KRITIKE is the official open access (OA) journal of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Santo Tomas (UST), Manila, Philippines. It is a Filipino peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary, and international journal of philosophy founded by a group of UST alumni. The journal seeks to publish articles and book reviews by local and international authors across the whole range of philosophical topics, but with special emphasis on the following subject strands:

- Filipino Philosophy
- Oriental Thought and East-West Comparative Philosophy
- Continental European Philosophy
- Anglo-American Philosophy

The journal primarily caters to works by professional philosophers and graduate students of philosophy, but welcomes contributions from other fields (literature, cultural studies, gender studies, political science, sociology, history, anthropology, economics, inter alia) with strong philosophical content.

The word "kritike" is Greek from the verb "krinein," which means to discern. Hence, kritike means the art of discerning or the art of critical analysis. Any form of philosophizing is, in one way or another, a "critique" of something. Being critical, therefore, is an attitude common to all philosophical traditions. Indeed, the meaning of philosophy is critique and to be philosophical is to be critical.

KRITIKE supports the Open Access Movement and is classified under the "Platinum OA" category, which means that articles published by the journal are fully accessible online without a subscription fee. Moreover, the journal does not levy charges against the authors for the publication of their works. Articles can either be read on site or downloaded as pdf files and old issues are archived for future retrieval.

KRITIKE is committed to meet the highest ethical standards in research and academic publication. The journal is guided by the principles set in its Publication Ethics and Publication Malpractice Statement.

KRITIKE is a Philippine Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Accredited Research Journal (A-2 Category) and is indexed and listed in the following:

The Philosopher's Index
Humanities International Complete™
Humanities International Index™
International Directory of Philosophy
Modern Language Association (MLA) Directory of Periodicals
Directory of Open Access Journals
PhilPapers: Philosophical Research Online
Google Scholar

KRITIKE is a biannual journal published in June and December of each year.

ISSN 1908-7330 | OCLC 502390973 | www.kritike.org
Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief
Paolo A. Bolaños, University of Santo Tomas

Managing Editor
Roland Theuas DS. Pada, University of Santo Tomas

Associate Editors
Fleurdeliz R. Altez-Albela, University of Santo Tomas
Moses Aaron T. Angeles, San Beda College
Marella Ada M. Bolaños, University of Santo Tomas
Peter Emmanuel A. Mara, University of Santo Tomas
Melanie P. Mejia, University of Santo Tomas
Dean Edward A. Mejos, University of Asia & the Pacific

Book Review and Creative Works Editors
Darlene Demandante, University of Santo Tomas
Tracy Ann P. Llanera, Macquarie University
Wendyl Luna, University of New South Wales
Jonathan Villacorta, University of Santo Tomas

Style and Layout Editors
Ranier Carlo V. Abengaña, University of Santo Tomas
Pia Patricia P. Tenedero, University of Santo Tomas

Editorial Collaborative
Agustin Martin Rodriguez, Ateneo de Manila University
Napoleon Mabaquiao, De La Salle University
Jeffry Ocyay, Silliman University
Renante Pilapil, Ateneo de Davao University
Ryan Urbano, University of San Carlos

International Advisory Board
Romualdo E. Abulad, University of Santo Tomas
Karim Bauer, McGill University
Alfredo P. Co, University of Santo Tomas
Leovino Ma. Garcia, Ateneo de Manila University
Heinrich Geiger, Katholischer Akademischer Ausländer-Dienst
John F. X. Knasas, University of St. Thomas - Houston
Zosimo E. Lee, University of the Philippines - Diliman
Julius D. Mendoza, University of the Philippines - Baguio
Hans-Georg Moeller, University of Macau
Karl-Heinz Pohl, Universität Trier
Peter L P Simpson, City University of New York
Nicholas H. Smith, Macquarie University
John Rundell, University of Melbourne
Vincent Shen, University of Toronto
John Weckert, Charles Sturt University
A TRIBUTE TO FLORENTINO H. HORNEDO

ROLAND THEUAS DS. PADA

The Humanity of Florentino Hornedo in the Humanities

ARTICLES

JENNIFER M. CASABUENA

Ideyolohiya at Utopia sa mga Liham sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo sa Baclaran

EMMANUEL C. DE LEON

Ang Pilosopiya at Pamimilosopiya ni Roque J. Ferriols, S.J.: Tungo sa Isang Kritikal na Pamimilosopiyang Filipino

LESLIE ANNE L. LIWANAG

Ang Pilosopiya ni Sr. Mary John Mananzan, OSB

VIRGILIO A. RIVAS

‘On the Jewish Question:’ A Polemical Précis

FRANZ GIUSEPPE F. CORTEZ

Critical Business Ethics: Contributions and Challenges

GERALD A. POWELL

Technological De-Worlding, Search for a Fleshy Method: An Investigation into Le Quotidienne

JEREMY DE CHAVES

Reading Erich Fromm’s The Art of Loving, or Why Loving Means Giving Nothing

CHRISTIANE JOSEPH C. JOCSON

Paul Ricoeur: A Synthesis of a History of Life and a History of Death through Phenomenological Hermeneutics

CHRISTINE ABIGAIL L. TAN

The Cultured Man as the Noble Man: Jun Zi 君子 as a Man of Li 礼 in Lun Yu 论语

SOUMICK DE

Not even to know that you do not know: Cicero and the “theatricality” of the New Academy

REVIEW ARTICLE

ADAM ROSEN-CAROLE

Father Can’t You See . . .? (Death)

BOOK REVIEW

JOVITO V. CARIÑO

Bolaños, Paolo A. On Affirmation and Becoming: A Deleuzian Introduction to Nietzsche’s Ethics and Ontology
A Tribute to Florentino H. Hornedo

The Humanity of Florentino Hornedo in the Humanities

Roland Theuas DS. Pada

Abstract: This brief essay is a tribute to Florentino Hornedo, a defender of the humanities. I share some biographical notes on the life of Hornedo as well as some of his salient works in Philosophy.

Keywords: Hornedo, humanities, ethnology, anthropology

Florentino Hornedo was born in the culturally rich and beautiful island of Sabtang, Batanes on October 16, 1938. His hometown in Savidug served as the inspiration for the theoretical, social, and intellectual engagement of his long and productive academic life. He originally intended to pursue his studies in the sciences, for he has loved reading books on biology and animal life, but through the reality of poverty (and the fear of breaking laboratory equipment), he decided to pursue in its place the study of education (mainly because he loved the idea of studying itself). As confused and as random these academic career choices were for him, Hornedo would later on become an intellectual tangled with a caboodle of disciplines in the humanities that would only make sense if we were to look back at his strong love for his cultural roots. It is difficult to say that he had some grand plan to pursue the field of anthropology, philosophy, literature, social science, ethnology, and history so as to bring back the necessary skills and theoretical understanding of the humanities to his beloved Batanes; all I can say from this is that as an intellectual wanderer, he always had a place to call home.

The sudden loss of Hornedo’s life was a shock to all those whose lives he touched, especially his students and colleagues. In the early hours of the 9th of December, 2015, he was found alone and clutching his chest in his room at the Saint Dominic College of Batanes. In this solitary departure, his family, friends, colleagues, students, and mentees, are all united in mourning the loss of a paragon of humanity in the humanities. Understanding Hornedo’s writings is an intellectual journey that traverses all the walks of life towards the understanding of humanity and its persistence to live life in the most
meaningful sense. His initial study of philosophy in his younger years led to the question of values that literature failed to answer. His thesis on the notion of freedom was his timely meditation on developmental and social process of autonomy. In this work, he emphasized that while freedom is a metaphysical concept, its embodiment is dependent upon the developmental resources that are allotted to the embodiment of freedom that can either enable humanity to pursue its own destiny or overcome barriers that hinder one’s pursuit of self-becoming. The timeliness of this work, however, was in part its own undoing. Due to the political upheavals of the Philippine Martial Law era of the 1970s, Hornedo’s book was left unread and copies were kept in a warehouse during the Marcos era only to be picked up and republished by the UST Press in 2000.

Hornedo’s strong affinity with the understanding of humanity in the humanities was strongly influenced by the multi-disciplinary approaches of the European intellectual tradition, that had a strong bent on the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, structuralism, and post-structuralism. His essays in his book Pagpapakatao propose some of the salient points of contemporary theories of philosophy and literature to the meaning and value of understanding humanity in its cultural and existential experience. Hornedo’s theoretical understanding of the humanities was not by far limited to the perspective of an ivory-tower theorist sitting smugly in his armchair as the world took its own historical course. His historical and anthropological essays looked back as far as the pre-colonial times of Philippine culture, down to its recent contemporary developments. Works on the aspect of values in Philippine culture and history can be seen in Ideas and Ideals and Pagmamahalan and Pagumumurahan.

Much of Hornedo’s life was dedicated to the development and preservation of Ivatan culture. His multidisciplinary works were instrumental to his cause of understanding and helping his Ivatan roots. The Ivatan in Batanes, was fecund with oral-folk traditions and cultural practices that survived the storm of times much like their naval understanding of the seas and architectural ingenuity has allowed them to weather out the most tempestuous parts of the Philippines. We can understand Hornedo’s interest in freedom and autonomous development when we understand his ardent desire for the development of his beloved Batanes to weather out the political and social challenges of contemporary Philippine politics. We can appreciate

4 Cf. Florentino Hornedo, Pagmamahalan at Pagumumurahan, (Quezon City: Office of the Research and Publication, School of Arts and Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University, 1997).
his love for literature and ethnology, in the context of his will to preserve the oral traditions and practices, such as the Laji of the Ivatans.

While the academe may mourn for the loss of a productive and creative talent found in Hornedo’s work, we are also at a loss when we remember his exceptional life. While he never fathered any children of his own, he was a father (and a mother) to family, relatives, and even complete strangers. A poet, painter, sculptor, and an excellent cook and a baker with an impeccable taste for excellent coffee. He frequently enjoyed going to the cinema, to which he drew most of his examples in the humanities towards understanding human nature. Unknown to a lot of people, he also picked up stray and injured animals on the streets so as to nurse them back to health. He had the nasty habit of drawing unflattering portraits of his teachers in class, to which he often got into trouble in his youth. We will never forget the bushy eyebrows and the distinctively manly moustache backed by an imposing height and a voice that can make man or god shudder in fear and reverence.

In his last few lectures, he shared his thoughts on the symbolism of the owl as a figurehead of philosophy. While owls may have the vision and the ability to see far and wide, they were not productive in the sense that they simply used that capacity to hunt mice. For Hornedo, philosophers should be likened to honeybees. They provide illumination in the dark with their wax, and allow the productive enjoyment of their labour with honey. While I mourn for the loss of a good friend and intellectual father, I am reminded of Theuth and Amon-Ra. The struggle between light and darkness is mitigated by the presence of Theuth, as the shining brilliance of Amon-Ra subsides through the night, it is the persistence of memory that allows Theuth to channel the presence of someone who is absent. May we serve as the moon to the sun that always shined brightly in the life of Florentino Hornedo.

Department of Philosophy and the Graduate School
University of Santo Tomas, Philippines

References


__________, Pagmamahalan at Pagnumurahan (Quezon City: Office of Research and Publication, School of Arts and Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University, 1977).

5 My thanks are extended to Georgina Gabilo for sharing her thoughts and experiences with Florentino Hornedo’s life.
THE HUMANITY OF FLORENTINO HORNEDO

__________, Pagpakakatao and Other Essays in Contemporary Philosophy and Literature of Ideas (Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House, 2002).

Ideyolohiya at Utopia sa mga Liham sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo sa Baclaran

Jennifer M. Casabuena

Abstract: This paper is focused on examining the contents of the letters addressed to Our Lady of Perpetual Help based on the level and shape of ideology and utopia. The following is the task of this piece: to determine the devotees’ concept of devotion, to ascertain the manner by which the devotees exercise their devotion to the Our Lady of Perpetual Help, and, to highlight the implication of ideology and utopia contained within the letters in relation to talks about conversion and societal transformations. Using the observations and interviews gathered from 96 respondents, this researcher was able to illustrate the manner by which the devotees practice their devotion. A sum of 215 letters were used to determine the level and shape of ideology and utopia prevailing in these letters. Based from the result of the studies, there are different concrete practices that the Filipino devotees do in relation to their devotion to Mary. In the field of ideology, what prevails is the devotees’ wish to be cured from their sickness, financial help, and reconciliation—these are the primary ideological aspects contained within the letters which blinds the devotees. On the other hand, in the field of utopia, we may discover the dominant concrete utopic visions in the letters about spiritual grace, health and recovery from non-threatening ailments, passing exams and obtaining jobs. This utopia can be seen as a result of the movement of the devotees including their practices of praying in order to ask for their wishes to be granted. As a result, it appears that the realization of their wishes brings about the deepening of their faith, changes in attitude and behavior, trust in God, and deeper devotion. As a conclusion for this study, this researcher has discovered that the Filipino way of true devotion and dealing with Mary occurs in one process: experience of challenges, visitation, participation, act of mutual trust, and being one with others.

Keywords: Our Lady of Perpetual Help, letters, ideology, utopia
Introduksyon

Sa kasalukuyan, ang Baclaran ang nagsilbing saksi sa malalim na debosyon ng mga Pilipinong Katoliko sa imahen ng Ina ng Laging Saklolo. Ipinapakita ng Baclaran phenomenon ang napakaraming bilang ng mga taong nagpupupunta sa Baclaran tuwing araw ng Miyerkules para sa nobena sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo. Isa sa natatanging gawain ng pagnonobena sa Mahal na Birhen ang pagbabasa ng mga liham ng pasasalamat. Ang mga liham pasasalamat sa mga kahilingang natatanggap ay mga konkretoong patunay ng malalim na pamimintuho kay Maria. Ito ay paglalarawan ng matinding pagsandig ng mga Pilipino sa kanilang pananampalataya para sa kanilang pangangailangan. Ang mga liham na inihuhulog ng mga deboto para kay Maria ay isang halimbawa ng kanilang paniniwala at pag-asa sa kaganapan ng kanilang mga kahilingan.

Ang pag-aaral na ito ay nakatuon sa pagsusuri ng penomenon ng pagsulat ng liham ng mga deboto sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo. Naglalayon itong ilarawan ang gawain ng paghuhulog ng liham sa dambana ng Ina ng Laging Saklolo sa Baclaran gayundin ang mators at antas ng ideyolohiya at utopia na mayroon ng mga mananampalatayang Katoliko na makikita sa mga liham na kanilang inihulog sa nasabing dambana. Sa pamamagitan ng pag-aaral na ito, malalaman kung alin sa ideyolohiya at utopia ang nangingibabaw sa mga liham ng mga deboto. Gagamiting salalayan sa pag-aaral na ito ang mga teorya nina Mannheim at Bloch ukol sa ideyolohiya at utopia.

Metodolohiya

Dalawa ang datos na sinuri ng mananaliksik na magsisilbing sagot sa layunin ng kaniyang pag-aaral. Una na rito ay ang panayam sa 96 na mga deboto at pangalawa, ang mga liham ng mga deboto sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo sa buwan ng Mayo taong 2014.

Sa 2,292 liham (petisyon at pasasalamat) ng mga deboto sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo sa Baclaran, mayroong 207 liham pasasalamat at 2,085 na petisyon o kahilingan. Mula sa bilang na ito ng mga liham, pinili ang 215 na liham na kumatawan sa pagsusuri ng antas at hugis ng ideyolohiya at utopia. Sa pagsusuri ng mga liham na ito gumamit ng coding ang mananaliksik. Ginamit ang D1-D215 para kumatawan sa mga halimbawang liham na ginamit sa pagsusuri. Samantala ang K1-K18 naman ay kumakatawan sa 18 kategorya kung saan inuri ang kahilingan ng mga deboto sa mga liham batay sa:
K1: Espiritwal na Biyaya
K2: Pagbabalik-loob
K3: Kapayapaan sa Tahanan
K4: Pagkakasundo
K5: Katuwan sa Buhay
K6: Kalusugan at Paggaling
K7: Kaligtasan sa Sakuna
K8: Pagkakaroon ng Anak
K9: Tulong Pinansyal
K10: Tagumpay sa Pag-aaral
K11: Pagpasa sa Eksam
K12: Pagbyahe sa Ibang Bansa
K13: Pagkakaroon ng Trabaho
K14: Katarungan at Kapayapaan
K15: Legal na Biyaya
K16: Materyal na Biyaya
K17: Lahat ng Biyaya
K18: Pasasalamat

Teorya naman nina Karl Mannheim at Ernst Bloch ang ginamit na lente para sa paghimay sa mga datos na ito. Si Karl Mannheim ay kilalang sosyolohista at pilosopo na ipinanganak sa Hungary. Ang kanyang sosyolohiya ng kaalaman ang nagpalamaw sa pananaw ni Karl Marx hinggil sa magkaibang sistema ng paniniwala ng proletaryo at ng burgis. Sa pananaw ni Mannheim ang salungatang panlipunan ay bunga ng magkakaibang ideyolohiya mula sa iba’t ibang antas ng lipunan. Ginamit niya ang konsepto ng ideyolohiya at utopia bilang dalawang pangunahing kaisipang lumilinlang sa diskursong politikal. Ninas niyang alisin ang negatibong katangian ng dalawang konseptong ito at gamitin ito bilang batayan sa pag-unawa kung paanong tinitingnan ng ilang grupong panlipunan ang kanilang kapaligiran.¹

Naniniwala siya na ang ideyolohiya ay makikita saanman at walang aspekto ng buhay ng tao na hindi napapalamutian ng ideyolohiya. Ang mga ideyolohiyang ito ay nakatago at kinakailanganang tanggali ang maskara ng bumanalo sa ideyolohiya ng tao ng pagtatanghal ng kasinungalingan. Hinahanap niya ang reyalidad sa likod ng ideyolohiya at utopia. Katulad ng pananaw ni Marx, ang pananaw ni Mannheim sa ideyolohiyang ito ay pumipigil sa anumang pagtatangka sa pagbabago samantalahang ang utopia naman ay mayroong paghahangad sa pagbabago upang mapabuti ang kanilang estado kaya naman kinakailangan ang utopia sapagkat taglay nito ang kinakailangang pagbabagong panlipunan.²

Ang ideyolohiya ay mga ideya na hindi natamo ang katotohanan sa pagpapakita ng mga naturang kapalibad. Ang mga ideyolohiya ay maaituturing na mga mabubuting layunin para sa subhettibong pagkilos ng indibiyal. Kapag ang mga ideyolohiyang ito ay inilalangkap sa pagkilos ng

individuales, el significado no se logra de manera sistemática. Se indica que ésta es una tarea de Cristianismo, en la que se enseña el amor mutuo en un contexto que puede ser a menudo en desacuerdo con el autor del texto. Masasabing ideología no es idea en cuanto a una concepto de amor mutuo en la sociedad. Sin embargo, estas ideas son más relevantes en una sociedad que no está en línea con las enseñanzas del Cristianismo. Así, la ideología del amor se entiende más como una idea ideológica que no se logra si la sociedad no está en línea con las enseñanzas del Cristianismo.

Tinalakay din ni Mannheim la idea de la utopía como una manifestación de la realidad en la que no se encuentra. Éste se refiere a lo que no se encuentra en la realidad, o no es realizable. La definición de la utopía en el texto se refiere a un proceso de pensamiento que se encuentra no desde el mundo real, sino desde el concepto de símbolo, fantasía, sueño, idea. Para él, esta idea y su receptividad para la realidad. Por lo tanto, no hay una realidad, sino que hay una realidad que está en línea con el sueño.

Bloch no acepta la estrategia de Mannheim para el uso de la historia para crear un esquema de la ideología y la utopía, ya que para Mannheim, este es un deseo (wishful thinking) sin importar en qué forma no se logra una utopía. En el texto, la utopía se debe entender como un proyecto de paz, que la sociedad pueda lograr un anhelo a través de sus esfuerzos.

---

pananaw naman ni Bloch, lahat ng mga pag-asa at pangako ay mayroong himaymay ng tinatawag n扬yang *utopian surplus*.7

Para kay Bloch, ang pag-asa ay laganap sa araw-araw na kamalayan ng tao at malinaw na makikita sa iba’t ibang anyo ng kultura ng tao simula sa mga “fairy tale” tungo sa mga pilosopikal at politikal na utopia. Ang bawat indibidwal ay mayroong mga pangarap na inaaasam niyang makamit. Naniniwala si Bloch na mayroong mga hindi nakakamit na potensyal na nangangailangan ng pagbabagong panlipunan na nangangahulugan lamang na mayroong utopia sa lahat ng sitwasyong nararanasan ng tao. Ang utopia ay abot-tanaw lamang, hindi pa nakakamit, at mayroong posibilidad na makamit. Ang mga hangarin at pag-asa ng tao ay matatamo upang magkaroon ng isang maayos na pamumuhay ang tao. Naniniwala si Bloch na ang mga tao ay aktibong kalahok sa pagbuo ng isang magandang hinaharap; kailangan lamang na taong mag-isip at kumilos ayon sa bisyon nakita ni Bloch sa sining, literatura, at musika.8

Sa kaniyang konsepto ng utopianismo, ginamit niya ang abstrak at konkretong utopia. Ang abstrak na utopia ay makikita sa pinakamahina nitong anyo na nangangahulugang pagnanasa lamang at walang malinaw na balangkas kung paano ito matatamo. Samantala, ang konkretong utopia naman ay isang obhektibong posibilidad na kung saan mayroong pagmimithi ng kaganapan ang kanilang pangarap na nakabatay sa masinsinang pag-aaral ng umiiral na kaayusan at pulidong pagdalumat ng balangkas at metodo ng pagbabago.9

Gamit ang teorya ni Mannheim, inilahad ng mananaliksik ang antas at hugis ng ideyolohiya na nangingibabaw sa mga inihulog na liham ng mga deboto sa Dambana ng Ina ng Lagiding Saklolo sa Baclaran upang matalaoy ang implikasyon ng ideyolohihayang nakapaloob sa mga liham na ito sa usapin ng pagbabagong-loob at pagbabago ng lipunan.

Pagtutuunan ng pansin sa pagsusuring ito ang tatlong pangunahing uri ng ideyolohiyang nabuo ni Mannheim: 1) mga elementong pumipigil sa isang taong makita niya ang tunay na kaayusan ng reyalidad, 2) mga elementong nag-uudyok sa isang taong linlang niya ang kaniyang sarili hinggil sa tunay na kaayusan ng reyalidad, at 3) panilinlang ng isang tao sa kaniyang kapwa para tanggapin na lamang ang umiiral na kaayusan.

Samantala, gamit naman ang teorya ni Bloch, sinuri ng mananaliksik kung gaano kaabstrakto o kakonkreto ang mga pagmimithi/pag-asa ng mayroon ang mga deboto mula sa mga liham na kanilang inihulog sa

---

dambana ng Ina ng Laging Saklolo. Nais makita ng mananaliksik kung gaano kakonkreto sa parte ng mga deboto at kung gaano kalakas ang kanilang pagmimithi upang maisakatuparan ang kanilang mga inaasam.

**Resulta at Diskusyon ng Pag-aaral**

**Paglalarawan ng Debosyon sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo sa Baclaran**

Sa paraan ng pagdededebosyon ng mga deboto sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo natuklasan ng mananaliksik na marami sa mga deboto ang nagsimula ang debosyon dahil sa impluwensya ng kanilang kapamilya, partikular na ang kanilang lola o ina. Naging tradisyon na ng pamilya ang pagnonobena sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo kaya nahihikayat na rin ang kapamilya na gawin ito. Mayroon din namang ang nakakaaimpluwensya sa kanila para magnobena at maging deboto ay ang kanilang mga kaibigan. Sa bihirang pagkakataon, mayroong ilan na dahil naririning na nila ang pangalang Ina ng Laging Saklolo at ang mga himala nito kay sila na mismo ang pumupunta sa dambana upang humingi ng tulong lalo na sa panahon ng matinding pangangailangan.

Kaugnay ng kanilang gawain bilang tanda ng kanilang debosyon sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo, lumabas na ang mga sumusunod naman ang kanilang ginagawa: pagnonobena, pagtanod kapag araw ng Martes, paglalakad nang paluhod, pagsalat sa imahen ng Ina ng Laging Saklolo, pagdarasal ng Santo Rosaryo, voluntaryong paglilingkod sa Dambana ng Ina ng Laging Saklolo at paghuhulog ng liham sa dambana.

Ayon sa mga deboto, ang mga pangunahin nilang dahilan sa pagdededebosyon ay pagtupad ng Mahal na Ina sa kanilang mga kahilingan, bilang pasasalamat sa biyayang natatanggap, at naging bahagi na si Maria ng kanilang buhay. Dahil naman sa kanilang pagnonobena, mayroon ding kabutihan na naidudulot ito sa kanila tulad ng pag-iwas sa kanilang masasamang bisyo, nagiging matapang sa pagharap sa pagsubok, at pagbabago ng ugali. Dahil din sa kanilang pagiging deboto at palagiang pagnonobena sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo, nagiging magaan ang kanilang pakiramdam kahit na marami silang mga problema sa buhay. Mula rin sa mga nakapanayam, natuklasan na ang mga hinihiling nila ay may kaugnayan sa kalusugan, trabaho, pagkakaroon ng anak o katuwang sa buhay, at pagpasa sa eksam.

**Antas at Hugis ng Ideyolohiya sa mga Liham**

Malaki ang kaugnayan ng pananampalataya ng mga Pilipino sa kanilang paghingi ng tulong kay Maria. Kadalasang makikita sa mga liham
ng mga deboto sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo ang kanilang paniniwala na ang anumang kanilang hilingin ay kanilang matatamo o ibibigay sa kanila sapagkat hindi sila kayang biguin ni Maria. Ayon sa Banal na Bibliya, mula sa “Aklat ng Hebreo,” “Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.”¹⁰ Nangangahulugan lamang na ang pananampalataya ay ang pagtitiwala sa magkakaroon ng katuparan ang anumang inaasam at mayroong paniniwala sa mga bagay na hindi niya nakikita tulad ng paniniwala sa kapangyarihan ni Kristo.

Mayroong tatlong katangian ang pananampalataya: paniniwala (believing) na tumutukoy sa pagkilala sa presensya ng Panginoon katulad ng malalim na pag-unawa na mayroon ng mga hiling; pangalawa ang paggawa (doing) na nangangahulugang pagsunod o pagsasagawa ng turo ng Panginoon, at pangatlo ang pagtitiwala (trusting) ng lahat sa kamay ng Panginoon. Ito ay nagmumula sa puso ng bawat indibidwal at ito ay lumalago sa pagmamagitan ng pagdarasal at pagpambata sa Diyos.¹¹

Sa pagkakataon, makikita sa mga namimintuho kay Maria ang konsepto nila ng pananampalataya sa Panginoon sa intersesyon ni Maria. Sa kanilang mga liham ng petisyon, makikita sa mga deboto na sila ay nabubulag ng kanilang depinisyon ng paniniwala at pananampalataya sapagkat may mga pagkakataon ang isang debotong humihiling ay lumalampas sa limitasyon niya bilang taong namamamahayag ng pagtitiwala. Nililinlang niya ang kaniyang sarili sa mga pagkakataon nakaramamadam siya ng matinding depresyon at desperasyon na makamit ang kahilingan.

Matutunghayan sa ibaba ang buod ng mga lihim na naglalaman ng ideyolohiya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KATEGORiya</th>
<th>Bilang ng Liham</th>
<th>IDEYOLOHIYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| K1: Espiritwal na Biyaya | D1-D5 | ● mayroong pag-amin ng pagkakamali  
● nakasalalay pa rin sa mga pahiwatig/hudyat sa mamamagitan ng mga himala ang pagbabago ng tao  
● tanging ang pagtawag lamang niya sa Panginoon ang makatutulong sa kaniya |
| K2: Pagbabalik-loob | D6-D10 | ● paniniwalang kung hindi maghihimala ang Mahal na Ina ay hindi na magkakaroon ng pagbabago sa kaniyang kapatid  
● iniuugnay niya ang pagbabago ng kaniyang asawa |

¹⁰ Heb. 11:1 (ESV).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>K3: Kapayapaan sa Tahanan</th>
<th>D11-D15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• pag-uutos na mabago ang ugali ng asawa o hiwalayan nito ang kinakasama</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• umaasa na lamang sila sa magiging tugon mula sa kaniyang pagdarasal batay na rin sa pahayag nilang &quot;humihindi&quot;, &quot;sana&quot; at &quot;hipuin&quot; para ang kanilang mga asawang napabang landas ay magbalik-loob</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• naniniwalang si Mama Mary lamang ang may kakayahang makapagpabago ng masamang ugali ng kaniyang manugang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>K4: Pagkakasundo</th>
<th>D16-D24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• sa mga pagkakataong wala nang magagawa, iniaasa na lamang sa pagkilos ng Maria ang kanilang hiling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• wala ibang inaasahan upang matupad ang kanilang kahilingan kundi ang tulong na himala at panalangan na lamang sa Mahal na Ina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• finitingnan na walang impossible sa Diyos kaya lahat ay kaya nitong gawin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• pagsusumamo ng pagkilos ng Mahal na Ina para sa kaniyang asawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• pakikipagtawaran sa Panginoon o kay Maria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• umaasa ang deboto na sa pagtatapos ng kaniyang nobena ay mayroon nang katuparan ang hiling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• pag-asa na maayos ang relasyon sa pamamagitan ng panalangin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>K5: Katuwangan sa Buhay</th>
<th>D25-D33</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• paghingi ng mga senyales/pahiwatig</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• sinusukat ang kakayahan ni Kristo na magdesisyon para sa kaniyang ikabubuti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• umaasa na lamang sa himala</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• pag-asa sa ipagkakaloob ni Maria na katuwang sa buhay sa pamamagitan ng nobena</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• labis na pagnanais o despresyon ng deboto kaugnay sa pagbibigay sa kaniya ng Mahal na Ina ng makakasama habambuhay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>K6: Kalusugan at Paggaling</th>
<th>D34-D49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• matinding depresyon ng isang kaanak na mabigyan o madugtungan pa ang buhay ng taong kanilang mahal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• pag-asa sa himala o milagro ng pagpapagaling ni Maria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• pag-asa sa maka-inang pagkalinga ni Maria na</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| K7: Kaligtasan sa Sakuna | hindi sila bibiguin  
|                         | • pagbuo ng pangako sa paniniwalang mas mainam ito upang matupad ang panalangin  
|                         | • pag-asa sa bisang dala ng pagnonobena  
| K8: Pagkakaroon ng Anak | walang gaanong makikitang mga paglalahad o pagsasalaysay ng kahilingan ang mga deboto kaugnay sa kategoryang ito 
|                         | • umaasa sa himala ng pagdadalantao na ipagkakaloob sa kanila ni Maria  
|                         | • kinukumpleto ang siyam na nobena para sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo sapagkat naniniwala sila na sila ay pagkakalooban ng anak  
| K9: Tulong Pinansyal   | D50- D53  
|                         | • pagpapaulubaya ng kahilingan kay Maria at pag-asa na hindi sila bibiguin  
|                         | • kawalan nila ng pag-asa na lusutan ang kanilang problema at maniwalang lamang sa tulong at saklolo ni Maria  
|                         | • lubusang pag-asa ng deboto sa panalangin  
|                         | • paniniwalang himala na lamang ni Maria ang makatutulong sa kaniyang problemang pinansyal  
|                         | • desperasyon na matugunan ang pangangailangan  
|                         | • paghahangad sa mabilisang pagtugon sa panalangin  
|                         | • pagpapakahulugan sa pagnonobena bilang katuparan ng mga temporal nilang pangangailangan  
|                         | • kinitikala nilang maaawain si Maria at walang imposible sa kaniya  
| K10: Tagumpay sa Pag-aaral | D65- D68  
|                         | • pagpapaulubaya ng hiling sa pamamagitan ng himala  
|                         | • paniniwalang mababago ang marka sa pamamagitan ng panalangin  
|                         | • paniniwala sa himala ng pagdarasal kaugnay sa pagkakaroon ng sipag at talino ng anak  
|                         | • nakasalalay lamang sa Mahal na Ina ang kaniyang pagpasa at kaniyang pagtatapos  
| K11: Pagpasa sa Eksam   | D69- D73  
|                         | • ang kanilang matinding kagustuhan o pagnagnasa na matamo ang isang bagay ang nag-uudyok sa kanila upang umasa sa himala ni Mariapaniniwalang sapagkat si Maria ay mapagbigay na ina, ipagkakaloob nito ang anumang nais nila kahit na wala naman silang gawin  
| K12: Pagbyahae sa Ibang Bansa | D74- D77  
|                         | • paniniwalang si Maria ay mapaghimalang birhen ang nagubunsod sa kanilang upang maniwala  
| K13:                      | D78 - D84  
|                         | • dahil sa deboto sila ng Mahal na Ina ng Laging Saklolo ay ipagkakaloob ang kanilang nais  

© 2015 Jennifer M. Casabuena
ISSN 1908-7330
### MGA LIHAM SA INA NG LAGING SAKLOLO

| Pagkakaroon ng Trabaho | • sa kahinaan ng loob, si Maria na lamang ang pag-asang makatutulong sa kanila  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>• may himig ng pag-uutos sa Mahal na Birhen hinggil sa kanilang nais</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| K14: Katarungan at Kapayapaan Panlipunan | D85  
|                         | • paghiling sa kalutasan ng kaso ukol sa demolisyon dahil walang ibang mahihingan ng tulong kundi si Maria  |
| K15: Legal na Biyaya | D86- D87  
|                         | • paniniwala sa kapangyarihan ni Maria sa pagkakaloob ng himala hinggil sa pagpapawalang-sala ng mga nasasakdal sa kaso  |
| K16: Materyal na Biyaya | D88- D91  
|                         | • umasaang pagkakalooban ng mga ari-ariang labis-labis sa pamamagitan ng kanilang pagdarasal pa rin sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo  
|                         | • pagnanasang makatagas sa hirap na kanilang pinagdadaan  |
| K17: Lahat ng Biyaya | D92- D96  
|                         | • tiningting nila ang debosyon kay Maria bilang isang “paghiling” o “wishing well”  
|                         | • pag-asa sa paghiling sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo ng lahat ng biyayang materyal at di materyal  |

#### Talahanayan 1: Mga nilalaman ng mga liham na mayroong ideyolohiya

Batay sa mga naging liham ng mga deboto kaugnay sa ideyolohiya o panlilinlang sa/ng mga deboto sa kanilang mga sarili, nakita ang ideyolohiya o pambubulag ayon sa kung paanong humihiling ang mga deboto sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo at kung paano nila tinatanaw na matutupad ang mga kahilingang ito. Ipinakikita sa 410 liham o 27% ng kabuuang liham na sinuri ang ideyolohiya na nangingibabaw sa mga deboto. Mula sa mga halimbawa ng liham na sinuri sa larangan ng ideyolohiya, marami sa mga deboto ay nabubulag ayon sa sumusunod na mga kadahilanan: a) Ina ng Laging Saklolo ayon na rin sa titulo ng Mahal na Birhen bilang isang ina na palaging prestigioso sa mga pangangailangan ng tao; b) desperasyon o matinding pagnanasang isang bagay sa panahong wala na silang magawa; c) paniniwala na sa pagtatapos ng nobena sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo ay makakamit nila ang kanilang hangarin sa buhay, at d) pag-asa ng mga deboto sa himala upang matamo ng kanilang mimimithi sa buhay.

Ang unang prominenteng ideolohiya ay ang pagtingin o pagtanaw ng mga deboto sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo ayon sa titulo ng Mahal na Birhen bilang isang ina na palaging handang sumaklolo at tumugon sa mga pangangailangan ng tao. Sa pagtitingin nila sa ganitong aspekto sa Mahal na Birhen, mayroon silang tendensiyang ipaubaya na lamang sa kanya ang lahat dahil sa parte nila ay wala naman silang ginagawa. Mayroon silang
paniniwala na sa pagdarasal sa Mahal na Ina ipagkakaloob nito ang anumang kanilang naisin. Para sa kanila walang imposible kaya Maria at lahat ay kaya nitong gawin.

Pangalawang aspekto ng pambubulag sa mga deboto ay ang kanilang desperasyon o matinding pagnanasa sa isang bagay sa panahong wala na silang magawa. Maaring tumukoy ito sa unang elemento ni Mannheim kaugnay sa ideyolohiya sapagkat nililinlang sila ng kanilang labis na pangangailangan o desperasyon para makita nila kung ano talagang dapat nilang gawin sa sitwasyong kinalalagyan nila. Mayroong mga debotong lumalapit sa Mahal na Ina sa mga panahong wala na silang alam na paraan upang mabigyang solusyon ang kanilang problema o suliraning pinagdaraanan sa buhay pansarili man o pampamilya.

Pangatlo namang aspekto sa bumubulag sa mga deboto ay ang kanilang paniniwala na sa pagtatapos o pagsasagawa ng nobena sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo, makakamit nila ang kanilang hangarin sa buhay. May mga debotong malinaw na naghahayag na sa pagtatapos ng kanilang pagnonobena ay inaasahan na nila ang katuparan ng kanilang pangarap.

Pang-apat ay ang pag-asa ng mga deboto sa himala na matamo ng kanilang minimithi sa buhay. Sa halip na gumawa sila ng paraan, ang kanilang matinding paghahangad na makamit ang mga hinahiling nila ay idinadaan nila sa paniniwala na pagkakalooban sila ni Maria ng himala. Nabubulagan sila sa ideya na sa kanilang pagtawag at paghiling kay Maria, kahit na ito ay imposible, naniniwala silang ito ay magaganap sapagkat walang imposible kay Maria dahil mayroong himala.

Batay sa pagsusuring ginawa sa mga liham sa larangan ng ideyolohiya, natuklasan na ang pangunahing elementong nangingibabaw sa mga deboto ay ang elementong nag-uudyok sa isang taong linlangin niya ang kaniyang sarili hinggil sa tunay na kaayusan ng reyalidad. Madalas ay nililinlang ng isang deboto ang kaniyang sarili sa kaniyang paniniwala na maipagkakaloob sa kaniya ang anumang kaniyang nais sa pamamagitan ng matiyaga at matinding pagtawag kay Maria.

Napatunayan din sa pag-aaral na ito na nangingibabaw ang ideyolohiya sa mga kahilingan ng mga deboto ukol sa pagkakasundo, paghiling ng mga kababaihan ng katuwang sa buhay, kalusugan at paggaling, at ang pagkakaloob ng pinansyal na tulog na karamihan ay humihingi ng himala ng pagkapanalo ng jackpot sa lotto.

Mula sa mga halimbawang ipinakita sa pagsusuring ito ng ideyolohiya, makikita na tinitingnan ng mga deboto ang pagdarasal nila ng petisyon bilang isang mahika na magbibigay sa kanila ng kanilang gusto. Sila ay nabubulag sa ideya na sa pamamagitan ng kanilang masidhing pagdarasal sa Mahal na Ina, magkakaroon ito ng awa upang ibigay sa kanila ang kahilingang minimithi. Madalas ay hindi nakikita ng deboto ang tunay na
estado ng reyalidad na kaniyang kinalalagyan at madalas ay nabubulag sa paniniwala na magkakaroon ng pagbabago dahil sa siya ay nagdasal. Nakakalimutan nila ang tunay na esensya ng pagdarasal na pagsusuho ng panalangin kay Kristo at pagpapaubaya na lamang sa Kanya kung ano ang nararapat.

**Antas at Hugis ng Utopia sa mga Liham**

Ang utopia sa pag-aaral na ito ay tumutukoy sa mga pangarap, hangarin, o mithiin ng isang tao na magkakaroon ng katuparan tungo sa pagtatamo ng kaayusang panlipunan.

Ayon kay Bloch malaki ang ginagampanan ng pangarap sa pag-impluwensya kung paano natin titingnan ang mundo sa pagpuuno ng tao ng kaniyang buhay ng mga paniniwala, ilusyon at pangarap, at delusyon. Ang ugam ng mga hangaring pantaong ito ay ang kasalukuyang kalagayan ng tao na nababalot ng iba’t ibang mga pangangailangan ng tao tungo sa pagkakamit ng kaginhawaan. Ang mga pangarap ding ito ay ekspresyon ng pangangailangan at pangarap ng tao sa kabila ng mga pangarap na mabago ito ay higit pa sa pagtupad ng isang pangarap. Ang pag-asang ito ang siyang nagpapakilos sa kanila tungo sa pagkakamit ng kaginhawaan. Ang utopia na ito ay nagbibigay ng utopia sa mga tao na mabago ito ay higit pa sa pagtupad ng isang pangarap.


---


13 Ibid., 73.
Matutunghayan sa ibaba ang sipi ng mga liham ng mga deboto na kakikitaan ng utopia sa kanilang mga kahilingan at pasasalamat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KATEGORIA</th>
<th>Bilang ng liham</th>
<th>UTOPIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K1: Espiritwal na Biyaya</td>
<td>D97 - D102</td>
<td>Konkreto: • lahat sila ay nagkakaroon ng pagkilos tungo sa pagtatamo ng kapatawaran • mayroong paghahangad tungo sa pagbabago • pagtalirod sa mga maling gawain Abstrak:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K2: Pagbabalik-loob</td>
<td>D103- D106</td>
<td>Konkreto: • mayroong paghahangad na mabago ang maling gawain • sa kaniyang pananampalataya nagkaroon siya ng positibong pagtingin sa buhay at nagawa niyang iligtas ang kaniyang sarili sa paggawa ng masama Abstrak:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K3: Kapayapaan sa Tahanan</td>
<td>D107-D112</td>
<td>Konkreto: • gumagawa ng paraan upang maisaayos ang kanilang pagsasama tulad ng pakikipag-usap, pagsuyo sa kanilang asawa at hindi pagsuko sa mga ito Abstrak: • pagdulog sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo at pag-asa nila sa himala • nagdidikta sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo upang gumawa ng pagkilos para sa kanilang hangarin magkaayos silang mag-asawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K4: Pagkakaasundo</td>
<td>D113- D119</td>
<td>Konkreto: • may mga ginagawa upang makahingi ng tawad sa kaniyang asawa at muling maayos ang kanilang pagsasama • paghahangad ng deboto na maging daan tungo sa pagkakaayos ng mag-ama Abstrak: • pag-asa na lamang sa panalangin para sa pagkakasundo ng mag-asawa • pag-asa sa tulong ng Mahal na Ina sa pagkakasunod ng miyembro ng pamilya at ng pinagkakautangan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K5: Katuwang sa Buhay</td>
<td>D120- D124</td>
<td>Konkreto: • pangangalaga sa relasyon • paghingi ng tulong na Abstrak: • nakasalalay lamang sa pagdarasan at pagkilos ng Ina ng Laging Saklolo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

© 2015 Jennifer M. Casabuena
ISSN 1908-7330
| K6: Kalusugan at Paggaling | D125- D139 | makilala na ang lalaking pangarap sa buhay  
• hindi pagsuko sa pagmamahal sa kabila ng lahat ng pinagdaanan sa buhay pag-ibig  
• ginagawa ring paraan sa kaniyang sarili upang matupad ang kaniyang hangarin sa buhay tulad ng pagpapagamot  
• pag-asam sa isang milagro na magmumula kay Maria |
|---------------------------|-----------|----------------------------------------------|
| K7: Kaligtasan sa sakuna  | D140- D147 | walang nakitang huwarang liham  
• maaring magkaroon ng anak lalo na kung walang karamdaman  
• nagpapatibling rin siya sa doktor upang maging katotohanan ang kaniyang pinapangarap  
• mayroong medikasyong pinagdadaanan at gagawin ang lahat tulad ng in vitro fertilization para sa pagkakaroon ng anak  
• hiling na huwag makuha ng anak niya ang sakit na tumama sa kaniya |
| K8: Pagkakaroon ng Anak  | D148-D153 | maayoong paghahangad na makabayad sa utang at iba pang bayarin  
• mayroong ginagawang paraan at ang pagtawag kay Maria ay paghingi lamang ng gabay kasama ng pagkilos  
• pag-asa sa tulong ni Maria na ibibigay sa kanila sa pamamagitan ng pagtama sa lotto  
• lubusang pag-asa lamang sa kapangyarihan ni Maria bilang ina |
| K9: Tulong Pinansyal     | D154- 158 | mayroong patungo sa pagtatamo ng pangarap na makapag-aral o makapagtapos ng pag- |
| K10: Tagumpay sa Pag-aral | D159- D163 | kumikilos patungo sa pagtatamo ng pangarap na makapag-aral o makapagtapos ng pag- |
| K11: Pagpasa sa Eksam | D164-D176 | • hindi pagsuko at pagsusumikap upang makapasa sa eksam
• naniniwala rin siya sa kapangyarihan ng panalangin kasama ang gawa
• pinagsisikapan ang pagrerebyu |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D177-D178</td>
<td>• umaasa na siya ay papasa sa eksam sapagkat ayon sa kanya ay marami nang naipagkaloob sa kaniyang ang Mahal na Ina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| K12: Pagbyahe sa Ibang Bansa | D179-D186 | • nagsusumikap na maayos at makapagsumite ng mga papeles na kailangan
• di pagsuko sa prosesong pinagdaraanan
• may lakas ng loob na harapin ang pagsubok na panayam
• pagsusuko ng kahilingan kay Maria bagamat mayroong ginagawang paraan sa pag-aaplay abroad |

| K13: Pagkakaroon ng Trabaho | D187-D195 | • humihingi ng tulong kaugnay sa kanilang pag-aaplay
• patnubay at gabay ang kanilang hinihingi habang kasalukuyang nilang tinatahak ang kanilang pag-aaplay
• pursigido sa paghahanap ng trabaho
• tagumpay sa pangangasiwa ng negosyoagpapabaya sa Diyos ng kahihinatnan ng pag-aaplay |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>K14: Katarungan at Kapayapaang Panlipunan</th>
<th>• umaasa sa tugon at pagtulong ng Ina ng Laging Saklolo sa pamamagitan ng panalangin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K15: Legal na Biyaya</td>
<td>• maaring magkaroon ng kalayaan sa kaso kung mapapatunayan nila na wala talaga silang kasalanan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• kung sa kanilang pagdarasal, wala silang ibang inaasahan kundi ang kilos ng Ina ng Laging Saklolo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K16: Materyal na Biyaya</td>
<td>• nagahangad na makabili ng bahay at lupa mula sa pagtratrabaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K17: Lahat ng Biyaya</td>
<td>• nagawa niyang mairaos ang kaniyang pag-aaral sa graduate school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• nagawa ng anak niya na makakuha ng iskolarsyip sa pinapangarap nitong unibersidad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• naglahad ng kaniyang pinagdaanan bilang ina sa pagpapaaral sa kaniyang anak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• nagpapasalamat na nakapasa siya sa eksaminasyon niya na nabigay sa kanya ng pinakamataas na karangalang na maging isang medical technologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• nagkaroon ng katuparan ang kaniyang panalangin na maaparubahan ang kanyang aplikasyon patungo sa Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• nagpapasalamat sapagkat siya ay gumaling matapos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

© 2015 Jennifer M. Casabuena
ISSN 1908-7330
Talahanayan 2: Mga nilalamang utopia ng mga liham na sinuri

Sa larangan naman ng utopia, makikita ang pangingibabaw ng konkretong utopia sa mga liham sapagkat makikita ang pagkilos ng mga deboto kasama ng kanilang pagdarasal sa pagtatamo ng kanilang mga kahilingan. Ayon sa naging resulta ng panayam sa mga deboto, higit na nagingibabaw ang utopia sa kanilang mga kahilingan sapagkat sa kanilang paghiling o pagdarasal sa Mahal na Ina, hindi sila umaasa sa kanilang mga kahilingan.

Sa mga liham na sinuri, nangingibabaw ang mga konkretong utopia sa larangan ng mga liham sapagkat makikita ang pagkilos ng mga deboto kasama ng kanilang pagdarasal sa pagtatamo ng kanilang mga kahilingan sa mga liham na sinuri. Sa kanilang mga liham, hindi lamang naghihintay sa mga liham na sinuri ang kanilang mga kahilingan sapagkat sa kanilang paghiling o pagdarasal sa Mahal na Ina, hindi sila umaasa lamang sa kanilang mga liham na sinuri. Sa kanilang mga liham na sinuri, nagpapasalamat sa kanilang mga deboto sa kanilang paghiling o pagdarasal sa Mahal na Ina, hindi sila umaasa lamang sa kanilang mga liham na sinuri.

Ang mga deboto na nagpapasalamat sa kanilang mga kahilingan, hindi lamang naghihintay sa kanilang mga liham na sinuri. Sa kanilang mga liham, nagpapasalamat sa kanilang mga deboto sa kanilang paghiling o pagdarasal sa Mahal na Ina, hindi sila umaasa lamang sa kanilang mga liham na sinuri.
ang pagdarasal gayundin ang kanilang paghingi ng tulong at gabay ni Maria upang patnubayan silang matupad ang kanilang hinihiling.

Samantala nakita naman ang pangingibaba ng abstrak na utopia sa mga kahilingan sa katuwang sa buhay, pagkakasundo, pagbabalik-loob, kapayapaan sa tahanan, pinansyal na tulong, kalusugan, at legal na biyaya. Sa mga aspektong ito, bagamat mayroong nakitang konkretong utopia, mas nangibabaw ang pagiging abstrak sapagkat mayroon sa kanilang nagpahayag ng pag-asag a rin nila sa himala kaugnay sa kagalingan ng mahal sa buhay, pagkakaroon ng maraming salapi, at pagpapawalang-sala sa mga kasong kinasangkutan.

Higit na nangingibaba sa mga liham ng mga deboto ang konkretong utopia sapagkat makikita sa mga deboto na kasabay ng kanilang pagdarasal, sila ay mayroong ginagawa kaugnay ng kanilang mga kahilingan upang magkaroon ng posibilidad na ito ay magkaroon ng katuparan. Marami sa mga pahayag ng mga deboto ay hindi lamang umawa sa panalangin sapagkat malinaw sa kanilang kinalaman din nilang kumilos upang matupad ang kanilang hinihiling. Ito ay pagtutulungan sa pagitan nila at ni Kristo, kaya nga ang pilosopiyang “Nasa tao ang gawa, nasa Diyos ang awa” ang pinaniniwalaan ng maraming debotong Pilipino.

Sa kabuuan ng nangingibaba sa mga liham ng mga deboto at sa bawat kategorya, lumalabas na ang nangingibaba na elemento sa mga liham ng mga deboto ay ang utopia sapagkat makikita sa kanilang mga naratibo na bilang mga taong nagdarasal at humihingi ng tulong sa Panginoon, hindi nila lubusang inaasa sa Panginoon o kay Maria ang kanilang mga hinihiling. Bagkus, ipinauubaya nila sa Panginoon ang kanilang mga kahilingan kasabay ng kanilang pagkilos tungs sa pagtatamo ng kanilang mga idinudulog kay Maria. Bagamat may kinalaman sila sa banal na kapangyarihan ng Panginoon, hindi nila minamamapala ang Panginoon o si Maria tungo sa pagkakamit ng kanilang personal na hangarin sa buhay.

**Implikasyon ng Ideyolohiya/ Utopiang Nakapaloob sa mga Liham sa Usapin ng Pagbabagong-loob at Pagbabago ng Lipunan**

Kaugnay naman ng implikasyon ng mga liham sa larangan ng ideyolohiya, maaring patuloy na malinang sa mga deboto ang sumusunod dahil sa kanilang maling pagtingin o pagtanaw sa kanilang debosyon kay Maria. Ang mga ito ay a) lubusang umasa na lamang sa kakakayahan ng Mahal na Ina na mamagitan para sa kanilang kahilingan, b) tingnan ang kanilang pananampalataya bilang pakikipagtawaran sa Panginoon o kay Maria, c) tingnan ang pagdarasal o paghiling bilang paghingi ng kanilang
mga personal na pangangailangan, d) maniwala o umasa na lamang sa himala o maging palaasa, at e) magkaroon ng mababaw na pagtingin sa debosyon.

Una, makikita sa mga deboto ang lubos na pag-asa sa pagkilos ng Mahal na Ina sa pagkakaloob ng kanilang mga kahilingan. Nagkakaroon ng pagkakataon ang mga tao na lumapit sa kanilang pananampalataya at magtiwala na magkakaroon ng pagbabago sa kanilang mga matinding inaasam at pinapangarap sa buhay. Mayroong aspekto ng pambubulag sa mga deboto sapagkat iniaasa na lamang nila sa pagkilos ng Mahal na Ina ang kanilang mga panalangin.

Pangalawa, pinalalagad na nila ang kanilang pananampalataya bilang pakikipagtawaran sa Panginoon o kay Maria. Sapagkat ang pangalan ni Maria ay Ina ng Laging Saklolo, hindi naparating sa kanila ang pagating ina sa anumang hiling nila, mayroong posibilidad na matutulungan na kung saan sasamahan nila ito ng pangako na may mga pagkakataon hindi na natutupad kapag naipagkakaloob na ang kanilang hinihiling.

