless to ask “How much love weighs?” or “What is the size of love?”). Putting math aside

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6 Regarding those four fields, Badiou’s foremost explicator Peter Hallward writes: “Because they mark out the possible instances of the subject as variously individual or collective ... Love affects only ‘the individuals concerned …, and it is thus for them [alone that the one-truth produced by their love is an indiscernible part of their existence. ’Politics, on the other hand, concerns only the collective dimension … ’And in ‘mixed situations’—situations with an individual vehicle but a collective import—art and science qualify as generic to the degree that they effect a pure invention or discovery beyond the mere transmission of knowledges (L’Etre et l’Evénement, 374 [Cited by Hallward]).” See Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth, 181.

7 Alex Callinicos, Resources of Critique (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006), 96.

8 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. by Oliver Feltham (NY: Continuum, 2005), 87.

9 Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth, 57.
(not to disregard but to occasionally refer to), let me begin my explication of Badiou’s ontology.

**On Alain Badiou**

Many commentators have conferred the title of “Most Important Living French Philosopher” to Alain Badiou. Indeed, the ability of his thought to intervene in questions crucial to both the Analytic and Continental Philosophical traditions displays its generative and enabling power. Yet, at the core of Badiou’s philosophy is a straightforward directive: return to Truth. It could be said that the idea that a subject’s ethico-political duty is to sustain fidelity to the Truth does not seem strikingly radical or particularly original. Does not Badiou’s position simply echo, albeit within the context of advanced capitalism, the Platonic commitment to the Ideal? Even the conceptual contours of his “philosophy of the event” bear an uncanny structural similarity to Walter Benjamin’s “Theses” (where revolution comes to being not as the conclusion of the logical unfolding of history but as a “catastrophe”, a “Messianic cessation of happening”), to Lacan’s concept of the Real (which occasionally punctures socio-symbolic reality, disrupting its fluid signifying operations), and even to Levinas’s concept of the ethical call of the other (which takes the subject as hostage and binds the subject to a pre-ontological ethical relationship with an absolute alterity that is the other).

It could be argued that part of Badiou’s appeal is the well-timed appearance of his thought: his ideas are attractively polemical in a time when dominant persuasions of thought seem restrictive rather than enabling of praxis. Badiou is openly hostile to the dominant orientations in contemporary Theory as well as to the apparently global consensus on matters such as human rights and respect for cultural differences. He positions his work against the three main orientations of contemporary philosophy; that is, Hermeneutic, Poststructuralist/ Postmodern/ Deconstructionist, and

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11 Badiou openly expresses his fidelity to Plato. He identifies three things in Plato that directly interest him: (1) Plato’s belief that “philosophy begins thinking not in relation to itself but in relation to another discipline (art, mathematics, etc.); (2) the Platonic commitment to the Ideal and the True; and (3) Plato’s belief (according to Badiou) that the operation of truth is one of immanence rather than transcendence. See Alain Badiou, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil* (London: Verso, 2001). See also Hallward, *Badiou: A Subject to Truth*.


13 For a brief survey and critical discussion of the “philosophy of the Event” see Callinicos, *Resources of Critique*.
Analytic/Epistemological. For Badiou, those orientations of thought share two malevolent characteristics: (1) “the theme of an end, of drawing to a close” (“end of metaphysics”, “end of grand narratives”) and (2) the elevation of language as the site of philosophical thought. Consequently, this leads to a profound suspicion of the idea of truth: the former announces the end of truth; the latter shifts the focus to the questions of meaning rather than the “classical question of truth.” Badiou insists, “language is not the absolute horizon of thought.” He further posits that the emerging moral vocabulary developed within what he calls “ethical ideology” (a way of thinking about relations to the other that is grounded in a “(vaguely) Kantian” universalism and a “(vaguely) Levinasian” respect for difference) is politically unproductive and intrinsically conservative. He believes that Ethics has come to replace (radical) politics: an essentially passive and non-intrusive culture of respect for the other has become preferred over militant activism. He passionately argues that this “ethics of difference,” what he mockingly calls “good old-fashioned tolerance,” has “neither force nor truth.” Ethics, whether “consensual representation of Evil or as concern for the other,” is a form of “resignation in the face of necessity” and “should be designated as nihilism.” Indeed, given the shape of the contemporary world, one cannot help but feel sympathetic to Badiou’s intuition that the now dominant moral ideological formation cloaks a fundamental political impotence.

### Ontology: Truth, Situation, Event, Subject

But if truth cannot be established via linguistic propositions, how is it to be encountered? Contrary to standard poststructuralist theory (and Christianity) that mark the Beginning with the Word, for Badiou, in the beginning there is only the inconsistent pure multiple. There is no structure in the pure multiple; it is not an assemblage of objects because there is yet no concept of “One”—the process of counting has yet to be initiated. And, as pure multiplicity, it has no other predicate but its own multiplicity, founded on nothing (a void) rather than on a “One.” This is because, as Slavoj Žižek points out, the pure multiple is not a collection of Ones since “to have One the pure multiple must

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14 Alain Badiou, “Philosophy and Desire,” in Infinite Thought, trans. by Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens (NY: Continuum, 2005), 34.
15 Ibid., 35.
16 Ibid., 37.
17 See Peter Hallward, Introduction to Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil.
19 Ibid., 30.
20 Badiou refers to this operation as the count-as-one.
already be “counted as One.” It can thus only appear as nothing, a void: “nothing is the name of Being prior to its symbolization.” The purely multiple is thus untouched by any process of unification.

For something to be, that is, for something to exist as an object in (socio-symbolic) reality, it has to be counted as part of what Badiou calls a “situation,” counted as an element of a set, for “all presentation is under the law of the count.” For Badiou, a situation is “… a presentation of multiples counted-as-one and brought to the form of a unity.” The situation is thus a “structured presentation” of the indifferent multiplicity. Being emerges when pure multiplicity has undergone the operation of the “count-as-one” and is thus made accessible to knowledge via categorization/grouping based on its properties, characteristics, and so on. Only elements of the situation are accessible to knowledge because for Badiou “all thought supposes a situation of the thinkable … a structure, a counting for one, whereby the presented multiple is consistent, numerable.”

The relationship of “nothing” or the “void,” which is the predicate of purely inconsistent multiplicity, to the situation is a rather special one, relative to the other elements of the situation. Although the void “belongs” to the situation it is not presented as one of its elements; it is present but not presented and consequently not represented. It is what Badiou refers to as the “phantom remainder,” and is that which wanders in the situation in the form of a subtraction of the count. But this “phantom remainder” is not merely an indifferent collection of elements passively waiting to be subjected to the structuring operation of the situation. The void, as conceived within Badiou’s “subtractive ontology” is the negative identity of the situation, and “every situation is founded on the void”; it is “what is not there, but what is necessary for anything to be there.” Badiou’s use of the term “phantom remainder” does not only describe the uncanny spectral existence of the void in the situation—the void being “the non-place of every place,” that is “neither local nor global, but scattered everywhere, in no place and in every place.” The term also calls attention to the way that the non-countable void perpetually haunts the situation, challenging the regime of structured presentation. Badiou writes:

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21 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Center of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999), 129.
22 Badiou, Being and Event, 52.
24 Badiou, Being and Event, 34.
25 Ibid., 53.
26 Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens, Introduction to Infinite Thought, 16.
27 Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth, 102.
All multiple presentation is exposed to the danger of the void ... It is necessary to prohibit that catastrophe of presentation which would be [the situation’s] encounter with its own void, the presentational occurrence of inconsistency as such, or the ruin of the One.\textsuperscript{28}

Because the void exceeds the law of the count in the Situation there is nothing that prevents it from threatening the consistency of presentation (the Situation’s “self-evident” Oneness). The Situation cannot depend on its own structure or the count-as-one to ensure consistency because the very operation of the count-as-one is subtracted from presentation, for “a structure exhausts itself in its effect, which is that there is oneness.”\textsuperscript{29}

Thus, to prevent the “ruin of the One,” the “catastrophe of presentation,” a structuring of the structure is required.\textsuperscript{30} “It is necessary that the structure be structured.”\textsuperscript{31} Badiou calls this second structuring principle the “State of the situation.” The State is the second order of presentation—that is, representation, and is defined by Badiou as “the “operation which, within the situation, codifies its parts and subsets.”\textsuperscript{32} It is what “discerns, names, classifies, and orders the parts of a situation.”\textsuperscript{33} Those two levels of structuring—the situation (presented multiplicity) and the State of the situation (codified/classified/ordered re-presented multiplicity)—are clearly illustrated in an example Badiou uses in \textit{Being and Event}:

\begin{quote}
[A] family of people is a presented multiple of the social situation (in the sense that they live together in the same apartment or go on holiday together, etc.), and it is also a represented multiple, a part, in the sense that each of its members is registered by the registry office, possesses French nationality, and so on. If, however, one of the members of the family, physically tied to it, is not registered and remains clandestine, and due to this fact never goes out alone, or only in disguise, and so on, it can be said that this family despite being presented is not represented.\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{28} Badiou, \textit{Being and Event}, 93.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid.}, 95.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}, 94.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, 93.
\textsuperscript{32} Alain Badiou, \textit{Metapolitics}, trans. by Jason Barker (London and NY: Verso, 2005), 143.
\textsuperscript{33} Hallward, \textit{Badiou: A Subject to Truth}, 96.
\textsuperscript{34} Badiou, \textit{Being and Event}, 174.
\end{footnotes}
Suffice it to say the State is to be distinguished from the original structure of the situation; however, what the State represents as “consistent multiples” is composed only of what the situation presents. Presentation is “on the side of the situation”; Representation is “on the side of the State of the situation.”

Being for Badiou is this ontological order structured by the situation and the State. It is what is present, could be represented in our horizon of consciousness, and is accessible to knowledge. But if all that is available to consciousness is made possible only by the structuring operation of the situation and the State, how can something authentically new emerge? How is innovation possible? The new cannot emerge from any of the elements of the situation since it is regulated by the structuring power of the State. At best, the State can only represent something as new. The authentically new has to emerge from beyond the sovereign domain of the State and the structured multiple of the situation, from a place of non-Being; that is, the void of the situation. However, if the void is precisely that which is subtracted from presentation, how can its “presence” be made palpable within a situation? How can its traces be made discernible at the level of presentation?

As discussed above, the first level of structuring in the situation (presentation) is always in danger of irruption of the void (hence the need for the second structuring principle that is the State). The void can thus be localized at the level of presentation through “abnormal multiples,” which are “points of subtraction from the State’s re-securing of the count,” located on the “edge of the void.” Badiou designates these abnormal multiples as “evental sites.” Evental sites are conditions for the localization of what Badiou calls “events” in a situation. An event is “that-which-is-not-being”; it is an encounter with “the void of the situation ... [and] has absolutely no interest in preserving the status quo as such.” The event occurs beyond the domain of established knowledge, thus there is no way to predict where and when an event will take place. It is an “emergence of the New which cannot be reduced to its causes and conditions.” Since the event has not been subjected to any “Law of Count” it is, by definition, multiple, but a multiplicity that counts as nothing within its Situation. “[I]t is not, as such, presented, nor is it presentable. It is—not being—supernumerary.” That is, it belongs to “that-which-is-not-being-qua-being.” Because it is not

35 Ibid., 103.
36 Ibid., 174-175.
37 Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth, 114.
38 Ibid., 386.
39 Badiou, Being and Event, 178.
40 Ibid., 189.
discernible in the Situation, the existence of an Event cannot be proven but can only be asserted by a human being who by the very act of fidelity to an Event becomes subjectivized by it. At this point the skeptic may wonder how subjectivization differs from the “count-as-one.” Does not subjectivization grant a singular identity to a human being by defining his or her subjecthood solely as an attachment to an Event? Nevertheless, whether axiomatic or arbitrary, Badiou posits that subjectivization “counts whatever is faithfully connected to the name of the Event.”

To an outsider—that is, those not directly a witness to a specific Event—Badiou’s subject would appear to be a rebel without a cause. The Event simply cannot be seen from the vantage point of a Third position, for “[s]ubjectivization takes place in the form of a Two.” He or she may be able to identify a subject’s act of fidelity to an Event, which is the attempt to give the Event a socio-symbolic existence, but the Event itself, since it belongs to “that-which-is-not-being-qua-being” will remain indiscernible. What the outsider sees, and consequently does not recognize, is Truth itself, which in Badiou’s ontology is defined as the “real process of a fidelity to an Event: that which this fidelity produces in the Situation.” In other words, the outsider cannot integrate what he or she sees in his ways of knowing because what he or she is witnessing is the “new” and not some familiar object simply recast in new ways by reigning systems of knowledge. This is not to suggest, however, that the subject fully assumes the full force of a Truth, but at best only its trace, an “approximative truth.” The subject is only a local configuration; the Truth, however, is universal: “A subject, which realizes a truth, is nevertheless incommensurable with the latter, because the subject is finite, and truth is infinite.”