Pangatlo, tinitingnan ang pagdarasal o paghiling bilang paghingi ng kanilang mga personal na pangangailangan. Mas nangingibabaw sa mga tao ang paghiling at pagtitiwala na makakamit nila ang kaginhawaan, seguridad, satisfaksyon, at kasiyahan sa pamamagitan ng paghiling ng tulang kay Maria. Tinitingnan nila ang pagdarasal nila sa Panginoon bilang paghiling at pagkakaloob ngunit hindi nagpapupuri at pagpapahayag sa kanilang kapanhangarian. Ayaw ng mga debotong tumanggap ng kabiguan sapagkat para sa kanila, palagi silang pagbibigyan anuman ang kanilang hinihiling sapagkat Mahal sila ni Maria.

Pangapat, ang kanilang pagdarasal ay iniuugnay na lamang nila sa paghiling ng himala sapagkat ang pagkumpleto ng kanilang nobena o kahit ang kanilang pagdarasal ay magdudulot ng sagot sa kanilang hinahangad. Ang kanilang pagnonobena sa Mahal na Birhen ay hindi isang pagdarasal kundi katumbas ng pagkakaloob ng isang hangarin sa buhay. At panghuli, nagiging mababaw ang pananampalataya ng mga deboto resulta ng mababaw na paraan ng pagtingin nila sa kanilang debosyon. Ang tunay na debosyon ay pagbaba ng sarili sa Panginoon at pagpapahayag ng kanilang hiling para sa kanila.

Sa usapin naman ukol sa utopia, nakita naman ang mga sumusunod bilang maaring epektong epekso sa utopiang nakapaloob sa mga liham: a) paglalim ng pananampalataya, b) pagbabago ng pag-ugali, c) pagtitiwala sa Panginoon, at d) pagpapakita ng tunay na debosyon. Sa mga liham higit na nangingibabaw ang pagbabagong-loob ng indibidwal sapagkat madalas ang kanilang paghiling ay personal na mga pangangailangan. Kaakibat ng mga
personal na paghiling na ito ang kanilang pagbabago sapagkat natututo silang sumunod at umayon sa kung ano ang niloloob ng Panginoon at upang mas maging karapat-dapat sila sa kanilang mga hinihiling.

Una, makikita ang paglalim ng kanilang pananampalataya sa Panginoon sa pamamagitan ni Maria. Sapagkat ang tao ay naniniwala sa kapangyarihan ng panalangin bilang siyang tulay patungo sa pakikipag-ugnayan kay Kristo, nagbubunsod ito ng isang makapangyarihang espiritwal na ugnayan sa pagitan ni Kristo at ng tao.

Pangalawa, pagbabago ng sarili ang maidudulot sa tao ng kanilang mga kahilingan sapagkat dahil sa kanilang pananampalataya, lalo na sa pagkakataoong nagkakaroon ng katuparan ang kanilang mga kahilingan, nagagawa ng taong magbago tungo sa ikabubuti niya bilang tao at bilang sumasampalataya sa Panginoon. Nagkakaroon ng reyalisasyon ang tao na ang kapangyarihan ng Diyos at ang makainang pagtulong sa kanila ni Maria ay isang patunay ng pagbabantay sa kanila. Makikita sa mga debotong humihiling sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo ang pagtanaw nila ng utang na loob sa kabutihan nito sa kanila.


Panghuli, nagpapakita ng tunay na debosyon ang mga liham ng nakararami sa mga deboto sapagkat tumutukoy ito sa panloob na gawain ng tao tulad ng pagsuko, dedikasyon, at ang kabangalan na gawin ang lahat para sa Panginoon. Sa pagkakataoong ito, magiging tunay ang debosyon ng isang tao sapagkat bukod sa kanilang pagdarasal, naroroon ang tunay na pagsusuko ng kanilang kahilingan sa kalokohan ng Diyos.

Mula sa mga natuklasang implikasyon ng ideyolohiya at utopiang nakakaloob sa mga liham, masasabi ng mga kahilingan ng mga deboto na maaaring magkaroon ng positibo at negatibong epekto sa isang tao o deboto ang labis niyang pagpapaubayba at pag-asa sa pamimintuho kay Maria. Batay sa mga halimbawang liham na nakalap, higit na nangingibabaw ang positibong epekto nito sa mga deboto tungo sa kanilang pagbabago upang maging isang mabuting Kristiano at mamamayan na mayroong paniniwala kay Kristo. Sa pagdanas ng mga deboto ng ginhawa ng kalooban sa kanilang pakikipag-ugnayan kay Maria at sa katuparan ng kanilang mga pangarap, nagkakaroon sila ng pagtanaw ng utang na loob sa Panginoon na
magbubunsod ng kanilang pagbabago na maaring personal na magbubunsod sa maayos nilang pakikipag-ugnayan sa kanilang kapwa.

**Konklusyon**

Mula sa ginawang pag-aaral, natuklasan na sa pagkapit ng mga deboto sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo sa panahon ng kanilang pangangailangan, malaki ang papel na ginagampanan ni Maria sa buhay ng maraming mga Pilipino. Sa pamamagitan ng kanilang mga liham, natuklasan kung paanong tinitingnan ng mga deboto ang kanilang debosyon at pamimintuho sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo.

Matapos na maisagawa ang pag-aaral, nabuo sa mananaliksik ang maka-Pilipinong pamamaraan ng debosyon kay Maria. Ang debosyon ng mga Pilipinong deboto sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo ay nagsisimula sa kanilang pagtanaw kay Maria bilang kanilang Inang malalapitan nila sa kanilang pangangailangan. Si Maria ay itinuturing nila bilang “hindi ibang tao” kaya nagagawa nilang maging totoo sa kanya. Si Maria, bilang ina na palaging tumugon sa kanilang hinain, ang naglisli nilang pag-asa sa buhay tungo sa pagkakami ng kaginhawaan at kapanatagan ng kalooban. Bilang inang kumakalinga sa kaniyang anak, si Maria ang naglisli nilang takuhan bilang taong hindi nawawalan ng mga suliranin at pasanin sa buhay.

Mayroong makahulugang tunog sa pangalan niyang Ina ng laging Saklolo—dalawang salitang mayroong malalim na kahulugan sa mga Pilipinong mananampalataya. Sa kanilang pakikipagtunguhan kay Maria, natuklasan ng mananaliksik sa pag-aaral na ito ang proseso ng pagpapatuloy ng kanilang debosyon: pagsubok, padalaw-dalaw, pakikilahok, pakikipagpalagayang-loob, at pakikisama.

Natuklasan din sa pag-aaral na ang pangunahing gawain ng mga deboto na tanda ng kanilang debosyon ay ang mga sumusunod: pagnonobena, pagtanod kapag araw ng Martes, paglalakad nang paluhod, pagsalat sa imahen ng Ina ng Laging Saklolo, pagdarasal ng Santo Rosaryo, bultaryong paglilingkod sa Dambana ng Ina ng Laging Saklolo, at paghulog ng liham sa dambana.

Sa pagsusuring ginawa naman sa mga liham, natuklasan na ang mga pangunahing kahilingan ng mga deboto na kakilalan ng ideyolohiya ay pawang tumatalakay ukol sa paggaling mula sa karamdaman, tulong pinansyal, pagkakaroon ng katuwang sa buhay, at pagkakasundo. Makikita namang paanong konkretong utopia sa mga liham kaugnay ng espiritwal na biyaya, pagbabalik-loob, kalusugan at paggaling sa hindi malalang karamdaman, pagkakaroon ng anak, tulong pinansyal sa larangan ng pagnansang makabayan ng utang, pag-aaral, pagpasa sa eksam,
pagbyahae sa ibang bansa, at pagkakaroon ng trabaho. Sa dalawang
elementong ito, higit na nangingibabaw sa mga liham ang utopia sapakat
kakikitaan ang karamihan sa mga deboto ng kanilang pagkilos at paggawa
tungo sa pagtatamo ng kanilang hinahangad. Ang kanilang pagdarasal kay
Hesus sa pamamagitan ni Maria ay paghingi lamang ng patnubay at gabay
tungo sa katuparan ng kanilang hinihiling. Naniniwala ang marami sa mga
debotong nagdarasal na ang katuparan ng anumang hinihiling ng tao ay
nakasalalay pa rin sa kaniyang pagkilos.

Ang implikasyong nakapaloob naman sa mga liham na nagtataglay
ng ideyolohiya ay nagbubunsod sa deboto upang lubusang umasa na lamang
sa kakayahan ng Mahal na Ina na mamagitan para sa kanilang kahilingan,
ingnan ang kanilang pananampalataya bilang pakikipagtaawaran sa
Panginoon o kay Maria, tigian ang pagdarasal o paghiling bilang paghingi
ng kanilang mga personal na pangangailangan, maniwalang o umasa na lamang
sa himala o maging palaasa at magkaroon ng mababaw na pagtingin
sa debosyon. Samantala sa utopia naman, nagagawa nitong mapalalim ang
pananampalataya ng mga deboto, mabago ang anumang masasama o di
kanais-nais na pag-uugali ng isang tao, magkaroon ng pagtitiwalang sa
kapangyarihan ng Panginoon, at magpakita ng tunay na debosyon sa Ina ng
Laging Saklolo.

Sa paglapit ng mga deboto sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo, higit na
nangingibabaw ang positibong epekto sa mga deboto sapakat sa
pamamagitan ng kanilang malalim na pagtingin kay Maria bilang isang ina,
binigyang pagpapahalaga nila ang pagkakaroon ng katuparan ng kanilang
kahilingan sa pamamagitan ng pagiging isang mabuting Kristyano. Ang
ginhawa at kapanatagan ng kaloobang natatamo nila sa pakikipagtunguhan
kay Maria ay nagbubunsod sa kanila upang higit na mananampalataya at
maniwalang sa pamamagitan ng paggabay at patnubay ni Maria sa bawat
paghiling nila, nagkaroon sila ng positibong pag-asa sa buhay. Naniniwala
silang ang bawat pagtawag nila sa Mahal na Ina na nilalangkapan ng
pagkilos ay magkaroon ng katuparan kung sila ay karapat-dapat sa
kanilang hinihiling.

Nakita rin sa mga liham na higit na nangingibabaw ang liham ng
mga kababaihan sa Ina ng Laging Saklolo sapakat bilang isang babae, higit
nilang nauugnay ang kanilang mga sarili kay Maria. Bilang mga babae rin,
higit na mas masanala ang magmahayag sapakat emosyonal ang mga
kababaihan sa kanilang mga nadarama. Ang kanilang pagiging bukas sa
lahat ng kanilang pinagdaraanan sa buhay kumpara sa mga lalaki ang
dahilan kung kaya’t higit na mas masanala ang mga babae sa Mahal
na Birhen na kadalasan ay may himig ng pagsusumbong o paglalahad ng
kanilang pinagdaraanan sa buhay. Ang pagiging totoo at makatotoo ng mga
debo sa Mahal na Ina ay nagpapakita ng kanilang tunay na debosyon.
References


Article

Ang Pilosopiya at Pamimilosopiya ni Roque J. Ferriols, S.J.: Tungo sa Isang Kritikal na Pamimilosopiyang Filipino

Emmanuel C. De Leon

Abstract: This paper is a presentation of the fundamental tenets of Roque Ferriols' philosophical enterprise. The first part of the essay presents and analyzes Ferriols' primary texts using the taxonomies suggested by F.P.A. Demeterio in order to report the basic discourses of the said Filipino philosopher. The next part of the paper inquires concerning the philosophical project of Ferriols. Centered on the idea of recognition and becoming immersed in social realities, this essay suggests that Ferriols' act of elevating the status of Filipino language into an epistemological concept is consistent to his philosophical task of awakening his readers to the realm of Being. Similar to a Socratic irony, Ferriols puts premium on the ontological importance of creative ignorance, which is only possible through what he dubbed as danas-masid-kilatis. With that in mind, this preliminary work on Ferriols opines that there is a gold mine in the philosophy of Ferriols that can be used as a starting point for a critical Filipino philosophy. In the last part of the paper, some reflections and recommendations for future venture on Ferriols' philosophy can be found.

Keywords: Ferriols, philosophizing in the Philippines, critical Filipino philosophy, pagpapakatao

Panimula

Matindi ang hamon ng pamimilosopiya sa Pilipinas. Bukod sa marubdub pa ring pinagtalunan kung mayroon nga bang matatawag na Pilosopiyang Filipino, malinaw na hindi rin nagkakaisa ang mga may hilig sa nasabing usapin pagdating sa kanilang mga samarahan. Sinabi nga ni Roland Theuas Pada, isa sa mga pursigido at papausbong na Pilipinong Pilosopo sa Unibersidad ng Santo Tomas, “The notion of what is Filipino is difficult to unify particularly if one is intending to look at ideological and ontological bases for a ‘universal’ definition of

© 2015 Emmanuel C. De Leon
ISSN 1908-7330
Filipino.”¹ Mistulang sinasabi ni Pada na problemado na nga ang terminolohiyang “Filipino,” paano pa kaya ang usapin tungkol sa pilosopiyang matatawag na “Filipino”? Dahil sa kontekstong ito, minumungkahi niyang mas pagtuunan ng pansin ang “pamimilosopiya sa Pilipinas” sa halip na magwaldas ng oras sa paghahanap ng uring pilosopiyang masasabing talagang “singaw” o purong-purong sa atin.

Sa ilang mga artikulo naman ni F.P.A. Demeterio, maingat niyang binalangkas ang limang anyo ng Pilosopiyang Filipino upang maipakita ang kasalukuyang estado nito at upang magpresenta ng ilang mahahalagang hamon. Limang “kalipunan ng mga kaalaman” ang kanyang nabanggit sa artikulo: 1) Filipino Thomism, 2) Critical Filipino Philosophy, 3) exposition of Western philosophical theories, 4) the interpretation of Filipino identity, at 5) the interpretation of the contributions of the Filipino intellectuals.

dahil sa paglaganap ng impluwensiyang Marxista sa Pilipinas. Sa pagdating naman ng mga Pilipinong iskolar na ipinadala ng goyernong Amerikano sa iba't ibang bansa upang mag-aral ng iba't iba ring sistema ng pilosopiya, nagsimula ang eksposisyon ng Kanluraning pilosopiya dito sa Pilipinas (numero 3 sa ilustrasyon). Samantala ang ekplorasyon naman sa matatawag na katutubong pilosopiyang Pilipino (numero 4 sa ilustrasyon) ay nagsimula noong dekada ’70 at ’80. Masasabing ito ang may pinakamaraming publikasyon sa larangan ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino. Ang interpretasyon at paghahanap ng kontribusyon ng mga mga Pilipinong intelektuwal (numero 5 sa ilustrasyon) ang masasabing pinakabata sa mga kalipunanang nabanggit ni Demeterio. Naging sanga ito ng mga ginawang eksposisyon at ekplorasyon ng mga dalubhahasa at dalubgurong Pilipino. Dahil pinakabata at papausbong pa rin lamang, masasabing kaunti lamang ang nagtratrabaho sa larangang ito.


Hindi natin kayang isiksik sa isang papel ang lahat ukol sa pamimilosopiya ni Ferriols. Kaya, gaya ng sinabi niya, “may kinukuha, may iniwan [muna].” Nakatuon lamang ang ating kasalukuyang atensyon sa mga sumusunod na usapan: 1) ang mga primaryang batis kay Ferriols, 2) proyektong pilosopikal ni Ferriols, 3) wika bilang potensyal, 4) danas-masid-kilatis bilang pamamaraang pilosopikal, 5) ang pagkakabukas at mapaglikhang katangahan, 6) tunggalian ng magkakaibang katuwiran bilang *techne* ng pagpapakatao, at 7) ilang mahahalagang puntos sa pilosopiya at pamimilosopiya ni Ferriols.
Ang mga Primarya Batis kay Ferriols

Uumpisahan natin ang pagtalakay sa pilosopiya at pamimilosopiya ni Ferriols sa pamamagitan ng paglilista ng mga naisulat niya na maari nating pagbatayan ng ating kasalukuyang pagdalumat. Ang ating listahan ay batay sa pinakahuling pagtitipon at paglilista na ginawa nina Roy Allan B. Tolentino, et al., na may pamagat na “An Annotated Bibliography of Roque J. Ferriols, S.J.” Makikita ang listahan sa ibaba:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PANAYAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MGA LIBRO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MGA ARTIKULO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


MGA REBYU


Talahanayan 1: Mga Akda ni Roque Ferriols Batay sa Paglilista nina Roy Allan B. Tolentino, Jefferson M. Chua, at Noel Clemente

Matapos nating mailista ang mga akda ni Ferriols, dalumatin naman natin ang kanyang mundong pilosopikal gamit ang pamamaraan at taksonomiyang iminungkahi ni F.P.A. Demeterio. Sa kanyang papel na may pamagat na “Status and Directions for ‘Filipino Philosophy’ in Zialcita, Timbreza, Quito, Abulad, Mabaquiao, Gripaldo, and Co,” nagbanggit siya ng labing-anim (16) na disyerto sa Pilosopiyang Filipino base sa mga pagsusumang-muni muna ng mga dalubhaya at dalubguong kanyang inusisa. Ang
mga nasabing diskursong ito sa “Pilosopiyang Filipino” ay (1) grassroots/folk philosophy, (2) lecture on scholasticism/Thomism, (3) lecture on other foreign systems, (4) critical philosophy as non-academic discourse, (5) application of logical analysis, (6) application of phenomenology/existentialism/ hermeneutics, (7) critical philosophy as an academic method, (8) appropriation of foreign theories, (9) appropriation of folk philosophy, (10) philosophizing with the use of the Filipino language, (11) textual exposition of foreign systems, (12) revisionist writing, (13) interpretation of Filipino worldview, (14) research on Filipino values and ethics, (15) identification of the presuppositions and implications of the Filipino worldview, and (16) study on the Filipino philosophical luminaries. Tingnan ang balangkas ng nasabing labing-anim na mga diskurso sa Pigyur 1.

Pigyur 1: Ang Labing-Anim na Diskurso ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino ni F.P.A. Demeterio


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taksonomiya ni Demeterio</th>
<th>Pamagat ng akda ni Ferriols</th>
<th>Bilang ng akda</th>
<th>Porsyento</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Critical Philosophy</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriation of Foreign Theories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriation of Folk Philosophy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophizing using the Filipino Language</td>
<td>“Interview by Leovino Ma. Garcia,” The “Psychic Entity” in Aurobindo’s The Life Divine</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Talahanayan 2: Mga Pamagat, Bilang, at Porsyento ng mga Akda ni Ferriols sa Bawat Diskurso ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino Ayon kay F.P.A. Demeterio

Mula sa ating paglalatag ng mga akda ni Ferriols base sa taksonomiya ni Demeterio, makikita ang tatlong pangunahing diskurso ni Ferriols. Ito ay phenomenon/existentialism/hermeneutics (36.6%), philosophizing using the Filipino language (36.6%), at appropriation of foreign theories (23.3%). Samantalang walang nailathala si Ferriols sa mga diskurso ng logical analysis, critical philosophy, appropriation of folk philosophy, exposition of foreign systems, interpretation of Filipino worldview, research on Filipino values and ethics, identification of the presuppositions & implications of the Filipino worldview, at study on the Filipino philosophical luminaries.

Ang Proyektong Pilosopikal ni Ferriols: Pagmumulat sa Karanasan

Binubuo raw ng kahuhulugan (telos) ang pag-iisip ng isang pilosopo. Dito nakasentro ang uring pamimilosopiya at mga tanong na nais sagutin ng isang pilosopo. Tawagin natin itong “proyekto.” Ang salitang “proyekto” ay
galing sa salitang Latin na may kaugnayan sa mga bagay-bagay na nakatapon sa hinaharap. Ano ang prinoproyekto ni Ferriols? Sa kanyang pamimilosopiya, saan niya gustong makarating ang landas na kanyang tinatahak?

Sa isang liham na ipinadala ni Ferriols sa isa sa mga nauna niyang naging estudyante sa pilosopiya, makikita natin ang tunay na pagtingin niya sa pilosopiya. Kwentong ni Ferriols sa kanyang estudyante, “I think the Ethics course is the most challenging. To give a course that will enable the student to realize (mamulatan-matauhan) the basics of ethics: e.g., that there is such a thing as intrinsically human – that even if we cannot define this clearly, we can truly ‘see’ it or have a kagat to it.” 3 Ang gawaing pamimilosopiya para kay Ferriols ay ang walang-hanggang-pagtatangka ng isang tao na magtanong at unawain ang kanyang karanasan sa Meron 4 upang kahit paano ay matanaw ang katotohanan (sa isang magalang na paraan). Ibig sabihin,

---


hindi tayo natatapos mamilosopiya at hindi rin natatapos ang pilosopiya sa atin. Ito marahil ang dahilan kung bakit binansagan ng matematikong si Pythagoras ang mga nagsasabuhay ng ganitong gawain bilang “mangingibig ng karunungan.” Ang isang mangingibig ay hindi napapagod na alamin ang iba’t ibang mukha ng pagkatao ng kanyang minamahal.

Ngunit kahit na likas sa ating mga tao ang kahiligang magtanong at umunawa, bukas din ang posibilidad na mahulog tayo sa katamaran at tignan ang Meron sa paraang awtomatikong. Kung talagang magtatapos ang mga nagsasabuhay ng ganitong gawain bilang “mangingibig ng karunungan,” ang isang mangibig ay hindi napapagod na alamin ang iba’t ibang mukha ng pagkatao ng kanyang minamahal.


Mas mahalaga kay Ferriols ang pagiging mulat sa karanasan kaysa pagbubuo ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino. Malinaw niyang ipinaliwanag, “When I try to philosophize in Filipino, it is with intent to live and to help awaken other people into living.”

Hindi sinasabi ni Ferriols na tagabunyag siya ng lahat ng katotohanan. Mas mainam sabihin na proyekto ni Ferriols ang gisingin ang kanyang mambabasa upang gamitin ng mga napukaw ang kanilang kakayahang dumanas, magmasid, mangilat, at gumanap sa katotohanan. Palagi nga raw may trabaho ang “bangaw” na nagngangalang Sokrates, ayon kay Ferriols.

---

5 Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 234.

Wika Bilang Potensyal

Sa kalagitnaan ng dekada 60, unti-unting umusbong sa damdamin ng mga pulitiko at taong simbahan ang masidhing kagustuhang gamitin ang wikang Filipino. Nanatiling wika ng mga “matatalino” at “kagalang-galang” ang wikang Ingles, ngunit matindi ang hamon ng panahon na mag-Filipino, salitain ang wika ng ordinaryong tao. Kauganay nito, wika ni Ferriols, “When respectable people can talk Tagalog in public as badly as I do and be applauded for it, it must be high time for me to speak Tagalog in public without having to fear the censorious eyes of some pure Bulakanese.”


Sa isang liham na ipinadala ni Ferriols kay Leovino Ma. Garcia, ipinaalala niya dito na ang isang bagay na karapat-dapat gawin ay karapat-dapat gawing mabuti. Ibinalita ni Ferriols, “This year [1969] I have an experimental project of teaching one class in Junior year and another in Senior

7 Ibid., 215.
year the core curriculum with Filipino as the medium of instruction and discussion. The texts and readings are still in English. *Here with all joy I will do badly what is worth doing well* [emphasis supplied]. And who knows, might not joy change the doing badly into well done in the end?"


---


12 Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 41.
gawing lehitimo ang isang ordinaryo at hamunin tayong danasin, kilatisin, at patalabin ang mga ito sa ating pagkatao.

“Danas-Masid-Kilatis” Bilang Pamamaraang Pilosopikal


Subalit, hindi naman ibig sabihin nito ay bara-bara o wala namang pamamaraan ang namimilosopiya ni Ferriols. Ang pinakamahalaga sa kanyang pamamaraang pilosopikal ay ang pagbabad sa karanasan. Ayon sa kanya, hindi dapat nakahiwalay ang nagsisisiyasat sa mismong sinisisiyasat. Kaugnay nito sinabi ni Ferriols,


Ang unang pamamaraan ng pagbigkas sa meron ay ang “paglundag sa mismong swimming pool.” Kung inuunawa mo ang paglalangoy sa tubig, lubos ang pangangailangang makipag-isa sa tubig na inuunawa. Hindi maaaring hiwalay ang discurso ng paglalangoy sa praktika ng mismong paglalangoy. Ikaw na may pangangailangang galawan ng paglalangoy ang siya mismong may pangangailangang dumanas, magmasid, at kumilatis ng laro ng halo-halong dinamismo at daloy. Sa pamamagitan nito, nakikilatis niya ang mga purong konsepto. Alin ba sa mga binigkas sa purong konsepto ang talagang nakakabili sa katotohanan at alin sa mga ito ang pamparami lamang?

14 Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 112.
Samakatuwid, ang unang yugto ng pagbigkas sa meron (na may kinalaman sa pagdanas, pagmamasid, at pangingilatis) ay isang talaban ng pag-unawa at paggawa. Ang pag-unawa ay pinakikinis sa pamamagitan ng paggawa; gayundin naman ang paggawa ay pinakikinis ng pag-unawa. Hindi maaaring paghiwalayin ang dalawa kung ayaw mong maging sabog ang pagbigkas sa meron. Kaya nga, wika ni Ferriols,

Sa pag-aapuhap na ganito, ginagamit ang mga konsepto; ngunit, sapagkat ang paghahilig sa meron ang naggapairal sa pagdanas, pagmasid at pangingilatis, hindi konsepto ang hari, kundi meron…. Ang konsepto ay kailangang maging angkop: angkop sa meron. At kung hindi angkop ay kailangang itaboy at palitan ng angkop. Sa meron.16


**Ang Pagkabukas at Mapaglikhang Katangahan**

Napakahalaga at parang mahirap talagang tanggihan na ang pagkabukas ay nagmumula sa malalim na pag-unawa sa katangahan.17
Magdadalawang-isip akong gawin, mag-iisip muna ulit ako bago ako kumilos, bago ako humusga, sapagkat bukas ako sa posibilidad ng aking katangahan. Subalit dahil sa ating katamaran na mamuhay nang mulat sa ating katangahan, isinasantabi ito at kumikilos na para bang alam natin ang lahat.


> At kapag natatutuhan ako na ako alam ay tanga, kaya kong bumaling sa mga alam ko at dibdibin ang pagka-tanong na mga ito. At baka matauhan ako na ang alanganin na alam ko ay tunay pa rin na pagkaganap sa meron: kapag tunay na mapagkumbaba.\(^\text{18}\)

Hindi naman siguro kalabisan kung imungkahi ko na itong konsepto ni Ferriols ng pagkabukas na nanggagaling sa matinong pag-amin ng katangahan ay may elemento ng pilosopiyan ng kritikal. Nauulinigan ko sa bahaging ito ng pilosopiya ni Ferriols ang kaisipang malimit tinawag na *struggle for recognition* (*Kampf um Anerkennung*). Bigyan natin ng kaunting paliwanag ang konseptong ito upang mapalawigan ko pa ang aking iminumungkahing kanina.


\(^{18}\) Ferriols, *Pambungad sa Metapsikika*, 95.
ni Ferriols sa mga kaisipan ni Axel Honneth. Ang konteksto ng paggamit ni Honneth ng ideya ng recognition ay ibang iba sa konteksto ng paggamit ni Hegel. Sa espekulatibo at metapisikal na proyekto ni Hegel, ang terminolohiyang Anerkennung ay mayroong kahulugan "pagkilala." Ang takbo ng kasaysayan, sa pananaw ni Hegel, ay isa ngang proseso ng tunggalian patungong pagkilala (Kampf um Anerkennung). Subalit bumaling si Honneth kay Herbert Mead upang matakasan ang determinismo ni Hegel. Sa naturalistic pragmatism ni Mead, binigyan ng halaga ang pakikitungo sa kapwa bilang kondisyon ng posibilidad ng pagkilala ng pagka-sarili (self-identity). Dito, ang mga karanasang positibo at negatibo ang siyang humuhulma ng isang pagkatao. Galing sa impluwensiya nina Hegel at Mead, nakabuo si Honneth ng sarili niyang pilosopiya ng recognition na nakaugat sa pagkilala o pagkadama sa kinasasadlakang sitwasyon.\(^19\)

Dito sa kontekstong ito kakikitaan ng elementong kritikal ang pilosopiya ni Ferriols. Sa pamamagitan ng inimunungkahi ni Ferriols na pamamaraang danas-masid-kilatis, posibleng madama (recognition) ng isang tao ang kakitiran ng kanyang katuwiran at naising kumawala (struggle) sa maling kayabangan sa pamamagitan ng palagiang pagkamulat sa kanyang katangahan. Kaugnay nito, wika ni Ferriols,

Kung ang isang tao’y makakakilos ng ganito sa kanyang kalooban, magkakaroon siya ng kakayahang pumanatag sa alam niya, habang mulat siya palagi sa kanyang katangahan. Kaya’t nawawala ang pagmamataas sa pag-aakala na siya lamang ang nakakaalam. Hindi na niya kayang isipin na lahat ng mga matitino ay dapat sumang-ayon sa kanya. At mawawala sa kanyang kawalang-malay, itong madalas na nakatagong pag-aakala na lahat ng tumututol sa kanyang mga kuro-kuro ay tumututol dahil sa sila’y walang isip o kaya’y nagmamatigas ng ulo sa pagtanggii sa katotohanan.\(^20\)

Subalit nailangang linawin na itong pag-amin at palagiang pagkamulat sa katangahan ay hindi tinittingnan ni Ferriols bilang hadlang upang lalo pang umalam. Sa kabalintunan, nagiging mas posible ang makaalam sa pamamagitan ng tunay at mapagkumbabang katangahan. Kaya tinatawag ko itong “mapaglikhang katangahan.” Mapaglikha ito sapagkat sa pamamagitan nito ay posible ang pagtubo ng katotohanan sa tao. Nakalilikha ang pagkaalam na kapiraso lamang ang ating pagkakagat sa katotohanan, na

---


\(^{20}\) Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 95.
Subalit maitatanong natin sa puntong ito, paano ba madarama (recognition) ng mga taong mas dapat munang isipin ang kanilang makakagat na pagkain kaysa sa pangangailangang kumagat sa meron? Gayundin, paano mamumulatan ang mga taong busog na busog at para bang wala nang pangangailangang “kumagat” pa ng panibago? Anong praktikal na mapapala ng mga taon kung gagawin nilang prayloridad ang pag-aapuhap sa meron? Kabilang ba ito sa mga panginghaling pangangailangan ng tao na maihahanay sa pagkain, hangin, tubig, tirahan, masusuot, at marami pang iba (parating mahalaga ang “at marami pang iba”)?


Sa aking palagay, mahalaga at susi sa pag-unawa ng pilosopiya ni Ferriols itong essensiya ng tao bilang “hindi nakaprograma.” Ano ba ang ibig niyang sabihin dito?


Kailangan ng taong matauhan sa katalagahang ito ng tao. Kailangan niyang maramdaman ang matinding pangangailangang makawala sa klase ng buhay na prinograma ng iba. At dahil hindi naman habambuhay ang buhay ng tao, kailangan niyang maramdaman ang masidhing pangangailangang gampanan na ito ngayon at huwag nang ipagpabuksan pa. Sarili ang nakataya sa pagpiling pumasok sa danas-masid-kilatis na sinasabi

21 Ibid., 96.
22 Ibid., 113.

**Tunggalian ng Magkakaibang Katwiran bilang *Techne* ng Pagpapakatao**

Gamit ang ideya ni Norris Clarke, inilarawan ni Ferriols ang pagpapakatao bilang “…sabay na paglalatag ng sarili sa kalawakan, pero lalo na, pagpasok sa kalaliman ng mga nilalang at sa kalaliman ng sarili. Kaya nga ang metapisika ay hindi pakiramdam na isang pambihirang impormasyon. Sinasabi lamang sa iyo, pumasok ka sa iyong sarili, at tingnan mo ang iyong dinamismo para sa lahat ng meron.”

23 Nagsisimula sa pinakamalapit sa iyong katotohanan, sa iyon sarili, at sa pinakamalalim na katotohanan nitong sariling ito na angkop sa Meron. Ang simula mo ay ang iyong sarili bilang walang alam pero nais malaman ang totoo.

Ito ang kahusayan ng pagpapakatao na tinatawag ng mga Griyego na *techne* na may kinalaman din sa kahusayan ng mga manggagawa. Ang mahusay na pagwawalis, halimbawa, ay bunga ng maraming beses na pagwawalis at pag-unawa dito. Ang *techne* para sa mga Griyego ay pag-unawang gumagawa at paggawang umunawana. Pero kung talagang nakikinig tayo kay Ferriols, sinasabi nito iba’t iba ang *techne* ng pagpapakatao. Ang mga abogado, magsasaka, karpertero, pulitiko, relihiyoso, hindi naniniwala sa Diyos, bakla, tomboy, gwardiya, kabataan, guro, at marami pang sektor ng lipunan ay may kanya-kanyang *techne*. Sa kani-kanilang pag-unawa-paggawa (*techne*), hindi dapat makalimutan na hindi lamang *techne* niya ang totoo. Dapat laging bukas ito sa katotohanan at handang matuto sa pamamagitan ng pakikisalamuha sa iba. Kaunay nito, paliwanang ni Ferriols,

Sapagkat ang wastong pagtingin sa anomang bagay ay nagaganap lamang sa isang abot tanaw. Iba ang kulay ng asul kapag ang abot tanaw ay pula o berde. Iba ang anyo at mismong buhay ng isang punong kahoy kapag ang kapaligiran ay kagubatan o isang matapik na kalsada. Iba ang aking tingin sa iyo kapag tayo ay

nagkatagpo sa eskwelahan o sa loob ng isang eroplano. Iba ang aking pag-uunawa sa iyo kapag dinalaw kita sa iyong abot tanaw kaysa kung walang-malay kitang pinilit magpakita sa loob ng aking sariling abot tanaw.\textsuperscript{24}


Maaaring raw ang premise ni Protagoras—iba’t iba tayo ng nadarama o karanasan sa mundo. Totoong mayroong “katotohanan” sa nadarama ng bawat indibiduwal na tao. Subalit hindi kumpleto itong nadarama at nalalaman ng tao. Ang isang taong gumagaalaw sa katotohanan ay kailangang gumalaw at hindi makulong na lamang sa kanyang pinangggalingan rasyunalidad. May udyok sa taong talagang sumusunod sa katotohanan na makipagtalaban sa ibang kaisipan.


Inihahalintulad ni Ferriols ang mga tao sa modernong panahon kay Theaitetos na natatakot pumasok sa diskurso tungkol sa pag-uunawa. Malimit ayaw na nating makipagdiskurso dahil kontento na tayo sa hawla ng ating nag-iisang rasyunalidad. Subalit kung lahat ng natin ang ating loob, bubuoin ang ating kalooban, bubuksan ang ating isipan sa katwiran ng

\textsuperscript{24} Roque J. Ferriols, \textit{Mga Sinaunang Griyego} (Quezon City: Office of Research and Publications, Ateneo de Manila University, c1995), 2. The italics are mine.
\textsuperscript{25} Ferriols, \textit{Pambungad sa Metapiska}, 71.
\textsuperscript{26} See \textit{Ibid.}, 65-82.
ka-iba, at papasok sa diskursong hindi mapagmaneobra, malamang mayrong mga bagong bungang isip tayong makukuha.

Isang Paglalagom

May ilang mahahalagang puntos sa pilosopiya at pamimilosopiya ni Ferriols ang maaari nating bigyan ng pansin.


Pangatlo, maaari din nating tingnan kung paano titindig sa mga tunay na usaping panlipunan ang pilosopiya ni Ferriols. Anong masasabi ni Ferriols sa problema ng dominasyon na nagreresulta ng pagsasantabi sa bases ng maliliit? Paano maunawaan ang negatibong epektro nito gamit ang pilosopiya ni Ferriols na nagnaisimula sa pagmumulat ng masalimuot na dinamismo ng tao? Anong klaseng lipunan ang meron tayo ngayon kung saan nagiging posible ang kawalan ng pagkadama sa pangangailangan ng tao? Anong mga institusyon ng kultura ang nagpapatakbo ng ganitong klase ng sikolohiya?

paggamit ng pilosopiyang wika. Saan ba dinala ng diskurso ni Ferriols ang pamimilosopiyang Filipino? Nakalikha ba ito ng mga bagong usapin o katanungan sa mga sumunod na henerasyon ng mga mag-aaral at mananaliksik sa pilosopiyang wika? Bukod sa mga pagtatangkang siwalat ang maranghang ontolohiya ng Meron gamit ang matulaan istilo ng pamimilosopiyang wika ni Ferriols (na wala naman sigurong masama), ano pang mga pilosopikal na pagsisyasat ang maaari nating buksan mula sa mga ito?

Department of Philosophy, University of Santo Tomas, Philippines.

References


__________, “Assessing the Developmental Potentials of Some Twelve Discourses of Filipino Philosophy,” Keynote Lecture presented at the National Conference of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila University, 9 April 2013.


__________, Mga Sinaunang Griyego (Quezon City: Office of Research and Publications, Ateneo de Manila University, 1999).

__________, Pilosopiya ng Relihiyon (Quezon City: Office of Research and Publications, Ateneo de Manila University, 1995).

50 ANG PILOSOPiya AT PAMIMILOSOPiya NI ROque J. FeRriOLS


Article

Ang Pilosopiya ni Sr. Mary John Mananzan, OSB

Leslie Anne L. Liwanag

Abstract: The philosophy of a Filipina in the academe is often equated with the name Emerita S. Quito. However, the purpose of this study is to shed light on the important aspects in Sr. Mary John Mananzan's philosophy, whose works generally made a wide contribution in the said field. Aside from her intellectual biography, the paper also surveys the following points in order to attain the purpose of the study: 1) her theoretical and praxiological foundation, 2) her reflective thoughts in philosophy, 3) her discourse about the Filipino philosophy, 4) her method in philosophizing, 5) her praxeology, and 6) her view on the Philippine society. The end of this paper concludes with the implications of these aspects in the Filipino philosophy.

Keywords: Mananzan, mga manifestasyon ng pilosopiyang Pilipino, teorya, praksiyolohiya

Introduksyon

Ibabahagi ng papel na ito ang mahahalagang aspekto at puntos ng kaisipan ng pilosopong Pilipina, feminista, aktibista, at madreng si Sr. May John Mananzan (1937). Hindi man kasing komprehensibo ni Emerita S. Quito ang kanyang pananaw ukol sa larangan ng pilosopiya, mawawaring naging sandigan ni Mananzan ang kalikasan nito upang mapagtagumpayan ang kanyang adbokasiya. Hangarin ng pag-aaral na itong matukoy ang mga puntos ng pamimilosopiya at diskurso ni Mananzan. Sa pamamagitan ng pag-aaral na ito, makikita ang paglalarawan ng iba't ibang bahagi ng kaisipan ni Mananzan at mababatid ang kanyang malaking kontribusyon sa larangan ng pilosopiya.
Intelektwal na Talambuhay ni Mananzan


Pagkatapos ng pakikisa kontra sa pagmamalabis ng La Tondena Distillery sa mga manggagawa, naging tagapagtaguyod ng teolohiyang mapagpalaya (liberation theology) si Mananzan na nahinuha kay Carlos

---


Dahilan ito upang maunay siya sa mga organisasyong may oryentasyong feminista tulad ng Filipina at General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership, and Action (GABRIELA) noong 1984; ang Institute of Women’s Studies sa SSC noong 1988; ang Women’s Crisis Center noong 1989; Life-Long Learning and Wellness Center sa SSC noong 1997; at ang Consortium of Women’s Colleges noong 2001.

Bilang patunay sa kanyang kahusayan at dedikasyon sa teorya at praksis ng teolohiya, politika, at feminismo, nakamit ni Mananzan ang mga sumusunod na rekognisyon: ang Dorothy Cadbury Fellowship sa University of Birmingham noong 1994, ang Henry Luce Fellowship sa Union Theological Seminary of New York noong 1995, an Asian Public Intellectual Fellowship noong 2002, Outstanding Woman Leader Award mula sa Maynila noong 2009, at naging bahagi sa listahang “one of the 100 inspiring persons in world” na pinamunuan ng Women Deliver noong 2011. Sa kasalukuyang edad na 78, aktibo pa rin si Mananzan sa kanyang pilosopiya, teolohiya, at praksiyolohikal na adbokasiya.

**Ang mga Obra ni Mananzan**

Hindi katulad sa kaso ni Quito, walang natagpuan ang mananaliksik ng mapagkatiwalaang listahan ng mga tekstong nailathala ni Mananzan. Hindi rin katulad kay Quito na nakapokus sa pagtuturo at pananaliksik, nakita si Mananzan bilang mas aktibo sa politikal na pakikibaka at pansamahang pakikisa. Kaya sa halip na magkaroon ng mga libro at artikulo, mas nakatuon si Mananzan sa pagsusulat ng maiikling sanaysay at talumpating kalaunang inilathala bilang mga bahagi ng libro. Bukod dito, mayroong isang aklat na bersyon ng kanyang mga natatanging monograph ng disertasyon noong 1973 at sariling talambuhay na pinamagatang *Nunsense: the Spiritual Journey of a Feminist Activist Nun* noong 2012.

Para sa mithiin ng pag-aaral na sisirin ang kanyang pilosopikal na diskurso, minabuting piliin ang mga sumusunod na sanaysay at talumpati mula sa kanyang aklat na 1) *Essays on Women* ng 1987, 2) *Challenges to the Inner*

---


Sa pagkakataong ito, malalimang sinuri ng mananaliksik ang mga artikulong kabili sa mga sumusunod na tala ng aklat na pinili mismo ni Mananzan sa dahilang kinakitaan niya ito ng higit na kahalagahan ng kanyang diskurso. Gayong may kontribusyon din ang iba pang feministang manunulat sa mga aklat na Essays on Women at Woman and Religion, minabuti pa ring isama ang dalawa sapagkat pinangunahan niya ang pagsasaayos nito bilang bahagi ng kanyang pangarap at ng mas malaki pang pangarap upang noo'y makapagsimula sa pagbubuo ng institusyon para sa araling pangkababaihan. Buhay nito, patatagpuan dito ang tig-tatlong artikulong pinakapuso ng kanyang pilosopikal na kaisipan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aklat</th>
<th>Pamagat ng Artikulo / Sanaysay ni Mananzan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essays on Women</td>
<td>The Filipino Woman:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before and After the Spanish Conquest of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sexual Exploitation of Women in a Third World Setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emerging Spirituality of Women: The Asian Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges to the Inner Room</td>
<td>1. Women, Religion, and Spirituality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redefining Religious Commitment Today:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Being a Woman Religious in a Third World Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christ to A Contemporary Religious Woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crisis as a Necessary Impetus to Spiritual Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Roots of Women's Oppression in Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Role of Women in Evangelization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benedictine Values and the Woman Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jesus Meets the Weeping Women of Jerusalem:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Filipino Women See Their Vision through the Tears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theological Reflections on Violence Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Women in the Third World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women of the Third World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Emerging Spirituality of Asian Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feminist Theology in Asia: A Ten-Year Overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religion, Culture, and Aging: An Asian Viewpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Jubilee Year from Asian Women's Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Women in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Filipino Woman: Before and After the Spanish Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feminine Socialization and Education to Feminism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women's Studies in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prostitution in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

© 2015 Leslie Anne L Liwanag
ISSN 1908-7330
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Woman and Religion</th>
<th>Filipino Migrant Workers in Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancing the Health of the Filipino Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Paschal Mystery from a Philippine Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman and Religion</td>
<td>Woman and Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Religious Woman Today and Integral Evangelization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Towards an Asian Feminist Theology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSPECTIVES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction: My Story, a Personal Perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Asian Feminist Theology of Liberation: A Historical Perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOMEN IN ASIAN WORLD RELIGIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Women and Christianity: A Feminist Theological Perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Basics of Hinduism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Hinduism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Basic Teachings of Buddhism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Buddhism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Tenets of Islam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Islam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOMEN IN NON-WORLD RELIGIONS IN ASIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Confucianism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Indigenous Religions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in New Religions of Japan: Tenrikyo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Folk Religions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Maliban sa intelektwal na talambuhay ni Mananzan, sinusuri ng papel ang anim na aspekto ng kanyang kaisipan: 1) ang kanyang teoretikal at praksiyolohikal na batis, 2) ang kanyang replektibong pananaw sa pilosopiya, 3) ang kanyang diskursibong katayuan sa pilosopiyan Pilipino, 4) ang kanyang metodo sa pamimilsopiya, 5) ang kanyang praksiyolohiya, at 6) ang kanyang pananaw sa lipunang Pilipino.

**Teoretikal at Praksiyolohikal na Batis ni Mananzan**

Naging pundasyon ni Mananzan ang misyolohiya sa Alemanya na umiinog sa esensya ng plano ng Diyos upang manumalik ang mga likha sa...
orihinal na layunin at kabuoan. Nakatali ang misyon sa konsepto ng Missio Dei sapagkat bilang mga nilikha, may pribilehiyo ang bawat taong makiisa sa plano ng Diyos. Kombinasyon ng pagtulong sa proklamasyon ng Salita ng Diyos at ang pakikisa sa panlipunang gawain at pagkamit ng katarungan ang mithiin ng mga misyolohista.⁵

Malaki ang kaugnayan nito sa pananaw ni Mananzan sapagkat isa sa mga katangian ng Missio Dei ang ideya ng kaligtasan bilang hindi lamang pagkakasalba ng mga kaluluwa, bagkus restorasyon sa aspekto ng espiritwal, pisikal, komyunal, at transpormasyon ng mundo.⁶ Sa Alemanya nabuksan ang kaisipan ni Mananzan sa iba’t ibang teolohiya. May mga pagkakataon pang nabibigla siya sa mga dinadaluhang seminar, kung saan aminadong muntik na niyang talikuran ang sariling pananampalataya. Dito nagsimulang dagundungin ang kanyang mga nakasanayang paniniwala. Dito siya lubos nakondisyon at nagkaroon ng mas malawak na pag-isip ukol sa Katolisismo.⁷

Hindi nagtagal, napagdesisyonan ni Mananzan na ipagpatuloy ang pag-aaral sa larangan ng pilosopiya. Sa kasong ito, kinailangan niya ng tagapayo (mentor) sa kanyang kukuning doktoradong digri. Sa tulong ng kanyang kaibigang si Sr. Dabalus, nakahanap sila ng isang tagapayong Aleman na nagtuturo sa Gregorian University sa Roma. Sinabi ng self-professed na Marxistang propesor na kinakailangan niyang tumungo sa nasabing bansa sapagkat doon siya nagtuturo.


⁶ Ibid., 1.
⁸ Cf. Liwag, A Biography of Sr. Mary John Mananzan, OSB: A Look into a Socio-Political Activist Radicalization.
niya ang mga sanhi ng pagkaapi at pagdarahop ng masa. Tinuligsa niya ang pagkaugat ng walang-katarungan ng umiiral na kalagayang sosyal.\(^9\) Paniwala ni Marx, pinatatakbo ng mayayaman (burgis) ang kapitalismo para sa kanilang kapakinabangan, kahit pa humantong sa eksploitasyon ng mga manggagawa (proleteryat).


Sa kabilang banda, naging pokus ng diskurso ni Austin na ang gawaing sentral ng pilosopiya ay ang maiahang na pagpapaliwanag ng ilan sa mga konsepto ng pangkaraniwang pagpapahayag. Datapwat hindi tulad ng iba, naniniwala siyang ang pagpapahayag na ito ay may sariling kahalagahan kakaiba sa pagpapadali sa pag-uunawa ng ilang palaisipan sa pilosopiya sapagkat ayon sa kanya, ang pagpapaliwanag sa mga maselang bahagi ng pangkaraniwang pagpapahayag ay nagpapaliwanag din sa mga maselang bagay hinggil sa mundo.\(^11\)

Gayunpaman, sa tala ng intelektwal na talambuhay ni Mananzan, mahihinuhang hindi sila malalimang nakaimpluwensiya si kanyang pilosopiya at natigil na lamang ito sa pagkakalathala ng kanyang disertasyon.

Alinsunod dito ang kanyang pagiging tagapagtaguyod ng teolohiyang mapagpalaya (liberation theology). Nakaimpluwensiya si Carlos Abesamis (1934-2008), isang Pilipinong kilala sa kanyang teolohiyang mapagpalayang naglulunsad ng anyo ng

---

seminaryong nakiisa sa sosyo-politikal na reyalidad bilang pakikiramay. Inangkla ni Abesamis ang konseptong ito sa kanyang malalimang pagbabasa ng doktrina ng kaligtasan bilang holistikong pagkakatubos ng kaluluwa.\textsuperscript{12}

Hinarap ni Mananzan ang mga baluktot na pamamalakad ng politikal na ekonomiya ng Pilipinas gamit ang teolohiyang mapagpalayang nahnuhu niya mula kay Abesamis na sentro ang kongkreto at lubos na kaligtasan (concrete and total salvation). Makapangyarihan ang kabatiran ni Abesamis sa dahlilang hindi literal ang kanyang pagsapakahulugan sa kaligtasang matatagpuan sa aklat ng Exodo. Para sa kanya, hindi lamang nauukol ang kaligtasan sa pagkakasalba ng kaluluwa mula sa kasalanan, bagkus bilang isang aktwal na kalayaan ng mga Israelitang nakaantig sa kabuoan ng pagkatao sa pamamagitan ng biyaya ng Diyos.\textsuperscript{13}

Sa pagkakataong ito, hindi lamang tumuon si Mananzan sa bahagi ng lipunang nakararanas ng opresyon; naging malinaw din sa kanya ang diskriminasyon sa kababaihang masasak sihan sa hirarkiya at patriyarkal na pamamalakad ng Simbahang Katoliko. Bukod dito, ipinagpatuloy ni Mananzan ang kaisipan ng Romano-Amerikanong teolohistang si Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (ipinanganak noong 1938) na nag-abala naman sa imahen ni Hesus ng Nazareth bilang nanguna sa relihiyosong kilusang naging dahilan kaya naisantabi ang diskriminasyon sa lahi, relihiyon, lipunan, at kasarian.\textsuperscript{14} Gayong napanatili ng mga tagasunod ni Hesus ang rebolusyong ito matapos ang kanyang kamatayan at muling pagkabuhay, tila naglaho itong muli nang mamayani ang matatag na patriyarkal na kultura ng mga Griyego at Romano. Tinawag itong “eklesiastikong patriyarkalisasyon” (ecclesiastical patriarchalization) na “humantong sa pagbubukod ng kababaihan mula sa serbisyon pansimbahan.”\textsuperscript{15}

**Replektibong Pananaw sa Pilosopiya sa Pilipinas ni Mananzan**

Hindi tuwiran ang pagtalakay ni Mananzan ukol sa kanyang pananaw sa pilosopiya sa Pilipinas. Gayunman, mababaks mula sa kanyang intelektwal na buhay ang kahalagahan ng pagkakaroon nito na nakaangkla sa kanyang adhikaing maahon sa lusak ang mga biktima ng opresyon, lalo na ang kababaihan. Malinaw ang kanyang feministang pilosopiya sa mga sumusunod na pangyayari sa kanyang buhay: 1) ang purong pilosopiya at

\textsuperscript{12} Mananzan, “The Religious Woman Today and Integral Evangelization,” 44-45.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 44.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 7.
teolohiyang markado ng disertasyong may kinalaman sa kaisipan nina Wittgenstein at Austin, 2) ang paninindigan sa pilosopiya ng teolohiyang mapagpalaya dahil napagtantong walang silbi ang birubuong teolohiyang Pilipino kung malayo sa karanasan at mga pasakit ng lipunang Pilipino, at 3) ang pagtuon sa woman question nang lumahok sa Women’s Conference sa Venice noong 1977.

Sa mapayapang buhay bilang propesor sa Heswitang institusyong Ateneo, napalapit si Mananzan sa grupong Interfaith Theological Circle na bumubuo ng teolohiyang Pilipino sa pamamagitan ng pamimilosopiya. Kasama ang iba pang miyembro ng grupo, napagtanto niyang hindi uusad ang pagbabalangkas ng pilosopiyang ito kung ipagpapatuloy ang talakayan sa loob ng komportable silid-aklata o sa nakapakong espasyo ng unibersidad. 16 Ito ang sitwasyong nagtulak sa kanya upang mag-ukol-panahon sa labas ng kombento at sumapi sa ebanghelikal na gawain kabilang ang mahihirap at manggagawa ng Maynila.

Buhat nito, mawawaring kung pinalitadahan ng mobilisasyon sa La Tondena Distillery ang radikal na politika ni Mananzan, ang partisipasyon niya sa komperensiya sa Venice na pinangunahan ng World Council of Churches noong 1997 ang humulma ng kanyang paninindigan sa pilosopiyang feminism. 17 Ito ang nagtulak sa kanyang lumahok at pangunahin ang ilang maka-feminismong institusyon at organisasyong nabanggit kanina.