**Amorous Axiomatics: Love as Truth-Procedure**

The ostensibly normal state of things then is one of repetition and regulation, and in fact, it is those regulative procedures of a situation that creates the appearance of normality. Systems of ideas that dominate in a specific situation—what Badiou designates as “encyclopedias”—will only allow the circulation of self-confirming ideas. This means that a situation will not from its own resources produce something genuinely new, for it will compromise the very order that it seeks to regulate. Thus, an event is

41 Ibid., 393.
42 Ibid., 393.
44 Badiou, *Being and Event*, 397.
45 Ibid., 396.
necessary to usher in the new, and force the components of the situation to come to terms with this radical contingency. Love— which is one of the truth-procedures along with Science, Art, and Politics—is one such instance of the event. Love manufactures its own situation that Badiou calls the “scene of two,” which is composed of a One and another One, an immanent Two. It is important to distinguish the Two from the couple. Whereas the immanent Two retain their disjunction the couple is a phenomenal appearance visible to a third position that counts the Two as One. The Two is not the sum of ‘one’ and ‘one’ but rather is an immanent Two, which suggests that “there is one position and another position … totally disjunct from the other.” Love as a process occurs as a matter of pure contingency when the life of one human being randomly intersects with another, a process that transforms both into Subjects (to truth)—that is, as authentic agents with the potential for action that is not limited nor manipulated by larger structures of power and knowledge. It opens up possibilities for the amorous subjects to see the world anew, from the perspective of the Two instead of from the One. Badiou poetically writes:

When I lean on the shoulder of the woman I love, and can see, let’s say, the peace of twilight over a mountain landscape, gold-green fields, the shadow of trees, black-nosed sheep motionless behind hedges and the sun about to disappear behind craggy peaks, and know—not from the expression of her face, but from within the world as it is—that the woman I love is seeing the same world, and that this convergence is part of the world and that love constitutes precisely, at that very moment, the paradox of an identical difference, then love exists, and promises to continue to exist. The fact is she and I are now incorporated into this unique Subject, the Subject of love that views that panorama of the world through the prism of our difference, so this world can be conceived, be born, and not simply represent what fills my own individual gaze.

It is crucial to highlight the ancillary comment “not from the expression of her face, but from within the world”. Badiou suggests that we should resist the temptation of thinking about love through a Levinasian

Rather, love should be conceived as an “experience of the world, or of the situation, under the post-evental condition that there were Two.”

Badiou develops his philosophy of love by beginning with an enumeration of nonnegotiable rejections. In particular, he rejects “the fusional conception of love” (for love cannot be a procedure that suppresses the multiple in favor of a One), “the ablative concept of love” (for love is not an experience of the Other but an experience of the world/situation), and “the superstructural or illusory conception of love” (for love is not just an ornament to make smooth the clumsy procedure of sexual relations). The conceptual origins of the first two definitions could be traced back to Romantic theories of love, while the third definition echoes Schopenhauer’s philosophy that conceives of love as something manufactured by nature’s will-to-live. For Badiou, love is a “procedure that makes truth out of the disjunction of sexuated positions.” The aforementioned definitions of love sacrifice the production of truth in favor of the rule of the One: the “fusional” conception of love seeks to make a One out of Two; the “ablative,” though attempting to produce an authentic knowledge of the Other, is only able to apprehend the Other as an object (objet a) within the coordinates of the subject’s own fantasy (and thus is also caught in the logic of the One); and the “illusory,” makes love a mere pawn in sexuality’s regime.

Badiou arrives at this unique understanding of love though a highly formal process, an axiomatics of love, formulated on the basis of nothing but an “essential conviction.” He elaborates on his account of love by demonstrating the logical connection among those axioms. Badiou, after all, insists that “No theme requires more pure logic than that of love.” The four axioms are the following: (1) “There are two positions of the experience of love” (Man and Woman); (2) “The two positions are totally disjunct”; (3) “There is no third position”; and (4) “There is only one humanity.” Those two positions that Badiou identifies in his first axiom are purely symbolic and have no biological, empirical, and social basis, but are so termed depending on the subject’s relation to the phallic signifier (of wanting to have or to be the phallus). It is instructive to point out that there is a clear homology between Badiou’s “axioms” and Lacan’s theories on the relation (or lack thereof) of the two sexualized positions.

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50 That is, as an ethical relation initiated by the phenomenological encounter with the face that binds the subject to a pre-ontological and infinite responsibility to the other.
51 Badiou, Conditions, 187.
52 Ibid., 181.
53 Badiou, Infinite Thought, 124.
54 Badiou, Conditions, 182.
55 Ibid., 183.
56 Ibid., 183.
57 It is instructive to point out that there is a clear homology between Badiou’s “axioms” and Lacan’s theories on the relation (or lack thereof) of the two sexualized positions.
experience, and no real connection between the two positions can be successfully established.\footnote{58} However, although Badiou accepts the Lacanian thesis that the two positions are absolutely disjunct, he rejects the conventional reading of Lacan when it comes to the role of love in addressing the disjunction. Numerous Lacanian commentators have interpreted Lacan’s famous “Love is that which comes to supplement for the lack of a real connection” to mean that love is merely this illusion that functions to make amorous subjects misrecognize their fundamental non-connection. Badiou unpacks Lacan’s formula by first interrogating the function of the supplement. By referring to love as a “supplement” Badiou is underscoring his claim that love is not something that belongs to a situation, but something that comes from “outside” it; it is not an element recognized as belonging to a preexisting structure. This properly foreign element opens up possibilities for the amorous subjects of seeing the world anew, from the perspective of the Two instead of from the One. He further argues that if one accepts the thesis that the two sexualized positions are separated by a non-rapport then this non-rapport cannot be written, and if it cannot be written, “if it is non-existent as an effect of a structure,” it follows that “love itself as supplement can only arrive by chance.”\footnote{59} This absolute contingency is crucial in Badiou’s project to re-think “love” as a truth-procedure. Love, therefore, is not a relation (in fact, it is born precisely at the point of non-relation); it is a process that is “the advent of the Two as such, the scene of Two.” Love is the “hypothetical operator” of the accidental collision of two trajectories that is the “event-encounter.”\footnote{60}

Badiou’s third axiom deals with the appearance of the disjunction within situations, what could be called the “announcement of the disjunction.”\footnote{61} The axiom “There is no third position” suggests that love as a disjunction cannot be witnessed from a situation outside the “scene of two” that love constructs. But from which vantage point then could the amorous truth-event be witnessed? Further, how can love be inscribed in a situation as a “Scene of Two” if no position is available from which love can be witnessed? This is where the notion of the amorous declaration comes into play. Within Badiou’s vocabulary this declaration of love is designated as “naming.”\footnote{62} And in this gesture of amorous nomination, the truth of the love-event necessarily

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Lacanian psychoanalytic theory similarly claims that there are two sexualized positions designated as “Man” and “Woman.”

\footnote{58} This is because the Symbolic Order and the Imaginary always mediate sexual relations; thus, subjects cannot transcend the limitations defined by their respective fantasies. Suffice it to recall Lacan’s famous pronouncement: “There is no sexual relation.”

\footnote{59} Badiou, “The Scene of Two.”

\footnote{60} Badiou, \textit{Conditions}, 188.

\footnote{61} \textit{Ibid.}, 184.

\footnote{62} \textit{Ibid.}, 188.
marks itself onto the bodies of the subjects of love, and thus makes itself legible within a socio-symbolic system. Badiou writes, “A Two that proceeds amorously is specifically the name of the disjunct as apprehended in its disjunction.”

While the first three axioms speak about the disjunction of the two positions, the fourth suggests that love is a generic procedure because it addresses only one humanity (and not a specific sexualized position). It must be noted that Badiou subtracted of humanist connotations. He defines humanity as “the historical body of truths” and emphasizes that “all truth holds for all its historical body.” Badiou’s fourth axiom creates a paradoxal relation among the axioms. The disjunction of the two positions, Man and Woman, suggests that truths are sexualized (read: there exists a masculine and feminine art/politics/love/science), but the axiom of a single humanity suggests that truths are transpositional. Badiou writes:

If the effects of thesis four are related to the three preceding theses, we can formulate precisely the problem that will occupy us: how is it possible that a truth is transpositional, or a truth for all, if there exists at least two positions, man and woman, that are radically disjunct in regard to experience in general?

The paradox that love produces makes legible the relationship of love to thought. Rather than conceive of love as a place of unity where questions are foreclosed, love becomes a site where the reality of sexual disjunction is negotiated. Love is precisely a process that thinks through the paradox. “Love does not relieve that paradox; it treats it.” Love then is itself the paradox that it treats.

Reading Literature with Badiou

If what Badiou has to say about love feels insufficient it is probably because his discussion is more concerned with providing a formal structure of love rather than what that structure might contain. Indeed, for such a method of approaching the topic of love, Terry Eagleton says: “Badiou speaks of love as though it is a self-evident experience, which may be true for Parisians but not for the rest of us.” Peter Hallward comments that it “comes
as no surprise that Badiou has had less to say ... about love than about the other generic procedures,” for in “the case of love ... such truth is private by definition.”  

Also, since love is, for Badiou, fundamentally the “truth of the disjunction” it cannot be an object of knowledge: “the experience of the loving subject ... does not constitute any knowledge of love.”

It is my conviction—in the spirit of Badiou, who often justifies claims via the force of conviction—that literature may provide clarificatory material to the very formal procedure of love that Badiou outlines. The passage is from Neil Gaiman’s The Sandman (1989), which I think beautifully articulates, both as content and as “subtraction,” Badiou’s ideas on love.

Have you ever been in love? Horrible isn’t it? It makes you so vulnerable. It opens your chest and it opens up your heart and it means that someone can get inside you and mess you up. You build up all these defenses, you build up a whole suit of armor, so that nothing can hurt you, then one stupid person, no different from any other stupid person, wanders into your stupid life ... They did something dumb one day like kiss you or smile at you and then your life isn’t your own anymore. Love takes hostages.

What one immediately notices in the passage is that although it speaks of love there is nothing specifically said about the loved object. No idealization occurs. In fact, we are given almost nothing about the loved object aside from the fact that “she” is a “stupid person, no different from any other stupid person.” A word of caution: “stupid” here is not to be understood as idiotic (although it could partially carry that meaning), for then it would simply operate as a regulative marker within the order of being, a way to classify and categorize elements in a Situation. Rather, “stupid” in this context suggests a person subtracted of any accidental feature or characteristic where desire could attach itself, a person in “her” stupid reality, as opposed to “her” tolerable (yet barred, in the Lacanian sense of the term)

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68 Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth, 185.
69 Badiou, Conditions, 182.
70 Despite Badiou’s insistence that literature cannot be a proper scene of representation for love, he nevertheless credits the poet Alberto Caéiro (Fernando Pessoa) for the line “To love is to think.”
72 I use scare quotes on “she” (and on “her” in the rest of the explication of the passage) to indicate that the loved object occupies the position W and does not necessarily indicate a biological or social reality.

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Symbolic identity. Subtracted of those accidental features to which desire aims, what remains is the other in his or her stupid reality. Love does not erase the problem of sexual difference; rather, it is testament to the truth of the absolute disjunction of the amorous Two.

Note also that the passage distinguishes between love and desire—that is, love does not have the objet a, the object of desire as its cause—while also resisting presenting love as a way of manufacturing an intimate knowledge of the other. Badiou insists that love is not an experience of the other, but an experience of the situation “under the post-evental condition that there were Two.” Consequently, it leaves the reader with a sense that love is precisely the absence of a relation, and calls attention to the fundamental gap that separates the amorous subjects. Further, note how the object of love just “wanders” into one’s existence, unanticipated and unexpected. Gaiman represents love as a chance encounter! Its appearance cannot be predicted or calculated within the order of Being, for it is a “disruptive occurrence.”

It also is important to highlight the aleatory nature of the encounter to fully appreciate Badiou’s contribution to the thinking of love. The passage states that the amorous other just haphazardly “wanders” into one’s life. Love is not represented as a choice but as “a forced choice.” Also, is not the mention of erecting “defenses” and donning a “suit of armour” an allusion to the operations of the State of the Situation? The State bars the “phantom remainder” from haunting the Situation so that humans counted as One of its elements may harbor illusions of security at the expense of their immortality, their relation to the infinite. Gaiman’s passage beautifully and clearly renders Badiou’s ontological Faustian bargain.