**Diskursibong Katayuan sa Pilosopiyang Pilipino ni Mananzan**

Uumpisahan ang pagtuklas sa diskursibong katayuan ni Mananzan sa pilosopiyang Pilipino sa pamamagitan ng pag-uuri ng kanyang tekstwal na produkson gamit ang iskema ng labing-dalawang discurso ng pilosopiyang Pilipino ni Demeterio. Ipinapakita sa Talahanayan 2 kung titulo, bilang, at ang porsyento sa mga obra ni Mananzan ang kabibilang ng labing-dalawang discurso ng pilosopiyang Pilipino:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taksonomiya</th>
<th>Titulo</th>
<th>Bilang ng mga Akda</th>
<th>Percent- age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logical Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenology / Existentialism / Hermeneutics</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0.0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appropriation of Foreign Theories</td>
<td>“Christ to a Contemporary Religious Woman,” “Crisis as a Necessary Impetus to Spiritual Growth”</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growth,” “Benedictine Values and the Woman Question,” “The Jubilee Year from Asian Women’s Perspective,” at “The Paschal Mystery from a Philippine Perspective”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriation of Folk Philosophy</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophizing using the Filipino Language</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revisionist Writing</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of the Presuppositions &amp; Implications of the Filipino Worldview</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Study on the Filipino Philosophical Luminaries

| Talahanayan 2: Mga Titulo, Bilang, at Porsyento ng mga Akda ni Mananzan sa Bawat Diskurso ng Pilosopiya Pilipino ayon kay Demeterio |
|---|---|
| 0 | 0.0% |

Biswal na ipinapakita ng radar chart sa Pigyur 1 ang nilalaman ng Talahanayan 2:

Pigyur 1: Percentage ng mga Akda ni Mananzan sa Bawat Diskurso ng Pilosopiya Pilipino ayon kay Demeterio

Sa pagkakataoong ito, masasakihan ang limang nangungunang diskurso ni Mananzan: critical philosophy (92.1%), research on Filipino values and ethics (26.3%), interpretation of Filipino worldview (18.4%), appropriation of foreign theories (13.2%), at exposition of foreign systems (13.2%). Samantalang walang nailathala si Mananzan na obra sa mga diskurso ng logical analysis, phenomenology/existentialism/hermeneutics, appropriation of folk philosophy, philosophizing using the Filipino language, revisionist writing, identification of the presupposition and implications of the Filipino worldview, at study on the Filipino philosophical luminaries.
Metodo sa Pamimilosopiya ni Mananzan

Upang mabatid ang metodo sa pamimilosopiya ni Mananzan, dadalumatin sa bahaging ito ang paraan na kanyang ginamit sa limang nangungunang discurso sa pilosopiyang Pilipinong natuklasan sa naunang seksyon: critical philosophy, research on Filipino values and ethics, interpretation of Filipino worldview, appropriation of foreign theories, at exposition of foreign systems.


Mga problem-based na akda pa rin ang mga obra ni Mananzan na napabibilang sa diskursong interpretation of Filipino worldview. Malinaw na makikita ang kontribusyon ni Mananzan sa diskursong ito bilang Pilipinang pantas na may pagkakakilanlan sa kanyang pagsusumikap na dalumatang ang patriyarkal na lipunang Pilipino base sa ilang pangyayari sa kasaysayan, kasama ang epekto ng kolonisasyon at Kristiyanismo sa Pilipinas. Upang magkaroon ng saysay ang kanyang feminism at konsepto ng teolohiyang mapagpalaya, komprehensibong nag-ambag si Mananzan ng implikasyon ng kulturan patriyarkal sa lipunang nagbigay-implikasyon sa Pilipinong identidad at pananaw sa mundo. Sa kabila nito, karamihan sa mga Pilipino

ang hindi nakauunawa sa katuturan at direksyon ng ganitong moda ng pamimilosopiya.


Hindi na rin nakapagtatakang tumulak si Mananzan sa pagkakaroon ng mga problem-based na obrang napabibilang sa diskursong exposition of foreign systems. Sa pagkakataong ito, mainam na panimulang punto ng tekstwal na kalikasan ang diskusyon niya ukol sa Hinduismo, Budismo, Islam, Tenrismo, at katutubong relihiyon upang umusbong ang apropiyasyon ng mga teoryang dayuhan. Inilantad niya rito na hindi lamang sa Kristiyanismo mananaig ang pagkakalugmok ng kababaihan na may mababang pagtingin. Isinisiwalat nito ang mga pilosopikal na kaisipan ng mga problem-based sa larangan ng araling pangkababaihan bilang bahagi ng kanyang proyekto.

**Praksiyolohiya ni Mananzan**

Sa ikalimang sanaysay, ibinahagi ni Mananzan na noong 1975 bumuo ang Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines ng apat na klasipikasyon ng panghihikayat ng Simbahan sa ilalim ng diktadurya ng rehimeng Marcos: 1) di-kritikal na pakikiisa, 2) mapanuring kolaborasyon, 3) kritikal na pagkilos, at 4) suporta sa armadong pakikibaka. Mula sa metikulosong pag-aaral ng kanyang mga panulat at praksis, ipinosisyon ni Mananzan ang kanyang sarili sa ikatlong moda ng politikal na pakikibaka bukod pa noong panahon ng Batas Militar. Minatiyagan niya ang kalagayan at hindi ito natigil matapos ang publikasyon ng kanyang mga pagsusuri, datapwet malaking tipak ng kanyang oras ang para sa mobilisasyon at organisasyon ng mga mamamayan. Mahalagang magunita na naunang maging radikal si Mananzan kaysa sa kanyang pagiging feminista.

Buhat ng kanyang mga politikal na pagtitipon at demonstrasyon siya rin minsan ang nagasaayos, mahahaba ang panahong imersyon at interakasyon ni Mananzan kasama ang mga Pilipinong nasa laylayan. Masasaksihang ang pangmatagalang praksis niya sa pamamagitan ng mga lupon at institusyon may politikal na oryentasyon tinutulungan at pinamumunuan niya, gaya ng: 1) the Friends of the Workers noong 1975, 2) the Filipina noong 1977, 3) the Citizens’ Alliance for Consumer Protection noong 1978, 4) GABRIELA noong 1984, 5) the Filipino Migrant Workers’ Center noong 1984, at 6) the Institute of Women’s Studies noong 1988.


Hindi kalaunan, naging daan ang grupong ito upang magpokus si Mananzan sa mahihirap at mga maralitang nasa lungsod, sapagkat bahagi ng mahihirap ang mga tinulungan nilang manggagawang maralitang nakatira rito. Isang pagtaliwa sa mataas na produktong petrolyo ang nagpausong sa Citizens’ Alliance for Consumer Protection. Unti-unti itong uminog sa usapin ng globalisasyon, seguridad sa pagkain at tubig, peligro ng nukleyar, at nutrisyon ng mga yaring pagkain. Sa organisasyong ito, nakilala ni Mananzan si Christina Ebro Carlos na nagturo sa kanya ng simulain ng aktibismo ng kababaihan at parlyamentarismo sa bansang Pilipinas.

Gawa ng pagiging feminista ni Mananzan noong 1977, nagresulta ng dagliang pagkakataan ng grupong Filipina. Noong makabalik mula sa Women’s Conference sa Venice, binuo niya ang organisasyon kasama sina Remy Rikken, Tagapangulo ng Philippine Commission for Women (na dating community organizer sa Mindanao); Teresita Deles, Kasulukuyang Presidential Adviser for Peace Process (na dating guro ng literatura sa Kolehiyo ng Maryknoll at peace and development advocate); at Irene Santiago, Chair Emerita at Chief Executive Officer ng Mindanao Commission on Women (na dating mamamahayag at peace advocate sa Mindanao). Nakapokus ang Filipina upang unawain at ilaan ang atensyon sa iba’t ibang usyu ng kababaihan sa Pilipinas, partikular na ang kagagahan ng mga Pilipinang prostitute. Kinilala ang Filipina bilang kauna-unahang feministang organisasyon sa bansa.
Lumutang ang GABRIELA dahil sa Center for Women Resources, isang organisasyong pinamunuan ni Manzan noong 1982 kabilang ang sosyolohista at tagapagtugoyong babaylanismo si Marianita Villariba. Pinangunahan ng Center for Women Resources ang pag-organisa ng isang forum na dinaluhan ng mga feministang organisasyon sa Pilipinas noong 1984, na siyang naglulunod ng umbrella organization na GABRIELA na halos 200 ang mga miyembro organisasyon. Bunga ng konseptwalisasyon ng feministang at pambansang demokratikong balangkas, itinaguyod ng GABRIELA ang mga isyung kinakaharap ng kababaihan. Taong 2003, naging politikal na partido ang GABRIELA na nagsilang ng sariling mga babaeng kandidato para sa pambansang lehislatura. Sa kasalukuyan, si Mananzan ang Chairperson Emerita ng GABRIELA.

Resulta ng pananaliksik ni Mananzan ukol sa kolonyal na kasaysayan ng Katolisismo sa Pilipinas ang Filipino Migrant Workers’ Center sa Madrid, Spain. Nasaksihan niya rito ang masaklap na sitwasyon ng Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) na halos kababaihan ang bumubuo. Gumawa siya ng paraan upang ma-organisa sila at magkaroon ng legal na rekognisyon. Gayong taon ng sabatikal ni Mananzan, hindi niya mapigilan ang sariling tumulong at tipunin ang mga indibidwal.

Noong Dekano pa ng St. Scholastica’s College, sumulpot ang Institute of Women’s Studies dahil sa kagustuhan ni Mananzan na bigkisin sa isang kurikula ang araling pangkababaihan sa programang tersiyarya. Upang maisakatuparan ang Institute of Women’s Studies, pinangunahan niya ang paglinang sa mga kurso at modyul kabilang ang ilang mga fakulti at ang mga nagboluntaryo mula sa grupong Filipina at GABRIELA. Hindi nagtagal, nilubos ng institusyon ang pagkakataon para sa mga elit na mag-aaral ng St. Scholastica’s College, gayundin ang mga Filipinang nasa laylayan, at interesadong kababaihang nananahan sa umuunlad pa lamang na bansa. Sa tulong ng donasyon ng dayuhan, nakapagpatayo ng sariling tahanan ang Institute of Women’s Studies sa labas ng St. Scholastica’s College na pinangalanang “Nursia,” sumasangguni ito sa lugar ng kapanganakan nina St. Benedict at St. Scholastica.

Dagdag pa sa manikapestasyon ng praksis ni Mananzan ang mga adbokasiya bilang miyembro ng Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians (EATWOT) at ng Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP). Naroroon si Mananzan nang itatag ang EATWOT noong 1976. Nang magdaos ng komperensiya ang EATWOT sa New Delhi, India noong 1981, isinulat ni Mananzan ang pagkakaroon ng organisasyon ng sariling Women’s Commission kabilang iba pang Pilipinang feministang madre na sina Virginia Fabella at Nila Bermisa ng Maryknoll Sisters of Saint Dominic, Rosario Battung ng Religious of the Good Shepherd,
at iba pang feministang teolohista. Sa pamamagitan ng Women’s Commission, sinimulan nina Mananzan at ng grupo ang pagsasagawa ng feministang teolohiya ng umuunlad pa lamang na bansa (feminist Third World theologizing). Mas matanda ang AMRSP kaysa sa EATWOT dahil itinatag ito noong 1971 na may layong mas radikal na restruksyon upang maipanatili sa iba pang relihiyosong organisasyong miyembro nito ang hindi makatarungang panlipunang kaayusan sa bansa.


**Pananaw sa Lipunang Pilipino**

Sa mga sanaysay at talumpati ni Mananzan, matingkad ang imahen ng isang lipunang binabagabag ng mga sumusunod na suliranin: patriyarkal na relihiyon, dispalinghadong politikal na ekonomiya, patriyarkal na kultura, at patuloy na epekto ng kolonisasyon.

**Patriyarkal na Relihiyon**


Una, sinundan ni Mananzan ang resulta ng imbestigasyon ng mga arkeolohista at historyador ukol sa pangunahing pagtitingin sa mga diyosa kaysa sa mga diyos noong sinaunang panahon sa Egypt, India, at maging sa Pilipinas. Dahilan ang pagiging tagapamahala ng mga diyosa sa sangkatauhan at kalikasan, pagkakaroon ng mahika, at kakayahan sa sining. Sa sinaunang konsepto ng bathala sa Pilipinas, diumanong itinuturing itong
walang kasarian panginoon. Gayunman, kaakibat ng pananakop ng Espanyol ang relihiyong Kristiyanoismo at ayon kay Mananzan: “isinaalang-alang sa Hudeo-Kristiyanong kultura ang lalaking imahen ng diyos na nagdulot ng pagkakatatag ng patriyarkal na monoteismong hindi pumapatotoo sa lugar ng panahon at kultura.”

Sa patuloy na pag-usbong ng Kristiyanismo, lubos na nawala ang prinsipyo ng pagkakapantay-pantay sa kasarian na itinatag na pamamagitan ni Hesus. Ang minanang patriyarkalismo ng Kristiyanismo mula sa mga Hudyo, Griyego, at Romano ay humantong sa pagkakahawalay ng relihiyosong kababaihan at domestikasyon ng mga babaeng layko. Sanhi rin ito upang maging eksklusibong teritoryo ng kalalakihan ang pampublikong espasyo. Pinaghihinalaang mga lingkod ng kasamaan ang mga babaeng hindi sumusunod sa kinagawang pagiging domestikadong asawa o ina.

Sa kasalukuyan, isinalaysay ni Mananzan na patuloy ang dominasyon ng Simbahang Katoliko sa kababaihan. Itinatangi ng maskulinong hirarkiyang kilalanin ang posibilidad ng ordinasyon ng babae, gayong mas aktibo at marubdub na sektor sila sa simbahan. Nagmamatigas ang liturhiya sa maling politikal na pagkiling sa maskulinong kasarian.

Dispalinghadong Politikal na Ekonomiya


Ipinapakita ni Mananzan na hindi lamang sinisira ng pagsandig na ito ang politikal na ekonomiya sa dahilang nakikilala ang mga dayuhan sa

22 Ibid., 33.
pagpaplano at layunin ng bansa. Nang piliin ng Pilipinas ang madaling daan, hindi ito nakausad upang mag-isip ng kongkretong paraan at harapin ang matapang na desisyong tutugon sa mga puntukulat na problema sa aspektong politikal na ekonomiya tulad ng mga sumusunod: “1) ‘di pagkakapantay na distribusyon ng bukal ng produksyon, lupa, at kapital at 2) kontrol ng mga dayuhang (US at Japan) sa ekonomiya ng mga transnasyonal korporasyon.”

Patriyarkal na Kultura

Itinuro ni Mananzan na sa pagsilang lamang ng sanggol, nagkakaroon na ng reproduksyon ng ideya sa kasarian sa patriyarkal na lipunan gaya ng Pilipinas—kapag babae ang sanggol, isinasalang ito sa kulay rosas na krib at aksesorya, asul naman para sa mga lalaki. Kapag lumaki na sila at may kakayahan maklamo, mga manika at lutu-lutuan ang ibinibigay sa mga babae, habang baril-barilan, maliliit na tangke, at iba pang maskulinong laruan para sa mga lalaki.

Sa paaralan, isang ekspektasyon na dapat magaling sa asignaturang wika at literatura ang mga babae, samantalang matematika at agham naman para sa mga lalaki. Sinasanay ang mga babae upang maging pasibo, maamo, tago, maging tagasuporta, samantalang tinuturuang maging abenteurero, matinik sa pagdedesisyon, pursigido, at matapang naman ang mga lalaki. Dagdag pang matuto dapat ang mga babaeng manamit at mag-make-up dahil hinuhubog na ang pinakultimong mithiin nila sa buhay ang makahanap ng lalaking magbibigay sa kanila ng “happy ever after.”

Sa mahihirap na pamilya, mas dehado ang estado ng mga babae. Nagiging mas mahalagang makapag-aral ang mga lalaki sa paniwalang mag-aasawa rin kalaunan ang mga babae. Iniaatas ang gawaing-bahay sa mga babae tulad ng pagluluto, paglilinis, at maging paglalaba ng mga damit ng kanilang kapatid na lalaki.

Nagiging domestikado ang kababaihan gawa ng kahalagahan sa pagkabirhen, habang libre namang nakagagala ang kalalakihan kahit gabi na sa paniwalang “wala namang mawawala sa kanila.” Itinatanim sa isipan ng mga batang babae na kapag nawala na ang kanilang pagkabirhen, wala na silang kwenta. Ipinaisip sa kanila na ang pinakapinal nilang layunin ang

---

26 Ibid.
magpakasal, magkaanak, at gawing matibay ang pamilya anong mangyari, gayong may ilang mapagsamantalahang asawang pisikal at emosyonal na silang binubugbog.28

Sa lipunang patriyarkal tulad ng Pilipinas, pinakamakapangyarihan ang mass media sa reproduksyon ng mga ideya sa kasarian at estereotipo. Kumakatawan ang mga nilalakong produktong kemikal at pagkain sa gawaing-bahay kung saan ipinapakita ang asawang matibay at madaling gawain ang mga ito.29 Sa mga naratibong palabas, ibinibigay sa kababaihan ang mga minoryang papel, pagiging estupido, o malaswa.30

Hindi itinanggri ni Mananzan na parehong may mga ideolohiyang pangkasarian para sa babae at lalaki, ngunit ang patriyarkal na kaayusan ang nagtutulak para sa sanayad na karahasan natatanggap ng mga Pilipina. Aniya, hindi makatarungang ipinakababae sa gawaing-bahay dahil pareho namang ekonomikal na produktibo ang babae at lalaki. Pagdidiin pa: “Kahit na parehong walong oras na nagtatrabaho ang mag-asawa; may gawaing-bahay o may obligasyon pa rin ang mga babae rito kahit may mga kasambahay.”31

May mga kaso pa ng pananakit sa kababaihan (wife battering) hindi dahil sa kakayahang pisikal ng kalalakihan, bagkus tinatanggap na lamang din ito ng kababaihan dahil pinansyal at emosyonal silang nakadependeng sa kanilang mga asawa. Alinsunod dito ang ilang isyu ng pagtatalik sa napakalapit na magkamag-anak (incest) at panggagahasa (rape) gawa ng dominasyong patriyarkal.

**Patuloy na Epekto ng Kolonisasyon**

Kabilang sa feministang proyekto ni Mananzan ang pagsusuri niya ukol sa kolonisasyon ng Espanyol at Amerikano. Sinimulan niya ang page ofer sa kung paano alterahin ng mga mananakop na Espanyol ang konstruksyon ng isang Pilipina. Bago pa dumating ang mga dayuhan, may sariling hirukiya ang sinaunang lipunan na pinamumunuan ng mga lider ng tribo. Sa komunidad na ito, kagalang-galang ang sinaunang Pilipina gawa ng kanilang kakayahang mamuno, manggamot, magsilbing tulay sa espiritwal na mundo, mag-alay sa mga diyos at diyosa, at magsilang ng mga indibidwal sa susunod na henerasyon.

Base pa sa mga nakalap na impormasyon sa pre-kolonyal na Pilipina ayon kay Teresita Infante: pantay ang mga mana, gawaing-bahay, at

---

31 Mananzan, “Women in the Third World: Beyond the Patriarchal Age,” 81.
opportunidad sa edukasyon sa anak na lalaki at babae.\textsuperscript{32} Matayog ang estado ng mga sinaunang Pilipina, kaya hindi isinasagawa ang pagbibigay-dote (dowry); katunayan, lalaki pa ang nag-aalay ng mga regalo at serbisyo sa familiya ng babae.\textsuperscript{33}

Bukod dito, nakita ng mga manunulat na Espanyol ang Pilipina na tinawag nilang \textit{mujer indigena} bilang may kakayahang mangasiwa, may mataas na moral, kapansin-pansin sa industriya, may kapasidad na magsakripisyo, magaling sa pagdedesisyon, at may sensitibidad.

Nang ipataw ng mga Espanyol ang kultural na modelo at patriyarka, inalis ang mga Pilipina sa pampublikong espasyo at itinulak sa mga tahanan at kombento. Itinuro pa ang modelo ng pagkababaeng halaw sa imahen ng Birheng Maria.\textsuperscript{34} Binansagan pang mga mangkukulang at tagapaglingkod ng masasamang elemento ang makakapangyarihang babaylan. Tinuruan ang mga sinaunang Pilipinong tanggapin ang pagdurusa tulad ng pagtanggap ni Hesus ng Nazareth sa sinapit na pagpapasakit.\textsuperscript{35}

Noong dumating ang mga Amerikanong kolonisador, pinalakas nila ang modelo ng Iberyang pagkababaeng may imahen ng ika-19 siglong Amerikanong babae.

Gayunman para kay Mananzan, hindi tuluyang naiwaksi ng makapangyarihang kultural na imahen ng \textit{mujer indigena} dahil sa kolektibong alaala sa mga sinaunang Pilipina. Makikita ito sa modernong babaylan na si Marianita Villariba, at sa historikal na pigura ni Gabriela Silang (1731-1763), Melchora Aquino (1812-1919), at Gregoria de Jesus (1875-1943). Gayun din ang mapayapang aktibismo ng kababaihang Kalinga na lumaban sa proyekto ng rehimeng Marcos ukol sa Chico River dam at Suprema ng Ciudad de Mystica de Dios sa Mount Banahaw na si Isabel Suarez.\textsuperscript{36}


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 157.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 166.


Kongklusyon

Sinasalamin ng pilosopikal na diskurso ni Mananzan ang aktibong misyon upang makiisa sa orihinal na dibuho ng Diyos sa sanlibutan—ito ang pagkakapantay-pantay ng bawat isa. Sinimulan niya ito sa pamamagitan ng matinding pakikisalamuha at pakikipaglaban sa exploisyon ng mabababang uring manggagagawa. Sa pamamagitan nito, mas maunawaan maging ng mga ordinaryong maging na orihinal na mithiin at imahen ni Hesus bilang mukha ng pagkakapantay-pantay mula pa noong panahon ng Batas Militar hanggang sa kasalukuyan.

Maituturing na dakilang pilosopong Pilipina si Mananzan sapagkat hindi siya natinag sa komportableng kalagayan, bagkus isinuon ang adbokasiya kasama ang mahihirap at api sa lipunan. Hindi napigil ng kanyang pakikibaka ang pagkakaroon ng mga tekstwal na proyekto. Datapwat ginamit ang kanyang matinding karaniwang nararanasang exploisyon, diskriminasyon, at opresyon bilang makabuluhang aktibong misyon tungo sa pagwawaksi ng ‘di makatarungang pamamalakad at kawalan ng pagkakapantay-pantay mula pa noong panahon ng Batas Militar hanggang sa kasalukuyan.

Naging makabuluhang ang kombinasyon ng punasyon ni Mananzan kaakibat ang pilosopiya, misyolohiya, at Marxismo. Nahubog siya upang maging mapanuri at replektibo sa sariling misyon tungo sa pagwawaksi ng ‘di makatarungang pamamalakad at kawalan ng pagkakapantay-pantay mula pa noong panahon ng Batas Militar hanggang sa kasalukuyan.

References


Dean, Rebecca, “Documenting GABRIELA Network, an Activist Filipina Women’s Organization,” in *Thinking Gender* Special Issue (2009), 13-14.


__________, “Benedictine Values and the Woman Question,” in Challenges to the Inner Room: Selected Essays and Speeches on Women (Manila: Institute of Women’s Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, 1998).


__________, “Feminine Socialization and Education to Feminism,” in Challenges to the Inner Room: Selected Essays and Speeches on Women (Manila: Institute of Women’s Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, 1998).

__________, “Feminist Theology in Asia: A Ten Year Overview,” in Challenges to the Inner Room: Selected Essays and Speeches on Women (Manila: Institute of Women’s Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, 1998).

__________, “Feminist Theology in Asia: A Ten Year Overview,” in Challenges to the Inner Room: Selected Essays and Speeches on Women (Manila: Institute of Women’s Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, 1998).


__________, “Jesus Meets the Weeping Women of Jerusalem: The Filipino Women See their Vision through the Tears,” in Challenges to the Inner Room: Selected Essays and Speeches on Women (Manila: Institute of Women’s Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, 1998).


__________, “Prostitution in the Philippines,” in Challenges to the Inner Room: Selected Essays and Speeches on Women (Manila: Institute of Women’s Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, 1998), 196-208.

Essays and Speeches on Women (Manila: Institute of Women's Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, 1998).


__________, “The Jubilee Year from Asian Women’s Perspective,” in Challenges to the Inner Room: Selected Essays and Speeches on Women (Manila: Institute of Women’s Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, 1998).

__________, “The Paschal Mystery from a Philippine Perspective,” in Challenges to the Inner Room: Selected Essays and Speeches on Women (Manila: Institute of Women’s Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, 1998).


__________, “Theological Reflection on Violence against Women,” in Challenges to the Inner Room: Selected Essays and Speeches on Women (Manila: Institute of Women’s Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, 1998).


__________, “Women in the Third World: Beyond Patriarchal Age,” in Challenges to the Inner Room: Selected Essays and Speeches on Women
(Manila: Institute of Women’s Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, 1998).


Quito, Emerita, Ang Kasaysayan ng Pilosopiya (Manila: Zone Printing, 1974).

‘On the Jewish Question:’
A Polemical Précis

Virgilio A. Rivas

Abstract: The essay is a polemical engagement with Karl Marx’s early writing “On the Jewish Question” as it traces its arguably Feuerbachian origin and influence. Althusser in his book *For Marx* allows us to recognize this imprint of Feuerbach in the writings of the young Marx yet also falls short of determining what “On the Jewish Question” conveys in the last instance. As the essay navigates this contested terrain of interpreting Marx’s key writing, the importance of revisiting Feuerbach’s influence on the young Marx is underscored vis-à-vis Bauer’s impoverished Hegelianism in full display in his polemic concerning the emancipation of the Jews. Towards the concluding section, we will connect Marx’s concrete-materialist form of critique with which he treated Bauer’s polemics to contemporary forms of philosophical materialism in relation to the overlapping logics of late capitalism today.

Keywords: Feuerbachian Hegelianism, epistemological break, *Judenfrage*, philosophical materialism

Preface

This essay is prepared for a polemical engagement with Karl Marx’s early writing, considerably pivotal in terms of its connection to so-called late or mature writings culminating in the rather unfinished third volume of *Das Kapital*. Marx’s “On the Jewish Question” briefly preceded in writing and composition what is deemed an important collection of texts, unique for their transitional significance or so in the history of Marxist literature. We are referring to the *Economic and Philosophical Writings* of 1844, which is reprinted in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Complete Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 193-217. Additionally, the essay is dedicated to the memory of the late Karl Marx, who passed away in London on March 14, 1883, at the age of 65. May his spirit live on!


© 2015 Virgilio A. Rivas
ISSN 1908-7330
Manuscripts of 1844, simply the Paris Manuscripts, acknowledged as the precursor of a more mature transition to post-Hegelian musings of Marx.

This sets off “On the Jewish Question” as polemically Hegelian. In his widely influential book For Marx, Louis Althusser, for a time a leading intellectual figure of the French left, argued that this crucial text is rather Feuerbachian. In otherwise much earlier account on the larger aspect of Marx’s theoretical influence, or rather, in Frederick Engels’ belated text, noting the supposed diacritical proximity of its spirit and content to Marx’s positions, inspite of the fact that it was published long after Marx’s death, Feuerbach represents the end of classical German philosophy which Hegel’s system, at least towards the latter phase, arguably predominates. With Engels’ and Althusser’s diacritical differences on this aspect of the debate alone, the matter of Feuerbach’s exact place in Marxist literature is as complicated as the matter of Hegel’s relation to Marx. But the label ‘Hegelian’ (and who says Feuerbach is no Hegelian) sticks consistently regardless of Althusser, and yet the diacritical significance of the Hegelianism of Marx must first be established just as we will try to explain later.

Despite the eclipse of Marxism in recent times (or we can push back the time to the debacle of the ’68 revolts in France), we wish to contribute to this ongoing debate by way of navigating, albeit not as thorough as one might expect, Feuerbach’s influence on Marx in line with his essay “On the Jewish Question,” which we assert is Hegelian yet with a different set of terms in mind. Hopefully this interrogation will put itself on track with the continued relevance of Hegel, especially in contemporary critical theory. The widely caricatured Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek, for instance, continues to valorize Hegel along this line, though certainly not without his trademark Lacanian transposition of the logic of desire that Hegel unlocked in the Phenomenology of the Spirit, for instance, in relation to commodity fetishism.

---


4 Althusser, For Marx, 45.

5 Marx died in 1883; Engels’ text was published in German three years after.


which forms a crucial part of the historical tenacity of capital that Marx earlier attempted to uncover in his rather more mature works. In the meantime, the polemical power of Marx’s essay “On the Jewish Question” lies in its alleged Hegelianism, a critical theoretical instrument for Marx to launch his later critique of capitalism along with his attempt to divest the intellectual spirit or logic of history of its otherwise profane but compelling articulation of the empirico-historical potential of Hegel’s vast speculative system. “On the Jewish Question” represents Marx’s early critical exposition of this logic of history, diacritically accentuated by his interrogation of the ‘Jew.’ Whether he succeeded in overcoming Hegel in his mature writings is another question.¹⁰

Althusser’s unique reading of “On the Jewish Question” rests on the supposed predominance of Feuerbachian themes that Marx consistently put into play in the background of his polemic against Bauer, such as “alienation, species being, total being, inversion of subject and predicate, etc.”¹¹ In Althusser’s words, it is unique for its “ethical [problematization] of understanding human history.”¹² But this also provides an unnecessary context for interpreting this early writing of Marx within an uncertain space in relation to the politico-economic orientation of the 1844 Manuscripts and to the more advanced economic cartography of his later writings. To extend a bit liberally Althusser’s contention, vis-à-vis the question of so-called epistemological break,¹³ the Judenfrage to which Marx was polemically introduced through a fellow Hegelian, Bruno Bauer, a senior member of the Hegelian school, writing two successive essays on the Jewish question, gave him the precise opportunity in which to work out his lingering Feuerbachian influence, this time to advance a critique of Bauer for his naïve speculations on the issue of political and religious emancipation of the Jews. But supposing these writings attempt to echo Hegel, Bauer’s essays are still less clear about

---


¹⁰ In the succeeding discussions, it will become gradually clear that Marx’s relation to Hegel can be addressed by way of the question, who’s Hegel?

¹¹ Althusser, For Marx, 45.

¹² Ibid., 46. Emphasis mine.

¹³ Althusser’s theory of the epistemological break, which extends the notion originally coined by Gaston Bachelard meant to designate a leap from pre-scientific to the scientific world of ideas (Althusser, For Marx, 249), is a useful cataloguing with respect to our contention on Feuerbach’s influence vis-à-vis the “On the Jewish Question.” Althusser extended the notion of the break to Marx’s own relation to Hegel’s idealism. But if, as Althusser asserts, “there are in Hegel utilizable analyses and even a number of naturally-isolated demonstrations of a materialist character (ibid., 192), it follows that the inversion of Hegel is unnecessary. Althusser would later resort to Leninism to settle this inversion thesis (cf. n. 4). What Althusser did not consider is—give and take a number of debatable concerns—this inversion most especially would have applied to Feuerbach.
their Hegelian orientation.

This would suggest that Bauer was not Hegelian enough or radical enough to see through the real issue of Jewish emancipation. Even in Hegel, it is clear that religious emancipation will always falls short of its transcendental aims. In the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes:

Religion . . . contains that point which, in spite of all change, failure of actual ends and interests, and loss of possessions, affords a consciousness of immutability and of the highest freedom and satisfaction. If, then, religion constitutes the foundation which embodies the ethical realm in general, and, more specifically, the nature of the state as the divine will, it is at the same time only a foundation; and this is where the two [i.e., the state and religion] diverge. The state is the divine will as present spirit, unfolding as the actual shape and organization of a world.14

In like manner, religion must give way to philosophy which Hegel identifies with absolute knowing whose dialectical function in the Phenomenology is to supersede the previous act of, say, “the [gathering] together of the moments . . . of the life of the Spirit.”15 That act refers to religion, and yet the relation between religion and philosophy dialectically plays out on the level of spiritual history only to ascend further onto a higher plane of political history; there, philosophy, or absolute knowing, becomes represented by the state. Incidentally, both concepts of philosophy and state would be subjected by Marx to further materialist critique, beyond the theoretical terms of the 1844 Manuscripts in which he intensified his critique of Hegel, and which, at least for Althusser, would have represented a ‘rupture’ in his theoretical journey,16 yet retaining much of the Feuerbachian concepts that informed his earlier works.17 This is particularly evidenced by

15 Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, 485.
16 The so-called ‘epistemological break.’ See Althusser, For Marx, 32.
17 Althusser includes the Paris Manuscripts as the point of the early theoretical break with Hegel in the form of concrete-materialist critique of various forms of Hegelianism, among others, at the time (though Althusser was not clear about this point) as opposed to the abstract-speculative critique perfected by Hegel (Althusser, For Marx, 37). What Althusser did not entertain is that this new form of critique (concrete-materialist) rather exhibits Marx’s Feuerbachian appropriation of Hegelianism that he opposed to the poor Hegelianisms of his contemporaries. Althusser thought that the new form of critique utilized by Marx was a “critique which remains a prisoner of the idealist problematic it hoped to free itself from” (ibid.), when in fact, as we are proposing that the seeds of his break with Hegel were already present in as early

© 2015 Virgilio A. Rivas
ISSN 1908-7330
texts written after the Paris Manuscripts, such as the “Theses on Feuerbach”\textsuperscript{18} and The Poverty of Philosophy.\textsuperscript{19} It would seem that the critique of Hegelianism, including its naïve articulation in Bauer’s two writings on Judenfrage, has something to do with its diacritical relation to Feuerbach’s legacy.

Marx’s concept of the Jew in his critique of Bauer may then be interpreted as a critical figure in which Marx would 1) celebrate Feuerbach as an antidote to the speculative front of the Hegelian school, and 2) dismiss all other Hegelianisms for their failure to articulate the ultimate authoritative interpretation of the most radical directions of Hegel’s thought, namely, Feuerbach’s philosophical materialism. This would technically place Feuerbach’s legacy as post-Hegelian. To expand Engels’ declaration of Feuerbach’s materialism as the end of classical German philosophy, Feuerbach arguably represents the beginning of Western speculative philosophy beyond the naivety and the theoretical inadequacies of Hegelianism. And yet, as Marx strongly suggests in “Theses on Feuerbach,” this authoritative Hegelian remained loyal to Hegel. Theoretical life beyond Hegel is unimaginable.

The allure of Feuerbach’s materialism is unquestionable for Marx at the same time that it represents a danger in the eyes of the most leftist of all left Hegelians—Marx himself. If Hegel’s speculative system is already complete in the order of ideas to which even Marx would concede, what necessarily comes next is its supposed dialectical materialization (we underscore the term ‘dialectical’ in contrast to the term diacritical in relation to the importance of Hegel’s texts), its concrete material form in the sphere of culture, political life, society and history. The inversion of Hegel is at least theoretically sufficient in Feuerbach, so to speak. But all the more, in the eyes of Marx, Feuerbach came up short in terms of identifying morality as the ultimate context of the ideological conflict with pre-bourgeois forms of consciousness, conservative history, in short, which continues to shape the modern mind, and yet not the only institution that anathematizes human emancipatory ideals.\textsuperscript{20} Hence, Feuerbach essentially lacks an understanding

\textsuperscript{18} Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in Selected Writings, 216-233.
\textsuperscript{19} Marx, “Poverty of Philosophy,” in Selected Writings, 171-174.
\textsuperscript{20} Feuerbach proposed Christian faith and love as sources of salvation and happiness. In a lengthy sermon, Feuerbach exhorts his fellow Christians: “[By] what means does man deliver himself from this state of disunion between himself and the perfect being, from the painful
of political economy.

It may also be argued, in light of Althusser’s lead, that Marx was also trying to engage Feuerbach’s theory of human nature diacritically through the figure of the Jew. But more than the inadequacy of his Hegelianism, Marx attacked Bauer’s frivolous idealism, which—if we are right about our next contention with Althusser—ignored Feuerbach’s radical Hegelian intervention. But with the figure of the Jew, even Feuerbach’s Hegelian limitation is exposed. Marx radicalized this figure to reveal what was at stake in the Jewish Question. More than a critique of the absence of emphasis on political economy in historical transformation, Marx exposed the real danger to metabolize, like an unpardonable attempt to infuse life to the dead, a concept without content.21 We refer here to an idea of human nature relieved of its historical actuality.

Any analysis of human nature has the tendency to ontologize what ought to be a shared problematic which cannot be addressed solely by philosophy, or by religion, art and science, each in its isolated interpretive frame. But even with these disciplines collaborating to formulate a unified concept of human nature, the ever-present threat of metaphysics—that which seeks a singular essence underlying things—does not rub away, let us say, magically, under the pretext that collaboration takes the place of the singularity of metaphysical contemplation into the nature of things. Whether it is achieved in collaboration or by pure individual contemplation, such as characterized most of speculative philosophy, any idea of human nature will always remain an ontological question or, ultimately, metaphysical. Nietzsche can be our essential guide—any claim to knowledge is an apology for knowledge.22 Expressed in the Freudo-Lacanianism of Zizek’s brand of left Hegelianism, for instance, ontologizing human nature is typical of the consciousness of sin, from the distressing sense of his own nothingness? How does he blunt the fatal sting of sin? Only by this: that he is conscious of love as the highest, the absolute power and truth, that he regards Divine Being not only as a law, as a moral being, as a being of the understanding; but also as a loving, tender, even subjective human being (that is, as having sympathy with individual man.” See Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. by Eliot George (Mt. San Antonio College, Walnut: MSAC Philosophy Group, 2008), 14.

21 Feuerbach’s materialism, as Althusser also argued, turned out to be pseudo-materialist (Althusser, For Marx, 35). In his The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach defines the essence of Man as that which belongs to God, or that external object acting as Man’s complete essence (Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 203). This passage points to Feuerbach’s proper Hegelianism, the full materialist complement of Hegel’s absolute idealism. For his part, Marx’s Feuerbachian Hegelianism is an attempt to isolate Feuerbach from the full idealist materiality of Hegel’s speculative philosophy. In the end, Marx challenged the theoretical sufficiency of Feuerbach’s inversion of Hegel, which he would transpose eventually onto a dialectical materialist inversion of Hegel, the Hegel of Feuerbach.


© 2015 Virgilio A. Rivas
ISSN 1908-7330

[cc] BY-NC-ND
self-alienation involved in the fantasy one projects onto a self-image, that is, from an imagined absolute outside, which, as Zizek argues, always “conceals a traumatic truth.” This does not have to be a purely psychological phenomenon—traumas extend to the level of population further complicating a historical awareness of the formal location of the individual in the dynamic transition or movement of history largely independent of it. This historical complication dawned on Bauer in the form of a poorly masticated Hegelian image of emancipation in the figure of the Jew—a fantasy Bauer practically referred back onto the individual sphere, ignoring its necessary entangled relation to history.

Aside from its polemical attack against the Hegelianism of Bauer, Marx also risked a conception of the Jew based on what he deemed as the outcome of the historical nexus between philosophy and the state, acutely articulated in Hegel’s system that Bauer in his inadequate understanding of Hegelianism, besides his blindness to history, otherwise hugely ignored. This obliviousness is sharply dramatized in his conception of the emancipation of the Jews, which, in our understanding of its poor Hegelianism, is as much oblivious as it is an attempt to ontologize human nature. Hence, the figure of the Jew is the figure of the inadequacy of Hegelianism in the absence of Feuerbachian materialism, and yet, this absence may turn out to be the opportunity for Marx to display, arguably, the correct form of Hegelianism.

‘On the Jewish Question’ and Other Marginal Polemics

It may as yet be significative of a person, such as the figure of the Jew, but taking that into hand, that is, as a figure, implies that the actual entity is negligible. As a figure, the Jew has ceased to be a person of some kind, yet this makes the Jew doubtlessly real. A figure can be a number, a shape, a symbol, a diagram perhaps. But more than any predication we can give of the Jew, the Jew rather exists in the utmost rational sense.

Assuming it to be true and exact, Hegel’s dialectical idealism (the real is rational) here touches upon the figure of the Jew, as yet mediated by the most radical abstractive method, far more advanced than the logic of Aristotle, correctly anticipating the logical perfection of the bourgeois state. There, logic assumes a real concrete potential. The only unique discovery of Marx in this respect is that for him the resolution of history can never be a logical one. But imagine here a situation where there is no logical reality to begin with, a kind of reality that is in Marxist terms ‘essentially

23 Zizek, Less Than Nothing, 239.
impoverished,’ such that history in the last instance will have to be summoned either to transform its logical realism into the fullness that it can only assume, or unmask its pretentious (because logical) claim to the concrete, such as the ‘Jewish Question’ taken apart from the question of real human emancipation, which—as Marx elaborates—does not even approach the level of a real question.

With Hegel on the background, the Jew must first logically exist in the same manner that the bourgeois state must exist and must only logically exist for capitalism to be abstracted from it. Lest we lose the essential point, the bourgeois as the active subject of the dispensation of capital is the real subject behind the abstraction. The bourgeois invents himself as he invents the logical reality wherein he exactly fits. Thus, the bourgeois is the perfect metaphysician. Paradoxically, it is with the view to shattering his illusion of independent logical formality that he unwittingly invents the state in terms of realizing his true historical, nay, self-destructive role. Marx would rely on the progressive section of the bourgeoisie to launch socialism by actually perfecting the dissolution of its class through the creation of its dialectical complement in the figure of the proletariat who will carry out the real radical—because it is the most actual—demolition of the bourgeois class.25

But we are still on the Jewish question: If it is to be found out that the Jew does not exist (that is, in the sense Bauer framed the logical existence of the Jew, rather defectively conceived along Hegelian terms), the most immediate next step, assuming a series of abstraction has exhausted itself in earnest, is to finally invent it (which applies to Marx’s Jew, for which he was uncritically branded as anti-Semite,26 at the expense of Bauer’s previous, albeit disappointingly Hegelian sorcery). We must emphasize again that Marx was no stranger to the exhaustive dialectic of Hegelian abstraction. And now with Marx on the background, stealing Bauer’s moment, the Jewish question is reduced to the question of inventing the Jew, that is to say, of producing a figure that can correlate itself unfortunately to an absent, if not ill-conceived, entity. Here, the goal of inventing the Jew is to expose its concrete limit in Bauer’s conception of the Jew, rather thought in abstraction. In The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx describes this active kind of misconception, quite fittingly, as abstraction in contrast to the critical function of analysis.27 On further reference to abstraction, Marx describes this opposite complement

26 See, for instance, Michael Perry and Frederick M. Schweitzer, eds., Antisemitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to Present (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 153-155, for a brief but substantial discussion on the radical anti-Semitism of Marx, which does not necessarily mean he was actually anti-Semite.
of analysis as “what language means,” which—he goes on to elaborate—“is certainly not Hebrew.” 28 What is not Hebrew in terms of the language with which Marx framed its diacritical function in *The Poverty of Philosophy* written much later is treated otherwise as almost, if not as singularly, Hebrew in Bauer’s polemics concerning the Jewish question, namely, as “the language of pure reason, separate from the individual.” 29 Apparently, what is not Hebrew is the Greek, which invented the pure language of reason of which Bauer (including M. Proudhon as in the case of Marx’s polemic in *The Poverty of Philosophy*) was exceptionally ignorant, mistaking the ‘Hebrew’ for the Greek, and the pre-modern or pre-bourgeois for the Hegelian, modernist appropriation of the Greek logos.

Curiously though, the language of pure reason generates the logical concept of the Jew. The Jew must be afforded beforehand the logical right to exist for any kind of logical abstraction to be obtained consistently and to the point directly. Apropos of the Jewish Question, Marx’s attack against Bauer is a declaration that the latter was not being Hegelian enough, but in so doing Marx had to extract, tease the political unconscious out of Bauer’s head. As Marx states, “Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real Jew.” 30 Bauer lacked this conception of the real Jew. The real is rational—he forgot his lesson. It is in this sense that he did not have the real question in mind. It belongs to Marx, the avenger of the real question. The real Jew is one who is not (Jew), the religious secretly at odds with the essence of religion. The rational is also the valorization of contradiction so dear to Hegel; thus, the real Jew is one who is deeply irreligious, atheistic to the core which, however, he does not profess. The entire logic of Hegelian negativity was too misty for him such that, as Marx puts it, “Bauer here transforms the question of Jewish emancipation into a purely religious question,” 31 forgetting all the while that religion is nothing religious. Marx goes on to elaborate: “What was, in itself, the basis of the Jewish religion? Practical need, egoism.” 32 Here, Marx is at his most forcefully Hegelian (let us remind ourselves of the diacritical value of the term ‘Hegelian’ when it is tagged onto Marx), which must first detect negativity in reality for that reality to be real. The figure of the Jew is right on target as it complicates the question of economic emancipation, complication being a chief point of access to understanding the dialectical resolution of conflict which proceeds, as Marx writes in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, from

---

28 Ibid., 219.
29 Ibid., 217.
30 Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in *Early Writings*, 236.
31 Ibid., 235.
32 Ibid., 238.
“affirmation, negation, and negation of the negation.”

Having extended itself onto a logical reality, the figure of the Jew becomes the unlikely starting point for radicalizing the project of human emancipation, which must first pass through the resolution of the religious question into a political one, then the political into economic resolution, underscoring its proximity to the full attainment of the species-life of Man. The ‘Jew’ then performs a metonymic operation, a part taken for the whole, the whole being the real Jew. Recall here that the real Jew is negative. The process of transfiguration from metaphor to metonymy has to see to it that at each end of the process, a level of progressive abstraction must be displayed; the more then it assumes the property of the real, rather beautifully expressed in Marx: “[The] real, individual man resumes the abstract citizen into himself.”

By failing to understand its negativity, Bauer was oblivious to the fact that the more politically emancipated the Jew is, the less free he could be under the same conditions in which he finds himself as a Jew.

At this juncture, the question of ‘who’ the Jew is transforms itself into ‘what’ the Jew is, which—as Bauer hugely ignored—is dialectically related to the state. Incidentally, in the Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State, Marx faulted Hegel for “identifying what is with the essence of the state” when it is obvious at this point that the essence of the state lies in its negativity: “That the real is rational is contradicted by the irrational reality which at every point shows itself to be the opposite of what it asserts, and to assert the opposite of what it is.”

Like a cunning twist of history, Marx had never been at his most Marxist (yes, Marxist in the sense of Feuerbach’s Hegelianism, and not Hegelian as in the Hegelianism of the Hegelians), despite his claim to the contrary that he is not a Marxist, by then practically declaring Hegel himself to be unHegelian, forgetting his core lesson on negativity. Marx writes:

Instead of showing how ‘universal concern’ acquires ‘subjective and therefore real universality’ and how it acquires the form of the universal concern, Hegel shows only that formlessness is its subjectivity, and a form without content must be formless. The form acquired by matters of universal concern in a state, which is not the state of such universal concerns, can only be a non-form, a self-deceiving, self-contradictory form, a pseudo-form
whose illusory nature will show itself for what it is.\textsuperscript{38}

Apropos of the question of the Jew, with Marx apparently standing Hegel on his head,\textsuperscript{39} the real question lies in the negativity of the Jew. When it appears somewhere as figure, it manifests itself elsewhere as metaphor, then as metonymy, creating a virtual Borromean knot of imponderables.\textsuperscript{40} We obtain here a homology between the bourgeois State and the real Jew — each in its pseudo-form, as state and as a Jew. If the State is thus essentially absent, what would then be the terms of the political emancipation of the Jew? The kind of issues that Bauer raised against the Christian state therefore do not entirely reflect what ought to be the proper Hegelian critique of the state in terms of its connection to ideology, represented by philosophy, or rather, ideology’s most expressive spiritual form. In summary, Bauer rejected the political emancipation of the Jews because he mistrusted the Christian state, which would never grant the Jew first his religious emancipation; here, Bauer equates political emancipation with religious emancipation. In response, Marx argued that it is possible for the Jews to be politically emancipated without being religiously emancipated. Yet Marx also acknowledged that the political emancipation of the Jews was not possible in Germany, not because the German state is predominantly Christian in influence, but rather because, as he wrote in a later essay, unlike in France, where “partial emancipation [or political emancipation] is the basis for universal emancipation [theoretically, human emancipation],”\textsuperscript{41} in the Germany of Marx’s and Bauer’s time,

\textsuperscript{38} Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State,” in \textit{Early Writings}, 127. In this passage Marx is essentially repeating what is already formulated by Feuerbach concerning Hegel. Althusser is an excellent aid: “[The] theoretical principles on which this critique of Hegel were based were merely a reprise, a commentary or development and extension of the admirable critique of Hegel repeatedly formulated by Feuerbach” (\textit{Althusser, For Marx}, 37).

\textsuperscript{39} Engels made the famous remark (in “Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy”) that Marx stood Hegel on his head. This was made 40 years after the publication of \textit{The German Ideology}, considered as a pivotal collaborative work of Marx and Engels. The diacritical value of this remark cannot be ignored, especially the context of time it brings to our attention vis-à-vis our claim that Marx’s Hegel is Feuerbachian. Concerning Marx’s break with Hegel, Engels pushed the timeframe back to an earlier point, the “Theses on Feuerbach.” Here, we are on the side of Leopold’s claim regarding the transitional importance of “On the Jewish Question” compared to the “Theses on Feuerbach” (cf. n. 4). But where Leopold would not wish to muddy the waters with respect to the popular acknowledgement of Hegel’s influence on the young Marx, we are more inclined to question the proposition that ‘all is water under the bridge.’


\textsuperscript{41} Marx, “A Contribution to Hegel’s Critique of the Philosophy of Right,” in \textit{Early Writings}, 255; emphases mine.
universal emancipation preconditions “any partial emancipation,” hence, the very impossibility of any talk of emancipation. It is in this sense that Germany, to extend the place of Hegel in the comparison between the two countries, is a bad Hegelian, diacritically represented by Bauer’s misunderstanding of the essence of the state, which is not to say that real Hegelianism actually thrived in France. Rather in France, there were as many competent rivals of Hegel except they were economists. Marx’s polemical attack against M. Proudhon, whose book *The Philosophy of Poverty* was the exact diacritical target of *The Poverty of Philosophy*, should rather be taken in this light.

But to return to our main concern: The state must logically exist for political emancipation to even acquire its most basic philosophical or ideological form. At least in Hegel, the state exists in a kind of dialectical negativity; it exists as a unity of opposites. Simply put, the state must exist at least in Bauer’s head as a logical reality (there goes the pseudo-form that Bauer forgot to imbibe as a Hegelian). But even this simple condition of dialectical idealism is missing in Bauer as we can deduce from Marx’s criticism of his conflation of political emancipation and human emancipation (including the Jew as a member of humanity): “[Bauer’s] own mistake lies clearly in the fact that he subjects only the ‘Christian state’ to criticism, and not the ‘state’ as such.” What is definitively most lacking in Bauer is the next step, that is, to embrace the most radical expression of Hegelianism in Feuerbach’s materialist philosophy, which Marx embraced in full display in his critique of Bauer’s *Judenfrage*.

**Precritical Hegelianism vs. Critical Hegelianism**

Bauer is at least Hegelian in its precritical or pre-bourgeois form. His Hegelianism suffered in two ways: 1) he was unfortunately unFeuerbachian, as we argued in the Preface, and for that 2) his ideological mindset belonged to pre-bourgeois consciousness, enough to situate him outside the Hegelian ambit. It is of interest to note that Feuerbach is already hinting at a poor version of Hegelianism in the following observations on the relation of Hegel’s doctrine to religion in *The Essence of Christianity*: “The learned mob was so blind in its hatred towards Hegel as not to perceive that his doctrine, at least in this relation, does not in fact contradict religion—that it contradicts it only in the same way as, in general, a developed, consequent process of thought contradicts an undeveloped, inconsequent, but nevertheless radically identical conception.”

---

42 Ibid.
44 Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, 186.
question, it would turn out that either of the two—religious emancipation or political emancipation—from the Christian state is unHegelian. One simply has to wait for the Christian state to fulfill its Hegelian mission to become a universal state. Feuerbach’s inversion of Hegel lies in this: while waiting for the Christian state to transform itself into a desirable state, Christianity must perfect itself into a true religion, that is, through love. However, the more perfectly Christian it is, the more unfortunately it is unHegelian—in secular terms—the more it negates the state. In a lengthy passage, Marx conveys what is also at stake in Feuerbach’s (Christian) inversion of Hegel via an exposition of Bauer’s (Jewish) Hegelianism:

The perfected Christian state is rather the atheist state, the democratic state, the state which relegates religion to the level of the other elements of civil society. The state which is still theological, which still officially professes the Christian faith, which still does not dare to declare itself a state, has not yet succeeded in expressing in secular, human form, in its reality as state, the human basis of which Christianity is the exaggerated expression. The so-called Christian state is simply the non-state, since it is only the human basis of the Christian religion, and not Christianity as a religion, which can realize itself in real human creations.

In place of Feuerbach’s Christian Hegelianism, Marx advanced the so-called concrete-materialist form of critique, as in the above case, the critique of Hegel’s doctrine of the state, and also of Feuerbach’s and Bauer’s conceptions of Christianity and of the Christian state, respectively. But notwithstanding the concrete-materialist form of critique which could represent Marx’s successful attempt to invert Feuerbach’s Hegelianism, Marx’s arguable Marxism (read: Feuerbachian) rather continues to shape his late or mature writings as he probed deep into economic theories, sanding away the rough edges of the concept of economic emancipation, even as he is still there struggling with how to invert this most radical Hegelian.