The prior relationship between two beings as designated by the structure of a particular (ordered) situation (defined by terms such as co-workers, classmates, neighbors, friends, strangers, etcetera) will have no bearing on the love that, upon their declaration, will confer to them both the status of subject. Love, for Badiou, creates new worlds! Longtime friends and perfect strangers are both equally suitable candidates to become subjects of love (for as a “generic procedure” love is open to all!). What matters is that the Two recognize the sudden emergence of the amorous event, and that they courageously declare its existence. The declaration makes love legible within the order of being, and its presence is what grants the amorous Two agency, making them proper subjects. To act out of love means that the subject is not acting from the position of the One (which the state of the situation designates), but from the perspective of the Two. Needless to say, the

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73 Badiou, Conditions, 182.
74 Badiou, Infinite Thought, 20.
75 Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology, 166.
emphasis on the contingency of the amorous encounter makes this passage an apt representation of Badiou's understanding of love.76

At this point, allow me to introduce a possible complication. The mention of “opening up”, “tak[ing] hostages”, and “smile” (metonymically, the face) alludes to a Levinasian vocabulary. I suggest that it would be a mistake to read this passage as an articulation of Levinasian ethics. The encounter dramatized here is not an encounter with the “face of the other” that binds the subject to a pre-ontological and infinite responsibility towards it. The speaker, as I have mentioned above, does not directly talk about the other (if anything, the speaker alludes to their fundamental disconnection), but rather, talks about love itself. The speaker suggests a responsibility, albeit hesitant, to the amorous-Event rather than a responsibility to the loved object. This responsibility towards the amorous encounter is nothing more than the fidelity to the Event. Suffice it to recall Badiou’s attempt to “preserve the word ethics” by reconfiguring it as an “ethic of truth,” a tenacious relation to Truth wherein you “do all you can to persevere in that which exceeds your perseverance.”77

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76 I put emphasis on “representation” to indicate that this literary fragment is not consubstantial with an Event—in the way that, say, for Badiou, the poetry of Stéphane Mallarmé constitutes an Event in the domain of Art—but rather only a symbolic enactment of it, a mere scene of re-presentation.

77 Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, 47.


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Feminism without Philosophy: A Polemic

Jeremiah Joven Joaquin

Abstract: In this paper, I address the problem about the role of academic philosophy for the feminist movement. I argue that the professionalization of feminism, especially within the sphere of academic philosophy, is detrimental to the stated goal of the feminist movement, which, as historically understood, is to procure women’s rights and liberties and to reassess the (oppressive) treatment of women by different social institutions. The thought is that if feminism were to reap the rewards of a socio-political change, feminists should stop their fantastic theorizing and start bringing their advocacies to the proper forums.

Keywords: feminism, feminist philosophy, feminist movement, feminist critique of philosophy

Introduction

In the beginning was the deed …
– Goethe, Faust

This is not an attack against feminism per se. It is rather an attack against the professionalization of feminism, especially within the sphere of academic philosophy. As historically understood, feminism is a movement devoted to procure women’s rights and liberties and to reassess the (oppressive) treatment of women by different social institutions. Given the idea that the stated goal of feminism is to effect social-political changes, this paper argues that in order for feminism to achieve this, it ought to cease its incessant attempt to form a foundation, or explanation, or even theory of how and why such oppression came about. That is, if feminism were to reap the rewards of a socio-political upheaval, feminists should stop their fantastic theorizing and start to bring their advocacies to the proper forums.

It must be emphasized that I am not suggesting that feminist philosophers should stop philosophizing. On the contrary, their critique of
philosophy is one of the catalysts for some philosophers to become iconoclasts in their way of doing philosophy. The danger that I am presenting, rather, is in too much theorizing. This danger can and will cause a trivialization or de-radicalization of feminism. Proponents of the feminist cause to effect socio-political change in favour of women would be accused of elitism if they were to stick with their highfaluting theorizing.

My suggestion is pure and simple: Feminism should take care of itself. That is, its proponents should be careful not to overstep the boundaries of discourse. If they were to achieve some concrete changes in the treatment of women in every facet of human living, then they better stick with the issues concerning women. It is not our theories that will determine whether there are women being oppressed; rather, it is the fact that we see them being oppressed. The argument that I will present in favour of my view can be stated in just five words: Too much talk is useless.

A Sketch

As we have seen from the above discussions, I have arrived at a problem that I wish to tackle in this essay. I formulate the problem as follows: Does feminism, as a socio-political movement, need to have a philosophy concerning the nature of gender inequality? And would feminism achieve its main socio-political concerns by giving philosophical foundations for them?

This problem can be felt more if we are to set an analogy for it. Consider the following issues: first, whether we must have a theory of aesthetics in order for us to have a social policy that prohibits throwing chewing gum waste; second, whether we should speculate on the mechanistic tendencies of “culture” in order to have an economic policy against inhumane treatment of labourers. If you answer affirmatively to both cases, then I resign my argument. However, appealing to my intuition, I would bet that you would take a negative stance concerning the first issue, and that you would give a not-so-straightforward answer to the second. Through the course of the discussion, I will explain why you would go for these options.

The first issue is a no-contest. No one in his or her right sense of mind would assert that there must be a theory of what is beautiful in order to make policies on cleanliness. That is, it is not a necessary condition for such a policy to have an underlying theory of aesthetics. For we can surely device a

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1 The referee has pointed out that one could make the argument that a theory of aesthetics might inform a general policy about sanitation. I agree with this. But the issue that I am pointing out here is whether it must inform such policies. Like most people, I would go for a negative answer, namely, that an aesthetic theory is not necessary to make policies about sanitation.
different set of conditions that could necessitate the need for such a policy. We could perhaps offer the fact that in some instances of environment pollution, infectious diseases occur. This implies that if we are to avoid these diseases, we better clean up. The condition that was offered, namely, that infectious diseases might occur if we have a polluted environment, can be taken as a reason for making a policy against pollution. The theory of beauty that seems to be necessary a while ago now vanishes into thin air. Of course, you may agree with this kind of reasoning for this issue. However, you may disapprove of its use to the second issue.

The second issue is a conjoining of two elements. On the one hand, there is our speculation about the mechanistic tendencies of “culture.” On the other hand, there is the need to make a policy against the inhumane treatment of labourers. If we were to argue in favour of making such a policy and if we were to give the condition that there is a mechanistic tendency found in our “culture” that dictates our behaviour towards our fellow human beings, then the conclusion is that the policy that we will make must assent to the mechanistic tendency. But wait! Isn’t this contrary to the policy that we want to achieve? If we were to say that we need a policy against the ill-treatment of labourers, then we should support this policy by asserting that such injustices are wrong. But if we are to find our reason for the claim that such injustices are wrong in the mechanistic tendency of our “culture,” we are lost in the argument. That there are labourers dying because of inhumane treatments—which we could ascertain just by looking at their work environment—is reason enough, I think, to make a policy against it.

Surely now, you might remark, there must be a theory that backs up the claim that there are injustices in the work environment. To this I will reply that yes, there surely can be a theory behind our judgment of what is an unjust treatment of human beings. But if you press to know more about it, I can go on further and talk about the different theories of justice since time immemorial. However, we might be taken aback once we see the labourer lying half-dead in the corner where we are speculating novel and philosophical ideas.

How we use our critical reason, our philosophical mind, in order to address these two issues shows how we use the god-given talent of thinking. There is nothing wrong with thinking about some social issue. In fact, it is always advisable to think through an issue before we make decision about it. All possible permutations and implications of the problem must be addressed before we could arrive at a viable position and course of action. The problem, however, is when we fail to focus on the issue itself, when we let our thoughts fly towards the sky, and when we leave the issue unanswered. Well, you might think that this is what philosophizing really entails. I will again second your observation here. But the point of effecting policies is that they must
address particular issues. If we are to make policies that can address this, then we must control our tinkering minds. Philosophical thinking is helpful, but it can, at times, be disruptive in achieving particular ends.

The discussion that I have presented so far is a preliminary sketch of what I will present in the remainder of the paper. I do hope that what I have presented has given you a glimpse of my general argument throughout. In the next sections, I aim to discuss the following under their respective headings:

- Feminism as a Movement, where I will present what feminism, as a movement, would like to achieve in its advocacy for women’s rights;
- Feminism as a Critique, where I will focus on the effect of the feminist critique in the academe, especially in philosophy;
- Feminism with/without Philosophy, where I will represent some of the dangers of too much speculation in feminism and how this affects their advocacy; and, finally,
- Feminism in the Public Sphere, where I will present my conclusion and restate my recommendations for the feminist cause.

**Feminism as a Movement**

The unfolding of the history of feminist ideals from Plato—although this may be debatable—down to the present is still a work in progress. Amidst this long and often turbulent unfolding, feminist ideals still hold water for modern advocates of feminism today. What are these ideals? Currie and Kazi tell us that:

> Despite the diversity of its arguments, feminism is unified through its challenge to male power and by its vision of an alternative society; one freed from inequalities based on sex and gender.²

From this, we can say that feminism envisions a society where one is freed from oppression caused by gender and sex inequalities³ and where all human beings (male and female alike) live harmoniously in one and the same world. I am not sure if I have formulated the second conjunct as well as most feminists would. But the point of these ideals is to give to humanity (not in

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³ As the referee has pointed out, there is a huge, albeit misguided, feminist literature about the “philosophical” issue of whether sex and gender are natural categories, or merely socially constructed ones. And to some extent I agree with this general indictment.
the gendered sense of the term) their liberty back, that is, the liberty to choose for ourselves the determination of our lives.

A survey of all feminist positions throughout the ages would not suffice to support the assumption that all feminists yearn for this ideal. Several feminists would in fact repudiate this, stating that the idea of equality is, in itself, a male-construct. Or that there are no real distinctions between sexes; our distinctions are merely creatures of fiction. Be that as it may, if we look at the history of feminism, we could see that the main themes and persuasions of each “school” of feminism are instructive to discern a univocal ascription of their aspiration, which is the recognition of the Other (the woman) as a person that is part of the same world.

Towards the end of the age of enlightenment, new voices can be heard resonating as one voice, calling the world to recognize women’s right to vote. The right to vote gave rise to a movement known as the Suffragettes, whose advocacy was to ensure that women, as citizens of a state, were given the same rights and privileges offered to their male-counterparts. The advocacy for the right to vote was only the beginning for the feminist call for equal distribution of rights and liberties.

Another advocacy put forward was the right to equal opportunity in education. And yet another is the equal opportunity to work. These advocacies were the foundations of feminism as a social force. There were many noble heroes and heroines that stood up in the late nineteenth century. Noble names such as John Stuart Mill, Harriet Taylor, Mary Wollstonecraft, and many others can be presented as advocates of women empowerment. Thus, a movement was born: the feminist movement.

Rhode envisions three central commitments of feminist cause (be it on a political, philosophical, or practical field):

1) On a political level, they seem to promote equality between men and women;
2) On a substantial level, feminist critical frameworks make gender a focus of analysis; their aim is to reconstitute legal practices that have excluded, devalued, or undermined women’s concerns; and,
3) On a methodological level, these frameworks aspire to describe the world in ways that correspond to women’s experience and to identify the fundamental social transformations necessary for full equality between the sexes.

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These commitments, Rhode continues, are mutually reinforcing. But because of differences in persuasions, they do, in some occasions, pull in different directions. These “directions” are the so-called feminist theories.

If we were to advocate for the rights and liberties of women, we would be called feminists. However, the label “feminist” is full of unnecessary conceptual baggage that often people regret being called as such. For example, Schnittker, Freese, and Powell remarked:

Despite increasing support for many feminist ideals, negative sentiments toward the label “feminists” remain strong and many individuals who embrace seemingly feminist positions nonetheless deny that they are feminists.5

Now, we may ask: Why is this? It may be, following these authors still, that the label “feminist” has the connotation of an ideology. Upon hearing the term “ideology,” people may start to think about the horrors that Marx, Hitler, and Stalin have impacted in history because of their respective ideologies. This is why, as Misciagno considers, this is a paradox for contemporary feminism.6 On the one hand, people may advocate the same ends as the feminist, but because of the added stigma of being an ideology—which I think feminism, as a socio-political movement, is not—some people may say that “I am a feminist, but ….” Whatever is at the end of that statement would surely counteract the reaction the first statement already induced to the hearer.

It is somewhat depressing to think that feminism as a socio-political movement, which promotes equality of men and women, advocates the rights and liberties of women, and criticizes the oppression caused by the idea of gender hierarchies, would be tainted by a stigma as bad as Marx’s, Stalin’s, or Lenin’s. All we can do now is to ask: Why did feminism come to such a situation?

Feminism as a Critique

In the preface to his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant tells us that:

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It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to undertake the most laborious of all tasks—that of self-examination—and to establish a tribunal, which may secure it in its well-grounded claims, while it pronounces against all baseless assumptions and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner…

Following Kant’s advice, a re-examination of our discipline itself, i.e., the discipline of academic philosophy, should be undertaken so that we can purposely go on to other inquires without guile or deceit to ourselves.

But alas! When philosophers, especially feminist philosophers, turned their lenses inward and looked upon the canonical works in philosophy they have seen, to their dismay, that there were misogynist remarks present, and often highlighted, by notable philosophers. But should it really be a cause of dismay to find such elements present in those works? For any self-respecting philosopher, it should be. After thousands of years of transmitting this body of knowledge from one hand to another, why did it not occur to these male philosophers that something is wrong here?

There are various examples of these misogynistic remarks in the philosophical canon. We see this in Aristotle, the father of systematic philosophizing, who, in the Politics, remarked that “the male is by nature fitter for command than the female.” We see this in Aquinas when he said that “women are incomplete men.” Certainly, these pronouncements send some mixed signals. Aristotle and Aquinas, after all, are looked up to as brilliant philosophers. But though brilliant, they still look at women as second-rate beings.

You might reply that we should be fair to these philosophers since they were a product of their time and situation. And their views might have been informed by their cultural milieu. After all, Aristotle was a product of the Hellenistic tendency to downgrade women, while Aquinas was a product of the medieval aspiration to cleanse man of his earthly desires. To this I reply, yes they were a product of their time, but after hundreds of years of scholarship, why did people not see these misogynistic messages? Or did they see it but failed to look? Why, if they had looked, did they not do something about it? Or why did they not even discourse about its ramifications?

But it is not only scholars of the past that should be blamed. We, as scholars of today, should be blamed as well. Most of us are still unaware of these misogynistic writings. Or if we are aware, some of us are still not doing

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8 I acknowledge the referee for pointing this out.

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something about it. As such, both the present and past scholars of philosophy have the same moral standing with regard to the failure to address gender-bias in our canons.

It is the task of a critique, still following Kant, to give appraisals to well-reasoned claims and to pronounce against those which are grounded on baseless assumptions. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, philosophy should take care of itself. And this process of assessment is where the feminist critique of philosophy has its glory. As Seller said, “we owe a great deal to feminists who have, through rigorous intellectual effort, revealed that much purportedly impartial and objective scholarship and science is grounded in male bias.”

I personally think that the feminist critique, which focused on the gendered elements in the way philosophers do philosophy, helps in the facilitation of libertarian ideas, which can be traced from Kant—or still quite farther down the line to Locke. Their commentary against the grounding of philosophical principles—e.g., Rousseau’s suggested formula for women education—to baseless assumptions of sex and gender hierarchies is a stroke of ingenuity and would, in the long run, result in the betterment of philosophical inquiry.

We have many heroines to thank for this. We have Charlotte Witt, Sandra Harding, Martha Nussbaum, Mary Warnock, Janet Richards, and Helen Logino to thank. And I can assure you that there are many more people to thank for their efforts. The task is indeed hard, but someone has to start it. And, in fact, some already did.

Amidst the glories of the feminist critique of philosophy, there are also some that drove their critique to the edge. This led to a hyper-critical, or even a hypocritical, critique. And these eventually led to the ascription of feminism not as a positive movement that criticizes gender hierarchies and promotes the rights and liberties of women, but as an ideology that promotes advocacies that simply serve their particular persuasions.

Feminism with/without Philosophy

It is imperative to make a distinction between the two uses of the term “feminism” in order to eliminate the stigma of ideology in feminism. Richards makes a clear distinction between feminism as a rigid doctrine and feminism as a belief about sexual inequality. Of course, the former use is associated with feminism as an ideology, while the latter is associated with feminism as a socio-political movement. The importance of this distinction

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was already touched on in the previous discussions. But it will figure again in our later explorations.

But we need to ask: Why is it necessary to eliminate the stigma of ideology from feminism? To answer this, still following Richards, we must point out that if feminism is construed merely in terms of an ideology of a certain “type of people” (women-type, of course), it will prevent a critical reassessment of the ideas of feminism by feminists themselves. For accepting an ideology implies closing down points of inquiry, and since healthy and open points of inquiry lead to critical reassessment, it follows, therefore, that feminism construed as an ideology implies nothing but dogmatism.

While dogmatism resists any change in the status quo and feminism, as a belief about sexual inequality, implies a direct attempt to make changes in the status quo, then it follows that feminism construed as a belief about sexual inequality can never be a dogmatist.\(^{11}\) However, since the use of the term “feminism” is closely associated with ideology, it would follow that the very conception of feminism as a belief in sex and gender inequality leads to a contradiction that will hinder the fulfilment of the socio-political changes that women, general, want to achieve. This result is inevitable if we are not careful with interplay of the uses of the term “feminism.”

The importance of making the distinction between the two uses of the term “feminism” is that amidst the term’s association with ideology, a greater and more significant issue is at stake, and that is the de-radicalization of the advocacies of feminism. As I have pointed out, feminism bore out from the struggle of women to achieve equal rights and liberties. This marks the start of feminism as a movement driven by the belief that there is something wrong with the status of women in society. The idea of equal rights for men and women and the idea of making political upheavals are radical ideas. However, due to the insistence of some theorists to create deeper philosophical foundations for the genesis of the struggle of women or the gender hierarchical model, feminism rose from being a political movement that promotes women’s rights to being an academic ideology, which focuses more on intellectual matters that only she and her cohorts could appreciate.

From the fashionable corridors of the academia, we might see a feminist philosopher in her academic gown discussing in highfaluting jargons why the word “womyn” is a better label than “women.”\(^{12}\) Perhaps, we might also see them (the academic feminists) discussing the ontological status of social constructs such as sex, gender, and gender roles. Or perhaps, we might see the elaborate demonstrations by a well-known French feminist explaining her views on the inadequacy of the bipolarity of the

\(^{11}\) The contrapositive, of course, also follows.

\(^{12}\) Again, my thanks to the referee for this wonderful example.
epistemological concatenations that grilled the hybrid array of Otherness in the whole warmth of being.

Currie and Kazi drive the point home when they remarked:

... [T]he radical ideas of feminism have been transformed into an academic debate which no longer has relevance for women outside the hallowed halls of institutional life ... ideas inspired by feminism have become separated from feminism as a social movement and at this point lose their potential for change... [the] ideas of feminism have been ‘de-radicalized,’ supporting status quo rather than working to undermine it.13

Bowles and Klein offer a slightly different take on the issue I am trying to set: “... differences within academic feminism merely reproduce hierarchies and create new divisions—this time between women.”14 But they have the same sentiments about too much academic philosophizing by feminists by pointing out that “…women’s studies may become a new road to elitism: writing and thinking time for the privileged few, this time for white, middle-class women.”15 Furthermore, Stanley and Wise make the same point that “… this ‘special relationship’ prevents the participation of all feminists in the production of ‘feminism’.”16

When feminism entered into the realm of academia (and this was around the late 1960’s and the early 1970’s), it was hoped that they would make the cause of women more apparent to a new generation. Alas! The case was different. What happened was feminism developed into an ideology that needs philosophical grounding. Yearning for a foundation is the battle cry of these feminists. I am not going to point any finger at whoever is the culprit of this phenomenon. All I am saying is that feminism did not start out as an ideology. It started out as a political movement for social change. But from this, it grew into one.

As it became more and more fascinated with explaining phenomena, the feminist ideology permuted and mutated into different species. It is mind blowing to consider that feminism as a theoretical academic endeavour happened only in the past 50 years. I say the root of all of this is the insistence

15 Ibid.
of some feminists to present feminism not as a catalyst for socio-political change, rather, as a body of doctrines about the primacy of anti-essential matter that permutated into a labyrinth of anomalies. (I’m being ironic here, of course).

If we try to evaluate the status of feminism as a philosophical enterprise, we would miss the point of what feminism can offer to the philosophical gourmet. Feminism offers a critique of philosophy in terms of the gravity of gender bias. Feminism also raised some curious points in the field of political philosophy and ethics. These are areas where they can present their case. I need to emphasize the idea that feminism is not a branch of philosophy (like metaphysics or epistemology). Nor is it a complete body of doctrines that we need to take wholesale. (It is not a bible.)

Feminism, rather, is like a nice pair of sunglasses that we need to wear from time to time in order to see things differently. It is a method in philosophy that tries to point out that there are some great works by philosophers which are loaded with gender insensitivity. It tries to let you see, as Richards did, that there are women who suffer from systematic social injustices just because they are women.\footnote{17 See Richards, \textit{The Sceptical Feminist}.} The goal of feminism as a movement, as Currie and Kazi stated, is to eliminate this type of injustice.\footnote{18 See Currie and Kazi, "Academic Feminism."} And, of course, this is something which women and men alike should want to eliminate.

Feminism is a movement that advances the causes of women, a movement that aims to effect social change in the status quo. But given this, one might now ask, where and how should feminists advance their aims? Should it be in the academe? Should it be by becoming philosophers?

\textbf{A Conclusion: Feminism in the Public Sphere}

Consider this dialogue:

\begin{quote}
A: \textit{Where} do we effect the changes that feminism advocates?

B: Well, this is easy to answer; of course, we need to effect these changes in the proper venues.

A: But what are the proper venues?

B: Well, it depends on what changes you would want to effect. If you want to change some company policies concerning pregnant
\end{quote}
employees, you should see your employer. Now if you want to make this policy into a law so that all women can benefit, then you should go to lawmakers.

A: But why should we trust those people? They won’t understand what a woman feels. They won’t even bother hearing me out. The only thing left for me is to physically fight for what is rightfully mine.

B: Thousands of years have already passed and we still have not learned anything. We still opt to fight. Don’t you know that we already have institutions that can do a pretty good job for our benefit?

A: But are all those people in those institutions really trustworthy?

B: I did not say that. I only said that we have institutions. I don’t even believe that most people in those institutions are doing their job right. What I am vouching for is that we have those institutions already. And we can turn to them to help address our needs.

A: Women should rule those institutions. Unless women do so, we cannot effect the changes that we want.

B: Well, I don’t know about that.

Feminism is a movement geared towards the emancipation of women from oppression due to sex and gender biases. It is a movement that promotes the welfare and rights of women. But how do we go about creating a climate of social cohesion among men and women.

MacKinnon points out that women cannot wait until all the spheres that procure social change are in their control. “If women are to restrict our demands for change in the spheres we can trust, spheres we already control, there will not be any.”\(^{19}\) To effect social change, especially the changes feminism wants, the proper venue would be the courts of law, the house of congress, or even the streets.

The right venue for feminists to address their concerns might not be in the hallowed walls of the academe where they will likely be tainted with the stigma of ideological speculation. If feminism is still considering itself as a movement geared towards creating a just and liberal society where women have equal rights and opportunities, then perhaps the public sphere is where

these demands are worth presenting. The openness of discussion in such a
venue results in positive action (or inaction, depending on the policy being
discussed). If results are what we are after as feminists, we need policies. And
since policies can only be achieved in the proper forums, it is imperative for
feminist proponents (be they be men or women) to go back to the streets and
make their hands dirty.

But there are still a lot more to discuss concerning women welfare
aside from the issue of rights and liberties. As Coultas explains:

Modern feminism cannot avoid taking part in [that] discussion and in the process we will be forced not only
to re-evaluate our own success and failures, but also our
attitude as a movement to the entire spectrum of
political opinions ....

What is the [that] that Coultas is referring to? There are many
problems besetting a feminist: problems concerning pornography, women
exploitation, abortion, issues on women employment, sexual harassment,
woman oppression, rape, violence against women, etc. These issues are not
resolved by setting up foundational theories. These are facts that we need to
combat. We can speculate how to combat them, what methods could be used,
what the implications of these methods will be, or what the implications of
not doing anything about it could be. Yes, we can speculate. But our
speculation should lead to a positive resolution.

If all we are going to talk about are matters proper only for
philosophers, then talk about them. But that is all that can happen: an
exchange of saliva. Yes, this salivating can raise awareness and clarify certain
pertinent issues. That’s what intellectual discussions are for anyway. But if
feminists want change, mere talk is not enough. What are needed are changes
in the socio-political make-up of society. And where can we do this? There
are a lot of venues as I have said. But there is an institution where, in fact, it
has already been done, that is, in civil law.