---

43 Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in Early Writings, 223.
44 Ibid. See also Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in Selected Writings, 55.
45 Engels, ‘Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy,’’ in Marx and Engels, Selected Works, 383). The controversial passages that refer to this aspect of inversion thesis may be found in Engels’ text: “[The] dialectic of Hegel was placed upon its head; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet” (ibid.). An interesting remark by Engels concerning this concept (dialectical materialism) also directs us to the Feuerbachian Hegelianism of Marx when he refers to a certain German worker, Joseph Dietzgen, who, according to Engels, “rediscovered” the materialist concept “independently of [Marx and
Marx set his eyes on the future, the future beyond capitalism of which he could barely sketch, at least before writing (with Engels) the Manifesto for the Communist Party, the concrete-materialist critique would carry on in form the speculative (Hegelian) character of Feuerbach’s philosophical materialism, rather usable compared to Hegel’s own dialectic. After the Manifesto, an initial call for the tactical unity of the working class to challenge the exploitative relation of capital and labor, etc., the beyond of capitalism, which would require a far more advanced theoretical perspective, vis-à-vis the formlessness of the future, nevertheless, would continue to haunt Marx.

Rather crucial in Marx’s initial attempt to put the issue of Jewish emancipation on track with the nascent idea of the future beyond capitalism,48 Bauer sought to remand Hegel’s notion of negativity, for instance, to the custody of time past. That is a time of history in which, among others, but singularly the most significant in terms of Marx’s critique of Bauer, a certain notion of subjectivity had yet to release itself from nature, thereof, the proper recognition of nature as a kind of inverse subjectivity, in which Man and Nature dialectically co-determine each other, was entirely absent from social consciousness. Marx writes in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts:

The universality of man is in practice manifested precisely in the universality which makes all nature his inorganic body—both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument of his life-activity. Nature is man’s inorganic body—nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself the human body. Man lives on nature—means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous intercourse if he is not to die.49

Because he was incapable of distinguishing political emancipation from universal human emancipation, Bauer’s Hegelianism essentially conflates, in the background of his polemics, nature and subjectivity as positive unity altogether in its pre-bourgeois form. The undialectical positive unity of nature and subjectivity works in Bauer’s analysis of Jewish

---

48 This, for instance, is the basic position of David Leopold. Cf. n. 4.
49 Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” in Marx and Engels, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and The Communist Manifesto, 75-76. The same citation can be found in Marx, “The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” in Early Writings and Selected Writings, 328, and 89-90, respectively.
emancipation in two ways: 1) political emancipation lacks an essential logical relation to the state, and 2) human emancipation lacks the initial force of political emancipation which, above all, must demand that the state acts as a state, that is, “a true, a real state.” As the logical reality of the state is absent in Bauer’s rhetoric of Jewish emancipation so is an intelligent and critical appraisal of the power of consciousness, at this stage, political consciousness, to imagine itself occupying a position external to social reality, logically represented by the state as the focal point of political emancipation (hence, any suggestion of fantastic sorcery as in Zizek’s Lacanian notion of ‘concealed trauma’ is relatively ruled out), of course, without severing the dialectical connection between the two to the extent that logical reality becomes ultimately the only reality that matters, or for that matter the state taken apart from economic reality (else, we are back to Zizek—it is nothing but fantasy). In Bauer’s negative analysis of the political emancipation of the Jew, what obtains rather is its empty rhetoric vis-à-vis the absence of a logical reality that it can demand, or rather because it does not demand it, namely, that the state behaves as real or rational. (We are not suggesting with respect to this reluctance vis-à-vis the state that Bauer is closely affirming Feuerbach’s position in relation to the Christian state, that it is enough to wait for the state to recognize religion, including Judaism. Bauer, as we emphasized, lacked a critical understanding of the Hegelian speculative concept of the state; in Feuerbach the state retained its Hegelian negativity and, in fact, attained the purity of the negative, albeit speculatively, which unfortunately also confined his materialism to a defense of both Christianity and the Christian state). Bauer simply cannot demand the state that he does not actually recognize in its true, real (Hegelian) form.

But, in the final analysis, Bauer would be proven essential to the bourgeois confirmation of the state as an instrument of the status quo by a powerful kind of illogical realism, the illogical pre-bourgeois realism of the unity of state and religion, or their imagined political complementarity, imagined because the real Jew demanding political emancipation, sans the needless conflation of the two ‘states’—the Christian state and the state as such—must be an atheist. Bauer’s defective Hegelianism would be upheld by political economy, which thrives under the same conditions that sanction mass ignorance as the ignorance—Feuerbach is right to the point—of the ‘learned mob.’ This rather powerful complementarity inscribed in political economy (even at its most advanced form, apparently transcendent to pre-bourgeois consciousness which conflates state and God) conceals what in fact is running the entire show. What could accomplish a rather difficult fusion of

---

50 Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in *Early Writings*, 216.
51 Cf. n. 24.
the profane and the sacred in the spirit of the negation of negation is something that is no longer a secret, at least for Marx:

Why are cotton, potatoes and spirits the pivots of bourgeois society? Because the least amount of labour is needed to produce them, and, consequently, they have the lowest price . . . . [In] a society founded on poverty the poorest products have the fatal prerogative of being used by the greatest number.

There, Marx is quintessentially Hegelian. The key to Jewish emancipation or, for that matter, human emancipation is economic in nature whose present aim, rather, is to produce poverty on a mass scale.

The Real Hegelianism of Marx

In summary, apropos of the Feuerbachian Hegelianism of Marx, we can briefly run through our major contention with Althusser. Althusser, in fact, questioned whether the inversion of Hegel in Marx is well-founded. He pointed out Engels’ own declaration in behalf of Marx that the latter stood Hegel on his head, thereby inverting his idealism into materialism. We agree with Althusser that this is not the exact inversion of Hegel, if we are looking for its textual indications in Marx, but disagree with him in terms of diacritically enlarging Engels’ commentary to expose the implausibility of the inversion thesis.

At least partially, Engels is pointing to the right direction. What again escapes Althusser is that the inversion in its simplest form is already at work in Marx’s embrace of Feuerbach’s Hegelianism, which dates back to the Early Writings (this Althusser also acknowledged but did not stretch much further). Hence, the inversion of Hegel would have most clearly applied to the Hegel of Feuerbach. One may wonder if Marx had approached Hegel independently of Feuerbach. This question is already addressed by Marx himself, noting his professed declaration of his alleged break with Feuerbach in two representative works, “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845) and “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” which appeared fourteen years later (1859). There is no doubt Marx read Hegel independently but his theoretical intervention in Hegelianism is mediated by Feuerbach’s appropriation of Hegel. Thus, his break with Feuerbach is a break with Hegel,

---

52 As in superstition.
54 Althusser, For Marx, 92, n. 5.

© 2015 Virgilio A. Rivas
ISSN 1908-7330

[CC BY-NC-ND]
though not entirely in the sense of ignoring Hegel’s own system independent of his materialist interpreter, Feuerbach. Here, at least, we can agree with Engels that in its “Hegelian form” Hegel’s own dialectic is unusable.56

Althusser ignored this suggestion of Engels with his own words: “if the inversion of Hegel into Marx is well-founded, it follows that Hegel could only have been already a previously inverted materialism.”57 This is exactly what our claim is all about because for him, the so-called epistemological break would have to mean a break with Hegel, the philosopher, but unmediated by Feuerbach. Here, Althusser would not accept that the break would have applied first to Feuerbach, then to Hegel.58 The break with Feuerbach’s Hegel would thus mean, albeit a bit unsuccessful, the break with Feuerbach’s sufficient inversion of Hegel. There, Marx became the Marxist that he is, the Feuerbachian through and through but without embracing the full extent of the latter’s Hegelian inversion. If anything, Marx died to the being that he became, a Marxist. Despite his rejection of the Marxist label, his failure to actually transcend the philosophical problematics that Feuerbach initiated vis-à-vis Hegel, and this certainly is not a new conception, as Levine,59 and somewhat Althusser (a convert of Leninism) before him, would also lump Hegel, Bauer and Marx under the same category, simply, that they considered theory to be antecedent to political organization, made him almost as if, and again, by a cunning twist of history, the true representative of the end of classical German philosophy that his friend Engels, to some extent, hastily attributed to Marx’s predecessor, Feuerbach. Marx stretched those philosophical problematics to the point of exhaustion. But his saving grace perhaps, vis-à-vis the changing dynamics of capital, was that he died with an unfinished work that would help revive interest, henceforth, in philosophical problematics, under new forms as well as with new content to sustain thought in its difficult confrontation, as it did to Marx in his time with the material challenges of history.

Conclusion

If the real question of the Jew escapes Bauer, it is rather with the misconception of the problem that his question uncovers, in the final analysis, the state of bourgeois consciousness at the time in relation to the mode of production peculiar to bourgeois-Capital relation. Suffice it to say that this unique relation has drastically changed in the last 300 years. In short, capitalism has historically progressed in terms of its peculiar way with

56 Ibid.
57 Althusser, For Marx, 92, n. 5
58 Ibid., 49.
59 Cf. n. 4.

© 2015 Virgilio A. Rivas
ISSN 1908-7330
democratizing logical reality, or rather its historical consciousness of the linear necessity to expand and enrich its speculative dimension (arguably, since Hegel), vis-à-vis the historical dynamics of philosophical materialism since Feuerbach, not to mention the continuing resistance of critical masses to capital’s role in human alienation.

Arguably, Marx’s exposition of the logic of Hegelianism in the transfiguration of the Jew, from religious to political to economic, would somehow prefigure succeeding diacritical expositions of the logics of worlds, as capitalism sustains its continuity in the realm of ideas, from the metaphysical to the post-metaphysical, albeit in more unrecognizable forms than it was in Marx’s time. Today the figure of the Jew that misled Bauer may have already transformed into various post-metaphysical figures, such as nature, cyborg, machine, precariat, etc, which also continue to complicate contemporary philosophical materialism. This is not to say that there should be a single or correct form of philosophical materialism with the same theoretical force as Marx exhibited in full display against the inadequacy of the Hegelianism of his time, but rather to say that perhaps a similar approach of Marx in terms of exposing the logical reality at work in today’s capitalism remains a viable line of inquiry and contestation towards overcoming contemporary forms of alienation.

For one thing, while there are many other similar contemporary attempts, Alain Badiou’s concept of materialist dialectic by far offers the most compelling and militant renewal of materialist philosophy since Marx. In the sequel to his Being and Event, Badiou opposes his concept of ‘materialist dialectic’ to the postmodernist concept of ‘democratic materialism’ which, he argues, represents capital’s latest alibi for incarcerating thought, bodies, modes of appearing, and truths, altogether within the confines of an alienating rhetoric to which human subjects readily adjust their “fettered, quartered and soiled body” to what he then describes, in reference to late capitalism’s global commodification of desire, as “fantasy and dream.”

60 Full reference to Badiou’s work is intended. See Alain Badiou, Logics of World: Being and Event, 2, trans. by Alberto Toscano (London and New York: Continuum, 2009).
65 See Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London and New York: Continuum, 2005).
66 Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 2.
Badiou identifies democratic materialism with “pragmatism of desire and the obviousness of commerce” to emphasize the fact that there is not a single logic that governs the present but rather multiple logics taken as natural in the sense that “[their] imposition or inculcation is freely sought out.”

This obtains as contemporary capitalism, in light of its huge investments in artificial intelligence, finance algorithms, medical science, etc., not to mention their applications on enhancement and upgrading of global military assets by the world’s major economies, also undergoes its own experiment in exploring ideas of human nature. This is precisely the time when philosophical materialism, or whatever names it can express itself in a radically post-Hegelian world, can expose the logics of today’s history while capital itself is in dire need of a new speculative structure to articulate its essence. We are not saying that capitalism is dying; on the contrary, it is precisely its lack of a single unifying speculative structure today that constitutes its most expressive and logical form of historical ascendancy, yet also its most threatening. In the same manner as Bauer tried to lend capitalism its philosophical structure in the guise of the Jewish question, various forms of ideological transfigurations and refigurations of capital today provide its continuity with multiple logical realities. But if capitalism, once defended by all sorts of defective Hegelianisms, such as Bauer’s philosophical speculation on the destiny of the Jew, which unwittingly endorsed the kind of obscurantism upon which 19th-century ruling ideology for a time became reliant, could with its war-machines liquidate or aid the genocide of six million Jews, there could be no question as to its real capability to wipe out for good its singular most absolute form of logical reality—this in spite of the multiple logics of democratic materialism that Badiou uncovered not to no avail—namely, the planet that capitalism has plundered for the last 300 years.

To Amable “Ka Abe” Tuibeo

Department of Philosophy and Humanities
Institute for Cultural Studies
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Philippines

References


67 Ibid., 1.
68 Ibid.


__________, *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).


Perry, Michael and Frederick M. Schweitzer, eds., Antisemitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to Present (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
Critical Business Ethics: Contributions and Challenges

Franz Giuseppe F. Cortez

Abstract: Various scholars have developed approaches to business ethics. In the secular sphere, the approaches include utilitarianism, deontology (Kantian), virtue, care, contractarianism, and stakeholder, among others. In the religious sphere, scholars explore what the major religions of the world have to say regarding the conduct of business. Thus, we encounter literatures on Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, Arab, and Confucian approaches to business ethics.

In this paper, I will talk about a relatively new approach called Critical Business Ethics (CBE). This approach is mainly an attempt to bring Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, structuralism, post-structuralism, and postmodernism among others, into the field of business ethics. However, it must not be seen as the approach to end all approaches but another way of looking at ethics and the conduct of business. In other words, the traditional approaches have already contributed a lot since the birthing of business ethics. The time is ripe to continue the march of reason and to not let business ethics be stunted or ossified.

I think that even if there were difficulties that a critical approach would confront, it would always remain a worthwhile endeavor. Thus, those who will teach Business Ethics and Social Responsibility must create opportunities and look for small pockets and openings when and where an alternative approach may thrive.

Keywords: ethics, business ethics, critical theory, critical business ethics

Introduction

Ethics as a branch of philosophy is usually defined as the systematic study of right and wrong conduct. Business ethics is commonly understood as the study of ethical principles as applied in the business setting. It is considered as an applied ethics along with bioethics, journalism
ethics, legal ethics, and others. Even within the sphere of business ethics, subbranches have sprouted, such as accounting ethics, financial management ethics, marketing ethics, advertising ethics, and human resources management ethics, among others.

Various scholars have developed approaches to business ethics. In the secular sphere, the approaches include utilitarianism, deontology (Kantian), virtue, care, contractarianism, and stakeholder, among others. In the religious sphere, scholars explore what the major religions of the world have to say regarding the conduct of business. Thus, we will encounter literature on Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, Arab, and Confucian approaches to business ethics.

In this paper, I will talk about a relatively young approach called critical business ethics. A quick search at Google would not produce much literature since very few scholars use the term “critical business ethics.”¹ This approach is mainly an attempt to bring the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, structuralism, post-structuralism, and postmodernism, among others into the field of business ethics.² Thus, with a plethora of intellectual patrons, critical business ethics is not Critical Business Ethics; that is, it is not a homogenous discourse.

At the outset, it must also be said that critical business ethics must not be seen as a messianic figure, the approach to end all approaches but another way of looking at ethics and the conduct of business. The other approaches have already contributed a lot since the birthing of business ethics. The time is ripe to continue the march of reason and to not let business ethics be stunted or ossified. After all, just like any other human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), business ethics is “not a stable or uncontested discipline.”³

---

¹ Probably, it was first used, but only in passing, in ten Bos’ and Willmott’s 2001 article where they hint at “an alternative, critical business ethics that would acknowledge the manifold moral struggles of people in organizational contexts.” See Rene ten Bos and Hugh Willmott, “Towards a Post-dualistic Business Ethics: Interweaving Reason and Emotion in Working Life,” in Journal of Management Studies, 38:6 (September 2001), 790. This term was mentioned (again, in passing) in the introductory page of: Campbell Jones, Rene ten Bos, and Martin Parker, For Business Ethics: A Critical Approach (London: Routledge, 2005).

² I follow the insight that critical theory does not only refer to the classical critical theory of the Frankfurt School and neo-Marxism but also to other discourses such as structuralism, post-structuralism, postmodernism, feminism, and psychoanalytic theory, among others. See Douglas Tallack, ed., Critical Theory: A Reader (New York: Harvester, 1995). See also Michael Peters, Mark Olsn, and Colin Lankshear, eds., Futures of Critical Theory: Dreams of Difference (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003).

³ Jones, ten Bos, and Parker, For Business Ethics, 8.
The “Critical” in Critical Business Ethics?

It is necessary to clarify the sense of “critical” in critical business ethics because it can be argued that ethics is necessarily critical and that the function of business ethics is to bring critical reflections into the world of business. For example, Alpar Losoncz contends that “ethics always includes critical normative perspectives and polemical aspects and, according to this, critical approach is not supplement to business ethics, but a necessary component of it.”⁴ Then, Peter Dean even “offers a set of questions to guide decision-makers who are faced with difficult choices, then presents a decision-making template based on sound ethical theory and demonstrates how it may be used.”⁵

Without undermining the importance of sound reasoning, I have to note that the “critical” in critical business ethics does not only refer to logical and analytical abilities.⁶ To make business ethics more critical does not simplistically mean to harmonize ethical reasoning with the laws and principles of logic and epistemology. It is not confined to the dream of making the business ethics students, teachers, professionals, and practitioners more adept in finding the fallacious reasoning in ethical decision-making.

Rather, the demand of critical thought is “to think about things, to look at alternative perspectives, and in the end to make the world that we are familiar with look a little bit more strange than it usually does.”⁷ To be critical is a constant practice of seeing the power relations embedded in ethical issues in business. Thus, more than an epistemological and logical category, critique is a social and political concept. Many years before Aristotle put an order into the Organon that he called Logic, Socrates was already thinking critically about the Greek polis. Socrates was the gadfly of Athens not for following the laws of Aristotelian logic but for problematizing the Athenian life.

The “critical” in business ethics may be aimed at the current practices of business and it may also be directed at how ethics is brought into the

---

⁷ Jones, ten Bos, and Parker, For Business Ethics, 1.
business sphere. Furthermore, for it to be an authentic critique, it must problematize and challenge the dominant discourses and then offer alternative discourses (not necessarily programs and systems) that are diametrically opposed to the said dominant discourses. It is “critical” because it looks into ethics whether it implicitly or explicitly, consciously or unconsciously, advocates the values and institutions of unbridled corporate capitalism.

**Main contributions of Critical Business Ethics**

**Critique of Conventional Business Ethics**

One way of understanding business ethics is to see it as a response of well-intentioned people to the evils brought about by capitalism. The prominent business ethicist, R. Edward Freeman comments that “business ethics was born in scandal” and “it seems to regenerate itself with each succeeding wave of scandal.” Edward Wray-Bliss, a professor of business and management at Macquarie University, similarly observes that significant developments in business ethics scholarship usually happen especially during times when the business world confronts issues and dramatic changes. However, Wray-Bliss also argues that many forms of business ethics are simply “complicit in deception, serving to contain and deflect criticism from the institutions of capitalism, enabling business to bluff ethical, to present a caring front while carrying on exploitative and unethical practices as usual behind its back.” Engelbrecht, another scholar along the lines of critical business ethics, argues that through business ethics, ethics is subordinated to business as the former becomes a means to an end, “representing principles and practices convertible into profit in the long run.”

And so, the first important contribution of critical business ethics is its pointed criticism of how the general ways of understanding and practice of business ethics are simply window-dressing and sugar-coating. Along the way, these ways of doing business ethics do not really tame the unbridled aspect of capitalist business. Rather, it is ethics itself that is tamed and that

---

10 Wray-Bliss, “Business Ethics,” 34.
facilitates as well the “sharpening of the teeth of the tiger.” It is ethics itself that has become an apologia to business in our capitalist society. Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility have become tools for corporate branding and corporate image as more money is poured into the promotion of good acts than into the good acts themselves. “Ethics becomes a specific part of a business and marketing strategy.” Values are subsumed by value. One is left to wonder whether business ethics truly helps in alleviating problems arising from business and economic interactions. Or does it only contribute to aggravating them? Indeed, conventional business ethics is so “interest-ed” that it ceases to be interested in ethics at all.

Rethinking the meaning of “ethics” and the “ethical”

The word “ethical” in the expression “ethical issues in business” would at once ring a bell and produce association with a plethora of examples: tax evasion, bribery, pollution, deceptive advertising, and many more. What the scholars of critical business ethics observe, however, is the narrowness of what counts as the ethical. When some issues are labeled as “ethical issues in business,” what happens intentionally or unintentionally is that other things are relegated to be not “ethical” and to be not “issues” at all. Regarding this, Jones, Parker and ten Bos ask the following questions: Is routine work, which is not satisfying and not meaningful at all, not an ethical issue in business? When a company with shareholders gives some of the profits it has made to investors who have not been involved in producing the value, this is seen as a reward for risk. But why should the bulk of the surplus generated by workers be given to someone else who almost certainly already has a lot of money in the first place? Why do poor nations have to export food when their own populations are starving? Why are third world workers paid so little to make things that are sold for huge profits in the first world?

This myopic understanding of ethics may lead one to also narrowly understand business ethics as simply and simplistically the application of
ethical principles into the field of business. But from a critical point of view, Wray-Bliss suggests that business ethics can also be understood “as the conceptualization, critique and promotion of ethics as it relates to business and organizational behavior.”19 This critical perspective leads one to see ethics not as a closed and finished system wherein day-to-day practices are supposed to fit in. Rather, ethics involves thinking and re-thinking, de-naturalizing and problematizing. The critical perspective opens as well to the possibility of “ethics-talk” that is not only centered on moral issues in business but also including the way in which business people who are “generally non-philosophers, engage with ethical and moral matters and issues.”20 Thus, scholars of critical business ethics take to task when bureaucratization of the workplace is taken as a given or when neoliberal ideology is considered natural.

**Persistent Critique of Economic Globalization**

Critical business ethics is highly critical of economic globalization that is mainly based on neoliberal economic policies, “which assume that unregulated markets will bring prosperity to all.”21 Along this understanding of critique, Lippke’s 1995 work entitled *Radical Business Ethics* suggests a business ethics that is “explicitly linked to an egalitarian theory of justice, and critical of the basic structure of advanced capitalist societies.”22 For his part, Engelbrecht imagines a radical business ethics that “refuses to believe that free-market capitalism represents the logical and desirable (final) destination of a linear and progressive history. Instead, free-market capitalism is regarded as a contingent and historical phenomenon, enjoying no necessary historical status.”23 Meanwhile, Jones, ten Bos, and Parker allot a whole chapter of their textbook on business ethics for an analysis of global capital and its concrete implications to business ethics.24

What these scholars have accomplished is a way of doing business ethics that cannot sit comfortably with neoliberal economic arrangements. At least on this line of thought, these critical scholars find resonance with what Pope Francis criticizes as the economy of exclusion. The Pope says:

---

21 Jones, ten Bos, and Parker, *For Business Ethics*, 96.
24 Jones, ten Bos, and Parker, *For Business Ethics*, 96-111.
...some people continue to defend trickle-down theories which assume that economic growth, encouraged by a free market, will inevitably succeed in bringing about greater justice and inclusiveness in the world. This opinion, which has never been confirmed by the facts, expresses a crude and naïve trust in the goodness of those wielding economic power and in the sacralized workings of the prevailing economic system.\(^\text{25}\)

Cardinal Luis Antonio Tagle, a Filipino Catholic bishop, refers to this as an economy that grows vertically (benefitting those who are already well-off from the beginning) but never expands horizontally (leaving behind the poor and marginalized).\(^\text{26}\)

**Diversifying the Philosophical Horizons**

It has been observed by some business ethics scholars that the philosophical foundations of Business Ethics are generally centered on utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics. R. Edward Freeman claims that even if this domination by Anglo-American analytic philosophy was beneficial especially during the birth of business ethics as an academic discipline, there is a need to go beyond Mill, Kant, and Aristotle. Freeman says:

For too long, business ethics has been the captive of Anglo-American analytic philosophy. Ethical theory to most business ethicists means the traditional trifecta of consequentialism (usually utilitarianism), deontology (usually Kant), and virtue ethics (usually Aristotle). While this has been quite useful in the academic beginnings of the field, it is high time that we begin to connect these now traditional texts and arguments in business ethics with other traditions in the humanities.\(^\text{27}\)


\(^{26}\) In a television interview, this is what Tagle originally said: “Ekonomiyang lumalago, subalit hindi lumataganap.”

\(^{27}\) Freeman, Foreword to *Business Ethics and Continental Philosophy*, xiii.
Jones, ten Bos, and Parker go a step further by arguing that business ethics scholars deliberately discount or even misrepresent 20th century philosophies and philosophers. According to these three authors:

Despite the fact that ethics has been hotly debated in philosophy throughout the twentieth century and has been one of the major sources of philosophical reflection up to the close of the millennium, the discipline of business ethics has insulated itself from these developments, either ignoring them altogether or misrepresenting them so that it looks as if twentieth century philosophy has nothing interesting to say about ethics.28

Hence, critical business ethicists explore atypical philosophical characters in the field of Business Ethics, going beyond discourses centered on Mill, Kant, and Aristotle. Thus, it should not be strange anymore to talk about Marx, Adorno, Honneth, Arendt, Levinas, and Derrida, among others. For example, Campbell Jones suggests how Levinas can help in our attempt to understand ethical relationship with the Other going beyond the traditional essentialist definition of ethics.29 Mollie Painter-Morland explains how Derrida helps us to take a critical stance regarding issues such as gift giving (bribery?) or the limits of constructing step-by-step menu in ethical decision-making.30 Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition was used by Gazi Islam to explain the ethical issues of reification and recognition in human resources management.31 Jones, ten Bos, and Parker deployed Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism for a deeper awareness of the dangers of global capitalism.32 Martin Parker deployed Theodor Adorno’s negative dialectics for a critical understanding of business and ethics.33 Clegg, Kornberger, and

---

Rhodes—to comprehend the ethical issues involved in a modern bureaucratic organization—positioned Arendt’s notion of the “banality of evil.”

Critique of the Technicization of Ethics

The business field, usually assumed as a scientific field and thus, embraces rationality, technique, and objectivity, has become hospitable to a tradition of philosophizing that is also particularly interested in technique and science—that is, analytic philosophy. Painter-Morland and ten Bos note that “business ethics is firmly rooted in the analytic tradition” and “embraced the analytic agenda.” Similarly, Parker observes that “the moral philosophies which are incorporated largely comprise the classics of the analytical canon.” This is not totally bad at all as business ethicists explored the normativities of business practices, assisted in the formulation of codes of ethics, and advanced novel ideas for a deeper understanding of the complexities of business relations.

However, along the way as analytic philosophy is centered, other philosophical traditions are marginalized. Painter-Morland and ten Bos argue that the continental philosophers are relegated to the background. And more seriously, business ethics in general falls prey to what Jürgen Habermas calls technocratic rationality and thus surrenders its emancipatory potential. Ethics is now deployed as a tool for solving business and management problems. The positivist process is exemplified by Martin Parker in these words: “The management decision-maker collects the evidence, models a set of potential algorithms, and then makes a decision on what actions should be taken.”

This technicization of ethics becomes clearer in Painter-Morland’s essay entitled “Moral Decision-Making.” Here, she notes that ethics becomes “a mere device that is ‘instrumental’ in management decision-making. It seeks to make ethics an easy set of rules, instead of confronting the decision-maker with some real ethical problems. Furthermore, it pretends that the right recipe will always lead to the perfect result….There is blind faith in the process and in the instrumental use of moral reasoning…..”

Taking its cue from Jacques Derrida’s notion of undecidability, Painter-Morland explains: “If decisions were in fact foregone conclusions
that could be identified via a set of steps or rules, we could program computers to make those decisions for us.”

Unfinished-ness and undecidability are real elements of ethical decision. Undecidability, as Derrida would explain, does not mean indecisiveness. Not that we will not decide but we should always maintain a certain level of discomfort in our decisions. The specter of undecidability must always haunt us. “A decision is always something that has to be pondered over time. It challenges us to an ongoing process of questioning, wondering whether we could not have done better.”

Retrenchment may be necessary, legal, and ethical. But should the decision-maker sleep soundly? Or should he wonder whether he could have done better? As Derrida would say, the decision is always haunted by what it excludes.

Dynamic Interaction between the Individual and the Social

Critical business ethics questions conventional business ethics because of the latter’s tendency to individualism. “Individualistic explanations of social action focus exclusively, or largely, on the characteristics of individuals, and ignore or downplay the role of social context.”

Admittedly, the individual (the erring businessman, CEO, manager, or employee) must bear the burden of responsibility.

But what is the role of social structures for their questionable conduct? Why do they evade taxes and pay bribe? “Sometimes we also need to criticize social structures and arrangements, and to see the way that those structures influence action, making some types of action possible and others impossible. If we want to explain the scandals associated with business, it is important that we see both the individuals responsible for certain choices and the context in which their actions took place.”

After all, these individuals are people of good reputation graduating from the best schools in town.

Thus, the question is not only—Is my action ethical or unethical?—but also—What structural and societal factors led me to these unethical decisions? We criticize the individual but we must also problematize the society that binds his/her ethicality. We do not just talk about whether child labor is ethical or unethical using the perspectives of Mill, Kant, Rawls, and Aristotle. We also take a closer look at who are really privileged and who are really hurt when the ethics of child labor is reduced to deontological analysis or utilitarian calculations. In the concrete, we become more critically curious why defiant Bolivian child workers passionately and violently opposed the

---

40 Ibid., 127.
41 Ibid., 138.
42 Jones, ten Bos, and Parker, For Business Ethics, 4.
43 Ibid., 4.
law that will ban child labor, making one 13-year-old Bolivian protester exclaim: “You cannot leave [us] without a job—those of us [whose] life has given no other choice but to work.”44 Thus, we do not just ask: Is it really morally right to categorically ban child labor? But we also contemplate: Who is really privileged and who is really deprived when child labor is uncritically banned?

To take another example, ethical judgment must not be confined to judging whether bribery is moral or immoral. We are encouraged to look at the whole system that forces one to bribe or that tolerates a culture of bribery. Copyright infringements must be seen not just as an individual offense against law and morality but also as a phenomenon that is inevitably linked with how the society is arranged economically and politically and how certain discourses are legitimized.45 A serious misconduct in the company cannot be myopically seen as an individual fault or an isolated glitch in the running of a well-oiled machine. (There is no problem with the system; there is a problem with the person.) The corporate individual is submerged in a corporate culture and structure that significantly affects the way he/she thinks, behaves, and acts. How difficult is it for you to be virtuous and just in a corporate culture that is not conducive to virtue and justice? How difficult can it be to live a good life in a wrong state of affairs?46

**Challenges to Critical Business Ethics**

**Marxophobia, Marxistomania, Marxolescence**

One of the many theoretical bases of critical business ethics is the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. Furthermore, it originates from scholars who are usually affiliated with Critical Management Studies. Brought into the realm of educational theorizing, the tradition of Critical Pedagogy would not have much difficulty in embracing critical business ethics as well. These mentioned intellectual traditions (critical theory, critical management studies, critical pedagogy) are essentially anchored on Marxian


(not necessarily Marxist) analysis of the society and political economy. In other words, critical business ethics is essentially Marxian and generally in the leftist wing.

The first challenge, therefore, concerns what Peter McLaren would call as the ongoing knee-jerk Marxophobia, an irrational fear of engaging with Marx. As for the case in the Philippines, this was also noted by Paolo Bolaños when he says that one of the reasons for the crisis of appropriating critical theory in the Philippines is the fear of materialist/Marxist philosophy branded inaccurately as a font of horrifying and violent political tendencies.

In relation to this, I further contend that this Marxophobia is rooted in a certain kind of Marxistomania, that is, an obsession to equate Marx with the Marxists. Thus, scholars of the critical approach to business ethics must continue to develop discourses that insulate the Marxian thoughts (not necessarily Marxist thoughts) from the accusations of totalitarianism and authoritarianism.

Coupled with Marxophobia is Marxolescence or the deemed obsolescence of Marx. Any discourse that implores Marx is usually subject to doubt at best and to outright disregard at worst. Thus, discourses must also be developed that show the paradoxical movements from outdated communist experiments to relevant Marxian revivals, for as long as unbridled capitalism is in business, the specter of Marx continues to haunt the contemporary society.

The Issue of Pedagogy

Another challenge is connected to the unresolved question of who should teach business ethics—the teacher who is trained in philosophy (but usually lacks business acumen) or the business practitioner and business professional (but usually lacks training in philosophy). More than 10 years ago, the American business ethics educator Ronald Sims suggested a kind of synergy among various fields. He said that business ethics teachers must be willing to cross the boundaries of discipline. It is because by nature,

---

49 This claim is not yet supported by a scholarly research but by a personal observation that many people, upon hearing Karl Marx, at once relates him with the human rights violations and terrors happening in communist countries.
business ethics is a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary field. One cannot uphold philosophy while undermining economics, politics, psychology, accounting, law, management, and other relevant fields in business activities. On the other hand, one cannot easily replace the teacher trained in the discipline of philosophy with the teacher trained in the business school or with a business practitioner.

This time, I further contend that although Ronald Sims already hints at the difficulty of the interdisciplinary approach when applied in the concrete aspect of educational management, the introduction of the critical approach in the business ethics classroom poses further difficulties and complexities. Can many business practitioners relate with the musings of critical business ethics scholars? In fact, can they sympathize with it so that they are willing to bring it into the level of pedagogy?

**Tendency to Esotericism**

Another challenge concerns the language of critical theories in general and critical business ethics in particular. In a field such as business, the place of theories is usually held in suspicion and the discussions about theories end up with being “unnecessarily complex and inaccessible” and “function as a form of exclusionary practice with the effects of producing a problematic expert elitist academic authority and culture.” Teachers and students of business ethics would take extra effort in understanding and appreciating unconventional sources from Marx to Adorno, to Foucault, and to Derrida. Of course, the undertaking is not impossible but it is extremely difficult. Scholars from the field of critical business ethics are challenged to produce works that are not soaked in elitist, exclusive, impenetrable, theoretical, abstract, and ambiguous terms and concepts. In fact, one of the accusations against critical pedagogues is the difficulty of the language they are using.

I support the view that those in the field of philosophy must not anymore hide behind the cloak of esoteric language that makes them detached from the concerns of ordinary people. Bringing in the empirical method especially in applied ethics such as Business Ethics may be a small step in making philosophy more relevant, of course, without compromising the speculative and critical aspect of the philosophical act.

---


53 For example, see Lois Christensen and Jerry Aldridge, *Critical Pedagogy for Early Childhood and Elementary Educators* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 13.
Business Ethics is one of those fields that would gain a lot from the methods of science. Hannah Arendt’s notion of banality of evil was corroborated by the social psychologist Stanley Milgram’s scientific experiment on obedience to authority. Robert Jackal’s brilliant admixture of ethnological critique and empirical method of the ethical culture of corporate managers confirms the speculations of Max Weber. George Ritzer’s extensive empirical and anecdotal data gathering on the phenomenon of McDonaldization is similarly an ode to Weber’s rationalization thesis. At present, scholars do not fail to cite Jackal, Milgram and Ritzer alongside Weber and Arendt when talking about the ethics of a bureaucratized society. Horkheimer himself endorses the crisscrossing of philosophy with social sciences when he envisioned a social philosophy that is multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary in approach.

Having said this, it must also be noted that approaching the empirical necessitates careful and calculated steps lest those who claim to embrace the critical approach may fall into the traps of what they are supposed to critique.

Openness to Alternatives

When esoteric language is coupled with hazy alternatives, the drumbeaters of the critical approach would have the tendency to be just noisy gongs and clanging cymbals. Coupled with passionate and justified criticisms of the present economic and political setup, scholars of critical business ethics must explore and popularize the alternatives. Will they endorse alternative globalizations? What about the potentials of social entrepreneurship, social businesses, b-corporations, socially responsible investments, and solidarity economy? Will critical business ethics not appear rigid vis-a-vis business models inspired by religious convictions, such as the Economy of Communion?

Are critical business ethics scholars willing to listen to the sincere attempts to put a human face on capitalism? Is the very internal logic of capitalism the problem? And if this is really the problem, can we not tinker

---

59 The issue is not so much the greedy businessman but the capitalist system from which even the businessmen are entrapped and rendered powerless.
with this internal logic? In our age when young generation would always find ways, should we not lose hope that even internal logic can be manipulated internally? Will not new combinations emerge when we tinker enough?

For example, did Malaysia, Singapore, and China tamper with the very logic of capitalism? There is also the case of Joseph Stiglitz, the economist who resigned from the World Bank. Even if he was scandalized with the globalizers, he was also at the same time hopeful about globalization.\textsuperscript{60} And what about the efforts of a Muhammad Yunus to resist World-Bank invasion, raise Grameen Bank, and in the process, defied “discourses embedded within capitalism while not completely abandoning the capitalist structure”?\textsuperscript{61} Of course, Yunus is not without its share of rightful criticisms, but it is worthwhile to note that Grameen Bank is considered as a potential alternative by some scholars in the tradition of critical business ethics and critical organization.\textsuperscript{62}

The Challenge of Auto-criticism

Critical business ethics may easily be dismissed as just another variation in a plethora of approaches. Worse, it may be conceived by business students, teachers, and professionals as “another ‘truth’ that fails to encompass the complexities of organizations and management”\textsuperscript{63} or that simply becomes insensitive “to the more mundane world of management and organization.”\textsuperscript{64} And if that is the case, scholars of critical business ethics must turn to themselves for auto-criticism. What could be the ethics of the very act of criticism?

The radical educator, bell hooks, once said: “When we write about the experiences of a group to which we do not belong, we should think about the ethics of our action, considering whether or not our work will be used to

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
reinforce and perpetuate domination.”

Paraphrasing hooks, when scholars of critical business ethics (many are outsiders to business) make judgments about the experiences of the business people, they should also think about the ethics (and politics) of making judgments lest their work may unintentionally contradict itself: dominating, subordinating, and oppressive masquerading as emancipatory, liberative, and critical.

One is reminded here of Friedrich Nietzsche’s quip that “a great truth wants to be criticized, not idolized.”

Or more relevant and fitting are the words of Theodor Adorno in 

**Negative Dialectics:** “No theory today escapes the marketplace. Each one is offered as a possibility among competing opinions; all are put up for a choice; all are swallowed.”

And is it not that critical business ethics is also a kind of theory-construction that does not exist in a vacuum and does not escape the marketplace? Thus, Martin Parker explains that the work of the negative dialectician consists in “an endless rehearsal of being critical of being critical.”

**Final Words**

The scholars of critical business ethics commonly operate within the institution that it resists. To a certain extent, they also lean on the corporations, business schools, and capitalist programs that they intend to problematize and challenge. I do not see that a combative declaration of independence from these interest groups is a prudent step towards emancipation. Critical business ethics is born from the womb of the business academic institutions. Thus, it has to continue its work of immanent critique or criticism from within.

The Brazilian philosopher and educator Paulo Freire says that critical educators must learn to play around the system: one foot outside and one

---

69 “Immanent critique involves critically questioning the norms and values found within existing social arrangements and institutions in order to expose contradictions and tensions between ideas and practices which often lead to unacknowledged forms of oppression. Once such contradictions and tensions are exposed, historically possible opportunities for emancipation and social change can then be identified and put into practice.” Chamsy el-Ojéili and Patrick Hayden, Critical Theories of Globalization (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 7.
foot within the system.\(^7\) Probably, it is because the system itself provides small spaces and openings to resist, to question, and to emerge. Having said this, critical business ethics has to contend incessantly with the persuasive force of the dominant discourse. And whatever small influence it can impart, it should always be taken as a small but necessary contribution in our quest for a more humane, just, and emancipatory social order. I think that even if there were difficulties that a critical approach would confront, it would always remain a worthwhile endeavor. Thus, those who will teach Business Ethics and Social Responsibility must create opportunities and look for small pockets and openings when and where an alternative approach may thrive.

*Department of Philosophy, University of Santo Tomas, Philippines*

**References**


---


Technological De-Worlding, Search for a Fleshy Method: An Investigation into La Quotidienne

Gerald A. Powell

Abstract: The evolution and survival of humankind from the Homo-habilis to the Homo-faber would not be so if it were not for technology. We are technological beings and cannot be otherwise, so it is only natural that we are seduced by the orgasmic, rhythmic current of technology. I first explore the idolatry and euphoric metaphysical entanglements associated with technological determinism but also consider if there is reason to throw caution to the wind. Realizing the benefit of technology, Martin Heidegger (The Question Concerning Technology) et al., were optimistically cautious about technological enframing that (de-)worlds humankind from his habitat (fleshiness of being-in-the-world). Resolved to find a solution, Heidegger’s project was to avoid Cartesian pitfalls and metaphysical jargon by clarifying Dasein’s relationship to transcendence, re-instituting Dasein concretely in the world. Bemused, Heidegger himself said this project remains a puzzlement. This essay considers Henri Lefebvre’s Métaphilosophie (Métaphilosophie: Proméleurgomenes) (Festival, Rhythmanalysis, La Quotidienne, Moments) as a non-philosophical means to dépaser our technological commonplace and re-habiter the “total man” in the world. What I am proposing here is that if Heidegger’s Faustian-like bargain is correct, then Lefebvre’s method and possibly others of the same spirit are critical to first locate and account for moments of alienation in one’s everyday commonplace and to find or create concrete ways of making do by realizing the potentiality of those moments.

Keywords: Lefebvre, rhythmanalysis, La Quotidien, poesis
In the Beginning: Technology Giveth ...

Plato’s Phaedrus captures the aura of technophobia in an exchange between Thamus and Thoth:

Most ingenious Thoth … this invention [writing] will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who learn to use it. They will not need to exercise their memories, being able to rely on what is written, calling things to mind no longer from within themselves by their own unaided powers, but under stimulus of external marks that are alien to themselves. So it’s not a recipe for memory, but for reminding, that you have discovered.1

Plato argued that the written word is a technological mediation that will produce forgetfulness. Among other factors, it cannot defend itself; though convenient, it is mute, lifeless, unresponsive, and is not a way of recalling but reminding. One can advance a similar criticism in that the shift from orality to literacy and on to electronic takes into consideration the aforementioned problems but additionally a host of new technologically-mediated problems of space, time, and indetermination as new mediation often complicates and further distances us from the original source. Gleaned from the two examples is technological mediation but also a human biophilic contract and ethos central to the human condition. Built into any co-present human communicative model is an unstated communicative ethos that does not necessarily exist with digital communication—material presences; therefore, I can’t simply delete you, log off, or unfriend you. It’s more complicated than that. The same is true with my relation to and with the world. If I’m bored or discontent, I can’t simply swap realities with URL addresses and applications. It doesn’t work like that. Marshall McLuhan, then Neil Postman, observed humankind’s escalating infatuation with technology, how it’s being domesticated/wired/circuited into our being. McLuhan argued, in Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man2, that technology isn’t just a tool humans use to facilitate their everyday goings; it is an artificial extension of their facticity that radically alters their ecology. Postman’s Amusing Ourselves to Death3 adds to McLuhan’s unrealized vision of

Frankenstein as he questions the spatial presence of human consciousness in
the digital age. It’s quite clear when we communicate in the flesh that our
being present does not depend on such things as digital pixilation or high-
definition fidelity. I can reach out, touch you, smell you, and feel your
presence, an entirely different fleshy proposition when I Skype, viber, tweet,
bank, and shop online. Paul Virilio\(^4\) realized Postman’s Faustian bargain in
techno-science, a science of extremes, as a result of reckless epistemological
accidents in which we defer “analogue mental process, in favor of
instrumental, digital procedures, which are capable, we are told, of boosting
knowledge.”\(^5\)

Regardless of the SPAM panic campaigns set in motion by some
“futurist,” technology has already been an important bioinformatic gene in
the evolution and progression of the human species. Rooted in the earliest
myth and sacred literature is transhumanist aspiration, the desire to alter
mind and body via technology in order to improve one’s life’s station, which
has always been humankind’s desire and naturally part of his evolutionary
destiny. Postmansaid, “Every [technology] is the [technology] of a stage of
media development [and with it carries a more extreme form of Truth].”\(^6\) I
would add human (de)evolution, too, which is the central proposition I
would like to consider. Our passivity and knee-jerk response to technology is
precarious—a can’t-lose, magic bullet attitude trumping rationality and
common sensibility should jostle us from our lull and give reason for pause
and critical review. But for now, these three archeological threads assist in
our limited understanding of the complexity that is our unsettled relationship
with and to technology:

1. The surrendering of fleshy organic experiences of
being-in-the-world to technological processes

2. The concern for ways in which the media and the
body (bio-media) (re)biologizes the body and
become circuited into everyday practices of society

3. How remediation of new technology epistemically
reorientates the user

Much of the previously mentioned technophobic literature captures
the anxiety and the mood of our trepidation, but not the loci of such things.
It is my contention that the source of our anxiety is best understood through

\(^5\) Ibid., 3
the work of M. Heidegger, particularly his treatment of Dasein vis-à-vis technology as enframing the body, and later Henri Lefebvre’s exhaustive work on la quotidienne. Before delving into Heidegger, Goethe’s Faust and the boiling frog syndrome (BFS) are excellent allegorical primers for understanding Man’s entanglements with technology.

**Faust, Boiling Frog Syndrome, and Heidegger**

When man sells his soul to technology, what is he really selling, wagering, and relinquishing, and is this worth retrieving? What do we mean by this—as if something urgent and of great value was to slip away, only to find that it is too late to be reclaimed? Seller’s remorse? Is our fate similar to Goethe’s Faust and his dealings with Mephistopheles—knowledge of ‘X’ for the service/bondage of Dasein?

Kurzweil’s theatrical account of humanity captures the spirit of Faust and the BFS:

**Boiling Frog: A Post-Script**

GEORGE2048: I’ll be devoted to you in any event. But I can be more than your transcendent servant.

MOLLY2004: Actually, [your] being “just” my transcendent servant doesn’t sound so bad.

C. DARWIN: If I may interrupt, it occurred to me that once machine intelligence is greater than human intelligence, it should be in a position to design its own next generation.

MOLLY2004: That doesn’t sound so unusual. Machines are used to design machines today.

C. DARWIN: Yes, but in 2004 they’re still guided by human designers. Once machines are operating at human levels, well, then it kind of closes the loop.
NED LUDD: And humans would be out of the loop
....

C. DARWIN: ... So the machines will design their
own next generation quickly.

GEORGE2048: Indeed, in 2048, that is certainly the
case.\textsuperscript{7}

Kurzweil’s theatrical brings to mind an old witch tale about boiling a
frog alive, which goes like this. If you put a frog in a pot of water, slowly
increasing the temperature, the frog will not be aware of the temperature
change, eventually being boiled alive. While the scientific premise is invalid,
the idea is that if one’s perception goes unchecked, one is susceptible to any
danger that befalls. Technomorphism is an allegory about the BFS as it speaks
to technological gradualism, how Dasein unwittingly becomes enframed by
technology. Alarming as it sounds, machines/nonbiological intelligence are
not only among us but are also a significant part of our ability to go about our
day-to-day. Dishwashers, vacuum cleaners, spectacles, vehicles, probes, and
medicinals are so much a part of our everydayness that without them we feel
dismembered. For the better part of our existence, in order to survive, human
civilization has been technomorphic, characterized by gradual technological
developments to compensate for human limitations.\textsuperscript{8} Technology not only is
a ubiquitous part of our everydayness but also has a naturalness about it so
much so that it is understood as a part of our facticity (material informatics)
and biology (bioinformatics). We have all but become technomorphic. The
more we adapt to these technologies, the more they adapt to us and the more
we become strangers to our bodies. Human minds and bodies are essentially
open to episodes of deep and transformative restructuring in which new
equipment (both mental and physical) can be incorporated into the thinking
and acting systems that we have identified as mind and body. For example,
when we talk about RAM or a computer performing poorly, human-related
terms such as triage, memory, speed, or virus are commonly used to
communicate the computer’s ability to think, respond, or showcase
consciousness. This is to say, references to aperture, battery life, and beach
call, for instance—non-human qualities—become linguistic, interchangeable
references with human qualities such as vision, energy/life, and

\textsuperscript{7} Raymond Kurzweil, \textit{Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology} (New York:
Viking, 2005), 38-41.

\textsuperscript{8} Cf. Heather Cristina Lum, \textit{Are We Becoming Cyborgs? How Technomorphism Influences
Our Perceptions of the World Around Us} (Ph.D. Dissertation, Orlando Florida: University of Central
Florida, 2009).
thinking/consciousness. By extension, smart phones, computers, tablets, and body gear (e.g., Google Glass, RFID chips, Samsung Galaxy, Apple watches) are mechanical versions of our extended limbs; our genetic codes have already been hacked, digitally transcribed, erased, edited, and manipulated. Once carbon, we are also fleshy metal. Technology co-evolves with us. Machines are fundamentally in sync with our biorhythms, everyday patterns, and idiosyncrasies; they know our bodies and sociological tendencies better than we do. With each evolutionary transition, the body and mind become more integrated, structurally complex, and technologically and sociologically enmeshed. A simple technology such as a contact lens with regular use cognitively becomes an extension of one’s eye; the same is true with a hammer being an extension of one’s hand. We have already become in some respects trans-human as these devices, after years of usage, have become natural extensions and/or accessories of our own body. Now the question is not whether man can transcend his facticity but how he chooses to do so. He is free to transcend himself and in doing so explore possibilities.

Within biomedia, the biological body is not hybridized with machines ... nor is it supplanted by machines [rather] the “intersection between genetic and ‘computer’ codes facilat[es] a qualitatively different notion of the biological body—one that is technically enhanced but still fully biological ... a particular instance in which the ‘bio’ is transformatively mediated by ‘tech’ so that the bio reemerges more fully biological.  

Collectively, my interpretation of Goethe’s Faustian bargain, Kerzweil’s dramatist (although I am aware he is a proponent of transhumanist technology, his dramatist here is apropos), and the BFS are cautionary signs about what seems to be already a fait accompli concerning humankind’s blind fervor toward technology and intelligence that is often passed over as conspiracy or overly deterministic. Kurzweil explained:

The rate of paradigm shift (technological innovation) is accelerating, right now doubling every decade. The power (price, performance, speed, capacity, and bandwidth) of information as a technology becomes more cost effective, more resources are deployed toward its advancement, so the rate of exponential growth increases over time .... With both the hardware and software needed to fully emulate human intelligence, we

---

can expect computers to pass the Turing test, indicating intelligence indistinguishable from that of biological humans, by the end of the 2020s.\(^\text{10}\)

Why throw caution to the wind? We live with our toys, joined at the hip. They know and comfort us, are always there. They are docile, obedient, efficient, and most important, come in all types of flavors and colors. What possible danger does technology represent? After all, technology has contributed appreciably throughout our existence from the Homo-habilis to our current evolutionary station (Homo-faber) and is a primary reason we exist. Nick Bostrom, professor, director of the Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, noted:

> Evolution created us … but we don’t need to sit back and let things slide; we can take an active part in shaping our future destiny .... We can use evolutionary methods where it suits us, but we can rein in evolution where we see better ways of selecting … We can substitute directed evolution for natural evolution.\(^\text{11}\)

Bostrom’s timely observation would certainly awaken Heidegger’s post-mortem slumber on a number of accounts: Dasein’s destining toward death\(^\text{12}\), the threat to Dasein’s presence being-in-the-world, etc. My concern is antithetical: technological Dasein and how that impacts my being-in-the-world. Heidegger had much to say about the dislocation of Dasein, enframed by technology, whereby Dasein becomes de-worlded, losing touch with the fleshiness of being-in-the-world. When technology wrestles away Dasein from its everyday possibility, then Dasein loses purpose, stands in reserve, losing all relation and drive to a world that is ready-at-hand (Zuhandenheit). Heidegger’s hermeneutic regarding technology is too comprehensive to indulge here, including his magnum opus *Being and Time*\(^\text{13}\), *The Question Concerning Technology*\(^\text{14}\), and *What is a Thing*, a lecture given in 1971. However, we can approach Heidegger sensibly, taking a parsimonious approach when evaluating and re-representing his thoughts in relation to my overall objectives. Briefly I revisit Heidegger’s treatment of technology vis-à-

---

\(^\text{10}\) Kurzweil, *Singularity is Near*, 35-38.


vis Dasein being-in-the-world and its influence on Henri Lefebvre’s project in which the total-man is grounded or re instituted in the world. (1) To start, I incorporate Heidegger’s BT and TQCT to make clear how enframing threatens man being-in-the-world whereby he is de-worlded and loses the fleshiness of experiences. Since Dasein always seeks itself, it always wants to become what it is. (2) Heidegger’s vision of Dasein fails due to its Cartesianism; it does, however, create space for refinement where Henri Lefebvre’s reinterpretation of the Greek term poiesis highlights the ready-at-hand potential in the La quotidien (rhythm, moments) whereby the total man is made total by his concrete efforts of making do, rupturing the Cartesian duality, and allowing for the reinstitution of being vis-à-vis festival. Key in my usage of the festival is its aesthetic and sociological significance, not economical, political, or (a)historical. Lefebvre is quite clear that the purpose of the festival was to transform how life is understood and lived, advocating for a new style of living. The festival beckoned the proletariat to wake from his slumber: “Seul l’action du prolétariat au cours d’une critique efficace (pratique et théorique) de société existante permet des les faire enter dans la vie et de réaliser la vérité sociale.” The only action for the proletariat is to effectively critique (merger of theory and practice) society’s existence, life realized, and the true life. Festivals, particularly the Parisian commune, gave pause for the proletariat to take action and were a transformative moment to transcend the Homo-faber en route to the Homo-quotidien.15 The commune was more than a work/labor dispute or political hats jockeying for power. It was the proletariat’s declaration of life and his fortitude to recapture La quotidien from contradictions, the limits of bourgeois society16 and negation of those things that prohibit and enframe “the total man” from emerging17 whereby he remains a stranger to himself.