Civil law, MacKinnon says, is more effective. In a discussion, Jeffries
and MacKinnon narrated how effective civil law is to effect socio-political
change. MacKinnon was asked to represent some raped Bosnian and Croat
women in a lawsuit against Radovan Karadzic. The result has been Kadic v
Karadzic, and MacKinnon is very proud of the result of this case because it
set the justice system rolling against sex-slave trade. The victims were

21 Stuart Jeffries and Catharine MacKinnon, “Are Women Human? An Interview with
awarded $745M. The money was used to establish an organization that provides support for victims of sex offenders. These are two forms of civil relief that actually could make a change in the situation. That they could make such a difference is the most important thing.

In conclusion, I say again that in order for the ideal of feminism (taken as a socio-political movement) to have concrete results in effecting socio-political changes, philosophical systems need not be built. Effecting socio-political changes happens in a proper forum. That proper forum happens in the public sphere (e.g., in civil law). However, quoting a reviewer of MacKinnon’s work, “we must be aware of the limitations of the state and of the law; the law is not everything, but it is not nothing either.”

We have our public institutions where we can raise our concerns about women’s welfare, rights, and issues. Yes, they are limited in their functions. But let this not deter us from using them to achieve the ends that we want. That there is women oppression—due to a baseless premise called gender inequality—is reason enough to ask for social change in proper forums in the public sphere.

References


23 A version of this paper was delivered in 2009 at the Ethics Conference held at Adamson University, Manila, Philippines. I would like to thank the organizers and participants of that conference for their helpful comments. My special thanks to my wife, Maria Georgina Joaquin, and my colleagues, Robert James Boyles, Mark Anthony Dacela, and Napoleon Mabaquiao for their constant support and encouragement. I acknowledge Noelle Leslie dela Cruz for the discussions that helped form the basis of this paper, and the anonymous referee for some very useful suggestions.
Griffiths, Morwenna and Margaret Whitford, eds., Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988).
Seller, Anne, “Realism versus Relativism: Towards a Politically Adequate Epistemology,” in Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy, ed. by Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988).
Aristotelian Categorical Syllogism: An Alternative Pedagogical Approach

Jiolito L. Benitez

Abstract: This paper deals with the rules of Aristotelian categorical syllogism as presented in various logic textbooks by Filipino authors. These textbooks allot a chapter or a considerable space for a discussion on categorical syllogisms. However, the presentations exhibit marked discrepancies and differences, which primarily involve the number of rules stipulated, rule number sequence, and the rule statements. From the viewpoint of instruction, in which diversity of learning sources and independent learning are desired, the above-indicated differences and discrepancies not only expose learners, particularly the beginners, to unnecessary difficulty and confusion but also stifle their ability and opportunity for an effective and independent learning. To address this problem, this paper offers a distinct alternative pedagogical approach to Aristotle’s categorical syllogism. The approach, which employs specialized symbols, not only eliminates the need to indicate the rule statement number and sequence but also reconciles the discrepancies and differences found in the textbooks. It also provides a pragmatic strategy for teaching and learning the rules of valid categorical syllogisms more efficiently and effectively.

Keywords: pedagogical approach, logic, Aristotelian categorical syllogism, rule statement

Introduction

This study offers an alternative pedagogical approach to Aristotle’s categorical syllogism. This approach entails the use of specialized abbreviations, which eliminate the need for the provision of rule numbers as well as the numerical sequence of the rules governing valid categorical syllogisms.
Aristotle’s immortal works in the field of logic are collectively called the Organon, which comprises six texts, namely, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, Categories, On Interpretation, and Sophistical Refutations. The bedrock of Aristotelian logic is the theory of syllogism, which is found in Prior Analytics. For many centuries, Aristotelian logic was taught in universities and colleges around the world. However, Aristotelian logic has been gradually eclipsed by the emergence of modern symbolic logic.

In the Philippine tertiary education, logic is part of the general education courses and is now offered in most undergraduate degree program curricula. However, with the implementation of the K-12 curriculum, logic as a course is offered in the senior high school level. Inasmuch as most philosophy and logic professors in the country have been educated in Catholic seminaries, Aristotelian logic generally forms part of the logic courses. This is evident in the inclusion of the categorical syllogism in most logic textbooks by Filipino authors. There are more or less a hundred logic textbooks by Filipino authors available in bookstores and libraries. Generally, all of these books apportion a chapter or a considerable space for the discussion on Aristotelian categorical syllogism.

A categorical syllogism is a form of a deductive argument consisting of three statements—the major and minor premises and the conclusion—which contain three terms. In the presentation and discussion of the rules governing valid categorical syllogisms, authors assign rule numbers to specific rule statements, such as, rule # 1 “There shall be three and only three terms in a categorical syllogism.” However, authors vary significantly not only in the assignment of rule numbers but also in the counting of the rules.

Logic Textbooks Selection

For the purpose of shaping a narrative of the problem, a selection of logic textbooks by Filipino authors is made. While the selection is arbitrary,

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1 Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 186.
6 Most of the members of the philosophical associations in the Philippines studied in Catholic owned institutions where Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy is taught.

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it should not necessarily affect the value and validity of the findings and conclusion as this representation should be enough to establish the existence of the problem this paper commits to address. Further, each of the 20 Filipino-authored books that are part of the selection, allocates a chapter or some considerable space for the discussion on Aristotle’s categorical syllogism. Below is a tabular presentation of the authors, book titles, year of publication, and number of rules for a valid categorical syllogism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Titles</th>
<th>Number of Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agapay, R.</td>
<td>Logic: The Essentials of Deductive Reasoning (1991)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardales, V.</td>
<td>Logic Made Easy (1998)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babor, E.</td>
<td>Logic: The Philosophical Discipline of Correct Thinking (2003)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauzon, P.</td>
<td>Logic for Filipinos (1994)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calandria, R.</td>
<td>The Art of Logic: Postscript to Classical and Symbolic Logic (1997)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceniza, C.</td>
<td>Elementary Logic (1994)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruz, C.</td>
<td>Introduction to Logic (1995)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fronda, E. S.</td>
<td>Reason for the Reasonable: An Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking (2005)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayme, V.</td>
<td>Introduction to Logic (2002)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joven, J.</td>
<td>Teaching and Learning Logic (2006)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maboloc and Pascual</td>
<td>Elements of Logic: An Integrative Approach (2012)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinez, S.</td>
<td>Logic: A Textbook in Deductive Reasoning (1980)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meer, T.</td>
<td>Basics of Logic (2004)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montemayor, F.</td>
<td>Harmony of Logic (2004)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piñon, M.</td>
<td>Fundamental Logic: The Science of Correct Thinking / Logic Primer (1973/1979)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan, A.</td>
<td>A First Course: Logic (2003)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timbreza, F.</td>
<td>Logic Made Simple for Filipinos (2001)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Logic Textbooks and Categorical Syllogism for Number of Rules
The table above shows a general picture of the problem, namely, a) dissimilar ways of counting the rules; b) dissimilar assignments of numbers to rule statements; and c) discrepancies in the rules involved. Specifically, the authors variably fix the number of rules from three, six, seven, eight, nine to ten. Of the 20, nine authors specify eight rules; four authors enumerate ten rules; three authors fix the rules at nine; one author propounds seven rules; two authors count six rules; and one author limits the rules to three.

Among the nine authors who identified eight rules, Timbreza\(^8\) and Agapay\(^9\) share generally the same rule number sequence and the same rule statements. The minimal difference between them is the manner by which the rule statements are expressed or worded. Notably, Agapay’s presentation is more concise and direct to the point compared with Timbreza’s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timberza’s Eight General Syllogistic Rules</th>
<th>Agapay’s Rules of Syllogism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Rules on the Terms</td>
<td>a) Rules on Terms:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. There must be only three terms in the syllogism.</td>
<td>1. There must be three and only three terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Neither the major nor the minor term may be distributed in the conclusion, if I is undistributed in the premises.</td>
<td>2. No term must have greater extension in the conclusion than it has in the premises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The middle term must not appear in the conclusion.</td>
<td>3. The Middle Term must not appear in the conclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The middle term must be distributed at least once in the premises.</td>
<td>4. The Middle Term must be universal at least once.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Rules on the Premises</td>
<td>b) Rules on Propositions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Only an affirmative conclusion can be drawn from two affirmative premises.</td>
<td>5. Two affirmative premises yield an affirmative conclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. No conclusion can be drawn from two negative premises.</td>
<td>6. Two negative premises yield no conclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. If one premise is particular, the conclusion must also be particular; if one premise is negative, the conclusion must also be negative.</td>
<td>7. When one premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative; when one premise is particular, the conclusion must be particular.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. No conclusion can be drawn from two particular premises.</td>
<td>8. When both premises are particular, there is no conclusion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Bauzon, Piñon, Gualdo, Babor, Montemayor, Calandria, and Joven indicate practically the same rule statements as Agapay’s and Timberza’s, varying only in the numerical order of the rules. Moreover, Babor and Calandria exhibit marked differences. Babor provides a separate rule on the composition of “three categorical propositions.” This provision may be unnecessary as Aristotle’s categorical syllogism fundamentally requires three categorical statements, namely, the major and minor premises and the conclusion. Calandria’s stipulation for rule # 2 - “Each term must appear only twice in the categorical syllogism” may also be unnecessary as this can be integrated in the elaboration of his rule # 1 on the three-term requirement. Nonetheless, these do not in any way imply that Babor and Calandria or any of the authors mentioned above are mistaken since they have the liberty to employ any method they deem best suited to their purpose.

Ardales, Cruz, Maboloc and Pascual, and Malitao enumerate ten rules for valid categorical syllogisms. Of the four, Malitao and Cruz observe the same numerical sequence and essentially the same corresponding rule statements except for rule # 10. On the one hand, Malitao specifies in rule # 10 that “The subject term of the premise must be asserted in the conclusion.”

Cruz, on the other hand, signifies in rule # 10 that “The subject of the conclusion must be found in the minor premise.” While expressed variably, in the final analysis, rule # 10 for both authors denotes the same principle. Maboloc and Pascual, and Ardales share essentially the same rules with Cruz and Malitao except for a few considerable disparities in the numerical order of the rules.

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11 Manuel Piñon, Fundamental Logic (Quezon City: Rex Bookstore, 1973) 139-162.
14 Felix Montemayor, Harmony of Logic (Manila: National Bookstore, 1983), 72-84.
17 Calandria, The Art of Logic, 83.
18 Venancio Ardales, Logic Made Easy (Iloilo City: Concerns, Inc., 1996), 82-90.
22 Ibid., 118.
23 Cruz, Introduction to Logic, 250.
Cruz’s General Rules of the Categorical Syllogism

1. There must be only three terms in the syllogism; the major term, the minor term, and the middle term.
2. The three major terms should be arranged in the following manner: the major term is the predicate of the conclusion and is found in the major premise; the minor term is the subject of the conclusion and is found in the minor premise; and the middle term is found in the two premises but not in the conclusion.
3. The major and minor terms should be universal in the conclusion only if they are universal in the premises.
4. The middle term must be universal at least once.
5. If the two premises are affirmative, the conclusion must be affirmative.
6. If one premise is negative and the other is affirmative, the conclusion must be negative.
7. The conclusion is invalid whenever the premises are both negative and not equivalently affirmative.
8. One premise at least must be universal.
9. If one premise is particular, the conclusion must be particular.
10. The subject of the conclusion must be found in the minor premise.

Malitao’s Ten Rules of Categorical Syllogism

1. A syllogism must contain the major, the minor, and the middle term.
2. The middle term should not appear in the conclusion.
3. The quantities of both the major and the minor terms should not be extended in the conclusion if they are particular in the premises.
4. The quantity of the middle term must be universal at least once.
5. The conclusion must be affirmative if both premises are affirmative.
6. The conclusion must be negative if one of the premises is negative.
7. The two premises must not be both negative or not equivalently affirmative. (emphasis mine)
8. One premise must be universal.
9. The conclusion should be particular if one premise is particular.
10. The subject term in the premise must be asserted in the conclusion.

Malitao’s rule # 7—“The two premises must not be both negative or not equivalently affirmative”—may have been a case of oversight. To say “not equivalently affirmative” implies “to be both negative,” which is what exactly this rule prohibits. The rule should have been rendered “or not equivalently negative.”

Jayme’s Rules for a Valid Categorical Syllogism

1. There must be three and only three terms—the major, minor, and middle terms.
2. The middle term does not occur in the conclusion.

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3. The major or minor term may not be universal (distributed) in the conclusion if it is only particular (undistributed) in the premises.
4. The middle term must be used as a universal (distributed) term at least once.
5. Two negative premises yield no valid conclusion.
6. If both premises are affirmative, then the conclusion must be affirmative.
7. If one premise is negative premise, the conclusion must be negative.
8. If one premise is particular, the conclusion must be particular.
9. From two particular premises no valid conclusion can be drawn.

Meer et al.,25 Jayme,26 and Ceniza27 limit the rules of categorical syllogism to nine. The three show no difference in the rules involved except in the sequence. With very few exceptions, these rules are typically included in all 20 textbooks. Jayme’s Rules for a Valid Categorical Syllogism typifies those of Meer et al. and Ceniza.

Fronda28 and Tan29 appropriate six rules to evaluate the validity of a categorical syllogism. Fronda’s first three rules include: (1) three-term requirement, (2) distribution of the middle term, and (3) distribution of the major and minor terms. His exposition on the fourth, fifth, and sixth rules is rather sketchy as he only presents arguments that he says violate those rules without specifying in detail what these rules are. Tan’s (2003) six rules consist of (1) three-term requirement, (2) middle term distribution, (3) distribution of the major and minor terms in the premises and the conclusion, (4) prohibition of two negative premises, (5) negative conclusion from negative premise, and (6) universal conclusion from universal premises.

Tabotabo et al.30 provide for seven rules, which comprise the following: (1) three-terms rule (2) univocal use of each term, (3) middle term not appearing in the conclusion, (4) distribution of the middle term, (5) prohibition of two negative premises, (6) prohibition of two particular premises, and (7) non-extension of major and minor terms in the conclusion. From the selection, Martinez31 stipulates the least number of rules—only three. The three include (1) distribution of the middle term, (2) non-extension

29 Armando Tan, A First Course: Logic (Dumaguete City: Siliman University Press, 2003), 119-145.
of the major and minor terms in the conclusion, and (3) coherence of the quality (negative) of conclusion with the quality (negative) of the premise. It would be impossible to determine the validity of a categorical syllogism using Martinez’s rules alone.

The Problem

The review of selected logic textbooks shows marked disparities and differences among the authors in terms of the number of rules governing valid categorical syllogisms as well as the assignment of rule numbers to rule statements. The crux of the matter is not about some authors having less than enough number of rules, or others having just enough, or still others having more. From the viewpoint of logic, the evident variance and disparities in the presentation are hardly an issue. The rules of validity are not sacrificed. However, from the pedagogical vantage point, the discrepancies pose adverse effects particularly on the part of the learners. This state of affairs not only leads to unnecessary confusion and difficulty but also potentially stifles the learner’s ability and opportunity for effective and independent learning.

In a logic class where the professor and students take recourse to different logic textbooks (diversified sources of learning), the professor spends more time and effort trying to reconcile and resolve the aforementioned disparities and the students experience needless confusion and difficulty. The possible effect will be inactive or passive learning as the students tend to rely on the professor’s presentation or adopt the professor’s text, thereby precluding diverse opportunities and sources of learning.

To address this problem, this paper offers an alternative pedagogical approach to the teaching and learning of the rules of categorical syllogism.

Abbreviations-based Approach to Categorical Syllogism

This approach utilizes specialized abbreviations in the teaching and learning of the rules governing valid categorical syllogisms. As such, the requirement for numerical order and corresponding rule statements is eliminated. To construct these abbreviations, it is first necessary to lay down the rules for categorical syllogism.

As can be gleaned from the review of the selections above, authors generally leave out or lump together distinct rules into one rule statement. Taking into considerations those rules that are left out and those that are lumped together in a single rule statement, a summary of rules for valid categorical syllogisms is thus derived:
Based on the summary of rules, specialized abbreviations are devised. For this purpose, an abbreviation may be an acronym or an initial. Each rule is assigned an acronym or initial. The acronyms or initials are creatively crafted such that they are immediately related to the rule statement. Each acronym or initial is then given a definition or meaning, which is subsequently linked to the full statement of the rule as shown in Table 2. The first column consists of acronyms and initials; the second column stipulates the meaning or definition of each acronym or initial; and the third column reflects the full statement of the rule.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms/Initials</th>
<th>Definition/Meaning</th>
<th>Rule Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TTT</td>
<td>Three and only Three Terms</td>
<td>There must be three and only three terms—the major, middle, and minor terms—in a categorical syllogism, each of which is used twice in exactly the same sense in different statements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMC</td>
<td>No Middle Term (M) in the Conclusion</td>
<td>The middle term (M) appears once in each premise and must not appear in the conclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>Do not Extend the Major Term (P)</td>
<td>The major term (P) must not be distributed (extended) in the conclusion if it is undistributed in the premise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>Do not Extend the Minor Term (S)</td>
<td>The minor term (S) must not be distributed (extended) in the conclusion if it is undistributed in the premise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDO</td>
<td>Middle Term (M) Distributed at least Once</td>
<td>The middle term (M) must be distributed at least once.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APAC</td>
<td>Affirmative Premises, Affirmative Conclusion</td>
<td>If both premises are affirmative, the conclusion must also be affirmative.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2: Acronyms/initials, definition/meaning and rule statements of a categorical syllogism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym/Initial</th>
<th>Definition/Meaning</th>
<th>Rule Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTNP</td>
<td>No Two Negative Premises</td>
<td>Two negative premises yield no valid conclusion; at least one premise must be affirmative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPNC</td>
<td>Negative Premise, Negative Conclusion</td>
<td>If either premise is negative, the conclusion must likewise be negative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>Particular Premise, Particular Conclusion</td>
<td>If either premise is particular, the conclusion must likewise be particular.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTPP</td>
<td>No Two Particular Premises</td>
<td>Two particular premises yield no valid conclusion; at least one premise must be universal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The order by which the rules are presented is arbitrary. This system does not require any specific numerical sequence nor does it need a rule number and rule statement correspondence. The use of acronyms and initials is pragmatic and efficient so that it greatly reduces the time, space, and effort required in teaching and learning. Thus, instead of stating rule # 5 “The middle terms must be distributed at least once,” all the professor and the learner need is to refer to MDO which stands for “Middle term “M” Distributed at least Once.” Moreover, in terms of committing the rules to memory, the learner need not memorize the rule numbers and their corresponding rule statements. Instead, he/she needs only to memorize ten acronyms or initials which already contain ideas of the rules in them.

This approach makes teaching and learning categorical syllogisms simple, fast, and easy. Moreover, this approach serves as a platform that renders all the disparities in the aforementioned logic textbooks intelligible. With minimal time and effort, the students are able to master the rules faster and easier. If students engage this approach first, they are expected to comprehend varied presentations of the rules of categorical syllogisms without unnecessary difficulty and confusion. Students who use different logic textbooks can easily relate to the abbreviations and find a new and pragmatic way of learning.

A sample learning assessment practice on categorical syllogisms is presented in Table 3. This exercise calls for an application of the abbreviations-based approach. This is to show that the approach makes learning simple, fast, and easy.
**DIRECTIONS:** Evaluate each of the following arguments. Write “V” if the argument is valid; if the argument is invalid, write “I” and indicate the abbreviation of each rule violated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISMS</th>
<th>Valid or Invalid</th>
<th>RULES VIOLATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Animals are mammals. Horses are mammals. Therefore, horses are animals.</td>
<td>Invalid</td>
<td>MDO, PPPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Butterflies are trees. Stones are butterflies. Therefore, stones are trees.</td>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Filipinos are not friendly. Italians are not friendly. Therefore, Italians are not Filipinos.</td>
<td>Invalid</td>
<td>DEP, DES, NTNP, NTPP, PPPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. No thieves are honest. Some professionals are honest. So, some professionals are not thieves.</td>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Some celebrities are athletes. All NBA players are athletes. Therefore, all NBA players are celebrities.</td>
<td>Invalid</td>
<td>MDO, PPPC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Learning Assessment on Categorical Syllogism

**Syllogism # 1.** The statement “Animals are mammals” does not have a subject term quantifier but analysis shows that the statement is particular (I) since only some but not all animals are mammals. Since this premise is particular, the **PPPC** (Particular Premise, Particular Conclusion) rule applies. Since the conclusion is a universal statement, the PPPC rule is violated. Moreover, the middle term “mammals” is undistributed in both premises, hence, a violation of **MDO** (Middle term Distributed at least Once). Ergo, the argument is invalid.

**Syllogism # 2.** The premise “Butterflies are trees” does not have a subject term quantifier, but it is obvious that it is a universal affirmative (A). It is false to say that all butterflies are trees. In fact, all butterflies are not trees. Hence, the subject term must be taken as a universal since it includes the entire class of butterflies. The same analysis applies to the statements “Stones are butterflies” and “Therefore, stones are trees.” The mood and figure of the argument is AAAI and it is a valid form of argument.

**Syllogism # 3.** The quantity of the term “Filipinos” in the premise is particular because it is logical to presume that only some Filipinos are not friendly. To view it as a universal is logically difficult since it demands proof that all Filipinos are not friendly. However, the quantity of the term
“Filipinos” in the conclusion is universal by virtue of a negative quality of the copula. Thus, the DEP (Do not Extend the Major Term “P”) rule is violated. The same case applies to the quantity of the minor term “Italians.” So, the DES (Do not Extend the Minor Term “S”) rule is also violated. Moreover, both premises are negative and particular so that the NTNP (No Two Negative Premises) and NTPP (No Two Particular Premises) rules are also violated. Lastly, since the conclusion is a universal statement, the PPC (Particular Premise, Particular Conclusion) rule is likewise violated. Hence, the argument is flawed.

Syllogism # 4. The syllogistic form is (EIO2). This is a valid argument.

Syllogism # 5. The middle term “athletes” is undistributed in both premises and thus violates the MDO rule. Also, since one of the premises is particular, the conclusion, which is a universal, violates the PPC rule.

As shown above, the use of acronyms or initials, wherein meanings directly denote the essence of the rules, is an efficient and effective way of evaluating categorical syllogisms. Moreover, the differences in presentation of the rules of categorical syllogisms by different authors are reconciled, thus, effectively dispelling unnecessary confusion and difficulty.

Conclusion

The selection of logic textbooks shows evident discrepancies and disparities in the stipulation of the number of rules as well as in the assignment of rule numbers to corresponding rule statements. This situation creates adverse pedagogical effects in both teaching and learning the rules for valid categorical syllogism. Moreover, this problem stifles the students’ ability and opportunity for effective and independent learning using diversified learning resources. With the adoption of the abbreviations-based approach, the need for rule numbers and corresponding rule statements is eliminated. Moreover, the approach not only significantly reduces the time, space, and effort requirements in teaching and learning the rules governing valid categorical syllogism, but also serves as a platform whereby the aforementioned inconsistencies are resolved and rendered intelligible. Hence, the abbreviations-based approach is pragmatic, efficient, and effective.

References

AN APPROACH TO ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM


Critical Rethinking of Critical Thinking:  
A Contribution of Critical Pedagogy in 
Facing the Challenges of K+12

Franz Giuseppe F. Cortez

Abstract: This paper argues that the tradition of Critical Pedagogy can 
deepen and sharpen our understanding of critical thinking as one of 
the manifest aims of the new Philippine educational system (K+12 
system). Thus, it is a critical rethinking of critical thinking. The paper 
discusses first Critical Pedagogy. It further explains critical thinking 
as one of the manifest aims of education. Then, it reveals the 
underlying principle of this dominant understanding of critical 
thinking. Using the perspectives of Critical Pedagogy, the paper 
explains that critical thinking cannot be restricted to a one-dimensional 
meaning of simply being a set of logical and cognitive skills. Inherent 
to critical thinking is its political and social dimension.

Keywords: critical pedagogy, critical thinking, critical theory, K+12 in 
Philippine education

Introduction

In a conference sponsored by The Philosophical Association of the Philippines, 
one of the questions that was addressed is this: “What updates or 
upgrades to philosophical pedagogy, in whatever educational level, may 
be considered, formulated and implemented, given K+12 and the new 
General Education Curriculum?”1 Through this paper, I participate in 
answering this question. My direct response is this: In updating our 
philosophical pedagogy, we may also consider what the tradition of Critical 
Pedagogy can contribute. Thus, I state my main problem as: How can Critical 
Pedagogy participate in a meaningful rethinking of our educational

1 The Conference is entitled “Philosophy and the Challenges of K+12.” It was held on 
1-4 April, 2014 at San Pablo Seminary, Baguio City, Philippines. This article is a revised version 
of a paper presented on the said conference.

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philosophy following the recent development in the Philippine educational system? I propose the following thesis statement: Critical pedagogy can deepen and sharpen our understanding of critical thinking as one of the manifest aims of the new Philippine educational system. In other words, through the lens of Critical Pedagogy, we can critically rethink critical thinking. The idea is not to offer a solution to an admittedly distressing problem in Philippine education. Rather, it is to invite a persistent and rigorous reflection on the character and inherent potentiality of a concept (that is, critical thinking) to emasculate on the one hand or to empower on the other hand.