**Heidegger: Dasein and Enframing**

Heidegger’s term *enframing* is useful here in that (1) it underscores technology not only as an instrument that humans create, make, produce, or as something external to us, but also as an ontological frame that humans make intelligible the world and categorize how the world is revealed to them. Specifically, enframing serves as a Cartesian way of relating to ourselves and others within-the-world, thereby dislocating Dasein as being-in-the-world, whereby it loses all familiarity, occluding it from taking up a fundamental relationship with the world. (2) The telos of technology here is not a thing or

---

an end for itself; it is that whichever distances Dasein from being within-the-world, its history, the unfurling of its being toward destining and possibility.

The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology .... The rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.18

Regarding our current epoch, the implications of Heidegger's observation are unsettling. With every technological adaptation, something essential about humanity or human activity is abandoned, lost, or standing in reserve. The body is muted, numbed to its own facticity, loses its memory to its environment (Umwelt) and "otherness." In its natural state, Dasein seeks itself in relation to being-with-others in the world in which it discloses with their being a fundamental point of being-with that is altogether transformed into mechanistic gestures. It is my concern that technology is usurping our fundamental attunement with being-in-the-world, "falling prey" in Heidegger's words, where ordinary experiences appear strange; those everyday organic activities that constitute being-within-the-world are ever widening, creating an epistemological and ontological breach and in the process choking the growth of Dasein. What is lost by enframing is the "fleshiness of experience," the essence of man whereby he wrestles with the world: orders it, domesticates it according to epistemological superstitions—the more the world resists, the stronger his chokehold. To a fault, man projects his expectations onto a thorny, indifferent world that is silent to his request. And so it is through the tensions of the flesh that enframing brings man into a faux existence with and to the world. Whether we understand "fleshiness of experience" via Sartre's lamentation of man being a series of projects/plans; Camus's Sisyphus; St. Augustine's confession; Unamuno's meditation,19 The Tragic Sense of Life; Dasein's being-with (Mitsein); or Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of kinaesthetics—the fleshiness of being human is a thorny, lived-bodily experience. "The thickness of the body, far from rivaling that of the world, is on the contrary the sole means I have to go unto the heart of things, by making myself a world and by making them flesh."20

---

18 Heidegger, TQCT, 14
So the problem presented before us is clearer. If we are enframed or practice the art of enframing, standing in reserve as Heidegger suggests, how does technology impact our being-with-the-world, being-in-the-world; what is being concealed that otherwise would be revealed? Enframing presents Dasein with several problems alluded to in passing. For instance, technology serves as the essential de-facto reference to the world and those things that constitute the world. A more fundamental problem is Dasein’s eigentlichkeit (authenticity and/or ownedness in terms of possession) and the provocation that technologies pose. Technology de-worlds Dasein, which means: (1) it reclaims the everyday from Dasein in the sense of ownedness, (2) it fractures and commodifies Dasein, inhibiting its ability to relate, share, and take care. These are primary ontological and existential structures of Dasein in which Dasein is (authentic) eigentlichkeit; La quotidien, therefore, is a mosaic of everyday fleshy experiences (body + subject = fleshy) resuscitating Dasein, bringing Dasein to eigentlichkeit. By its nature, Dasein is characterized as possibility, not in terms of “this or that” but existentially, pushing toward, being more.

Dasein is also never less. It is existentially that which is not yet in its potentiality of being. And only because the being there gets its constitution through understanding and its character of project, only because it is what it becomes or does not become, can it say understandingly to itself: become what you are!21

(3) Our task, then, is both an existential and phenomenological one in which Dasein is brought into authenticity, a movement away from merely seeing to knowing, that is to move from present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) to ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) in order to gain access into the thickness of everyday.

**Heidegger: Dasein, Spatiality, and De-Worlding**

In BT and TQCT Heidegger characterizes Dasein as an indeterminate journeying through the ontological corridors of everydayness, using its instruments to bring-forth, blossom, or unconceal. The assumption here is that technology brings about a spatiality (nearness, closeness, indeterminate). In terms of spatial proximity, Mejias noted, “Technology bridges distances; however, it does not bridge ‘the existential gap between the knower and the known’…. In fact, the whole experience might result in an increased feeling of alienation from the object and from the ‘real’ world …”22 Alienation here

---

21 Heidegger, *BT*, 146.
is a result of a world that has been altogether enframed and mediated through signs and referents, that which is Vorhandenenheit (present at hand) and does not go beyond. Common logic suggests that mediated technologies bring us to a more intimate knowledge of the world; paradoxically, for Dasein an instrumental mediated world only distances no matter how penetrating the instrument. Instrumentation only de-worlds Dasein, drives Dasein away from the light into the shadows from all those things that are natural.

In terms of one’s fleshy existence, we can say that when one is de-worlded one is phenomenologically amputated from their ecological niche, body, everyday ongoings, and interactions that constitute their everydayness. Movements, gestures, and any semblance of authenticity are reduced to predictable links of cooked probabilities and algorithms. By a click of the Function key, the world waits at our command. Why participate, engage in the everydayness of things, when we can move it with a mouse, watch it or edit it—a dash of color here, hi-fidelity sound in the comforts of our commonplace; after all, there is nothing more to wish for, see, discover, or be; the world is past tense. Intelligent technologies not only thwart the art of living—experience of moment and presence—but allow for space-transcending movements and sensory experiences that derail its users from being fully present within physical space. “A [user] does not end with the limits of his physical body or with the area to which his physical activity is immediately confined but embraces, rather, the totality of meaningful effects which emanates from him temporally and spatially.”

Users are fluid—able to speed up, slow down, skip, repeat, pause, reboot, download, upload, connect, and disconnect at their own discretion. At the center of users and their technological Dasein is the reality that “users” are not only quantum superpositions but can mash up space, conjoining digital space with physical space. Second, these user-friendly technologies—“I,” “you,” “my,” and body sensory technologies—allow for a user’s being to absorb and be absorbed. Ironically, each spatial pronoun/metaphor further takes into consideration how users are epistemologically and ontologically distanced and eventually de-worlded into an orgasmic abyss of mirrors and self-gratifying echoes.

“Our love affair with [technology] … runs deeper than aesthetic fascination and deeper than the play of the senses. We are searching for a home for the mind and heart.”

---


driving away every possibility of authenticity to shadow. If not de-worlded, what is revealed that otherwise is concealed, and how is humankind drawn from the shadow into the light? What is required to pursue this investigation is not another Cartesian experiment but a métaphilosophie of La vie vecu, not as an anthropologist with his tools but as a being ready to wrestle with the world at hand and in wrestling discovering possibilities of being-in-the-world. La quotidien is a type of intimacy—a phenomenology of the flesh that can assist in the reinstitution of Dasein being-in-the-world.

**Heidegger’s Alltäglichkeit and Lefebvre’s La Quotidien: Prelude to a Method**

*L’homme … est à la fois enfoncé dans La quotidien et privé de quotidien.*

(Man is … at once submerged in the everyday and deprived of it.)

—Blanchot

Heidegger sees everydayness (Alltäglichkeit) in terms of averageness in which we encounter the other in terms of their facticity; whether their presence serves as wallpaper to our ongoings or their idle chat the background noise to a chain of meaningless exchanges: Good morning, paper or plastic, credit or debit, sugar with that, and what does SIRI have to say are all inauthentic and become the mode of expectation by which we encounter others and the world. For Heidegger, the aforementioned descriptions signify a world that has become all too familiar with no possibility, stripped down, depersonalized, and filled with waiting rooms with no chairs. In such a world there is no sense of transzendens because every possibility is outside of that which is possible.

My treatment of the La quotidien establishes Heidegger’s Altäkleishkeit as a fundamental backdrop for everydayness insofar as it signifies averageness, ennui, and a sense of anxiety about one’s being-in-the-world in which Dasein is stuck in a sea of existential meaninglessness (cycles, repetitions, constancy antithetical-movements, and impossibilities). For Heidegger there seems to be little to no konkret existence for Dasein being-in-the-world, which Heidegger duly noted in his lecture “On the Essence of Ground”27, letters to Jasper, Bultmann, and his ongoings with Husserl, mainly due to perceived metaphysical pitfalls. Heidegger’s project, which is

---

26 Cf. Heidegger, *BT*.
too exhaustive to account here, was to clarify Dasein’s relationship to transzendens in the manner that being is revealed. Heidegger noted in “On the Essence of Ground,” transzendens is equated to surpassing, constitutes self-hood, something that belongs uniquely to Dasein (Dasein in itself as transzendens), Dasein as surpassing, exceeding, and grounded in truth in the manner in which Dasein achieves authenticity. Heidegger could not truly escape Cartesian metaphysics and his efforts remained inconclusive but paved space for Lefebvre’s critique of philosophy and application of métaphilosophie. Heidegger’s influence on Lefebvre is often passed over, but it should be noted that Heidegger was the twentieth-century philosopher with whom Lefebvre conversed the most.28 (I will return to this point.) For the purposes of our query here, Heidegger was one of the earliest modern philosophers to foresee the inherent dangers in overvaluing technology and some preliminary solutions to restore Dasein. To that, Lefebvre argued that everyday life has been colonized by new technology-work-labour and needs to be reorientated to its elemental sensibilities.29

The link between Dasein and authenticity, which by Heidegger’s measure still remains philosophically inconclusive, may not have been all for naught because it inspired H. Lefebvre’s appropriation of Marx’s alienation and the reconstruction of the Greek term poiesis to mean harnessing the creative potential existing in nature to human activity: “Poiesis thus [becomes the] creation of works (œuvres) [in which man in his depraved state transforms his alienation and makes do].”30 This is similar to Michel de Certeau’s perruque, a mid-level, cog in the wheel employee whose total being—way of identifying with the world—is strapped to the mechanistic cycle of his oppressive place of business. He is nothing more than his mechanistic mandates but by making do, in Lefebvre’s terms (poiesis), finds ways of transcending, re-inventing himself, and relating to the world on his own terms. In “Notes Written One Sunday in the French Countryside,” Lefebvre journaled a pedantic account of how festivals heal wounds from alienated labor, mend old friendships while establishing new ones, form community, and inspire harmony between man and nature by rebirthing humankind to his natural state.

Poiesis and festivals were not only restorative but seeded elements (the necessary creative energy) that sprouted moments of revolution.31 To reinstitute humankind into the world, one must transform one’s being-in-the-
world, how one dwells and practices, and one’s disposition to and with the world, being mindful that festival—if it is to have any meaning beyond metaphysics—must lead to revolution: a style of living. No matter how ephemeral, moments were opportunities in which humankind could live and achieve their potential: “No aspect of himself, of his energy, his instinct, was left unused. Perhaps he was basic and elementary, but at least he lived without being fundamentally ‘repressed’ …” He continued to say that moments “must be capable of opening a window on supersession, and of demonstrating how we may resolve the age-old conflict between the everyday tragedy, and between triviality and Festival.” Lefebvre turned to Marx’s writings on the 1871 Parisian commune; later he was critical of its lack of inspiration and creativity, but nonetheless it was necessary for him to develop his treatise, The Meaning of the Commune, in which he establishes an aesthetic ground on which the worker/laborer overcomes alienation by creatively working through and is fundamentally remade into the total man. This is to say the Commune was more than a political statement against the state; it was festival as revolution in that it underscored (1) moments of negation as a first step to creativity, (2) the aesthetic (speech act, poeisis, poetry, creative demonstration) as a fundamental component of social movements, (3) everything that alienated man from the aesthetic: work, labor, technology, etc.—it was about how to live, the manner of living, the style of living, and by the practical means, and (4) how to re-establish, trust, order, and the social contract that once existed between humankind and their environment.

Sketches of revolution as festivals are outlined in the Critique of Everyday Life, Volumes 1 (1991) and 2 (2008), Métaphilosophie, and Rhythmanalysis (2004) as it was a restorative project with scattered philosophical vestiges soldered to create Lefebvre’s Métaphilosophie. Lefebvre took on Heidegger’s project from a materialist objective framework. He reworked it with Marx (alienation and praxis), Hegel (objective idealism), insights from Guy Debord’s Situationist International (SI; revolutionary movement), Andre Brecht’s Surrealism (radical ethnography and artistic projects), and Gaston Bachelard (elements and moments), subjecting it to a radical transformation in which abstraction and materialism produced a concrete truth based on practical, historical, and social reality. (I should add there are vestiges of Sartre involved that Lefebvre could not avoid, although he tried.) Lefebvre’s method is not overly romantic, but it is grounded in the everyday mood, tone, moment, and rhythm of the lived life that inspired the SI and others to utilize art as a weapon within social movements. Ultimately

Lefebvre reconciled various methods and philosophical positions in his Métaphilosophie.

**Search for a Method: Métaphilosophie and Quotidienne**

“Suggesting that in order to understand the world [Lefebvre noted] we cannot base it on individual conscience [Sartre] … nor can we simply understand it on the basis of praxis, the Marxist misconception.”

Central to Lefebvre’s position is that (1) we must abandon philosophy for the investigation of praxis, as philosophy tends to be too speculative, uninspiring, and appreciably ontological and (2) Lefebvre’s metaphysics, particularly Heidegger’s ontology regarding Dasein was still too abstract and offers no reprieve. Lefebvre sees La quotidienne as the true métaphilosophie as a radical way to dépasser rather than tranzend. Recognizing the totality and complexity of the human subject as a sociological, historical, and biographical being involved in creative processes of making do in his common place, Lefebvre’s quotidienne (emphasizes the “total man,” rather than Dasein) stresses finding meaning in the ordinary, routine, rhythms, cycles, repetition, signs, métro-boulot-dodo, production, reproduction, objects, space, and diversions that alienate and de-world man from his habitat. “Notes Written One Sunday in the French Countryside” in the Critique of Everyday, Volume 1, followed by his exposition of Theory of Moments in Volume 2, offer a glimpse of Lefebvre’s thinking as he realized the potential of his métaphilosophie (moments, ceremonies, praxis, and festivals/revolution). To say what moments are proves quite difficult as Lefebvre alludes to them by style, a type and or formation of poises. The only concrete thing we can say about a moment is that it is seeded in indetermination: absolute, impossible possibility of ambiguity that becomes existentially purposeful in that it transforms the everyday through revolution. What I am particularly interested in is bringing clarity to a dimension of moments, those existential attributes, elements, and stages of existence leading toward a referendum on style of living.

[Existential] moment comprises a totality that can illuminate, however briefly, new possibilities for social relations and cultural practices along with new opportunities to realize them. Lefebvre’s theory of moments could [bottle] a revolutionary upsurge or a

---

34 Elden, *Understanding Henri Lefebvre*, 78.
flash of cultural innovation [and unleash it in creative reforming ways].35

Significant here is Moore’s use of the celestial and astronomical metaphors illuminate, flash, and the quantum metaphor of possibility, which is complementary to Lefebvre’s metaphoric verbiage of constellation, astrological, spirituality, spontaneity, etc. Thematically these adjectival metaphors depict the religious and almost transformative nature of the moment. Similar to Saul’s transformation to Apostle Paul, Christ’s lament on the cross—“It is finished” and Lefebvre’s revelation as he walks through the pyrenees—“the moment is an attempt to achieve the total realization of a possibility.”36 Continuing with our astronomical references, moments (gravitational, weak, electromagnetic, and strong) were forces necessary for the birth of the universe and everything that followed including everyday life. “Everyday life is the native soil in which the moment germinates and takes root.”37 Predicting the birth of a star, let alone cosmic pregnancy, is indeterminate and at best speculative. The same holds true for moments. Moments are always present and indeterminate, predicting the how and when these moments take form is at best existential.38 The moment is always empty/full in the sense that nothing visible has yet to happen, but as we have discussed it is full in the sense that its necessary elements, although dormant to the eye, are always churning; thus, determining when the moment ruptures everyday life is the game of everydayness in which the Dionysian (festival) and the Apollonian (tragedy) contest.

Certainly, right from the start, festivals contrasted violently with everyday life, but they were not separate from it. They were like everyday life, but more intense; and the moments of that life—the practical community, food, the relation with nature—in other words, work—were reunited, amplified, magnified in the festival.39

Festivals were sacred spaces where people could not only renew their kinship to friends, family, and community but also challenge the current institutionalized paradigm and move toward possibilities—potentialities—imagination, wresting the everyday from the inertia of rationalism.

37 Ibid., 651.
38 Ibid., 63.
Lefebvre’s method is that which seeks to locate and account for moments as transformative possibilities in one’s everydayness, and finding practical ways to dépasser alienation by realizing the potentiality of those moments. Moments provoke spatial situations and the possibility for man to take action—to restructure one’s being from those commodifying forces that seek to shackle the human spirit, making the most out of those situations. In doing so, birthing conditions for the total man emerge. This is not to say that the total man spontaneously combusts at a final stage in man’s historical evolution; he is “a figure on a distant horizon beyond our present vision ... a limit, an idea and not a historical fact”.40 He is part of a continuous revolutionary praxis—both individual and collective—which aims to reform everydayness by taking ownership and responsibility of one’s style of living.

We can say that the métaphilosopher utilizing Lefebvre’s Métaphilosophie is concerned with everyday practices, specifically the metaphoric prowess of poiesis, how space is performed and utilized, and how moments prod situations in which the “total man” can emerge and realize. The métaphilosopher also assumes the role of an autoethnographer—not divorced from that which he is observing. He attends to his fleshiness, uncertainties, obfuscation, and blurred experiences. He absorbs his alienation, finds potentialities in those moments of making do (mixed genre, storytelling—i.e., performance, fiction, evocative techniques, speech acts, drama, all renderings to hail attention to normal subversive everyday practices that fracture society—that go unchecked and seem organic) producing situations and ways to dépasser. Diagramming these observations, we can say the métaphilosopher is tuned with those embryonic debris that birth cosmic shape and frequencies of life: rhythmic cycles of everydayness (i.e., biological, physiological, metaphysical, anthropological, material, structural) by means of difference, repetition, and frequency. “Everywhere where there is interaction between a place, a time, and expenditure of energy, there is rhythm.”41 To say that the métaphilosopher is a cartographer of rhythms for revolutionary purposes is not an overstatement; he charts, graphs, highlights, scales, and measures everydayness in order to diagram the creative potential of living.

In the future the art of living will become a genuine art .... The art of living presupposes that the human being sees his own life—the development and intensification of his life—not as a means towards ‘another’ end, but as

40 Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life (2014), 88.
41 Henri Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis (New York: Continuum, 2004), 15.
an end in itself .... The art of living implies the end of alienation—and will contribute towards it.  

Rhythmology

1. To begin, one must assume the role of a rhythmologist. A rhythmologist is fundamentally attuned to the tones and textures of everydayness. (See point 3.) This is similar to the mythologist who is not only doing the mythologizing but is part of the myth.

2. Supposing there is a centre at which the method begins, one might begin with the lamentation: Is this my life, and what has become of it? Any query into the quotidienneté assumes a strangeness or absurdity that splinters the individual’s commonplace and feeling of revolution, not just on behalf of one’s self but on behalf of humanity which inspires an art of living—“to change the world, we must change life.”

3. Quotidienne or quotidienneté is comprised of physical and metaphysical structures, strategies, tactics, things, codified systems, games, rules, and forms that are ordinary, repetitive, and homogenic that strip life from any modicum of authenticity. The reformation of quotidienneté sheds light on those structures that appear to be mired in sameness and exposes them for their differences and potentialities vis-à-vis repetitive difference (1+1+1 …).

4. The rhythmologist must be able to identify an ensemble of varying rhythms, repetitions, temporalities, and spontaneous actions (calendrical, bodily, lunar, mechanical, geographical) as they are interwoven into the lifecycle of everydayness that account for a critical part of how we arrange and order movement within space and time. Raymond Queneau’s Exercises De Style is a rapport of everydayness in which repetition is used to probe the limitations of linguistic wordplay, newness,

Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. 1, 199.
Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre, 118.
Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis, 6.
banality, style, and sensation. And Georges Perec’s Tentative d’épuisement d’un lieu parisien is a visual sketch of rhythms, norms, cycles, timetables, movements of mobility, habitations, and connections over a 3-day period in which these accounts are reported through café windows.45

5. The rhythmologist must be able to engage idealism with praxis and poises. Michel De Certeau’s la perruque is “[t]asked with defusing or ‘making do,’ the mapless minefield of his place of employment ... without promise of a transparent user manual, camouflages his vexation by encoding his ways of operating vis-à-vis aesthetic performance [as a way of revolting against the established order].

6. Counter rhythms include English graffiti artist Banksy, various splinters of Occupy, Networked movements (Arab Spring), and Indignados. These examples of aesthetic revolutionary rhythmic tactics of resistance echo Lefebvre’s festival as revolution. What is hoped for by employing a method of rhythm to La quotidienette is the rediscovery of a style of living—moments that reaffirm man’s natural order in the universe and in doing so reinstitute the total man.

What are we signifying when we say that we are reinstituting the total man, rescuing him from alienation (e.g., technology, work, labor)? Are we saying that there is more to being-in-the-world than the mechanical pulley, leverage, cable rhythms of the métro boulot dodo—that there is a style of life that is worth fighting for? That technology divorces man from being-in-the-world, denatures him from work, community, others, and self? Yes! But we are not disillusioned, drunk in absolution or mysticism. We are affirming that alienation and ennui are not the final stage of human growth and evolution but a necessary stage for man in his effort to become what he is—the total man—and that this concept of the total man, which may merely be symbolic, does not deter man from exceptionality. Equally, it does not preclude that man is a cycle of repetitive failed projects that lull him into a purgatory of non-expectation that steals away moments of authenticity—new

ways of thinking, seeing, and being. The total man is more than the sum of its parts; it is the quantum particles of everyday that go unnoticed that have the potential to transform the rhythms of everyday and in doing so impact moments, situations, and culture. Acts, gestures, performances, and creative expressions are exercises of potentialities evidenced in the works of Charles Baudelaire’s Flâneur; Edward Hopper’s “Gas” and “Hotel Room,” François Truffaut’s Bertrand in L’Homme qui aimait les femmes (1993), Luce Giard, Georges Perec, Maurice Blanchot, Roland Barthes, et al., all of whom have contributed appreciably to the reinstitution of being via La quotidien. Their works collectively describe a certain fleshy phenomenology that reinstates humankind into a world of possibility. At the core of La quotidien is indetermination, an openness/hazy-cloudiness, an unfurling of temporal possibility—the stretching along of what is to be the total man. Resuscitating the total man, breathing new life into his lungs, are those ordinate objects, sensations that give shape to everydayness (e.g., the fleeting scent of a beautiful passerby, the smell of newness after a summer rain, the sea of humanity pouring into the crevice of the underground, the undulating throb and pitch of sound gyrating at Delhi’s AIIMS, a random shredded tire in the middle of the highway, or the misrecognition of a hand wave from a beautiful woman that pulsates the heart). These sensations can ignite what Stéphane Mallarmé noted, “la vie, immédiate, chère et multiple, la nôtre avec ses riens sérieux” (life, immediate, clear and multiple, with our own serious nothings). Everydayness is not entrenched inside us or enframed somewhere else, it is all around us so we must manually pursue our investigation with the fleshiness of our senses, bringing ourselves into an authentic relationship with the world situation by situation and in doing so creating spatial possibilities for reinstitution of the total man.

Reinstitution of The Total Man

Appropriation versus alienation and spaces of between(less) mark our current crisis.

Reinstitution of the total man is tantamount to pursuing the everydayness with openness and newness—thus, matter, objects, experiences, sensations, no matter how ordinary they appear, are sociological potentialities (Zuhandenheit). At the center of appropriation is authenticity in which man relinquishes his shackles and finds his style of living. “Ce qui compte n’est pas seulement ce que les forces sociales font de notre vie quotidienne mais ce que nous faisons de ces forces à travers notre mainèr...
les vivre”⁴⁷ (What counts is not simply what social forces do to our everyday life but what we do with those forces through the way we live them). Declaring his freedom, the total man yells, “I hate everything that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity.”⁴⁸ Nietzsche’s lament is not anarchic, but it does encourage us to engage in a radical pedagogical undertaking, questioning the fleshy epistemic and ontological grounding to which our senses instruct. So entrenched in the cultural logic of everyday, our senses are without perception. When we see what are we not seeing, and when we hear what are we not hearing? So when we pursue a style of living with all of our flesh, we are seeking a project of negation and consummation, stressing a radical poiesis and purification of our senses. Our eyes are a test to see if we can see beyond them. Aristotelian reasoning and Newtonian mechanics are merely mental exercises—two of many cognitive dimensions or ways we have become familiar strangers. The total man is not a mystic figure whose purpose is messianic; his life is an intense project—a supernova for others to see. He is exemplary of what is possible when one transcends cultural logic and sensibility. “Sadly, the stars of what is possible shine only at night …. Until such time as mankind has transformed this light and this darkness, stars will shine only at night.”⁴⁹ And until such a time, Lefebvre notes, we must revolt.

I am reminded of the Yippies’ 1968 “Festival of Light” in which LSD was dropped into the NYC water supply, fuck-ins were staged, etc. All questioned the cultural logic of the time, raising issue and association with the concept of pleasure insofar that it’s permissible under the auspice of consumerism. Mediated through theater, play, and festival, the Yippies included the everyday passerby and lingering materials for props. It was not a members-only movement; it depended on community involvement.⁵⁰ Similar to Lefebvre, the Yippies’ protest reinforced the importance of solidarity, collective consciousness, carnival, and community building. Other festive revolutionary examples include:

1. Boulevard de Bonne-Nouvelle, described in Breton and Eluard’s Immaculate Conception—the everyday is what is and what appears only if we could apprehend it. In practice, the boulevard is

⁴⁷ Lefebvre, Métaphilosophie: Promolegomenas, 349.
⁴⁹ Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life (2014), 642.
synonymous with potential energy, formless space, space that has yet to be articulated or practiced—indeed banal without expectation.

2. Recently, Chinese Flash Mob Tuangou united, where consumers connect on social media, agree to purchase from a specific vendor, and demand a reduced rate.⁵¹

3. 5 Points in NYC

4. Pop-up classes at The New School in which random lectures across NYC would surface. Pop-up classes challenged the role of the university as an economic extension of government and private interest whose primary interest was vested in a system of perpetual training and indentured servitude.

5. The Reverend Billy and the Church of Stop Shopping⁵² is an anti-consumer film and movement that stages flashmob and street theatric performances in consumer-driven spaces. The movement inspires more than just an intellectual awareness of neoliberal capitalism and herd mentality; it provokes awareness of how one can get out there and do something, individually and as a community.

These projects have several things in common: they reinstitute the subject as an active agent who (in)habiter space. The verb “habiter” provides a grounding, making it possible for the subject to chart uncharted geographies or corriger géographies anciennes (correct old geographies) and create new ones. Second, the subject is consubstantiated with his project—their life is an experience, translated in French as experiment, a mélange of projects that brings one to attention. Third, each project dépassait, paraphrasing Feurbachian’s reformation: How can we change the world,


⁵² The Reverend Billy and the Church of Stop Shopping, directed by Lucia Palacios and Dietmar Post (New York: Play Loud! Productions, 2002).
rather than merely interpret it. It brings grounding to the Cartesian chasm by bridging two distinct worlds—that which man perceives (historical) and that which he imagines (reverie). Said in another way, the total man is not just simply a linear historical entity, homo erectus, destining toward a factual end; he’s a homo quotidien, fluid, rhizomatic, whose very presence ruptures any premeditated destining. The total man is a man of the moment. “The moment offers us a taste or a glimpse of unity and connection, and although it is temporary … it has the power to change the course of history and the quality of everyday life.”

In closing, with every technological concession gained, it is only responsible to ask what is in jeopardy of being lost, and if lost, is it worth retrieving? Technological development is speeding up, parceling, fragmenting, and distancing man from his natural state. The trick is to see technology as a red herring. Whether or not I possess the latest mediated something is to miss the point. The issue set forth is one of technological enframing and its implications toward man being-in-the-world. Staying faithful to the ongoing rhythmic course, man’s end is a de-worlded one as light is eclipsed by the eternal shadow—fait accompli, or does man revel in the light-eclipsed shadow until the darkness draws its final chill upon his being. Accepting the second proposition that the everyday is worth fighting for is the recognition of the lived experience (habiter + expérience = La vecu), indeterminate moments between the light and darkness, transitions of existence at the level of daily life that beckon humankind to realize their potential, a humanity grounded not so much in the quantity of social interactions, processes, inputs and outputs, places, and things but in the quality of those social fusions, con(fusions), and the richness of relationships and experiences fostered. I’m not convinced that my individual effort here will inspire a change in how we approach, befriend, and engage technology or La quotidienne. On a very concrete level, I hope it can illuminate feelings of unease and discomfort, giving reason to question the very elements of our everydayness, to hail attention to how unfamiliar (artificial—minced—flat white—homogenous) the world has become, what we have become, and what we can do to peel away the silicon and metal veneer enveloping our everydayness to recapture the fleshy moment of being human.

School of Media Studies, The New School University, United States

---

54 Moore, “The Beat of the City,” 69.
References


__________, Rhythmanalysis (New York: Continuum, 2004).


Lum, Heather Christina, Are We Becoming Superhuman Cyborgs? How Technomorphism Influences Our Perceptions of the World around Us


Mallarmé, Stéphane, Oeuvres completes (Paris: Gallimard-Pléiade, 1945).


Perec, Geroges, Tentative d’épuisement d’un lieu parisien (France: Christian Bourgois, 1982).


The Reverend Billy and the Church of Stop Shopping, directed by Lucia Palacios and Dietmar Post (New York: Play Loud! Productions, 2002).


Thacker, Eugene, Biomedia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).

de Unamuno, Miguel The Tragic Sense of Life (New York: Dover, 1954).

Reading Erich Fromm’s *The Art of Loving*, or Why Loving Means Giving Nothing

Jeremy De Chavez

Abstract: The concept of love has been receiving sustained critical attention in recent critical discourse. While there was once reluctance to consider love an object of serious scholarly inquiry, contemporary philosophers and theorists have turned to love in theorizing issues of overlapping philosophical, ethical, cultural, and political concern. This paper seeks to contribute to the expanding discourse on love by offering a rereading of the work of critical theorist Erich Fromm. I reevaluate Fromm’s work within the constellation of late capitalism, and I explore the utility of his prescriptions regarding amorous relations. How might his “art of loving” be realized given the problem of sexual difference and the commodification of love? Towards this goal, I place Fromm in conversation with Jacques Lacan to offer a way to rethink what it might mean to give one’s lack to the other, a gesture of acceptance of one’s symbolic castration.

Keywords: Fromm, Lacan, psychoanalysis, love

Introduction

Contemporary critical discourse has recently been intensely invested in the concept of love. While there was once a reluctance to even consider it as a proper object of scholarly inquiry, it is now becoming a key concept in theorizing issues of overlapping philosophical, ethical, cultural, and political concern. Several important contemporary philosophers and theorists have granted love a renewed dignity as a philosophical concept by turning to it to conceptualize the possibility of establishing genuine, non-dominating, and non-totalizing relations with the other within the constellation of the present historical situation. Alain Badiou has identified love as an “Event” that constructs a “scene of Two,” a situation that creates
the paradox of “identical difference.” For Jean-Luc Nancy love is an occurrence that “fractures” and “shatters” the subject, leaving him exposed and open to the Other, “an extreme movement, beyond the self, of a being reaching completion.” Conscripting the concept within a broader Feminist framework, Anna Jonasdottir posits that amorous relations offer “world-creating capacities’ which contain the possibility of genuine reciprocity between co-equal subjects.” Further, there have also been attempts to theorize love as a conceptual adhesive to consolidate the oppressed so that they may forge collective resistance. For example, in Methodology of the Oppressed, Chela Sandoval conceives of love as a methodology to enact “oppositional social action.” In Commonwealth, by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, love is the initiative of singularities to connect and form new assemblages to establish common interest, which is achieved through “the collective organization of our desires, a process of sentimental and political education.”

This paper seeks to contribute to the expanding discourse on love by returning to the work of Erich Fromm, a critical theorist who emphasized the transformative and enabling possibilities of love at a time when it was considered thoroughly at the service of the period’s dominant capitalist morality. Even his colleagues in the Frankfurt School thought his work was simply “the laboring[s] of the obvious, of everyday wisdom” and is “sentimental and wrong.” I offer a rereading of Fromm’s The Art of Loving that places it in conversation with Jacques Lacan’s theories on love and desire, and I posit that such a positioning is productive for it makes legible the contemporary relevance of Fromm’s work that seems to be incompatible with the prevailing ethics of the current historical situation. Thus, I conscript Lacanian theories not with the intention of supplementing Fromm’s putatively naïve prescriptions with theoretical sophistication, but rather, to make perceptible the structure of Fromm’s thought without being

---

4 Chela Sandoval, Methodology of the Oppressed (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 146.
prematurely swayed by the bias of our dominant ethics. Biases bracketed, I argue that Fromm’s work reveals an enabling dimension to certain concepts he develops in his most sustained meditation on love, *The Art of Loving*.

I turn to Psychoanalytic theory as a primary critical resource of my inquiry because I find that it has developed a substantial corpus of concepts that enables one to discern love’s formal structure. Incidentally, this is also the reason why Alain Badiou insists that Psychoanalysis is indispensable in thinking about sexual differentiation. I proceed with the conviction that Psychoanalysis can tell us a lot about love even if generally it has had a rather ambivalent relationship towards it. Responding to the question “What can Psychoanalysis tell us about love?” Jacques-Alain Miller says:

A great deal, because it’s an experience whose mainspring is love. It’s a question of that automatic and more often than not unconscious love that the analysand brings to the analyst, and which is called transference. It’s a contrived love, but made of the same stuff as true love. It sheds light on its mechanism: love is addressed to the one you think knows your true truth. But love allows you to think this truth will be likeable, agreeable, when in fact it’s rather hard to bear.8

There is, of course, the problem of transitioning from intra- to inter-subjective dynamics. It is rather a big leap to suggest that what an analyst discovers in very specific clinical situations could be a generic condition that is true for all. Advocates of psychoanalytic social theory have rarely attempted to define the conditions that make such a method valid or invalid (Why is it seemingly more justifiable to universalize the “logic of desire” or fantasy but questionable to do so for, say, hysteria or even for the Oedipus complex?). Instead, they have depended on a deconstructive counter-offensive, that is, to call into question the simple binary of individual and collective. However, in (Lacanian) psychoanalysis, one cannot speak purely of an individual psyche. Even psychopathologies that are seemingly particular to an individual emerge from a larger, inter-subjective social field, what Lacan refers to as the big Other. The (symbolic) consistency of a subject (in the Lacanian sense) is a mere “effect,” for his actions, speech, and fantasies are designated by the big Other, the Symbolic Order. Paradoxically, the real(ity) of our being is what is inaccessible to us, and we mistake the

---

symbolic texture of our being with what is “in us more than ourselves.”” And, as Žižek and Salecl argue, it is that “kernel of the real” that is the true aim of love, “what is in the object more than the object itself.” If it is this inaccessible thing (das Ding), “the-beyond-of-the-signified,” that love aims at, then it is surely outside the field of the perceptible.

Prolegomenon: An Eventful Encounter with Erich Fromm

Although I had heard of Erich Fromm long before I became interested in his ideas, what I consider to be our first meaningful encounter took place in a used bookstore in Toronto in 2008. While perusing the Psychology section of the bookstore, a pristine-looking paperback edition of Fromm’s The Art of Loving caught my eye. When I opened the book, what first arrested my attention were not the words of Fromm, but someone else’s. Written on the cover page, the pleasantly slanting cursive in blue ink read: “To my dearest _________,” followed by a short dedication, then concluded with a rather trite “I love you,” then signed. Though I am now unable to reproduce faithfully the contents of that message, I do remember thinking at the time that what I had in my hands was a special copy of The Art of Loving. It is not one that was owned by some profligate and/or impoverished student who immediately sold it off for a few dollars at the end of term, but rather one that was once a gift from a lover to his beloved.

That realization was accompanied by a spontaneous feeling of guilt for intruding into another’s amorous universe. I happened to stumble upon information that could be devastatingly humiliating for the lover who penned those words: an object that he elevated as a privileged signifier of love had found its way into some used bookstore—what once was priceless, now sadly available at a bargain price. So, intrigued as I was by this book, I decided to buy a different copy, one that does a better job in keeping quiet about its history. That “special book,” however, did make me want to ask questions: assuming that the beloved received that gift, why did it end up in a used bookstore? Desiring the most scandalous explanation, I concluded that their relationship ended badly, and that the beloved just wanted to remove all those objects that might bring back painful memories of her lover.

Standard narratives of love make it seem that there are only two things that could be done to such amorous relics: they are either kept (as painful

11 A friend who wrote his Master’s research project on Erich Fromm incessantly talked about him when we were doing graduate studies at the National University of Singapore.

© 2015 Jeremy C. De Chavez
ISSN 1908-7330
reminders of what once was) or destroyed (in a ritualistic gesture of closure). But rarely are they sold.

I begin this paper with this anecdote not only because it dramatizes so clearly certain aspects of the fundamental structure of love and how those very aspects have been contaminated by the logic of capital. Psychoanalysis suggests that the concept of “the gift” is a crucial component of the amorous structure. Freud traces the practice of gift giving to infantile anal eroticism. In “On Transformations of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Erotism,” he writes: “[The] first meaning which a child’s interest in faeces develops is that of a gift … Since his faeces are his first gift, the child easily transfers his interest from that substance to the new one which he comes across as the most valuable gift in life.”\(^\text{12}\) The child, yet to be alienated from his labor, considers his faeces not as a worthless piece of shit but as a product of a work of love. It is for him a part of his body that he has to give up (to the (m)other who suffers from lack). Thus, it is the first time that he realizes the split meaning of defecation: as a narcissistic activity (when he experiences pleasure from defecation) and as a sacrifice (object love). When adults reenact (as transferential love) gift giving as this practice of generosity, are they not really just exchanging pieces of shit? That is, they are simply giving to each other objects that have been subtracted of (use-)value, of vitamins, and nutrients? It is no surprise then that the less use-value a gift has, the more likely it is able to signify love. Toilet plungers, screwdriver sets, and dustpans, useful as they are, tend to fall short in making a loved one feel special. Is this not exactly what O. Henry’s famous short story “The Gift of the Magi” (1906) renders perfectly clear?\(^\text{13}\)

Jacques Lacan, in his famous essay “The Meaning of the Phallus” (1985), suggests that giving is not merely a component of the practice of love but the act of loving itself.\(^\text{14}\) The lover is one who gives to the (sexed) other. But


\(^{13}\) O. Henry’s story is about a poor young couple, James and Della, and their secret desire to buy each other Christmas gifts that would approximate the intensity of their amorous feelings. To circumvent financial constraints, they both sell, without the other knowing, something of value that they possess: for James his heirloom pocket watch and for Della her long, beautiful hair. The twist is that James uses the money to buy Della a set of jewel-encrusted combs and Della to buy James a platinum chain for his watch. Their personal sacrifice thus renders the other’s gift useless. Standard readings of the story suggest that it is ultimately their sacrifice that signifies love rather than the actual gifts themselves. However, one could imagine an alternative ending where the couple finds a way to raise the funds through other means and the gifts retain their use-value. Even if a sacrifice is still involved—James puts in the extra overtime hours or Della risks humiliation by borrowing money from her estranged parents, for example—the attempt of the story to be a scene of presentation for love is indubitably weaker.

what does he give? “[The] gift of something which it does not have.”

Needless to say, Lacan does not mean that lovers are those who give false promises or stolen goods; rather, he means that what lovers give to each other is lack itself, the phallus. This is a complicated formulation that I will engage in this paper. For now, however, it will be sufficient to say that the “phallus” does not stand for pleasure, but rather its endless deferral. For Lacan, lovers do not provide each other with fulfillment, but rather false hopes, a romance of (dis)illusion(ment).

Erich Fromm also equates love with giving. His famous book *The Art of Loving* (2000), which according to the back cover has helped “hundreds of thousands of men and women achieve productive lives by developing their hidden capacities for love,” proposes a methodology of loving based on “active penetration,” which for Fromm is primarily a form of giving, “the highest expression of potency.” Suffice it to say, for the contemporary reader, Fromm’s word choice is somewhat alarming because it appears to be undergirded by heterosexist and heteronormative assumptions. And indeed, he has received numerous criticisms on that score—among them those coming from no less than his colleagues at the Frankfurt School. But is this a valid enough reason to leave Fromm in the dustbin of academic history? I suggest that there is more to Fromm than meets the eye, for his notion of giving as “active penetration” allows us to think of this amorous act outside the coordinates of capital and perversion. The political utility of psychoanalysis is in large part linked to its extensive theorizations of forms of perversion. Fromm’s work offers a new way for psychoanalysis to participate in thinking the ethico-political by expanding the notion of “giving” within the context of the sexed relation.

I take my chance encounter with Erich Fromm (in a used bookstore no less!) as an opportunity to return to his ideas and reconsider them in light of the contemporary forms of attachment we generously label as love. Fromm’s *The Art of Loving* had the audacity to instruct individuals on how to become masters of the amorous arts, an audacity that made it difficult for Herbert Marcuse and Theodor W. Adorno, for example, to take him seriously. Further, his thought seems to be weighed down by unacceptable heteronormative assumptions that are arguably no longer compatible with our contemporary values. Thus, I propose to read *The Art of Loving* through a Lacanian lens to offer an alternative reading of Fromm’s theories on love that might resonate more strongly with contemporary subjectivities.

---

15 Ibid., 80. Emphasis mine.
17 Ibid., 21.

© 2015 Jeremy C. De Chavez
ISSN 1908-7330
The (Un)Critical Theory of Erich Fromm

Once upon a time, Erich Fromm was an academic superstar. His work was able to speak to a broader audience compared to most psychoanalytic theorists. Adam Phillips observes that as a writer he “is calm and intelligible...wary of mystification.” Fromm wrote a number of bestsellers, among them Fear of Freedom (1941), The Sane Society (1955), The Heart of Man (1964), The Revolution of Hope (1968), To Have or To Be? (1976), and of course The Art of Loving (1956). However, his popularity was confined to his own lifetime, and now, his work has been relegated to the dustbin of intellectual history. To be sure, there were a few attempts to rectify this neglect, yet no “return to Fromm” has sparked the kind of academic wildfire that occurred for, say, Emmanuel Levinas or for Herbert Marcuse. His disappearance from academic consideration is, at least in part, a consequence of his highly readable prose. In today’s intellectual climate, immortality appears to be linked to inaccessibility. Phillips notes that this is perhaps the reason why “it was the more hermetic members of the Frankfurt School, Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin in particular, who had more staying power than Fromm.”

Further, Fromm has achieved the perhaps regrettable reputation of being a “common-sense” theorist. He is a popularizer of “philosophy” rather than a visionary. Nothing makes an idea more unpopular with intellectuals than its being rubber stamped as commonsense. Robert Bocock in his Freud and Modern Society (1978)—a study that explores the impact of psychoanalysis in the development of Sociology—portrays Fromm’s revisions of Freudian theory as regressive rather than productive. He writes: “[Fromm] seems to be a return to pre-Freudian thought rather than a building upon Freud.” For Bocock, Fromm perverts Freud’s teachings so that they may be more palatable to a mass audience, revising Freud to achieve compatibility with the dominant morality. He consequently dismisses Fromm’s work as nothing more than “a form of inspirational literature rather than a rigorous sociological or philosophical analysis.”

Bocock’s uncharitable pronouncement is not just a contemporary reassessment, but one that has been leveled against Fromm even during the height of his scholarly productivity. It should be noted that Fromm’s...
colleagues at the Institute of Social Research were responsible in large part for his image as an impotent moral philosopher and a naïve utopian who could only offer “the power of positive thinking,” to use Herbert Marcuse’s words.22

It is well known that the original members of the Frankfurt School agonized over the fear of being co-opted and integrated into the dominant culture. So it is no surprise that Fromm’s modifications of Freudian theory, which Marcuse alleges are “the laboring[s] of the obvious, of everyday wisdom,” were regarded as threats to the group’s intellectual integrity.23 Adorno, the first among the Institute members to openly criticize Fromm, accused him of grossly exaggerating the transformative powers of love.24 Fromm’s article of 1935 in Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung entitled “The Social Determinateness of Psychoanalytic Therapy,” which argued that the cold analyst cloaked authoritarian tendencies that should be rejected in favor of a more kind and caring analyst, was dismissed by Adorno as simply “sentimental and wrong.” Adorno told Horkheimer that “silly arguments like ‘lack of kindness’ cannot be permitted … I cannot keep from you the fact that I see [Fromm’s] work as a real threat to the line of the journal.”25

Adorno’s open hostility towards Fromm is commonplace in historical accounts of the Frankfurt School, and some accounts even portray their conflict as having exceeded professional bounds.26 In his book The Art of Living: Erich Fromm’s Life and Works, Gerhard Knapp writes:

Theodor W. Adorno … disliked Fromm intensely. This feeling was reciprocal. Adorno had insulted Lowenthal and Fromm, who were both still orthodox in their adherence to Judaism at the time, by mockingingly calling them “professional Jews” … Fromm’s serious, unblinking outlook on life must have clashed with the

---

22 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 262.
23 Ibid., 250.
24 Fromm responds by arguing that “genuine love, far from being merely ‘ideological’…is actually quite rare in contemporary society because it is out of step with the prevailing character of social relations.” See Daniel Burston, The Legacy of Erich Fromm (Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1991), 216.
26 Burston suggests that Adorno’s alleged misguided critique of Fromm is due to an “elementary misunderstanding of the clinical issues” in Fromm’s article, and concludes that Adorno’s assessment “was somewhat obtuse politically, and tangential to the issues Fromm was addressing, See Burston, The Legacy of Erich Fromm, 213-214.
whimsical and caustically self-ironic personalities of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Pollock.\(^{27}\)

For Adorno, Fromm’s “serious, unblinking outlook on life” translated into a kind of naïve uncritical theory. Fromm insisted on the possibility of love in a world that he himself describes as repressive. Adorno saw this as problematic. He writes: “... any direct evidence of love serves only at confirming the very same conditions which breed hatred.”\(^{28}\)

If Adorno seems to have been critical of Fromm from the start, most of the authoritative literature on the history of the Frankfurt School portrays Horkheimer’s falling out with Fromm as a slower process. Horkheimer was especially enthusiastic about supplementing the Institute’s brand of neo-Marxism with psychoanalytic theory. Historical accounts have suggested that Horkheimer worked overtime in trying to make the Institute an accommodating space for psychoanalytic thought.\(^{29}\) Fromm was initiated into the Frankfurt School mainly because of Horkheimer’s efforts to have the Psychoanalytic Institute, of which Fromm was a member, granted the status of “guest institute” by the University of Frankfurt (and thus making it the first ever Freudian organization to be connected to a German university).\(^{30}\) In *Critical Theory, Politics and Society*, Peter Stirk suggests that initially “Fromm’s influence was central to the Institute’s self-perception,” and Horkheimer held him in high regard. This good working relationship, however, would turn sour by 1934. In a letter to Pollock, Horkheimer revealed the reasons for his change of heart. Fromm, according to Horkheimer, was “trying to stay on good terms with too many people” and was lacking a “maliciously sharp eye for prevalent conditions.”\(^{31}\)

**Rereading Fromm**

I propose to read Fromm’s theory of love in conjunction with Jacques Lacan’s theories on sexuation. Suffice it to say, my “return to Fromm” does not consist of merely trying to resurrect the analytical concepts he developed so that those could be blindly applied as a kind of general/universal corrective to current social ills, but rather it is to discover that which his dominant


\(^{30}\) The Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute was an organization formed by Horkheimer’s analyst Karl Landauer.

academic reception was unable to discern. I claim that when one “looks awry” (to use the words of Slavoj Žižek) at the work of Fromm, one discovers a surprising compatibility with Lacanian motifs. At first blush, Lacan and Fromm make for strange bedfellows, for even more than the American ego psychologists, Fromm’s ideas appear to be anathema to Lacan’s. Fromm’s humanism, his belief in the existence of a universal, transhistorical human nature, his emphasis on social psychology, his rejection of the death drive, do not seem to sit well with standard interpretations of Lacanian thought. It is, however, precisely this apparent incompatibility that makes possible new and fruitful ways of reading that often escape formulaic modes of processing information. Slavoj Žižek uses the term “short-circuiting” to describe the resulting effect of reading seemingly incompatible texts together (at least, incompatible in terms of their positive content), to “cross wires that do not usually touch.”

I endeavor to “short circuit” Fromm using Lacan not to come up with new concepts but rather to see the old ones that he already formulated in new ways (and in doing so hopefully liberate their hidden radical potential). The difference between formulating new concepts and “looking awry” at old ones is perhaps small but nevertheless crucial. With the former, we begin in the subjunctive mode: If Fromm and/or Lacan were alive today, what would they likely say about the current historical condition? This is of course followed by the rather ambitious attempt to think in the same manner as a great theorist, supported by the rather questionable premise that the trajectory of that theorist’s thought unfolds following a predictable pattern that we are now in the fortunate position to take to its inevitable conclusion. However, with the latter, we assume that a theorist’s prescriptions, even if conceived within the specificities of different historical conditions, nevertheless, can surprisingly shed light on current problems.

The Art of Hysterical Loving

So, according to Fromm, how does one become a master in the art of loving?

For a psychoanalytic theorist known for being “calm and intelligible” and for refusing to “promote those forms of mandarin intelligence that could produce convincing critiques of culture that hardly anyone in the culture was able to read,” it is surprisingly difficult to tell how Fromm satisfies the burden his book The Art of Loving sets up. He offers love as the “answer to the

---

problem of human existence,” which is the “question of how to overcome separateness.”\(^35\) He bewails the tendency of most people to overcome this separateness through *conformity*, which includes “orgiastic unions.”\(^36\) And then he discusses different “types” of love—parental, brotherly, motherly, erotic, self-love, love of God—and shows how each attempts to resolve the fundamental anxiety brought about by the condition of separateness.\(^37\) He speaks of love and of the art of loving as the only legitimate means to overcome human separateness. Love is a sincere way of establishing relations with the other and a basis on which a meaningful and ethical life could be lived. Love could also sever our dependence on those things that our capitalist orientation desires: “success, prestige, money, power.” \(^38\) Being a master of the art of loving has to be a matter of ultimate concern, therefore. Fromm thus provides his readers with the reason for love and for the necessity of love. But what about the practice of love?

In the section of the book called “The Practice of Love,” Fromm identifies several traits that every lover worth the name should have: discipline, concentration, and patience. He then gives rather concrete suggestions on how these traits could be developed. Most of his suggestions are suspiciously prosaic and old-fashioned. His prescription for developing discipline:

> Our grandfathers would have been much better equipped to answer this question. Their recommendation was to get up early in the morning, not to indulge in necessary luxuries, to work hard...To get up at a regular hour, to devote a regular amount of time during the day for activities such as meditating, reading, listening to music, walking; not to indulge, at least not beyond a certain minimum, in escapist activities like mystery stories and movies, not to overeat and overdrink are some obvious rudimentary rules.\(^39\)

After these rather overbearingly moralistic prescriptions, however, Fromm anticipates his reader’s disappointment. His suggestions are

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 12.
\(^{37}\) For Fromm, separateness is the consequence of being an animal with reason, “life being aware of itself.” This awareness makes him anxious of his “short life span, of the fact that without his will he is born and against his will he dies, that he will die before those whom he loves, or they before him, of his helplessness before the forces of nature and of society, all this makes his separate, disunited existence an unbearable prison,” *ibid.*, 8.
\(^{38}\) Ibid., 5.
\(^{39}\) Ibid., 103.
accompanied by a caveat: “… many readers of this book expect to be given prescriptions of ‘how to do it yourself,’ and that means in our case to be taught how to love. I am afraid that anyone who approaches this last chapter in this spirit will be gravely disappointed.” As with any art that demands an original and creative mind and spirit, the art of loving “can be practiced only by oneself.”

In the opening chapter of the book, Fromm makes the mastery of the art of loving seem like a simple process. It can be “divided conveniently into two parts,” he writes, “one, the mastery of the theory; the other, the mastery of practice.” But what the careful reader of Fromm discovers by the time he or she reaches the conclusion of the book is that Fromm only frustrates their desire for knowledge about love and consequently says nothing about how love may be fruitfully practiced. This does not mean, however, that The Art of Loving fails in providing its reader with new knowledge about love, but that it does so by positioning its reader in a hysterical position of interpretation, a position of uncertainty about the (desire of the) other.

Contrast the hysterical position with what we might call the perverse position of interpretation. Like the pervert who is sure of the desire of the Other and thus effectively puts into action what the hysterical only keeps as fantasy, the perverse reader installs the text fully within the coordinates of his or her fantasy, which supports and gives Imaginary body to his or her interpretation. For example, the perverse reader of the Christian commandment “Thou shall not kill” knows first and foremost that the directive is addressed to him or her, and that it applies to only a certain group of people (but perhaps not to heathens, non-believers, animals, criminals). The hysteric reader, however, asks “What does the other mean when he says Thou shall not kill?” “And why does he say it to me?” “Is the directive even addressed to me?” As Žižek notes, the hysteric understands the demand of the Master as “I’m demanding this of you, but what I’m really demanding of you is to refute my demand because this is not it.” Thus, hysteria could be read as a “radically ambiguous protest against the Master’s interpellation.”