To answer my main problem and to defend my thesis statement, I start with a discussion of Critical Pedagogy. I proceed to explain critical thinking as one of the manifest aims of education. Then, I show how the concept of “critical thinking” can be critically rethought. The last section is the concluding remarks.

What is Critical Pedagogy?

Some 30 years ago, in a monumental book entitled *Theory and Resistance in Education* (1983), the North American educator Henry A. Giroux coined the term “critical pedagogy” to refer primarily to an educational theory that is not just an obsession with criticizing the school as a production and reproduction mechanism, but is also a catalyst for opposition, resistance and change.\(^2\) Five years after, in his 1988 publication of *Teachers as Intellectuals*, Giroux used the terms “language of critique” and “language of possibility” to refer to the twin task of critical pedagogy—on the one hand, to problematize the school as a hegemonizing and homogenizing domain and on the other hand, to posit the school as a potential counter-hegemonic and counter-homogenizing force.\(^3\) He singles out Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator and philosopher, as responsible for continuously highlighting this Janus-faced character of the school.

As the tradition of Critical Pedagogy evolves, it has become heterogeneous. Thus, Critical Pedagogy is not a monolithic discourse. According to Patricia Bizzell, a critical pedagogy scholar, critical pedagogy “should be taken to refer to a variety of practices, not one orthodox methodology.”\(^4\) Hence, rather than label it as Critical Pedagogy, we can talk

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of various critical pedagogies. But even if there are critical pedagogies, we can still find some commonalities in their discourses. According to Monica McLean in her book *Pedagogy and the University* (2006), the common features of Critical Pedagogy are “critique of current conditions; a focus on transformation and emancipation; emphasis on the value-laden and political nature of education; and interest in culture, identity and subjectivity.”

Critical Pedagogy is an embodiment in the educative setting of the Frankfurt School critical theory. In other words, Critical Pedagogy is one among many applications and implementations of Critical Theory in the realm of educational process and theorizing. Giroux acknowledged the extensive contributions of the Frankfurt School critical theorists, such as, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse in laying the foundations of Critical Pedagogy. Joe Kincheloe talks about how Critical Theory “forms as one of the foundations of Critical Pedagogy.” P. Lather stresses that Critical Pedagogy is “a combination of Frankfurt School critical theory, Gramscian counter-hegemonic practice and Freirean conscientization.” J.M. Gore similarly suggests that this discourse is “borrowed from Neo-Marxism, the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, and oppositional politics generally.”

It is significant to mention the tradition of Critical Theory running through the veins of Critical Pedagogy and soaring over its fields. It is because inasmuch as the Frankfurt School critical theory was very much informed by Marxian thoughts, critical pedagogies are also inherently Marxist pedagogical philosophies and practices. In an essay that documents various Marxian perspectives on education, Douglas Kellner identifies the tradition of Critical Pedagogy as a direct legacy of Marxian educational viewpoints. Kellner suggests that the critical pedagogues’ attempts to intertwine Marxist concept of class oppression with other contemporary faces of oppression in the realm of gender, race and culture among others have provided the promises of expanding and enriching Marxist perspectives.

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10 Douglas Kellner, “Marxian Perspectives on Educational Philosophy: From Classical Marxism to Critical Pedagogy,” in *University of Los Angeles, California*,
But Critical Pedagogy does not deify the whole of Marxism. Martin Jay makes this clear in his *Dialectical Imagination* (1973) when he says that “[one] of the essential characteristics of critical theory from its inception had been a refusal to consider Marxism a closed body of received truths.”¹¹ Stephen Brookfield, a prominent figure in critical adult educational theory and practice, says that “though critical theory can be conceived as a constant conversation with Marx, it is not a simple replication of Marxism.”¹² For his part, the Italian Antonio Gramsci, an all-the-way Marxist and whose concept of hegemony has become a household term for the critical pedagogues, does not fail to counsel us about the temptation to fall into an idolatrous worship of Marx and Marxism. He observes rightly that Marxism “tends to become an ideology in the worst sense of the word, that is to say a dogmatic system of eternal and absolute truths.”¹³

One of the important articles of the Black American thinker, Cornel West, who is considered as a progenitor of critical pedagogy, is fittingly titled “The Indispensability Yet Insufficiency of Marxist Theory.” In this article, which is actually a 1992 dialogue between West and the Hungarian philosopher Eva L. Corredor, West stresses that “Marxist theory and Marxist sensibility are both indispensable and inadequate, something to build on but also something to bring serious critique to bear on.”¹⁴ In the same vein of considering both the relevance and insufficiency of Marx, Freire says that, “Marx is not a has-been. He continues to be, needing only to be reseen.”¹⁵ The critical theorists and the critical pedagogues do not cease to reflect on the potentials and limits of Marxist thoughts and approaches.

Words such as these are meant to respond to what Peter McLaren would call as the students’ and teachers’ “knee-jerk Marxophobia.”¹⁶ Brookfield explains McLaren’s understanding of this irrational fear of the bearded man in these words: “Marxophobia holds that even to mention Marx is to engage in un-American behavior and by implication to support the...
genocide and repression exhibited by totalitarian communist regimes throughout history.”

The implication of this idea for us as Filipino educators is this. For those who think that by adopting Critical Pedagogy as one of the pedagogical philosophies relevant to the contemporary situation of Philippine education, one is turning the school into a haven of communists and NPAs, you can relax. The reviewer of this paper opines that there is a difference between the academic appropriations of Marxism on the one hand and its use as an ideology for terrorism on the other hand. Moreso, by advocating some of the key features of critical pedagogy, we are not called to be fixated and obsessed with radical social restructuring through violent means. We neither expect the laborers nor incite the students to storm the Malacañang. Neither can we imagine the NPAs springing from the Cordillera Mountains and occupying every embodiment of power asymmetries in the lowlands. Following the line of thought of Paulo Freire, power must be redefined, reinvented and rediscovered.

**Critical Thinking: An Educational Aim**

As always and as ever, the framers of Philippine educational system would never miss a magical phrase in the expression of our educational foundation. That phrase is “critical thinking,” the crowning glory of humanist liberal education. As early as 2010, during a Department of Education (DepEd) discussion on the goals of K+12, the following was already explicitly stated:

> Every graduate of the Enhanced K+12 Basic Education Program is an empowered individual who has learned, through a program that is rooted on sound educational principles and geared towards excellence, the foundations for learning throughout life, the competence to engage in work and be productive, the ability to coexist in fruitful harmony with local and global communities, the capability to engage in autonomous critical thinking, and the capacity to transform others and one’s self.

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18 NPA is *New People’s Army*, the armed group of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
After some time, the K+12 Primer released by the Department states categorically that K+12 is designed to develop a learner who, among others, “engages in critical thinking and creative problem solving.” This is what the framers of the new educational system refer to as producing “holistically developed learners with 21st century skills.”

I can safely assume that nobody will object to this. Various scholars even in opposing camps would agree that one of the noble aims of education is the development of critical thinking. Robin Barrow, in his book The Philosophy of Schooling (1981), declares that “one clear goal of education is developing powers of critical thought.” Even the Philippine Constitution’s provision on education directly asserts that all educational institutions shall “encourage critical and creative thinking.” Furthermore, the vision-mission statement of many educational institutions does not fail to include “critical thinking” as one of the desired educational ends. It is one of those skills that every school would like to develop in its students. It is one of those proficiencies that every employer would be happy to find in the products of the educational institutions. Indeed, “critical thinking” has become an educational buzzword especially after the 1980 recommendation of the Rockefeller Commission on the Humanities, stating that critical thinking must be included by the U.S. Office of Education as one of the defining characters of true education. This has led Robert Sternberg, a prominent theorist of intelligence, to declare that: “Probably never before in the history of educational practice has there been a greater push to teach children to think critically.”

But what do people mean by critical thinking? What do we understand when we say that we want our students to become critical thinkers? What does the dominant educational discourse mean by this statement? As we now enter a new chapter in the history of Philippine educational system, it is also high time to rethink what we mean by “critical thinking.”

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22. Ibid.


Critical Rethinking of Critical Thinking

To start a critical rethinking of critical thinking, we must be aware that we do not have a univocal understanding of this term. Faculty members attending a seminar on curriculum development may all nod their heads when somebody proposes that the development of “critical thinking” is a must. But I highly suspect if the polite head-nodding signifies a uniform and standardized understanding of the term. According to Jennifer Moon, critical thinking “seems to be a prominent activity in education … but about which there is so much uncertainty.”

The second step in this process of rethinking involves asking the question: What is the dominant understanding of critical thinking as an educational goal? Barrow says that critical thinking includes coherent reasoning, conceptual clarity, discrimination in planning, discussion, explanation and others. Diane Halpern mentions a review of literature on critical thinking which shows the following as some of its main features: “reasoning/logic, judgment, metacognition, reflection, questioning and mental processes.” Stella Cottrell lists the following as some of the skills and attitudes of a critical thinker: “identifying other people’s positions, arguments and conclusions; identifying false and unfair assumptions; drawing conclusions about whether arguments are valid and justifiable, based on good evidence and sensible assumptions.” Nicholas Burbules and Rupert Berk further observe that this tradition of critical thinking is primarily concerned with “criteria of epistemic adequacy: to be ‘critica’ basically means to be more discerning in recognizing faulty arguments, hasty generalizations, assertions lacking evidence, truth-claims based on unreliable authority, ambiguous or obscure concepts and so forth.” It is clear from these various explanations that critical thinking is basically a mental process. Irvin Peckham calls this the cognitive strand of the critical thinking tradition. He says that, “teachers in the cognitive strand focus on argumentation as the exclusive vehicle of critical thought.”

28 Ibid., 19.
33 Irvin Peckham, Going North, Thinking West: The Intersections of Social Class, Critical Thinking, and Politicized Writing Instruction (Utah: Utah State University Press, 2010), 12.
The third step in this rethinking is to ask the question: What is the philosophical foundation of this dominant understanding of critical thinking? Brookfield’s study of the different traditions of critical thinking offers a worthwhile answer. In a book entitled *The Power of Critical Theory for Adult Learning and Teaching* (2005), he suggests that the notion of criticality in critical thinking can be traced to at least five different traditions: analytic philosophy, pragmatism, psychoanalysis, constructivism and critical theory. Brookfield further suggests that the tradition of logic and analytic philosophy has dominated the educational underpinning of higher education. He says: “From this perspective, to be critical is to be skilled at argument analysis, to recognize false inferences and logical fallacies, to be able to distinguish bias from fact, opinion from evidence, and so on.”

I can further assume that the most concrete manifestation in our educational system of the dominance of this critical thinking tradition is the long-standing habitation of Logic as a philosophy subject offered in many tertiary educational institutions and in some secondary schools.

This leads me to the next step in this rethinking: Given that there is a notion of critical thinking privileged in many academic institutions, what is marginalized along the way? Again, Brookfield’s observation is very helpful. He believes that the skills developed by the analytic tradition are useful and necessary but the tradition’s overemphasis on mental processes has led to inattention to social and political critique. Peckham calls this the social strand of critical thinking, which is concerned with promoting social justice. He says: “The critical thinking within this strand is not a function of informal logic and language; rather, it applies to a way of reading culture, of demystifying or denaturalizing socializing narratives.”

The development of the skills of reasoning and argumentation is not done for itself. Rather, it is privileged “for the larger purpose of promoting social justice.”

And here lies the significance of the tradition of Critical Theory in general and Critical Pedagogy in particular. The critical teacher is concerned not only with the validity of reasoning process. Pedagogy must involve a deeper understanding of the socio-political and economic arrangements that hegemonize and homogenize the lives of the students. This is partially what Freire would mean by *conscientization*, an educational process that prepares

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35 Ibid.
36 In the current curriculum, philosophy subjects are not anymore centered on Aristotelian Logic but on *Philosophy of the Human Person* and *Introduction to World Religions*. I consider this a welcome development. Future researchers may also consider the history of the dominance of Logic as a philosophy subject in the Philippine educational system.
38 Peckham, *Going North, Thinking West*, 12.
39 Ibid., 12.
students to become skillful not only in reading the word (both traditional literacy and functional literacy) but also in reading the world (critical and political literacy).\textsuperscript{40} By themselves, functional literacy and traditional academic skills cannot remedy the marginalized status of the citizens. Literacy must involve a continual demystification of socio-economic and political forces responsible for the oppressive condition of the people. It is worthwhile to quote in full one of Freire’s most concrete description of a conscienticized individual.

A person who has reached conscientization is capable of clearly perceiving hunger as more than just not eating, as the manifestation of political, economic, and social reality of deep injustice … [He/she] is able to connect facts and problems and to understand the connections between hunger and food production, food production and agrarian reform, agrarian reform and reactions against it, hunger and economic policy, hunger and violence and hunger as violence, hunger and the conscious vote for progressive politicians and parties, hunger and voting against reactionary politicians and parties, whose discourse may be deceptively progressive.\textsuperscript{41}

Thus, critical thinking is a fusion of various literacies. Relevant education is not reduced to what is acclaimed in the workforce or in the corporate world or by students and parents themselves: technicism and instrumentalism.\textsuperscript{42} Relevance comes to mean also as dynamic participation in democratic processes and citizenship.\textsuperscript{43} It is the substitution of a culture of

\textsuperscript{40} Freire discusses these ideas in many of his works. The following are good starting points: Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968), The Politics of Education: Culture, Power, and Liberation (1985), and one co-authored with Donaldo Macedo, Literacy: Reading the Word and Reading the World (1987).


\textsuperscript{42} “We submit to the peaceful production of the means of destruction, to the perfection of waste, to being educated for a defense which deforms the defenders and that which they defend.” Herbert Marcuse, Introduction to One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (London: Routledge, c1991), xxxix.

\textsuperscript{43} In an article, Beatrice Avalos argues that relevance in education must be understood in the Habermasian sense. It must satisfy not only the technical and practical interests of an individual or a society but also the emancipatory interests. See Beatrice Avalos, “Education for the Poor: Quality or Relevance” in British Journal of Sociology of Education, 13:4 (1992), 431.
voice to what Freire would call as a culture of silence.\textsuperscript{44} As we prepare our students to land their first job, we also prepare them to learn to question. In fact, this is clear in the K+12 agenda: education is not only for job preparation but for total human development. Critical pedagogues take seriously statements such as this.

But of course, my ideas are neither groundbreaking nor earth-shaking for Philippine education. Some Filipino scholars do not fail to remind us of the necessity of this dimension of critical thinking. Let me just mention some. Renato Constantino’s “Miseducation of the Filipino,” originally written in 1959, is a critique of the neocolonial character of our educational system.\textsuperscript{45} I do not buy the idea that it has ceased to become relevant after more than half a century. In a 1971 paper, Fernando Nakpil-Zialcita reminds Filipino scholars to allow philosophy as a critique of the society to flourish and develop along with other forms of philosophizing.\textsuperscript{46} Thirty-two years after, Feorillo Demeterio III, in at least two articles, calls for Filipino scholars of philosophy to learn again the pathway of critique understood not just as logical thinking but as critique of our deformed societal structures as well.\textsuperscript{47} Even in a 1995 publication, Florentino Hornedo emphatically says that values education in the Philippines must necessarily be education for social justice.\textsuperscript{48} And I am sure that I am missing many more.

Admittedly, when educators commit to this notion of critical thinking, they may be treading on inhospitable and dangerous ground: putting their profession at risk, gaining the ire of the powers-that-be, held under suspicion by school administrators and co-faculty members, frowned by students and parents who see the school merely as a training ground for careerism. Freire was very much aware of this dilemma of the critical teacher. In one of his dialogical books, he says that the teacher must be able to play around the system: one foot outside and one foot within the system.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{44} For his discussion on the notion of culture of silence, see Paulo Freire, “Cultural Action and Conscientization,” in Freire, \textit{The Politics of Education}, 67ff.

\textsuperscript{45} Renato Constantino, “The Mis-education of the Filipino,” in \textit{The Filipinos in the Philippines and Other Essays} (Quezon City: Filipino Signatures, 1966).


\textsuperscript{49} Paulo Freire and Ira Shor, \textit{A Pedagogy for Liberation: Dialogues on Transforming Education} (Connecticut: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Inc., 1987).
Stephen Sweet, a Sociology professor from the State University of New York, recognizes the institutional constraints; thus, he argues for balancing and tempering radical pedagogy by being conscious and considerate about these constraints.\footnote{Stephen Sweet, “Practicing Radical Pedagogy: Balancing Ideals with Institutional Constraints,” in \textit{Teaching Sociology}, 26(2) (1998), 100-111.} Giroux’s words are also enlightening. Citing the former City University of New York (CUNY) Chancellor, Joe Murphy, he says that educators should “give students [the critical] sensibility to understand economic, political, and historical forces so they’re not just victims of these forces but can act on them with effect. Giving [students, especially the poor] this power is a threatening idea to many. But it is essential to the health of a democratic society.”\footnote{Henry A. Giroux, “Cultural Studies as Public Pedagogy: Making the Pedagogical More Political,” in \textit{Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory} (October 1999), \texttt{<http://eepat.net/doku.php?id=cultural\_studies\_and\_public\_pedagogy>}, 21 June 2012.}

**Concluding Remarks**

Personally, notwithstanding the preparedness (or unpreparedness?) of the Philippine government and its citizenry, I recognize the fact that the major re-structuring of Philippine education (K+12 system) is a progressive move in the continuous evolution of the concept that education is a privilege gifted to a few into the “modern” idea that it is a fundamental human right for each person.\footnote{Cf. C. Lohrenscheit, “Curriculum and Human Rights,” in \textit{International Encyclopedia of Education}, vol. 1, ed. by Penelope Peterson, Eva Baker, Barry McGaw (Oxford: Academic Press, 2010), 287.} The former basic education system is at best a right that is wanting. At worst, it is a privilege that disguises itself as a right. The present one is in the direction of the actualization of a right. K+12 is a progressive one step forward.

However, in the interest of total human development being bannere

\textit{d} by the new educational system in the Philippines, we have to listen as well to the critical pedagogues. When critical thinking is rethought critically, we will find out that it means \textit{more} than what majority of the framers of our new educational system would like it to mean as a 21\textsuperscript{st} century skill. It cannot be confined to a one-dimensional meaning of simply being a set of logical skills. Inherent to critical thinking is its political and social dimension.\footnote{In another book, Stephen Brookfield claims that “critique” is a sacred word. And it cannot be understood properly when separated from the tradition of Frankfurt School Critical Theory. See Stephen D. Brookfield, “Transformative Learning as Ideology Critique,” in \textit{Learning as Transformation: Critical Perspectives on a Theory in Progress}, ed. by Jack Mezirow & Associates (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 129.} To be critical is also to have the skill to problematize dominant knowledge and to
challenge hegemonic arrangements. We have to make the critical in critical thinking more critical. Anything less is merely lip-service.

Then, when we look at the new K+12 curriculum, we will also find out that the field of philosophy, arguably a deathbed discipline that is in dire need of resuscitation, is in a better position to reclaim and reintroduce the critical in critical thinking. Edukasyon sa Pagpapakatao, the values-education subject given to students across all year levels in the new Basic Education, and Introduction to the Philosophy of the Human Person, obviously a philosophy subject required for senior high school students to take, are exciting venues and avenues for critical pedagogues. In the first place, Logic as the main take-off for critical thinking skill is already abolished. Secondly and more importantly, the two courses mentioned have the potential to support teaching and learning for social justice and equality. I have the inkling that these subjects have a temper that is in harmony with what Freire would call as “reading the word” and “reading the world.” Who in their right minds can accept the fact that pagpapakatao may not involve concern for justice, equality and human rights? Pagpapakatao is always a dynamic tension between personal agency and social agency. Freire is correct once again: Education is always Janus-faced! There will always be cracks and openings for the critical educators to operate. Philosophy is both a force for domestication and/or liberation.

The tradition of Critical Pedagogy and Critical Theory offers interesting and promising signposts for this noble but extremely difficult undertaking. The idea is not to replace one tradition with the other. Rather, Critical Pedagogy extends the discourse. And by extending it, at least two things are accomplished. First, the dominant discourse on critical thinking is problematized, for this concept can really be appropriated to cater to the interest of the dominant part of the society. The “critical thinker” becomes an effective cog in the well-oiled machine of an oppressive system. Second, the marginalized discourse is given a place in the vast field of what Agustin Rodriguez, in his book Governing the Other (2009), would term as “multiverse

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of rationality.”57 We need different perspectives on education. We cannot just submit to one dominant discourse.

In the spirit of Freirean liberating education, I ask you not to just accept what I said here but to think critically about it.58

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57 Agustin Martin Rodriguez, Governing the Other: Exploring the Discourse of Democracy in a Multiverse of Reason (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2009).


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- Creative Works (short philosophical fictions, poems, etc.)

C. When should you submit your work?

Because of the sheer number of unsolicited submissions we receive everyday, submission management has become a challenge for us. This often results in the piling-up of submissions, the breakdown of the online submission tool, and, at times, unacknowledged submissions. Therefore, we have devised a scheme to help us manage unsolicited submissions.

- Submissions for the June issue will be entertained ONLY during the January-February period (March-May for the refereeing process)
- Submissions for the December issue will be entertained ONLY during the July-August period (September-November for the refereeing process)

Specific Submission Guidelines

1. Submissions may be in either English or Filipino with good punctuation, grammar, and spelling. Provide a 200 word abstract in English and at least 4 key words. Please take note of the number of the acceptable word count for your submission (see Section B above).

2. KRITIKE is a refereed journal, so make sure that your text is prepared for blind review, meaning your name and institutional affiliation should not appear in the body of your paper. If you cited your own previous work(s) in the article, delete your name from the citation(s).

3. We recommend that, at the first instance, you use our prescribed citation style. You may also use the Chicago style which resembles our own. Click here to visit the journal’s style guide page.

4. Submit your text in 2.0 line spacing with 12 points font size. Quotations exceeding four lines should be indented and single-spaced.

5. Save your paper as either a Rich Text Format file (*.rtf) or a Microsoft Word document (*.doc or *.docx).

6. We recommend that you submit your paper by filling in the online submission tool at the right column of the submissions page (http://kritike.org/submissions.html) for a more systematic and efficient submission process.

7. We have amended our submission management policy (see Section C above). Submissions entered through the online submission tool outside the specified periods in Section C will not be considered. We recommend that you resubmit your work during a specific submission period.

8. By sending us your submission, you agree to be bound to the Terms and Conditions set in Section C of the journal’s Publication Ethics and Publication Malpractice Statement.
KRITIKE is committed to meet the highest ethical standards in research and academic publication. The journal is guided by the following principles:

A. Responsibilities of the Editorial Board

The Editorial Board ensures that manuscripts are prepared for blind peer-review. It is the responsibility of the Editorial Board to accept, reject, or recommend a manuscript for revision and resubmission. Such decision is based, to a large extent, on the recommendations of nominated experts who act as referees. It is the responsibility of the Editorial Board to inform an author about the status of his/her submission, regardless of the decision. The Editorial Board may choose to reject a paper that violates legal provisions on libel, copyrights, and originality (plagiarism). Information regarding a manuscript under review must remain confidential until it is finally accepted for publication. The Editorial Board does not necessarily endorse the views expressed in the articles published in the journal. As an Open Access journal in the Gold category, KRITIKE does not charge any fees to complete the publication process. No charges are levied against the authors or users for submission or article processing.

B. Responsibilities of the Referee

The referees nominated by KRITIKE’s Editorial Board are experts in their areas of specialization. The referees assist the Editorial Board’s decision to accept, reject, or revise and resubmit manuscripts based on their objective assessments and recommendations. A referee must treat an assigned manuscript with utmost confidentiality during the peer review process; however, it is the responsibility of the referee to inform the Editorial Board when a legal violation by the author is suspected. The evaluation of a manuscript should be based solely on its academic merit and not on race, gender, sexuality, or religious and/or political orientation of the author.

C. Responsibilities of the Author

It is the responsibility of the author to prepare his/her manuscript for blind review. The author must ensure that his/her work is original and not plagiarized. The sources used in the manuscript should be properly cited. An author must not submit the same manuscript to another journal when it is currently under review by KRITIKE. It is the responsibility of an author to inform the Editorial Board right away if his/her manuscript is being considered in another journal or publication medium; in such case, KRITIKE will discontinue the review of the manuscript. If an author’s manuscript is published by KRITIKE, he/she must adhere to the provisions set in the Copyrights section of the journal.
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If you wish to send us your feedback, general questions about the journal, questions about article submissions, theme suggestions for future issues, or word of intention to be a peer-reviewer or referee, send a message to kritike.editor@gmail.com.

If you wish to be a peer-reviewer or referee, do send us your complete name, e-mail address, institutional affiliation, position, and area of expertise via e-mail (include subject heading: reviewer). If you have any suggestions for specific themes (e.g., “European Philosophy and the Filipino Mind” or “Is there such thing as Filipino Philosophy?”) for future issues of the journal, send them via (include subject heading: theme).

Please note that unsolicited submissions should be sent through the journal’s Article Submission Tool.

You can also contact us via snail mail:

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