The psychoanalytic wager is that love is fundamentally a problem of knowledge. Love is a matter of “knowing,” of properly positioning oneself in relation to the Other’s desire: “How may I be able to situate myself within the Other’s desire?” Of course, this question is posed not entirely for the benefit of the other; needless to say, it cloaks a self-serving agenda. It is only within

40 Ibid., 99.
41 Ibid., 99.
42 Ibid., 5.
the coordinates of the Other’s desire that the Other is in the position to tell me the truth about myself. The desire to love then is fueled by the belief that by loving another, you will get to a truth about yourself. Needless to say, the loved object does not possess the truth about you, and, sans the veil of idealization, the elevated object of love is really just another individual in his or her plain, fragile, imbecilic being.45

Yet, this path towards amorous knowledge cannot be properly attained via the perverse route. The pervert disavows castration and in mistakenly believing that he has the phallus, locks himself in the closed loop of desire under the illusion that he undermines “the very foundations of symbolic authority,” not realizing his (false) subversion “fits the existing power constellation perfectly.”46 It is via the hysterical route that knowledge about love may be produced. It is hysterical uncertainty that makes the subject question the master’s injunctions. “You tell me that this is how to love, but is it really?”

Lacan’s definition of love as giving the “gift of something which [one] does not have”47 could thus be understood within the opposition of perversion and hysteria. The pervert who thinks he has the phallus gives the beloved those objects that signify the full value of his love, an object brimming with the fullness of meaning. In contrast, what the uncertain amorous hysteric gives to the other is lack itself.

I Have Nothing to Give, and Here It Is

Fromm’s The Art of Loving attempts to think how love aims to suture sexual difference; however, rather than challenging the ruling hegemony via perverse strategies that obscure the reality of sexual difference, Fromm works with the Lacanian premise of a fundamental sexual division, and argues that “love,” as he defines it, is a way to transcend this fundamental gap through

---

45 Herein lies the explanation for the curious dynamic between the analyst and analysand in a Lacanian clinic, the scene where the transferential drama is played out. The analysand brings his or her problems to the clinic, hoping that the analyst can alleviate his or her psychological distress by revealing the truth of his or her disorder. The ethical analyst, of course, does not simply “diagnose” the problem. Easy—and perhaps even (sadistically) pleasurable—as it is to reproach the analysand directly for being too selfish, too narcissistic, too fixated on his or her mother, etcetera, the analyst takes a more unconventional path: he “frustrates” the analysand by purposely foiling his or her “demands,” by leaving his or her questions strategically (and often painfully) unanswered. The logic behind this curious practice is that the analysand has to realize in his or her own terms how he or she is caught in the closed loop of desire. Lacan writes: “To have carried an analysis through to its end is no more nor less than to have encountered that limit in which the problematic of desire is raised” (Seminar VII 300).


what Fromm calls “penetration.” Again, it is easy to accuse Fromm of simply accepting the phallogocentric vocabulary of psychoanalysis by using the term “penetration” and suggesting that it is an active form of loving. However, reading Fromm’s notion of “penetration” together with Lacan’s distinction of the two sexualized positions as fundamentally the difference between “being” and “having” the phallus unveils a structure of thought that allows for new ways of thinking about sexual relations.

In The Art of Loving, Fromm posits that love and knowledge are related insofar as there is a “basic need” to discover the “secret of man,” the unfathomable secret of the other. For him, the attempt to overcome the sexual division is primarily a will-to-knowledge. Yet, according to Fromm, it is accompanied by a fundamental paradox: the more we attempt to grasp the other in the (totalizing) grip of knowledge the more his secret “nucleus” eludes us. Fromm posits that there are two ways to overcome this paradox. The first is through the domination of the other: “It is that of complete power over another person … to torture him, to force him to betray his secret in his suffering.” For Fromm this is where the “essential motivation for the depth and intensity of cruelty and destructiveness” comes from. The second is through love. Suffice it to say, for Fromm, the amorous relation is not a power relation, so any attempt to produce knowledge about the loved object is accomplished through methods other than “force.” What is this method then? Put simply: it is love.

Fromm’s suggestion that love is the key that unlocks the other’s secret should not be read as a naïve and unworkable prescription to suture the sexual division. What Fromm is suggesting here is supported by axioms central to psychoanalytic theory itself. Fromm writes:

The other path to knowing “the secret” is love. Love is active penetration of the other person, in which my desire to know is stilled by union. In the act of fusion I know you, I know myself, I know everybody — and I “know” nothing … In the act of loving, of giving myself, in the act of penetrating the other person, I find myself, I discover myself, I discover us both, I discover man … [Love] transcends thought, it transcends words.

Let us spend some time unpacking this rich passage. Let us start from the obvious blatant paradox in the passage: the idea that love leads to knowledge, yet it is the knowledge that “I know nothing.” Surely, Fromm is
not merely suggesting that love leads an individual to assume a posture of humility: the trite (Westernized) Taoist idea that emptiness not fullness is what brings about inner tranquility. The key that unlocks the “secret” of the passage is the word that sticks out, phallus-like, in the text. What does Fromm mean by “active penetration”? And why does he equate “active penetration” with love?

First of all, it should be said that Fromm does not use the Freudian definition of the “active-passive” dichotomy as an instinctual aim that later becomes superimposed onto sexual difference. Fromm equates “activity” with “giving.” He writes: “Love is an activity, not a passive affect … In the most general way, the active character of love can be described by stating that love is primarily giving not receiving.”

If in Fromm’s vocabulary, “activity” is equated to giving, what does giving entail? Throughout The Art of Loving, Fromm remains vague about what he means by the term. Ironically, he does not give his reader a sufficient definition of what it means to “give.” The most he could provide is a seemingly empty definition, a rather lengthy list that seems to say less as it grows longer: “What does one person give to another? … [H]e gives him of that which is alive in him; he gives him of his joy, of his interest, of his understanding, of his knowledge, of his humor, of his sadness—of all expressions and manifestations of that which is alive in him.”

Let us in the meantime dwell on the idea of “active penetration” as giving the other the phallic signifier. In doing so, we assume that it is the phallus that is “alive in him”—that which gives symbolic body to his joys, interest, understanding, knowledge, humor, sadness, and so on, and positions the subject within the Symbolic Order (Also, is not symbolic death the result of challenging the Law of the Father?). What does it mean to give the phallus, the signifier of lack, to the other? Obviously, one cannot give one’s joy, or understanding, or humor to another; however, one can displace one’s desire for joy, desire for understanding, and so on.

In the act of “giving” the phallus, what one really gives the other is one’s lack. This is what Lacan means when he defines love as giving to the other what one does not have. Loving is thus a kind of act of symbolic castration, for to love means to accept that one is a being with lack. Jacques-Alain Miller would go so far as to say that “Loving feminizes,” for the lover must accept his or her (symbolic) castration. Thus, the act of loving could only really be properly accomplished from the feminine position. What does this mean?

52 I am very much aware of the phallic imagery that haunts this paragraph.
53 Fromm, The Art of Loving, 23.
Let us return to Lacan’s fundamental distinction of the two positions. Lacan claims that there are two sexualized positions designated as “Man” and “Woman.” These two positions are purely symbolic and have no biological, empirical, or social basis, but are so termed depending on the subject’s relation to the phallic signifier (of wanting to have or to be the phallus). Those two positions constitute two wholly separate realms of experience, and no real connection between the two positions can be successfully established. This is because the laws of the Symbolic and the deceptive images of the Imaginary always mediate sexual relations; thus, subjects cannot transcend the perimeters defined by their respective fantasies (Hence, Lacan’s famous pronouncement: “There is no sexual relation.”)

In trying to say everything, Fromm ends up saying nothing. Rather than giving his readers “knowledge,” he ends up giving them empty signifiers. What does it mean to give one’s joy or one’s interest? We just end up asking more (clarificatory) questions. Fromm displaces the lack in his own text onto his readers. He gives his reader phallic signifiers. The Art of Loving thus offers its readers “lack”, that is, a gesture of love.

Department of Literature, De La Salle University-Manila, Philippines

References


© 2015 Jeremy C. De Chavez
ISSN 1908-7330


WHY LOVING MEANS GIVING NOTHING


Paul Ricoeur: A Synthesis of a History of Life and a History of Death through Phenomenological Hermeneutics

Christiane Joseph C. Jocson

Abstract: Paul Ricoeur’s work entitled Memory, History, Forgetting presents his understanding of the works of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger with regard to history. What is admirable about Ricoeur here is that he was able to see that a notion of history emphasizing about life is not at all contradictory to an understanding of history based on a notion of death. What this paper will try to do is to expose how Paul Ricoeur bridges the link between the philosophy of history of Dilthey and Heidegger through his phenomenological hermeneutics.

Keywords: Ricoeur, hermeneutics, life and death, history

Ricoeur on Dilthey: History and the “Connectedness of Life”

One of the common misunderstandings with regard to history is that it is a mere narrative of the dead or of lives long gone. But reading the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, we can see that even the people of the past are not excluded from the possibility of life. The past is more than something to be cherished and remembered, but it is also something that must be projected towards possibilities beyond its time. For Ricoeur, there is still hope to be found even in the irrevocable past. Although we cannot change what has already transpired, these narratives of the past, for Ricoeur, can still live on and continue to be written. In order to justify his claims, Ricoeur utilizes Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophy of history as a foundation for presenting that life is still possible to the people of the past.

1 It is important for Ricoeur to present that the past is not a closed moment of human history. The challenge is always to find a means by which we are able to open up the past, to find the world of possibility that is latent in the moment that we refer to as the past.
One of the enunciations of Dilthey’s concept of the “connectedness of life” is his presentation that history is more than just the passage of time, the passing of one moment to another. History, says Dilthey, does not proceed by mechanical causation (Kausalzusammenhang) but instead by dynamic causation (Wirkungszusammenhang). What Dilthey means here is that history must go beyond the perception of mere chronology; history is more than just a linear timeline of events. But there is something enigmatic about history that brings to shame any attempt to reduce it to a long line of mere cause and effect kind of understanding. Any kind of deterministic perspective of history fails to see that even the most thought-about event in history still has something that can evoke our surprise.

Chronology is not history for Ricoeur. A mere sequencing of events that fails to recognize the human struggle in each moment is not history. Historical time for Ricoeur cannot be reduced to a mere qualitative view of time; history is not statistics. Even a minute moment in history bears witness to the plight of many different faces. Thus, it is important that we shed light into the counterpart of Kronos and present a history beyond the numbers that can actually testify to the human quality implicit in history.

The problem here is that we commonly take the task of teaching history as nothing but a concern with dates, numbers, names, and other figures. Our fixation on treating historical time as Kronos had always resulted in alienating the human from history. We had forgotten that inside history there is a story to be told. It must be emphasized that history is home to a plurality of faces, voices, and stories that tell how human beings tried to live as human beings. Ricoeur’s reading of Dilthey sheds light on his idea that life has a place in history.

Ricoeur begins by presenting that in Dilthey we are able to realize a conception of temporality that avoids the common segmentation between past, present, and future. This allows Dilthey to present historical time as a continuum of life between different timelines. In other words, the past is not closed off from the present and the future, the present is not closed off from the past and the future, and the future is not closed off from the past and the present. To alienate the past, the present, and the future from one another

---

2 Emerita S. Quito, Philosophers of Hermeneutics (Manila: De La Salle University Press, 1990), 45.
3 Richard Kearney in his idea of “carnal hermeneutics” elucidates on the idea that any kind of hermeneutics must be wary of the aspect of the flesh contained in the word. Hermeneutics for Kearney cannot be exclusively an encounter with the text but it also must be an encounter with a living flesh that struggles to be in every moment of history.
4 It would be important also to emphasize that Ricoeur’s understanding of Dilthey puts into question the boundaries between the past, present, and future. For Ricoeur, there is no such a thing as an absolute past, present, and future. They are intertwined with one another and it is their intertwinement that gives birth to history.
will be tantamount to destroying the temporal interweaving of possibilities that we refer to as history. As Emerita S. Quito would state:

Understanding is a fusion of horizons. No one can abstract or isolate an event with its backdrop or horizon from other events with their corresponding horizons.5

The task of a hermeneutist or a historian is always to be wary of any tendency to alienate one event from another and to allow people of different times and cultures to reach out to each other. Ricoeur here is also presenting that we are not just responsible for the people that are present before me; a responsive human being is also able to be responsible for people who are absent, both to those situated in the past and the future. Hermeneutics is one of the ways by which we are able to manifest our responsibility even to the people who are absent. Also, it is through hermeneutics that we are able to affirm a living social connection that transcends space and time.

An encounter with history is an encounter with life embedded in the text of the past. What is important in the project of Dilthey is that see tries to bring back the vital spirit that fuels history and the other human sciences. The task of the historian according to Dilthey is not simply to recount events but also and most importantly to relive it. The life of the people of the past is not something that must be thrown in an attitude of indifference because of reasons of irrelevance. History is a communion of human lives with one another, for history is a plurality of human narratives that tell of a flesh that lived, suffered, and died. We remember and we partake in the suffering of a people beyond our time. That is why for Dilthey, the historian must learn to encounter the different human faces behind all these names, dates, and figures. To quote:

Dilthey’s final letter (summer 1897) contains one of his rare confessions: “Yes! the term Geschichtlichkeit is the most apt to convey the supreme task of the human sciences, which is to stand up, in self-reflection, in the name of ‘victorious spontaneous vitality,’ to the lack of spirituality of modern times”; to value, he says, “the consciousness of the supra-sensible and supra-rational nature of historicity itself” (Renthe-Fink, Geschichtlichkeit, 107).6

---

5 Quito, Philosophers of Hermeneutics., 96-97.
Ricoeur’s appropriation of Dilthey’s notion of the connectedness of life has brought on his understanding that life is not an exclusive possession of those who are present. Even those who are absent convey a certain vitality that can be found in a hermeneutical encounter. But unlike Dilthey, Ricoeur goes further in his presentation of life in history. Instead of just a reliving of history, Ricoeur would stress that we are able to affirm that history is a living narrative through our actions. It is through putting into action the lessons that we learn from the lives of the people of the past that they are enabled to be present even in their absence. We make their being live through us and in our actions. We allow them to speak again through our being and our actions.

History too is a science of the speaking living being; the juridical normativity that governs the genealogical field is not only one of its objects, not even a “new” object, but instead a presupposition attached to the positing of its object and in this sense an existential presupposition: history encounters only speaking living beings in the process of institution. Genealogy is the institution that makes life human life. In this sense, it is a component of standing for, constitutive of historical intentionality.7

In this sense, Ricoeur adds to Dilthey that the historian plays an important role in giving voice to the voiceless. The historian then appears as the one who, in a variety of ways, makes the dead speak.8 But this notion of Ricoeur is not simply limited to reading and telling the stories of these people who passed away that their spirit may live on. It is important to note that what we refer to as the narrative of the other is closer to our being than what we realize. For Ricoeur, there is no such thing as a narrative that is exclusive to myself and excludes everything other. History is a dialogue between human narratives; it is this intersubjective dialogue that transcends time that creates the ground for history.

The narrative of the other becomes a part of my own narrative, and mine becomes part of his. The responsibility of refiguring lives is both a social responsibility and a responsibility towards the self. In other words, for Ricoeur ethical responsibility and existential responsibility go hand in hand with one another. But this dialogue between narratives is not simply limited to people who are present and alive right at this moment. Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics allows us to dialogue with both the people of the past and the people of the future. The world of the text offers a soil

---

7 Ricoeur, MHP, 379.
8 Ibid., 368.
fertile for a dialogue that transcends time. Through a hermeneutical encounter with the text we are able to reach out to human lives beyond our current situation.9

In any event, it is the function of discourse as the place of language to offer soil and a tomb to the dead of the past: “The ground is an inscription of meaning, the tomb a passage of voices.”10

Language here becomes more than just a means for us to convey meanings and ideas, but it also through language that death avoids becoming an absolute cessation of life. It is through language that we are able to make the world fertile to accommodate and give space for those who have passed on. Their absence does not discount them from my responsibility. I am called on by these mute voices of the past to make them be heard, heard not just by the people of the present but also for the people who are soon to come.

Richard Kearney, in his article entitled “Capable Man, Capable God,” discusses that Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics allows us to be attentive to the repressed voices of the past. Not everything has already been said in history; on the contrary, what we understand much of history is told through the voices of the victors and the dominant class.11 What Ricoeur’s hermeneutics tries to achieve is to give justice to these repressed dreams and hopes in history by trying to make people of the present and of the future remember that these repressed people also have something to say about history. They are also people who lived like us and tried to participate in the becoming of history. In other words, they are to be considered as co-authors in the narrative that we refer to as history.

A meditation on repetition authorizes a further step, following the idea that the dead of the past once were living and that history, in a certain manner, moves closer

---

9 Ricoeur goes beyond the original intentions of Dilthey’s concept of the “connectedness of life” through a presentation of his phenomenological hermeneutics. Ricoeur sees a “connectedness of life” through a dialogue of narratives and interpretations. The idea for Ricoeur is that there is always a whole world of narratives of which I am not the author that set the ground for my own narrative. In other words, for Ricoeur, it is important that we adopt an open attitude with regard to the narrative of the other. The story of another person is not strictly contradictory or alien to my own but they overlap with each other.

10 Ricoeur, MHP, 369.

to their having-been-alive. The dead of today are yesterday’s living, who were acting and suffering.\textsuperscript{12}

History is not just about telling and finding historical facts; it must also consider that history is a human narrative of acting and suffering. We are not simply spectators of history but we are also actors that have a part to play in the unfolding of history. But we must note that the nature of history is not merely to be able to give life to the dead or to give voice to the voiceless; it must also convey a message of possibility. It is here that Ricoeur makes an appropriation of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of history to convey a message of hope in history.

**Ricoeur on Heidegger: History and “Being-towards-death”**

Having been able to present the element of vitality or life in history through a reading on Dilthey, Ricoeur sets forth to the other aspect of history. In the first instance, as it is apprehended in *L’Absent de l’histoire*, death is that which history misses.\textsuperscript{13} In order to present death as not simply death, Ricoeur makes use of Heidegger’s philosophy, most notably his concept of Dasein as a “being-towards-death.”

Here, we can offer resistance to Heidegger’s analysis, for which the determination of the past as elapsed must be considered an inauthentic form of temporality, dependent upon the vulgar concept of time, the simple sum of fleeting nows.\textsuperscript{14}

Heidegger’s understanding of history and temporality is something that cannot be reduced to mere linear causation. History is not just an indifferent flow of time or a mechanistic transition from one era to another. But we, as human beings, have a part to play in the unfolding of history. Each human being has a particular place in history and each one of these narratives constitute what we refer to as history. We participate in the unfolding of history and at the same time we participate in a narrative of another. In other words, there is a human aspect that constitutes history. It is also because of this human element in history that it cannot be objectively determined; history is a history of surprises.

In order to emphasize this human element in history, Ricoeur appropriates Heidegger’s notion of an authentic death. For even in death, the

\textsuperscript{12} Ricoeur, *MHP*, 380.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 366.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 364.
authentic being affirms that there is something human, subjective, and existential even in his death. To treat death merely on the level of the biological would clearly miss what Heidegger is pointing out. Death in history bears a face, a face that had been wounded by time and had struggled to project himself towards his possibilities.

He first notes that death in history is not directly the indiscriminate death of anonymous people. It is, primarily, the death of those who bear a name; death that is an event.\textsuperscript{15}

For Heidegger, death is something that we are all fated to face in our life. We all share in the very ownmost possibility of Dasein. But this does not mean that every tombstone that we see tells about the same tale. Any effort that tries to generalize death in history would only do violence to the human beings that struggled to do more than just be. Each human being for Heidegger struggles to become something apart from the crowd of anonymous people. Each tombstone that we encounter bears a name, bears a tale, and also bears witness to the human struggle to be in history.

This primacy of the future is implied in the theme of being-toward-death; this theme condenses, then, all the fullness of meaning glimpsed in the preparatory analysis of care under the heading of “being-ahead-of-itself.”\textsuperscript{16}

One of the important insights that Ricoeur derives from his interpretation of Heidegger is that what we call as past is not closed as past. What I mean by this is that our understanding of history or of past events is not already set in stone; there are still elements of the unthought that remain in history. In other words, history must be thought as a collective and an individual expression of possibility.

It is the structure of care that, by its very openness, imposes the problematic of totality and that confers on it the modality of potentiality, of possible being, as is summed up in the expression \textit{Ganzseinkonnen} (potentiality of being-a-whole, possible being-a-whole): whole is to be understood not as a closed system but integrality, and in this sense, openness.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 367.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 356.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
If I think of a simple way of translating Heidegger’s idea of Care in Filipino it would be “Ang Bukasan sa Kinabukasan at ang Hinaharap sa Panghinaharap.” The first expression: “Ang Bukasan sa Kinabukasan” (The Opening in Tomorrow) would somehow crudely express the idea of the future as an open possibility. That is, think of “Bukasan” as something like a keyhole, a doorknob, or any instrument to open things. Meanwhile, “Kinabukasan” would be something like a door where we only know that there is a door but we do not know of what lies beyond the door.

One aspect of hope in Ricoeur that is inspired from the existentialist philosopher Soren Kierkegaard is that to hope for something is also to hope in fear and trembling. We know that there are different possibilities that lie in wait for us, but the problem is that we never know exactly what these possibilities have lying in store for us. What this means is that hope does not equate with the absolute certainty of success. The true kind of hope for Ricoeur is something that acknowledges that even if someone exerted all due effort there to attain something, there is still the possibility of disappointment and failure. Rebecca Huskey would even emphasize that hope and despair are two things that are closely linked to one another. The ability to despair is what makes us human.  

To hope is to be open, open to the future, open to possibilities, and open to failure and disappointment.

And openness always leaving room for what is “outstanding” (Ausstand, §48), hence for unfinishedness. The term “incompleteness” is important to the extent that the “toward” of being toward-death seems to imply some destination, some course completed.

Care’s being-ahead-of-itself is thereby affected by its reformulation as “anticipation of possibility.” The attitude of Dasein is open to the possibility of the future, the life of history does not stop at the establishment of the monument or grand narratives that try to conclude the historical development. But for Heidegger, history must admit that there is always something that is left unfinished after every past event.

---

19 Ricoeur, MHP, 356.
20 Ibid.
21 History can be considered as something like a collective work-in-progress as there is a kind of indebtedness to carry on the task of opening up the possibilities of life for the next generation. “The tie between futureness and pastness is assured by a bridging concept, that of
Ricoeur’s appropriation of Heidegger’s presentation of the element of death in history is also important in acknowledging that even the capable human being also has his limitations. Even the most capable of all human beings is unable to fulfill completely a promise. But this sentiment of Ricoeur is not to express pessimism, but instead he points out that in reality it is not out place to completely fulfill promises. The promise of utopia is always a work in progress, a promise that must always be understood in a state of anticipatory resoluteness. The more we come closer to fulfilling the promise of a utopia, the more we must realize that there is still much to be done. We hope that the beings soon to be would be responsible to carry on the promise of a good life to other future generations.

Instead of just facing our own possibilities and keeping our own promises, there is also a kind of ethical responsibility that goes hand in hand with the existential responsibility to be authentic. For Ricoeur, we are not simply responsible for keeping our own promises, but understanding Ricoeur’s notion of utopia, we can understand that we are also called on to keep the word of another. The promise of bringing into reality our utopian projections is a promise that is not exclusively mine, but I am invited to keep it and try to fulfill it.

It is here that the idea of hope of Ricoeur comes into play. Utopia is always something that we hope for; the dream of a good life is always something that we strive to achieve but always fall short of attaining it completely. This does not mean that we should give up on attaining it, but instead Ricoeur would encourage us to welcome such failure. It is because we admit that there are some shortcomings in our attempt to fulfill our utopian promise that we are able to free the utopian promise from any attempts to dominate or to possess it. Part of the utopian promise is to leave it open for others to participate in its realization.

Looking at this idea of hope and utopia for Ricoeur, we can see a close similarity with his thoughts and that of the thoughts of Ernst Bloch. One aspect of hope that Bloch discusses in his philosophy that can help us better understand-resoluteness can only be the assumption of the debt that marks our dependence on the past in terms of heritage.” See Ricoeur, MHP, 363.

We can say that the image of a utopia for Ricoeur is not a static, fixed, or absolute conception. But instead, utopia must be thought as something creative. For there is no single ideal utopian vision that can fit all cultures. Ricoeur presents an important distinction between ideology and utopia, wherein ideology is always projecting a singular ideal world. In contrast, utopia is something creative; it is an ideal that cannot be fully determined.

Rebecca Huskey, in her book Paul Ricoeur on Hope, presents a section that compares the notion of hope in Ricoeur and of Ernst Bloch. She discusses that like Bloch, Ricoeur views hope as something that we must strive to achieve. Heaven is not something that will naturally come when the time is right. But part of our task as human beings is to make this possibility possible. It is through action that the dream of a good life fails to be just a fleeting dream.

© 2015 Christiane Joseph C. Jocson
ISSN 1908-7330
understand the connection of Heidegger’s history of death to Ricoeur is his notion of an active hope. For Bloch, hope is something that we must work towards. It is not something that will naturally fall on our heads as long as we exert an extraordinary amount of patience. Similar to Bloch, Ricoeur following Heidegger’s notion of history tells us that history is not simply a natural movement that automatically moves from one moment to the next. But history progresses through the participation of people who open up space and possibilities for history to move onto.

Another idea here is that these doors that represent the possibilities of history do not open by themselves, but it is the task of Dasein to be the one to open the possibilities of history. It is here that the second expression, “Ang Hinaharap sa Panghinaharap” (The Facing of the Future) comes into play. What does it mean to face something? Here Heidegger answers that it is with anticipatory resoluteness before one’s possibilities that one can say that he is truly facing something. “... Angst, invoked here by virtue not of its emotional character but of its potentiality for openness with respect to the ownmost being of Da-sein confronting itself.”

But Ricoeur goes further than Heidegger in presenting that it is not just the future where we can find the possibilities of history. But even the past has unfulfilled possibilities that lie in wait for us to hear them. Between absolute presence and absolute absence, Ricoeur would state that human beings are always in a state of limbo between absence and presence. For human beings are always in the state of being; they are always an ongoing project, and this goes the same for what we refer to as history.

The debate between the philosopher and the historian has everything to gain from re-establishing the dialectic of presence and absence, inherent in every representation of the past, whether mnemonic or historical. The intention of the past as having been comes out of this reinforced, once having-been signifies having been present, living, alive.

Heidegger asserts, to conduct upon this basis “a genuine ontological analysis of the way Da-sein stretches along between birth and death.” Dasein is not exclusively promoting death even though he is a “being-towards-death.” Neither does he take fully the side of birth, for Dasein is always at the crossroads of time. It is by acknowledging this that he is able to witness the unfolding of things. And it is also by this quality of Dasein to be

---

24 Ricoeur, MHP, 354.
25 Ibid., 364.
26 Ibid., 374.
in between that he is able to create a dialectic of birth and death that creates the dynamic foundation for a history.

Da-sein can then be said to exist “as born” just as it is said to exist as “dying.” Now what is this interval, if not care? “As care, Da-sein is the ‘Between.’”

The significance of presenting the philosophy of Heidegger is not to oppose the philosophy of Dilthey but instead to present history as an interplay between life and death, and of presence and absence. Taking Dilthey’s philosophy of life without taking into consideration Heidegger would only come to emphasize history as capable of supporting human life but unable to look further than just living and acquiring lived experiences. On the other hand, solely promoting Heidegger’s Dasein and excluding Dilthey would make history an always-serious undertaking, failing to appreciate the simple fact of being.

Death in history, I would say, is inherent in what Ranciere calls “the founding narrative.” It is death on the scale of the past as it is completed, elapsed. It is “the inclusion of death in science, not as residue but as a condition of possibility.... There is history because there is a past and a specific passion for the past. And there is history because there is an absence of things in words, of the denominated in names.”

Ricoeur’s understanding of the aspect of death of history through Heidegger enables him to conceive death as a possibility. In contrast to the common understanding of death, death for Ricoeur is not the cessation of possibility. But it is this moment of absence of what we refer to as death that conditions the possibility for history. It is also this aspect of absence that allows for the possibility for freedom. Quoting from Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another: “But instead death enables me to see I am always moving toward my death, and this prevents me from ever grasping it as a narrative end.” Death does not denote the end of the narrative; instead, it denotes possibility, but this possibility is not made possible by the self but it is the other that opens up the possibility to hope for something beyond death.

---

27 Ibid., 375.
28 Ibid., 368.
Ricoeur’s Phenomenological Hermeneutics and the Open-endedness of History

One thing that Ricoeur was able to emphasize in his synthesis of the notion of history in Dilthey and Heidegger is the idea that historical interpretations are meant to be challenged and reevaluated. What we understand about history today is just one of the many possibilities. The idea is for us to remember that we must be responsible to challenge interpretations of history, even our own interpretations. This is in order that we may give other people hope that history is a constantly progressing narrative of freedom.

The object of interpretation, the text, furthermore, takes on an autonomous character once produced, so that it is no longer adequate to merely refer to its original meaning; instead of containing a fixed meaning, a text invites plural reading and interpretation.

One thing that is notable in the phenomenological hermeneutics of Ricoeur is his presentation of the notion of “an excess of meaning.” Meaning for Ricoeur is not something that is fixed; even events that happened in the past are still open for interpretation. There is no single kind of interpretation that is able to totally capture the event. This is one of the reasons that history for Ricoeur is something open-ended; it is home to a plurality of interpretations that enrich and inform one another.

Because here the semantic relation emerges from the excess of potential meaning over its use and function within a given synchronic system, the hidden time of symbols can convey the historicality of tradition, which passes on and sediments tradition, as well as the historicality of tradition which keeps tradition alive and renews it.

---

30 Ricoeur in his philosophy is referring to one of the lessons that we can learn from the masters of suspicion—that one must be able to adopt a critical attitude towards any kind of historical interpretation or historical narrative. The objective here is to avoid any kind of narrative that justifies any kind of domination.


The goal of historical hermeneutics is not just a reminiscence of the past, but it must also come to reinvigorate history. The job of the interpreter is to unravel the entire string of life and history latent in language. By doing hermeneutics, we are not just trying to romanticize and reminisce about the glory days of antiquity. But the goal of doing hermeneutics is always to open up a possible world that is able to testify that there is freedom in the world. History must not be fixated with the past, but it also must see ahead. In this regard, the retrospective character of history cannot by itself be equated with the imprisonment of determinism.

Hermeneutical encounter of historical narratives for Ricoeur is more than just a reliving of the past. For if this is so, then we can think that there is no use to read present romance literature since they can be treated as mere variations of Shakespeare’s highly acclaimed “Romeo and Juliet.” Or in the case of philosophy, for example, there is no need to read other western thinkers other than Plato since all other western thinkers are just a series of footnotes to Plato as Alfred North Whitehead would claim.

Infinitely more promising for us is the assertion that repeating is neither restoring after-the-fact nor reactualizing: it is “realizing anew.” It is a matter of recalling, replying to, retorting, even of revoking heritages. The creative power of repetition is contained entirely in this power of opening up the past again to the future.

What we must think about history is that just as hearing Johann Pachebel’s “Canon” is just a series of variations of a single piece, each variation opens up something new. Though history may be thought as repeating itself, it is by repeating itself that it renews itself and makes the earth fertile to support reconfigured life and lived experiences. The same goes also with the idea of phenomenological hermeneutics of Ricoeur. With every repetition of the hermeneutical encounter with the text we always learn something new. Even should a renowned scholar present his interpretation, the challenge according to Ricoeur is to maintain the constant attitude to challenge the interpretation of the other and even of the self. Our role in history is to keep it alive and one of the means that we keep it alive is through a constant struggle, not to find the perfect interpretation, but a struggle to always renew history through a presentation of new points of view.

33 Quito, Philosophers of Hermeneutics, 90.
34 Ricoeur, MHP, 380.
35 Ibid.
The idea in the phenomenological hermeneutics of Ricoeur is not to make oneself take primacy in the understanding of the text. On the contrary, the main idea is to make oneself become a witness to the process of unfolding (\textit{Alethia}), never at beginning or the end as Heidegger’s Dasein stands between life and death. One thing that we must remember in doing hermeneutics is that we must avoid imposing ourselves on the text. To interpret is to stand at a distance and to act as a witness to the unfolding of the text before one’s self.

To understand is not to project oneself into the text but to expose oneself to it. The interpreter is always in medias res, never at the beginning or end.\textsuperscript{36}

It is not when the historian writes the last page of his book that history is brought to a close. But the spirit of the narrative of history must be ever kept alive. For when we are capable to still open up history that we can know that there is still life to be lived and a freedom to be free. At the end of a reconstruction, which mobilizes the historical imagination, the thought of the historian can be considered a means of rethinking what was once thought.\textsuperscript{37} The project of interpretation is a continuous struggle to free the text from any interpretation that tries to monopolize it. Any attempt to monopolize it is a kind of violence that denies the realization of freedom in history.

Neither in literary criticism nor in the social sciences is there a last word. Or if there is, we call that violence.\textsuperscript{38}

There is no distinct or absolute end in history; what makes history end abruptly is when we fail to critically engage and dialogue with history. It is through phenomenological hermeneutics according to Ricoeur that death fails to become absolutely a cessation of life. It is by declaring the last word that history is brought to its end. The philosopher and the historian must maintain an attitude that avoids any declaration or possession of the truth. It is by a dispossession of the truth that we allow history to live on and see a horizon beyond what we envision.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} Quito, \textit{Philosophers of Hermeneutics}, 92.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 380.
\end{itemize}
Conclusion

To conclude this paper, there are three notable points that Ricoeur presents in his synthesis of the history of life in Wilhelm Dilthey and the history of death in Martin Heidegger.

First, through phenomenological hermeneutics we are able to affirm what Dilthey refers to as the “connectedness of life” by allowing for dialogue between people of different time periods. Life and the possibility to be does not end in death, but one is left to hope in his absence that the Other becomes responsible to make him capable again. Each one of us is an enabling presence to the other. We are able to hope because of the presence of the Other and we are able to be response-able because there is an Other that gives us hope. History thus becomes a narrative that describes how human beings try to bring into fruition the promise of an infinite responsibility.

Second, death turns to life and life turns to death, history for Ricoeur is an interplay between life and death, and of presence and absence. History is a living narrative because things that are absent are never truly absent, but it is our responsibility to allow for things that are absent to be present. On the other hand, there is the aspect of death in history because even things that are present are not fully present. There are things that are present before me that exhibit a level of transcendence that eludes my ability to grasp it. It is a form of a resistance that tells me that there are possibilities in history beyond what I deem is possible.

Lastly, history for Ricoeur can be thought as an ongoing narrative of the constant interplay between human capability and human fallibility. The past, the present, and the future all have possibilities beyond what we ordinarily see. Thus, history presents us with the collective task of interpreting it. For interpretation or hermeneutics is not a task given exclusively for a self to refigure itself. But it is at the same time a means to refigure the world of the social. To open up and to face these possibilities in our own selves, in the world of the social, and in history is a responsibility that I can only hope I can achieve in fear and trembling.

The Graduate School, University of Santo Tomas, Philippines

References


Huskey, Rebecca K., Paul Ricoeur on Hope: Expecting the Good (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2009).


The Cultured Man as the Noble Man: 

*Jun zi* 君子 as a Man of *Li* 禮

in *Lun yu* 論語

Christine Abigail L. Tan

**Abstract:** The aim of this article is to show the Confucian virtue of *li* as the highest embodiment of the *Jun zi* as found in the *Lun yu*. While *ren* remains the most primary and most important of the virtues, it is an inner goodness which can only find its expression or manifestation in the virtue of *li*, while such manifestation is made possible only through an external ontological ideal that is the virtue of *yi*. As such, the interplay of *ren* and *yi*, which finds its harmony in *li*, is made possible only through the embodiment of *li* as a dynamic moral principle given substance by *ren* and given form by *li*, and perfected by the *Jun zi*.

**Keywords:** *Jun zi*, *Li*, Confucius, ritual, propriety

Li, or rituals and propriety, when viewed by the modern mind, can have the tendency to be dismissed by modernity as nothing more than empty tradition which binds and limits one’s capabilities, especially in a generation which celebrates the creation of one’s self as an art form. From the Confucian perspective, however, it does just exactly the opposite, which is to widen one’s horizons, that is, consciousness, and thus capabilities as well.

Indeed, one cannot help but wonder just how following ancient, even outdated, traditions can possibly be a virtue. What does this matter of culture, commonly understood as something that’s amoral, have to do with becoming a good citizen of the state, or even becoming a good human being?

---

1 See Nietzsche’s body of works, among other counter-enlightenment thinkers, which dominate the intellectual trends of contemporary society.

2 That is to say, that high culture as an aesthetic virtue is, after modernity, commonly averse to morality. In a way, culture can even be said to be meta-ethical in that it is the context, which shapes ethics and is therefore not boxed within morality. Nietzsche, Freud, Marx, Foucault, among other thinkers of modernity argue to this effect.
Yet *li* is considered as one of the five primary Confucian virtues, and as I will try to argue, even the very virtue, which the Noble Man or *Jun zi* embodies most.

It is thus the aim of this study to show the relation between *ren* and *li*, being that *li* is the manifestation of *ren* in its concreteness, but which is made possible by the concept of *yi*. This interplay of *ren* and *yi*, which finds its harmony in *li* is, as I will try to prove, found in the *Lun yu* to be embodied in the *Jun Zi*.

In order to do this, I will first show the utmost importance of *ren*, its immediacy and immanence, as well as show the two aspects of *ren*, which are *zhong* and *shu*. Next, I will show the implication of *yi* in *zhong* and *shu*, coming to the conclusion that *yi* is an external moral ought while *ren* is an internal motivation for goodness. The third section will thus deal with the notion of *li* as the concrete manifestation of the previous two virtues, where the compassion of *ren* and the unflinching discipline of *yi* find their perfect harmony. Finally, thus, I will try to show the *Jun Zi* as a man of *li* who, in him, and in practicing *li* to its full effect, is also able to embody *ren* as well as *yi*.

### I. 仁 Ren

Perhaps there is no other virtue more important than *ren*. *Ren* is commonly translated as virtue,3 fundamental goodness,4 true goodness,5 benevolence,6 or idiosyncratically ‘authoritative conduct,’7 which connotes the firm and steadfast nature of how one’s character should be.8

Indeed, *ren* is regarded as even more important than life itself,9 and

---

3 James Legge and Arthur Waley translate 仁 *Ren* simply as ‘virtue’ and although this captures the encompassing nature of 仁 *Ren* (that is, that it necessarily precludes the other virtues, which shall later be discussed), it can be quite problematic in distinguishing it from 德 *de*, which also directly translates into the word ‘virtue,’ which has a different and less substantive meaning than the concept of 仁 *Ren* in the Analects. See Confucius, “The Analects,” trans. by James Legge, in *Chinese Text Project*, <http://ctext.org/analects>, 19 September 2014. See also Confucius, *The Analects of Confucius*, trans. by Arthur Waley (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).


6 D.C. Lau.


8 Ren is all these but also more, and as such, will be referred to simply as ren.

9 The Master said, “For Gentlemen of purpose and men of benevolence while it is inconceivable that they should seek to stay alive at the expense of benevolence, it may happen that they have to accept death in order to have benevolence accomplished.” See Confucius, *The
“The Master said, ‘If a man sets his heart on benevolence, he will be free from evil.’” In other words ren comes at the helm, serving as a shield from all malevolence that threatens to sully the character of he who possesses the virtue of ren. Furthermore, The Master says, “… The gentleman never deserts benevolence, not even for as long as it takes to eat a meal. If he hurries and stumbles, one may be sure that it is in benevolence that he does so.” In other words, when one has become aware of ren, it can no longer be undone nor erased from one’s character.

The essence of ren, however, is perhaps highlighted through the verse in the Lun yu which reads: “The Master said, ‘It is Man who is capable of broadening the Way.’ It is not the Way that is capable of broadening Man.” Such is the humanist foundations of his moral philosophy, which looks at man as the locus of the unity between heaven and earth. This saying of the Master is fleshed out in the rest of the Lun yu, and is mostly seen in the virtue of ren; it is derived from the root words 人 ren meaning person or human, and 二 er meaning two, which suggests that human beings are irreducibly social, and can only exist by co-existing.

a. The Anthropocentricity of ren

If ren has no fixed definition in the Lun yu, it is because ren, as Ames and Rosemont would note, is “a qualitative transformation of a particular

---


*10* 4:4, D.C. Lau.

*11* 4:5, D.C. Lau.

*12* Literally Dao, though it should be noted that the Confucian Dao is different from the Dao referred to in Laozi and Zhuangzi, as well as the rest of the Daoist school. The Confucian Dao is, unlike the metaphysical Dao of Daoism, anthropologically bent. It is simply an “ought” as opposed to metaphysical principle defining the nature of Being, much less a heavenly canopy which watches over the ten thousand things. In order to elucidate this further, this Dao is what Mencius refers to as Heaven when he describes Tian Ming: “Heaven sees according as my people see; Heaven hears according as my people hear.” See Mencius, *The Works of Mencius*, trans. by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 32; 88.

*13* 15:29, D.C. Lau.

*14* See Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, trans., *The Analects of Confucius*, 48-51, for a comprehensive discussion on the etymology of 仁 as well as its corresponding significance to the philosophical meaning of the concept, which suggests that we are inevitably social and that without another or other human beings, we cannot exist alone.

© 2015 Christine Abigail L. Tan
ISSN 1908-7330
person,”\textsuperscript{15} indeed more like a process of becoming rather than having a fixed formula. Further, in the \textit{Lun yu}, “The Master said, ‘Is benevolence really far away? No sooner do I desire it than it is here,’”\textsuperscript{16} because what is internal is that which is most accessible and, for Confucian philosophy in particular, must become evident in \textit{praxis} and as such, becomes the measurement through which one can know others. Another passage in the \textit{Lun yu} which goes likes this is, when: “Tzu-hsia said, ‘Learn widely and be steadfast in your purpose, inquire earnestly and reflect on what is at hand, and there is no need for you to look for benevolence elsewhere.’”\textsuperscript{17} 

Ren is thus humaneness that is not simply in theory, but concrete and immanent, even firm and unrelenting.

The anthropological bent can be further seen in more passages in the \textit{Lun yu}, when “The Master said, ‘It is enough that the language one uses gets the point across,’”\textsuperscript{18} as the Master did not want to deal with unnecessary hair-splitting, and believed that the only wisdom which mattered was that which is communicable, so it is with ren, in that if one is good inside, then it must show one’s deeds; it must be concrete. Moreover, it is said that “the topics the Master did not speak of were prodigies, force, disorder and gods,”\textsuperscript{19} for the Master believed that whatever is out there cannot be known by man, for even that which is here, is not yet understood by man, and so deserves more focus.

This said, we see that ren, in order to be fully manifest, or to be actualized, must be seen or communicated, and this is done only (as I will later argue how) through the practice of \textit{li}, the importance of which is seen particularly when “The Master said, ‘Guide them by edicts, keep them in line with punishments, and the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. Guide them by virtue, keep them in line with the rites, and they will, besides having a sense of shame, reform themselves.’”\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{b. Zhong (忠) and Shu (恕)\textsuperscript{21}}

According to Fung Yu-lan, there are two aspects of ren. He notes:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{16} 7:30, D.C. Lau.
\item \textsuperscript{17} 19:6, D.C. Lau.
\item \textsuperscript{18} 15:40 D.C. Lau.
\item \textsuperscript{19} 7:20 D.C. Lau.
\item \textsuperscript{20} 2:3 D.C. Lau.
\item \textsuperscript{21} It is interesting to note, that both ideograms contain the character \textit{xin} 心 literally translated as heart, but also associated with the mind, and hence more commonly referred to as the mind/heart. As such, it is also interesting to note the relation of ren both to human emotion and reason. See Alfredo P. Co, The Blooming of a Hundred Flowers: Philosophy of Ancient China (Manila: UST Publishing House, 1992), 107-108 for a comprehensive discussion of the etymological significance of the ideograms in relation to ren.
\end{itemize}
Thus the practice of jen consists in consideration for others. “Desiring to sustain oneself, one sustains others; desiring to develop oneself, one develops others.” In other words: “Do to others what you wish yourself.” This is the positive aspect of the practice, which was called by Confucius chung or “conscientiousness to others.” And the negative aspect, which was called by Confucius shu or “altruism,” is: “Do not do to others what you do not wish yourself.” The practice as a whole is called the principle of chung and shu, which is “the way to practice jen.”

Moreover, Yu-lan maintains that this “principle of applying a measuring square” is a principle wherein one uses himself in order to be able to gauge his own conduct. Zhong is often translated simply as loyalty and faithfulness. James Legge in particular translates it as faithfulness or devotion of soul, but a more apt illustration of zhong is found in D.C. Lau’s translation of a verse in the Lun yu where the Master says: “Make it your guiding principle to do your best for others …” This directly supports Yu-lan’s claim that zhong is indeed the positive aspect of ren.

The negative aspect of ren that is shu, on the other hand, is also reflected in the Lun yu when: “Tzu-kung asked, ‘Is there a single word which can be a guide to conduct throughout one’s life?’ The Master said, ‘It is perhaps the word shu. Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire.’”

One notices here, that whether it be 忠 zhong or 慎 shu, positive or negative, both are treated as the supreme virtue, because both aspects of 仁 ren, which as we have previously mentioned, consist the most important Confucian virtue. This claim is cemented by one of the oft-cited verses in the Lun yu, that is:

The Master said, ‘Ts’an! There is one single thread binding my way together.’
Tseng Tzu assented.

After the Master had gone out, the disciples asked,

23 Ibid.
24 See 1:8, 3:19, 9:25, 12:10, James Legge.
25 See 7:25, James Legge.
26 9:25, D.C. Lau.
27 James Legge translates this as reciprocity.
28 15:24, D.C. Lau.
'What did he mean?'
Tseng Tzu said, 'The way of the Master consists in doing one's best and in using oneself as a measure to gauge others. That is all.' 「夫子之道，忠恕而已矣。」

That is indeed all, but the phrase “one single thread binding my way together” presupposes a system wherein the philosophy of the Master is built upon, and at its core, according to the verse, is zhong and shu—ren. One should be careful, however, not to interpret this in a literal sense. Rather, 忠 zhong and 恕 shu should be guided by yi.

The sinologist, Alfredo Co, in his book “Philosophy of Ancient China: the Blooming of a Hundred Flowers,” says that yi is implied in zhong through zheng ming or the Rectification of Names.30

The Master said, ‘If something has to be put first, it is, perhaps, the rectification (cheng) of names.’
Tzu-lu said, ‘Is that so? What a roundabout way you take! Why bring rectification in at all?’
The Master said, ‘Yu, how boorish you are. Where a gentleman is ignorant, one would expect him not to offer any opinion. When names are not correct, what is said will not sound reasonable; when what is said does not sound reasonable, affairs will not culminate in success; when affairs do not culminate in success, rites and music will not flourish; when rites and music do not flourish, punishments will not fit the crimes; when punishments do not fit the crimes, the common people will not know where to put hand and foot. Thus when the gentleman names something, the name is sure to be usable in speech, and when he says something, this is sure to be practicable. The thing about the gentleman is that he is anything but casual where speech is concerned.’31

This again, further supports ren as the very foundation of the Confucian moral system, where zhong that is being true to one’s principle and truth is manifested, and where the firmness of yi is indeed implied.

It is, however, my contention that yi is also implied in shu even if simply on account of shu being a guiding principle towards which we must strive, albeit through restraint—still, moral restraint. What I am trying to

30 Co, Philosophy of Ancient China, 109.
arrive at is that yi, righteousness or moral rightness, is an external ideal, which guides our moral actions, made possible by such two aspects of ren.

II. 义 Yi

If ren therefore is self-reformation, it takes its form from the moral ought, yi. In the Lun yu, “The Master said, ‘For the gentleman it is morality that is supreme. Possessed of courage but devoid of morality, a gentleman will make trouble while a small man will be a brigand.’” Indeed, if ren is the internal motivation for the goodness, yi is the ontological yet external ideal—the universal moral of ren towards which li, as we will later discuss, directs its particular acts. Of the Jun Zì, “The Master said, ‘In his dealings with the world the gentleman is not invariably for or against anything. He is on the side of what is moral.’” This, again, affirms the thesis that ren has no fixed definition nor function, but is rather, a process which allows for the practice of li, according to what is yi, in the context of the uniqueness and singularity of each situation and particular circumstance. Moreover, it asserts yi as a constant and universal ideal or righteousness (or more aptly, rightness) upon which li is modeled upon.

In his article “On Yi as a Universal Principle of Specific Application in Confucian Morality,” Chung-ying Cheng claims that yi gives unity to all virtues, and creates more when needed, thus directing what is appropriate for specific situations as an ordering principle which generates specific actions. Like ren, Cheng argues that it is a common sentiment to all men rooted from ren, and so whereas ren is internal, yi is external. Yi “transforms the world into a world of self,” because it is when the subjective act assumes objective validity. A passage in the Lun yu which affirms this is when “The Master said, ‘It is these things that cause me concern: failure to cultivate virtue, failure to go more deeply into what I have learned, inability, when I am told what is right, to move to where it is, and inability to reform myself when I have defects.’” Here, we notice that The Master talks about cultivating ren, which is “deeply” within, while yi or that which is right is mentioned as something “to move to” in order to reform oneself; that is, yi is depicted as something outside of man but towards which he must strive as an ideal of moral perfection, an imperative for moral action, that is (if paired with ren and refined by li) required for a community to prosper, have peace

33 4:10, D.C. Lau.
35 Ibid.
36 7:3, D.C. Lau.
and order, as is thus noted in the *Lun yu*:

> When Fan Ch’ih left, the Master said, ‘How petty Fan Hsu is! When those above love the rites, none of the common people will dare be irreverent; when they love what is right, none of the common people will dare be insubordinate; when they love trust-worthiness, none of the common people will dare be insincere. In this way, the common people from the four quarters will come with their children strapped on their backs. What need is there to talk about growing crops?’

37

We go back, therefore, to when “The Master said, ‘It is Man who is capable of broadening the Way. It is not the Way that is capable of broadening Man.’” 38 Moreover, “The Master said, ‘The gentleman understands what is moral. The small man understands what is profitable.’” 39 This is because as we have previously mentioned, *yi* is the capability to connect subjective actions, unique and situational as well as circumstantial deeds into a universal ought which changes flexibly from situation to situation, in the same way that *li* changes according to the situation. The small man, unable to rise to the universal level of *yi*, only thinks of himself and, therefore, of personal profit.

This is also why, “the Master said, ‘It is quite a remarkable feat for a group of men who are together all day long merely to indulge themselves in acts of petty cleverness without ever touching on the subject of morality in their conversation!’” 40 *Yi* elevates the subjective, the particular into the communal, and to be exposed to the community and the normative expectations of society, without ever taking *yi* into consideration, would indeed be a shame as it would lead to insubordination and chaos.

This elevation from personal to community, or transformation of the world into a “world of self” as previously mentioned, is again found in a passage from the *Lun yu*, which says:

> Tzu-lu commented, ‘Not to enter public life is to ignore one’s duty. Even the proper regulation of old and young cannot be set aside. How, then, can the duty between

38 15:29, D.C. Lau.
39 4:16, D.C. Lau; James Legge ‘The Master said, “The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the mean man is conversant with gain.”’ (君子喻於義.)
ruler and subject be set aside? This is to cause confusion in the most important of human relationships simply because one desires to keep unsullied one’s character. The gentleman takes office in order to do his duty. As for putting the Way into practice, he knows all along that it is hopeless.41

We can thus conclude that for the Master, ren finds no expression without yi, for it is only through yi where man is brought into a world where others truly exist, and where there can be found an ontological moral given, upon which ren directs itself towards. Indeed, “The Master said, ‘Make it your guiding principle to do your best for others and to be trustworthy in what you say, and move yourself to where rightness is, then you will be exalting virtue.’”42

In other words, to move towards yi is to exalt virtue (now in a more general/wider sense): de. Here, moreover, the word used in the Chinese for “exalt” is 崇 chong, which can also mean to worship, to hold high, or to honor—all of which imply a movement of feeling towards a more superior realm. This is because when yi, as was claimed by Chung-ying Cheng, pulls all other virtues into the objective realm.

Yi thus ensures that the moral deed is done, while ren ensures that the motive is aligned. These two make two sides of the same coin. Therefore just as ren manifests itself in li, yi is the form upon which li is expressed. Of the Jun Zi, “The Master said, ‘The gentleman has morality as his basic stuff and by observing the rites puts it into practice, by being modest gives it expression, and by being trustworthy in word brings it to completion. Such is a gentleman indeed!’”43 In other words, the Master Kong says that, the gentleman has yi as his basic stuff, and by observing li, puts it into practice.

This very position of li, where it is the concrete manifestation of the harmony between ren and yi, as well as the Confucian anthropological and practical bent, is precisely what makes li very important despite common misconceptions that li is impractical—abstract rituals that are “out there” and without rational explanations.

III. 禮 Li

In Lin Yutang’s work, “The Wisdom of Confucius,” the following passage on li goes, as follows:

42 12:10, D.C. Lau, Emphasis/Italics mine. (Virtue here is 德 de, not 仁 ren)
43 15:18, D.C. Lau.
“Is li so very important as all that?” asked Tseyu again. “This li,” replied Confucius, “is the principle by which the ancient kings embodied the laws of heaven and regulated the expressions of human nature. Therefore he who has attained li lives, and he who has lost it dies.”

I would like to emphasize here how li is the harmony of the embodiment of heavenly laws, as well the regulation, the medium, for expression of human nature. This passage from the Book of Rites suggests that the authenticity of a man consists of him in being a man of li which comes with it, both ren and yi.

Li, however, despite referring to sacrificial rites is, in the Confucian sense, largely humanistic and anthropological in nature. If it talks of any such higher order, or heavenly canopy at most, it is only inasmuch as li, although manifested by ren, takes its shape through the ontological moral given, thus universal principle that is yi. To repeat a previously quoted passage for emphasis:

The Master said, ‘The gentleman has morality as his basic stuff and by observing the rites puts it into practice, by being modest gives it expression, and by being trustworthy in word brings it to completion. Such is a gentleman indeed!’

Here, we see the interconnection of ren and yi, practiced into li. More importantly, however, is to establish the connection of ren and li, as we have already established the implied yi in the two aspects of ren.

---

45 Heavenly laws here in no way refer to fa. In fact, it is important to stress the difference between fa or law and li in the Lun Yu. While fa is only mentioned twice, it plays an important role in shaping the multitude. One passage which describes its role is: 「法語之言，能無從乎？改之為貴。…」 The only way to preserve the meaning of which is to provide a rather awkward but very literal translation that goes: “When lawful words are spoken, can one refuse to follow? But to change is most valuable.” See Lun Yu 9.24, translation mine. In other words, it is emphasized here how obeying laws or words spoken in a strict and authoritative manner is easy, but true virtue lies within the inner character. This sentiment also mirrors a passage that can be found in the Li ji, which reinforces the idea that fa is for the xiao ren while it is li that is for the superior man or da ren: “The rules of ceremony do not go down to the common people. The penal statutes do not go up to great officers.” See “Qu Li I,” in The Book of Rites (Li Ji): English-Chinese Version, trans. by James Legge (Washington: Intercultural Press, 2013), par. 68.
46 15:18, D.C. Lau.
In his article “Li as Cultural Grammar: On the Relation between Li and Ren in Confucius’ Lun yu,” Chenyang Li uses the analogy of grammar and language in such a way that li becomes cultural grammar, while ren is the mastery of a culture.47 This claim is sketched against a much controversial debate with regard to the relation between li and ren, as well as several claims on the interpretations of li and ren. My argument, however, follows along the same path as Chenyang Li’s interpretation, where he claims that ren is flexible because ren as mastery is more like an art, whereas li as grammar becomes proper expression, but uses a different analogy. In other words, it’s an instrumentalist claim broadly construed, wherein li and ren complement and need each other in order to function. Moreover, we see in the Lun yu, and even in the Da Xue,48 several analogies of the virtues to a tree. Indeed, ren is the root, but the concrete practice of ren is li. It is said in the Lun yu, that: “The gentleman devotes his efforts to the roots, for once the roots are established, the Way will grow therefrom. Being good as a son and obedient as a young man is, perhaps, the root of a man’s character.”49 Here, we see that ren as practiced becomes li, and through yi, in a web of interconnection and in this particular case, takes on the concrete form of filial piety. This analogy, as well as Chenyang Li’s, is mostly supported by the following passages in the Lun yu:

The Master said, ‘Why is it none of you, my young friends, study the Odes? An apt quotation from the Odes may serve to stimulate the imagination, to show one’s breeding, to smooth over difficulties in a group and to give expression to complaints.50 The Master said, ‘Surely when one says “The rites, the rites,” it is not enough merely to mean presents of jade and silk. Surely when one says “Music, music,” it is not enough merely to mean bells and drums.’51

---

48 In the following verses, it would seem that ren was precluded. “From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides.”
  “It cannot be, when the root is neglected, that what should spring from it will be well ordered.”
  See The Great Learning, trans. by James Legge, 13-14. This is not improbable, as The Master himself would say that he is merely a transmitter of ancient wisdom: “The Master said, ’I transmit but do not innovate; I am truthful in what I say and devoted to antiquity.’” See The Analects, trans. by D.C. Lau, 7:1.
49 1:2 D.C. Lau.
50 17:9 D.C. Lau.
51 17:11 D.C. Lau.
The Master said, ‘A cowardly man who puts on a brave front is, when compared to small men, like the burglar who breaks in or climbs over walls.’

*Li* cannot exist in of itself, but as it is not simply *li*, which becomes empty without *ren*, *ren* also becomes impossible without *li*, for even with *li*, it is difficult. “The Master said, ‘Even with a true king it is bound to take a generation for benevolence to become a reality.’

As Chenyang Li notes: “*Ren* cannot exist independently of *li*, nor can one obtain *ren* without *li*, because *li* is embedded in the culture of which the person of *ren* acquires mastery. In other words, without *li* there can be no culture for the person of *ren* to master.”

This can again be traced back to the *Lun yu*, when “The Master said, ‘If a man be without the virtues proper to humanity, what has he to do with the rites of propriety? If a man be without the virtues proper to humanity, what has he to do with music?’”

*Ren* and *li*, therefore, are to be understood as interconnected where *li* is instrumental to the practice of *ren*, and where *ren* simply cannot function without *li* as its guiding principle.

The Master said, ‘To return to the observance of the rites through overcoming the self constitutes benevolence. If for a single day a man could return to the observance of the rites through overcoming himself, then the whole Empire would consider benevolence to be his. However, the practice of benevolence depends on oneself alone, and not on others.’

The Master said, ‘Do not look unless it is in accordance with the rites; do not listen unless it is in accordance with the rites; do not speak unless it is in accordance with the rites; do not move unless it is in accordance with the rites.’

Confucius himself was an example of this, “The Master said, ‘I set my heart on the Way, base myself on virtue, lean upon benevolence for support...’”

---

52 17:12 D.C. Lau.
54 Chenyang Li, “Li as Cultural Grammar,” 323-324.
55 3:3, James Legge. “If a man be without *ren*, what has he to do with *li*; if a man be without *ren*, what has he to do with music?”
56 12:1, D.C. Lau.
and take my recreation in the arts.’”57 Moreover, the permanence of ren within a person is manifested in different ways among different situations, just as a tree’s roots may grow in different unique paths, and a sentence may be differently phrased or structured in grammar for each situation, so is li also relative, but ren unfettered, firm, and resolute.

Fan Ch’ih asked about benevolence. The Master said, ‘While at home hold yourself in a respectful attitude; when serving in an official capacity be reverent; when dealing with others do your best. These are qualities that cannot be put aside, even if you go and live among the barbarians.’58

It is in and through li, that we find the concreteness and reality of ren, of which, “The Master said, ‘Love your fellow men.’”59 This love, however, as we have previously discussed, finds its moral balance with the virtue of yi, which gives li its form.

IV. 君子 Jun Zi

The sage is never sullied. That is why the call of the Master Kong is for the Man of ren to enter public office,60 and to ignore this call is to ignore one’s duty. So long as he has ren, even if he serves, in virtue of yi, he is not sullied. As “The Master said, ‘What the gentleman seeks, he seeks within himself; what the small man seeks, he seeks in others.’”61 Regardless thus of the external disorder present in society, the Jun Zi finds calmness and serenity within himself. Another passage, which supports this, is when: “The Master said, ‘The gentleman is at ease without being arrogant; the small man is arrogant without being at ease.’”62

Indeed for Confucius, the solution to chaos and disorder is not outright refusal that is marked by the hermit’s or mystic’s withdrawal from society, but neither is it to succumb to it, but the courage to fight the system in spite of the system. Because “as for putting the Way into practice, he [Jun Zi] knows all along that it is hopeless,”63 yet even then, the Jun Zi stands above this impossibility, because no matter what circumstance, the purity of his

57 7:6, D.C. Lau.
60 18:7, D.C. Lau.
61 15:21, D.C. Lau.
character would remain untarnished. In fact, the following passage suggests that it is not Jun Zi who is influenced; rather, it is he who influences with his strength of will: “The Master wanted to settle amongst the Nine Barbarian Tribes of the east. Someone said, ‘But could you put up with their uncouth ways?’ The Master said, ‘Once a gentleman settles amongst them, what uncouthness will there be?’”

But if the 君子 Jun Zi is a man of internal calmness and strength, unsullied and unfettered, why the need for refinement, why the need to show others if he is, in himself, secure of his internal character? A disciple of the Master asked this as well:

Chi Tzu-ch’eng said, ‘The important thing about the gentleman is the stuff he is made of. What does he need refinement for?’ Tzu-kung commented, ‘It is a pity that the gentleman should have spoken so about the gentleman. “A team of horses cannot catch up with one’s tongue.” The stuff is no different from refinement; refinement is no different from the stuff. The pelt of a tiger or a leopard, shorn of hair, is no different from that of a dog or a sheep.’

Indeed, because whatever is inside, must necessarily show outside. The awareness of ren, must necessarily be followed by its expression in li, with yi as its form.

Jun Zi thus is a man of ren,66 of yi,67 perfected and refined, that is, precisely made a Jun Zi through the practice of li. All this is in him when he practices li to perfection because: “The Master said, ‘Virtue never stands alone. It is bound to have neighbours.’”68 Indeed, the primary Confucian virtues cannot each stand alone; all of them are connected and interdependent upon each other. Moreover, ‘The Master said, ‘The gentleman is no vessel.’”69 This is to say that the Jun Zi is no specialist, designed for a specific purpose. He is the embodiment of all virtues, and because all virtues come from Tian, therefore, it necessarily follows that Jun Zi is the embodiment of Tian. As Wing-tsit Chan notes: “The sage aspires to become Heaven, the worthy aspires to become a sage, and the gentleman aspires to become a worthy.”70

---

64 9:15, D.C. Lau.
65 12:8, D.C. Lau.
66 4:5, D.C. Lau.
68 4:25, D.C. Lau.
69 2:12, D.C. Lau.
This is also why in the last passage of the Lun yu: “Confucius said, ‘A man has no way of becoming a gentleman unless he understands Destiny; he has no way of taking his stand unless he understands the rites; he has no way of judging men unless he understands words.’” Man is, again, therefore, cultivated in li and by understanding li, gains the ability for the expression of ren and his firmness of character, towards the direction of yi, the ideal of objective morality cemented by the existence of community.

It is, however, in the following verse in the Lun yu where li would stand as a very place where Jun Zi is cultivated despite li being a supplementary instrument to both ren and yi: “Tzu-chang said, ‘One can, perhaps, be satisfied with a Gentleman who is ready to lay down his life in the face of danger, who does not forget what is right at the sight of gain, and who does not forget reverence during a sacrifice nor sorrow while in mourning.’”

If one is able to follow yi through li, one is also able to uphold ren, because he is also aware of his yi. This is most concretely mentioned in the Lun yu, where: “The Master said, ‘The gentleman widely versed in culture but brought back to essentials by the rites can, I suppose, be relied upon not to turn against what he stood for.’”

Epilogue

Ren is the root and most important virtue of Confucian philosophy, which precludes the moral system of the Master, but it is counterbalanced as well as complemented by yi. The interplay, however, of Love and Discipline, is perfected by the Jun Zi, a man of li, who in doing the proper rituals and social conduct, also shows his ability to empathize with and respect others, as well as his ability to fulfill his moral duty to society as a good citizen and member of the community. By carrying with it, necessarily all the other virtues, li becomes a locus for the cultivation of Jun Zi, the perfection of man as a moral project, able to express ren, able to understand and work towards yi.

The Graduate School, University of Santo Tomas, Philippines
References


Not Even to Know That You Do Not Know: Cicero and the “Theatricality” of the New Academy

Soumick De

Abstract: The relation between philosophy and theatre has mostly been an ambiguous one, frequently informed with a certain playful irony. Plato’s aversion to include the tragic poets in his Republic, which itself remains a philosophical work written in the dramatic form of dialogues, testifies to this traditional ambiguity. It is well known that in this tradition of philosophic dialogues, the name which perhaps immediately follows Plato is that of Marcus Tullius Cicero. This paper would examine certain Ciceronian dialogues in order to argue that a certain theatricality was also prominent in Cicero’s thinking, which makes it distinct not only from other philosophical schools of his time but also from Socratic dialogues. The paper would try to argue that this theatricality was expressed not through irony but a process of masking philosophical presentations. At the same time, to such a theatrical gesture par excellence as that of masking was added the art of rhetoric to present such philosophical enunciations to an ‘audience’ in order to persuade them of the practical functions of philosophy. It is this public application of a private and leisurely practice of philosophy, which this paper would discuss through an examination of the style of Ciceronian dialogues and the nature of skeptic philosophy that Cicero’s New Academy championed.

Keywords: Cicero, Socrates, irony, skepticism

The tradition of philosophical dialogues is not new to us. In its unique way of expressing concerns about meanings of life and death, about the order of things and the nature of beauty, about what constitutes truth, and about what is ethical and what is political, the technique of employing dialogues goes as far back as Socrates. In fact, to engage in dialogues was the Socratic method par excellence. In Socrates we have the apparent duality of silence and dialogue always at work. The anonymous
figure of the philosopher would on one hand stand in silence, alone in the midst of the worldly cacophony, separated from it as an absolute and independent personality in his contemplative repose. At the same time we have the “essential impact of such an original personality upon the race and its relation to the race (which) fulfil themselves partly in a communication of life and spirit, partly in a release of the individual’s locked-up powers.”¹ It is the dialogues, which carry the secret force of this impact as it melts the finite boundaries of existence and allows us to stare into the nothingness of the abyss beyond. Thus, at least this much can be said, that the art of engaging in dialogues has a profound relation to Philosophy since around its inception. As a matter of fact, the Greek word dia-legein from which the idea of dialogue is conceived belongs to a family of other Greek words like dialegesthai and dialectike, the latter being the source for the concept of dialects or the art (techne) of discourse.

What this relation perhaps also indicates, but is quite infrequently dealt with within philosophical discourses, is the constant but difficult association of philosophy with theatre. If the discursive practice of dialogues in philosophy opens up the method of dialectics, then it also provides us with a way of understanding and critiquing the nature of this philosophical theatre. Conversely, theatre in this philosophic sense or more precisely the idea of theatre will always be then subjected to this ‘movement’ within philosophy, which is identical with the dialectical movement. Thus, like dialectic which cannot function without certain fundamental but contrary propositions, which the ancients called axioma, the movement inherent to a notion of theatre cannot operate without the fundamental but oppositional proposition of an ‘actor’ and a ‘spectator.’ When Peter Brook famously quoted “I can take any empty space and call it a bare stage … A man walks across this empty space while someone else is watching him, and this is all that is needed for an act of theatre to be engaged,”² it is already a resonance of the philosophical concept of ‘movement’ which is at issue. To formally map out the relationship between philosophy and theatre through an analysis of the concept of ‘movement’ is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless we would treat this relationship as the presupposed basis of this paper which would try to show how, not the Socratic, but another type of philosophical dialogues from antiquity—the Ciceronian dialogues—sets up this philosophical theatre through a particular way of externalizing the infinite internal dialectical movement of Socrates. Again, it is beyond the scope of this paper to follow an appropriate comparative analysis between the Socratic dialogues and the Ciceronian mimicking of them. Yet the paper would try to

present its argument with constant reference to Socrates, though in a much truncated and schematic fashion.

Thus, methodologically, the paper would be divided into three sections including certain concluding remarks. The first section would deal with the style and function of the Ciceronian dialogues (in reference to Socratic dialogues). The second section would present the nature of skeptic philosophy and the problem of externalization or mimicking within skeptic philosophy through an examination of the arguments in defence of this tradition, while the third and concluding section would try to very briefly counterpose the concept of Socratic daimon with that of Ciceronian persona.

The Function and Style of Ciceronian Dialogues with Constant Reference to Socrates

When Cicero retired from public life and decided to engage more openly with philosophy, in the latter part of his life, it is the dialogic method that he chose in order to express his philosophical concerns. The reason he gives for this choice has implications, which extend to the matters of the polis. The dialogic form was re-employed by Cicero as a response against what he thought was a growing dogmatism of the dominant schools of philosophy in his time, namely, the stoics and the epicureans. We find numerous references of this move against dogmatism in Cicero, a move which was not only embodied in the skeptic philosophy of the new academy and its dependence on a concept of probability (we shall return to this point) but also expressed through a form which would not harm those who hear it by making them obstinate followers of these camps or schools. The challenge was to find a method of pursuing philosophy, which would lead one to a state where he can be guided by his own reason in forming his own judgments. The exercise of philosophy as a matter of personal freedom of judgment was a fundamental principle of Ciceronian philosophy. And what better way to counter dogmatism that flourished on a stylistic use of positive statements (which in its turn produced a definite science of philosophy), than to revive the Socratic spirit of doubt. But now, the spirit of disputation would be brought back not only to counter dogmatism within philosophy but also to make philosophy accessible to the citizen subject. To make philosophy “the most useful means of educating (our) fellow-citizens.”\(^3\) This pedagogic function of philosophy allied to the state was perhaps first fully expressed in Cicero because in Socrates, though there was certainly a pedagogic function to his philosophy, the tendency to ally it with the state was perhaps missing.

Philosophy employed through the dialogic method could now be the perfect discursive technique, which could be concretely practiced by the citizen subject, thus making philosophy a useful tool for the republic. In the Nature of Gods, Cicero quite explicitly expresses his desire to philosophize as not only guided by the existential imperative of leading a truthful and virtuous life but also as a public service. He writes, “So my first thought was that I should explain philosophy to my fellow-citizens as a public duty, for I believed that the glory and reputation of the state would be greatly enhanced if such weighty and celebrated issues were discussed in Latin works as well as Greek.”

But what happens to the Socratic method of doubting everything when applied to produce citizen-subjects, who can be made capable of exercising their freedom of judgment in order to appear in public? More specifically, how does the Socratic dialogue transform itself stylistically in the hands of Cicero to become a useful tool not only to educate but also to persuade individuals to follow certain principles, which would effectively provide them with the persona of the citizen?

Stylistically speaking, we observe in Cicero a complete change of situation for the dialogues as compared to Plato. While Plato gives the greatest importance to the date and place which establish a context in which the ensuing conversation is to be understood, in Cicero we have the leisurely retreat of the erstwhile statesman himself in either of his two gymnasia (one named the Academica, in honor of Plato and the other, Lyceum, in honor of Aristotle) or the home of a friend (like the home of Gaius Cotta, which serves as the backdrop for the dialogues in The Nature of the Gods), which keeps coming back as the location for these dialogues, while the time is mostly not specified or when it is—as in case of the First book of Academica—it is fictional. There is hardly any variation to the time and place of the dialogues in Cicero, which makes the situation effectively quite boring and repetitive. As Michael Foley correctly observes, “What is remarkable about the Platonic dialogues is the variety of their settings and situations: on a lonely road, at a drinking party, before a grand jury, etc. while Cicero also uses this technique his dialogues more often than not takes place at his Tusculan Villa in either of his two gymnasia.”

If there were variations in the settings of Socratic dialogues, it was perhaps because—as Kierkegaard so brilliantly argues—for Socrates, the true centre was never fixed. The Socratic stage was always everywhere and nowhere. Socrates took any place and situation and made it into any other

---


place and any other situation through a process of conversation, which essentially operated though a concept of irony. The Socratic art of asking questions was not to gain any profound answer which would give meaning and substance to a situation and thus speculatively move ahead to a resolution but to make all and every answer empty of its substance and every situation devoid of its meaning. As Kierkegaard writes, “This emphasis on situation was especially significant in order to indicate that the true centre for Socrates was not a fixed point but an ubique et nusquam (everywhere and nowhere) ... in order to make graphic the Socratic method, which found no phenomenon too humble a point of departure from which to work oneself up into the sphere of thought.”

This hollowing out of the world stage made possible a veritable theatre of philosophy to take place through a movement which was infinitely carried out in its multiple and contingent forms but which always leads to the inevitable necessity of the negative. It is about this concept of negation epitomized by the Socratic slogan of knowing only and inevitably that one does not know that Kierkegaard informs us in his book The Concept of Irony with continual reference to Socrates. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in detail with the various movements of this irony, but suffice it to say here that the effect of such irony is to produce dialogue not in the form of merely contradictory speech, dialectically opposed to each other. In fact, as Kierkegaard goes on to show, the effect of irony through conversation—that is the technique of asking questions par excellence—was not speech at all. What such conversation necessarily leads to is silence. The interlocutor in participating in the conversation is slowly but inevitably caught in the trap, which Socrates lays out for him such that in the end he must become like Socrates—an ignorant and anonymous figure. The philosopher never achieves any superior position but conversely and ironically brings every superior position to his own level, which is that of ignorance and, hence, silence. This is the unexpected virtue of ignorance that every participant either realizes in order to become wise minimally or resents in prejudice. The Socratic movement thus begins from a “modest frugality” of speech to the absence of speech altogether, achieved through conversation by the anonymous figure of the philosopher. This movement is completely and, if one might add, ironically absent in Cicero.

---

6 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 16-17
7 Here the idea of minimalism is not to be taken merely quantitatively as the measure of knowledge. The idea of frugality or minimalism that Kierkegaard informs us of in the philosophy of Socrates is rather a qualitative moment where although you have the least of knowledge which is your simple ability of not knowing, it paradoxically becomes the condition of possibility of maximum impact because it is on the basis of this minimum affirmation that the entire world of phenomenal knowledge is to be negated.
8 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 18.
What Cicero seeks through his dialogues is the abundance of speech as a private activity of the philosopher who in the leisure and comfort of his retreat wants not only to contemplate but also to educate and persuade the public to lead a life of virtue in conformity with the state. What we find in Ciceronian dialogues is, thus, the art of rhetoric substituting the art of questioning, while conversation is replaced by conference. The Tusculan Disputation is perhaps the best example of this philosophical conference where Cicero writes, “So it is my design not to lay aside my former study of oratory, and yet to employ myself at the same time in this greater and more fruitful art; for I have always thought that to be able to speak copiously and elegantly on the most important questions was the most perfect Philosophy.”

Nothing could be farther from the Socratic sensibility of wisdom based upon ignorance and frugality, which resists the plenitude of oratory at every step. It is not possible here to show the various other stylistic distinctions, which separate Cicero from Socrates. But one can already sense that there is a certain “pedestrianism,” a certain utilitarian logic to Cicero which is missing in Socrates. The infinite and interior art of questioning in order to empty out existence, where the interlocutor not only participates externally in the act but also internalizes it in order to question his own self, is displaced or rather externalized into the art of question and answer which leads to speech and rhetoric in order to standardize a class of subjects who would now be prepared to participate in the affairs of the state wearing the mask of reason and virtue. The dialogue thus becomes a tool, the most useful and rational as far as philosophic methods are concerned, in order to paint the glorifying image of philosophy itself as the noblest and highest of all activities, the “most honorable delight of leisure.”

It is this persona of the philosopher as the figure of wisdom and, hence, superior to all that becomes the heart of the problem in Cicero, even if the wisdom is the suspension of all wisdom. Cicero remarks in Book I of Academica:

The method of discussion pursued by Socrates in almost all the dialogues so diversely and so fully recorded by his hearers is to affirm nothing himself but to refute others, to assert that he knows nothing except the fact of his own ignorance, and that he surpassed all other people in that they think they know things that they do not know but he himself thinks he knows nothing, and that he believed this to have been the reason why Apollo declared him to be the wisest of all men, because all

---

10 Cicero, Academica, 413.
wisdom consists solely in not thinking that you know what you do not know.\textsuperscript{11}

Whereas in Socrates, the absence of wisdom makes one wise \textit{minimally}, which is what human wisdom amounts to\textsuperscript{12} in Cicero this fragile interiority of a realization which makes one wise has to be given a face, a personality quite distinct from others in its glory and superiority. In Socrates we have the expression of a personality, which in being the location of truth, is also and immediately the location of simulation because it exposes the emptiness of all faces, of all personalities—be it the orator, or the poet, or the craftsman. What Socrates shows, in hollowing out all faces, all personalities, is the human and finite predicament of having no knowledge, possessing no truth except the minimal knowledge of this negation. If we follow Kierkegaard’s concept of irony as negation of the phenomenal world in Socrates, then what Socrates shows through such negation is perhaps this: that behind all appearance (be that of the orator or the poet, of \textit{Lycon} or \textit{Meletus}) is hidden nothing but the emptiness of all such appearance.\textsuperscript{13} It is not simply that the face of the poet or the craftsman hides some other truth about their existence. But in so far as they all fall into the same abyss of the emptiness behind their respective faces (which is also their mask), they bring into the phenomenal world nothing but their resemblance to each other, their simulations of each other, which include Socrates himself. This is the infinite

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Ibid.}, 425.

\textsuperscript{12} In \textit{Apology}, Socrates talks about human wisdom as against other kinds of wisdom, which is extra human. He, though ironically, talks of expert knowledge, particularly in the context of Evenus from Paros, who charges 500 drachmas for each of his sittings. Socrates claims to have no such expert knowledge about anything. For him, human knowledge amounts to nothing more that the minimal and limited access to one’s own ignorance. And yet on the basis of this weak knowledge grounded on negation, he empties out all worldly forms of knowledge, dissolving them in metaphors, and makes an incommensurable ‘leap’ into the unknown. But all this happens within in the self with no help from the outside. See Plato “Apology” in \textit{Symposium and the Death of Socrates}, trans. by Jane O’Grady (London: Wordsworth Classics, 1997), 83-115.

\textsuperscript{13} Giorgio Agamben, in his elegant little article called “The Face,” discusses the problem of the face as the quintessential human urge to possess one’s own appearance as the site of both knowledge and the struggle for truth. And yet this truth, according to him, this being manifest of appearance has nothing essential or substantive behind it but the act of manifestation itself. What the face brings into appearance is the very possibility of appearing. This is the truth of appearance, where all that remains behind the face is emptiness or a void, which is its eternal condition. The groundlessness of this ground, which is the face itself, has to be somehow displayed as having some substance, some meaning. This is the struggle for recognition, which Agamben equates with the act of taking possession or controlling of appearances. Whereas the appearance of the face can only in its simulation make manifest the possibility of appearance itself, the truth of such a universal possibility is turned into a personal recognizable truth when enacted through possession. See Giorgio Agamben “The Face,” in \textit{Means without Ends: Notes on Politics}, trans. by Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino, (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 91-100.
interior movement of the self caught in irony vis-à-vis the phenomenal world, which minimally realizes itself through this infinite interior dialectics.

In Cicero we find no such interiorization of truth, which leads to anonymity. What we find is the public display of this very subjective decision of acknowledging that one does not know but even this exposition is not done nakedly, never absolutely. (The nature of Ciceronian decision is that it has to be mediated or masked in order to make it more utilitarian. It is here, as we shall see in the following section, that the concept of probability comes in). The exposition thus transforms itself into a *value* in the name of the truth, which till now was infinite but accessible to all. The figure of the philosopher now comes into the public stage as the face, the *persona* who possesses the truth and who controls it. Thus, the finite personality of the philosopher in possessing truth gives it a value, which can now be distributed according to the order of the state and the hierarchy and status of personas. Thus, the elite erstwhile statesman possesses more wisdom than the statesman immersed in public life though he, in his turn, possesses more truth than the normal citizen and so on and so forth. This is the politics of the persona, which Cicero explains in the first book of *De Officiis*. But interestingly, by the same token of assigning a value to it, the infinite interiority of the Socratic truth is made finite, pedestrian. If in Socrates the task of the philosopher was to expose the truth in spite of himself, in which all, including the figure of the philosopher himself, would be anonymously dissolved, in Cicero the task of the philosopher seems to turn truth into “his own proper truth.” A value which when assigned to truth, which till now was free and accessible to all, is then accumulated in images, personas of different degrees and levels of truth accessible to each according to his persona but always jealously guarded by the highest of all personas, which is that of the philosopher. It is this externalization of an interior movement, to give a recognizable face to the

---

14 Stoic ethical doctrine from which, according to De Lacy, Cicero draws his concept of the *persona* in the first book of *De Officiis*, differentiates four conditions which need to be considered when we talk of personae: 1. the nature we share with all human beings, 2. our individual natures, 3. the persona arising from circumstances which is imposed onto us by chance and time, and 4. those which pertain to our choices resulting from the judgment of the kind of life we wish to live. Although two of these conditions are supposedly natural to us, the duality of the concept of *persona* as both the face which we inhabit and the mask (the Greek residue of the idea of *prosopon*) which is external to us never loses its context. Hence, though all are human as different from god or animal, that individual is good who is always true to the role he plays no matter what the circumstances according to rational judgment and wisdom, which should always guide his choices. And since he cannot be truly wise, like Socrates, he cannot truly play the role of the wise man but can, nevertheless, try according to his natural capability try to be like Socrates. See Phillip H. De Lacy, “The Four Stoic ‘Persona’” in *Illinois Classical Studies*, 2 (1977), 163-172.

anonymous figure of the philosopher, which, we would argue, informs the nature of skeptic philosophy itself.

Two ‘movements’ are thus at work here in context of Ciceronian appropriation of Socratic dialogues.

1. An exteriorization and exposition of the Socratic interior movement of irony (through negation) in order to make such philosophical ‘movement’ useful for the state. This makes the Ciceronian ‘movement’ mimic the Socratic movement but also makes an infinite interior movement finite by assigning a value to it. This is the “pedestrianism” of Cicero, which this section has tried to argue.

2. In order to disseminate and make philosophy useful for the public, but still maintain the value of wisdom and truth ascribed to it in the name of negation of the phenomenal world, the concept of probability is devised which on one hand disseminates wisdom, but at the same time dissimulates it in order to retain the value ascribed to the persona of the philosopher who acknowledges his ignorance.

It is this second point that we shall try to briefly elaborate now in the second section.

The Nature and Function of the Problem of Probability within Skeptic Philosophy

In his book on epistemology, titled Academica, Cicero explains the problem of dogmatic knowledge, which informed the peculiar state of philosophy in his time. As Foley notes, “Cicero had competition: unlike Plato he had to contend with many well-developed and well-known schools of thought, some of them promoting themselves as the true heirs of the Socratic legacy.”\(^{16}\) Academica is thus structured as a dialogue between the representatives of these ‘decadent’ forms of philosophy and his own conviction that it is only through the philosophy of the New Academy, which he championed that the classical model of Socrates and Plato could be saved. Here his main opponents were the stoics as represented by Varro and Lucullus in Book I and Book II, respectively.

\(^{16}\) Foley, “Cicero, Augustine and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum Dialogues,” 57-58.
The Stoic School, presumably founded by Zeno, claimed to be a modification and not a rejection of the philosophy begun by Socrates. The fundamental critique of the skeptics against this school was in the domain of knowledge or logics, which then led to further criticism regarding physics and ethics, the two higher domains of philosophy in the classical world. This criticism came in view of the Stoic idea of sense perceptions or catalepsies. According to the changes made by Zeno in the domain of Logic, Cicero informs us, sensation was triggered by a combined operation of some sort of impact offered from outside which are received by the senses, termed phantasia (presentations) conjoined with the act of mental assent or syncatastasis, which he made out to reside within us and is thus a voluntary act. This process of reception and approval of the phenomenal world was jointly called catalepton or “mental grasp.” It literally translates to the idea of grasping or gripping between the hands an object whose existence cannot be refuted. The question of assent is crucial here because in order for free presentations or phantasia to become ‘manifestations’ or truthful sense-presentations, they have to naturally offer themselves to approval or assent. Zeno further elaborates, again according to Cicero, that true things are naturally graspmable, where the truth is inscribed or marked into the object. “They are recognized by a mark that belongs specially to what is true and is not common to the true and the false.”

Here the relation between reason and catalepton is negative, where reason cannot remove the truth of what is naturally grasped and thus approved by the senses. It is against this idea of sense-presentation embodied in the idea of catalepton that Cicero forwards the concept of probability. The skeptic, Cicero asserts repeatedly, is not against the idea of truth. Rather the skeptic considers himself the most vigilant guardian of truth because he is guided by reason and not authority. And it is this reason, which asks him to doubt the nature of appearances as such both true and false. And since there is always the possibility that false sensations can appear exactly identical to true sensations; hence, all perception, which is based upon the inherent quality of a sensation which offers itself to approval, has to be rejected. And since no perception is possible, sense-presentations can be judged only partially, according to true reason, on the basis of their appearances. This leads ‘the wise man to withhold assent’ which the skeptics expressed through the doctrine of epoche. But to ‘withhold assent’ does not lead to inactivity and confusion of duty, which the stoics are accused of. Rather, according to Cicero, it leads to proper action without judgment being clouded by dogmatism. According to Cicero, the academics hold that there are dissimilarities between things, such that some of them seem probable while others their contrary. But this is not adequate ground for saying that

17 Cicero, Academica, 511.
some things can be absolutely perceived and others cannot, because many false objects are probable but nothing false can be perceived and known. Thus, Cicero writes:

The ‘wise man withhold assent’ is used in two ways, one when the meaning is that he gives absolute assent to no presentation at all, the other when he restrains himself from replying so as to convey approval or disapproval of something, with the consequence that he neither makes a negation nor an affirmation; and that this being so, he holds the one plan in theory, so that he never assents, but the other in practice, so that he is guided by probability, and whenever this confronts him or is wanting, he can answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ accordingly.18

What such a distinction does to the concept of knowledge is to first and foremost de-radicalize the dialectical intensity of negation. This dilution of the intensity of negation still functions by opposing categories (probable and not probable), hence, *mimics* the infinite interior dialectic of Socratic dialogues but it is no longer able to produce a concept of irony which hollows out the phenomenal world through a conception of absolute negation. And hence, hierarchies are now established in the world of phenomenal knowledge, categories on the basis of which one can take finite decisions in the finite realm of appearances. Cicero writes, “Thus he is not afraid lest he may appear to throw everything into confusion and make everything uncertain.” 19

But according to Socrates, it is exactly this uncertainty, which makes the philosopher wise because he can put anything and everything under his ironic vision, questioning and dismantling the established order of things within the state so that he can fulfill a higher duty outside the state, which is the private or subjective obligation to serve truth and justice. This distinction of the private from the public is crucial to Socrates whose teachings are always a private affair,20 a pedagogy which is not allied to the state. Thus, the Socratic sense of duty is different from the Ciceronian sense. Cicero further writes:

---

18 Ibid., 601.
19 Ibid., 609.
20 In the context of Socrates, we should not confuse the idea of private and public in the modern sense of a distinction, which has juridical or even customary implication. Such a distinction could rather be compared with the Greek idea of the *oikos* and *polis*, the household and the city, which also resonates in the philosophy of Cicero and the Roman distinction of private and public. But in the Socratic sense, private is the interiority of the self as against the exteriority of the world and the movement from one to the other which, on the contrary, can take place anywhere, anytime, be in the *oikos* or the *polis*. 

© 2015 Soumick De

ISSN 1908-7330
For if a question is put to him about duty or about a number of other matters in which practice has made him an expert, he would not reply in the same way as he would if questioned as to whether the number of the stars is even or odd. And say that he did not know. For in things uncertain there is nothing probable, but in things where there is probability the wise man will not be at a loss either what to do or what to answer.  

Thus, the Ciceronian *persona* of the wise man is based on two fundamental principles—that in matters of public affairs that correspond to matters regarding the state, he will be dutiful according to the distribution of his senses, judging and affirming according to the demands of the phenomenal world. This is his public persona, which is immediately mediated by his modesty of not assenting to anything, of affirming that he does not know. This is what makes him wise because he now privately possesses the truth, which is the condition of possibility of all his worldly freedom of judgment. The theory of probability not only mediates this state of public practice of philosophy with the realm of private practice of theory but also gives a certain value to theory which makes it superior to practice. To dissimulate truth through a concept of probability is also to give truth the value it requires in order to have the scholastic status it requires in Roman society to become an effective political tool.

**Concluding Remarks**

The concept of irony sustained by a logic of negation, which informs the life of Socrates, comes as a gift of the absolute. (In “Apology,” Socrates says he is gift to the state of Athens). Here the virtue of ignorance comes unexpectedly where the human participates in the divine, through establishing an absolute relation to the absolute. It is this relation, which is perhaps expressed in the Socratic idea of the *daimon*, a voice from within the self, which warns Socrates unexpectedly at different moments in his life. The *daimon* triggers decision in Socrates, which is neither completely divine, hence external to the self and imposed upon it, nor is it the human consciousness of his self mediated through reason. The *daimon* directs him *minimally* to enter upon a life of irony and negation by warning him unexpectedly of what not to do. It is not possible here to show an elaborate relationship between this unexpected *daimonian* gift and the knowledge of ignorance that Socrates possesses. Suffice it to say here that the constitutive inconsistency of the

---

affirmation that ‘one only knows that one does not know’ is related to the movement of the *daimon*, this secret movement of the self within itself. The un-decidability of knowing anything becomes the very condition for the possibility of the decision that ‘one knows that one does not know’ through the movement of this power of the self.

No such inter-subjective movement is available to Cicero. The inaugural decision of wisdom grounded on a ‘constitutive inconsistency’ is always put on hold through an act of dissimulation. Hence, in Cicero we find another kind of movement which is that of dissimulation, where a play of personas is determined by the mediation of truth through probability. Here by ascribing a value, truth is made useful for general purpose, which is embodied in the finite persona of the philosopher, thus making truth pedestrian. The skeptic argument of ‘not even to know that one does not know,’ which highlights the concept of probability, on the one hand dissimulates the inaugural inconsistency of Socratic negation by making it logically consistent. On the other hand, by de-radicalizing the movement of negation, it becomes successful in giving the anonymous figure of the philosopher a face.

References


Liran Razinsky’s *Freud, Psychoanalysis and Death* (Cambridge: 2014) aggressively pursues the thesis that the psychoanalytic tradition both constitutively and contingently obscures the overwhelming obviousness of death, a “metaphysical reality” to which common sense attests and in respect of which human life is fundamentally oriented, which yet is in need of theoretical and practical acknowledgment and elaboration into the service of which Razinsky seeks to recruit psychoanalytic inquiry once suitably reformed by a systematic incorporation of the sovereignty of death. Deflecting relations to death, its (anti-)human significance, into familiar hermeneutic apparati has allegedly cost psychoanalysis dearly in terms of its theoretical, cultural, and practical authority; Razinsky seeks to present the bill and offer a path to redemption of the heretofore unacknowledged debt. That death, however metaphysically and thus psychologically inescapable, is not sufficiently traumatogenic is what, ultimately, Razinsky protests against—the normalization of death.

Razinsky’s pseudo-philosophical connivances at rendering the “existential” or “ontological” meaning of death are matched in juvenile bombast by the middlebrow pseudo-sophistication of his linguistically unwieldy—overindulgent and woefully imprecise—writing and by the audacious naiveté of his ambition to rectify “official” psychoanalytic theory and thereby reform practice. In light of the manifest plurality of psychoanalytic perspectives,¹ the relative mutual autonomy of psychoanalytic theorizing and practice and the perhaps originally anachronistic, i.e., mythological or polemical-projective status of “official” psychoanalytic theory, Razinsky’s presumption of an official, dominant, and unified—or unifiable—psychoanalytic theory whose rectification would  

immediately entail practical revisions, seems a freighted fantasy. Pursuit of what would seem the least pertinent of these complaints, namely, that concerning the juvenile quality of the writing, may prove uncommonly rewarding, i.e., put us on track of a number of substantive, illuminating, and interconnected vexations.

The writing is extremely imprecise, inferentially reckless, and exegetically and philosophically sloppy—aggressively sloppy, perhaps. Especially with Freud—the master—in view, Razinsky misconstrues one view, then claims that the misconstrued view contradicts another (often misconstrued) view, or otherwise forces a contradiction. The plea for logical consistency, especially in the context of not otherwise illuminating analyses of “contradictions,” while not in itself untoward, seems, in its stale, quasi-compulsive repetition, to bespeak a disgruntled adolescent purism, a disenchanted yet undislodgeable demand for coherence, integrity, and therewith, Justice, rightful authority, perhaps a plaintiveness raised against the heavens and/or an equally nebulous, immanently conflicted and extremely censored, ethical/political protest. While it would be pedantic to correct Razinsky’s many and massive misreadings—and we are not yet in a position to appreciate the significance of the dogmatism and polemical willpower that lend pseudo-coherence to a book that, argumentatively, is in shambles, let alone its political-theological complications—attending briefly to the juvenile character of his writing may provide entrée to concerns that are by no means “merely rhetorical.” Razinsky seems to write, as often do inadequately read and instructed yet ambitious juveniles, with his finger on the thesaurus function. Synonyms for the repudiation of death multiply furiously, yielding muddy obscurity there where concretion is called for and slightly annoyed boredom there where Razinsky would seem to be driving home his central point: commodified variation dulls intellectual appetite yet

---

2 For a striking example, see Razinsky’s reading of Freud’s “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death.” How Razinsky comes to consider The Interpretation of Dreams “Freud’s most important theoretical and clinical book” is a mystery (46; see also 48).

3 E.g., underplayed, discarded, deflected, dismissed (96), forbidden (102), neglected, reduced, relegated to secondary status (103), repressed (183), belittled (183), subordinated (184), marginalized (189), minimalized (189), minimized (179), concretized (190), ignored (190), neutralized (190), disqualified (246), reluctantly acknowledged or examined (1, 187), unwillingly recognized (2), disbelieved (2), distorted (4), excluded, pathologized, rejected (10), not taken seriously (25), concealed (54), defensively displaced (86), suppressed (94), retreated from (95), downgraded (101), expelled (109), lost and forgotten (109), not considered (111), subjugated, blocked (124), rendered secondary, epiphenomenal (128), sidestepped (131), unaddressed (147), trimmed to manageable size (161), overlooked (170), deflated, cut down, and flattened (170), brought low (173), diverted (174), explained away (179), subordinated (184), refused as a question, reduced to a definite theoretical construct (194), expunged (206), pushed aside, rendered absent (209), diminished and altered (213), unappreciated (219), disregarded (227), relegated to a secondary voice (282), left out (282), so on.
piques it just enough to be duped into disappointment by the next iteration of the self-same amorphousness. And in each appeal to the nebulous credentials of the thesaurus function, one senses conflict and prohibition: a claim to semantic sophistication, thus to creative-critical individuation, is processed as a demand for authoritative social integration. Razinsky’s devotion to common sense will be soon discussed in greater detail. For now, let us note the awkward, adolescent admixture of semantic and thematic bravado with seething anti-intellectualism: nothing in the book is empirically-experimentally established or corroborated, or even presumes to be; Razinsky’s arrogation of “common sense” against empirical and reflective inquiry manifests as explicit anti-intellectualism, implicit social contempt (orthodoxy⁴), in short, as defensive ego rigidity. “[T]error of death needs no explanation,” says Razinsky; it is “intrinsic” (225). “Israel in truth” and “Egypt in error”?⁵

The structure of the book is likewise lame because it is excessively but ineptly obedient to an imperative to standardization. (The “argument” is overintegrated yet threadbare—like modern subjectivity?) Hobbled yet excessively animated, it seems—by an imperative to proceed “methodologically,” that is, to “exhaustively” and “circumspectly” contend with the psychoanalytic tradition’s alleged multiform deflections of and occasional rapprochements with death—Razinsky cannot stop going through the motions, yet such strenuous, fixed, overtaxed efforts yield but an intellectually vacuous, rote reproduction of high academic form, i.e., academic kitsch. Death, says Razinsky, is “a powerful, independent, and unchangeable reality of another order” (242); “pointless, incomprehensible, and unjustifiable,” and as such “lies at the heart of our misery” (205). Unavoidably and pervasively influential in virtue of its “resistance to representation” (28), it is indifferent, without reason, a blind force of nature (137, 145, 148). An all-pervasive power, “it touches every aspect of our life, every act, project, and plan” (167) yet remains intractably obscure, withdraws itself. So thematized, “death” might seem a cipher for the obscure, incomprehensible and irrefusable relation to authority that characterizes

⁴ On the connection between orthodoxy and anti-Jewishness, see Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, *Spinoza’s Critique of Religion and Its Heirs: Marx, Benjamin, Adorno* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Of particular concern for clinicians is that Razinsky’s arrogance precludes empirically establishing whether death-related material is pathologically or otherwise clinically pertinent, whether generally or particularly. Indeed, such arrogance overrides empirical and reflective inquiry altogether. Cf. 230-231.

Razinsky’s orientation to his central topic: intellectually and affectively disorganizing obedience to self-obscuring authority takes shape as aggressively fixated (self-) certainty, commitment to a cause or, stylistically, to a form. If the Oedipal overtones of conflicted adolescent attempts at individuation are here palpable—simplifying considerably: irreversible independence, i.e., impossible and (un)desirable return to parental authority and intimacy, is phantasmatically processed as, at once, abandonment and overintrusiveness, resulting in sadomasochistic flight into identifications with ideals and their embodied representatives—then Razinsky’s otherwise strained (frankly ludicrous) positioning, i.e., idealization, of Lacan as an ally is symptomatically comprehensible. As are, perhaps, the theological-political undercurrents of the text, to which we will later turn more explicitly. More pertinent to the present context is that the empty spectacle of “rigorous” and “exhaustive” analysis may put one in mind of gifted adolescents educated in contexts they know to be inadequate and untrustworthy, resulting in extreme, repressed worry as to whether, as a result of such conditions for intellectual formation, they will ever be anything other than frauds, and consequent conflicted attempts to deceive themselves—and others, thereby siding with the agents of stultification against the injured potential—by passing off quantity as quality (magical thinking), while at once, and thereby, confessing their need for instruction, thus demanding a more felicitous future for their yet (it is hoped) promising past. That Razinsky’s engagements with Freud and certain sectors of subsequent psychoanalytic thought are picky (anti-authoritarian) while exegetically and philosophically undiscerning, even sloppy (sadomasochistic, libidinally unbound, “death driven”), and that the core complaint—“death is denied”—is repeated ad nauseam, becoming as if a mantra, a fixation providing a measure of consistency to a

---

6 Oddly, given his concern with the “external” and especially the voicing of this concern as criticism of the primacy of the intrapsychic in psychoanalysis, Razinsky makes no mention of a figure who would seem to be his natural ally, namely, Ferenczi, nor of prominent psychoanalytic trends informed by Ferenczi, i.e., relationalist developments. See, e.g., 184, 242 and 37.

7 See, e.g., 16. The aggressively Oedipal tenor of Razinsky’s complaints—awkward and pathetic precisely in their purported seriousness—is unmistakable. Razinsky charges Freud with inconsistency—what a shock! Father Freud is deemed insufficient, wanting for authority because failing to provide a complete “map,” (i.e., theory) of the mind—this is just calumny, if not delusion. Freud is accused of indulging in speculation without explicitly marking the provisional, tentative character of his speculations—a scandal! (The irony of this accusation is plain.) Yet Freud’s texts are said to be “full … of reservations and personal expressions regarding the subjective nature of [his] response” to death (37). So Razinsky charges Freud with unearned certainty and suppressed doubt while knowing full well of Freud’s explicit provisionality, then accuses the psychoanalytic tradition of rigidifying what was explicitly tentative in Freud: accusations run wild. Whether there is a connection between Razinsky’s hysterical desire for father Freud’s consistent authority and the political-theological issues discussed below, and if so, what manner(s) of connection, I leave as a question for the readers of this review.
partially disorganized, overfreighted mind, while at once interrupting such consistency by dint of its purportedly unmetabolizable content—death “evades modeling and understanding” (255), is “almost absent, inherently contradictory, absurd” (265), “a significant impossibility” (265)—and thereby attaining an air of authenticity, suggests, broadly, juvenile turmoil. The suggestion of a prodigiously overgrown and thereafter awkward, immature hothouse plant, i.e., of stultified juvenility, is everywhere on display. To claim, and all the more so to insist, loudly and publicly, that awareness of death “shakes our beliefs about the constancy of our world” would seem a consummate expression of juvenility (51). That Razinsky is stylistically, methodologically, and programmatically identified with power and authority is perhaps the most evident, and certainly one of the more distressing, loci of his vexed juvenility. The dialectic of juvenile adoration of power, disillusionment, sadomasochistic delinquent outburst, reparative fantasy, and its fraying proceeds undaunted, structured as a whole by a defensive idealization of depressive integration.

Everyone denies death except Razinsky ... and, it turns out, everyone else except Freud and those working within the tradition he inaugurated. The inherent terror of death (106), that death “can intervene at any moment” (258), and the constitutive significance of death, that awareness of death is an essential condition for the development of meaning and value, for the shaping of a life, Razinsky claims, are ubiquitously recognized, indeed common sense, and yet Freud, obtusely and somewhat perversely, deflects, isolates, and otherwise repudiates the orientational significance and primordial disturbance of death. (Note once again the undercurrent of anti-intellectualism: Freud raged against common sense.) Freud is calumnized as

---


9 A brief clinical note: To acknowledge death in the way that Razinsky demands may put analysts at serious risk of calamitous failures to master the transference. See Sigmund Freud, Fragments of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (1905 [1901], Standard Edition Vol. 7, pp. 1–122).

10 More precisely, Razinsky’s (implicit) claim is that death is broadly denied in contemporary culture, indeed, to an extent, must be denied given its metaphysical structure, though such pervasive denial symptomatically bespeaks the evidence of death, its prior registration, and thus is not a denial of death on the order practiced by Freud and his followers. The psychoanalytic denial of death—especially subsequent to Freud—is qualitatively, indeed categorically, distinct: its specific mark is its non-symptomatic, thus nondisclosive, automaticity. The psychoanalytic denial of death is not exemplary in the sense of representative, it is merely striking—an outlier. At worst, the following analysis isolates and explores an explicit, strong claim advanced by the text, shielding it from other sectors of the text that contradict or are in tension with it, and so hyperbolizes a bit. Whether the risk of objectively unavoidable isolation and exaggeration proves worthwhile can only be decided by the reader’s judgment of the value of the insights attained or claimed by these means.
the—albeit ambivalent and contradictory—Jewish denier of death\(^{11}\) responsible in large part for the marginalization of death in the psychoanalytic tradition and thus for that tradition’s wanting for theoretical and practical authority.\(^{12}\) The Oedipal inflation of Freud as the inadequate Father responsible for the corruptions of his progeny is noteworthy, as is the shaping of this Oedipal fantasy by a Christological redemption motif: Freud’s repudiation of death is cast as original sin, ineffaceable corruption (such repudiation, recall, is in part constitutive of psychoanalytic praxis) that yet does not put its inheritors beyond hope for (qualified) redemption. And if Freud is so obviously a “Jewish thinker,” then, presumably, we are to understand the psychoanalytic tradition\(^{13}\) as “the Jewish science,” at which point Razinsky appears to be intimating that the primary culprits in the denial of death, ineffectual though they may be against its common sense (self) evidence, are “the Jews” or that such denial is in some way “Jewish.” *The Jews deny death. Denial of death is a Jewish inheritance.* Even were one to hear, or overhear, in such intimation a heavily guarded registration and highly mediated pressing of a claim about the disposition of contemporary hegemonic Israeli politics, discourse, and popular psychology\(^{14}\) as concerns death-bearing relations to Palestinians and other Arab peoples, their current regional and/or global fallout, and their even more catastrophic potential (e.g., Israeli Jews pervasively deny—isolate, minimize, repudiate, rationalize—historical and contemporary death-bearing relations to Palestinians and other Arab peoples, the mortal danger in which, partly in consequence, they find themselves, and the broader, potentially cataclysmic, geopolitical ramifications of mutually escalating, focus-consuming bellicosity), and/or as concerns the theological, specifically nihilistic-providential, character of the Israeli state—perhaps the pressing back of some such claim against its denial, marginalization, authoritative repudiation, official blockage; even were one to hear, or overhear, in such intimation a distorted, insistent echo of thoughts or fantasies concerning the experience and/or aftermath of the European Catastrophe, or perhaps a displaced and distorted claim about the relation of these to one another, an unassumable—prohibited—protest against their invidious and insidious convergence in contemporary hegemonic Israeli political culture, nevertheless, its perversity strikes quick and hard.

\(^{11}\) Freud is claimed *immediately* as a “Jewish thinker”—on the very first page of the Introduction.

\(^{12}\) If death’s “pointless, incomprehensible, and unjustifiable nature … lies at the heart of our misery,” then psychoanalysis cannot, absent supplementation by existential inquiry, truly get at our misery (205). See also, 190.

\(^{13}\) Expecting Lacan?

\(^{14}\) Liran Razinsky is a Lecturer in the Department of Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies at Bar-Ilan University, Israel.

© 2015 Adam Rosen-Carole
ISSN 1908-7330

[Creative Commons BY-NC-ND]
(The) Jews deny death. Denial of death is a Jewish inheritance. Might one hear in such intimation a defensively transmuted reverberation of a historical truth: that whereas death once marked, or more precisely, through routine social-memorial praxis was supposed capable of marking, the outermost limit of a life, bringing all that unfolded within that life to a kind of closure, a significant end in view of which what precedes is regathered and reinterpreted (i.e., socially memorialized, hence doubly integrated); i.e., whereas death was once a moment of constitutive significance in a singular life, functioning as a stamp, simultaneously, of the singularity of a life and of the boundedness of that life, qua singular, to a social horizon; Jews \textit{(inter alii)} did not die in the camps, death died in the camps? The anonymous production of corpses is the dying of death. Jews were denied (significant) death, \textit{thus denial of death is a Jewish inheritance}. Might one then hear, too, the rumblings of the ideological Nazi appropriation of the truth they were instituting: Jews do not die in the camps; they are exterminated? And might we hear, further, an unmediated moment of raw disturbance issuing from the ashes of industrialized death: the death of death, occluded from memory, let alone worked through, is repeated as Israeli state providentialism, i.e., as Jewish inheritance? Such providentialism, in league with its diabolical double, nihilistically perpetuates the death of death \textit{as singularly significant}, each time unique, by claiming anonymous mass deaths as proleptic state property, the death of death as a moment of the state’s foundational narrative (theodicy), indeed as \textit{necessary violence redeemed} by the significance it attains for an entirely independent—as if metaphysically independent—stratum of significance, namely, the ideological—and to an extent, material-psychological—foundation of the state of Israel. Through state providentialism and the imaginary immunities against concern for death-dealing and destruction it supports, “the Jews” deny death, as if this were their inheritance.  

Might one hear, further, in such intimation the registration and repudiation of a related historical truth: that the camps revealed all too

---

\textsuperscript{15} One might then hear, albeit very obliquely: Jews, particularly state-revering Zionists, deny death in the sense that the Jewish prohibition of idolatry was originally tied to its connection to human sacrifice; the state demands human sacrifice (practical, intellectual, affective); thus the state is an object of idolatry—death as sacrifice is denied by state providentialism.

\textsuperscript{16} Razinsky’s implausible characterization of “official” (dogmatic, unified, authoritative) psychoanalysis might be thought in connection with this.
plainly that death is hardly the worst fate that can befall us? Death died in the camps as of orientational significance. Or at least it did so for those who have come to be called, in an idiom popularized by Primo Levi, the Muselmänner. That there are fates far worse than death, that meaningful individuality, every semblance of dignity, even the impulse to self-preservation, can be utterly annihilated, thus that the human form of life is not a metaphysical given but an ongoing social accomplishment, is perhaps one of the central, repulsive, and repulsed cultural traumas of the Catastrophe. Razinsky’s metaphysical enshrining of death, particularly his casting of death as inherently significant, may be understood as a deflection of (the dying of) death in the camps and of the unwanted transmission of the terrifying mortality of death “itself” into the present, i.e., as a denial of death, and at once, an overburdened, indirect obedience to a political-ideological commandment to remember, specifically to remember precisely these deaths, but to re-member them only within the ideological parameters of a specific political theodicy. Death’s metaphysical memorialization is here, perhaps, the denial of its concrete historical specificity in the camps, thus an attempted foreclosure of alternative memory work and of the politics in which such work might issue or to which it might contribute; death is denied in and through its metaphysical-political remembrance. Or from a slightly different angle, political concern for the— in principle unlimited, but in practice highly uneven—exposure of human life to absolute peril, to total destitution and annihilation, is perhaps displaced and domesticated by Razinsky’s metaphysics of death. Death itself, he says,


18 See, e.g., Primo Levi, If This Is a Man (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2000). Also see, inter alia, Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (New York: Zone Books, 2002). Insistence on the metaphysical self-evidence and inherent orientational significance of death is a direct repudiation of the figure of the Musselman. Given the prominent discussion of this aspect of the dying of death in the camps and Razinsky’s interest in fields where this discussion occurs, his avoidance of the Musselman seems a willful ignorance. To say that this evasion is willful, a shielding of eyes and of thought, is not to say that it is a calculated deception or otherwise strategic subterfuge. Quite the contrary. Razinsky’s refusal of the obvious, the Musselman as anti-metaphysical counterexample to his death metaphysics, seems beholden to dark powers: transgenerationally transmitted disturbances taking shape as imperatives not-to-know, and so to know selectively, thus as enforced prejudice. Vexed virility, both thematically (as in resolute facing of death-borne insignificance) and performatively, is perhaps not the least symptom of this. Incidentally, Razinsky’s willful ignorance deprives him of the opportunity to raise what could be, in view of his concerns, an interesting question: If and to the extent that psychoanalysis cannot but focus on meaning, specifically on the meaning(s) of death, how can it respond, if at all, to the dying of death in the camps, to that singular form of the destruction of significance, and to its legacies?

19 “That in the concentration camp it was no longer an individual who died, but a specimen—this is a fact bound to affect the dying of those who escaped the administrative measure.” See Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 362.
is an “ominous backdrop” imperiling meaning, value, subjectivity before it coldly sweeps them away (258); the self-enforcing (104), brutal realization of “one’s insignificance” always already threatened (52). And this is said to be a “stimulating” mystery and something with which we all in our own ways contend. Death in Razinsky’s sense would seem to bear the simultaneously repulsed and ideologically coveted memory of the Shoah, rendering such destitute death eternal yet occluded, sacralized: untouchable, infinitely obscure, thus nonnegotiable, and in this way obscenely powerful—an irrefusable self-occluding authority; perversely, deathly anti-significance becomes the absolute master. The metaphysics of death recalls us to the scene of torture, the sovereign antiman.

In Razinsky’s intimation that the denial of death, like psychoanalysis, is specifically related to Jews or Jewishness or Jewish inheritance, might one hear a horrified, perhaps perverse, claim to Jewish exclusivity? The traumatic denial of (individuating, meaningful) death to Jews in the camps, their systematic, torturous devastation, destitution, and anonymous extermination, along with—or as the pinnacle of—the historically and globally sweeping denial of concern with Jewish death (and life), makes the denial of death a specifically Jewish inheritance, indeed a mandate for Jews—or their political representatives—to secure themselves against oblivion? The exceptional persecution of Jews grants them (in the eyes of God?) preemptive exculpation for whatever is done in the service of their security? Having suffered so much destruction, devastation, and death, and having suffered it in such uncommonly brutal forms, the Jews are granted—as unremittingly incomprehensible compensation—exceptional, indeed absolute, prerogative, i.e., are placed ontologically beyond good and evil, like a nominalist God?

Or might one discern a perverse theological-political protest: the “ordeal” of the Holocaust was insufficiently instructive, the revelation of the ontological evil of Death was not received, insofar as the Jews, or rather “bad Jews,” i.e., analysts (and perhaps others: anti-Zionist Jews?), deny death—the denial of death is a Jewish inheritance, indeed a “Jewish science”? (Hints of survivor guilt are also worthy of mention. As is prominent convergence, at least in the Anglo-American context, of psychoanalytic thought and anti-Zionist politics.) If so, one might suspect Razinsky’s metaphysical overcoding—and thereby occlusion, of simultaneously unprocessed and over-processed transmissions of concrete historical atrocity—of attempting to

20 “Death itself” seems as paranoid a projection as “the Jew.”
turn the Shoah into revelation of the Truth of Existence. And if one senses here an attempt or imperative to relieve the living of the nightmare of dead generations weighing upon them by means of metaphysical sublation; then, perhaps unsurprisingly, a culture of redemption joins forces with veiled threat and condemnation. Jews, “good Jews” in any case, do not deny death, specifically, the catastrophic death of European Jewry upon which the state of Israel stakes its claim to unquestionable legitimacy or necessity, even in occupied territories and extraterritorial actions. To resist the brute assertion of raison d’état is to deny death, thus to break the commandment emergent from the ashes of Auschwitz: Remember. Never forget, meaning: never deny, minimize, marginalize, analogize, resist.

Or might one hear in the intimation that denial of death is a Jewish inheritance, in conjunction with the wild proliferation of synonyms for such denial, an assertion of the unavoidability and unprocessability (which is at once an overprocessing) of Holocaust trauma? Death, says Razinsky, is deflected, dismissed, neglected, reduced, repressed, marginalized, concretized, distorted, excluded, pathologized, rejected, subjugated, blocked, deflated, diverted, disregarded. Such semantic diffusion perhaps suggests the extreme difficulty and/or prohibition of coming to terms with, i.e., acknowledging and elaborating, the specific forms, and let me underscore, the various forms, of “death denial” in contemporary culture, both Jewish and more broadly.

22 Independently of the abovementioned premise, Razinsky’s metaphysical occlusion of concrete, historical, yet unprocessed atrocity turns the Shoah into revelation of the Truth of Existence, thus into theodicy and Redemption. Not even the dead are safe: through such conversion the memory of the dead is made ready for political-ideological appropriation. Worse, reified death, abstract and indifferent to concrete historical detail, sanctions the existent as such: from its imperious metaphysical perspective, all is already lost.


24 That Razinsky, so consumed with psychoanalysis’ alleged denial of death, does not engage the voluminous literature concerned with psychoanalytic responses to transgenerationally transmitted trauma and similar such topics is, to me, completely inexplicable. (That he is concerned, as he maintains in this book and elsewhere, with psychoanalytic theory and not applied psychoanalysis seems but a dodge made possible by a gross misunderstanding of psychoanalytic theory construction. Cf. 189) Less so, but still perplexing, is his silence concerning Freud’s very late flight from the Nazis and the literature around this perilous misjudgment. It is as if a prohibition on explicit discussion of the Holocaust conditions his metaphysical self-confidence and critical treatment of psychoanalysis. Compared with these, that Razinsky does not attempt to specifically configure the development of psychoanalysis in wartime and post-war Europe and America in relation to the concrete, historical experiences of death and terror among influential émigré analysts fleeing fascism, let alone pursue the significant contrasts between – and within – European and American developments, especially in relation to “darker matters” and differential conditions of hospitality to intellectuals in exile, e.g., pressures for integration, adaptation, and communication, seems but a failure of methodology rather than a mystery.

© 2015 Adam Rosen-Carole
ISSN 1908-7330

[Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License]
Even if one considers the premise of the previous paragraphs far-fetched, i.e., that the immediate identification of Freud as a “Jewish thinker” suggests an association of psychoanalysis with Jewishness—specifically, by invoking the ideological understanding of psychoanalysis as “the Jewish science”—resulting in an unconscious amalgamation to which are attracted, as if by extreme gravitational force, and in the highly volatilized matrix of which are forged distorted expressions of, a multitude of unspoken, inadmissible thoughts and fantasies concerning the denial of death of which psychoanalysis and, to be sure, not Jews, Jewishness, Israel, etc., is explicitly accused, nevertheless, Razinsky’s crude metaphysics of death and strained accusations of psychoanalytic death-denial seem, in view of their implausibility together with the imperturbable overconfidence of their assertion, freighted with forces they cannot easily bear. Something is askew. A culturally marginal therapeutic praxis is interrogated for its refusal to confront death “as death”: there is a manifest imbalance between the cultural clout and prevalence of the critical target—even to say that the psychoanalytic star is waning would be grossly optimistic—and the effort as well as the purported metaphysical and psychological significance of such a critical undertaking. If the above efforts to discern the contours of the unspoken seem less like patient attention to Razinsky’s intimations than speculative projection, then perhaps not only in view of the independent interest of the themes developed but also, indeed especially, in view of the challenge of making sense of manifest absurdity, such “speculative” endeavors will not be immediately despised. Least of all by those whose professional or intellectual interests crucially involve the risk of response to such challenges.

Irrespective of such a premise, there is something ethically/politically right about an Israeli academic wanting to acknowledge death and death anxiety. And that the form of acknowledgement such an academic pursues and demands is centrally “metaphysical,” i.e., precipitous and abstract (even when cast as culturally-mediated and/or idiosyncratic insight), is at least understandable in view of reigning political-ideological pressures and prohibitions. But there is something terribly wrong about blaming Freud and his inheritors for, respectively, inaugurating and consolidating the failure to acknowledge death, and about wanting the correction to take place in psychoanalysis.²⁵ In view of what would seem to be the stakes of Razinsky’s

---

²⁵ Razinsky is clear that correction immanent to psychoanalysis will be insuperably limited: psychoanalysis must be supplemented by forms of existential inquiry that, unlike psychoanalysis, are not bound to transmute the inherent metaphysical obscurity and diffuse wonder, i.e., the mystery, of death into forms of intrapsychic or otherwise personal meaning. We “suffer” from too much meaning, not enough freewheeling speculative encounter with the self-concealing Otherness of death.
project—pursuing and promoting encounters with the Nothingness, the “significant impossibility,” of death as it reverberates throughout life—what do Freud and his followers matter, unless these are ciphers?

Especially but not exclusively in the Israeli context, the urgent but unwanted confrontation with death might be considered in relation to the theological-political/discursive legacy of the Shoah, specifically in relation to death-bearing Israeli exceptionalism effected, in part, through projection of and identification with a sacralized victim position arrogated as the eternal ground of unrefusable, nonnegotiable, thus unintelligible political-theological authority. One might consider, for instance, that, ironically, Israeli political life has become beholden to a demand for pious obedience while Jewish theology is—or rather, remains—infinitely negotiable and refusable, i.e., that the Israeli state is far more religious than Jewish theology. Or such a theological-political/discursive legacy, especially its appropriative, domesticating manifestation as exceptionalism, might be considered in relation to the accusation of nihilism readily and aggressively deployed at critics of the Israeli state. Such critics, accused of destructiveness, of bearing while at once denying death, indeed of putting the state and thereby the Jewish people at risk of annihilation while shielding objective alliance with the Enemy with disingenuous or naïve claims to freedom of thought, i.e., to political freedom, become targets of attempted annihilation. In view of the nihilist tendencies and potentially all-consuming destructiveness of Zionist belligerence, the projection of such critics as to-be-annihilated nihilistic elements seems not simply oppressively censorious but authoritarian mimetic regression, a malicious scapegoating in service of an anti-political fantasy of purifying the state/people and thereby achieving eternal stability: metaphysical presence. The historical resonance of such political theology is disturbing in the extreme.26

Or more generally, one might consider the urgent but unwanted confrontation with death in the Israeli context, as configured with the theological-political/discursive legacy of the Shoah, in relation to Israeli—particularly Jewish Israeli—consumption of and by death anxiety: its exploitation by political and media interests, the pervasive haze it casts over daily life and thought, its morbid cherishing and horrified projection as the reigning affective atmosphere and/or concretized expulsion onto figures at once materially controllable and metaphysically indomitable, i.e., its idolization, its simultaneous intensification and amelioration by the securitizing of multiple sectors of civic society, its overwhelming if diffuse insistence and consequent exceptionalist appropriation, specifically but not

---

26 Would it be too outrageously offensive to ask whether hegemonic Israeli politics and popular psychology have become, unwittingly, Schmittian?
only with respect the Nakbah, its sustaining and aggravation by “defensive” brutality, indeed its irrationalist disturbance of all political categories and institutions, its inhibiting effect on projecting, let alone pursuing, alternative futures, i.e., its mortifying, stultifying inertia—its destruction of possibility.

Or, the urgent but unwanted confrontation with death, specifically, with its disconcerting, defense-activating and -overriding, insistence and attendant anxieties, and with its various, often overdetermined and otherwise haze-enveloped, highly managed meanings, might be considered not just in relation to the theological-political/discursive legacies of the Shoah and the Nakbah, but, more generally, in relation to political-discursive questions concerning the relations between the living and the dead, thus with broader forms of exceptionalism, e.g., the rhetoric, psychology, cultural management, and politics of “our dead.”

In comparison, Razinsky’s mystified wonderings about natality (that we are of woman born), finitude (that we are, to the great dismay of our limitless narcissism, limited\(^{27}\)), and mortality (that we are exceeded and enveloped by the presence-absence of death) seem, if not trifling indulgences with which to assuage mass-produced boredom and “kill time,” then symptom-bait.

Or, from another angle, insofar as and to the extent that such historical-political considerations seep through or can be retrieved from Razinsky’s metaphysical constructions and obscurely motivated witch hunt are the latter more than vain palliatives for objectively enforced meaninglessness.

That an Israeli academic seeks to shift concern from the death of the other (aggression, sadism, abandonment) to the death of the self and, at greater circumference, to the human condition of finitude and mortality—or if not to redirect concern, then simply to focus concern on the death of the self at the expense, explicitly, of concern for the death of the other—is, at least, suspicious. Might the flight into juvenile (i.e., enthusiastically morbid) metaphysics and philistine platitude serve the defensive deactivation, displacement, or dispelling of socially enforced, in part appropriate, in part intrusive, anxieties?\(^{28}\) Razinsky registers a true need: to consider the place and work of death in psychic life, and more generally. But he turns historical, psychosocial, i.e., material-political, truth, or what would be such, into ontological and psychoanalytic falsity.

While the psychic meanings of death are, Razinsky uncontentiously claims, indefinitely modifiable, and while his ambition to recruit

\(^{27}\) Though the point cannot be developed here, one might consider Razinsky’s assumption about our wild narcissism in connection with melancholic consciousness. Cf. 259 and note 42 below.

\(^{28}\) Appropriate anxieties may also be intrusive; these are not necessarily contraries.
psychoanalysts into the investigation and publicization of such meanings is in part sourced in a fairly standard conception of psychic idiosyncrasy, death itself, he insists, is conceptually and metaphysically self-sufficient: an in-itself. What is worrisome here is not only the philosophical credentials of Razinsky’s metaphysico-linguistic realism, i.e., the credibility of his implicit thesis that the meanings, or at least the core or focal meanings, of concepts, or at least of certain concepts—e.g., and most prominently, “death”—are and/or must be real (as metaphysical universals) because, presumably, such concepts or their core or focal meanings correspond to metaphysically real, mind-independent objects: fixtures in the eternal cosmological architecture. On such a picture of language, concepts and their objects are metaphysically real, out there in the mind-independent (divinely guaranteed?) order of things; meaning is achieved as or validated by descriptive correspondence between material signifier and immaterial yet metaphysically real signified, i.e., by mystical invocation through material-semantic ritual of extra-mundane Meaning (grace). Meaning runs on its own metaphysical tracks, invulnerable to the vicissitudes of practice. Such Meaning is infinite self-presence in contrast to the finite historicity of the human. When properly invoked, meaning is automatic, transcendentally grounded and guaranteed, not, as Cavellian currents of Wittgensteinian thought, among others, would have it, precarious social responsibility, ethical rather than metaphysical. The meanings or meaningfulness that, Razinsky says, “death itself” annihilates, clearly cannot be this Meaning. Even more worrisome than the philosophical credibility of this view is the manner of its psycholinguistic assertion, i.e., that it is manifestly unwarranted, merely stipulated, indeed not even explicitly asserted, let alone argued, but simply taken for granted, assumed with startling self-assurance. As if it were common sense. As if Razinsky were the voice of common sense, the conduit of self-evident authority. Here as elsewhere, Razinsky presumes to speak with a “universal voice,” though in a manner contrary, indeed antagonistic, to what Kant intends with this phrase. In comparison with the arrogance of its assertion, the theological-political aspect of which is made quite plain by Razinsky’s fiat veritas, or more precisely, in comparison with the orthodox intensity of Razinsky’s conviction, his arrogation, once again, of authoritative common sense, philosophical discomfiture pales in significance. Razinsky’s identification with common sense and its smug, silencing employment suggests the festering of fascism within an ostensibly critical enterprise.

29 Compare Razinsky’s characterization of death as “a powerful, independent, and unchangeable reality of another order” (242). Also cf. 193-4.
30 Cf. 247.
Likewise, that in view of his metaphysico-linguistic realism, Razinsky’s desired enlistment of psychoanalysis in the elaboration and publicization of the psychic meaning of death would relegate psychoanalysis to the role of underlaborer of metaphysics, and that this realism would thus be the rationalization of that relegation, is disturbing. But far more disturbing is that since such metaphysics reduces to identification with authority, psychoanalysis would come into the service of authority, obscurity, and prohibition, betraying its innermost interests, if successfully recruited into Razinsky’s “existential” inquiries. In league with the culture industry and fascism, this would be psychoanalysis in reverse.32

Razinsky insists that “death itself” is unique (225, 173, 184, 239), “a thing in itself” (257), metaphysically and thus semantically/conceptually self-sufficient, and yet “almost absent, inherently contradictory, absurd, opposed to the rest of the system of ideas” (265), thus unthinkable, or more precisely, incomprehensible, distorted by the theorizing and modeling (265, 267) it cannot but attract (267, 271), but by no means a transcendental illusion.33

Death, “a significant impossibility” as Razinsky at one point puts it, seems to describe the preconscious insider’s view of a symptom (265). Object of unavoidable attraction and repulsion, thus commanding site of conflict and (dis)orientation, and guarded by a demand not to unravel its “metaphysical” mystery,34 death seems very much at home, and ill at ease, in a psychoanalytic setting. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, death is projected onto a theological—Razinsky would not doubt say “ontological”—register. Razinsky’s death-literalism takes shape as an evasive negative theology: “Taking death seriously means, above all, recognition of death as a thing in itself, a recognition that avoids rendering death merely the aim of a death wish, social

32 As the underlaborer of death metaphysics, psychoanalysis, in virtue of its attention to psychic idiosyncrasy, would explore and elaborate the indefinite variability, i.e., “individuation,” of the ever-same meaning of “death itself,” it would be the culture industry counterpart of metaphysical production in which the semblance of particularity is developed, packaged, and promoted, i.e., in which the illusion of individuation is socially enforced. Put otherwise, Razinsky’s metaphysico-linguistic realism would make of the purported psychic idiosyncrasy of meaning but a pretense: the contingent uptake and processing of an invariant code. Razinsky’s relation to psychoanalysis is thoroughly instrumental: subsumptive and annihilating.

33 Cf. 224. Where Razinsky suggests (perhaps in the voice of another commentator, thus ambivalently) that though death necessitates illusion, it itself is no illusion.

34 I note in passing that, especially on p. 267, “death” seems clearly modeled on femme fatale cliché. Correspondingly, Razinsky assumes the posture of lad detective, in a way reminiscent of David Lynch’s Blue Velvet. (Recall this memorable bit of dialogue: Jeffrey: I’m seeing something that was always hidden. I’m in the middle of a mystery and it’s all secret. Sandy: You like mysteries that much? Jeffrey: Yeah, you’re a mystery. I like you very much.) This deserves to be thought more fully, especially in conjunction with Razinsky’s—startling!—comparison of the would-be transformative integration of death into psychoanalytic theory and practice with the impact of feminist concerns on psychoanalytic theory and practice.
death, separation or any other understanding where death is actually no longer death” (257; cf. 29). Jealously guarded against analogy and, more broadly, against contamination by “vulgar” experience, death, “absurd and untenable,” (265) unknowable and unrepresentable (29), is asserted as absolute and incomparable, pure self-presence, and as such, captivating; necessitating thwarted reflection, Death thus seems an object of ambivalent idolatry, the image of an immaterial god, a metaphysical image. A thing in itself, “death” perhaps bears a dim image of an intransigent and self-obscuring order of things, or more precisely, a reified image of reified life. Might the anguished theological longing contained in Razinsky’s metaphysical image of death bespeak a protesting consciousness? What in the wake of Marx’s “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” might be called a religious form of protesting consciousness? Death would be, as sexuality was once hoped to be, nonintegratable, a metaphysically secure moment of exception, and perhaps resistance, to the overintergrated world of late capitalism. Or to speak with Hegel, “death itself” is the overintergrated world reflected in religious protesting consciousness.

Razinsky’s metaphysical image of death, especially the imaging of death as an overwhelmingly intrusive, irrefusable yet only intermittently actualized, sovereign power to suffuse existence with anxiety and thereby collapse every normative horizon; as emerging from out of the nowhere (absurdity) of its perpetual presence-absence to unexpectedly engulf every modicum of meaning and value in its cold void; as “persistent trigger of dread and alertness” (29); as suddenly stripping life of all significance, emptying it not only of present significance and standing but of all hope for future significance, indeed of any connection to a future, thus radically depotentiating life, not only refusing what was once initiated or accomplished of any possible futurity but retroactively destroying what once seemed significant, thus as sweeping in advance the remnants of a life, what would have been the possible horizons of its memorialization, into the sovereign enclosure of inescapable insignificance, is uncannily reminiscent of Jean Améry’s description of ressentiment, the indelible aftermath of torture: trust in the world is to be mistrusted because the more it is established, and thereby becomes self-effacing, the more it becomes available to violation, betrayal, sadistic manipulation. Death itself, which “shakes our beliefs about the constancy of our world” (51), which makes tremble and ultimately annihilates meaning and value; death itself, in “its pointless, incomprehensible, and unjustifiable nature, which lies at the heart of our misery” (205), which is “opposed to the rest of the system of ideas” (265),

---

35 Cf. 242.
36 Cf. 258.
“absurd and untenable” (265), unknowable and unrepresentable (29), “the meaningless end of life” (205), would seem a metaphysical image of loss of trust in the world: an image of worldlessness, of torture. Correspondingly, Razinsky’s understanding of death “as such” would seem a contemplative, intellectualized, thus palatable, even homeopathic, introjection of ressentiment: wide-eyed wondering and the mystified silence of metaphysical insight imaging a face transfixed by horror. What Razinsky ascribes to the metaphysical efficacy of death, the world become radically untrustable, subject to senseless, arbitrary, and absolute destruction of value and meaning: this is the scene of torture. Torture is the production of senselessness, meaninglessness, absolute arbitrariness, torture is the vortex in which human significance is plunged irrecoverably, not “death.” Not death but absolute lawlessness, or the obscene law of the antiman, is the annihilation of reason and sense. Not incidentally, perhaps, does Razinsky situate mortality in corporeality itself, for torture is the systematically enforced betrayal of its victims’ selfhood by what was once their own bodies, the inscription of sovereign violence in the body become instrument of another’s annihilating will, the turning of bodily openness to the world—condition for meaning and value—into helpless exposure to limitless suffering—37—the endless scouring of insignificance into the “fact” of the body itself.38 Torture, the enduring devastation of its human objects, becomes perversely “death itself.” Such sublation of unimaginable suffering into metaphysical permanence leaves behind its victims, its historical conditions of intelligibility.

That Razinsky would project acknowledgement of death, thus understood, as constitutive of the human is at once perverse and perhaps an important historical truth: the ontology of the human is radically affected by torture; we are the beings who can be ontologically undone. So redolent is Razinsky’s metaphysical image of death with scenes of torture that one might wonder whether the metaphysical function of this image is to block out—contain and refuse—the memory of torture. Is “death itself” the reification of torture? Lifted to the metaphysical firmament, death reigns as a new idol, or perhaps not so very new. To be plain, the question is whether Razinsky’s metaphysical image of death is Nazi wish fulfillment.

Though as a highly charged site of conflict, such a metaphysical image may be, also, a redemptive, metapolitical image. Insofar as it bears unappeasable, irredeemable loss of trust in the world to metaphysical heights, “death itself” may be a metaphysical, thus wishfully universal, timeless, and authoritative, registration of what historically was refused not only by Nazi destruction of archives of the atrocities they perpetrated but by

37 It is perhaps limitless suffering that is metaphysically recoded as “the infinite.”
38 Cf. 95. “The death that we fear is embodied in us.”
every call to work through or reconcile with, let alone forget, the past: namely, Nazi destruction of trust in the world via “the rule of the antiman...expressly established as a principle” (31). Metaphysical “super-recognition” would thus be the wishful registration and repetition of historical non-recognition, the conducting of unappeasable plaints to God.

At issue here is not exclusively Holocaust trauma and its vicissitudes but the registration and refusal in the metaphysical image of death of contemporary conditions conducing to loss of trust in the world, especially but not exclusively among Palestinians, and of the urgent reflection and response they demand. Might “death itself” be a metaphysical overwriting, a bearing and concealing, of socially and historically variable exposure to the demographic, especially ethnic and religious, distribution of precarity? In particular, in the denial of its figurability (28) might “death” precisely figure, among other things, Arab abjection?

That death will suddenly and irrecoverably submerge life in insignificance (258, 52, 87-9), that its annihilating presence is active and felt beforehand, tormenting us with its ever-present onrush (87) and sapping the significance of life before its final coup de grâce, indeed that death is coextensive with matter itself, “a permanent presence that permeates our entire existence,” (257-8, 89) and that we have intuitive—psychologically unavoidable (234)—knowledge of these and other aspects of its intrinsic meaning (129), would seem to suggest that life itself tremulously bears the trauma of death, that life transpires amidst the traumatic insurgency of death, in short, that life is centrally and constitutively an encounter with the trauma of death. So much so that “We have to create illusions, fantasies, defenses, cultural symbols, and biases in perception, to provide us with a sense of meaning to soothe the anxiety of death” (225, paraphrasing Piven; see also 137).

Though given to malignant morbidity—e.g., “The time one has left to accomplish one’s aims is uncertain, and this fact enters every consideration, every expectation. These are not sporadic or isolated thoughts, but pertinacious, tormenting concerns” (87; also see 268)—Razinsky stops

---


40 In the words of Ecclesiastes, in the face of death “all is vanity and vexation of spirit” (Ecc. 1:9).

41 See 268, 273, 275-6. The metaphysical denigration of transient worldly existence in its totality, i.e., Razinsky’s thought of death as destructive of meaning altogether, is no less Christian (anti-Jewish) for being an inverted providentialism: the diabolic teleology in which material-political life, the “City of Man,” concludes inexorably, through its innermost tendency, in damnation/destitution, is recognizably Augustinian—though, because shorn of its dialectical relation to the “City of God,” distorted.
short of denying life significance altogether, and since “acknowledging, confronting, and coping with death” is necessary “to lend life content and make it worth living,” death must be pervasively acknowledged, confronted, and coped with (164). Razinsky’s criticism of the psychoanalytic tradition takes issue with its exceptionality and even then oscillating denial of death. So certain is Razinsky of the universally traumatogenic insistence of death that even his criticism of psychoanalysis refuses the thought that death can be actually, effectively denied. Psychoanalysis, he claims, is constituted as such by the denial of death, developed in order to deny death (104), and ill from its ongoing deflections of death (51), thus everywhere testifies to the traumatogenic incursion of death. Apparently, what death presses upon us we cannot avoid. “It enforces itself” (104). “Even if not present, it is nonetheless present, as absence, and influences the rest of psychic life. Death is the light, or rather the shadow that is cast over all other psychic entities” (89). It is “the void at the center of our entire mental life” (89). Death is auto-enforcing power of annihilation, inescapable source of torment, and when adequately engaged, condition for a meaningful life, even for vitalizing enhancement.42 Death and whatever traumatisms it bears, as well as whatever emboldening opportunities its authentic confrontation affords, are undeniable—can only be, as with Freud, denied (feebly). 43

This all rings false. That Razinsky cannot stop screaming from the mountaintops that death is undeniable and all-influential; that laying the accusation of death-denial at Freud’s feet makes little sense if Freud or psychoanalysis is not in some way exemplary; various hints about “superficial” forms of acknowledging death not being limited to psychoanalysis (104); and the sheer implausibility of Razinsky’s projection of death mania onto human life as such, all suggest that, in some way, Razinsky knows better. How can he not? Is not the onus probandi on he who would assert that death, in Razinsky’s amplified sense, plays any, let alone a major, role in psychic life? Especially with respect to regions of the world where death is routinely subject to institutional and geographical separation and neutralization—America has dedicated two whole states to this separation and neutralization: Florida and Arizona; walls and checkpoints keep death distant, though less effectively elsewhere—to mass media anesthetization and block out, and to stunning/numbing production as aesthetic spectacle, is

42 See 230-231.
43 The metaphysical ultra-meaning of death, no matter how existentially confounding or psychologically abrasive, redeems the nihilistic world as meaningful; it affirms what is as the inevitably adequate occasion for existential anguish and struggle. Yet in so grossly affirming whatever positivity as the ground of or springboard for allegorical ascent, something of the unredeemable pathos of the actual is registered: the nihilistic world comes into view as nihilistic in and as ongoing departures from it.
it plausible to claim that death is as captivating and disturbing, as grossly consuming, as Razinsky claims? To attempt to immediately turn the tables and claim that expulsion and aesthetic taboo are evidence of disturbance would be to precipitously discount the efficacy of these cultural institutions.

What prominent social institutions (aside from the military), what forms of routine social accomplishment require, or even allow, concern for death or death anxiety? (An open question: Has Israel’s “universal” drafting policy shaped Razinsky’s understanding of death?) Could contemporary social institutions bear anticipatorily retrospective, i.e., death-oriented, reflection? Is their barbarism not secured by propagandistically defusing and deflecting such reflection until, feeble and despised or patronized (either way, infantilized), those who endeavor to so reflect have little chance of pressing their insights into transformative social praxis, even were they inclined, in the face of powerful, internalized social prohibitions, to spoil the optimism of those they love and for whom, after all, it is not impossible that things could turn out better? Is death anxiety, when and where extant, sufficiently powerful to contend with trends toward the psychopharmacological alleviation of anxiety generally and the consequent dulling of reflection? With culture industrial bombardment, its dulling and manipulating of anxiety and inhibiting of reflection? Let alone with their combined neutralization of anxiety and reflection generally? Where has death not been crowded out, anxiety overtaken? The positing of death as inherent terror is hyperbolic protest against its unbearable, in part because all too bearable, normalization: metaphysical security against complacency, against the evisceration of experience, is itself complacent illusion—and adolescent fantasy.

In virtue of its prima facie implausibility, unevidenced assertion, and unlikely claim to psychoanalytic significance, might Razinsky’s insistence on the centrality, systematic significance, and inevitability of encounter with the traumatism of death suggest protest detached from its target and consequently distorted? Might Razinsky’s insistence on the “constitutive trauma” (that one is forced into such a contradictory expression is to the point) of death clamorously protest, i.e., register and refuse, a nexus of pressing problems having to do, broadly, with the fact that death is too easily mourned, evaded, ignored, that death is evident not traumatic? Might Razinsky’s vehement insistence on the necessity and self-enforcing significance of death trauma, his projection of such trauma onto

44 Cf. 258. “Death can intervene at any moment. It is always a possibility for us.”
45 “Because the individual actually no longer exists, death has become something wholly incommensurable, the annihilation of a nothing. He who dies realizes that he has been cheated of everything. And that is why death is so unbearable.” See T.W. Adorno, “Dying Today,” in Can One Live after Auschwitz? ed. by Rolf Tiedmann, and trans. by Rodney Livingstone, et al. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 460.
“metaphysical reality,” signal quasi-religious desperation (fear and hope) over the fact that death is too easily integrated, managed, distributed, and disregarded? That, for instance, divestment and reattachment proves unnervingly easy (it is the libidinal drive of late capitalism) and that anticipation of this corrupts attachment prior to its shattering (all relations are obsolete in advance); that the past does not fester, quickly becomes past, i.e., fades into the oblivion of ideological claims to progress or to the self-sufficiency of the present, or into a haze of induced forgetfulness; that loss is itself, as mutually dependent social institution and psychological capacity, lost, fueling and consumed by aggressive reattachment, e.g., ethno-religious nationalism, or by aggressively provisional, ruinous and so self-justifying strategic attachment; that we fail to suffer what we sense we must if our humanity and individuality are to be more than ideology. The conversion of the loss of loss — i.e., of the inability to sustain loss, to reflectively endure its powers of interruption — into the irrefusable power of trauma would seem wishful thinking. This would be the social truth of Razinsky’s metaphysical ineptitude.

That death and that with which this concept is freighted is not traumatic may well be behind Razinsky’s protests against the denial of death, his demands to recognize death, his desire to metaphysically secure the meaning of death against practice and history. Razinsky would have it that death is absolutely non-integratable (242). Might such authoritative assertion give voice to a demand, garbled and inhibited because pitched against reigning, internalized political-ideological forces that will certainly refuse it as unintelligible or disastrous, and mimetically assuming their projection of authoritative inevitability, perhaps then more a dream than a demand, that death, in its overwhelming obviousness, not be so smoothly integrated into familiar political-discursive practice, thus to anxiety that death is too well integrated, normalized? Perhaps such conversion of inhibited ethical-political voice into defensively inflated ontological assertion bespeaks a demand for death to be integrated — negotiated, lived, memorialized — otherwise, as well as fear that such a demand would likely be immediately dismissed, manipulated, or patronized. Trauma thus becomes a placeholder for blocked political possibility, perhaps a conduit for refused political responsibility. Or more precisely, it may be that what Razinsky struggles to avow, what lies behind his “death driven” metaphysical inclination and protesting consciousness, is that death and that with which the concept is freighted is

46 This consideration may be the least attended in the copious literature on Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia.”

47 Also, compulsive monogamy, workaholism.

and is not traumatic: 49 that death is overintegrated yet (thereby) on the cusp of oblivion, a perturbing unprocessed residue borne by, and perhaps fueling, its administrative overprocessing. The stale stench of platitude throughout Razinsky’s writing perhaps registers this grinding down of traumatism. 50 Not incidentally does Razinsky seem to plea at one point against learning to overcome irrational, perhaps infantile or childlike, dread of death: if death is denied in and through social rationalization, a dose of irrationality, of infantile helplessness, might seem like an antidote (227). Just as sexuality, or other figures of excess, have seemed like antidotes to those despairing over the want of clear and effective channels to protest reified social relations. This is juvenile regression. 51

That death has become normalized, “inauthentic everydayness” as opposed to enduring traumatic disruption, routinely abstracted into statistics and population management rather than “authentically encountered,” is what Razinsky refuses to know. But, to paraphrase Freud, neurotics hide their secrets in plain air, declare forthrightly and publicly, indeed clamor on and on about, what they refuse to know. 52 Razinsky’s death metaphysics and indictment of psychoanalysis are no doubt superficial and absurd, yet such surfaces teem with highly invested, contradictory content. What keeps such content unknown, perhaps, is unanalyzed authority. Razinsky’s existential psychology repeats Heidegger’s disastrous political-metaphysical juvenility. 53

49 Just as administered society and consciousness are and are not seamlessly integrated.
50 Just as his endless rehearsal of Hamlet perhaps registers its refusal.
51 Consider in this context Razinsky’s cryptic insinuations about our prospects for radical re-beginnings. If death radically eviscerates significance, turns all to dust and wipes it away, then we can, indeed must, start anew ex nihilo. Razinsky’s claims about the denial of death are themselves a denial of history, especially with respect to the spellbound character of the historical present. The “pretentions to profound human experience” forwarded by his “existential analytic” and all the more so by the existential adventurism he promotes are but sublimity amid the muck, false transcendence (Adorno, “Jargon of Authenticity,” in Can One Live after Auschwitz?) 165.
52 “Death operates precisely as a kind of unknown, an absurdity, a nothingness” (28-9). “Death loses its uniqueness, singularity, and importance … once … equivalence is firmly established, one starts to lose sight of what was so frightening about death in the first place” (226-7). What such refusal to know perhaps knows too well is that even death, the absolute master, is radically outmatched by the forces sustaining the barbarously rationalized historical present, in particular that such inertial forces remain inordinately powerful despite profiting no one (or nearly so) and harming all, and despite being nothing but the product of social labor. Soil contaminated by such all-pervasive toxicity is apt for but the growth of magical thinking.
53 Unsurprisingly, Razinsky takes religious hope seriously (223; see also 155-158): whether from the trauma of death or from the want of such trauma, “only a god can save us.” A great debt of appreciation is due to Anna Katsman and Roy Ben Shai for their extraordinarily thoughtful and challenging comments on an earlier draft of this essay. Katsman is an interlocutor beyond compare: gracious and agile in her following of somewhat circuitous lines of thought and remarkably deft in her ability to discern their substantial core. Ben Shai’s comments were so
References

Améry, Jean, At the Minds Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor of Auschwitz and its Realities (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980).
Horowitz, Gregg, Sustaining Loss: Art and Mournful Life (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002).
Levi, Primo, If This Is a Man (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2000).

provocative that nothing less than an independent treatment of their themes would in any way do justice to their profound insight and importance. I hope to take up these themes in a companion essay in the near future.
Jovito V. Cariño

I read Paolo Bolaños’ maiden major work, On Affirmation and Becoming: A Deleuzian Introduction to Nietzsche’s Ethics and Ontology with the felicity and pride shared by the rest of the UST Department of Philosophy for his singular feat of breaking through the world of foreign book publication. Fathering a book is no mean accomplishment and finding a foreigner for a mate adds to an already exceptional endeavor an extra layer of fulfillment. Bolaños’ achievement came at the heels of the department’s major publication hauls starting from Moses Angeles’ God Beyond Metaphysics in 2012, Jove Jim Aguas’ Person, Action and Love in 2014, and early this year, Robert Montaña’s Thomistic Ethics. We have yet to add to this list titles penned by the other members of the department, which will be soon off the press either this year or the next. Worthy of note as well is the recent CHED elevation to an A2 status of Kritike, the department’s official online journal, which is also under the editorship of Bolaños himself. All these undertakings are clear testament that research is alive in the Department of Philosophy and that there is more to it than the petri dish and microscope.

Bolaños’ first book, I should say, is a highly textual and an equally textured piece. By using the description textual, I am referring to the prodigious amount of research underlying the groundwork of his work. Its size in fact can be deceiving. We have always been warned against judging a book by its cover. The same caution is useful in reading Bolaños; one definitely should be careful not to be taken in by the appearance of its handy size. The book in fact packs a punch and is doubtless equal to the task of propounding the “greatest weight” that Nietzsche spoke of when he described the immanence of eternal recurrence.

Nietzsche is an extremely popular thinker and against his wishes, he has become a fashionable philosophical figure, so fashionable that he has

been a constant favorite for name-dropping even by those who can hardly
spell his name let alone read him. Bolaños, however, is not addressing his
book to this crowd but to scholars who thought they’ve got Nietzsche all
figured out or whose interpretations have brought Nietzsche too far afield
from the testimonies of his texts. At the outset, one might be tempted to view
Bolaños’ project as a mere updating or rehabilitation of Nietzsche. This
manner of reading however runs counter to Bolaños’ intentions and can only
be supposed by someone who reads him or Nietzsche erroneously.

Of course, misreading is a possibility which Nietzsche shares with
practically all philosophers especially those of the same celebrated status as
his. The task of a scholar, however, as Bolaños knows fully well, is not to
insulate the kernel ideas of this philosopher but to expose them to critical
engagement. Thus, when I noted earlier that Bolaños’ work is highly textual,
I had in mind his exceptional textual ability, that is, his intimate knowledge
of the lay of the land. His keen and synthetic perception allowed him to move
with dexterity in and out, up and down, back and front Nietzsche’s texts.
Rather than taking the route of conventional exegesis, the kind that treats text
as sacrosanct and immovable, Bolaños adopted Deleuze’s rhizomic
hermeneutics or what he called “creative experimentation,” so as to activate,
following Delueze’s lead “the potentialities of the text and the creativity of
the reader.” The result of this Nietzsche-Deleuze fusion is a veritable
philosophical anthropology, which in true Nietzschean fashion is both timely
and untimely. That Nietzsche’s philosophy can evince a philosophical
anthropology is no longer a secret to the well-read, Nietzscheans and non-
Nietzscheans alike. But those who have yet to see Nietzsche beyond his God-
is-dead pronouncement may find in Bolaños’ work a pleasant surprise that
will cast Nietzsche, his vocabulary and the grammar of his philosophical
project in a different light, unless of course they have made up their minds
that Nietzsche indeed is the anti-Christ. This explains my earlier description
of the book as textured. By textured I mean nuanced, intense, daring, and
cognizant of the complexity of the matter without getting mired in its
complications. As pointed out earlier, Bolaños made this possible by grafting
Nietzsche on Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence and difference. His
is a book that reads Nietzsche through the eyes of Deleuze and vice versa.
Readers, therefore, are in for a double treat when they begin digging in
between the book’s slim covers; on one hand they get a re-education on
Nietzsche and on the other, they acquire an introduction on Deleuze. While
the language and style of writing of the two philosophers, being both edgy
and uncompromising, can sometimes intimidate many, the efforts to linger
and to pierce through the layers of their stylistic expressions will not certainly
go unrewarded. Besides, readers can find relief in Bolaños’ fluid prose.
Lucidity of thought and writing style are a rare combination among doers of
philosophy. To the readers’ advantage, this is a gift that Bolaños generously dispensed in his book, page after page. His way with words helps cushion the impact of a dizzying encounter with concepts and notions, which though garbed in English remain as foreign and cryptic. It should be noted though that the idea to juxtapose Nietzsche with Deleuze is not Bolaños’ own. The origin of such project was no less than Deleuze himself who, in his work *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, attempted to re-appropriate Nietzsche via his philosophy of immanence and difference. What is it in Nietzsche that requires re-statement? What more prestige or new intensity can a thinker like Deleuze add to his long-established legacy? Deleuze offered his answer to these questions in another work authored with Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* Quoting Nietzsche himself, Deleuze wrote: “[Philosophers] must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them convincing. Hitherto one has generally trusted one’s concepts as if they were a wonderful dowry from some sort of wonderland,’ but trust must be replaced by distrust, and philosophers must distrust most those concepts they did not create themselves.” Further in the book, Deleuze punctuated this point more pointedly when he said: “What is the best way to follow the great philosophers? Is it to repeat what they said or to do what they did, that is, create concepts for problems that necessarily change?”

In engaging Nietzsche, therefore, Deleuze certainly was not offering himself merely as his mouthpiece but, as indicated earlier, as an exponent of creative experimentation that can bring Nietzschean discourse beyond the nostalgia of hermeneutics or the pessimism of deconstruction. More important than the concepts’ definition, for Deleuze, is their function. The creative experimentation he was proposing, as noted by Bolaños, was meant to make “Nietzsche’s ideas work. Nietzsche’s ideas become alive because they are put to use, thus restoring their very philosophic dignity.”

Bolaños’ work is evidently suffused with the same philosophic anima. He too believes in the creative possibilities of reading and the functional potentials of the text. But in toeing the same Deleuzean line, he also runs the risk of being read as merely doing the repetition of the same or performing an exercise of eternal recurrence. Bolaños was aware of this pitfall; hence, at the very outset, he recognized his conceptual debt to Deleuze as he delineated the main premise of his book, that is, Nietzsche’s critique of nihilism. His project he said was in no way an attempt to replicate what Deleuze did for Nietzsche nor did it aspire to map out the philosophic nexus between the two. “On Affirmation and Becoming,” the ethics and ontology of Nietzsche interpreted via Deleuze, speaks of a much more modest promise even if the term “modest” might not accurately represent the amount of difficulty required by writing a book, specifically, writing a book with the
aforementioned theme. Bolaños’ work makes for a compelling read precisely because the culture of nihilism which Nietzsche himself has sought to overcome remains as pervasive and as rampant to this day. It has undermined our institutions, damaged our cultures, divided our families and blurred our own appreciation of our humanity. One knows the clutches of nihilism remain upon us because God has died a thousand deaths in our hands and we continue to have the gall to call ourselves godly. Is ethics then possible without religion? Can we affirm our humanity and become humane without invoking transcendence or eternal values? This is a problem that haunted philosophers like Nietzsche and Deleuze all the way back to Plato as he articulated the same question in his dialogue *Euthyphro*. Bolaños’ answer to this dilemma is a resounding yes. His concluding admonition is a clarion call for us to think differently or at least to consider anew whether or not we are ascending or descending in our becoming human. But given the textured character of his work, I take his position not as an outright exclusion of religion from human affairs but an emphatic affirmation of the inherent value of our humanity and an honest indignation against a reactive mode of thinking that constantly pulls us away from fulfilling our best potentials. In a country like our own, where life is a daily struggle against the pernicious outcomes of eternal recurrence—the same cycle of mediocrity, the same oppressive politics and policies, the same mindless politicians and policymakers—Bolaños’ book could definitely be a timely and untimely intervention. The constancy of nihilistic state of things and the therapy provided by philosophy that Bolaños articulated in his book are actually the best arguments why there should be more philosophy in the university as there should be more philosophical researches. For while it is debatable whether or not philosophy can the change the world, it surely has the power to move and sway the minds of those who can. Theirs is the will-to-power that will make the difference.

Department of Philosophy, University of Santo Tomas, Philippines
Submissions

Please Read Carefully

A. What do we publish?

We are interested in publishing articles, review articles, book reviews, and creative works across the whole range of philosophical topics, but with special emphasis on the following subject strands:

- Filipino Philosophy
- Oriental Thought and East-West Comparative Philosophy
- Continental European Philosophy
- Anglo-American Philosophy

The journal primarily caters to works by professional philosophers and graduate students of philosophy, but welcomes contributions from other fields (literature, cultural studies, gender studies, political science, sociology, history, anthropology, economics, inter alia) with strong philosophical content.

B. How long should a submission be?

- Article (8,000 words or less)
- Review Article (8,000 words or less)
- Book Review (2,500 words or less)
- Creative Works (short philosophical fictions, poems, etc.)

C. When should you submit your work?

Because of the sheer number of unsolicited submissions we receive everyday, submission management has become a challenge for us. This often results in the piling-up of submissions, the breakdown of the online submission tool, and, at times, unacknowledged submissions. Therefore, we have devised a scheme to help us manage unsolicited submissions.

- Submissions for the June issue will be entertained ONLY during the January-February period (March-May for the refereeing process)
- Submissions for the December issue will be entertained ONLY during the July-August period (September-November for the refereeing process)

Specific Submission Guidelines

1. Submissions may be in either English or Filipino with good punctuation, grammar, and spelling. Provide a 200 word abstract in English and at least 4 key words. Please take note of the number of the acceptable word count for your submission (see Section B above).

2. KRITIKE is a refereed journal, so make sure that your text is prepared for blind review, meaning your name and institutional affiliation should not appear in the body of your paper. If you cited your own previous work(s) in the article, delete your name from the citation(s).

3. We recommend that, at the first instance, you use our prescribed citation style. You may also use the Chicago style which resembles our own. Click here [http://kritike.org/kritike-style-guide.html] to visit the journal's style guide page.

4. Submit your text in 2.0 line spacing with 12 points font size. Quotations exceeding four lines should be indented and single-spaced.

5. Save your paper as either a Rich Text Format file (*.rtf) or a Microsoft Word document (*.doc or *.docx).

6. We recommend that you submit your paper by filling in the online submission tool at the right column of the submissions page [http://kritike.org/submissions.html] for a more systematic and efficient submission process.

7. We have amended our submission management policy (see Section C above). Submissions entered through the online submission tool outside the specified periods in Section C will not be considered. We recommend that you resubmit your work during a specific submission period.

8. By sending us your submission, you agree to be bound to the Terms and Conditions set in Section C of the journal's Publication Ethics and Publication Malpractice Statement.
KRITIKE is committed to meet the highest ethical standards in research and academic publication. The journal is guided by the following principles:

A. Responsibilities of the Editorial Board

The Editorial Board ensures that manuscripts are prepared for blind peer-review. It is the responsibility of the Editorial Board to accept, reject, or recommend a manuscript for revision and resubmission. Such decision is based, to a large extent, on the recommendations of nominated experts who act as referees. It is the responsibility of the Editorial Board to inform an author about the status of his/her submission, regardless of the decision. The Editorial Board may choose to reject a paper that violates legal provisions on libel, copyrights, and originality (plagiarism). Information regarding a manuscript under review must remain confidential until it is finally accepted for publication. The Editorial Board does not necessarily endorse the views expressed in the articles published in the journal. As an Open Access journal in the Gold category, KRITIKE does not charge any fees to complete the publication process. No charges are levied against the authors or users for submission or article processing.

B. Responsibilities of the Referee

The referees nominated by KRITIKE’s Editorial Board are experts in their areas of specialization. The referees assist the Editorial Board’s decision to accept, reject, or revise and resubmit manuscripts based on their objective assessments and recommendations. A referee must treat an assigned manuscript with utmost confidentiality during the peer review process; however, it is the responsibility of the referee to inform the Editorial Board when a legal violation by the author is suspected. The evaluation of a manuscript should be based solely on its academic merit and not on race, gender, sexuality, or religious and/or political orientation of the author.

C. Responsibilities of the Author

It is the responsibility of the author to prepare his/her manuscript for blind review. The author must ensure that his/her work is original and not plagiarized. The sources used in the manuscript should be properly cited. An author must not submit the same manuscript to another journal when it is currently under review by KRITIKE. It is the responsibility of an author to inform the Editorial Board right away if his/her manuscript is being considered in another journal or publication medium; in such case, KRITIKE will discontinue the review of the manuscript. If an author’s manuscript is published by KRITIKE, he/she must adhere to the provisions set in the Copyrights section of the journal.
Contact Us

If you wish to send us your feedback, general questions about the journal, questions about article submissions, theme suggestions for future issues, or word of intention to be a peer-reviewer or referee, send a message to kritike.editor@gmail.com.

If you wish to be a peer-reviewer or referee, do send us your complete name, e-mail address, institutional affiliation, position, and area of expertise via e-mail (include subject heading: reviewer). If you have any suggestions for specific themes (e.g., "European Philosophy and the Filipino Mind" or "Is there such thing as Filipino Philosophy?") for future issues of the journal, send them via (include subject heading: theme).

Please note that unsolicited submissions should be sent through the journal's Article Submission Tool.

You can also contact us via snail mail:

KRITIKE

c/o Dr. Paolo A. Bolaños
Department of Philosophy
Room 109 Main Building
University of Santo Tomas
España, Manila 1015
Philippines